GENERALITY AND EXCEPTION:
A STUDY IN THE SEMANTICS OF EXCEPTIVES

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I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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

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

Abstract

This dissertation is a study in the semantics of exceptive constructions in English. Starting from a detailed discussion of naturally-occurring data, I show that the empirical domain of exceptives is substantially larger than was previously assumed, and that several interpretive properties which are often associated with exception phrases (or EPs) in the literature must be reappraised.

In the dissertation, I challenge some received views on exceptive constructions and argue, on the basis of syntactic and semantic evidence, for the following novel hypotheses: (*i*) EPs are sanctioned by statements that express generality claims; (*ii*) EPs do not directly affect the truth of the statements they modify; (*iii*) there are no exceptive determiners in English; (*iv*) exceptions are invariably propositional; and (*v*) EPs are not semantic (i.e. locally compositional) restrictors of quantifier domains. I also advance several new generalizations concerning exceptive constructions and, after reappraising the distribution of EPs in English, provide a semantics for so-called connected and free uses of these phrases.

A central component of the theory developed in the dissertation is the hypothesis that exception sentences express a conjunctive proposition consisting of a generality claim and an exception to that statement. From this theoretical perspective, the licensing condition on EPs is not difficult to formulate: an EP is licensed only by sentences which give rise to the expression of a generalization about a given domain which includes the denotation of the right argument of the exceptive. Since generality claims may be instantiated defeasibly, I argue that EPs are sensitive to defeasible aspects of sentence meaning.

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I dedicate this work to Débora, soul mate extraordinaire, and the rest of my family, for their unfailing love and support over the past few years.

Contents

Chapter 1

Charting the Territory

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall aim to define the empirical scope of the theory of exceptive constructions developed in the dissertation. Given the vastness of the empirical domain at hand, the title 'charting some of the territory' may have been more appropriate. Nevertheless, in the following pages I shall try to map the boundaries of this territory in some detail, focusing on those areas that truly define the exceptive landscape, and hence are more likely to lead to interesting theoretical insights.

As I will show in this chapter, previous analyses of exceptive constructions have focused narrowly on a small subset of the data, to the exclusion of other acceptable uses of exceptives. One unfortunate consequence of this theoretical bias is that, even though the interpretation of EXCEPTION PHRASES occurring as modifiers of universal DPs has received meticulous attention in the literature, no general theory of EXCEPTIVES exists to date. In fact, despite much progress on this topic in the last two decades, the full range of expressions that may license such phrases has not yet been properly explored, and the more subtle aspects of their interpretation are still poorly understood.

This chapter is structured as follows: after introducing exceptives (or EXCEPTION MARKERS) in section 1.2, I shall make some preliminary remarks concerning

their typology in section 1.3. Section 1.4 discusses three basic properties of exception phrases. It will be shown that a widely accepted assumption regarding the class of DPs with which an EP may associate is incorrect. Section 1.5, which draws heavily on naturally occurring data, discusses a representative sample of expressions with which EPs may combine. Finally, section 1.6 summarizes the discussion in this chapter.

Let me introduce at the outset some basic notions that will expedite our discussion of exceptive constructions. Following the well-established terminology of Moltmann (1995, 1996), I will use the term EXCEPTION DPs to refer to DPs of the form DP + exception marker + XP, such as *every defense attorney except Perry Mason* in (1a), or *no chiropractor but Jones* in (1b).

(1) a. Smith dislikes every defense attorney except Perry Mason.
b. No chiropractor but Jones drives a red Maserati.

Following Moltmann, the term exception phrase (henceforth, EP) will be used to refer to phrases consisting of an exception marker and a following XP, typically a DP, such as *except Perry Mason* or *but Jones*. Furthermore, the DP that an EP relates to will be called its ASSOCIATE, and the XP argument of the exception marker will be referred to as the COMPLEMENT of the EP. Thus, *no chiropractor* is the associate of the EP in (1b), and *Jones* is the complement of the EP. The use of this terminology for sentence (1a) is illustrated graphically in (2) below.

