

Group implication and welfare state politics

Seminar presentation

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
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Project theme


Global pattern: heterogeneity → less redistribution



Source: Alesina et al. (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2004)

Note top-left cluster of homogeneous, highly redistributive, 'universal' welfare states

... yet welfare states are increasingly fractionalized:



Source: Statistics Denmark, table FOLK2


Does this imply a weaker foundation for redistribution? By which mechanism?

Project theme


General idea in group implication theory:

- Policy attitudes are formed through *analogical reasoning* based on *cognitive schemas about groups*.
- Hence, opinion can be shaped by *framing issues* in ways structurally analogous to existing group schema

Canonical example: US media portray welfare recipients as 'symbolically black', i.e. in ways congruent with black stereotypes; likely contributes to low support for welfare spending among whites.



Source: Gilens (1996)



Source: ANES

Theoretical implication: policies in other societies could become subject to group implication.


Project theme

Other theorists argue that group implication is conditional on liberal welfare regimes that rely on means-tested delivery:

“Welfare delivery systems that highlight differences, that single out ‘deserving’ from ‘undeserving,’ (...) sensitize citizens to the ‘other’ much more than when services are organized in a universal fashion.” (Crepaz and Damron, 2008, p. 446)

Theoretical implication: policies in universal welfare regimes largely *immune* to group implication.

Supporting evidence: some measures of welfare chauvinism are significantly lower in universal regimes.



Source: Crepaz and Damron (2008), ISSP 2003

Case: Scandinavian Euro referendums

Denmark's 2000 euro referendum: Danish People's Party campaign framed the euro as analogous to immigration:



- (a) "Keep the krone - vote Danish!"
 (b) "Should us Danes rule in Denmark?"
 (c) "For the krone and the fatherland"

Danish People's Party flyer during the 2000 Euro referendum.

Bille (2001) "[Appeals] from the 'no' side to the general conservative and nationalistic sentiments of the voters (...)"

Sweden's 2003 euro referendum: no equivalent of Danish People's Party; 'no' campaign mostly leftist.

Widfeldt (2004): "The campaign centred on two main themes: **economy and influence** (...) The 'No' side argued that there is no clear relationship between economic performance and membership in the eurozone"

→ Economic issues dominated both debates, but additional nationalistic themes largely exclusive to Denmark

Case: Scandinavian Euro referendums

Recall that group implication works through establishing *analogies*:

- “Welfare recipients \simeq black people” \rightarrow Opinion about proper level of spending on welfare (Gilens, 1996)
- “Saddam Hussein \simeq Hitler” \rightarrow Opinion about Iraq War (Spellman and Holyoak, 1992)
- “Health care reform \simeq ‘Obamacare’ ” \rightarrow Opinion about government provision of health care (Tesler, 2012)


Is it possible the Danish euro campaign ‘implicated’ immigration attitudes? E.g.,

- “The euro \simeq immigration” \rightarrow vote on euro adoption


Case: Scandinavian Euro referendums

Consistent with a model of group implication moderated by elite cue-taking, anti-immigration attitudes predict voting against euro adoption, but only among Danish right-wing voters:

Left wing voters



Right wing voters



(a) Denmark

(b) Sweden

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Appendix

Q: How are anti-immigration attitudes measured?

Denmark

“Islam er en trussel mod dansk kultur”
[“Islam is a threat against Danish culture”]

5-point Likert scale

Sweden


“Satsa på ett mångkulturellt samhälle med stor tolerans gentemot människor från andra länder med andra religioner och levnadssätt?”
[“Aim for a multi-cultural society with great tolerance towards people from other countries with different religions and ways of life?”]

10-point Likert-like scale


Full model controls for: left/right self-placement, index of economic attitudes, index of ‘values’ attitudes, education, age, gender, household income

Appendix

Q: What are the non-interacted effects of anti-immigration attitudes?



(a) Denmark



(b) Sweden

Appendix

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.09)	−0.48 (0.49)	−1.40** (0.58)	−1.57*** (0.59)
Cultural threat	−1.12*** (0.14)	−0.99*** (0.16)	−0.97*** (0.19)	−0.36 (0.27)
Right-wing party voter	0.88*** (0.11)	0.78*** (0.11)	0.17 (0.16)	0.71*** (0.23)
Threat × Party				−1.05*** (0.33)
Self-placement			0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Economic ideology			1.46*** (0.23)	1.42*** (0.23)
Values ideology			−0.60* (0.35)	−0.77** (0.36)
Dem. controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	2321.74	2070.04	1774.75	1766.76
BIC	2338.14	2113.25	1832.86	1830.15
Log Likelihood	−1157.87	−1027.02	−876.37	−871.38
Deviance	2315.74	2054.04	1752.75	1742.76
Num. obs.	1752	1639	1455	1455

Appendix

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	−0.25* (0.14)	−1.41** (0.68)	−3.72*** (0.91)	−3.62*** (0.91)
Cultural threat	−0.71** (0.31)	−0.60* (0.33)	−0.43 (0.40)	−0.72 (0.45)
Right-wing party voter	1.49*** (0.17)	1.24*** (0.19)	0.66*** (0.23)	0.23 (0.38)
Threat x Party				1.12 (0.79)
Self-placement			0.19*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
Economic ideology			3.46*** (0.97)	3.52*** (0.97)
Values ideology			−1.02 (0.66)	−1.05 (0.67)
Dem. controls	No	Yes	Yes	
AIC	981.10	917.77	837.28	837.23
BIC	995.02	954.66	887.36	891.87
Log Likelihood	−487.55	−450.89	−407.64	−406.62
Deviance	975.10	901.77	815.28	813.23
Num. obs.	766	743	701	701


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Appendix

Q: Do the results merely reflect larger Danish sample size?

A: Cannot be ruled out for the main effect. But the coefficient for right-wing voters does *not* reflect sample size:



T-statistics of coefficients of interests with $N = 700$ subsamples of Danish data, compared to coefficients in Swedish data (blue line)

Appendix

Q: Was there no negative, symbolic campaigning in Sweden?

A: There was, but not (implicitly or explicitly) nationalistic. Sweden's 'no' campaign, mostly leftist, focused on distributive effects of monetary union:



"EMU and solidarity". Green Youth poster, Swedish euro referendum.