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Peer Effects in the Diffusion of Solar Photovoltaic Panels

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Social interaction (peer) effects are recognized as a potentially important factor in the diffusion of new products. In the case of environmentally friendly goods or technologies, both marketers and policy makers are interested in the presence of causal peer effects as social spillovers can be used to expedite adoption. We provide a methodology for the simple, straightforward identification of peer effects with sufficiently rich data, avoiding the biases that occur with traditional fixed effects estimation when using the past installed base of consumers in the reference group. We study the diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels in California and find that at the average number of owner-occupied homes in a zip code, an additional installation increases the probability of an adoption in the zip code by 0.78 percentage points. Our results provide valuable guidance to marketers designing strategies to increase referrals and reduce customer acquisition costs. They also provide insights into the diffusion process of environmentally friendly technologies.

Key words: social contagion; diffusion models; empirical IO methods; probability models; word of mouth; endogeneity

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1. Introduction

Factors affecting the adoption of new products have long been of great interest to marketers. Social interactions between consumers are of particular interest because they may result in social spillovers, in which a marketing action that affects one agent then indirectly influences other agents. Marketers often attempt to account for these social spillovers when determining the targeting and intensity of marketing activity. However, there must be a *causal* social interaction effect for the social spillovers to exist. In the classic aggregate diffusion models, such as the canonical Bass (1969) model, social contagion is assumed to be a driving force behind accelerating adoption rates, but the estimated coefficient of contagion may capture a variety of factors that influence the diffusion of the technology, which may or may not include social interaction effects.

This paper makes several contributions to the literature on social interaction effects in the adoption of new technologies. Substantively, we document and estimate the magnitude of peer effects in the diffusion of an environmentally beneficial technology, solar photovoltaic (PV) panels. Policy makers are particularly interested in the diffusion of solar PV technology as increased adoption leads to

reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Methodologically, we provide an empirical approach for the quick and straightforward estimation of peer effects using daily adoption data. Our methodology leverages the difference between the date an installation is requested and completed along with a first-differences estimation method to (i) avoid the restrictive functional and distributional assumptions on the data-generating process and unobservables often seen in the literature, (ii) control for endogenous group formation and correlated unobservables with a rich set of fixed effects, and (iii) avoid the biases present in traditional fixed effects estimation with endogenous or predetermined regressors. Although a first-differences methodology is far from new, our estimation approach to deal with the endogeneity of predetermined regressors is novel.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we discuss the difficulties of identifying causal peer effects using traditional methods in the literature and lay out our approach for addressing them. In §3, we provide background on the industry, describe the data, and document the pattern of geographic clustering of solar PV panels in California. In §4, we present our results and evidence suggestive of different possible mechanisms behind the peer effect. We provide further evidence of causal peer effects using

quasi-experimental variation in §5. Section 6 compares our results to those obtained using other diffusion models. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the managerial implications of our findings.

2. Identification of Peer Effects

2.1. Perils in Identifying Peer Effects

Causal peer effects are notoriously difficult to identify. To begin, there are three well-known issues that often confound the identification of peer effects: endogenous group formation leading to self-selection of peers (homophily), correlated unobservables, and simultaneity (Manski 1993, Brock and Durlaf 2001, Moffitt 2001, Soetevent 2006). Consider a setting where agent i in peer group z_i is making some choice (e.g., what technology to adopt) at the same time as others in the peer group.¹ Then the three issues can be easily seen in the common linear-in-means model:

$$a_{it} = \alpha + \beta \mathbb{E}[a | z_i, t] + \gamma' \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x} | z_i, t] + u_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where a_{it} is the choice by agent i at time t , $\mathbb{E}[a | z_i, t]$ is the average number of adoptions in i 's peer group z_i at time t , $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x} | z_i, t]$ is a vector of average characteristics in z_i at time t , and u_{it} is a stochastic error term. Although β is intended to capture the effect of the actions of others in z_i on the decision of agent i , it will not be consistently estimated if $\mathbb{E}[u_{it} | z_i, \mathbf{x}] \neq 0$. This is the case if there is self-selection of peers on common (unobserved) characteristics or if there are any other correlated unobservables, such as macroeconomic trends or time-varying localized marketing efforts. In addition, β may not be identified if the decision maker is influencing others while also being influenced by them, a simultaneity issue known as *reflection*. By taking the mean of (1) conditional on z_i and t and rearranging, we can see why simultaneity implies that β is not identified in this model:

$$\mathbb{E}[a | z_i, t] = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \beta} + \frac{\gamma'}{1 - \beta} \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x} | z_i, t].$$

One can consistently estimate the *combined* effect ($\gamma'/(1 - \beta)$), but it is not possible to separately estimate the causal social interaction effect β . Randomized field experiments are one way to address this issue (Bertrand et al. 2000, Sacerdote 2001, Duflo and Saez 2003). Hartmann et al. (2008) discuss many of the

strategies often used with nonexperimental data. One common approach used to address the self-selection of peers and correlated unobservables is to include a rich set of random or fixed effects (Manchanda et al. 2008, Nair et al. 2010). In this case, (1) can be rewritten as

$$a_{it} = \alpha + \beta \mathbb{E}[a | z_i, t] + \gamma' \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x} | z_i, t] + \eta_{z_i, t} + u_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where $\eta_{z_i, t}$ are random or fixed effects for the peer group and time. If peer group effects flexibly control for group-specific characteristics, and if self-selection is the only issue, then $\mathbb{E}[u_{it} | z_i, \mathbf{x}] = 0$ and β can be consistently estimated. Correlated unobservables can also be addressed with a rich enough set of random or fixed effects; if the correlated unobservables are time-varying, as in the case of targeted unobserved marketing, then peer group–time effects would be necessary.

