Groth16 Implement Specification in BitVM2

Fiamma [1]

July 2024

Abstract

In this paper, we will show how we implement the Groth16 verification in Bitcoin, we are grateful to all the members who contribute to BitVM2 repository, such as Robin, Weikeng, and Zerosync team, etc. Based on this paper, we hope: (1). Our design and implementment could be reviewed by BitVM2 community; (2). Let more developer and researchers to know the details that how BitVM2 works with Groth16; (3). Accelerating the process of BitVM2 with whole community to ensure it could be adopted in production in a safe way;

Contents

1 The Basics

The section will introduce some basic knowledgers you would better to know, including (1) The Groth16 verification progress; (2) On proving pairing; (3) Limitations when split the script;

1.1 Groth16-verification-program

The verify progress of Groth16[3] as follows:

$$0/1 \Leftarrow Vrf(R, \sigma, a_1, ..., a_l, \pi) : Parse\,\pi = ([A]_1, [C]_1, [B]_2) \in G_1^2, G_2 \tag{1}$$

Aceept the proof if and only if

$$[A]_1 \cdot [B]_2 = [\alpha_1] \cdot [\beta]_2 + \sum_0^l a_i [\frac{\beta\mu_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + \omega_i(x)}{\gamma}]_1 \cdot [\gamma]_2 + [C]_1 \cdot [\delta]_2 \tag{2}$$

Let

$$[msm]_1 = \sum_0^l a_i [\frac{\beta\mu_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + \omega_i(x)}{\gamma}]_1 \tag{3}$$

It should be noted that $a_0 = 1$

1.2 On-proving-pairing

This is a efficient ways to prove correctness of [2], the algorithm shows in page 25:

Algorithm 9: Multi Miller loop with embedded c exponentiation

Input: $A = [(P_1, Q_1), (P_2, Q_2), ..., (P_n, Q_n)], c, c^{-1} \in F_{q^k}, s \in F_{q^3}, P_{Q_j} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}(Q_j)$

Output: $1\ if \prod_{i=0}^{n} e(P_i, Q_i) = 1$

(1) assert $c \cdot c^{-1} = 1$

(2) $f \leftarrow c^(- 1), lc \leftarrow 0$

(3) Initialize array T such that $T[j] = Q_j$ for each non-fixed point Q_j

(4) for $i = L - 2$ to 0 do

(5) $f = f^2$

(6)   for j=1 to n do

(7) $l \leftarrow P_{Q_j}[lc]$

(8) $f = f \cdot l.evaluate(P_j)$

(9)   if Q_j is not fixed then

(10) $T \leftarrow T[j]$

(11)   assert $l.is_tangent(T)$

(12) $T[j] = l.double(T)$

(13)   end

(14)   if $bit^2 == 1$ then

(15) $f = f \cdot c^{-1}$ if $bit == 1$ else $f \cdot c$ end

(16) $l \leftarrow P_{Q_j}[lc + 1]$

(17) $f = f \cdot l.evaluate(P_j)$

(18)   if Q_j is not fixed then

(19) $Q^{'} = Q_j$ if $bit == 1$ else $-Q_j$

(20) $T \leftarrow T[j]$

(21)   assert $l.is_line(T, Q^{'})$

(22) $T[j] = l.add(T, Q^{'})$

(23)   end

(24)   end

(25)   end

(26) $lc = lc + 2$

(27)   for j=0 to n do

(28) $f \leftarrow f \cdot s \cdot (c^{-1})^q \cdot (c^{-1})^{q^2} \cdot (c^{-1})^{q^3}$

(29) $l_{1..3} \leftarrow (P_{Q_j}[lc + i])_{i=0}^2$

(30) $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_1.evaluate(P_j) \cdot l_2.evaluate(P_j) \cdot l_3.evaluate(P_j)$

(31)   if Q_j is not fixed then

(32) $Q_1 \leftarrow \pi_p(Q), Q_12 \leftarrow \pi_p(Q_1), Q_3 \leftarrow \pi_p(Q_2)$

