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CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES IN TRANSITIONAL POLITIES

A Research Note

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ABSTRACT

This research note summarizes initial research from a wider project on the determinants of candidate selection procedures. It seeks to contribute to the growing literature on candidate selection by distinguishing transitional and institutionalized democracies. First, it provides a review of the existing literature, with particular emphasis placed on identifying the existing hypotheses on the determinants of candidate selection procedures. Second, it elucidates why transitional polities differently constrain the choice of legislative candidate selection procedures compared to institutionalized democracies. Third, several hypotheses derived from the literature indicate that the barriers to adopting inclusive legislative candidate selection procedures are higher in transitional than in institutionalized democracies.

KEY WORDS ■ democratization ■ global ■ literature review ■ political parties ■ selecting candidates

Introduction

It has long been recognized that candidate selection (CS) is a core function that political parties perform, and that CS activities distinguish parties from other types of political organization (Epstein, 1967: 10, 77; Henig, 1970: 15; Key, 1964: 370; Kirchheimer, 1966: 189–90; Ranney, 1981: 102–3; Schattschneider, 1942: 64). In his writing about United States political parties, Schattschneider (1942: 64) states that the nomination is the most important activity of the party; 'if a party cannot make nominations it ceases to be a party'.

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in legislative recruitment and CS (see Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Norris, 2006; Rahat, 2007).

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Political recruitment refers to 'the process through which individuals are inducted into active political roles' (Czudnowski, 1975: 156). CS is but one part of the recruitment process. Along with Ranney (1981: 75), this work conceptualizes CS as:

> the predominantly *extralegal* process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates.

Duverger reminds us that in certain electoral contexts the CS process largely determines who will be elected (1959: 368–9). This occurs in two-party electoral contests where there is a clear disparity of support, and in proportional representation systems with fixed lists. In the former instance, Key (1964: 383) states that it cannot be said that 'the primary is a method of nomination; it is the election'. Speaking of the safe seats in the British parliamentary system, Rush (1969: 4) states that '*selection* is *tantamount* to election'. In closed-list proportional representation systems, Duverger (1959: 368) asserts 'it is as if the electorate conferred on a particular party the right to choose 20% of the parliamentary representatives, to another the right to choose 15%, to a third 40%, and so on'. The ranking, determined by the CS process, determines the relative chances of each individual. In all electoral environments, the CS process is the selection before the election which dramatically narrows the electorate's choice.

According to recent studies, CS procedures have become more inclusive, referring to the number of people involved in the selection process (the 'selectorate'), in many advanced industrial democracies (Bille, 2001; Caul Kittilson and Scarrow, 2003; Norris, 2006; Rahat, 2007; Scarrow et al., 2001). Bille (2001) found that only 16 percent of western European parties used membership ballots for the final decision on CS in 1960, while 23 percent did so by 1989. Membership ballots were used by parties in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Bille, 2001: 366). Hopkin (2001) describes the use of more inclusive CS procedures in Great Britain and Spain in recent years. The three significant nationwide parties in Great Britain use some form of membership vote prior to nomination, and, in Spain, the Socialist Party adopted party primaries to select 'the individual candidates for public executive offices', which also head legislative lists (Hopkin, 2001: 354). Rahat (2007) indicates that several parties in Ireland adopted direct nomination by party members. Primaries were introduced by the Labour Party in Israel in 1992 (Chazan, 2005) and by several parties in Iceland in 1971 (Kristjánsson, 1998). Norris (2006: 93) also cites the greater inclusiveness of CS procedures in the ÖVP and SPÖ in Austria, the CDU and SPD in Germany and Fine Gael in Ireland. To these cases we can add the United States and Canadian parties that use even more inclusive CS procedures than the European parties (Rahat, 2007).