There are several approaches that can be used to address the simultaneity issue. In some cases, detailed data on the peer group provide an exclusion restriction when there are only partially overlapping peer groups (De Giorgi et al. 2010, Nair et al. 2010). However, a more common approach is to have the agent's decision depend on *past* decisions made by agents in the peer group. A common way to implement this approach is to include the “installed base” of the product or service purchased in the relevant peer group as the explanatory variable of interest and condition \mathbf{x} on the previous time period:

$$a_{it} = \alpha + \beta b_{z_i t} + \gamma' \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x} | z_i, t - 1] + \eta_{z_i, t} + u_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where the installed base is defined as

$$b_{z_i t} = \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_{z_i}} a_{j\tau},$$

where m_{z_i} is the number of potential adopters in z_i . In this context $a_{j\tau}$ is an indicator for an affirmative decision.

The installed base has been used extensively in the marketing literature in the early aggregate diffusion models (Bass 1969; Mahajan et al. 1990, 1995) and in more recent studies using disaggregate data (Sorensen 2006, Manchanda et al. 2008, Choi et al. 2010, Iyengar et al. 2011, Narayanan and Nair 2012, McShane et al. 2012). Unfortunately, there remain further challenges to using the installed base as the regressor of interest in the presence of random effects or fixed effects. The issue here relates closely to the dynamic panel data literature, which describes how models with fixed effects and random effects are inconsistently estimated when a lagged dependent variable is used (Nerlove 1971, Nickell 1981).² By

¹ The peer group can be defined using self-elicitation (Conley and Udry 2010, Kratzer and Lettl 2009, Iyengar et al. 2011, Nair et al. 2010); social, demographic, or cultural proximity (Bertrand et al. 2000, Sacerdote 2001, Duflo and Saez 2003, Sorensen 2006, Munshi and Myaux 2006); or geographic proximity (Topa 2001, Arzaghi and Henderson 2007, Bell and Song 2007, Manchanda et al. 2008, Choi et al. 2010, McShane et al. 2012, Nam et al. 2010, Narayanan and Nair 2012).

² The issue is straightforward. Consider the dynamic panel model $y_{it} = \alpha + \beta y_{it-1} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}$, where μ_i is a fixed effect for unit i .

definition, b_{zt} contains lagged adoptions, so the inclusion of random effects or fixed effects will lead to inconsistent estimates, just as in the dynamic panel data literature. Manchanda et al. (2008) work around this by including only the past adoptions of *others* in the group, implicitly assuming that the errors are not correlated for individuals within the same peer group. Random effects have a further issue: the installed base is the aggregation of previous adoption decisions of other consumers who share the same random effect, so the random effects and installed base are by construction correlated. Thus the random effects and installed base are not orthogonal, so random effects estimation is inconsistent.³

Narayanan and Nair (2012) study the diffusion of hybrid vehicles and address this issue with the installed base using two approaches: an instrumental variables approach and a bias correction approach using fixed effects. Both hold promise in certain settings. When suitable instruments are available, an instrumental variables approach is quick and easy. In practice, suitable instruments tend to be extremely difficult to find, particularly because the installed base is a stock variable. The bias correction approach uses the assumption of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) errors to find a closed-form solution for the bias as a function of the variance of the errors and the variance of installed base.⁴ Unfortunately, the bias adjustment is only appropriate when there is no autocorrelation in the errors.

2.2. Our Methodology

Our methodology addresses the issues inherent in identifying social interactions and provides a consistent estimate of the effect of the installed base of solar PV panels on the household-level decision of whether or not to install them, even in the presence of correlated unobservables. We leverage the fact that in the solar PV market, the decision to install solar panels does not lead to an instantaneous installation, as a result of the time needed to complete the necessary paperwork and perform the installation. Other situations in which there may be a time lag between the decision to adopt and the actual adoption include purchases of new vehicles, all online

purchases, customized product purchases, and the adoption of regulated or incentivized products. In our situation, we would not expect social interactions to have an effect until the solar PV panels have actually been installed, after which point the adopter would have experienced the benefits of the panels and neighbors may then be able to see the installation.

Accordingly, we define the installed base in our setting as the cumulative number of *completed* installations at time t in zip code z . We drop the i subscript because we perform the analysis at the zip code level, and all households in a zip code have the same peer group: the other households in that zip code. Let \tilde{a}_{zt} be an indicator variable for a completed installation (i.e., delivery of the product or service). Then $b_{zt} = \sum_{\tau=1}^t \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}$. In our primary specification, we model the probability that a household in zip code z adopts a solar panel in any given day t as

$$Y_{zt} = \alpha + \beta b_{zt} + \gamma' X_{zt} + \eta_{zq} + \xi_t + \epsilon_{zt}, \quad (4)$$

where Y_{zt} is the fraction of owner-occupied households in z that had not previously adopted solar panels and decide to adopt on day t ; η_{zq} are zip code-quarter fixed effects (q denotes a quarter); ξ_t are time indicator variables, including year-month indicators, day of the month indicators, and day of the week indicators; and ϵ_{zt} is a mean-zero stochastic error. X_{zt} contains additional explanatory variables that may vary over time, such as indicator variables for different levels of subsidies available for adopting solar panels.

We estimate (4) using several approaches, including traditional fixed effects estimation taking mean-differences on the zip code-quarter, zip-quarter random effects, and our preferred specification that uses first differences to consistently estimate β , even with the predetermined b_{zt} and serial correlation.⁵ The first-differences specification is

$$(Y_{zt} - Y_{zt-1}) = \beta(b_{zt} - b_{zt-1}) + \gamma'(X_{zt} - X_{zt-1}) + (\xi_t - \xi_{t-1}) + (\epsilon_{zt} - \epsilon_{zt-1}). \quad (5)$$

The following proposition formally describes when β is consistently estimated in the first-differences model. Let l denote the time lag between the adoption decision and the installation of the solar PV panel, and let ν denote the order of autocorrelation of ϵ .

PROPOSITION 1. *If (i) $l > \nu + 1$ and (ii) the social interaction effects do not begin until the installation has been completed, then β in (5) is consistently estimated.*

A model with random effects is inconsistently estimated if μ_i is correlated with y_{it-1} , yet this is the case by construction. A mean-differencing approach to fixed effects, $y_{it} - \bar{y}_{it} = \beta(y_{it-1} - \bar{y}_{it-1}) + (\epsilon_{it} - \bar{\epsilon}_{it})$, is inconsistently estimated since $(\epsilon_{it} - \bar{\epsilon}_{it})$ is correlated with $(y_{it-1} - \bar{y}_{it-1})$. A similar issue occurs using a first-differencing approach for fixed effects estimation.