(33) $T \leftarrow T[j]$

(34)   assert $l_1.is_line(T, Q_1); T \leftarrow T + Q_1$

(35)   assert $l_2.is_line(T, -Q_2); T \leftarrow T - Q_1$

(36)   assert $l_3.is_line(T, Q_3)$

(37)   end

(38)   end

(39) end

(40) return $f == 1$?

if We adopt this algorithm into Groth16, The whole algorithm process should be like this:

$P_1 = [msm]_1; Q_1 = -[\gamma]_2$

$P_2 = [C]_1; Q_2 = -[\delta]_2$

$P_3 = [\alpha]_1; Q_3 = -[\beta]_2$

$P_4 = [A]_1; Q_4 = [B]_2$

Q_4 is non-fixed, Q_1, Q_2, and Q_3 is fixed.

Input: $A = [(P_1, Q_1), (P_2, Q_2), (P_3, Q_3), (P_4, Q_4)], c, c^{-1} \in F_{q^k}, s \in F_{q^3}, P_{Q_4} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}(Q_4)$

Output: $1 \; if \prod_{i=0}^{n} e(P_i, Q_i) = 1$

(1) assert $c \cdot c^{-1} = 1$

(2) $f \leftarrow c^(- 1), lc \leftarrow 0$

(3) Initialize array T such that $T[j] = Q_j$ for each non-fixed point Q_j

(4) for $i = L - 2$ to 0 do

(5) $f = f^2$

(6) $f = f \cdot c^{-1}$ if $bit == 1$ else $f \cdot c$ end

(7)   for j = 1 to 4 do

5

(7) $l \leftarrow P_{Q_j}[lc]$

(8) $f = f \cdot l.evaluate(P_j)$

(8)   end

(9) Q_4 is not fixed then

(8) $f = f \cdot l.evaluate(P_4)$

(10) $T \leftarrow T[j]$

(11)   assert $l.is_t angent(T)$

(12) $T[j] = l.double(T)$

(14)   if $bit == 1$ or $bit == -1$ then

(7)   for j = 1 to 4 do

(7) $l \leftarrow P_{Q_j}[lc + 1]$

(8) $f = f \cdot l.evaluate(P_j)$

(8)   end

(18) Q_4 is not fixed then

(16) $l \leftarrow P_{Q_j}[lc + 1]$

(17) $f = f \cdot l.evaluate(P_j)$

(19) $Q^{'} = Q_j$ if $bit == 1$ else $-Q_j$

(20) $T \leftarrow T[j]$

(21)   assert $l.is_l ine(T, Q^{'})$

(22) $T[j] = l.add(T, Q^{'})$

(24)   end

(28) $f \leftarrow f \cdot s \cdot (c^{-1})^q \cdot c^{q^2}$

(7)   for j = 1 to 4 do

(30) $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_1.evaluate(P_j)$

(7)   end

(31) Q_4 is not fixed then

(32) $Q_1 \leftarrow \pi_p(Q), Q_1 2 \leftarrow \pi_p(Q_1), Q_3 \leftarrow \pi_p(Q_2)$

(33) $T \leftarrow T[j]$

(34)   assert $l_1.is_l ine(T, Q_1); T \leftarrow T + Q_1$

(35)   assert $l_2.is_l ine(T, -Q_2); T \leftarrow T - Q_1$

(36)   assert $l_3.is_l ine(T, Q_3)$

(38)   end

(39) end

(40) return $f == 1$?

1.3   Limitations-on-bitcoin-script

There are some constraints we have to take into account:

- Max script size: 4MB;

- Max stack depth: 1000 (main stack + alt stack);

- Max stack item size: 520 bytes

- 1 bit signature size: 26 bytes with Winternitz;

As the signature is much big now, so we plan to use economic games to reduce the risk of being malicious in our first version. We wil give clarification on this later.

1.4 Block-size-calculation

It would be better know that how we calculate the Bitcoin block size based on taproot upgrade now.