(2) Smith dislikes $\overbrace{\text{every defense attorney}}^{\textit{Associate}}$ $\overbrace{\text{except Perry Mason}}^{\textit{Exception Phrase}}$ $\overbrace{\text{Perry Mason}}^{\textit{Complement}}$ — $\overbrace{\text{every defense attorney except Perry Mason}}^{\textit{Exception DP}}$

1.2 Exceptives

Natural languages typically have a rich inventory of exceptives. In English, for example, we find the syntactically simplex markers *aside, bar, besides, but, except,*

and *save*, and the complex *apart from*, *aside from*, *but for*, *except for* and *other than*. The situation is similar in the Romance languages. For instance, Italian has the simplex markers *eccetto* ('except'), *fuori*, *fuorché* ('apart from'), *meno* ('but'), *salvo* ('save'), and *tranne* ('but'), as well as the complex *a parte* ('besides') and *al di fuori di* ('outside of', 'apart from'); and Spanish has the simplex *excepto* ('except'), *menos* ('but'), *salvo* ('save'), and the complex *aparte de* ('apart from') and *fuera de* ('aside from').

Exceptives across languages often have independent uses as adversative coordinators (Mourin 1980). English *but* and *except*, and French *excepté que* and *sauf que* are cases in point. The use of the coordinator *but* in sentence (3a), for example, indicates the existence of a contrast between the apparent simplicity of the proof and the speaker's lack of understanding. Likewise, the use of *except* as an adversative coordinator in (3b) expresses the idea that our wish to visit Kim is at odds with our ability to do so.

(3) a. This proof seems pretty simple, but I don't understand it.
b. We'd go see Kim, except we don't have a car.

1.3 The distribution of EPs: preliminary remarks

I will start my discussion of the distribution of EPs by observing that exception DPs are not restricted to bearing a certain grammatical role. The following sentences illustrate some of the grammatical roles that exception DPs in English may adopt in the sentence: a subject in (4a), a direct object in (4b), an indirect object in (4c), a prepositional complement in (4d), and a PP adjunct in (4e).

(4) a. Every cabinet member except Jones denied the allegations.
b. Sally painted every room except the kitchen with a roller.
c. I sent a postcard to every relative of mine except aunty Jane.
d. Harry put a marble in every box except this one.
e. Mary called back home from every European capital except Paris.

In this and the following chapters I will concentrate on subject exception DPs for the most part, but this strategy is adopted merely in the interest of simplicity.

EPs may also occur in various position within the sentence. Hoeksema (1987) introduced a seminal distinction between CONNECTED and FREE EPs. Connected EPs typically attach to the DP they modify, or they may occur extraposed from that position. Free EPs, on the other hand, have a greater distributional freedom, not unlike that of sentential adverbs. *But*-phrases and *except*-phrases in their use as postmodifiers of DP, as in (5a–b), are the prototypical examples of connected EPs in English. Sentences (6a–b) illustrate the canonical instances of free EPs.

(5) a. No district judge came to the party but Kim.
b. Every linguistics professor except Jones drives a Mercedes.

(6) a. No district judge, besides Kim, came to the party.
b. Except Jones, every linguistics professor drives a Mercedes.

In the spirit of Hoeksema's typology, EPs in English can be classified, according to their distribution in and with respect to the sentences they modify, into five different categories. The sentences in (7) through (11) below, taken from my corpus of naturally occurring exception constructions, illustrate the whole range of EP types (according to their distribution). Connected EPs occurring within a DP are exemplified by sentences (7a) and (7b).

(7) a. In one street, every cat but two has disappeared over the past 13 days.[1]
b. And he said Dukakis had been on every television show except "Wheel of Fortune" because he was "afraid Vanna White would turn the 'L' word."[2]

In sentences (8a) and (8b), the EPs *except Texas* and *except 'The Advertiser' critic* are displaced to the right of the constituents they modify, respectively, the DPs *all states* and *nobody*; and so, they are representative instances of extraposed connected EPs.

