Foreign money: Group implication and support for euro adoption

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Abstract

Prevailing theories about political cognition emphasize the potential role of group identity in shaping political attitudes. The theory of group implication specifices the ways in which we sould expect rhetoric to be able to link group stereotypes to policy attitudes. Yet while theoretically based on general features of human cognition, empirical studies of group implication forcus nearly exclusively on racialized political attitudes in the United States. This leaves the generality of the phenomenon unsettled.

This paper argues that group implication observed among American voters – and by extension racialization – are in fact local instantiations of a general phenomenon, applicable in a variety of political and institutional contexts. As a demonstration of the traveling power of group implication, the paper argues that during the 2000 referendum on euro adoption in Denmark, nationalistic campaign messages caused some voters to understand the issue of euro adoption as a question of (ethnic) group identity. The case is contrasted with neighboring Sweden's 2003 referendum, in which identity cues were largely absent.

Empirical support for the argument is provided through a study of open-ended responses in two nationally representative surveys. Consistent with expectations, identity-based voting was significantly more prevalent among Danish voters and only there concentrated among those high in ethnic prejudice and low in political engagement. The results suggest that group implication can occur in contexts vastly different from its original site of discovery.

1 Introduction

Arriving at opinions on political issues is a civic norm for members of democratic societies, yet for most citizens it is one fraught with ambiguity, lack of motivation and insufficient factual knowledge. The task is complicated by the fact that on many issues, not only is it disputable what the right position is; it is unclear what the issue is really about. The literature on political issue framing convincingly shows that frames broadly construed can affect public opinion in powerful ways (Schattschneider, 1960; Riker, 1986; Chong and Druckman, 2007). Yet for rhetorical framings of issues, what Chong and Druckman (2007) label "frames in communication", to shape citizens' reasoning about issues, i.e. "frames in thought", they need to resonate with citizens' existing predispositions.

A long-running but recently reinvigorated strand of framing research examines the power of frames that appeal to *group identities* (Nelson and Kinder, 1996; Winter, 2008; Sides, 2013). By appealing to identities, group cues can short-circuit voters' systems of higher-order information processing; they allow voters to substitute a 'hard' issue for an 'easy' one (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Kahneman, 2011). Winter (2008) formulates the theory of *group implication* as a general model of how policies can come to be implicitly associated with group identities.

However, demonstrations of group implication outside the United States are few and far between. In the absence of evidence outside of its original context, it remains unclear whether it is a phenomenon specific to the United States' politico-historical context. On a theoretical level, this would be at odds with the idea of group implication being rooted in social identity as a fundamental category of political cognition. On an empirical level, it is difficult to reconcile with the fact that group-based conflict is a recurrent feature of human societies throughout recorded history (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001).

There is, in other words, a tension between the generality of the theoretically posited mechanism driving group implication and the particularity of the cases in which it has been shown. In fact, empirical evidence is not only largely limited to American politics, it is also dominated by a particular type of identity, namely race. A special case of group-based cognition, racialization, is the focus of a substantial body of work linking racial identity to policy attitudes about welfare (Gilens, 1996; DeSante, 2013), crime (Peffley et al., 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz, 2002), and health care (Tesler, 2012; Banks, 2013). Yet in the in the absence of evidence of group implication-like issue dynamics outside American politics, it remains unclear whether the psychological process of racialization is indeed as potentially general as its theoretical underpinnings suggest. This leaves unsettled whether scholars of American politics should conceptualize racialization as a historically unique phenomenon or a local instance of a general feature of social and

political cognition.

Building on previous theoretical work, this paper argues that group implication – and, accordingly, racialization – are indeed general phenomena, not necessarily confined to the United States. As evidence supporting this posited generality, I present evidence of a group implication dynamic in a context far removed from its original site of discovery – both in terms of geography, dimension of group conflict and type of political issue.

Specifically, the evidence suggests that in Denmark's 2000 referendum on euro adoption, nationalistic cues in the campaign environment caused Danish voters to partly base their support for euro adoption on their attitude towards immigrants, a politically salient ethnic outgroup. In order to bolster the claim that the nationalistic cues in the campaign environment affected voter cognition, I use Sweden's 2003 referendum on the same issue – a campaign in which such cues were largely absent – as a control case.

Despite playing out a vastly different context, the nationalistic rhetoric group implicated the euro adoption issue, analogically to how racialized rhetoric has group implicated the issue of welfare in American public opinion. The implication is that policies in a variety of geographical and political contexts are potentially susceptible to group implication.

2 Theory

The core of my theoretical argument is that group implication connects Americans' views on welfare with their attitudes about race *and* similarly connected Danish voters' stance on euro adoption with their attitudes about immigration during the 2000 referendum.

Even so, unmistakable differences remain between the two cases, most notably that the ingroup-outgroup distinctions as well as the policy issues are very different. In fact, the inferential power of the argument rests precisely on the notion that the same process can be identified across vastly different issues and contexts. This section argues why, these differences notwithstanding, both cases can be understood as instances of group implication.