1.4.1 block size

The block size will be calculated as the following picture:

Figure 1: Block size

1.4.2 transaction size

The transaction size will be calculated as the following picture:


Figure 2: Transaction size

You can check more details in [5]

1.4.3 script chunk limitation

Based on the deign of BitVM2 [1], we hope each script chunk could be packed into one block as a transaction. So, the transaction size could not exceed 4,000,000 - 320 = 3,999,680 weight units [5].

The disputed transaction is a 1 input and 2 outputs, the average size of non-witness data in this kind of transaction is around 464 weight units. So for the witness size, the limitation is 3,999,680 - 464 = 3,999,216 weight units.

As showed in BitVM2 [1], the disputed transaction needs to the signature of Committee, and the sign type is SIGNHASH_SINGLE. Let's assume that the number of Committee is 7 and the size of each schnorr signature is 65 bytes (64 bytes for SIGNHASH_ALL)

So the limitation will be 3,999,216 - 7 * 75 - 8(stack item size) = 3,998,683 weight units.

4,000,000 BLOCK weight units	Signatures	others	Non-witness Data	Block Data
3,999,680 TRANSACTION weight units	Signatures	others	Non-witness Data	
3,999,216 WITNESS DATA weight units	Signatures	others		
3,998,683 ZKP SCRIPT CHUNK weight units				

Figure 3: ZKP script chunk limitation

1.5 Transaction constructure

The transaction constructure of Bitcoin show in the following excel.

Field	Size	Description
Version	4 bytes	The version number for the transaction. Used to enable new features
Maker	1 bytes	Used to indicate a segwit transaction. Must be 00
Flag	1 bytes	Used to indicate a segwit transaction. Must be 01 or greater
Input Count	Variable	Indicates the number of inputs
Input-TXID	32 bytes	The TXID of the transaction containing the output you want to spend
Input-VOUT	4 bytes	The index number of the output you want to spend
Input-ScriptSig Size	Variable	The size in bytes of the upcoming ScriptSig
Input-ScriptSig	Variable	The unlocking code for the output you want to spend
Input-Sequencer	4 bytes	Set whether the transaction can be replaced or when it can be mined
Output Count	Variable	Indicates the number of outputs
Output-Amount	8 bytes	The value of the output in satoshis
Output-ScriptPubKey Size	Variable	The size in bytes of the upcoming ScriptPubKey
Output-ScriptPubKey	Variable bytes	The locking code for this output
Witness-Stack Items	Variable	The number of items to be pushed on to the stack as part of the unlocking code.
Witness-Stack Items-Size	Variable	The size of the upcoming stack item
Witness-Stack Items-Item	Variable	The data to be pushed on to the stack
Locktime	4 bytes	Set a time or height after which the transaction can be mined

The blue part means it will be stored in segwit part. Any one could check more details in [4]

1.6 Signature-hash-type

Signature Hash Types:

- 0x01 = SIGHASH_ALL
- 0x02 = SIGHASH_NONE
- 0x03 = SIGHASH_SINGLE
- 0x81 = SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY | SIGHASH_ALL
- 0x82 = SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY | SIGHASH_NONE
- 0x83 = SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY | SIGHASH_SINGLE

2 Bench data

This section mainly give some bench datas for some operators used in Groth16 verification process.

2.1 operators-script-size-origin

We give some initial bench data we test in current implement first. Including:

- Double and Add operators in G_1 group;
- Double and Add operators in G_2 group;
- Field operators in extension field;

2.1.1 G1 group

operator typr	script size	max depth	exceed 4M?
$2 \cdot g_1$	1,752,916 bytes	131	no
$g_1 \cdot g_1^{'}$	3,997,319 bytes	< 1000	no

2.1.2 G2 group

operator typr	script size	max depth	exceed 4M?
$2 \cdot g_2$	7,019891 bytes	815	yes
$g_2 \cdot g_2^{'}$	9,270,854 bytes	293	yes

