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Shijie Lu , Koushyar Rajavi , Isaac Dinner

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Shijie Lu,[a] Koushyar Rajavi,[b] Isaac Dinner[c]

[a] Department of Marketing, Bauer College of Business, University of Houston, Houston, Texas 77204; [b] Department of Marketing, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia 30308; [c] INDEED, Austin, Texas 78750
Contact: slu@central.uh.edu, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4180-6022 (SL); krajavi3@gatech.edu,
 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9325-3557 (KR); isaac@isaacdinner.com, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5579-7593 (ID)

Abstract. The rise of over-the-top (OTT) video streaming services has raised the question of how this new form of digital media affects consumer search for pirated content. We address this question by using Netflix's unexpected announcement of a global market expansion in January 2016 and the subsequent block by the primary telecommunications firm in Indonesia as an exogenous shock to the supply of OTT services in that country. Using synthetic control methods, we compare the change in piracy search between Indonesia and 40 Asian countries where Netflix simultaneously entered and remained available. Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia leads to a 19.7% increase in search for pirated movies and TV shows in Indonesia, relative to the other countries, suggesting a net substitution of piracy for OTT services. Comparison of treatment effects between exclusive and nonexclusive content shows that the treatment effect is driven by both a combination of an expansion of the market for piracy and a substitution between piracy and OTT services. We also find that the treatment effect is stronger for less dialogue-oriented content, which is consistent with the greater appeal of dialogue-light content to non–English-speaking consumers.

1. Introduction

In 2018, the Video Advertising Bureau estimated that 71% of U.S. households accessed media through an over-the-top (OTT) media service and that the number of U.S. households that solely use OTT services rapidly increased from 5 million in 2013 to more than 14 million in 2017 (Video Advertising Bureau 2018). The growing popularity of OTT services in the United States also coincides with an increasingly large number of OTT service providers globally. Although U.S. consumers are likely most familiar with Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Prime, there exist a substantial number of international options at widely affordable price points: Spuul is popular in India, Showmax in South Africa, and Viaplay in Finland. There are also growing niche players focused on specific genres such as horror (Shudder) or cinematic classics (Mubi). The popular press speculates that the introduction of these high value, low cost, media services can help bring down global piracy (ZDNet 2016). However, these arguments are largely correlational and have not been supported by rigorous empirical evidence.

Theoretically, OTT media services may affect piracy in two opposing ways. First, the introduction of a reasonably priced on-demand substitute may be so attractive that many consumers will discontinue consuming pirated content in favor of the OTT service. It is therefore possible that the introduction of OTT services will induce the piracy market to shrink, suggesting a substitution effect. Prior research suggests that consumers may turn from piracy to legal channels for any number of reasons. For example, unlike piracy channels, which often require consumers to proactively search for desired content, legal digital distribution channels significantly lower the search cost (Hennig-Thurau et al. 2007). Other possible reasons include the guaranteed high-quality video content available on OTT platforms and the lack of legal, moral, or technical risks typically associated with pirated content (Hennig-Thurau et al. 2007, Danaher et al. 2010, Smith and Telang 2016). Second, the market for pirated content may increase as a result of OTT services. In particular, word of mouth (WOM) and promotional activities may spread product information associated with OTT services, leading consumers to search for alternative outlets. For example, an article about female inmates in the *New York Times,* during the promotion of the

show *Orange Is the New Black* (Deziel 2014), may have triggered consumers' awareness of and interest in the show and consequently driven some consumers to watch the show from piracy sites instead of Netflix. This suggests a market expansion effect of OTT services on piracy. Because both substitution and market expansion effects may occur, whether the introduction of an OTT service will lead to a decrease or an increase in the demand for piracy is not clear.

The main goal of this research is to quantify the effect of OTT services on consumer search for piracy by examining a unique natural experiment. On January 6, 2016, Netflix announced that it would immediately become available in 130 new countries (41 in Asia), including Indonesia (Minaya and Sharma 2016). However, on January 27, 2016, the dominant telecommunications provider in Indonesia blocked the Netflix service because of governmental concerns (Yuniar 2016). In this natural experiment, we define the treatment to be Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia, which provided a natural shock to the availability of OTT services in Indonesia. Accordingly, Indonesia is the only country in which Netflix entered but was subsequently blocked and thus is the only treated unit. The remaining 40 countries in Asia, where Netflix entered at the same time and remained available, constitute a control group.

To investigate the effect of the treatment on piracy demand, we collected monthly piracy search data from Google for a sample of 304 Netflix titles, including both movies and TV shows, in 41 Asian countries (including Indonesia) between October 2014 and June 2016. We begin by considering a difference-in-differences (DiD) model, which compares the relative change in search for pirated content (hereafter called piracy search) between Indonesia and the 40 control countries before and after treatment. The results show a significantly positive short-term effect of the treatment on piracy search in Indonesia relative to the 40 control countries. Nevertheless, the path of piracy search in control countries does not match well with Indonesia during the pretreatment period from October 2014 to December 2015. As such, in the main analysis, we use a synthetic control method (Abadie et al. 2010, 2015), which Athey and Imbens (2017, p. 9) call "arguably the most important innovation in the evaluation literature in the last 15 years." The synthetic control method extends the DiD framework by allowing the effect of unobserved confounders on the outcome to vary over time (Abadie et al. 2010). With this approach, we construct a synthetic control country by allowing different potential control countries to have different weights. We then compare the change in search volume in Indonesia with that in the synthetic control country to estimate the treatment effect.

We find that Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia leads to a 19.7% increase in search for pirated movies and TV shows in Indonesia relative to the other 40 countries where Netflix entered and remained available, suggesting a net substitution effect of OTT services on piracy. Additional support comes from the observation that the difference between Indonesia and these other countries disappears when alternative OTT services became available in Indonesia. However, despite the net displacement between OTT services and piracy, do OTT services also expand the piracy market?

We provide evidence of the market expansion effect by investigating the differential effect of the treatment between original content exclusively distributed by Netflix and nonoriginal content licensed by Netflix, which is also available on other legal distribution channels. If the positive effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search is driven solely by substitution, we expect this effect to be stronger for original content than for nonoriginal content. This is because nonoriginal content is available on multiple legal distribution channels, whereas original content is exclusive to Netflix, implying a higher level of substitution between Netflix and piracy for original content. Conversely, if the introduction of OTT services also expands the piracy market, we expect the associated negative effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search to be stronger for original content than for nonoriginal content because of increased WOM and a higher promotional effort for original content. In essence, the existence of a substitution effect alone would indicate that Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia results in a more positive effect on piracy search for original than nonoriginal content. Our finding of a less positive treatment effect for original than nonoriginal content is consistent with the coexistence of both a substitution and a market expansion effect rather than just a substitution effect.

We also explore the moderating role of dialogue orientation in the effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search. Given that most Netflix titles (96.7%) are not in the local languages of the 41 Asian countries, less dialogue-oriented titles tend to be more appealing to Asian consumers because of lower language barriers. As a result, we expect a stronger substitution effect of the availability of OTT service on piracy search for less dialogue-oriented titles. For each title, we measure the degree of dialogue orientation using the average number of words per minute. We find a greater treatment effect for less dialogue-oriented titles using multiple methods of classifying dialogue orientation, which offers evidence of the hypothesized moderating effect of dialogue orientation.

We contribute to the piracy literature by providing new evidence for the substitution of media

consumption between legitimate and illegitimate channels. Specifically, we show a positive effect of the unavailability of an OTT service on the search for pirated content. Compared with previous studies, we identify the effect based on an exogenous supply shock at the service, rather than content level, which makes the control less likely to be affected by the shock and therefore provides a cleaner setting for identification. We quantify the treatment effect using a synthetic control method, which extends the commonly used DiD method by selecting the control in a more data-driven manner. We also examine the moderating effects of content exclusivity and dialogue orientation, both of which are novel.