2.1 Group implication theory, racialization and intereth-nic conflict

A recent theoretical development, *group implication theory* (Winter, 2008), provides a conceptually stylized account of how out-group prejudice combined with issue frames that cue group identities can cause voters to understand policy issues in terms of their group attitudes. In the most general sense, group implication is "the process through which ideas about social groups (...) can be applied to political issues that do not

involve [them] directly" (Winter, 2008, p. 19). The theory is thus essentially one of framing, though of a specific type of framing effect: the effect of implicitly framing policies so as to be structurally similar to widely shared cognitive schema about group relations, leading voters to draw analogies between the two.

Group implication theory is based on the literature on racialized welfare attitudes (Sears et al., 1979, 1997). In a seminal study in this tradition, Gilens (1996) shows that the extent to which respondents agree with the notion "blacks are lazy" is a stronger statistical predictor of their support for welfare than other, supposedly likelier explanatory variables such as economic self-interest, ideological commitment to individualism, or views about the poor in general. Recent experimental evidence has convincingly demonstrated the causal impact of symbolic racism on welfare attitudes among American voters (Gilens, 1996; Banks and Valentino, 2012; DeSante, 2013).

Yet while relevant to American politics, this specific type of racialization is unlikely to occur in European welfare states, for the simple reason that these countries do not have a racial minority with the political significance of African-Americans in the United States. However, they do have an *ethnic* minority group subject to prejudice and whose rights and obligations are a matter of intense, highly salient political contestation, namely non-Western immigrants, a minority whose size as a share of native populations has increased dramatically in recent decades (Zick et al., 2008).

This difference in the political context of intergroup relations across the two cases makes the comparison well-suited for testing the traveling power of racialized politics. If similar patterns of voter cognition can be found across otherwise very different cases of intergroup relations, racialization is more likely to be a local instance of a universal phenomenon of group-based cognition rather than a *sui generis* phenomenon unique to American politics and society.

2.2 Group implication of the issue of euro adoption

By construing racialization of welfare as a special case of a general phenomenon, group implication theory subsumes racialization as just one particular instantiation of the potential implicit linkage of group schema to issue frames. Table 1 (middle column) summarizes the argument with respect to the cases of welfare in the United States and euro adoption in Denmark.

Notably, the feature driving the implicit association in the United States is that the notion of *unjust rewards* inherent to public debate over welfare is symbolically associated with a dominant group attitude, *racial resentment*. Group implication of welfare gains cognitive potency when the policy is framed in a way that accentuates this structural analogy (Sears et al., 2000; Winter, 2008). The cornerstone of racial resentment is the notion that policies such as affirmative action, school busing, or welfare violate

	United States	**Denmark**
Group attitude	Racial resentment	Ethnic prejudice
In-group	White Americans	Native Danes
Out-group	African-Americans	Immigrants
In-group stereotype	Hard-working	Familiar, reliable
Out-group stereotype	Lazy	Foreign, threatening
Potentially implicated policy	Welfare	Adoption of the euro
Analogous policy feature	Unjust rewards	Intrusion

Table 1: Structure of group and policy schema in United States and Denmark. Extension of Winter (2008).

cherished American values by rewarding race and neglecting the values of individualism and hard work (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Yet given the historically particular role of race in American politics and society, there is no reason to expect racial resentment to define intergroup relations in European welfare states. Instead, a conceptualization of group attitudes should be sufficiently sensitive to the context of interethnic relations in contemporary Europe (Zick et al., 2008).

Toward this end, I conceptualize *ethnic prejudice* as the key group attitude used in this study. The concept builds on Allport's (1954) canonical definition of prejudice as "antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization", a definition which neatly encompasses both the cognitive and affective dimensions of prejudice. Using the concept of ethnic prejudice resolves the awkwardness of speaking of racial attitudes in a context where intergroup relations are ethnic rather than racial. Nevertheless, racial resentment and ethnic prejudice should be understood as merely localized expressions of the same basic phenomenon of intergroup hostility. This is supported by the fact that the two are in important ways empirically similar: for example, both measures contain classical as well as modern, subtler components (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Kinder and Sanders, 1996).

Ethnic prejudice is related to the concept of *ethnocentrism*, succinctly described by Kinder and Kam (2009):

> "[e]thnocentrism is a mental habit. It is a predisposition to divide the human world into in-groups and out-groups. (...) *Symbols and practices become objects of attachment and pride* when they belong to the in-group and objects of condescension (...) when they belong to out-groups." (p. 8, emphasis added)

Ethnocentrism can be conceptually distinguished from ethnic prejudice in that eth-

nocentrism is a dual concept, encompassing both in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, attitudes which are analytically distinct and empirically almost entirely uncorrelated (Brewer, 2007; Kinder and Kam, 2009). While this study uses measures of ethnic prejudice, it draws theoretically on the quoted prediction that symbols and practices can become symbolically associated with an in-group identity. If a policy can be symbolically framed in terms of out-group intrusion and a threat to objects of in-group attachment, it is likely to be susceptible to group implication in contexts where group identities are politically salient.

Because the issue of euro adoption can be understood as a matter of the intrusion of something foreign (i.e., the euro) threatening an object of symbolic in-group attachment (i.e., the Danish *krone*), euro adoption has the potential to be implicitly linked to ethnic group schema. The logic goes as follows:

Political entrepreneurs who oppose joining the euro can campaign against it by strategically framing the euro as a foreign *intrusion*. This framing makes the issue schematically analogous to a group relation many voters find very pertinent: that of native Danes and immigrants, which similarly involves an elite-driven, foreign intrusion into a familiar experience. This is likely to be a resonant frame: qualitative studies find that metaphorical representations of immigration in Europe are typically spatially structured around outside-inside distinctions (Charteris-Black, 2006).