2.1.3 field

operator typr	script size	max depth	exceed 4M?
$F_{q12} : a + b$	6,644 bytes	220	no
$F_{q12} : 2 * a$	6,793 bytes	217	no
$F_{q12} : a * b$	11,641,775 bytes	545	yes
$F_{q12} : mul\_fq6\_by\_nonresidue$	4,923 bytes	146	no
$F_{q12} : frobenius\_map(1)$	4,541,887 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : frobenius\_map(2)$	2,224,363 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : mul\_by\_034$	9,810,459 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : ell\_by\_constant$	9,525,050 bytes	383	yes
$F_{q6} : a * b$	3,873,847 bytes	275	no
$F_{q6} : frobenius\_map(1)$	1,518,206 bytes	-	no
$F_{q6} : frobenius\_map(2)$	598,274 bytes	-	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_01\_with\_1\_constant$	3,280,529 bytes	221	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_fp2\_constant$	1,520,337 bytes	101	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_01$	3,769,633 bytes	-	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_fp2$	2,252,362 bytes	167	no
$F_{q2} : a * b$	750,883 bytes	113	no

2.2 operators-script-size-optimization

The less script chunks, the better. So before we split the big operators, we want to optimize them first. We will give our new data first and then clarification the pricinple.

- Double and Add operators in G_1 group;
- Double and Add operators in G_2 group;
- Field operators in extension field;

2.2.1 G1 group

operator typr	script size	optimized script size	exceed 4M?
$2 \cdot g_1$	1,752,916 bytes	1,251,319 bytes	no
$g_1 \cdot g_1^{'}$	3,997,319 bytes	1,001,977 bytes	no

2.2.2 G2 group

operator typr	script size	optimized script size	exceed 4M?
$2 \cdot g_2$	7,019891 bytes	3,262,334 bytes	yes
$g_2 \cdot g_2^{'}$	9,270,854 bytes	2,761,898 bytes	yes

2.2.3 field

operator typr	script size	max depth	exceed 4M?
$F_{q12} : a + b$	6,644 bytes	220	no
$F_{q12} : 2 * a$	6,793 bytes	217	no
$F_{q12} : a * b$	11,641,775 bytes	545	yes
$F_{q12} : mul\_fq6\_by\_nonresidue$	4,923 bytes	146	no
$F_{q12} : frobenius\_map(1)$	4,541,887 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : frobenius\_map(2)$	2,224,363 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : mul\_by\_034$	9,810,459 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : ell\_by\_constant$	9,525,050 bytes	383	yes
$F_{q6} : a * b$	3,873,847 bytes	275	no
$F_{q6} : frobenius\_map(1)$	1,518,206 bytes	-	no
$F_{q6} : frobenius\_map(2)$	598,274 bytes	-	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_01\_with\_1\_constant$	3,280,529 bytes	221	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_fp2\_constant$	1,520,337 bytes	101	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_01$	3,769,633 bytes	-	no
$F_{q6} : mul\_by\_fp2$	2,252,362 bytes	167	no
$F_{q2} : a * b$	750,883 bytes	113	no

3 Split pricinple

We will mainly introduce why we select a manually way to split the ZKP verification script.

3.1 automated

Splitting the whole computation automately is a good story. Ideally, the whole progress shoule be like the follow picture:

The overall flow shoule be as follows:

- The program will be complied into a set of customized gadgets first
- Each gadget will correspond with a script gadget;
- The accmulator begin to split the whole gadgets;
- Becasue each script gadget has a fixed size, so when the accumulated size is almost equal to 4M, these gadgets will spilt as one chunk;
- The Node A execute the script program locally to generates input and output for each chunk;
- All the input and output locate in stack, so The Node A have to commit all the value in the stack;

It is worth to note that stack depth is another factor shoule be taken into account. For the automated way, we think there have a few constrains:

- It is easy to exceed the stack depth limitation;
- It committes lot of value which won'be used in current chunk;
- It has to implememnt enough gadgets to support any computation which means turing completed;
- Executing a big scirpt program is much slow;
- It adds the costs when verify the expected input and output on chain;
- The logic of each chunk is unreadable;

However, automated fragment has some advantages as well, like it will generate the minimal number of script chunk. But as we dont put all chunks into Bitcoin network, So we do can not mind the number of chunks unless the size is much big.