2. Related Literature

This article draws from the literature on digital piracy in marketing, economics, and information systems. Early research on digital piracy primarily focused on the software and music industries and generally found displacement between legal and illegal sales (Givon et al. 1995, Rob and Waldfogel 2006, Zentner 2006).[1] More recent empirical studies on video piracy reveal mixed evidence on how piracy affects sales. Rob and Waldfogel (2007) examine the effect of piracy on DVD purchases and find that video piracy has a relatively higher rate of substitution but a more modest overall effect on sales than music piracy. Using a longitudinal survey data of German consumers, Hennig-Thurau et al. (2007) also find that illegal consumer file sharing significantly hurts theater visits, DVD rentals, and DVD purchases. Ma et al. (2014) show that prerelease piracy negatively affects box office revenues. Danaher and Smith (2014) find that the shutdown of a major piracy site positively affects digital sales and rentals of movies from major studios, again suggesting a substitution of piracy for legal content consumption. By contrast, when examining the relationship between DVD sales and the availability of a pirated copy during a broadcast TV window after theatrical release, Smith and Telang (2009) find no evidence of the detrimental effects of piracy. Peukert et al. (2017) find a negative effect of the shutdown of a popular piracy site on box office revenues of an average movie and explain their findings by the WOM effect of online piracy. Lu et al. (2020) find a positive relationship between postrelease piracy and box office revenues and show that WOM drives this positive relationship. Following Peukert et al. (2017) and Lu et al. (2020), we theorize a potential market expansion effect of the introduction of a legal distribution channel on illegal content consumption through an increase in associated WOM and promotion.

Previous research suggests that piracy consumption incurs multiple types of nonfinancial costs, although accessing content through piracy is generally considered *free* (Hennig-Thurau et al. 2007, Danaher et al. 2010, Smith and Telang 2016). The most obvious cost is legal. In particular, there are file sharing cases where individuals have been fined upward of $675,000 (BBC 2012). There are also nonfinancial costs that include learning how to use specific software to download content from torrent sites. Technical costs may exist because of the possibility of downloading malware when using torrent software, and time spent finding the online content creates a search cost. Finally, there are moral costs about whether piracy is equivalent to theft. These costs provide the theoretical underpinnings for why the introduction of a legal distribution channel, such as an OTT service, may decrease the demand for piracy and thus have a substitution effect.

Most previous piracy research focuses on how piracy affects demand for legal content and relatively less attention has been devoted to examining how legal distribution channels affect the demand for piracy. Three studies have made notable progress in this area. Danaher et al. (2010) use the removal of NBC shows from the Apple iTunes store to identify the effect of a digital distribution channel on sales from both physical channels and piracy channels. Their results show that the removal of NBC content led to an 11.4% increase in demand for NBC's pirated content but no change in demand for NBC's DVD content. Danaher et al. (2015) use the addition of ABC shows to Hulu in 2008 as a natural shock and find that piracy decreased by 20% for the four weeks after the addition of ABC shows. De Matos et al. (2018) examine the effect of OTT services on piracy consumption by randomly giving a sample of active cable and BitTorrent users temporary access to a television cinema package. They find that the provision of this television add-on increased television viewing and decreased general Internet use but did not significantly decrease BitTorrent downloads.

Our research extends these three studies in several ways. First, we propose a new and relatively cleaner identification strategy to examine the effect of an OTT service on piracy using the service-level rather than content-level supply shock. A focus on the supply shock at the service level helps alleviate concerns about spillover effects. That is, the treatment may affect the behavior of consumers in the control group. For example, the removal of NBC content from iTunes (Danaher et al. 2010) may have affected consumers' viewing behavior of content produced by control channels. Second, we use a synthetic control method, which extends the DiD method by selecting the control in a more data-driven manner (Abadie et al. 2010, 2015). The synthetic control method is suitable for this empirical context because of the relatively large

donor pool (40 control countries). Research has also used this method to assess the effect of TV advertising on online chatter (Tirunillai and Tellis 2017), the effect of opening a physical showroom on sales (Li 2019), and the engagement and spillover effects of newspaper paywalls (Pattabhiramaiah et al. 2019). Third, we explore the heterogeneity of the treatment effect by content exclusivity and dialogue orientation.

3. Natural Experiment
3.1. Netflix and Its Global Market Expansion
Netflix was founded in the United States in August 1997 with an initial business model focused on DVD rental by mail. In 2007, Netflix expanded its business by introducing streaming video on demand via the Internet (Hardy 2007). With the growth in consumer demand for streaming content, Netflix began shifting away from its initial core business of renting DVDs while investing heavily in the streaming platform. After the market showed traction for streaming content, Netflix began slowly expanding into international markets. In 2010, Canada became the first international market in which Netflix's streaming services became available (Nowak 2010). In 2011, Netflix became available in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean (Netflix 2011), followed by expansion to select European countries in 2012 (PR Newswire 2012). By the end of 2015, Netflix was available to 65 million members across 60 countries (Carter 2015). Despite the initial success of global market expansion, Netflix was still only available in less than one third of all potential global markets.

On January 6, 2016, at the Consumer Electronics Show, Netflix announced that its service would be immediately available to 130 additional countries around the world (Netflix 2016).[2] This was a major market expansion of its services, as overnight it more than tripled the number of countries in which it operated. As a result, Netflix became available globally in all countries except China, Crimea, North Korea, and Syria (Stelter 2016).

3.2. Failure to Launch in Indonesia
Despite Netflix's intention to remain available in 130 new countries, it failed to do so in Indonesia. On January 27, 2016, Indonesia's state-owned telecommunications provider, Telekomunikasi Indonesia (or Telkom), blocked access to Netflix because Netflix did not have a permit to operate as a content provider in Indonesia (Yuniar 2016). Telkom also shared the Indonesian Film Censorship Board's concerns about violent and adult content on Netflix. Although other telecommunications options are available in Indonesia, Telkom is clearly the dominant network. OTT services are most cost effective for consumers on fixed lines, and Telkom has a near monopoly of wired

networks, commanding 85.7% market share as of 2016 (Frost 2018). The second player, Indosat, and other smaller providers, had a primary corporate focus on voice and SMS instead of data, which make them a poor fit for OTT service use. The block by Telkom had a clear impact on Netflix's availability in Indonesia and was not anticipated by Netflix. Using data from Google Trends, we show in Figure 1 that searches for the term Netflix spiked on January 6, 2016, and again at the end of January 2016, when Netflix was blocked in Indonesia. These spikes suggest that neither Netflix's intended introduction nor Telkom's block was anticipated by Indonesian consumers. After the block, searches for Netflix dropped considerably, nearly reverting to the preintroduction levels when Netflix was not available in Indonesia.

Netflix's failure to launch served as a natural shock to the availability of OTT services in Indonesia. We therefore define the treatment as Netflix's *failure to launch* in Indonesia.[3] Indonesia is the only treated country where Netflix entered but was subsequently blocked. The remaining countries constitute the control set in which Netflix both entered and remained available.

Netflix remained largely unavailable in Indonesia until April 2017, when it reached an agreement with Telkom (Cher 2017). Through this agreement, Telkom formed a strategic partnership with Netflix, which resulted in the unblocking of Netflix's content in Indonesia on April 12, 2017 (Maulani 2017). The period between Netflix's block in Indonesia on January 27, 2016, and unblock on April 12, 2017, creates an appropriate posttreatment period for a natural experiment. However, Telkom allowed several local competitors of Netflix to enter the Indonesian market between January 2016 and April 2017. The most important entry was by iflix, a Malaysian streaming platform targeting emerging markets in Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa. Iflix entered Indonesia on June 16, 2016 (Piar Consulting 2016), suggesting that the supply of OTT services increased after June 16, 2016. To avoid any confounding effects caused by the availability of other OTT services in Indonesia, we narrow the posttreatment window to the period between January 27, 2016, and June 16, 2016, during which OTT services were largely unavailable in Indonesia. We henceforth focus on a short-term rather than long-term treatment effect in this research.

4. Data
We collect data on multiple countries, titles, and measures. For countries, we compare piracy demand in Indonesia with a broader set of Asian countries where Netflix entered and remained available. For video content, we focus on Netflix titles that were widely available in these countries. For piracy demand,

Figure 1. Interest in Netflix in Indonesia over Time

we collect data on piracy search at the title–country–month level using multiple phrases.

4.1. Control Countries

Although all other 129 countries in which Netflix entered and remained available could serve as a control unit, to make the scope of data collection manageable, we focus on the 40 Asian countries in which Netflix was introduced in January 2016 and remained available. The list includes 10 countries in Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam); 5 countries in East Asia (Hong Kong, Macau, Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan); 8 countries in South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka); 12 countries in West Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen); and 5 countries in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).[4]

We calculate the number of Internet users for each country by collecting statistics of national populations from the World Bank and Internet penetration rate from the International Telecommunication Union. As of 2016, Indonesia was the third-largest country in Asia, with a population of 261 million and an Internet penetration rate of 20.4%. This implies a total number of 53 million Internet users, which is a country's potential market size for piracy consumption. The number of Internet users in Indonesia is also larger than that in other Southeast Asian countries: Vietnam has 49 million Internet users, the Philippines has 45 million, Thailand has 29 million, and Malaysia has 21 million.

