

Crypto refresher

IND-CCA: Indistinguishability under Chosen Ciphertext Attack

- **IND-CCA** is a game against an adversary \mathcal{A} having access to an oracle \mathcal{O}
 1. Game chooses $k \in \mathcal{K}$, $b \in \mathbb{B}$ and $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{P}$ and sends $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m_b)$ to \mathcal{A}
 2. \mathcal{A} gets $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m_i)$ from \mathcal{O} for messages $m_i \in \mathcal{P}$ of their choosing
 3. \mathcal{A} gets $\tilde{m}_i \leftarrow \text{Dec}_k(c_i)$ from \mathcal{O} for ciphertext $c_i \in \mathcal{C}$ of their choosing (except c)
 4. \mathcal{A} guesses $b' \in \mathbb{B}$ and wins if and only if $b = b'$
- A cryptosystem is **CCA secure** if no adversary wins this game more than half the time

$CPA \subset CCA$

FHE schemes are malleable and by definition not CCA secure