³ Maximum likelihood estimation with random effects can be consistent if the true distribution of the errors is known and specified correctly (Narayanan and Nair 2012).

⁴ The bias is found to be $\text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty}(\hat{\beta} - \beta) = (5/9)(\sigma_\epsilon^2/\sigma_b^2)$, where σ_ϵ^2 is the variance of ϵ and σ_b^2 is the variance of b .

⁵ We drop the first observation in each quarter so that the zip-quarter effects cancel out in the first-differenced equation.

Table 1 Zip Code-Level Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	<i>N</i>
Zip code number of residential installations	51.481	78.262	1	713	1,652
Zip code MW of residential installations	0.270	0.440	0	3.783	1,652
Population (100,000s)	0.244	0.216	0	1.095	1,290
Household size	2.829	0.611	0	5.210	1,290
Median income (\$10,000)	6.34	2.90	0	37.50	1,290
% pop male	50.2	3.2	34.4	97.8	1,290
% pop who are white	65.2	20.2	4.4	95.2	1,290
% pop with college degrees	38.1	17.6	4.1	95.7	854
% pop between 20 and 45	33.3	7.9	3.9	79.6	1,290
% pop over 65	12.4	6.2	0	80.9	1,290
% pop who drive to work	86.2	10.4	4.3	100	1,304
% pop who carpool	14.7	6.5	0.5	55.9	1,280
% pop using public transit	3.9	5.7	0.1	42.6	1,026
% pop who work at home or walk to work	8.8	6.9	1.6	61.5	1,207
% pop with over a 30 min commute	38.2	12.7	5.4	80.9	1,117
% pop who drive a hybrid	3.6	5.8	0	100	1,354
Number of owner-occupied homes (1,000s)	4.959	4.204	0	18.965	1,290
Median value of owner-occupied home (\$ million)	0.534	0.260	0	1	1,290
Home loan (SPI ^a)	121.0	67.8	0	576.0	1,290
Home repair (SPI ^a)	122.7	70.4	0	585.0	1,290
% homes worth \$0–\$50K	2.6	3.7	0	53.2	1,290
% homes worth \$50–\$90K	2.0	2.7	0	37.3	1,290
% homes worth \$90–\$175K	5.9	7.7	0	61.7	1,290
% homes worth \$175–\$400K	30.6	23.2	0	89.7	1,290
% homes worth \$400K+	58.5	29.8	0	100	1,290

Note. Summary statistics for residential installations in zip codes with at least one installation.

^aSpending potential index, where 100 is the U.S. average.

See Appendix A for a proof. We could further relax assumption (ii), because the consistency of β holds as long as the order of autocorrelation is less than the number of days after the decision to adopt before social interactions take effect.

3. Industry Background and Descriptive Evidence

In January 2006, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) established the California Solar Initiative (CSI), a \$3.3-billion, 10-year rebate program aiming to “install 3,000 megawatts (MW) of new solar over the next decade and to transform the market for solar energy by reducing the cost of solar” (CPUC 2009, p. 1).⁶ These substantial subsidies have contributed to the dramatic growth in annual solar PV adoptions in California over the past decade. To explore the pattern and determinants of this growth, we assembled an installation-level data set of residential solar PV installations in the three investor-owned utility (IOU) regions from January 2001 to December 2011.

The data include the zip code of the customer, IOU, size of the installation and incentive, PV installer and


manufacturer, the date when the customer requested solar incentives for an installation, the date payment was submitted for the installation, and the date of completion. We further augment the installation data with zip code-level demographic data from Sourcebook America and American FactFinder, as well as data on hybrid vehicle registrations from R. L. Polk & Co. The cleaned data set includes 85,046 requested residential installations between January 2001 and December 2011. Table 1 contains zip code-level summary statistics for residential installations and key demographics.

If there are indeed peer effects in the diffusion of residential PV panels, we would expect to see a spatial clustering of installations. Figure 1(a) shows the initial pattern of clustering of solar PV panel installations in the San Francisco Bay Area from 2001 to 2003. More densely populated zip codes tend to have more installations, yet there are densely populated zip codes with few installations and less densely populated ones with many installations. This could be indicative of either peer effects or spatially correlated preferences, perhaps due to the clustered environmental preferences (Kahn and Vaughn 2009). Moreover, we find a similar clustering pattern at the neighborhood level.

The presence of peer effects should also imply *accelerating* adoption in regions with more installations.

⁶ For an overview of the history of solar PV policy in California, see Taylor (2008).

Figure 1 Clustering in Solar PV Installations in the San Francisco Bay Area



Indeed, in our data the pattern of clustering appears to build on itself. Figure 1(b) shows the same map of the San Francisco Bay Area with installations from 2004 to 2006 also included. Although there are more installations everywhere by 2006, the clustering pattern very clearly increases. The acceleration of installations can be seen further in the empirical hazard rate (averaged at the monthly level) shown in Figure 2.

Table 2 provides summary statistics for the probability of a household adoption in a zip code-day and the zip code installed base. To better understand the distribution of each of these, Figures 3 and 4 provide histograms for the probability of

Table 2 Zip Code-Day Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	<i>N</i>
Household prob. of adoption (in 10^{-6})	4.39	276.49	0	333,333.34	6,102,465
Zip code installed base (count)	13.10	31.07	0	657	6,102,465
Zip code installed base (MW)	61.83	158.26	0	3,332.06	6,102,465

adoption (conditional on there being an adoption in the zip code on that day) and the installed base. Not surprisingly, in 98% of the observations, there are no adoptions in the zip code that day.