The burgeoning literature on CS and political recruitment in nascent democracies expands our scope of understanding to encompass a greater number of cases in very diverse socio-economic, cultural, political and institutional contexts, as well as at distinct phases of democratic development. Should we also expect a trend toward inclusive legislative CS procedures in nascent democracies? Despite the increased use of primaries to select presidential candidates and important cases in which at least some parties have adopted, allowed for or experimented with more inclusive legislative CS procedures, such as in Argentina (De Luca et al., 2002; Jones, 1997, 2002; Jones et al., 2002), Mexico (Wuhs, 2006a) and Taiwan (Baum and Robinson, 1995; Robinson and Baum, 1993, 1997; Wu, 2001), a review of the literature reveals that adopting exclusive CS procedures for legislative candidates appears to be the rule rather than the exception in nascent democracies. Exclusive procedures were adopted at the outset of democracy in parties in Chile (Siavelis, 2002), Croatia (Kasapovic, 2001), Portugal (Leston-Bandeira and Freire, 2003), Spain (Esteban and López Guerra, 1985; Field, 2006), Venezuela (Coppedge, 1994), Uruguay (Moraes, 2008), in the Greek PASOK (Gillespie and Gallagher, 1989), and in Brazil – with the exception of the PT (Samuels, 2008). Among the 13 Left parties in Latin America studied by Wuhs (2006b), only one (FMLN) uses some form of primary to select legislative candidates. Even in Mexico, the oft-cited case of greater inclusiveness, the parties retained exclusive CS procedures for the legislative seats elected through proportional representation and the PAN maintained exclusive procedures for both PR and single-member district seats for the lower house (Wuhs, 2006a). Why are parties in transitional polities not adopting more inclusive legislative CS procedures?

As part of a wider project on CS in transitional polities, we provide this research note in an effort to propose some guidelines for the study of the determinants of CS procedures. It has three goals: first, it provides a review of the existing literature on legislative CS, with particular emphasis on identifying the hypotheses on the determinants of CS procedures. Most of the existing literature focuses on the wide-ranging effects of CS. However, we know little about why particular CS procedures are adopted. Second, it elucidates why transitional polities differently constrain the choice of legislative CS procedures compared to institutionalized democracies. Therefore, we argue that it is more productive to separate the study of the genesis of CS procedures in post-authoritarian environments from their transformation in institutionalized democracies.[1] Third, we derive several hypotheses from the literature which indicate that the barriers to adopting inclusive legislative CS procedures are higher in transitional than in institutionalized democracies.

Candidate Selection Research

There are three broad questions related to CS procedures: what are the CS procedures? What are the effects of particular CS procedures? What are the determinants of particular CS procedures?

What Are the CS Procedures?

There is a substantial body of literature that identifies the CS process within particular parties and countries. This is true for the longer-standing democracies (see, for example, Bille, 2001; Czudnowski, 1970, 1972; Epstein, 1967; Gallagher, 1980; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Henig, 1970; Key, 1964; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Lundell, 2004; Norris, 1996, 1997a; Obler, 1974; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Ranney, 1965, 1981; Rush, 1969; Scarrow et al., 2001; Seligman, 1967; Ware, 1996). We also now have a better understanding of CS in the newer democracies of southern Europe (Bruneau, 1997; Esteban and López Guerra, 1985; Field, 2006; Hopkin, 2001; Leston-Bandeira and Freire, 2003; Montero, 2005), Latin America (De Luca et al., 2002; Jones, 1997, 2002; Jones et al., 2002; Langston, 2001, 2006; Siavelis, 2002; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008; Taylor-Robinson, 2001a, b; Wuhs, 2006a), Russia and eastern and southeastern Europe (Ishiyama, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001; Kasapovic, 2001; Moser, 1999), and East Asia (Baum and Robinson, 1995; Robinson and Baum, 1993, 1997; Wu, 2001).

The identification of such procedures is not as easy as one might expect. CS is a difficult process to analyze. In most countries, it is a private process which takes place within the party, and, as Duverger (1959: 354) states, 'often it is even secret, as parties do not like the odours of the electoral kitchen to spread to the outside world'. Formal *de jure* rules may not reflect the *de facto* and informal process; there are likely to be multiple processes and therefore no individual or body may actually control the process (Gallagher, 1988a: 5). Related to the latter, Rahat and Hazan (2001: 300) point out two difficulties:

> First is the *mixed* candidate selection system. This is a method in which *different* potential candidates face different restrictions; or different candidates are selected by different selectorates, in different locations, or according to different nomination systems. Second is the *multi-stage* CS method. This is a method in which the *same* candidates have to face more than one selectorate during the selection process.

Therefore, adequately identifying the CS process requires a substantial amount of research as well as country-specific and party-specific expertise.