Accumulator

Automated fragment ③

Program_A executed in BitVM2 ① → Compile ② → gadgets → gadget_A → gadget_script_A ~4M → chunk_0 → Node_A

gadget_B → gadget_script_B

gadget_C → gadget_script_C ~4M → chunk_1

gadget_* → gadget_script_* ~4M

agadget_* → gadget_script_* → chunk_k

Executed script locally to get the input and output of each chunk ④

Commitment	0~199	200~399	400~599	600~799	800~899	900~999	Input	Output
input							chunk_0	
z_0							chunk_1	chunk_0
z_1							chunk_2	chunk_1
output								chunk_2

⑤

Figure 4: automated fragment

3.2 manually

Why do we select a manually way to split the whole program?

- It is not easy to exceed the stack depth limitation as we just put data into stack which is needed by current chunk ;
- It only committes data which only used in current chunk;
- We just need to implement gadgets to support ZKP verification as any computaion could generate a ZK proof;
- Executing the rust program to generate the input and output of each chunk;
- It keeps the lowest costs when verify the expected input and output on chain;
- The logic of each chunk is readable;

This approach maybe generate more chunks, but just like we said before, there will only one script chunk executed on Bitcoin.
So it's acceptable. The overall flow of manually fragment as follow pictures:

The overall flow shoule be as follows:

- We implememnt the rust version and script version of Groth16 ZKP verification cocurrently first;
- The rust verion includes the witness generation of each chunk;
- The script verion includes all chunks we split;
- We keep each chunk satisfies the size constraint and depth constraint;
- The Node A execute the rust program locally to generates input and output for each chunk;
- The Node A committes all the inputs and outputs;

4 Optimization pricinple

We will mainly introduce how we recude the script of operators in G_1 and G_2.

Figure 5: manually fragment

4.1   group-g1

It needs more opcodes if we implement the double or add operator in G_1 directly because there are some divison operators which is not bitcoin-friendly. We obey the rules proposed in paper On Proving pairing.

4.1.1   Double

- Show that the pair (λ, μ), indeed define a tangent through T showing that $y_1 - \lambda x_1 - mu = 0$ and $2\lambda y_1 = 3x_1^2$. This step is dominated by $2\tilde{m}$ and one $\tilde{s}$
- Compute λ^2 which is simple one $\tilde{s}$
- Compute $x_3 = \lambda^2 - 2x_1$ and $2\lambda y_3 = -\mu - \lambda x_3$ which is dominated by computing λx_3

4.1.2   Add

- Show that the pair (λ, μ), indeed define a tangent through T showing that $y_1 - \lambda x_1 - mu = 0$ and $y_2 - \lambda x_2 - mu = 0$. This step is dominated by $2\tilde{m}$
- Compute λ^2 which is simple one $\tilde{s}$
- Compute $x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$ and $2\lambda y_3 = -\mu - \lambda x_3$ which is dominated by computing λx_3

4.2   group-g2

The unique difference between G_1 and G_2 is that G_1 is based on F_q while G_2 is based on F_{q2}.

Based on this optimization, we reduce the size of Double and Add operator largely. So we dont need to split the Double and Add operations now. This is a big improvement.

Additionally, we also highly reduce the size of Double and Add operators in G_1 as well. Now, we can combine at most 3 randome operators into one script chunk while before optimization, we only could combine 2 Double operators into 1 script chunk and only 1 Add operator for 1 script chunk. It reduce the number of script chunks for MSM part to around 1/3 directly.