Figure 2 Zip Code Empirical Hazard Rates




Figure 3 Nonzero Household Probability of Adoption





Figure 4 Zip Code Installed Base



4. The Effect of the Installed Base

4.1. Effect on Adoption Rates

Table 3 presents our primary zip code-level results. The first column contains the ordinary least squares (OLS) results from estimating (4) without zip code fixed effects, the second column contains the results using the traditional mean-differenced zip-quarter fixed effect (FE), the third column contains zip-quarter random effects (REs), and the fourth column presents the first-differenced (FD) results from estimating (5). Consistent with Narayanan and Nair (2012), the traditional mean-differenced results appear to be biased downward. Using a Hausman test, we find that we can reject the orthogonality assumption of the random effects model at a 90% confidence level. In the traditional fixed effects regression, we find statistically significant and positive (albeit small) autocorrelation for the first two lags (days), whereas in the first-differences regression, we find a statistically significant, negative correlation of -0.5 for the first lag (a mechanical result of the first-differencing). This demonstrates that the order of autocorrelation is much less than the time between the adoption decision and the installation, which had a median of 163 days and is greater than 40 days 99% of the time.⁷ The actual installation time (from breaking ground to completion) is short, with a median of 11 days and an average of 16 days. So even if the social interaction effect began once the actual installation began, our estimation method is valid because the decision to install occurs so much earlier.

Our preferred coefficient estimate of 1.567 is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level and implies that every additional installation increases the probability of a household adoption in the same zip code by 1.567×10^{-6} . At the average number of

Table 3 Zip Code Model

	OLS	FE	RE	FD
Installed base	0.049 (0.003)	0.126 (0.099)	0.049 (0.004)	1.567 (0.376)
Quarter-zip effects	N	Y	Y	Y
Year-month indicators	Y	Y	Y	Y
Day of week indicators	Y	Y	Y	Y
Day of month indicators	Y	Y	Y	Y
Incentive step indicators	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.000
N	6,102,465	6,102,465	6,102,465	6,034,360

Notes. The unit of observation is zip code-day. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.


owner-occupied homes in a zip code of 4,959, an extra installation in the zip code increases the probability of an adoption in the zip code by 0.78 percentage points. At the average number of installations in a zip code of 13.1 and the average household adoption rate of 4.390×10^{-6} , the installed base elasticity of adoption is 4.68. At the median installed base of 2 (in zip codes with at least one adoption), the elasticity is 0.71. These results provide clear evidence of a statistically and economically significant effect.⁸

4.1.1. Testing for a Time-Varying Response. As a robustness check, we estimate a model allowing for the response to new installations to change along with the level of the installed base. We find a small, positive, and statistically significant effect of an included quadratic term, implying *increasing* effects of new installations. In another specification we interact the installed base and year. Figure 5 plots these coefficients⁹ with robust standard errors, again indicating that the installed base effect increases over time. Such an increase may derive from recent marketing efforts to leverage peer effects to induce adoptions. For example, one of the strategies employed by SolarCity (the largest installer in California) involves finding one or two vocal solar advocates in a neighborhood and giving the entire neighborhood a slightly lower price if enough adoptions are made within that neighborhood. Some firms commonly increase the visibility of new installations by putting up a sign indicating that a solar PV panel has been installed at that location. The Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) CSI administrators have even established “Solar Champion” training sessions for “citizens interested in helping spread the word about solar in their neighborhoods” (PG&E 2011).

⁸ We also perform the first-differences regression including zip code fixed effects, which essentially includes a linear, deterministic time trend for each zip code (Amiti and Wei 2009), and our results do not change significantly.

⁹ The estimate for 1999 is not shown for visibility issues, as it is large and insignificant.

⁷ The mean is 195 days with a standard deviation of 121.

Figure 5 Estimated Installed Base Coefficients by Year, Along with the 95% Confidence Intervals

4.1.2. Demographic Interactions. A critical question for practitioners is where to target marketing efforts to best leverage social spillovers. As a starting point, we include zip code demographics and demographics interacted with the installed base in an OLS estimation of (4) to examine the determinants of adoption (see Table 4).¹⁰ Our proxy for environmental preferences, hybrid vehicle adoption, has a large and highly statistically significant effect on the rate of adoption in a zip code. Higher adoption rates are also associated with the percentage of the population who are male, are white, have over a 30-minute commute, and have home repairs. Lower adoption rates are associated with variables such as the zip code population, percentage of people aged 20–45 and over 65, and zip codes with higher value homes.

To assess the conditions under which social spillovers are likely to be most effective, we estimate (5) and include interactions between the installed base and demographic variables.¹¹ We find that zip codes with larger household sizes and a higher fraction of people with more than a 30-minute commute have a larger peer effect, whereas zip codes with higher median household income and more people who carpool have a smaller peer effect. The significance of the household size and commuting variables may suggest that the mere visibility of installations may contribute to the peer effect; larger households have more eyes per household to see other adoptions of solar, and longer commutes may imply more driving time to see

Table 4 Adoption Model with Demographics

	OLS	FD
<i>Installed base</i>	0.002	−5.526
<i>Population</i>	−1.675***	
<i>Household size</i>	−0.072	
<i>Median income</i>	−0.658***	
<i>% pop male</i>	0.226***	
<i>% pop who are white</i>	0.010***	
<i>% pop with college degrees</i>	0.025*	
<i>% pop between 20 and 45</i>	−0.135***	
<i>% pop over 65</i>	−0.168***	
<i>% pop who drive to work</i>	−0.061	
<i>% pop who carpool</i>	−0.017	
<i>% pop using public transit</i>	−0.083	
<i>% pop who work at home or walk to work</i>	0.046	
<i>% pop with over a 30 min commute</i>	0.021***	
<i>% pop who drive a hybrid</i>	0.484***	
<i>Home loan</i>	−0.021	
<i>Home repair</i>	0.039**	
<i>% homes worth \$90–\$175K</i>	−0.069***	
<i>% homes worth \$175–\$400K</i>	−0.038***	
<i>% homes worth \$400K+</i>	−0.031**	
<i>Population × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.202***	−1.810
<i>Household size × Zip code installed base</i>	0.061***	3.448*
<i>Med income × Zip code installed base</i>	0.006*	−2.521*
<i>% pop male × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.000	0.232
<i>% white × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.000	−0.004
<i>% college × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.001***	0.062
<i>% pop between 20 and 45</i>	0.003***	−0.002
<i>× Zip code installed base</i>		
<i>% over 65 × Zip code installed base</i>	0.004***	−0.101
<i>% drive × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.001*	0.042
<i>% carpooling × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.002***	−0.602**
<i>% public transit × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.001	0.070
<i>% work at home or walk</i>	0.002*	0.233
<i>× Zip code installed base</i>		
<i>% pop with over a 30 min commute</i>	0.000**	0.087*
<i>× Zip code installed base</i>		
<i>% driving hybrids × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.006***	0.430
<i>Median home value × Zip code installed base</i>	0.009	3.109
<i>Home loan × Zip code installed base</i>	0.001***	0.147
<i>Home repair × Zip code installed base</i>	−0.001***	−0.082
<i>% homes worth \$90–\$175K</i>	−0.008	−0.168
<i>× Zip code installed base</i>		
<i>% homes worth \$175–\$400K</i>	0.022	−0.058
<i>× Zip code installed base</i>		
<i>% homes worth \$400K+</i>	0.039***	−0.110
<i>× Zip code installed base</i>		
<i>R-squared</i>	0.008	0.001
<i>N</i>	3,817,392	3,775,584