Newer research also provides us with improved comparative analytical frameworks on the key aspects of CS and typologies of CS procedures (Bille, 2001; Hazan, 2002; Gallagher, 1988a; Norris, 1993, 1996; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Ranney, 1981; Ware 1996). Several key aspects of CS have been identified.

First, the degree to which the process is legally regulated or privately controlled by the parties themselves (Ranney, 1981; Ware, 1996). A second relates to candidacy requirements. This refers to the party rules and/or laws governing who can become a candidate (Hazan, 2002; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). Third, the degree of centralization versus decentralization of the CS process (Czudnowski, 1975: 221; Duverger, 1959: 354–64; Epstein, 1967: 202; Gallagher, 1988a; Hazan, 2002; Norris, 1993, 1996; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Ranney, 1981; Schattschneider, 1942: 99–100; Ware, 1996). Decentralization can be territorial or functional (Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 304–6). Territorial decentralization refers to whether CS takes place at the national, regional or constituency/local level, and, if at multiple levels, the relative importance of each. Functional decentralization refers to mechanisms that allow the participation of groups, such as women, labor, etc.

A fourth is the inclusiveness of the CS process and the degree of participation in it (Epstein, 1967: 201–2; Gallagher, 1988a; Hazan, 2002; Michels, 1949: 111; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Ranney, 1981; Ware, 1996). This is often referred to as the selectorate. The selectorate can range from the electorate as a whole to a non-selected party leader (Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 301). Fifth, the voting or appointment system used to choose the candidate/s (Duverger, 1959: 360; Hazan, 2002; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). A sixth relates to the degree to which the process is institutionalized or patronage oriented (Norris, 1993, 1996).

While all six elements are significant, most research focuses on (de)centralization and the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The existing literature appears to consider the inclusiveness of the selectorate to be the most influential CS feature with regard to party organization and the overall consequences for the political system. For example, Epstein states that decentralized control of CS may not be what sets United States CS apart from the European model, but rather the weakness of party control (1967: 207–9), which is related to the inclusiveness of the selectorate.

What Are the Effects of Particular CS Procedures?

A second important research question analyzes CS as an independent variable and seeks to identify its effects. Most research has been conducted in this area.

CS is seen to both reflect and affect the distribution of power within the party (Duverger, 1959: 151; Gallagher et al., 2001: 284; Henig, 1970: 523; Ranney, 1981: 103). Michels noted that CS illustrated the oligarchic tendencies of parties (1949: 111–13) and was a means whereby party leaders could prevent new leaders from emerging (1949: 183, 187). According to Schattschneider (1942: 64):

> [T]he nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party. This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party.

There has been some recent work that associates particular CS procedures with degrees of internal democracy (Bille, 2001; Hazan, 2002; Hopkin, 2001; Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). CS procedures have generally become more inclusive and decentralized in recent years in many advanced industrial democracies; however, there is some debate about whether this represents democratization. Some see moving toward a more inclusive selectorate as democratization (Bille, 2001: 365; Pennings and Hazan, 2001: 268; Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 309). However, a more inclusive selectorate can also come at the cost of undermining intermediate party activists and thereby leaving party leaders better able to achieve their goals and to manipulate less informed and atomized selectors (Hopkin, 2001: 358; Katz, 2001: 290–3; Obler, 1974; Scarrow et al., 2001). Similarly, some claim that a decentralized CS process represents greater internal party democracy (Bille, 2001: 365). However, others argue that decentralization *per se* does not represent democratization; local or regional oligarchic control can simply operate instead of national oligarchic control (Gallagher, 1980). According to Rahat and Hazan (2001: 309), 'decentralization can limit, maintain or expand the extent of intra-party democracy'.

The CS process is found to affect the types of candidates selected (and therefore legislators) and the degree to which candidates represent significant societal cleavages (Gallagher, 1988a: 12–14; Norris, 1993, 1996, 1997b). This refers to demographic variables such as age, ethnicity and gender, but also to the amount and type of prior political or professional experience, and ideological identity (Katz, 2001: 277). Norris (1993: 327), for example, finds that positive discrimination in favor of women works best in formal and localized recruitment systems. Rahat and Hazan (2001: 316) find that democratizing CS can decrease the representativeness of candidate lists.