(8) a. In 1986, all states made provision for alimony except Texas.[3]

b. "I was there for my first Festival of Arts in 1986, but on opening night nobody turned up except The Advertiser critic," Bob said.[4]

Free EPs may occur in sentence initial or sentence final position, and may also have a sentence internal use. All three types of free EPs require an intonation break, which sets them off from the rest of the sentence. This is usually signalled orthographically by the use of commas. Sentences (9a) and (9b) below illustrate the use of sentence-initial EPs, and sentences (10a) and (10b) that of sentence-final EPs.

(9) a. Apart from a tiny memorial exhibition of sixteen canvases two years later, nothing had been shown or sold since then.[5]

b. Other than proof of legal status or citizenship, program rules require virtually no written verification or documentation of eligibility factors.[6]

(10) a. In those six years I had never been away, except on visits at holiday time in the neighbourhood.[7]

b. I cannot, for instance, recall anything about our own or the Golds' apartments, except perhaps high ceilings.[8]

Finally, the sentence internal use of free EPs is illustrated in sentences (11a) and (11b) below.

(11) a. Ireland, apart from the political issue, is a great and little-trodden field for social, agricultural, and commercial example.[9]

b. Today, just about every TV mom, except for Marge Simpson and a handful of others, has a job.[10]

Free EPs may also occur in a sentence immediately following the one which contains its associate, as in the following examples:

(12) a. Direct marketers do not often think about Reims. Except when ordering champagne, that is, when they may prefer Epernay-based Moet et Chandon to Reims-headquartered Louis Roederer.[11]

b. Morning mobilization has always been an onerous chore for me. Except on Saturdays.[12]

These uses of EPs are argued in von Fintel (1994) to involve an "afterthought, repair, or self-correction", and he concludes that they fall outside the scope of a compositional analysis of EPs. While there is some truth to von Fintel's conclusion, examples of this type are not essentially different from those in which free EPs occur in sentence final position, as the following pair of sentences illustrates:

(13) a. Everyone loved the new show and no one thought it would be canceled so soon. Except for George, of course.

(von Fintel (1994: 115), example (37))

b. Everyone loved the new show and no one thought it would be canceled so soon, except for George, of course.

Hoeksema's binary division between connected and free EPs has been generally associated in the ensuing literature with a systematic difference in their interpretation and co-occurrence restrictions.

Thus, it is often assumed that connected EPs can appear only with universal determiners, while free uses may relax this requirement in some instances. However, as I will argue in chapter 3, where the distribution of exceptives will be discussed in greater detail, an EP cannot in general be categorized as connected or free solely on the basis of the marker which heads the phrase, because most exceptives have both uses.

1.4 Basic semantic properties of EPs

EPs are often associated with two distinguished inferences and a characteristic co-occurrence constraint on their associates. Following the well-established terminology of Moltmann (1995, 1996), I will refer to these inferences as the 'Condition of Inclusion' and the 'Negative Condition'.

1.4.1 The Condition of Inclusion

The CONDITION OF INCLUSION requires that the complement of the EP be a member of the N'-restrictor of its associate. Thus, for example, both (14a) and (14b) imply that Björn is a foreign dignitary.

(14) a. Every foreign dignitary except Björn speaks English fluently.
b. No foreign dignitary speaks English fluently except Björn.

The CONDITION OF INCLUSION has had a somewhat uncertain status in the literature. Keenan and Stavi (1986) assume that it is an entailment of sentences containing exception DPs. According to von Fintel, this inference might be just a Gricean implicature (von Fintel 1993), as Hoeksema (1987) had in fact suggested, or a presupposition (von Fintel 1994), but he adopts Keenan and Stavi's received view as a simplifying assumption.

Several arguments can be provided, however, in support of the view that the information in (16), for instance, is in fact a PRESUPPOSITION of the speaker of (15), a possibility considered but not adopted by von Fintel (1994).

(15) Every investor but Smith has fled the country.

(16) Smith is an investor (under discussion).

First, observe that the speaker of (15) cannot explicitly cancel the proposition that Smith is an investor without incurring a contradiction, as shown by (17a–b) below, which suggests that uttering (15) also commits the speaker to the truth of that proposition.

(17) a. # Every investor but Smith has fled the country, but Smith is not an investor.
b. # Every investor but Smith has fled the country, but I do not mean to imply that Smith is an investor.