Note. The unit of observation is zip code-day.

***Significant at the 1% confidence level; **Significant at the 5% level;

*Significant at the 10% level.

other installations. Carpooling may have the opposite effect by reducing driving time.

The interaction with median income is economically significant: running the regression on only the lower half of the zip code income distribution leads to a coefficient and standard error of 2.478 (0.680); for the top half, it is 1.243 (0.454). So although households with lower income may be less likely to adopt solar,

¹⁰ Because of the inclusion of demographics, we do not include zip-quarter fixed effects in this estimation, and thus we view these results as suggestive.

¹¹ The “main effects” from the demographics are differenced out.

Table 5 First-Differenced Model with Different Measures of Installed Base

	(1) Counts	(2) MW	(3) Counts per household	(4) MW per household
Installed base (count)	1.567 (0.376)	0.272 (0.062)	0.125 (0.089)	0.018 (0.013)
R-squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	6,034,360	6,034,360	6,034,360	6,034,360

Notes. The unit of observation is zip code-day. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

they are more influenced by the peer effect. This is consistent with the high percentage of consumers naming finances as a primary reason for adopting solar, especially if the financial benefits of adoption are learned through information exchange.¹²

4.1.3. Effect of Installation Size. If the visibility of installations matters, are peer effects stronger when the existing installations are larger? Table 5 provides evidence suggesting that this is likely to be the case. We estimate (5) using the installed base measured in megawatts as the explanatory variable of interest to allow larger installations to have a greater impact. Again, we find a positive, significant effect of the installed base (column 2).¹³ To assess the relative explanatory power of the installed base measured in terms of number of installations versus megawatts of installations, we estimate a model including both. We find that both become statistically insignificant (although jointly significant), so we cannot determine which is more important.¹⁴ We hypothesize that the size of the installation may matter because larger installations are slightly more visible, but that spreading out the same number of megawatts over more homes increases the visibility even more.

4.1.4. Is the Peer Effect Contractor-Specific? If the peer effect operates in part through word of mouth, one might expect the peer effect to be contractor-specific. To test this, we estimate (5) using the probability of an adoption in a zip code by a *specific contractor* as the dependent variable. We also include both the contractor-specific installed base and the total zip code installed base (both first-differenced) as explanatory variables. We estimate the

model for the top five contractors by total installations (over 1,000 residential installations each). The coefficient on the contractor-specific installed base in all five of the regressions turns out to be statistically insignificant, suggesting that peer effects in solar PV have a limited contractor-specific effect.¹⁵

4.2. Effect on Installation Size

Peer effects that work through information transfer may serve to reduce the uncertainty in the expected value of installations. For example, consumers may discuss tax incentives, rebates, or the actual production of a solar PV system. If consumers are risk averse, we would expect to see installation sizes increase as more neighbors adopt solar PV systems because larger installations are riskier (assuming the risk is per MW).

The summary statistics for the size and price of all residential installations are shown in Table 6.¹⁶ To test our prediction, we estimate a linear model of installation size (conditional on an installation occurring), first using OLS regression, then including zip code fixed effects, and finally using zip-quarter fixed effects. Because the installed base is no longer a predetermined variable, traditional fixed effects estimation provides a consistent estimate. We find a positive, significant coefficient on the zip code installed base when using zip code fixed effects, as shown in Table 7.¹⁷ This is consistent with peer effects reducing the uncertainty of the solar PV investment, leading to larger installations on average.

4.3. Effect on Adoption at the Street Level

If peer effects are a major factor underlying the clustering pattern in the data, we might expect to see evidence of peer effects at a more localized level than the zip code. With 2001–2006 address-level data from the California Energy Commission Emerging Renewables Program, we can examine how solar PV system adoption decisions are affected by the previous decisions of others *on the same street*. We define a *street* here as a street within a zip code, so that a long street that is in several zip codes is considered several separate streets. We create a panel data set where an observation is a street-month.¹⁸ Table 8 provides summary

¹² In a phone survey of 639 participants and 601 nonparticipants in the CSI program, 52% of participating consumers reported financial reasons as the primary reason for their installation, 26% cited a concern for the environment, and 11% cited saving energy (CPUC 2009).

¹³ When using the number of installations per household (column 3) or the number of megawatts per household (column 4), we find positive but insignificant effects.

¹⁴ Details can be found in the online appendix (at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1120.0727>).

¹⁵ Details can be found in the online appendix.

¹⁶ The installation price is adjusted by the CPI to real 2009 dollars per watt, and all watts in this paper are direct current watts. The average size of an installation is 5.24 kilowatts, with an average preincentive price of \$8.49 per watt. This corresponds to an average system price in the range of \$40,000 before incentives.

¹⁷ The significance disappears with zip-quarter fixed effects, but this is not surprising because we have only a single observation per installation.