Researchers also find that the CS process affects candidate and therefore legislator behavior (Gallagher, 1988a, b; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008; Taylor-Robinson, 2001a). The idea that politicians and aspiring politicians respond to the incentives of electoral laws is equally found to apply to the incentives of the CS procedures. In short, aspirants, candidates and legislators will, to some degree, be responsive to the selectorate. This impacts where their loyalties lie, e.g. to the national party leadership, the party rank-and-file, campaign donors. It may affect the roles legislators assume and prioritize; for example, centralized CS by party leaders may encourage general policy-making roles, while locally controlled CS may encourage more constituency service (Gallagher, 1988a: 15). Along these lines, Key (1964: 453) finds that the degree of decentralized nomination affects the degree of localism in politics.

Given the wide-ranging effects on behavior, CS procedures are also found to affect the degree of party cohesion and discipline (Gallagher et al., 2001: 288; Pennings and Hazan, 2001: 267; Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 316). Duverger (1959: 364) claims that the primary system encourages the development of internal factions and rivalries between groups of leaders. It

is often claimed that discipline and cohesion are likely to be highest where CS is centralized in the hands of party leaders, lowest where selection is not controlled by party organs, and that legislators are likely to be pulled in different directions where CS remains in party hands but decentralized (Gallagher, 1988a: 15). The studies in Gallagher and Marsh (1988), however, indicated that 'it may not matter much . . . *which* party agency selects candidates, but it does matter that *some* party agency selects them' (Gallagher, 1988b: 271). In other words, centralized party control was not essential for party discipline. This has yet to be confirmed outside the Western European context of institutionalized and disciplined parties.

Divided loyalties, reduced discipline and cohesion can in turn affect the overall stability of parliamentary governments (Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 313), the general predictability of political behavior (Gallagher et al., 2001: 272), government effectiveness and legislative–executive relations in presidential systems (Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008; Taylor-Robinson, 2001a).

What Are the Determinants of Particular CS Procedures?

Given the significant effects of CS procedures, we need to better understand what influences their adoption. There is little comparative analytical and theoretical work in this area, and there are few solid findings.

In the context of established democracies, Epstein's (1967: 201–32) comparative analysis of CS in the United States and Great Britain suggests several interesting hypotheses for why CS differs in the two polities, such as the strength of party organizations, political culture, the degree of electoral competition, constitutional structure (presidential or parliamentary), electoral system and the territorial organization of the state. The Gallagher and Marsh volume (1988) sets out to investigate the 'influences shaping the candidate selection process' (Gallagher, 1988a: 8), including legal provisions, the territorial organization of the state, the electoral system, political culture, the spillover of procedures from one party to another, and the nature of the party. However, most of the country chapters in the volume only touch on CS as a dependent variable tangentially and focus more on the effects of CS. Furthermore, the conclusion to the volume states few empirical relationships; only the territorial organization of the state is found to be important. CS in federal states is likely to be more decentralized than CS in unitary states; however, Gallagher (1988b: 257) states 'the relationship is not clear cut'.

Lundell (2004) specifically seeks to identify the determinants of the degree of territorial decentralization of CS using data from several advanced democracies of the developed world. He tests party ideology, party size, party age, inter-party competition, aspects of electoral laws, territorial organization of the state, country size (physical) and European region. Similarly, he discovers very few empirical relationships. Only party size (parties with larger vote shares have more centralized CS) and European region (southern

European parties have more centralized CS; Nordic more decentralized) are statistically significant predictors of the degree of decentralization of CS.

In the context of newly democratizing polities, Field (2006) shows how the mode of transition toward democracy can influence the adoption of CS procedures. Comparing the pacted transitions in Spain, Colombia and Venezuela, she finds that, in the absence of formal institutional guarantees of cross-party consensus, disciplined political parties with CS controlled by the pact-making elites helped provide the mutual assurance necessary to make the political pacts credible. The effect of political pacts on internal party politics and CS is echoed by Coppedge (1994) on Venezuela. Field's (2006) comparison of the Spanish and Argentine cases suggests that some transitional contexts may externally constrain party choice of CS procedures, while others may be less constraining and thereby more influenced by internal party dynamics. Siavelis (2002) and Esteban and López Guerra (1985), for Chile and Spain, respectively, highlight the effect of alliance and coalition formation on CS procedures. Satisfying alliance and coalition partners may encourage a greater role for party leadership in CS. The importance of alliances is echoed by Thiébault (1988) on France.