4.2. Netflix Titles

We focus on Netflix titles that were available in Indonesia throughout the posttreatment period (January 27, 2016–June 16, 2016) to limit the scope of the study. We use the Wayback Machine on Finder.com's web pages to retrieve a list of 703 titles, including both movies and TV shows, available on Netflix in Indonesia in January 2016. Because Netflix frequently updates

its catalog, not all 703 titles may have been available throughout the entire posttreatment period. Because the Wayback Machine does not provide a full snapshot of Finder.com's Netflix title lists in Indonesia after June 2016, we instead collect Netflix titles that were available in Indonesia in March 2018 from an alternative source, JustWatch (2,189 titles).[5] We find that 304 of the 703 titles remained in Netflix's catalog in Indonesia as of March 2018. Online Appendix A provides the names of all 304 Netflix titles. We assume that a title was available throughout the posttreatment period if it appeared in Netflix's catalog in both January 2016 and March 2018. For these 304 titles, approximately one third (109) are TV shows and two thirds (195) are movies, and 16% of the titles are Netflix originals (shows exclusively distributed by Netflix).[6]

We further check the availability of the 304 titles in the control countries. Although similar retrieval of Netflix titles across all 40 countries proved untenable, we do recover the list of titles for a small set of countries neighboring Indonesia (India, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam) using the same method as for Indonesia. We find that all 304 titles were available in at least one of these four countries and therefore focus on these titles in the main analysis.[7]

4.3. Data on Piracy Search

Previous marketing and economics research has shown that keyword search frequency on online search engines serves as a suitable proxy for (or a strong predictor of) consumer demand in contexts such as the automotive market (Hu et al. 2014), movies and TV shows (Liu et al. 2016), news media (Lambrecht and Misra 2017), recreational cannabis (Wang et al. 2019), and video games (Xiong and Bharadwaj 2014). Studies in psychology, public heath, and political science have also found that Google search data are highly correlated with a variety of behaviors, such as suicides (Ma-Kellams et al. 2016), smoking cessation (Ayers et al. 2014), voting decisions (Stephens-Davidowitz 2014), and drug-related crimes (Gamma et al. 2016). Following previous research, we use consumer search for piracy-related queries on Google as a proxy for

piracy demand. Specifically, we use Google Ads' (formerly Google Adwords) keyword planner to collect search data for each of the 304 Netflix titles in each country (the 40 control countries and Indonesia). Google was the dominant search engine in Indonesia, accounting for 96.5% of all search in 2016 (Statcounter 2018). Google Ads reports monthly country-specific search volume for keywords. At the time of our study, we were able to use Google Ads to collect search data from as early as October 2014 because Google Ads' Keyword Planner only reports data for the past four years.

We use Google Correlate and Google Trends to identify queries that consumers most frequently use when trying to illegally download or stream movies and TV shows. To capture search for both streaming piracy and methods requiring a download, such as torrents, for a title named X, we collect monthly search volume for five keywords using the exact match method in Google Ads: "X torrent," "watch X free," "X download," "X free," and "stream X free." We then aggregate the search volume across these five keywords as the monthly piracy search volume for each title–country combination from October 2014 to June 2016. In some situations, titles overlap with terms that are not specific to the show of interest. This occurs when the title, such as *The Fall,* is a phrase commonly used for another purpose, or that the title refers to other downloadable products, such as video games (*Star Trek*), songs (*Creep*), or music albums (*Utopia*). In these cases, we include additional words in the search keyword to ensure that we accurately measure piracy activity for the exact movie or TV show in Netflix's catalog. Specifically, we instead collect data for "The Fall series," "Star Trek movie," "Creep movie," and "Utopia series." Despite this collection filter, inspection of the search data indicated serious anomalies for two titles: *Catch Me If You Can* and *Piku*; thus, we dropped these two titles and focused on the remaining 302 titles in subsequent analyses. In Online Appendix B, we show the robustness of the findings to the inclusion of *Catch Me If You Can* and *Piku* in sampled titles.

During the data period (October 2014–June 2016), the monthly piracy search volume of an individual title in Indonesia had a mean of 52.5 and a maximum of 4,000 searches, whereas the 40 control countries had a mean of 15.2 and a maximum of 5,800 searches per title. This suggests that the mean of monthly piracy search volume across all 302 titles is $52.5 \times 302 = 15,855$ in Indonesia and $15.2 \times 302 = 4,590$ in the 40 control countries. Four of the top 10 titles with the highest piracy search volume in Indonesia overlap with the highest search volume in the 40 control countries (*The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring*, *How to Train Your Dragon*, *Arrow*, and *Gravity*), suggesting some discrepancy in the piracy search

interest between Indonesian consumers and representative consumers from the 40 control countries.

We also use Google Ads to collect several additional variables related to consumer search. These variables include the monthly search volume of a title-associated keyword in each country, the monthly search volume of the keyword "Netflix," and the monthly search volume of keywords related to piracy ("torrent," "movie torrent," "film torrent," "TV show torrent," and "TV series torrent"). To gauge the search interest of the Netflix titles in the control countries, for each title we calculate the number of control countries that have positive search volume of title-associated keywords during the data period. Across the 302 titles, each title, on average, has positive search volume in 39 control countries (median = 40), suggesting the popularity of these titles in the control countries.

To ensure that piracy search is a reasonable proxy for piracy demand, we collect additional data on visits to piracy sites related to film or TV from MUSO, a leading piracy-tracking company. We check the correlation of monthly country-specific piracy search volume from Google Ads with the piracy visit data from MUSO. Here, piracy search volume refers to the total search volume of piracy-related keywords used in the study ("torrent," "download," "watch free," and "stream free"). As MUSO data are at the daily level, we aggregate the piracy visit in each country to the monthly level to be comparable with the search data. This correlation check is based on data from January 2017 (the first month in MUSO's database) to October 2019 (34 months) in all 41 Asian countries, which results in 1,394 observations in total. Piracy search volume is strongly correlated with piracy visits related to film or TV ($r = 0.651$). The correlation between search volume and piracy visits related to film or TV is also strong in Indonesia ($r = 0.587$). These correlations provide empirical support for the use of piracy search volume as a proxy for piracy demand. Unfortunately, MUSO's piracy visit data cannot be used as the main dependent variable in this research because MUSO's data begin in January 2017, whereas the posttreatment period in this study ends in June 2016.

5. Empirical Analysis

We conduct two sets of empirical analyses to examine the effect of Netflix's failure to launch and subsequent unavailability in Indonesia on consumer search for piracy. We first present a DiD model and then relax the identifying assumptions of a DiD model by using a synthetic control method. We proceed by discussing the suitability of the synthetic control method to this empirical context, highlighting identifying assumptions, and finally presenting estimation results.

5.1. DiD Analysis

To examine the effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search, we first consider a DiD model in which we use the 40 other Asian countries where Netflix simultaneously entered as individual control markets. We consider the following specification:

$$y_{it} = \beta Event_t + \gamma Event_t \times Indonesia_i + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} represents aggregate normalized piracy search volume in country i ($i \in [1, \ldots, 41]$) at month t ($t \in [-15, \ldots -1, 1, \ldots 5]$). We exclude observations in January 2016 ($t = 0$) to be consistent with the definition of pretreatment period from October 2014 to December 2015.

We calculate the normalized piracy search volume y_{it} in two steps. First, we aggregate the piracy search volume for each title k, denoted by y_{ikt}, across the 302 titles to obtain country- and month-specific raw piracy search volume denoted by y_{it}^R. Second, we normalize the piracy search volume by dividing y_{it}^R by the level at the month of intervention ($t = 0$). In other words, $y_{it} = y_{it}^R / y_{i0}^R$, where $y_{it}^R = \sum_k y_{ikt}$. As the raw piracy search volume is generally greater in countries with larger populations such as India and Indonesia, the normalized value allows the dependent variable and thus the estimated coefficient (effect size) to be comparable across countries.[8] For ease of exposition, we refer to y_{it} as the *piracy search volume* hereinafter.

In Equation (1), $Event_t$ is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the posttreatment period and 0 otherwise; α_i stands for country fixed effects; and β captures the overall change in piracy search, across all countries, after the treatment (Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia). The main parameter of interest is γ, which captures the change of piracy search in Indonesia after the treatment relative to that in the control countries. A positive γ would indicate that Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia led to an increase in piracy search there compared with the control countries, averaged across the five posttreatment months.