¹⁸ Because of the vast number of streets, it is not possible to perform the analysis at the street-day level, but as installations on a

Table 6 Residential Installation Size and Price Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	<i>N</i>
Size (kW)	5.241	3.272	0.114	49.92	85,046
Price (\$/W)	8.494	4.16	0.279	697.333	47,029

Note. KW, kilowatt.

Table 7 Installation Size Regressions

	OLS	FE	FE
<i>Installed base</i>	1.672 (0.348)	1.741 (0.518)	2.564 (9.685)
<i>Price</i>	−0.074 (0.040)	−0.061 (0.032)	−0.052 (0.025)
Zip FE	N	Y	N
Quarter-zip FE	N	N	Y
Year-month indicators	Y	Y	N
Day of week indicators	Y	Y	Y
Day of month indicators	Y	Y	Y
Incentive step indicators	Y	Y	Y
<i>R</i> -squared	0.055	0.199	0.377
<i>N</i>	47,028	46,754	38,930

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 8 Summary Statistics at the Street-Month Level

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
<i>New installation</i>	0.015	0.121	0	1
<i>Previous installation</i>	0.040	0.196	0	1
<i>Zip installed base</i> (100s)	0.189	0.321	0	3.24
<i>Zip contracts</i> (100s)	0.388	0.345	0.01	1.83
<i>N</i>		1,400,117		

statistics, showing the number of new installations and previous installations in a street-month, as well as the installed base and number of completed contracts within each street's zip code.

We regress an indicator variable for an adoption on an indicator for an installation already having occurred on the street and the zip code installed base. Because many streets are in relatively early stages of adoption, we have sufficient variation for our analysis. Appendix B contains further details of our specification, and the results for two first-differences specifications (FD 1 and FD 2) are shown in Table 9. The second column adds interactions between the installed base and zip code indicator variables to non-parametrically control for the unknown number of potential adopters on each street. The results indicate that each installation increases the monthly probability of an additional installation by approximately

Table 9 First-Differenced Street-Level Model

	FD 1	FD 2
<i>Number of previous installations on street</i>	0.127 (0.011)	0.151 (0.012)
<i>Zip code installed base</i> (100s)	0.074 (0.046)	Street-specific
Street-quarter effects	Y	Y
Month of year indicators	Y	Y
Street indicators interacted with month of year indicators	Y	Y
Street indicators interacted with zip installed base	N	Y
<i>R</i> -squared	0.275	0.327
<i>N</i>	7,585	7,585

Notes. The unit of observation is zip code-month. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

15 percentage points. The effect of an installation elsewhere in the zip code is not statistically significant. These results provide evidence that the peer effect decreases with distance, with stronger peer effects at the street level.

5. Further Evidence of Causal Peer Effects


Ideally, to test for causal peer effects, we would have two geographic areas with identical environmental preferences, demographics, and macroeconomic shocks. We would then randomly place a few solar PV installations in one of the areas to see whether the exogenously placed installations lead to additional installations. Because this ideal randomized experiment is not possible, our approach above flexibly controls for potential correlated unobservables and homophily. Our empirical setting also allows for an alternative approach to estimate causal peer effects motivated by the ideal experiment: two similar regions and a temporary, exogenous difference in incentives that serves to induce more installations in one region than the other. If the region with more installations continues to have a higher adoption rate once the difference is removed, then we can infer a causal effect of the extra installations on the rate of adoption.

We use a difference-in-differences approach, focusing on zip codes located around the border between IOUs. We use 33 zip codes along the border between PG&E and Southern California Edison (SCE) and 174 along the (more populous) border between SCE and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E).¹⁹ The CSI incentives are on a "step" schedule, whereby the incentives drop to a lower level once a certain number

particular street are infrequent, there should be minimal aggregation bias.

¹⁹ Details can be found in the online appendix.

Figure 6 The Difference-in-Differences Approach Exploits Changing Incentives for Zip Codes on the Utility Border



of cumulative MW of solar PV technology has been installed in that administrative region. This implies that there are times when one CSI administrative zone moves to the next incentive step and for a limited period has lower incentives than the other CSI administrative zone, as illustrated in Figure 6. To examine the treatment effect of the extra installations, we estimate

$$Y_{zt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + \beta_2 B_i + \beta_3 C_i + \beta_4 (S_i \cdot B_i) + \beta_5 (S_i \cdot C_i) + \zeta_z + \zeta_z \cdot t + \varepsilon_i, \quad (6)$$

where Y_{zt} is defined as before, S_i is an indicator for whether the electric utility received a “shock” of relatively higher incentives (e.g., SDG&E in Figure 6), B_i is an indicator for the period of the higher incentive, and C_i is an indicator for the period afterwards when the incentives were realigned. ζ_z are zip code indicators, t is a linear time trend, and ε_i is a mean-zero stochastic error.

We use the transition from step 5 to 6 for the PG&E/SCE border and the transition from step 2 to 3 for the SCE/SDG&E border for the analysis. These are the first steps with a large difference in the step transition times (62 and 181 days, respectively).²⁰ The results are given in Table 10. As expected, the adoption rate is larger on the side of the border that did not change a step (i.e., had a relatively larger incentive). More important, the adoption rate *remained* higher after the incentives are realigned, providing further evidence for a causal effect of additional installations.

²⁰ Previous steps are small—only 15 days between the transitions from step 4 to 5 for the PG&E/SCE border and 1 day for the SCE/SDG&E border—or the incentive transitions switch.

Table 10 Regressions for Incentive Step Transitions

	PG&E/SCE step 5 to 6	SCE/SDG&E step 2 to 3
S (higher incentive utility)	2,976.480 (1,910.597)	449.341 (253.365)
$Period\ B$ (period of shock)	−7.916 (5.470)	0.904 (0.292)
$Period\ C$ (realigned incentives)	−15.964 (6.333)	1.254 (0.752)
$S \times Period\ B$	5.790 (5.882)	6.604 (4.130)
$S \times Period\ C$	18.725 (7.638)	9.581 (5.685)
Zip code FE	Y	Y
Zip indicators interacted with time trend	Y	Y
R -squared	0.011	0.008
N	14,100	55,577

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

6. Comparison to Other Diffusion Models

As a benchmark and robustness check, we compare our results to those from other common models of technology diffusion. We begin with the canonical Bass model commonly used to study product diffusion with aggregate data. Appendix C provides details on the Bass model estimation. Table 11 presents the estimation results, which are performed at the daily level. Column (1) shows the results using data aggregated over all zip codes. Columns (2) and (3) report the results at the zip code level, with and without zip code fixed effects. All three specifications yield similar results for the coefficient of imitation, q . The estimated value of q falls in the range reported by Sultan et al. (1990). The estimated market potential is much larger for the aggregated data because it corresponds to all of California instead of a single zip code.