As a consequence, voters struggling to make sense of the complex issue of whether Denmark should join the eurozone are likely to adopt the emotionally resonant frame as a cognitive heuristic. Voters receptive to the frame should come to symbolically associate the euro with the threatening intrusion of something foreign into a familiar realm. The rightmost column of table 1 (above) summarizes the argument and its constituent parts.

3 Case: the Danish and Swedish euro referendums

There is, in other words, a causal claim at the heart of my argument: owing to analogous policy features between immigration and euro adoption, Danish voters developed an attitude toward the latter based on their existing attitude toward the former. However, in order to assess whether group identity-based voting occurred to a significant extent, I need a reasonable baseline with which to compare the Danish case. To this end, I use Sweden's 2003 euro referendum as a control case. In other words, the research design is effectively a *most similar design* (MSD) comparative case study (Przeworski and Teune, 1970).

Here, I exploit a specific difference between the two: the fact that nationalistic

themes were prevalent in the 2000 Danish campaign, and much less so in Sweden's 2003 campaign. In other words, the design assumes that the Swedish campaign is a reasonable counterfactual to the Danish case with respect to the prevalence of nationalistic campaign messages.

This difference is borne out by contemporary accounts of the two campaigns. For example, in his retelling of the Danish referendum campaign, Bille (2001) mentions that while economic considerations dominated the debate, "appeals from the 'no' side to the general conservative and nationalistic sentiments of the voters gained ground during the campaign" (p. 287).

Campaign materials from the Danish referendum provide additional, direct evidence of messaging linking the euro with the issue of immigration. Figure 1 shows three pages from a campaign booklet by the Danish People's Party. With taglines such as "Should we Danes make the decisions in Denmark?", the campaign messages frame the euro issue in a way strongly evocative of the immigration issue. Similarly, the tagline "Danish welfare is theatened when the floodgates between countries are opened" specifically evokes the metaphor of intrusion.

(a) "Keep the krone - vote Danish!"

(b) "Should we Danes make the decisions in Denmark?"

(c) "Danish welfare is theatened when the floodgates between countries are opened"

(d) "For the krone and the fatherland"

Figure 1: Danish People's Party flyer during the 2000 euro referendum.

In contrast, contemporary accounts of the Swedish campaign mention no campaign appeals to Swedish voters' sense of national identity. Widfeldt (2004), in his retelling of the campaign, explains that

> "[t]he campaign centred on two main themes: economy and influence. On the former theme, the 'Yes' side claimed that the euro would have positive effects for business and employment. (...) The 'No' side argued that there is no clear relationship between economic performance and membership in

> the eurozone (...). On the influence/democracy theme, the 'Yes' side used the slogan 'Should we be part or stay outside?' (...). The 'No' side criticised the European Central Bank (ECB) for a lack of openness and democratic accountability (...)" (Widfeldt, 2004, p. 1146)

In other words, economic and political considerations dominated the Swedish campaign. The reason for the difference in campaign environments is quite straightforward: In 2003, Sweden had no established equivalent to the Danish People's Party, which largely drove the nationalistic messaging in the Danish campaign. In other words, party system dynamics produced significantly different issue environments across the two countries, with national identity being a relatively salient issue in Denmark and largely absent in Sweden.

The contrast identified in contemporary accounts is corroborated by data on election agendas. Figure 2 shows the share of party manifestos devoted to national identity issues based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens, 2013). CMP data codes the attention parties devote to issues by coding the number of 'quasi-sentences' across 56 categories. Figure 2 shows the average share of quasi-sentences parties devote to the categories "National Way of Life" or "Multiculturalism", which arguably reflect political concerns about national identity.



Figure 2: Average share of uncoded quasi(sentences) in party manifestos devoted to "national way of life" or "multiculturalism" by party in Denmark and Sweden, 1981-2011. Both positive and negative sentences are included. Dashed lines show euro referendum years.

As the figure shows, national identity issues emerge on the party agenda in Denmark around the mid-1990's and comprise a substantial share of party manifestos since then, with a noticeable peak in 2001. In contrast, the issue is essentially absent from the Swedish agenda, albeit with a slight uptick in the late 2000's, too late to affect the agenda for the 2003 referendum.

Explaining this difference in national agendas in turn is far beyond the scope of this study, but other studies attribute the difference to differing strategic incentives for issue-competing center-right parties (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). In the case of the euro referendums, one specific reason deserves mention: for Sweden, adopting the euro would have entailed switching from a floating to a fixed exchange-rate regime. This policy feature itself contributed to economic concerns dominating the campaign agenda (Jupille and Leblang, 2007).

Employing comparative case study designs using Denmark and Sweden is by no means a novel idea (see, e.g., Swenson, 1991; Iversen, 1996; Daugbjerg, 1998; Jupille and Leblang, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm, 2008). Studies comparing the two countries point to a host of obvious commonalities – both are relatively small, historically homogeneous, universal welfare states with multi-party, parliamentary systems of government – though the validity of the MSD boils down to one crucial assumption: absent the treatment in question, the observed outcomes in the two countries would be similar.