We present the DiD estimation results in Table 1. Given the small number of treated units (one in this setting), the typical asymptotic inference based on a large number of policy changes tends to bias the estimates on standard errors (Conley and Taber 2011). We therefore follow the literature to report the p value of γ from permutation inference in addition to the p value from robust standard error. The results show that Netflix's unavailability led to a 17.9% increase in piracy search in Indonesia relative to the control countries ($\gamma = 0.179$, $p < 0.10$). We show in Online Appendix C that alternative variations of the DiD model lead to qualitatively similar results.

A critical identifying assumption for the DiD method is that, in the absence of intervention, control and

Table 1. Results from the DiD Analysis

	Dependent variable = normalized piracy search volume
Event (β)	−0.085
Event × Indonesia (γ)	0.179
Country fixed effects	Yes
p value of γ	
Robust standard error	0.012
Permutation inference	0.098
Number of observations	840
R^2	0.409

Note. The p value from permutation inference equals $4/41 = 0.098$.

treatment groups will have parallel trends in average outcomes during the pretreatment period. If the parallel trends assumption fails, the control group will not be a good counterfactual for Indonesia, and therefore the DiD estimates will be biased. Although the parallel trends assumption is not directly testable, researchers usually have more confidence in its validity when they find that the average outcomes of the treated and control units follow a similar path in pretreatment periods. We follow Danaher et al. (2010) and examine this pattern by plotting the predicted monthly piracy search volume in Indonesia and the control countries using the following model specification:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{t=-15}^{5} \beta_t Month_t + \sum_{t=-15}^{5} \gamma_t Month_t \times Indonesia_i + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where $Month_t$ is an indicator variable for month t and the other variables are the same as in Equation (1). If the parallel trends assumption holds, γ_t will be equal to 0 for each pretreatment month. We plot the predicted monthly piracy search volume for Indonesia and the control countries in Figure 2, where piracy levels in Indonesia are given by $\beta_t + \gamma_t + \bar{y}_{it}(T)$ and piracy levels in control countries are $\beta_t + \bar{y}_{it}(C)$. Here, $\bar{y}_{it}(T)$ and $\bar{y}_{it}(C)$ are the average baseline piracy searches during the pretreatment period for the treated and control countries. The patterns in Figure 2 do not strongly support the parallel trends assumption because the trend of piracy search in the control countries deviates from the trend in Indonesia before the treatment. We further test whether $\gamma_t = 0$ for $t = -15, \ldots, -1$. Of the 15 tests, 13 are rejected at the 5% level. A Wald test of the null hypothesis that $\gamma_t = 0$ for all t before January 2016 is also rejected at the 0.1% level.

The lack of strong evidence for a parallel trend in the DiD model using aggregate controls leaves two options. We can either identify one or a few selected countries from the 40 countries that fit Indonesia

Figure 2. Predicted Piracy Search Volume Between Indonesia and Control Countries

better before the treatment or use a synthetic control method. We investigate the former option in Online Appendix C, where we provide additional model-free evidence of the treatment effect using individual control markets. However, this option of manually selecting control countries requires researchers to make ad-hoc assumptions. For example, at what level of fit do we decide if a country is appropriate for the control? Should we assign equal or different weights to those selected countries when forming the control? If nonequal weights are preferred, how should we determine the weights? These ad hoc assumptions rely on subjective criteria and therefore make the first option unappealing (Abadie et al. 2010). We therefore focus on the latter option, the synthetic control method.

5.2. Synthetic Control Method
The synthetic control method extends the conventional DiD framework by allowing the effect of unobserved confounders on the outcome to vary over time (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Abadie et al. 2010). By using matching methods conditioned on pretreatment covariates and outcomes, the synthetic control method helps balance the effect of potential time-varying confounders between the treated and control groups (Xu 2017). Whereas the DiD analysis assigns equal weights to all control countries, the synthetic control method estimates weights for each of the 40 countries in a data-driven manner so that the resulting synthetic Indonesia best approximates the actual Indonesia on stated features during the pretreatment period. After constructing the synthetic control country, we calculate the treatment effect as the average gap between the predicted piracy search volume in the synthetic control and the actual piracy search volume in Indonesia during the posttreatment period.

5.2.1. Model. Following Abadie et al. (2010, 2015), we define the synthetic control country as a weighted

average of the J countries in the control group. Let $i = 1$ represent the focal treated country (Indonesia) and $i \in [2, \ldots, J+1]$ represent the potential control countries. The predicted outcome in the synthetic control is represented by $\sum_{i=2}^{J+1} w_{i*} y_{it}$, where $W = (w_2, \ldots, w_{J+1})$ is a $(J \times 1)$ vector of country-specific nonnegative weights ($w_i \in [0,1]$ and $\sum_{i=2}^{J+1} w_i = 1$). We select the optimal weights (W^*) to minimize the difference between the pretreatment characteristics of the treated country and the synthetic control during the pretreatment period. Let X_1 denote an $(M \times 1)$ vector of pretreatment characteristics for the treated country and X_0 denote the corresponding $(M \times J)$ matrix of pretreatment characteristics for the J control countries. Then, we obtain the optimal weights W^* by minimizing

$$\sum_{m=1}^{M} v_m (X_{1m} - X_{0m} W')^2, \qquad (3)$$

where X_{1m} represents the value of mth pretreatment characteristic of the treated country, X_{0m} is the corresponding vector of the same characteristic of the J control countries, and v_m is a weight measuring the relative importance of each pretreatment characteristic in matching the treated unit and the synthetic control. According to Abadie et al. (2010, 2015), a pretreatment characteristic with greater prediction power on the outcome should be assigned with a larger v_m. Specifically, v_m can be chosen by minimizing the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) of the outcome variable in the pretreatment period.

Given the optimal weights (W^*) derived from minimizing Equation (3), the synthetic control estimator for the treatment effect in posttreatment period t is given by

$$\hat{\alpha}_{1t} = y_{1t} - \sum_{i=2}^{J+1} w_i^* y_{it}, \qquad (4)$$

where $\hat{\alpha}_{1t}$ is the gap between the treated unit and the synthetic control.

5.2.2. Matching Characteristics. Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) recommend using predictors of posttreatment outcomes (piracy search volume of Netflix titles) as pretreatment characteristics. We therefore include the following country-specific variables as pretreatment characteristics for constructing the synthetic control: *title search volume* (monthly search volume for all sampled Netflix titles), *interest in Netflix* (monthly search volume for the keyword "Netflix"), *interest in general piracy* (monthly search volume for piracy-related keywords mentioned in Section 4.3), *interest in competitors* (monthly search volume for keywords of Netflix's major competitors[9]), and *Internet users* (annual). Following Abadie et al. (2010, 2015), we also include the pretreatment outcome (*piracy search volume*) in X_0 and X_1.[10]

5.2.3. Identifying Assumptions. For the synthetic control method to yield valid results, four identifying assumptions must be met. First, the treated and the synthetic control country should exhibit similar patterns in the pretreatment period (Abadie et al. 2010). Subsequently, we provide evidence that the gap in piracy search volume between Indonesia and the synthetic control country is close to zero before the treatment.

The second assumption is that only the treated unit (Indonesia) undergoes the treatment—Netflix's failure to launch—and any control country did not. An extensive search confirms that none of the 40 control countries in Asia experienced Netflix unavailability during the intervention period (February 2016–June 2016).

Third, according to Abadie et al. (2010), the treatment that occurred in the focal country should not affect the outcome in the control countries and vice versa. In other words, there should be no spillover effects of the treatment (or lack of the treatment). The spillover effect might occur if Indonesians used virtual private networks (VPNs) to access Netflix through the service in control countries after the block of Netflix in the domestic market. However, cross-country access was unlikely during the period of analysis because, in January 2016, Netflix expended substantial effort to prevent customers from bypassing country lines using unblocking tools such as VPNs (Verge 2016). Although we are unable to fully verify this assumption, there is substantial evidence that Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia had little influence on piracy demand in other countries because of language, cultural, and regulatory differences, as well as Netflix's increasing emphasis on setting virtual country restrictions. The spillover effect can also occur if Indonesians tend to read news from foreign countries, which enables the news about Netflix and its content in these foreign countries to affect Indonesians' piracy behavior through WOM. We investigate this issue in Online Appendix D and provide evidence that mitigates the concerns about spillovers of WOM.