Furthermore, (16) is not contextually cancellable either; that is, there are no scenarios in which an utterance of (15) would not be taken to imply that Smith is an

investor. Since explicit and contextual cancellability are held to be necessary conditions on the presence of Gricean implicatures (Grice 1989: 44), we can conclude contrapositively that (16) is not an implicature of the speaker of (15).

We can be more specific as to the connection between (15) and (16). Unlike entailments, presuppositions exhibit PROJECTION behavior: loosely speaking, the presuppositions of simple sentences tend to be inherited by certain sentences which embed them. Thus, for example, if $S_{\{\phi\}}$ is a simple sentence which implies that the truth of ϕ is taken for granted, the complex sentences (18a–e) will tend to carry the same implication (in the absence of inconsistency).

(18) a. It is not the case that $S_{\{\phi\}}$.
b. $S_{\{\phi\}}$?
c. Maybe $S_{\{\phi\}}$.
d. Either $S_{\{\phi\}}$, or S'.
e. If $S_{\{\phi\}}$, then S'.

This result, however, would not obtain if ϕ were merely an entailment of S, because ϕ is not asserted by an utterance of any of the sentences in (18). Applying this diagnostic to sentence (15) above, we can see that every complex sentence in (19) implies that (16) is true, which shows that (16) is presupposed rather than asserted by an utterance of the exception sentence.

(19) a. It is not true that every investor but Smith has fled the country.
b. Has every investor but Smith fled the country?
c. Maybe every investor but Smith has fled the country.
d. Either every investor but Smith has fled the country, or the undercover agent is not telling the truth.
e. If every investor but Smith has fled the country, we must contact the authorities at once.

This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that, as one would expect in the presence of presuppositional information, an utterance of sentence (15) is felt to be

inappropriate in a context where the proposition expressed by (16) is not already accepted as true, or cannot be accepted as true while preserving consistency with other propositions known to be true in that context. For example, the following discourse is markedly infelicitous:

(20) # Yes, we know by now that Smith isn't an investor. The news is that every investor but Smith has fled the country!

1.4.2 The Negative Condition

The NEGATIVE CONDITION is the claim that, when applied to the verbal predicate, the DP associate and the exceptions differ in truth value. As Moltmann (1995: 225) puts it, "the exceptions have to be exceptions". So if the associate of an EP is positive, applying the predicate property to the exception yields a negative truth value. But if the associate is negative, then the opposite result obtains. Thus, according to Moltmann, sentence (21a) entails that Franks does not smoke Cuban cigars, but sentence (21b) entails that he does.

(21) a. Every U.S. army general but Franks smokes Cuban cigars.
b. No U.S. army general but Franks smokes Cuban cigars.

A detailed discussion of the nature and effects of this very important feature of the meaning of exception constructions will be offered in chapter 3 in connection with the semantic interpretation of EPs.

1.4.3 The Quantifier Constraint

One of the most widely accepted results of semantic theories of exceptive constructions is a purported restriction on the class of DPs with which an EP may associate. Such a restriction, often referred to in the literature as the QUANTIFIER CONSTRAINT, predicts that EPs of the form [DP exception marker XP] can only be applied felicitously to DPs headed by universal determiners, in particular *every*, *all* and *no*:

(22) THE QUANTIFIER CONSTRAINT
The NP that an exception phrase associates with must denote a universal or negative universal quantifier (Moltmann 1995: 227).

This semantic restriction predicts that exception DPs whose associates are headed by non-universal determiners such as *most, many* and *few* are ill-formed. Most of the analyses proposed in the literature for connected exception DPs either explicitly adhere to this constraint, or they implicitly entail some version of it in the semantics that interprets the DPs, as the following quotes indicate:

(23) "Connected exception phrases are strictly associated with universal determiners, in particular, *every, all* and *no*."

(Hoeksema 1987: 101)

(24) "The associate of an exception phrase must be a universal or negative universal quantifier."

(Moltmann 1992: 377)

(25) "An interesting side-effect of the solution is that a previously unknown formal property is singled out that universal determiners (*every* and *no* and their synonyms) share, to the exclusion of all other basic determiners."

(von Fintel 1994: 101)

(26) "[...] exception phrases can only be applied to NPs with universal determiners."