The transformation of CS procedures in democratizing one-party regimes has been analyzed for Taiwan (Baum and Robinson, 1995; Robinson and Baum, 1993, 1997; Wu, 2001) and Mexico (Langston, 2008; Wuhs, 2006a). Wu (2001) places the socio-economic development of Taiwan and the KMT's transformation into a less ideological and more inclusionary party at the heart of his explanation of the adoption of more inclusionary CS procedures. However, the perceived electoral effects of CS procedures (Baum and Robinson, 1995; Wu, 2001), internal party factionalism and elite conflict (Wu, 2001) also generated subsequent changes in the KMT's CS procedures. For Mexico, Langston (2008) analyzes why different CS procedures are used for Senatorial candidates in the three principal parties (PAN, PRI and PRD) despite the same institutional environment. She finds that the party's organizational background, the effects of electoral competition in a federal system and whether CS is for a plurality of PR seats to be significant.

Aside from the above works, most studies of CS simply mention possible explanations for CS procedures. These hypotheses, as well as the above, are categorized in Table 1 according to whether the causal variable is largely internal or external to the political party and whether it is largely formal or informal. Though separated here for analytical purposes, several combinations of variables can operate in any one case. Hypotheses in the internal–formal quadrant emphasize the effect of types (degree and form) of party organization on CS procedures (Epstein, 1967; Gallagher, 1988b; Key, 1964). For example, parties with a large membership base may encourage the inclusion of members in the CS process (Epstein, 1967).

In terms of internal–informal determinants, we subcategorize explanations according to whether they are based on internal power struggles or ideas. For example, struggles or bargaining between factions or elites can lead to

Table 1. Hypothesized determinants of candidate selection procedures

	Informal	*Formal*
Internal	*Power struggle* Factional or elite (Hopkin, 2001; Katz, 2001; Langston, 2001; Wu, 2001) *Ideas* (Gallagher, 1988a, b) Ideology – degree and type (Hazan, 2002; Wu, 2001) Party culture/ethos	*Party organization* Party organization – degree and form (Epstein, 1967: 207, 210, 231; Gallagher, 1988b; Key, 1964: 377)
External	*Electoral* Alliance and coalition exigencies (Esteban and López Guerra, 1985; Siavelis, 2002; Thiébault, 1988) Electoral/legitimacy costs and benefits (Obler, 1974: 167–8; Hopkin, 2001: 345; Pennings and Hazan, 2001: 269; Ware, 1996: 266–9; Wu, 2001) Inter-party competition (Epstein, 1967: 211; Key, 1964: 376) Party size – electoral success (Lundell, 2004) *Social* Mass political culture (Epstein, 1967: 211, 215; Gallagher, 1980: 501; 1988a, b, c; Key, 1964: 371) Socio-economic development (Scarrow et al., 2001; Ware, 1996: 266–9; Wu, 2001) *Contagion* Domestic (Gallagher, 1988a, b; Obler, 1974: 167–8) International (Jupp, 1968: 22) *Moments of political uncertainty* Transitions from authoritarian rule, e.g. modes of transition, pact-making and enforcement (Coppedge, 1994; Field, 2006) State formation (Arian, 1979) Institutional flux (Thiébault, 1988)	*State institutions and laws* Electoral system – e.g. district magnitude, counting systems, candidate quotas, campaign finance (Czudnowski, 1975: 221; Epstein, 1967: 225–6; Gallagher, 1980, 1988a, b, c; Hermens, 1972: 51–9) Territorial organization (Epstein, 1967: 209, 229; Gallagher, 1988a, b; Harmel, 1981) Constitutional structure, e.g. parliamentary, presidential (Epstein, 1967: 225)

rule changes (Hopkin, 2001; Katz, 2001; Langston, 2001; Wu, 2001). The move toward less ideological parties is an explanation for the 'democratization' of CS procedures in established democracies (Hazan, 2002) and greater inclusiveness of CS procedures in transforming dominant parties such as the KMT (Wu, 2001). Also, non-Marxist leftist parties may tend to stress so-called democratic methods of selection, while internal democracy may be less important in conservative and Marxist parties (Gallagher, 1988a, b).