A number of scholars have also compared the Danish and Swedish euro referendums specifically, often emphasizing the fact that not only are the cases largely comparable, they constitute the only two known instances in which the question of abandonment of a national currency has been decided by popular vote (Jonung, 2004; Hobolt, 2007; Jupille and Leblang, 2007).

In a particularly relevant study, Jupille and Leblang (2007) argue that the fact that Sweden's referendum implied not just the abandonment of the national currency but also the country's floating exchange rate regime meant that in Sweden as compared to Denmark, "calculation" concerns loomed relatively larger than "community" concerns.

While finding no flaw in the argument, this study improves on Jupille and Leblang (2007) and similar studies in two distinct ways. First, by theorizing identity-based voting as a case of group implication, this study presents a theoretically specific account of a phenomenon normally defined in very broad terms. For example, Jupille and Leblang (2007) define "community concerns" as "attitudes toward the transfer of policy-making authority from the national to the supranational level" – a definition which encompasses both purely identity-based concerns and principled political beliefs about the proper delegation of power. The theoretical framework presented here accounts for how and why specifically group identity, as distinct from principled political concerns, can shape voters' thinking about euro adoption.

Second, and in extension hereof, this study uses a novel empirical approach to characterize the causal drivers of vote choice. Adopting a standard approach in survey research, Jupille and Leblang (2007) construct a regression model of attitudes toward euro adoption and EU membership and compare the size and significance of

various attitude items used as predictors. Before the proliferation of experimental designs in political science, this approach also dominated the debate over racialized welfare attitudes (e.g. Sidanius et al., 1996; Sears et al., 1997). However, this 'variable competition' approach is inevitably challenged by the fact that the causal order of attitudinal variables is unknowable from observational data. Hence, any given set of other attitudinal items used as controls risks either producing omitted variable bias or controlling for post-treatment variables. This study eschews the problem by using voters' open-ended explanations for their vote as its dependent variable. While not without its own challenges, this approach has the virtue of being able to observe voters' stated motivations directly rather than inferring them from their attitudinal correlates.

3.1 Hypotheses

If attitudes toward adoption of the euro can be group implicated, evidence of such a dynamic should be stronger in the Danish referendum compared to Sweden, given the prevalence of identity cues in the Danish campaign. In other words, we should expect some portion of Danish voters to base their vote choice on group identity, and significantly fewer Swedish voters to do so. The main hypothesis of this study, then, is that *compared to Swedish voters, Danish voters' stated reasons for their vote choice more often reflect identity concerns.*

For now, this hypothesis sidesteps the issue of how to observe voters' motivations, discussed in section 4.2 below. Still, a mere comparison of levels of identity-based voting does not close the case for group implication. By exploring which voters were more likely to vote based on their identity, three additional hypotheses attempt to solidify the theoretical case.

First, as a validation exercise, we should expect voters high in ethnic prejudice to respond more strongly to group implicating cues. Hence, an additional expectation is that *controlling for potential confounders, ethnic prejudice is positively associated with identity-based voting in Denmark, but not in Sweden.*

Second, a potential competing explanation of the pattern could be that the observed association is confounded by a principled, ideological preference for national self-determination. Voters who value Danish culture and national-level decision-making on ideological grounds – i.e., so-called 'values conservatives' – may be opposed to immigration as well as eurozone membership on principled grounds. This argument echoes so-called 'principled politics' critiques of theories of symbolic racism (e.g., Sniderman et al., 1996). If this argument is correct, the association between ethnic prejudice and identity-based voting should be strongest among politically engaged voters, who possess the motivation and knowledge to arrive at 'correct' political attitudes which connect the identity cues to their ideological predispositions (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997).

Table 2: Overview of hypotheses

H1	*Compared to Swedish voters, Danish voters' stated reasons for their vote choice more often reflect identity concerns*
H2	*Controlling for potential confounders, ethnic prejudice is positively associated with identity-based voting in Denmark, but not in Sweden*
H3	*The association between ethnic prejudice and identity-based voting is stronger among Danish voters low in political engagement*
H4	*The associations are robust to exclusion of Danish People's Party identifiers*

Conversely, under the group implication account, this link should be strongest among voters *low* in political engagement, since these less motivated voters derive greater heuristic benefit from substituting cognitively taxing substantive issue knowledge with the easily accessible group frame. Hence, I also expect that *the association between ethnic prejudice and identity-based voting is stronger among Danish voters low in political engagement.*

Lastly, a competing account based on theories of partisan cue-taking could explain the pattern as merely reflecting voters' adoption of party positions as their own. Specifically, Danish voters identifying with the Danish People's Party would likely give responses reflecting high ethnic prejudice and voting 'no' to the euro – not because there is any causal psychological link between the two, but merely reflecting the positions of their preferred party. This argument mirrors traditional Michigan-school models of vote choice emphasizing the power of party identification (Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002). Testing for the influence of party cues, I expect that *the associations are robust to exclusion of Danish People's Party identifiers.* This is likely a conservative test of the theory, since voters self-selecting into the DPP are plausibly among the most susceptible to group implication.

Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses.