(Lappin 1996b: 202)

(27) "Only universally quantified noun phrases can be first arguments in exclusion phrases [...]."

(Zuber 1998: 268)

(28) "On the other hand, exceptive clauses introduced with *but*, *save*, *except*, and their analogues can only be hosted by universals."

(Horn 2000b: 6)

The intuition behind the Quantifier Constraint is not new, for it has been recognized at least since the Middle Ages, as noted by Horn (2000b):

(29) "An exceptive proposition is never properly formed unless its non-exceptive counterpart is a universal proposition. Hence, 'A man except Socrates is running' is not properly formed".

(Ockham 1980: 144-5, *Summa Logica* II:18, cited in Horn (2000b))

While William of Ockham was right to assume that there is something distinctly odd about the statement

(30) A man except Socrates is running.

the claim embodied in the Quantifier Constraint is factually incorrect. The next section provides new evidence showing that connected exception DPs headed by non-universal determiners are generally acceptable, thus debunking the notion that exceptive modification is a reliable diagnostic of the universal status of a DP.

We often come across universal positive generalizations and universal negative generalizations (i.e., non-existence claims). Not surprisingly, both types of generalizations can take exceptions. English allows us to qualify universal generalizations in due recognition of their exceptions by means of statements like

(31) a. All dogs except Rottweilers are friendly.
b. No doctor except Mary smokes king-size Cuban cigars.

(32) a. All dogs are friendly.
b. No doctor smokes king-size Cuban cigars.

Thus a speaker can choose the true assertions (31a) and (31b) instead of the false ones in (32), assuming, that is, that Rottweilers are, in fact, unfriendly dogs, and that Mary is a smoker of king-size Cuban cigars.

However, as I will next show, other kinds of generalizations admit exceptions too, even much weaker generalizations than universal ones. There is, of course, no litmus test to determine what constitutes an exception to a non-universal quantificational statement such as those involving the quantificational determiner *most*, *many* or *few*. For example, *most* only claims that a majority of individuals in its domain have the predicate property. Not having that property does not necessarily make an individual exceptional, for those individuals could be part of the minority whose existence is countenanced by the truth of this quantifier. From this perspective, the concept of being an exception to a non-universal quantificational claim seems hard to pin down. In the following chapter I will try to show how this problem should be approached.

1.5 Some associates of EPs

In this section, I explore a representative sample of those expressions which may be modified by EPs. Among the associates of EPs, we can distinguish pretheoretically between those that involve some form of determiner quantification, and those which do not. In the former group we find DPs headed not only by the universal determiners *every* and *no* (and their synonyms), but also DPs headed by *most*, *many*, *few*, and by the mass quantifiers *much* and *little*. In the latter we find definite DPs, bare nouns, indefinite singulars, and superlative DPs. A semantic analysis of a series of key examples will be given in chapter 3. The aim of this section is simply to describe informally some important aspects of the meaning of these expressions.

1.5.1 Determiner quantifiers

The prediction that exceptive DPs whose associates are headed by non-universal determiners are semantically ill-formed is incorrect. Here I provide evidence from naturally occurring data showing that exceptive DPs headed by *most*, *many* and *few* are in fact acceptable in English. First, consider EP-associates headed by the

determiner *most*.

(33) a. Most vegetables except the tap-rooted ones can be started off in small pots and transplanted into the garden when the ground is ready.[13]

b. Salvias are native to most continents except Australia.[14]

c. Johnston noted that most dishwashers except very low-end models have a water-saving feature.[15]

d. If Mr. Tools does not run into complications, his doctors say, he should eventually be able to walk long distances and do most things except vigorous exercise.[16]

EPs may also associate with DPs headed by the determiner *many*, as the following examples show:

(34) a. Kate is an actress who has played many roles except that of a real woman.[17]

b. With many countries except Japan, the United States maintains a trade surplus or trade balance.[18]

c. The Cincinnati-based company has cut its coupon budget by 50 percent since 1990 and claims to have lowered prices on many products except coffee, according to spokesman Greg Rossiter.[19]

d. Vetta spaghetti remained unavailable at many supermarkets except Parkson Bukit Bintang and Aktif Lifestyle at The Mall.[20]

