

Discussion: *Money in Politis* Conference

Connections, Gender, and Access to State-Facilitated
Private-Sector Development

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2022-06-16

Overview

- Private sector (and small businesses) as an engine for economic growth
- Importance of political connections for individual business successes
- **Highly relevant research**
 - countries leaving growth potential on the table

Intro & Framing of the paper

- Emphasize the importance and policy relevance of the paper
- Connections to work on capacity & informal sector growth

Intro & Framing of the paper

- Is it really about political connections? Is it about preferential treatment/discrimination?
- Why gender? What is the connection to pol. connections?
- What are the motivations and political incentives behind the discrimination (or are there any)?

Research Setting

- Need much more detail on the research context
- What is the economic and political environment?

Research Setting

Ethics

- Discussion of non-intrusiveness
- Implications for generalizability
- Power

Treatment

- *How relevant is the treatment?*
- Can the t-shirt be cheap-talk?
- What is the generalizability of this treatment?

Results

Is it all about the women?

Table 4: Average treatment effects: Interactive effect

	Duration of visit (minutes) (1)	Number of visits required (2)	Number of people spoken to (3)	Outcomes		
				Application rejected (unable to be submitted) (4)	Application deposited successfully (5)	Number of follow-up calls required (6)
Politically connected	-12.846 (13.656)	0.012 (0.119)	0.324* (0.221)	-0.128 (0.099)	0.128 (0.099)	0.105 (0.219)
Female applicant	-12.001 (13.509)	0.285*** (0.119)	-0.219 (0.219)	0.172** (0.100)	-0.172** (0.100)	-0.165 (0.225)
Politically connected × female applicant	6.553 (21.225)	-0.326* (0.185)	-0.211 (0.344)	-0.155 (0.155)	0.155 (0.155)	-0.252 (0.351)
Control group mean	98.959	1.075	1.767	0.275	0.725	1.541
Control group std. error	(8.666)	(0.071)	(0.150)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.135)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	183	159	183	159	159	136

Notes: Each specification is estimated using OLS. Specifications include fixed effects for randomization block and permit type. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$ from two-sided tests and pre-registered one-sided tests.

Results – Minor

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Outcome 4 & 5 seem to be the inverse of each other