The fourth assumption requires that there are no alternative changes to either the treated or control countries during the posttreatment period. This implies that, at a minimum, no other alternative OTT service providers should enter during this time period. If alternative events occur, the estimates would actually measure the combined effects of the focal intervention and these alternative ones. As discussed in Section 3.2, we choose a posttreatment window during which there were no significant events that might affect piracy in Indonesia, so this assumption holds. In Section 5.3, we further verify this assumption for the countries that contribute to the formation of the synthetic control country. The price charged by Netflix may also be heterogenous across countries, although as shown in Online Appendix D, that does not appear to be the case.

5.3. Results
We construct the synthetic control country for Indonesia from a collection of 40 Asian countries by matching

Table 2. Country Weights in the Synthetic Indonesia

Country	Weight	Country	Weight	Country	Weight
Afghanistan	—	Laos	—	South Korea	—
Armenia	—	Macau	—	Sri Lanka	—
Azerbaijan	—	Malaysia	—	Taiwan	—
Bahrain	—	Maldives	—	Tajikistan	—
Bangladesh	—	Mongolia	—	Thailand	0.427
Bhutan	—	Myanmar	—	Timor-Leste	—
Brunei	—	Nepal	—	Turkey	—
Cambodia	—	Oman	—	Turkmenistan	—
Hong Kong	—	Pakistan	—	United Arab Emirates	—
India	0.077	Palestine	0.379	Uzbekistan	—
Iraq	—	Philippines	0.116	Vietnam	—
Kazakhstan	—	Qatar	—	Yemen	—
Kuwait	—	Saudi Arabia	—		
Kyrgyzstan	—	Singapore	—		

pretreatment characteristics from October 2014 to December 2015 (15 months). Table 2 shows the full list of potential control countries and associated weights (w_i^*) in the synthetic Indonesia. The weighting algorithm identifies a synthetic control country that puts substantial weights on four countries: Thailand (0.43), Palestine (0.38), the Philippines (0.12), and India (0.08). These countries appear to be reasonable proxies for Indonesia. For example, Thailand and the Philippines are geographic neighbors of Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia has a large Muslim population, which aligns with the characteristics of Palestine. Although these control countries appear to have high external validity, there exists other countries, such as Malaysia, which are not members of this group. In Online Appendix D, we provide further detail on why some countries that seem similar to Indonesia may not be selected by the synthetic control method. Finally, we also search for notable demand shocks in the four control countries during the posttreatment period as an additional check of the fourth assumption in Section 5.2.3.

Table 3 presents the means of pretreatment characteristics for Indonesia, the synthetic control country, and the 40 control countries. As this table shows, the synthetic control country is more similar to Indonesia than the control with equal weights—which is the control used in the DiD analysis. For example, before the intervention, the total search volume of Netflix titles in an average control country was only 43% of the level in Indonesia. By contrast, the search volume of Netflix titles in the synthetic Indonesia achieves a much better match (94%).

Figure 3 depicts the trajectory of piracy search volume of Netflix titles in Indonesia (solid) and its synthetic counterpart (dashed) over the period of analysis. First, the synthetic control country fits Indonesia reasonably well during the pretreatment period $(t<0)$, providing support for the first assumption in Section 5.2.3. Second, there is a statistically significant downward trend in piracy search volume during the pretreatment period (Indonesia: slope = –0.021, $p = 0.007$; synthetic control country: slope = –0.021, $p = 0.001$).

**Table 3.** Mean of Pretreatment Characteristics

	Indonesia		Average of 40 control countries
	Real	Synthetic	
Piracy Search Volume (y_{it})	0.910	0.921	1.036
Title Search Volume	468,524	442,119	199,861
Interest in Netflix	89,067	72,636	39,154
Interest in General Piracy	92,637	178,646	77,831
Interest in Competitors	37,726	36,717	14,138
Internet Users (2014)	43,627,401	33,726,703	15,332,342
Internet Users (2015)	50,083,428	45,198,475	19,182,583

Note. Piracy search volume in each country is normalized by the level in January 2016.

However, after Netflix's entry into the control countries at $t = 0$, the piracy search volume in the synthetic control country moves further downward and is always below the piracy search volume in Indonesia, which suggests an increase in piracy search volume in Indonesia relative to the synthetic control country after the treatment. Such a divergence in piracy search volume between Indonesia and the synthetic control country is also apparent in the difference in trends after the treatment. The downward trend of piracy search volume in Indonesia is similar before and after the treatment, although the posttreatment slope is not statistically significant (slope = –0.021, $p = 0.541$). The downward trend in piracy search volume in the synthetic control country is steeper after the treatment (slope = –0.057, $p = 0.003$) than beforehand.

The gap plot in Figure 4 illustrates the magnitude of the effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search. The relatively small gap in the first month after the treatment $(t = 1)$ suggests that the effect is not strong initially. However, from March 2016 $(t = 2)$ onward, the effect becomes more pronounced, perhaps because consumers came to realize that the block was not temporary and therefore began seeking piracy to substitute the OTT service. The average gap in piracy search volume between the actual and the synthetic Indonesia totals 0.197 over the five months following Indonesia's Netflix block, which suggests that Netflix's unavailability is associated with a 19.7% increase in piracy search in Indonesia relative to the other 40 countries where Netflix entered and remained available. This effect size is comparable to the 20% decrease in piracy of ABC's content after that content was added to Hulu (Danaher et al. 2015). This comparison is notable despite substantial differences between Hulu and Netflix at the time of each study; Hulu was a free service with only licensed content in 2008, whereas Netflix in 2016 was a paid service with both licensed and original content. In contrast, Danaher et al. (2010) found that the removal of NBC shows from iTunes led to an 11.4% increase in demand for pirated content. This lower magnitude might have occurred because iTunes is merely an a la carte service.

There are at least two possibilities that might lead to an overestimation of the treatment effect. One, if the three-week availability of Netflix in Indonesia in January 2016 generated some demand for content, the gap estimates using data from the five posttreatment months can be a combined effect of Netflix's unavailability from February to June and the short-term operation of Netflix in January. Second, the spike in piracy search in Indonesia in March 2016 may be an outlier, the inclusion of which may result in an overestimated treatment effect. We consider these two possibilities in Online Appendix D and present

Figure 3. Trends of Piracy Search Volume: Indonesia vs. Synthetic Control Country

empirical evidence that neither of them is likely to hold, which suggests that the estimated treatment effect is unlikely to be biased.

We follow the synthetic control literature by using permutation inference to assess the significance of treatment effect (Abadie et al. 2010, 2015; Tirunillai and Tellis 2017).[11] For each country j in the control group ($j = 2, \ldots, 41$), we iteratively estimate the average posttreatment gap in piracy search volume relative to that of the synthetic control of this country. We then use the distribution of these placebo treatment effects to measure the significance of the actual treatment effect.

Two measures are often used to evaluate the significance of the treatment effect obtained from the synthetic control method. The first measure is the ratio of post/pretreatment MSPE obtained from placebo runs across countries (Abadie et al. 2010, 2015; Tirunillai and Tellis 2017). The main advantage of this method is that it does not require choosing a cutoff to determine the inclusion of well-fit placebo tests. In other words, it uses information from all placebo runs. If the post-/pretreatment MSPE ratio is greater for Indonesia than for the other countries, we can confidently reject the null hypothesis that Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia has no effect on piracy search. The pretreatment

MSPE of piracy search in Indonesia is 0.003, whereas the mean and median of pretreatment MSPE among the 40 other countries are 0.072 and 0.012, respectively. As Figure 5 shows, Indonesia has a greater post-/pretreatment MSPE ratio than any of the other 40 countries; thus, the probability of obtaining a post-/pretreatment MSPE ratio as large as Indonesia's is $1/41 = 0.024$, if the event randomly occurred in one of the 41 Asian countries.

The second measure is to simply compare the size of gaps across all countries. The downside of this test is that it may be biased by countries lacking a suitable synthetic control, which typically have a poor pretreatment fit. Figure 6 shows the results from the placebo tests. The gray lines in panel (a) depict the estimated gaps for each of the placebo tests of the 40 control countries, and the black line represents the estimated gap for Indonesia. The figure suggests that, for many countries, the synthetic control method does not provide a good fit for piracy search during the pretreatment period. As Abadie et al. (2010) note, placebo tests with poor pretreatment fit do not provide information to gauge the potential randomness of observing a large posttreatment gap from a country with a good fit before the intervention. We follow

Figure 4. Gaps in Piracy Search Volume Between Indonesia and Synthetic Control Country

Figure 5. (Color online) Ratio of Posttreatment MSPE to Pretreatment MSPE Across All Countries

Abadie et al. (2010) and exclude countries that have a pretreatment MSPE beyond a certain level.