Few is also a possible head of associates of exception DPs:

(35) a. Few people except director Frank Capra expected the 1946 film 'It's a Wonderful Life' to become a classic piece of Americana.[21]

b. Few except visitors will know that Czechoslovakia produces wine.[22]

c. One barrier to popularizing lichens is that few except the most eye-catching and common have common names.[23]

d. "It's like I always tell them, if they learn to make good choices now, maybe they'll live to see 21 with few regrets except that belly-button ring."[24]

EPs also frequently occur with MASS QUANTIFIERS and in PARTITIVE DPs. The sentences in (36) below involve the quantifier *little*, which is often thought to correspond to the count quantifier *few* in the mass domain (McCawley 1993b, Higginbotham 1995).

(36) a. There was little furniture except our big fridge in the corner of the living room.[25]

b. Otherwise, the plants require little care except a sunny location where the soil drains well.[26]

I complete the presentation of evidence regarding quantificational exception DPs with the following sentences involving partitive DPs headed by non-universal determiners:

(37) a. 'Business hasn't been too good. It's quiet most of the day except the afternoons, when people drop by during lunch time,' he confessed.[27]

b. It affects drainage in most of the city except south Slidell.[28]

c. They cited several ways errors could occur. The judge rejected many of these scenarios except the one concerning pens.[29]

d. Few of us, except yachties and farmers, trust our own judgment any more.[30]

EP-associates do not form a homogeneous class. As the following subsections will demonstrate, any impression that EPs may only occur in the context of quantificational determiners must be dispelled. To this end, in the remainder of this section I will present and discuss naturally occurring data illustrating associates of EPs of other kinds.

1.5.2 Definite DPs

According to the Russellian account, a definite singular count DP refers to the unique entity satisfying the content of the common noun property in the relevant domain. This uniqueness condition is not generally satisfied in the same way by

a definite plural DP such as *the pilots*, or a definite mass DP such as *the wine in the cellar*. Rather, the latter DP refers to the maximal amount or quantity of wine in the cellar, or perhaps the sum of the set of quantities of wine in the cellar. Similarly, *the pilots* refers to the maximal group (or set) of pilots, or the sum of the set of groups of pilots (Sharvy 1980, Link 1983).

Hoeksema (1987) originally made the observation that, although singular definite DPs do not normally tolerate exceptive modification, free EPs with *except* may modify plural definites. This behavior was used to distinguish free EPs from their connected counterparts which, according to Hoeksema, may never co-occur with definite DPs.

In later work, Hoeksema explained this putative restriction on connected EPs on the grounds that definite DPs such as *the district judges* and *your body* do not express universal generalized quantifiers, but are interpreted as referring terms (Hoeksema 1990, 1996a). But this explanation begs further inquiry, of course, as it does not address the question why free exceptives are acceptable as modifiers of sentences containing expression of this type.

In this section, I will present some of the types of definite DPs that allow modification by EPs and discuss their interpretations. I will show that EPs are acceptable not only with (*i*) plural definites, but also with (*ii*) singular definites denoting group terms and (*iii*) kind-referring singular definites.

I shall start by considering examples of plural definite DPs in exception sentences, such as the following:

(38) a. The boys, except Nathan who was listed as stable, and their mothers were released from hospital.[31]

b. The judges were the essence of banality, except the good-looking black-haired guy, Simon Cowell, who often seemed intent on smooching with the voluptuous lady judge.[32]

c. The senators, except for Stevens, took their spouses along for the other portions of the trip, which involved meetings with Australian and New Zealand officials on security, commerce, fisheries and environmental

issues.[33]

d. Except for a squirrel chattering on the fence and a dog scratching at his locked door, the whole neighborhood is empty, all the children off to school, the fathers off to work, and the mothers, except for me, also off to work.[34]

The meaning of each of the sentences in (38) is intuitively clear. For example, in sentence (38a) the plural definite *the boys* picks out the maximal set of boys in the relevant situation or, in Link's terms (Link 1983), the SUPREMUM of the denotation of the common noun property, and so this sentence attributes the property of being released from hospital to the maximal set of boys (other than Nathan).