The external–formal quadrant refers to explanations that emphasize the state institutional and legal environment. Studies propose the causal importance of the electoral system (Czudnowski, 1975; Epstein, 1967; Gallagher, 1980, 1988a, b, c; Hermens, 1972), the territorial organization of the state (Epstein, 1967; Gallagher, 1988a, b; Harmel, 1981) and the constitutional structure (Epstein, 1967).

The final cell of the matrix is external–informal. We subcategorize these explanations according to whether the explanation is primarily based on electoral conditions, social characteristics, contagion or moments of political uncertainty. Several electoral and social hypotheses are suggested by recent studies of the 'democratization' of CS procedures in established democracies, such as the party's need to attract members, mobilize support or increase legitimacy (Hazan, 2002; Hopkin, 2001: 345; Pennings and Hazan, 2001: 269; Ware, 1996), the decline of social hierarchies and greater cognitive mobilization (Hazan, 2002; Scarrow et al., 2001; Ware, 1996). With the exception of Scarrow et al. (2001), these hypotheses have not been subjected to systematic comparative testing.

Contagion refers to the copying of procedures from one party to another within the same political system (Gallagher, 1988a, b; Obler, 1974: 167–8) or cross-nationally (Jupp, 1968: 22). Moments of dramatic political uncertainty merit further development. In addition to transition from authoritarian rule toward democracy, state formation in the case of Israel and institutional uncertainty in France were found to have an effect on CS. In the former case, Arian argues (1979: 300) that the deference paid to the 'founding fathers' contributed to elite-based CS. In the latter, Thiébault (1988: 86) claims that because post-1967 elections were about constitutional as well as normal electoral issues, the stakes involved in the elections may have encouraged national-party dominance of CS to control, to the degree possible, constitutional changes.

Candidate Selection in Transitional versus Institutionalized Democracies

This section analyzes several ways in which the adoption of CS procedures is differently constrained in transitional compared to institutionalized democracies. We highlight four key differences: political uncertainty, party organization, strategic complexity of the electoral system and the imperative

for pact and alliance formation. Based on the prior literature, we hypothesize and set out for future testing that transitional democracies provide a less permissive environment for the adoption of inclusive legislative CS procedures than institutionalized democracies, largely due to these key differences.

Three caveats are in order: first, CS procedures vary within both types of polities; however, here we focus on cross-polity variation. Second, actors (party leaders, faction leaders, activists, leaders of allied organizations, etc.) ultimately make decisions on the CS procedures. Our goal here is to highlight constraints on actor choice. Third, parties' responses to these constraints are mediated by historical legacies, particularly prior institutionalized CS procedures. Not all parties in transitional democracies start with a clean slate. The point of departure and how it interacts with the transition process must be taken into consideration.

According to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 6):

> Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.

To mark the end of a transition to democracy, we use Linz and Stepan's (1996: 3) definitional standard:

> A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.

The first key distinction between transitional and institutionalized democracies is political uncertainty. Transitional environments are distinct from institutionalized political systems because the 'assumptions about the relative stability and predictability of social, economic, and institutional parameters – and, therefore, of their descriptive and explanatory power – seem patently inadequate' (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 4). In a transitional environment, the institutional design, the identity of many of the key actors, relative actor strength, the strategic alliances, etc. are more difficult to predict and behavior is less constrained. We hypothesize that uncertainty regarding the installation of democracy and the institutional arrangements is important for understanding why particular legislative CS procedures are adopted. The uncertainty of the political outcome provides party leaders with the incentive as well as the credible argument vis-à-vis mid-level activists and the party rank-and-file to stipulate and attain a greater degree of leadership control over who will represent the party – the stakes are simply too high. Therefore, we posit that uncertainty is likely to encourage a smaller selectorate (Arian, 1979; Field, 2006; Thiébault, 1988). While there are clearly periods

of great uncertainty in institutionalized democracies (see Thiébault, 1988, on France) that encourage exclusive CS, these instances by definition are more frequent in transitional polities. Notably, transitional polities that faced less uncertainty about the installation of democracy, such as Argentina, also adopted more inclusive procedures. Certainty, however, is less constraining and therefore compatible with various CS procedures. If true, parties in transitional polities face a less permissive environment for the adoption of inclusive CS procedures than parties in institutionalized democracies.