4 Data and Methods

4.1 Data sources

In order to test the hypotheses, I turn to nationally representative surveys conducted around the time of each country's referendum. Denmark's 2000 referendum survey, "EURO-afstemningen, 2000" (Worre and Nielsen, 2003), is a post-election survey with n=1,000. Sweden's 2003 referendum survey, "Folkomröstningsundersøkning 2003" (Holmberg et al., 2003) encompasses equal-sized pre- and postelection surveys with total N=2,947.

4.2 Measuring vote motivation using open-ended survey responses

In order to assess whether respondents vote based on their group identity, I exploit the fact that both surveys asked voters a simple, open-ended question: *why did you vote the way you did?*. Although open-ended questions were regularly fielded in the early years of social science survey research, the responses have rarely been utilized.

The advantage of using open-ended questions to study voter motivations is that they convey voters' spontaneous, unstructured explanations for their vote choice (Bradburn, 1983, cited in Hopkins (2013)). This is an advantage of added flexibility, not of added authenticity: the open-ended nature does not imply that the responses are in any sense truer or closer to respondents' real motivations than responses to closed-ended questions. Some scholars argue that survey responses are mere rationalizations of processes hidden from the surveyer and perhaps even from the respondents' own conscious cognition (Lodge and Taber, 2013). Still, the open-ended responses offer a much more diverse set of stated voter motivations. For the purpose of analyzing responses quantitatively, this diversity is a double-edged sword: while each individual response can be informative about the voters' motivation, systematic comparison requires some method of categorization.

One novel, promising avenue in the utilization of open-ended survey responses is the application of automated text classification methods to categorize responses (Hopkins, 2013; Roberts et al., 2014). However, since my data consists of relatively short responses across two different languages, which would be difficult for an automated methods to parse, I opt for human coding of the responses. In order to avoid confirmation bias, student coders naïve to the study's hypotheses were hired to code the responses from both surveys. The students were Danish, but sufficiently familiar with Swedish that they could understand the content of the responses.

After failing to reach acceptably high inter-coder reliability with a relatively fine-grained coding scheme, a student was asked to code the responses according to a simple, dichotomous scheme: whether the voter appears to have voted based on their identity (coded 1) or not (coded 0). In order to ensure a focus on purely identity-based concerns, instructions emphasized that responses partly reflecting political beliefs about delegation of political power away from the national level (e.g. references to "national sovereignty") should be coded as 0. In order to assess reliability, a second coder was asked to code a random subsample of 100 responses from each country. Levels of inter-coder reliability were reasonably high (Krippendorf's α=.84 and .79 for Danish and Swedish samples respectively).

The open-ended questions in the two surveys differ in one significant regard: whereas Danish voters are asked to explain their vote only once, Swedish voters are prompted

an additional two times after their first response whether they can think of additional reasons for their vote. 42 percent of those giving a reason on the first prompt provide an additional reason on the second prompt. 13 percent provide an additional, third reason. In the analysis that follows, Swedish voters' responses are counted as identity-based if one or more of their responses were coded as identity-based. This coding rule works against my hypothesis in that, *ceteris paribus*, it increases the probability that Swedish voters' responses will be coded as identity-based.

4.3 Measuring ethnic prejudice

As will be explained below, however, differences in average levels of identity-based voting could plausibly be explained by other theories unrelated to group implication. In order to make the case for the group implication account, I use regression models of identity-based voting to show that it is concentrated precisely among those voters a group implication account would predict to be the most susceptible. Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix present translations of the specific question wordings used to measure each of the key variables used in the models. Of these, ethnic prejudice is both the most important hypothesized moderator of identity-based voting and a challenging concept to measure validly and reliably in survey-based research. Hence, my measurement strategy deserves some further elaboration.

Most importantly, the items are chosen so as to best approximate previously used measures of ethnic prejudice, given the constraints of data availability. Akrami et al. (2000) develop scales of classical and modern racial prejudice which (although the name suggests otherwise) are designed to elicit prejudicial attitudes toward immigrants in a Scandinavian context. The scales consider items such as "A multicultural Sweden would be good" and "I favor full integration of Swedes and immigrants" which closely mirror the items used in this study. Hence, the measurement of ethnic prejudice used in this study matches earlier approaches.

In the Danish data, ethnic prejudice is measured using an additive index of two items which exhibit acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .63$): a 5-point scale of agreement with the statement that "we accept far too many [refugees]" and a binary scale of whether "immigrants and refugees [are] a threat to Danish culture". While the latter arguably captures anti-immigrants affect, there could be a concern that the former reflects a principled policy attitude, perhaps based on fiscal concerns, rather than ethnic prejudice as such. In order to account for this possibility, table 11 in the appendix reruns the models tested below using only the binary measure of ethnic prejudice. As shown, the results are robust to using the cruder measure.

In the Swedish data, ethnic prejudice is similarly based on an additive index, adding 5-point scale agreement that "[Sweden should] accept fewer refugees" with 11-point scale

agreement that "[Sweden should a]im for a multicultural society with great tolerance toward people from foreign countries with different religions and ways of life". The two items exhibit acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .7$). One significant advantage of adding the two is that the latter question was asked only in the pre-election survey; hence, using an average of the two items allows for using both pre- and postelection surveys, nearly doubling the available sample size (from N≥827 to N≥1513). Maximizing the number of cases is particularly important in the Swedish case, since increasing the statistical power of a test strengthens the evidence that the true effect, as is hypothesized here, is negligible (Rainey, 2014). However, as shown in table 12 in the appendix, the results are robust to using an ethnic prejudice measure based on only the latter item.