Hoeksema (1996a) argues that the ability of EPs to occur with plural definite DPs is due the presence of a covert DISTRIBUTIVE OPERATOR in the logical representation of the sentence. This operator guarantees universal distribution over the argument of the verbal predicate.

There are, of course, exception sentences in which plural definite DPs receive a COLLECTIVE interpretation due to the presence of collective verbal predicates like *gather*, *disperse*, or *scatter*, such as the following:

(39) a. The troops have gathered, except for the governor.[35]

b. Slowly the girls dispersed to bed except for one Frenchy who consumed a little too much wine on an empty stomach and was having trouble breathing.[36]

c. Much later the crowd had dispersed except for two young men who sat zombielike on a park bench, their eyes fixed on nothing at all.[37]

d. When police arrived, the fighters scattered except for one man, who Orr said began cursing and screaming at police.[38]

Elaborating on ideas in Dowty (1987) and Taub (1989), Brisson (2003) points out that, although collective predicates do not in general tolerate exceptive modification, collective ACTIVITY and ACCOMPLISHMENT predicates are generally acceptable with EPs. However, collective predicates denoting STATES and ACHIEVEMENTS are not. These are her examples:

(40) a. * The girls are a big group, except for Kim and Hannah.
b. The campers built rafts every summer, except for the youngest ones.
c. The students built a raft, except for Maggie and Josh.
d. * The students elected Mike, except for the sophomores.
(from Brisson (2003: 147), examples (72)–(75))

As we see, the sentences with activity and accomplishment predicates (40b) and (40c) exhibit a distinction in acceptability with respect to their stative and achievement counterparts in (40a) and (40d). Brisson takes the successful interaction with EPs of the former types of collective predicates to indicate that they involve distributive quantification covertly.

But there are other semantically plural definites (though oftentimes morphologically singular) with a collective interpretation that may also be modified by exceptive phrases. I have in mind the so called GROUP nouns such as *committee, group* and and *league,* out of which the definites *the committee, the group* and *the league* can be built. These GROUP TERMS (Barker 1992) are perfectly able to support EPs, as the following sentences indicate:

(41) a. "This team is new to the playoffs, except for the seniors," Bisbe said.[39]
b. His plan has the support of the School Committee, except for member Richard Harding, the board's only African-American, and the Cambridge Teachers Association.[40]
c. Copeland was 18 and 6-foot-2 by then, but the show used two sickly looking impostors to fool the celebrity panel, except Kitty Carlisle.[41]
d. The group, except for one member, all concluded that there was excellent intensive care and post-operative pediatric cardiac surgery facilities in Toronto, London and Ottawa.[42]

Definite DPs may be interpreted either as definite descriptions or as definite generics. And so, a DP such as *the potato* may refer to either a specific potato under discussion, or else the species 'Tuber Tuberosum'. In the first case, *the potato* is a definite description; in the second, it is a definite generic. So far in this section, I

have discussed exceptive modification of singular and plural definite descriptions. I shall now turn to definite generics but, before I do that, let me briefly introduce the notion of genericity that I will be referring to in this and the following sections.

Krifka *et al.* (1995) discussed two basic varieties of genericity: REFERENCE TO A KIND and CHARACTERIZING (or generic) sentences. The former type involves reference to an abstract entity that is related to specimens, as exemplified in (42a), where the DP *the apple* does not designate a certain apple or group of apples, but rather the kind 'Malus Domestica' itself. Likewise, the DP object of the verb *invent* in (42b) does not refer to an individual thermoscope, but to a kind.

(42) a. The apple grows in temperate climates.

b. Galileo invented the thermoscope.

Characterizing statements express regularities or generalizations about sets of entities or situations. For example, sentence (43b) states that all, or typical, mangoes are naturally sweet. Similarly, sentence (43b) reports a habit, rather than a particular episode of Rupert reading an English newspaper.

(43) a. A mango is rich in natural fructose.

b. Rupert reads *The Guardian* before breakfast.