The second key difference between institutionalized and transitional democracies is the type and extent of party organization. Party organization refers to a party's material resources (party financing, property, branch offices), human resources (leaders, activists, staff/personnel) and links with organized interests (Mainwaring, 2001: 186–9). After long periods of illegality and/or political repression, party organization is likely to be lower and party leadership autonomy (Kitschelt, 1994) higher in transitional political environments than in institutionalized political systems. We hypothesize that a greater degree of base-level and mid-level organization and low leadership autonomy increases the bargaining power of the party organizational actors and thereby encourages the adoption of CS procedures that include a role for the party organization that is more inclusive than leadership selection. However, it does not necessarily encourage the inclusion of party sympathizers or the electorate. While party leaders may still be able to exact control of CS, they have to face and convince the party organization that they should have this control. In contrast, we hypothesize that leadership autonomy is compatible with exclusive CS (party leaders do not need to struggle with the party organization and can choose to control CS) or very inclusive CS (the leadership may determine that inclusive CS is an effective strategy to attract party activists, members and voters, and/or identify 'electable' candidates). For example, Gallagher (1988b) demonstrates that organizational weakness is compatible with primaries, as occurred in the United States, or with party leadership selection, as in India.

While institutionalized democracies generally have more organized political parties, the move away from mass parties (Duverger, 1959) with strong party organizations toward catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966) and cartel parties (Katz, 2001; Katz and Mair, 1995) with weaker party organizations in the institutionalized democracies may reduce the distinction between parties in transitional versus institutionalized democratic systems. In fact, the argument that we advance is similar to Katz's (2001) observations of cartel parties in the established democracies. The cartel party is 'characterized by the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a pattern of inter-party collusion' (Katz and Mair, 1995: 17). Cartel parties appear to be compatible with leadership control of CS or CS procedures that bypass party activists to appeal to the rank-and-file or voters. Therefore, unlike the role of uncertainty, party leadership in both types of political system may not be as constrained by an organizational base in the selection of CS procedures as

they would have been, for example, when mass party organizations were prevalent in Europe. Nonetheless, we hypothesize that, on average, parties in institutionalized democracies are likely to be more organized and with less leadership autonomy, which is a more permissive scenario for the adoption of inclusive CS procedures. Along these lines, Spanish party leaders faced little pressure from the non-existent party bases when they adopted elite-centered CS procedures at the outset of the new democratic regime. However, the PSOE's use of more inclusive CS procedures 20 years later under the institutionalized democratic system occurred at a time of low leadership autonomy due to the leadership vacuum created by Felipe Gonzalez's departure.

The third important difference lies in the extent of strategic complexity generated by the electoral system. Strategically complex electoral systems are those in which parties must solve coordination problems in order to win and where winning for one candidate depends on the decisions and actions of other potential or actual allied candidates or their parties (see Cox, 1997). The extent of complexity will vary, of course, depending on the interaction of the election system and the nature of the party system. It is tempting to say that PR tends toward more complexity given the higher number of actors involved. Indeed, most scholars argue that PR, and particularly large magnitude PR, systems tend toward less inclusive CS procedures (Czudnowski, 1975: 22; Epstein, 1967: 225–6; Gallagher, 1988b: 260; Hermens, 1972). We depart from these mechanistic explanations to contend that strategic complexity depends not on the simple electoral system format, but on the impediments to and incentives for forming and enforcing alliances generated by the interaction of the party system with the electoral system and ballot structure. For example, in fractionalized party systems, large magnitude PR systems may provide a wide electoral market for all significant political parties, meaning parties can simply present their own lists, and the permissive nature of the system will allow wide representation. There is little strategic complexity here. On the other hand, where alliances are necessary and a majoritarian election system coexists with a multiparty system, choices and negotiations regarding CS are likely to be exceedingly complex. Where small magnitude PR or majoritarian systems are paired with fractionalized party systems, a strategically complex dance of negotiations might ensue in order to choose candidates that represent the full range of parties in a potential governing alliance.