A second concern in the Swedish case could be that the latter item, whose question wording is quite laden with social desirability bias, would leave no room for respondent disagreement. As shown in figure 5 in the appendix, though the distribution indeed is skewed toward the lower end of the scale, the measure still exhibits variation across the entire scale.

4.4 Remaining explanatory variables

The other key independent variable, *political engagement*, is measured using items asking respondents about rate their level of interest in matters regarding European Union on 5- and 4-point scales in Denmark and Sweden respectively. Gender, age, and income are measured using standard survey items. Economic ideology is measured using a single 3-point scale item in the Danish case, and in the Swedish case an additive index of five 5-point scale items attaining acceptable reliability (α=.62). All variables except for age are rescaled to range from 0 to 1 in order to simplify comparison across variables. Summary statistics for each sample are provided in tables 3 and 4.[1]

4.5 Modeling identity-based voting

The analysis models identity-based voting as a function of the form:

$$Y_i = f(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \times EP_i + \beta_2 \times PE_i + \beta_3 \times EP_i \times PE_i + \gamma \times \mathbf{X_i}) \tag{1}$$

Where Y_i is a binary measure of identity-based voting, EP_i and PE_i are measures of respondent i's ethnic prejudice and political engagement, and $\mathbf{X_i}$ and γ are vectors of additional controls and their coefficients. The model allows for testing, within each country, how ethnic prejudice and political engagement are jointly associated with

[1]These and remaining tables were created using the statistical software `R`'s `stargazer` package (R Core Team, 2013; Hlavac, 2013).

Table 3: Summary statistics, Denmark

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Identity-based vote	932	0.11	0.31	0	1
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	992	0.47	0.35	0.00	1.00
Political engagement (PE)	999	0.55	0.27	0.00	1.00
Gender (female)	1,000	0.53	0.50	0	1
Age	1,000	45.98	16.33	18	99
Education	1,000	0.47	0.32	0.00	1.00
Income	812	0.49	0.29	0.00	1.00
Economic ideology	1,000	0.69	0.36	0.00	1.00

Table 4: Summary statistics, Sweden

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Identity-based vote	2,947	0.03	0.18	0	1
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	1,571	0.48	0.28	0.00	1.00
Political engagement (PE)	1,882	0.61	0.26	0.00	1.00
Gender (female)	2,293	0.51	0.50	0	1
Age	2,293	46.07	16.38	18	80
Education	1,872	0.56	0.35	0.00	1.00
Income	1,808	0.21	0.28	0.00	1.00
Economic ideology	1,589	0.40	0.18	0.00	1.00

identity-based voting and how this compares with the hypotheses presented above. Since Y_i is binary, equation 1 is estimated using logistic regression.

5 Results

5.1 Hypothesis 1: Levels of identity-based voting

Figure 3 presents the results from the coding of identity-based voting, showing the estimated proportion of identity responses for each country. The figure also shows the share of identity-based responses among Swedish voters' first responses, which are presumably the most causally important. Furthermore, so as to provide a sense of the content of the responses, the figure plots a random sample of identity-coded responses for each country.



Figure 3: Share of identity-based stated reasons for voting in Denmark and Sweden. Thick lines represent 90 pct. confidence intervals, thin lines 95 pct. confidence intervals. Word clouds provide examples of identity-coded responses.

Besides providing evidence of the coding's face validity, the sampled responses show that some voters appeared to base their vote choice purely on concerns about national identity. For example, the response *"preserve Danishness, the national element"* expresses a clearly nationalistic sentiment. Responses like this are not uncommon among Danish identity responses. Given that the euro referendum concerns the ostensibly purely economic issue of joining the eurozone, a share of 11 percent is arguably a substantial share of voters giving identity-based reasons for their vote. In contrast, the

Swedish share of identity-based responses, even across all three response prompts, is a comparatively low 3 percent.

5.2 Hypotheses 2-4: Correlates of identity-based voting

Results from estimating model 1 within each country are presented in tables 5 and 6. Figure 4 plots the associations of interest.

Table 5: Logit models of identity-based voting, Denmark

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	1.83***	1.66***	1.66***	2.73***	2.67***
	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.86)	(0.89)
Political engagement (PE)				0.76	0.79
				(1.03)	(1.06)
Gender (f)		0.70***	0.68***	0.69**	0.68**
		(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Age		−0.002	−0.003	−0.001	0.001
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		−0.91**	−0.87*	−0.88*	−0.99**
		(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.48)
Income		−0.76	−0.69	−0.56	−0.31
		(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.50)
Economic ideology			−0.47	−0.39	−0.50
			(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.36)
EP*PE				−2.22	−2.15
				(1.43)	(1.49)
Constant	−3.13***	−2.69***	−2.39***	−2.99***	−3.12***
	(0.23)	(0.57)	(0.61)	(0.87)	(0.90)
N	925	762	762	761	719
Log Likelihood	-298.59	-223.77	-222.85	-218.56	-200.98
AIC	601.19	459.55	459.71	455.12	419.97

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

As shown in the top row of figure 4, which plots predicted probabilities from model 3 for each country, ethnic prejudice is indeed significantly associated with identity-based voting among Danish voters. In other words, Danish voters with a negative attitude towards immigration are more likely to refer to national identity when explaining their vote on the euro. The increase is not only statistically, but substantially significant: across the observable range of ethnic prejudice, the predicted probability of identity-based voting increases from around 4 percent to around 17 percent.