We replot the placebo tests in Figure 6, (b) and (c) by excluding countries with a pretreatment MSPE of more than 10 times and 2 times the MSPE of Indonesia. Among the 31 countries remaining in panel (b), the average posttreatment gap of Indonesia is the third-highest (after Myanmar and Nepal), suggesting a probability of $3/31 = 0.097$ of observing a gap of the magnitude that is equal to or greater than the gap for Indonesia under a random assignment of the treatment in the data. The significance of the positive gap for Indonesia becomes more visible in panel (c) when we lower the cutoff on pretreatment fit to twice that of the MSPE of Indonesia. The average gap for Indonesia is the highest among the 12 countries, suggesting a $1/12 = 0.083$ chance of observing the same gap as Indonesia's if the treatment were randomly assigned to a country.

5.4. Heterogeneous Effects of the Treatment
5.4.1. Moderating Role of Content Exclusivity. We examine the moderating role of content exclusivity to better understand whether the main positive treatment

effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search is driven solely by the substitution effect or by a combination of the substitution effect and the market expansion effect. If the main effect is driven solely by substitution, we expect the positive treatment effect to be stronger for Netflix originals. Unlike nonoriginal content, which is available from multiple legitimate sources, original content is exclusively broadcast on Netflix. Therefore, it is impossible for consumers to find the same show from other legitimate sources if Netflix becomes unavailable. This argument suggests a higher level of substitution between the OTT service and piracy for original content than for nonoriginal content.[12] Let θ_O^S and θ_N^S denote the positive substitution effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search for original and nonoriginal content, respectively. Given the previous reasoning, we expect $\theta_O^S > \theta_N^S > 0$, where the superscript S stands for substitution, the subscript O stands for original content, and the subscript N stands for nonoriginal content.

Theoretically, it is also possible that an OTT service increases demand for piracy because of the increase in

Figure 6. Placebo Tests

Notes. (a) Comparison with placebo gaps from 40 control countries. (b) Comparison with placebo gaps from 30 control countries (discarding countries with pretreatment MSPE 10 times higher than Indonesia's). (c) Comparison with placebo gaps from 11 control countries (discarding countries with pretreatment MSPE two times higher than Indonesia's).

WOM and promotion associated with the introduction of the OTT service, which may drive consumers to seek out the same content provided by the OTT platform through piracy. Because such a market expansion effect is usually more pronounced for the introduction of new products than existing products (Chen et al. 2005), we expect the market expansion mechanism to lead to a more negative effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search for original content than nonoriginal content. Formally, we expect $\theta_O^E < \theta_N^E < 0$, where θ_O^E and θ_N^E denote the potential negative market expansion effects of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search for original and nonoriginal content, respectively, and the superscript E stands for expansion.

This discussion suggests that if only a substitution effect is present, the net effect of the treatment for original content will be stronger than that for nonoriginal content ($\Delta\theta = \Delta\theta^S = \theta_O^S - \theta_N^S > 0$). However, if both effects exist, the net effect for Netflix originals will be either positive or negative, depending on the relative strength of the two effects. Let $\theta_O = \theta_O^S + \theta_O^E$ ($\theta_N = \theta_N^S + \theta_N^E$) denote the net effect for original (nonoriginal) content. When both substitution and market expansion effects exist, the difference in the net effect of treatment between original and nonoriginal content is the same as the difference between the change in piracy substitution and the change in piracy expansion: $\Delta\theta = \theta_O - \theta_N = \Delta\theta^S - \Delta\theta^E$, where $\Delta\theta^S = \theta_O^S - \theta_N^S > 0$ and $\Delta\theta^E = \theta_N^E - \theta_O^E > 0$. If the magnitude of the market expansion effect for original content relative to nonoriginal content ($\Delta\theta^E$) outweighs the magnitude of the substitution effect for original content relative to nonoriginal content ($\Delta\theta^S$), we expect to observe a weaker net effect of treatment on piracy search for original content than nonoriginal content ($\Delta\theta < 0$).

Calculation of the effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search for original and nonoriginal content can be done in at least two ways. The first is to use one synthetic Indonesia as the control country for all titles (in this case, the synthetic Indonesia is the same as the one created for the main analysis in Section 5.3). Because the piracy search volume for Netflix originals is not necessarily matched between the actual and synthetic Indonesia before the treatment, we cannot use the average posttreatment gap as an estimate of the treatment effect directly. Instead, we follow the idea of DiD to use the change in the average posttreatment gap between the actual and synthetic Indonesia relative to the average pretreatment gap to estimate the treatment effect. We find an effect size of 0.048 for original content and 0.241 for nonoriginal content. The second way is to apply the synthetic control method to aggregate piracy search volume of 49 Netflix originals and 253 nonoriginals separately. We find that Netflix originals have an average posttreatment gap in piracy search of 0.063. However, 10 other countries have a higher post-/pretreatment MSPE ratio than Indonesia, implying that the effect for Netflix originals is nonsignificant because of a p value of $11/41 = 0.27$. For nonoriginal titles, the average posttreatment gap estimate is 0.161, and Indonesia has the third-highest post-/pretreatment MSPE ratio, suggesting a p value of $3/41 = 0.073$. The results from both methods indicate that the net effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search is smaller for original content than for nonoriginal content ($\Delta\theta < 0$), which is consistent with the coexistence of a substitution effect and a market expansion effect rather than the existence of a substitution effect alone. We provide additional evidence for the market expansion effect and rule out an alternative explanation for the smaller effect for original content due to the lack of piracy availability in Online Appendix E.

5.4.2. Moderating Role of Dialogue Orientation. Most Netflix titles (292 of 302) are not in the primary local languages of any of the 41 Asian countries, according to IMDb. Furthermore, 290 of 292 foreign titles are in English.[13] Less dialogue-oriented titles are likely to be more appealing to Asian consumers because of lower language barriers; therefore, we expect a stronger substitution effect of the availability of OTT service on piracy search for less dialogue-oriented titles. In other words, we expect the positive effect of Netflix's unavailability on piracy search in Indonesia relative to the synthetic control country to be greater for less dialogue-oriented titles.

We measure the degree of dialogue orientation using the average number of words per minute for each title. We collect the script data from a United Kingdom–based script database[14] and the length of each title from IMDb. The script data are available for 228 titles. The average number of words per minute has a mean of 86.9, a median of 82.1, and a range from 12.1 (*Halo 4: Forward unto Dawn*) to 174.6 (*The Fluffy Movie*). To test the moderating effect of dialogue orientation, we apply a median split, a three-way split, and a four-way split to the 228 titles, based on the degree of dialogue orientation, and then estimate the treatment effect for each group of titles using the same methods as in Section 5.4.1. Table 4 presents the results. Under a median split and the DiD-type method, Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia leads to a 27.4% increase in piracy search for titles with a low degree of dialogue orientation and a 9.7% increase in piracy search for titles with a high degree of dialogue orientation relative to the synthetic control country. The finding of the greater treatment effect for less dialogue-oriented titles is consistent with the expectation and is robust to

Table 4. Treatment Effect for Titles with Different Degrees of Dialogue Orientation

	Effect size (DiD)	Effect size (SC)	Post-/pretreatment MSPE (*p* value)
Median split			
High (wpm ≥ 82.1)	0.097	0.092	4.46 (0.098)
Low (wpm < 82.1)	0.274	0.256	39.68 (0.024)
Three-way split			
High (wpm ≥ 96.7)	0.047	0.050	3.41 (0.195)
Medium (71.1 ≤ wpm < 96.7)	0.127	0.117	5.87 (0.098)
Low (wpm < 71.1)	0.341	0.321	20.04 (0.024)
Four-way split			
High (wpm ≥ 102.3)	0.077	0.042	1.63 (0.317)
Medium-high (82.1 ≤ wpm < 102.3)	0.114	0.102	3.37 (0.098)
Medium-low (64.8 ≤ wpm < 82.1)	0.157	0.156	3.62 (0.073)
Low (wpm < 64.8)	0.353	0.340	40.39 (0.024)

Note. Wpm, words per minute; DiD, difference in differences; SC, synthetic control.

alternative ways of classifying dialogue orientation (three-way and four-way splits) and an alternative estimation method (using separate synthetic controls).