How does this relate to the cross-polity comparison? In the most general terms, because transitional systems tend to be characterized by greater uncertainty and party fluidity, they are more likely to present problems of coordination, more strategic complexity. At the party level, this uncertainty is likely to result in haggling, bargaining and jockeying for position between various factions within parties. However, even more strategic complexity is introduced once relations between parties come into play. In institutionalized democracies, well-worn patterns of party competition and alliance formation

increase predictability in outcomes and reduce strategic complexity. Parties have some certainty about electoral performance, have established patterns of alliance formation, and are engaged in an iterated alliance game where repeated interactions between parties in alliance formation have cemented relations of trust and predictability. However, in transitional systems this predictability evaporates, creating a more strategically complex environment where the stakes for crafting alliances are simultaneously higher and certainty about their outcomes is lower.

We hypothesize that strategically complex electoral systems are more likely to see elite control to facilitate successful strategic coordination (Esteban and López Guerra, 1985; Siavelis, 2002: 436–7). For example, at the outset of democratization in Chile, 17 parties (and 5 major parties) formed part of the *Concertación* alliance opposing the military regime, and yet the electoral system bequeathed by the military regime had district magnitudes of 2. Therefore, Chilean parties faced numerous coordination problems and an exceedingly complex strategic environment in which to provide a fair designation of candidate slates for all significant parties, to which they responded with almost complete elite control of CS. Had these efforts at alliance formation failed, and the opposition remained divided, the Right – questionably democratic at the time – might have proved victorious, in turn, jeopardizing the democratic transition. Where the interaction of the party system and the election system produces few strategic coordination problems we are less likely to see exclusive CS procedures. Therefore, the greater strategic complexity in transitional systems limits the parties' ability to adopt inclusive CS procedures vis-à-vis institutionalized democracies.

Strategic complexity also depends on the extent to which formal or informal alliances and pact-making are central to underwriting the success of the democratic transition, which is the fourth significant variable we identify that differentiates the dynamics of CS in institutionalized versus democratizing polities. In many transitional polities, alliances (i.e. the sharing of legislative slates) have been central to the success of the democratic transition. Elite intervention in CS is often central to striking and maintaining these types of agreements, meaning that inclusiveness is often not an option. Indeed, in cases where alliance-making during democratic transitions has not been central to their success, certain parties have tended to introduce more inclusive procedures (i.e. Mexico and Argentina).

The formation of such alliances, and indeed governing coalitions, may be facilitated by the institutional structure. For example, the centrality of forming and maintaining governments in multiparty parliamentary systems provides strong natural incentives for coalitions and alliances, not least of which is the desire of all involved parties to stay in government and the prime minister's desire to remain the prime minister. However, there are fewer incentives for the formation of alliances in presidential multiparty systems (Mainwaring, 1993), and more purposeful elite intervention in CS can be an important tool by which to build such alliances.

Conclusions

In this research note, we highlight major initial hypotheses from our ongoing research to provide the background toward understanding why there are crucial differences between transitional and institutionalized polities and how that may affect the CS procedures. When it comes to CS, the peculiarities of transitional political systems provide different contexts that differently constrain actor choice and bargaining compared to institutionalized democracies. We highlight four key differences: political uncertainty, party organization, strategic complexity of the electoral system and the imperative for pact and alliance formation. While we certainly expect variation in CS procedures within both types of systems (transitional and institutionalized), we hypothesize that institutionalized democracies on average provide a more permissive environment for the adoption of inclusive legislative CS procedures than transitional democracies due to the above differences.

As the burgeoning study of CS procedures advances, we argue that scholars should seriously consider the differences between transitional and institutionalized polities when investigating the determinants of legislative CS procedures. We also stress that the genesis of CS procedures in post-authoritarian environments is important to analyze because founding transitional moments help explain not only the CS procedures initially adopted but may also create a certain path dependency (Panebianco, 1988). In presenting this research note we propose the further testing of these variables to account for variation across polity types (institutionalized versus transitional democracies) and among transitional political systems.

Note

1 This is part of a larger project that develops and tests a framework for understanding the determinants of CS procedures in transitional polities. We explore how within transitional systems distinct transitional environments, including historical legacies, condition party choice of CS procedures.

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