Figure 4: Ethnic prejudice, political engagement and predicted probability of identity-based referendum vote in Denmark and Sweden. Across all voters, ethnic prejudice is positively and significantly associated with identity-based voting in Denmark, but weakly and negatively in Sweden (top row). Consistent with expectations, the association with ethnic prejudice is concentrated among voters with low levels of engagement (middle and bottom rows). Predicted probabilities are based on models 3 and 4 in tables 5 and 6. Gray bands represent 95 pct. confidence intervals. Solid lines signify statistically significant associations ($p<.05$).

Table 6: Logit models of identity-based voting, Sweden

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	−1.08***	−0.69	−1.09**	−1.31
	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(1.30)
Political engagement (PE)				1.10
				(0.87)
Gender (f)		−0.27	−0.13	−0.07
		(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Age		0.02***	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		1.15***	0.96***	0.80**
		(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Income		0.64*	0.11	0.05
		(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Economic ideology			2.75***	2.60***
			(0.63)	(0.62)
EP*PE				0.48
				(1.67)
Constant	−2.19***	−4.06***	−4.86***	−5.37***
	(0.19)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.83)
N	1,571	1,513	1,513	1,513
Log Likelihood	-370.84	-334.76	-324.92	-320.99
AIC	745.68	681.51	663.85	659.98

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

In contrast, the relationship among Swedish voters, though significant, is weak and *negative*. The sample of identity-coded responses in figure 3 provides a hint as to why: consistent with contemporary accounts of the campaign, the small minority of Swedish voters referring to identity in explaining their vote tend to be pro-euro voters referencing a European identity. As a result, Swedish voters high in ethnic prejudice are in fact slightly less likely to explain their vote in terms of identity. The data thus provide support for hypothesis 2.

Turning to hypothesis 3, the middle and bottom panels of figure 4 show the predicted probabilities of identity-based voting across the observable range of ethnic prejudice for voters high and low in political engagement respectively. The direction of the interaction is unmistakable: for Danish voters high in engagement, there is no significant relationship between ethnic prejudice and identity-based voting.

For voters low in political engagement, on the other hand, the relationship is strong and highly significant: among these voters, moving across the observable range of ethnic prejudice increases the probability of identity-based voting from around 2.5 percent to just shy of 29 percent, a more than ten-fold increase. The interaction term itself falls short of statistical significance, and so the null hypothesis of no interaction cannot be rejected. Still, the results strongly suggest that identity-based voting is concentrated among voters low in political engagement and high in ethnic prejudice – the very types of voters a group implication model would predict to be the most likely to receive, accept, and make us of group cues.

Finally, model 5 in table 5 tests hypothesis 4 by excluding Danish People's Party identifiers. None of the coefficients change substantially; most importantly, ethnic prejudice is still strongly and significantly associated with identity-based voting among voters low in political engagement. While partisan cue-taking is likely an important component in explaining voting on euro adoption in general, the robustness of the result to excluding Danish People's Party identifiers suggest that it cannot explain the observable evidence for group implication.

6 Conclusion

Mirroring a broader trend in the social sciences, political science has in recent years seen a renewed focus on the power of group identities. In the study of American politics, a likely contributing factor to this trend is the election of Barack Obama, which has renewed scholarly discussion of the extent to which race shapes the policy attitudes of American voters. Yet the singular importance of racial group relations in American society also means that studies of the political impact of group identity have tended to neglect the effects of other types identities as well as intergroup relations in other

political contexts. This leaves unclear whether racialized policy attitudes are somehow unique to the issue of race or are merely a special case of group-based cognition.

This study has argued that the latter is the case. Racialization is a case of group implication, which in turn is a phenomenon with traveling power beyond the American context in which it has previously been studied. As evidence of this claim, the study compared identity-based voting in two political contexts far removed from American politics: referenda on euro adoption in two comparatively homogeneous, politically consensual European societies where the salient dimension of group conflict is ethnic rather than racial. In spite of these differences, identity-based voting followed a pattern conforming to group implication theory. In Denmark, where nationalistic frames pervaded the campaign environment, the extent of identity-based voting was substantial and concentrated among voters high in ethnic prejudice and low in political engagement, precisely those expected to be receptive to group implicating cues. In Sweden, where nationalistic cues were largely absent, identity-based voting was very limited.

By demonstrating the traveling power of group implication, the study demonstrates the potential of testing theories originally developed to explain racialized political attitudes in vastly different contexts. In a still diversifying Europe, understanding the political effects of intergroup conflict is likely to become a still more urgent concern.

Looking ahead, two specific theoretical threads in the racialization literature are likely to yield original insights when applied to new contexts. First of all, the link between racial attitudes and support for welfare among American voters is commonly understood to rely on a stereotype about African-American laziness. Does this imply that such a link will only be found in other cases where immigrants are stereotypically associated with laziness? In a broader sense, comparative studies of the role of stereotype content in group-based political cognition will likely yield important insights about the preconditions for observing group implication.