5 Split data

We give the result directly how we split the script which the size exceeds the 4M limitation. As we showed in the 2, There only have some operations of F_{q12} need to be split after we optimize the operations for G_1 and G_2

operator typr	script size	max depth	exceed 4M?
$F_{q12} : a * b$	11,641,775 bytes	545	yes
$F_{q12} : frobenius\_map(1)$	4,541,887 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : mul\_by\_034$	9,810,459 bytes	-	yes
$F_{q12} : ell\_by\_constant$	9,525,050 bytes	383	yes

We will show how we split these 4 big script one by one, as we split it manually, we try our best to satifying the following property cocurrently:

- Doesn't exceed the limitation of size and stack depth;
- Keeping the size of input and output is minimal;
- Try our best to make logic of each chunk is readable;

5.1 split-code

5.1.1 $F_{q12} : a \cdot b$

```
% Split Fq12 mul into small scripts. For each script
% size < 4M && max_stack_used < 1000
% Input: a0, a1, b0, b1
%
% Algorithm:
%     Final_a0 = a0 * b0 + a1 * b1 * \gamma
%     Final_a1 = (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1) - (a0 * b0 + a1 * b1)
pub fn split_mul() -> Vec<Script> {
    % The degree-12 extension on BN254 Fq6 is under the polynomial z^2 - y

    let mut res = vec![];

    res.push(script! {
        % a0, b0
        { Fq6::mul(6, 0) }
        % a0 * b0
    });

    res.push(script! {
        % a1, b1
```

```
            { Fq6::mul(6, 0) }
            % a1 * b1
        });

        res.push(script! {
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, a0, a1, b0, b1,
            { Fq6::add(6, 0) }
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, a0, a1, b0 + b1,
            { Fq6::add(12, 6) }
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, b0 + b1, a0 + a1,
            { Fq6::mul(6, 0) }
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1)
            { Fq6::copy(12) }
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1), a0 * b0
            { Fq6::copy(12) }
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1), a0 * b0, a1 * b1
            { Fq12::mul_fq6_by_nonresidue() }
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1), a0 * b0, a1 * b1 * \gamma
            % z^2 - \gamma = 0
            { Fq6::add(6, 0) }
            % a0 * b0, a1 * b1, (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1), a0 * b0 + a1 * b1 * \gamma
            { Fq6::add(18, 12)}
            % (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1), a0 * b0 + a1 * b1 * \gamma, a0 * b0 + a1 * b1
            { Fq6::sub(12, 0) }
            % a0 * b0 + a1 * b1 * \gamma, (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1) - (a0 * b0 + a1 * b
                1)
        });

        res
    }
```

5.1.2 $F_{q12} : frobenius\_map(1)$

```
    pub fn split_frobenius_map(i: usize) -> Vec<Script> {
        let mut res = vec![];
        if i == 1 {
            % [p.c0, p.c1]
            res.push(script! {
                { Fq6::frobenius_map(i) }
                { Fq6::roll(6) }
                { Fq6::frobenius_map(i) }
                % [p.c1 ^ p^i, p.c0 ^ p^i]
            });
            % [p.c1 ^ p^i]
            res.push(Fq6::mul_by_fp2_constant(
                &ark_bn254::Fq12Config::FROBENIUS_COEFF_FP12_C1
                    [i % ark_bn254::Fq12Config::FROBENIUS_COEFF_FP12_C1.len()],
            ));
        } else {
```

```
            res.push(Self::frobenius_map(i));
        }

        res
    }
```