Table 11 Bass Model Estimation Results

	(1) Aggregate	(2) Zip no FE	(3) Zip with FE
$Constant\ (pm_{zt})$	2.275 (0.433)	1.158×10^{-3} (0.046×10^{-3})	1.771×10^{-3a}
$Cumulative\ installations\ (q - p)$	1.089×10^{-3} (0.063×10^{-3})	1.055×10^{-3} (0.008×10^{-3})	1.002×10^{-3} (0.010×10^{-3})
$Cumulative\ installations^2\ (-q/m_{zt})$	-4.51×10^{-9} (1.21×10^{-9})	-1.41×10^{-6} (0.051×10^{-6})	-1.48×10^{-6} (0.0562×10^{-6})
Zip code FE	N	N	Y
R -squared	0.745	0.260	0.299
N	147	42,690	42,696
p	6.02×10^{-7}	9.74×10^{-8}	1.60×10^{-7}
q	0.0170	0.0167	0.0163
m_{zt}	3.78 million	11,890	11,030

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^aDenotes the average value of the zip code fixed effect.

In the aggregate Bass model, we find that one additional installation increases the probability that a household adopts (q/m) by 4.51×10^{-9} . This cannot be directly compared to our first-differences estimate (1.57×10^{-6}) because the aggregate model assumes that an installation affects the probability of adoption everywhere in California, rather than simply in the zip codes where adoption is occurring. This difference underscores why aggregate diffusion models are unsuitable for the estimation of *localized* peer effects. Interestingly, our results from the zip code-level Bass model turn out to be quite close to our preferred estimate of (5) and, in fact, are not statistically significantly different. Yet the average market size estimates from the disaggregate Bass model results are over twice the average number of owner-occupied homes in a zip code, suggesting that we may have reason to be concerned about the zip code-level Bass model results.²¹

Although the Bass model is a useful benchmark, it may be more suitable to compare our approach to recent work in the marketing literature using disaggregated data. Bell and Song (2007) use a clever approach to identify social interactions in the adoption of online grocery retailing. They assume i.i.d. errors and use order statistics to derive an expression for the probability that at least one individual within a region makes use of the new technology. The authors estimate the model using maximum likelihood estimation. One concern about their approach is the reliance on i.i.d. errors across individuals, an assumption that would not hold if there are shocks that affect many individuals in a particular area. An advantage of this method is that only information on the first adoption in each market is necessary. However, this also limits the number of control variables; only two-digit zip code fixed effects can be used. This limitation is recognized by the authors, who also estimate a mixed proportional hazards model with a zip code random effect.

In this spirit, we estimate a hazard model with zip-quarter random effects and monthly indicators. This follows Iyengar et al. (2011), who use city and monthly indicators. The use of time controls is more flexible than a mixed proportional hazards model because it allows the hazard rate to vary as a flexible function of time rather than a predetermined parametric function of time. Using a Poisson model with the number of daily installations as the dependent variable, we find that adding an installation to the installed base increases the probability of a household

installation by 0.011 (standard error of 0.0001). For an average zip code with 4,959 owner-occupied homes, this corresponds to a household effect of 2.198×10^{-6} . This is quite close to our first-differenced results. One concern, however, is the assumption of orthogonality between the random effects and covariates.

We can include fixed effects rather than random effects in a model using the generalized method of moments estimator described in Woolridge (1997) and Windmeijer (2000). This method is computationally intensive and again assumes i.i.d. errors. We estimate the model using monthly aggregated data, where the dependent variable is the probability of a household adoption (in millionths).²² The resulting estimated coefficient is insignificant, possibly as a result of the computational necessity of monthly aggregation.

7. Conclusions and Implications for Practitioners

This paper provides a straightforward methodology for consistently estimating peer effects in the adoption of new technologies that display a lag between the time of adoption and delivery, and then it quantifies the magnitude of those peer effects. We find strong evidence for causal peer effects, indicating that an extra installation in a zip code increases the probability of an adoption in the zip code by 0.78 percentage points when evaluated at the average number of owner-occupied homes in a zip code. These peer effects appear to increase in magnitude over time and are greater for larger installations and at the more localized street level. Our findings also indicate that peer effects appear to lead to larger installations. The results are suggestive of the pathways by which peer effects work: both visibility of the panels and word of mouth appear to contribute to social interactions that lead to further adoption. Accordingly, both image motivation and information transfer are likely to underlie the peer effects. These findings have clear implications for marketers who are striving to reduce the high cost of consumer acquisition in the solar PV market.

A first implication is that because visibility appears to enhance the peer effect, increasing the visibility of adoptions would be expected to increase the rate of adoption. Indeed, this strategy can be seen with several installers putting up signs indicating that a solar PV panel has been installed. Our finding that a larger installed base in a zip code leads to larger installations suggests that other methods of information provision may also lead to increased adoption levels. The use of demonstration sites has been shown to have positive effects on the adoption of green technologies (Bollinger 2012), although Kalish

²¹ This is likely to be the case because the Bass model attributes the acceleration of adoption entirely to the coefficient of contagion and ignores the possibility of anything else, including other macro shocks.

²² Details can be found in the online appendix.

and Lilien (1986) caution us that such demonstrations for solar PV should only be used when the information to be learned is positive. Programs such as PG&E's "Neighborhood Solar Champions" training program aim to leverage peer effects to provide such positive information to neighbors. Our finding of an increasing effect of new installations in a zip code suggests that targeting marketing efforts in areas that already have some installations is a promising strategy. Our demographic interaction results further suggest that efforts to leverage peer effects can be targeted to particular areas based on demographics, such as those with larger household sizes and many commuters.