Secondly, a number of recent American studies examine the group implicating effect of the association of policies with Barack Obama, most notably health care reform, with which Obama is very explicitly associated. The studies tend to find that the group identity of a sponsoring politician can in fact spill over into attitudes about a public program, yet are largely confined to contemporary American politics. Here, too, studies of the effects of policy sponsorship in other contexts and of other types of group identities can yield additional insights about the conditions under which group identities structure political cognition.

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Appendix

Table 7: Measures of attitude variables, Denmark

Variable	**Items**	**Scale**
Ethnic prejudice	*I will now mention some points of view from general political debate which you may or may not agree with. Here is a card with five options. Please select one of the responses.*	
	People disagree on how many refugees we can accept. Some think we accept far too many. Others think we could easily accept more. What do you think?	1-5
	Do you consider immigrants and refugees a threat to Danish culture?	1-2
Political engagement	How interested are you in European Union politics, i.e. matters regarding the EU?	1-5
Economic ideology	*Now I have a few questions to which I would like you to respond either yes or no.*	
	Government has too little control over private investment	1-3

Table 8: Measures of attitude variables, Sweden

Variable	**Items**	**Scale**
Ethnic prejudice	*I will now read a number of policies which some people believe should be implemented in Sweden.*	
	Accept fewer refugees in Sweden?	1-5
	I will now read a number of visions of types of societies which some people believe we should aim for in the Sweden of the future.	
	Aim for a multicultural society with great tolerance toward people from foreign countries with different religions and ways of life?	0-10
Political engagement	*Now, a number of questions about the EU.*	
	How interested are you in questions regarding the EU?	1-4
Economic ideology	*I will now read a list of policies which some people believe should be implemented in Sweden.*	
	Reduce the size of the public sector?	1-5
	Lower taxes?	1-5
	Reduce income differences in society?	1-5
	Reduce the influence of financial markets?	1-5
	Run more health care on private hands?	1-5



Figure 5: Distribution of 11-point scale agreement that "[Sweden should a]im for a multicultural society with great tolerance toward people from foreign countries with different religions and ways of life" ($N = 855$)

Table 9: Logit models of identity-based voting, Denmark, with listwise deletion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	1.87***	1.65***	1.65***	2.73***
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.86)
Political engagement (PE)				0.76
				(1.03)
Gender (f)		0.75***	0.73***	0.69**
		(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Age		−0.002	−0.003	−0.001
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		−0.96**	−0.93**	−0.88*
		(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Income		−0.69	−0.62	−0.56
		(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.48)
Economic ideology			−0.45	−0.39
			(0.34)	(0.35)
EP*PE				−2.22
				(1.43)
Constant	−3.26***	−2.74***	−2.45***	−2.99***
	(0.27)	(0.58)	(0.61)	(0.87)
N	761	761	761	761
Log Likelihood	-230.53	-221.43	-220.58	-218.56
AIC	465.05	454.86	455.16	455.12

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 10: Logit models of identity-based voting, Sweden, with listwise deletion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	−1.00**	−0.69	−1.09**	−1.31
	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(1.30)
Political engagement (PE)				1.10
				(0.87)
Gender (f)		−0.27	−0.13	−0.07
		(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Age		0.02***	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		1.15***	0.96***	0.80**
		(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Income		0.64*	0.11	0.05
		(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Economic ideology			2.75***	2.60***
			(0.63)	(0.62)
EP*PE				0.48
				(1.67)
Constant	−2.27***	−4.06***	−4.86***	−5.37***
	(0.20)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.83)
N	1,513	1,513	1,513	1,513
Log Likelihood	-346.30	-334.76	-324.92	-320.99
AIC	696.61	681.51	663.85	659.98

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 11: Logit models of identity-based voting, Denmark, with binary ethnocentrism measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	1.07***	1.00***	1.00***	1.80***
	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.60)
Political engagement (PE)				0.14
				(0.80)
Gender (f)		0.73***	0.71***	0.68**
		(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Age		−0.002	−0.002	0.001
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		−1.01**	−0.99**	−0.97**
		(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Income		−0.56	−0.50	−0.39
		(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Economic ideology			−0.42	−0.34
			(0.35)	(0.36)
EP*PE				−1.83*
				(1.05)
Constant	−2.64***	−2.36***	−2.08***	−2.38***
	(0.17)	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.75)
N	874	727	727	726
Log Likelihood	-284.52	-216.28	-215.55	-210.11
AIC	573.04	444.57	445.11	438.22

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 12: Logit models of identity-based voting, Sweden, with only 11-point ethnocentrism measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnic prejudice (EP)	−1.02	−0.72	−0.88	−0.86
	(0.65)	(0.70)	(0.71)	(1.97)
Political engagement (PE)				0.97
				(1.14)
Gender (f)		−0.11	−0.02	0.03
		(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Age		0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.81	0.71	0.59
		(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.55)
Income		0.37	−0.02	−0.07
		(0.58)	(0.62)	(0.62)
Economic ideology			2.17**	2.05**
			(0.91)	(0.90)
EP*PE				0.15
				(2.58)
Constant	−2.53***	−3.80***	−4.55***	−5.06***
	(0.26)	(0.76)	(0.83)	(1.10)
N	855	827	827	827
Log Likelihood	-174.99	-162.81	-159.94	-158.77
AIC	353.99	337.62	333.87	335.54

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01