6. Robustness Checks
6.1. Varying the Number of Countries Used in the Synthetic Control
We check the robustness of the findings to the number of countries used in the formation of the synthetic control country. As Abadie et al. (2015) note, researchers typically favor a sparse set of synthetic control units because of the high interpretability of characteristics and outcomes between the focal unit and each of these control units. However, using fewer units in the synthetic control method may result in a lower pretreatment fit between the treated unit and the synthetic control. We explore the sensitivity of the pretreatment fit and our finding of the positive posttreatment gap in piracy search between Indonesia and the synthetic Indonesia to the number of countries that contribute to the synthetic Indonesia.

Recall that the synthetic Indonesia in the main analysis is a combination of, in decreasing importance, Thailand, Palestine, the Philippines, and India. Following Abadie et al. (2015), we sequentially decrease the number of countries used to construct the

Table 5. Synthetic Weights from a Combination of Control Countries

Synthetic combination	Countries and synthetic weights			
Four control countries	Thailand 0.43	Palestine 0.38	Philippines 0.12	India 0.08
Three control countries	Thailand 0.26	Palestine 0.49	Philippines 0.25	
Two control countries	Thailand 0.56	Palestine 0.44		
One control country	Thailand 1.00			

synthetic control from four to one. Table 5 reports the countries and weights for the sparse synthetic controls. Thailand is generally the largest contributor to the synthetic Indonesia, except when the number of control countries is three, when Palestine has the top weight. Philippines and India are the third and fourth contributors, respectively, in terms of their synthetic control weights. Figure 7 shows the piracy search path and gap for Indonesia and the sparse synthetic controls with *l* = 3,2,1 countries included in the control group. Comparing Figure 7 with Figures 3 and 4 suggests that the sparse control with *l* = 3, 2 provides a similar pattern to the baseline result; there is both a good pretreatment fit and a significant gap in piracy search between Indonesia and the sparse synthetic control when *l* = 3,2. Similar to Abadie et al. (2015), the pretreatment fit is less than ideal when using only one country (Thailand) in the control set, which highlights the potential benefits of using a weighted combination of countries rather than a single country as the control unit.

6.2. Alternative Choices of Posttreatment Periods
We selected the posttreatment period to be from February 2016 to June 2016, during which other OTT service providers were not available in Indonesia. The five posttreatment months allows us to examine only the short-term effect of the treatment in this research. This selection provided the longest window during which there was no significant confound from other possible interventions. To ensure that the main findings are not driven by the choice of posttreatment period, we consider the average gap estimates and associated *p* values from alternative posttreatment windows (Table 6). Consistent with Figure 4, Indonesia's Netflix block did not have a substantial effect on piracy search during the first month (February 2016) after the intervention. The effect size of using a three-month posttreatment period (0.208) appears to be

Figure 7. Trends and Gaps in Piracy Search Volume Between Indonesia and Sparse Synthetic Controls

(a)
Three Countries in the Control Group

(b)
Two Countries in the Control Group

(c)
One Country in the Control Group

Notes. (a) Three countries in the control group. (b) Two countries in the control group. (c) One country in the control group.

similar to the results of using a five-month window as in the main analyses. The effect estimates from a three-month posttreatment window are also significant in that Indonesia has the highest post/pretreatment ratio among 41 countries based on placebo runs. These results provide evidence for the robustness of the findings to the posttreatment window.

Next, we explore how the effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search changes after the introduction of a local OTT service. To estimate this effect, we extend the posttreatment window to include periods after the entry of iflix in June 2016 and continuing to the entry of Netflix in April

2017. We do not collect data after April 2017, when Netflix was unblocked in Indonesia after its strategic partnership with Telkom. As expected, Table 6 shows that the positive effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search diminishes when including additional months in the posttreatment window. In particular, the average effect of Netflix's unavailability is small (0.039) and nonsignificant (p value = 22/41 = 0.537) from July 2016 to April 2017, suggesting that the piracy search in Indonesia returned to the level in the synthetic control country when alternative OTT services became available in Indonesia. Notably, although we observe piracy search through April 2017

Table 6. Estimated Effects Using Alternative Posttreatment Period

	Before iflix entry 02/2016–06/2016			After iflix entry 07/2016–04/2017				
Last month of posttreatment period	02/2016	04/2016	06/2016	08/2016	10/2016	12/2016	02/2017	04/2017
No. of months in posttreatment period	1	3	5	7	9	11	13	15
Average posttreatment gap estimates	0.060 (0.317)	0.208 (0.024)	0.197 (0.024)	0.134 (0.073)	0.109 (0.122)	0.108 (0.122)	0.104 (0.122)	0.092 (0.146)
Average gap estimates		0.197 (0.024)				0.039 (0.537)		

Note. The proportion of 41 countries with a post-/pretreatment MSPE ratio as large as Indonesia's is reported in the parentheses. A smaller proportion means a more significant effect of treatment.

(15 months after the treatment), the entry of local OTT service providers such as iflix in June 2016 prevents us from separating the long-term effect of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia and the effect of entry of local competitors when using posttreatment data from July 2016 to April 2017. The long-term effect over five posttreatment months reported in Table 6 should therefore be interpreted cautiously.

6.3. Alternative Specifications of Piracy Search

The primary reason for using normalized piracy search volume as the dependent variable in the main analysis is that it allows us to directly compare the effect sizes across different countries. We examine the extent to which our findings are driven by this specification by considering alternative specifications of y_{it} in the synthetic control method.

As a robustness check, we use raw piracy search volume and log-transformed piracy search volume as outcome variables.[15] A good fit of pretreatment characteristics remains for both measures. For the effect size, the average posttreatment gap estimate from the model with raw piracy search volume is 2,974, which means that there is an average of 2,974 more searches of piracy-related terms about the 302 Netflix titles per month in Indonesia than in the synthetic control country. Given that the average raw piracy search volume in Indonesia was 16,920 in January 2016, this gap estimate suggests a 2,974/16,920 = 17.6% relative increase in piracy search from the baseline level in January 2016. For the model with log-transformed data, the average posttreatment gap estimate is 0.192, suggesting that the piracy search volume in Indonesia is, on average, 19.2% higher than the synthetic control country after the treatment. The effect sizes obtained from these two alternative models are similar to that from the normalized piracy search volume (19.7%), suggesting that the estimated treatment effect is not sensitive to the specification of outcome variable used in the synthetic control analyses.

6.4. Alternative Sampling of Netflix Titles

We present two robustness checks to the selection of Netflix titles, in addition to the robustness check to the

inclusion of two titles with abnormal search patterns in Online Appendix B. As explained in Section 4.2, we sampled 304 titles appearing in Netflix's catalog in both January 2016 and March 2018 to avoid the inclusion of titles that Netflix might have removed during the posttreatment period. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence shows that Netflix tends to sign multiyear contracts, based on Netflix's previous contracts with Disney (Sandoval 2012) and CW (Prudom 2016). It is possible that the 703 titles observed in Netflix's catalog in Indonesia in January 2016 were still available June 2016. To ensure that findings from the main analysis are not subject to sample selection, we collect Google Ads data for the additional 399 Netflix titles that were available in Indonesia in January 2016 to conduct a robustness check. Because of the 48-month rolling window of data in Google Ads, the search data for the new 399 titles were only available after March 2015 at the time of data collection in May 2019, leaving us with nine months of pretreatment data. Despite the relatively short pretreatment period, we apply the synthetic control method to the data of 701 titles (*Catch Me If You Can* and *Piku* were dropped because of the anomalies previously mentioned) and report detailed estimation results in Online Appendix F. We find that Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia led to a 22.4% increase in piracy search relative to the control countries. We also find that the effect size for nonoriginals (0.242) remains greater than that for originals (0.012). These results suggest that the main findings are robust to the inclusion of all titles.

The second robustness check pertains to the language of titles. If most titles are in local languages, the supply shocks resulting from Netflix's entry might not be comparable between countries where most people speak these local languages and other countries. Given that most of the sampled titles (292 of 302) are not in the local languages of the 41 Asian countries, the introduction of Netflix should be comparable across countries. This observation also suggests that the market expansion effect is unlikely to be driven by the increase in piracy supply due to

the improved convenience of creating piracy content from the existence of the same content on the OTT platform. When most titles are in foreign languages, the availability of an OTT service in a given country is unlikely to affect the piracy supply in that country as long as similar OTT services are available in other countries. As such, we explain the market expansion effect by the increase in WOM and promotion rather than the increase in piracy supply in this study. Despite the large proportion of foreign titles in this sample, 10 titles are still in local languages of the Asian countries. To ensure that the main findings are not driven by the data pattern associated with these 10 titles, we apply the synthetic control method using the 292 titles that are not in local languages of the Asian countries. We find qualitatively similar results and provide details in Online Appendix G.