5.1.3 F_{q12} : mul_by_034

```
pub fn split_mul_by_034() -> Vec<Script> {
    let mut res = vec![];

    % compute b = p.c1 * (c3, c4)
    % [p.c1, c3, c4]
    res.push(Fq6::mul_by_01());
    % [b]

    % [c0, c3, b, p.c0, p.c1]
    % [Fq2, Fq2, Fq6, Fq6, Fq6]
    res.push(script! {
        % compute a = c0 * p.c0
        { Fq6::copy(6) }
        % [c0, c3, b, p.c0, p.c1, p.c0]
        { Fq2::copy(26) }
        % [c0, c3, b, p.c0, p.c1, p.c0, c0]
        { Fq6::mul_by_fp2() }
        % [c0, c3, b, p.c0, p.c1, c0 * p.c0]
        % [c0, c3, b, p.c0, p.c1, a]
        % compute gamma * b
        { Fq6::roll(18) }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b]
        { Fq12::mul_fq6_by_nonresidue() }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b * gamma]

        % compute final c0 = a + gamma * b
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b * gamma]
        { Fq6::copy(6) }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b * gamma, a]
        { Fq6::add(6, 0) }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, a + b * gamma]
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, final_c0]

        % compute e = p.c0 + p.c1
        { Fq6::add(18, 12) }
        % [c0, c3, a, final_c0, p.c0 + p.c1]
        % [c0, c3, a, final_c0, e]

        % compute c0 + c3
        { Fq2::add(20, 18) }
        % [a, final_c0, e, c0 + c3]
```

```
        });

        % [b, a, final_c0, e, c0 + c3, c4]
        res.push(script! {
            % update e = e * (c0 + c3, c4)
            { Fq6::mul_by_01() }
            % [b, a, final_c0, e]

            % sum a and b
            { Fq6::add(18, 12) }
            % [final_c0, e, b + a]

            % compute final c1 = e - (a + b)
            { Fq6::sub(6, 0) }
            % [final_c0, e - (b + a)]
            % [final_c0, final_c1]
        });

        res
    }
```

5.1.4 $F_{q12}:$ *mul_by_constant*

```
pub fn split_mul_by_034_with_4_constant(constant: &ark_bn254::Fq2) -> Vec<Script
    > {
    let mut res = vec![];

    % [p.c1, c3], constant = c4
    res.push(Fq6::mul_by_01_with_1_constant(constant));

    % compute a = p.c0 * c0
    % Input: [p.c0, c0]
    % Output: [p.c0 * c0]
    res.push(Fq6::mul_by_fp2());

    % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b]
    res.push(script! {
        { Fq6::copy(0) }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b, b]
        % compute beta * b
        { Fq12::mul_fq6_by_nonresidue() }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b, b * beta]

        % compute final c0 = a + beta * b
        { Fq6::copy(12) }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b, b * beta, a]
        { Fq6::add(6, 0) }
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b, a + beta * b]
        % [c0, c3, p.c0, p.c1, a, b, final_c0]
```

```
        % compute e = p.c0 + p.c1
        { Fq6::add(24, 18) }
        % [c0, c3, a, b, final_c0, e]

        % compute c0 + c3
        { Fq2::add(26, 24) }
        % [a, b, final_c0, e, c0 + c3]

        % update e = e * (c0 + c3, c4)
        { Fq6::mul_by_01_with_1_constant(constant) }
        % [a, b, final_c0, e]

        % sum a and b
        { Fq6::add(18, 12) }
        % [final_c0, e, a + b]

        % compute final c1 = e - (a + b)
        { Fq6::sub(6, 0) }
        % [final_c0, final_c1]
    });

    res
}
```

5.2   split-result

We give the split result directly as follow excel:

operator typr	chunks	script size	max depth	exceed 4M?
$F_{q12} : a * b$		11,641,775 bytes	545	yes
	chunk0	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
	chunk1	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
	chunk2	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
$F_{q12} : frobenius\_map(1)$		4,541,887 bytes	-	yes
	chunk0	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
	chunk1	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
$F_{q12} : mul\_by\_034$		9,810,459 bytes	-	yes
	chunk0	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
	chunk1	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
	chunk2	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
$F_{q12} : ell\_by\_constant$		9,525,050 bytes	383	yes
	chunk0	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
	chunk1	11,641,775 bytes	545	no
	chunk2	11,641,775 bytes	545	no

18

6 Summary

Bibliography

[1] **BitVM2**. URL: https://bitvm.org/bitvm2.

[2] **On Proving Pairings**. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/640.pdf.

[3] **On the Size of Pairing-based Non-interactive Arguments**. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260.pdf.

[4] **Transaction constructure**. URL: https://learnmeabitcoin.com/technical/transaction/.

[5] **Transaction size**. URL: https://learnmeabitcoin.com/technical/transaction/size/.