The results in this paper are consistent with the latest developments in the solar PV market. Companies such as SolarCity and Sungevity have recognized that reducing the consumer uncertainty about installing solar is critical to expanding the market. These companies lease solar panels to consumers, performing the installation for free and taking care of all the maintenance. Furthermore, they guarantee the system will perform as promised or will pay the consumer the difference. By transferring the risk of installation to the installer, moral hazard issues may be reduced, leading to the installation of larger (and riskier) installations.

Many of the results in this paper are also likely to apply to the diffusion of other visible green technologies, such as hybrid vehicles, electric vehicles, geothermal heating, and outdoor high-efficiency lighting. A decision support system for using this "analogue approach" to forecast diffusion is described in Choffray and Lilien (1986). We see many promising opportunities to further explore the influence of social interactions in other solar PV markets and other markets for green products.

Electronic Companion

An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the online version at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1120.0727>.

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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1

To begin, recall our definition of the installed base, $b_{zt} = \sum_{\tau=1}^t \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}$, where $\tilde{a}_{j\tau}$ is an indicator for a completed installation by household j at time τ . In contrast, Y_{zt} is based on the fraction of households who *decide to adopt* a solar PV system in zip code z at time t , with the time lag between an adoption and installation of l .

A necessary and sufficient condition for consistency and unbiasedness is that the vector of covariates is orthogonal to the error term. In particular, we are most concerned that the installed base in the first-differenced model, $b_{zt} - b_{zt-1}$, is orthogonal to the first-differenced error term. We then show that

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}[(b_{zt} - b_{zt-1})(\epsilon_{zt} - \epsilon_{zt-1})] \\ &= \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^t \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau} - \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}\right)(\epsilon_{zt} - \epsilon_{zt-1})\right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}\left[\epsilon_{zt} \sum_{\tau=1}^t \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[\epsilon_{zt-1} \sum_{\tau=1}^t \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}\right] \\ &\quad - \mathbb{E}\left[\epsilon_{zt} \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}\right] + \mathbb{E}\left[\epsilon_{zt-1} \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}\right] \\ &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

To see why the final equality holds, it suffices to focus on $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{zt-1} \sum_{\tau=1}^t \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}]$. If this term equals 0, then the others also equal 0. When $l \leq \nu + 1$, then $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{z\tau-1} \epsilon_{z\tau-\nu}] = \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{z\tau} \epsilon_{z\tau-\nu+1}] \neq 0$, so by definition of Y_{zt} , $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{z\tau-1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}] \neq 0$ for all τ . However, with $l > \nu + 1$, $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{z\tau-1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau}] = 0$ for all τ .

Appendix B. Details of Street-Level Analysis

As with the zip code model, we model the probability of a household adopting solar panels. However, unlike the analysis at the zip code level, we do not know the set of potential adopters on each street because we do not have information on the number of households on each street. However, we can overcome this issue. Let the probability of a household adopting solar on street s in zip code z in month μ be given by

$$Y_{sz\mu} = \frac{1}{m_s} \beta_s b_{s\mu} + \beta_z b_{z\mu} + \gamma' X_{z\mu} + \eta_{z\mu} + \xi_\mu + \epsilon_{sz\mu},$$

where b_{st} is the street-level installed base and m_s is the unknown number of potential adopters. In this specification, we assume that the effect of previous installations on the street is smaller for streets with larger numbers of potential adopters because of the increased length of those streets. If we multiply the equation on all sides by m_s , we get

$$\begin{aligned} m_s \cdot Y_{sz\mu} &= \beta_s b_{s\mu} + m_s \cdot \beta_z b_{z\mu} + \gamma' m_s \cdot X_{z\mu} \\ &\quad + m_s \cdot \eta_{z\mu} + m_s \cdot \xi_\mu + m_s \cdot \epsilon_{sz\mu}. \end{aligned}$$

Now $\mathbb{E}(N_{sz\mu}) = m_s \cdot Y_{sz\mu}$, where $N_{sz\mu}$ is the number of installations on street s and zip z in month μ . Therefore, we can write

$$N_{sz\mu} = \beta_s b_{s\mu} + m_s \cdot \beta_z b_{z\mu} + \gamma' m_s \cdot X_{z\mu} + m_s \cdot \eta_{z\mu} + m_s \cdot \xi_\mu + \epsilon_{sz\mu}.$$

Although we do not know m_s , we can include interactions between street indicator variables and explanatory variables

to control for the unobserved number of potential entrants and isolate the effect of the street-level installed base, β_s . The large number of explanatory variables necessitates the use of streets with at least four installations; however, with the use of street-quarter fixed effects, these are the streets that provide the identifying variation anyway. Again, we estimate the model using first-differences to control for time-varying unobservables as well as for correlated preferences. Our standard errors are again robust to heteroskedasticity, which is present by construction.

Appendix C. Details of Bass Model Estimation

In the Bass model, the probability of adoption at time t (given that adoption has not occurred) is modeled as

$$Y_{zt} = \sum_{\tau=1}^t \sum_{j=1}^{m_z} \tilde{a}_{j\tau} / (m_z - b_{zt}) = p + (q/m_z)b_{zt},$$

where p and q are the coefficients of innovation and imitation, respectively. Recall that m_z is the total market potential and z denotes the market (e.g., all of California or a zip code). The first-order condition shows that the number of new adoptions is given by a quadratic function of b_{zt} :

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{j=1}^{m_{zt}} \tilde{a}_{jt} &= [m_{zt} - b_{zt}][p + (q/m_{zt})b_{zt}] \\ &= pm_{zt} + (q - p)b_{zt} - (q/m_{zt})b_{zt}^2. \end{aligned} \quad (C.1)$$

The common approach, which we take, is to run a linear regression estimating coefficients equal to the expressions pm_{zt} , $q - p$, and $-q/m_{zt}$. We define t in our estimation as a month (i.e., μ as in the street-level estimation), but it was sometimes defined as a year in the previous literature.

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