7. Conclusion

This research presents new evidence for the effect of the availability of an OTT service on piracy search. Our identification strategy relies on Netflix's failure to launch in Indonesia in the wake of its global market expansion in 2016, which provides an exogenous shock to the availability of this service in Indonesia and therefore creates an opportunity for a natural experiment. Applying the synthetic control method to data from Indonesia and 40 Asian countries where Netflix entered and remained available, we find that Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia leads to a 19.7% increase in piracy search in Indonesia relative to the other countries. This result suggests an overall substitution between OTT services and piracy. Given the estimate of 160 million visits to piracy sites in 2017 (Muso 2017), our findings suggest that Netflix's global market expansion is responsible for a decrease of millions of visits to illegal sites.

We further investigate the differential effects of Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia on piracy search through two content characteristics. For content exclusivity, we find no significant treatment effect on searches for piracy of Netflix originals exclusively broadcast on Netflix but find a positive treatment effect on searches for piracy of nonoriginal content available on other legal channels. Such a data pattern is consistent with the coexistence of the substitution effect and the market expansion effect of OTT services on piracy rather than the substitution effect alone. For dialogue orientation, our results show that Netflix's unavailability in Indonesia leads to a greater increase in piracy search for less dialogue-oriented titles.

Our findings provide several implications for managers of OTT platforms and policy makers. OTT platforms concerned about piracy should be strategic in the way they fight it. Our results suggest that OTT platforms should target their limited antipiracy resources to combating piracy for content with exclusive distribution rights rather than content that is available on other legal channels. This suggestion seems to be in line with current methods of Netflix, which "sent out over a million takedown requests to Google alone since last year, and [is] currently looking to beef up its internal anti-piracy division" (Smith 2017) by actively hiring people focused on protecting Netflix's original content from piracy (Dassanayake 2018). Our finding on the moderating role of dialogue orientation suggests that OTT platforms should pay more attention to copyright protection for dialogue-heavy (versus dialogue-light) titles, especially during launch in foreign markets.

Evidence of the effectiveness of government intervention on the supply of piracy in increasing legal consumption of media products is mixed, especially with regard to blocking individual websites. One of the most significant supply-side interventions, the shutdown of Megaupload in 2012, led to an increase in box office movie revenue for three major studios (Danaher and Smith 2014) but a decrease in box office revenue for an average movie (Peukert et al. 2017). Alternatively, simultaneous blocking orders directed at 19 major piracy sites in 2013 in the United Kingdom led to a meaningful reduction in total piracy and a 12% increase in the use of legal streaming sites (Danaher et al. 2020). The effectiveness of the shutdown of piracy sites on boosting legal consumption is therefore not guaranteed unless a major coordinated action is taken. Our findings indicate that the introduction of OTT services is an effective way to discourage people from searching for piracy. Although the 19.7% change in piracy search found in this study is not the same as a change in revenue, our finding of the substitution between OTT services and piracy suggests that the introduction of OTT services provides strong utility to consumers over piracy, which should ultimately lead to an increase in firm revenues. From a policy perspective, although punitive measures may reduce the supply of piracy, initiatives that spur the market entry of innovative, high-value media platforms may also produce a substantial decrease in piracy.

Despite the dominance of the substitution effect, our finding that the introduction of OTT services can generate more interest in piracy for some titles (market expansion effect) also provides important implications to content creators. The existence of the market expansion effect of an OTT service might result in lower revenues for content creators and reduced consumer welfare in the long run. This is mainly because the market expansion effect in the current period may sway consumers, who would not have been aware of certain titles, to incur the fixed cost of either learning to use BitTorrent or the fixed moral cost of illegal behavior. When the fixed cost of piracy is sunk in the current period, it may affect these consumers' preference for piracy over legal options in

the future and therefore hurt the content creators' revenues in the long run. For example, a consumer who becomes aware of the first season of *Narcos* from market expansion might not yet be a candidate subscriber of Netflix at the time of entry. However, if this consumer watched the first season of *Narcos* on a piracy site, she might continue watching future seasons on illegal sites rather than on Netflix, negatively influencing Netflix's future value from this customer. If content creators are forward looking, such a detrimental effect on future revenues may motivate them to provide content at a suboptimal level in terms of quantity and quality, which in turn hurts consumer welfare. These are purely theoretical arguments, and an investigation of the long-term effect of Netflix's availability (or lack thereof) is beyond the scope of this research. Our discussion suggests that the market expansion effect could potentially harm the surplus of different stakeholders in the long run and therefore merits further investigation.

We note several limitations of this study. First, monthly data do not allow us to understand dynamics at a more detailed level, particularly during the period between when Netflix was introduced (January 6, 2016) and when Netflix was blocked (January 26, 2016). More granular data at daily level could uncover additional temporal patterns and provide a more accurate estimate of the treatment effect. Second, although we show that piracy search is highly correlated with visits to piracy sites, the dependent variable in this study references search rather than actual consumption of pirated content. There may exist situations in which the treatment effect on actual piracy behavior is different from our estimated effect. Third, while Telkom is far and away the market leader in Indonesia, it would be interesting to explore the extent to which individuals use alternative telecommunication services to bypass Telkom's block. Given that Netflix is not completely blocked by all telecommunication firms in Indonesia, our estimated effect on piracy search in Indonesia relative to the control countries (19.7% increase) should serve as the lower bound of the true effect of the treatment. Finally, the lack of individual-level data hinders a deeper understanding of heterogeneous treatment effects across consumers, and may induce potential bias, which is particularly relevant for a country-level study. Despite these limitations, we hope this research stimulates further interest in exploring the effectiveness of antipiracy interventions.

Acknowledgments

Endnotes

[1] A notable exception is Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), who find little evidence of a link between digital music downloads and sales, although subsequent analysis of their data shows alternative results (Liebowitz 2016). For a review of early research on piracy, see Danaher et al. (2014).

[2] For the full list of countries where Netflix became available in January 2016, see Stelter (2016).

[3] In comparative case studies, it is conventional to call the single country where certain events or interventions occurred as *treated* and the remaining countries as *controls* (Abadie et al. 2010). We follow previous synthetic control literature and define the treatment as *Netflix's failure to launch* rather than *Netflix's availability*, given our focus on the event occurring solely in Indonesia.

[4] Netflix was also available in Iran, but Google Ads, which we use to collect search data, is not available in Iran (Prabhu 2011).

[5] We also used the Wayback Machine on JustWatch (https://www.justwatch.com/id/provider/netflix) to access Indonesia's Netflix catalog. The earliest record of JustWatch on the Wayback Machine was in June 2017. However, the Wayback Machine only saved a subset of Netflix titles (60) in Indonesia.

[6] We treat television shows with multiple seasons as one title.

[7] We show the robustness of the findings to the use of all 703 titles in Section 6.4.

[8] Without normalization, the scales will not be comparable across countries. For example, the 1,591 increase in monthly piracy search volume before and after the treatment is a moderate change for Indonesia (mean = 15,844) but a gigantic change for a smaller country such as Bhutan (mean = 86.2).

[9] We collect the search volume data for the following keywords of Netflix's competitors: "Amazon Prime," "Catchplay," "Fimplus," "Genflex," "HOOQ," "Hulu," "iflix," "Tribe," "Viki," "Viu," "Voot," and "YuppTV."

[10] We check the robustness of the results to adding additional economic factors (gross domestic product, employment rate, and inflation rate) to pretreatment characteristics. The inclusion of these factors led to a worse match of the pretreatment period (as indicated by larger MSPE). We therefore focus on a parsimonious model without these economic factors.

[11] Recent studies such as Xu 2017 and Li 2019 have developed inferential theories for extended versions of the synthetic control method. An inferential theory for the standard synthetic control method is still lacking.

[12] We provide more details and empirical support for this argument in Online Appendix C.

[13] One title is in Spanish (*Club de Cuervos*), and one title is in French (*Wakfu*). For the remaining 290 foreign titles, 10 are in dual languages, one of which is English, and 280 are in English only.

[14] See http://SpringfieldSpringfield.co.uk. For television shows with multiple episodes, we measure the dialogue orientation on the basis of the first episode.

[15] For consistency, we take the log on search-related pretreatment characteristics in the model with log-transformed search data.

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