Kind denoting DPs may also occur in generic sentences, giving rise to characterizing statements about the specimens of kinds. Thus, sentence (44) states that, in general, a member of the kind 'Mangifera Indica' is rich in natural fructose.

(44) The mango is rich in natural fructose.

In English, there are two types of nominals that can be used for kind reference: bare plural and singular definite noun phrases. Definite generics are the topic of the remainder of this section. The interaction of EPs with bare plurals and characterizing statements will be discussed in sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.4, respectively.

Consider the following naturally occurring sentences involving definite generic subjects:

(45) a. Except for a specimen found in Colombia, the Trizogeniates is distributed in south-central South America.

b. The garden dahlia should be staked, except for dwarf varieties.

c. The Wollemi pine is susceptible to red ray rot infection except for young seedlings and small saplings.

d. The giant squid is the largest invertebrate, and, except for their larvae and some recently captured juveniles, has never been observed alive, although the Colossal Squid is likely to be even larger.[43]

The predicate *be distributed in south-central South America* in (45a) selects for the kind reading of the definite DP. Likewise, the DPs *the garden dahlia* and *the Wollemi pine* in (45b–c) do not denote a salient dahlia or pine, but rather their respective species. This is also true of the definite DP *the giant squid* in (45d). The denotation of the complement of the EP in (45d) above, for example, makes reference to particular entities that exemplify the kind *the giant squid*. If we identify a kind with the set containing all of its exemplars (Chierchia 1998), the role of the EP in this sentence seems clear: it prevents the addressee from reaching a certain conclusion in regard to the exemplars of the kind denoted by the EP-complement.

I will close this section by pointing out some cases where an EP modifies a generic definite plural. Unlike the French plural definite, plural definites in English do not usually receive a generic reading. But consider the sentences (46a) and (46b), where the plural definite DP *the dinosaurs*, respectively modified by the EPs *except ...for Barney* and *except for birds*, appears to receive a generic interpretation.

(46) a. Frogs, it seems, are resilient animals. Having survived for 175 million years they outlived the dinosaurs (except, obviously for Barney).[44]

b. The dinosaurs died out (except for birds) about 65 million years ago and small, struggling mammals – warm-blooded animals that bear their young live (instead of laying eggs) – survived.[45]

The predicate *die out* in (46b), for example, typically requires a kind-reading of its subject argument because, obviously, only kinds and not objects can die out. But

given that generically interpreted definite plurals are highly marked in English, it is likely that the relevant reading of the sentences above is simply a taxonomic one, ranging over all sub-types of the dinosaur kind.

1.5.3 Bare Nouns

In this section I discuss the possibility of exceptive modification of bare nominal arguments in English. First, I will concentrate on bare plurals, and then on mass nouns.

English bare plurals are usually associated with two distinct interpretations: a GENERIC reading and an EXISTENTIAL one. Consider the following examples:

(47) a. Apples contain tartaric acid.
b. Apples fell from the sky.

The most natural reading of sentence (47a) is generic; it claims that apples generally contain tartaric acid. Sentence (47b), however, receives an existential interpretation, simply stating that some apples fell from the sky.

There have been many attempts to account for the various readings of bare nouns and the relationship between these readings. These approaches fall into two main types. One treats bare nouns in English as being names of kinds of things (Carlson 1977, Chierchia 1998). According to this approach, the existential readings of bare nouns are derived from the basic kind-level denotations. The other takes bare plurals as ambiguous between kind terms and weak indefinites (Wilkinson 1991, Diesing 1992, Gerstner-Link and Krifka 1993, Kratzer 1995). Indefinites introduce variables which may be bound by a generic or existential quantifier, depending on the lexical and aspectual properties of the predicate, or the information structure of the sentence.

For the purposes of discussing the co-occurrence of exception phrases with bare nouns in this section, I will assume the NEO-CARLSONIAN approach of Chierchia (1998), and consider both bare plurals and mass noun arguments to be unambiguously kind-referring. The semantic operations that derive the various readings

of the seemingly ambiguous bare noun arguments are determined by the lexico-aspectual characteristics of the verb. Statements about kinds in episodic sentences are reduced to statements about specimens (or stages) of the kinds.

Bare plurals may occur in combination with EPs (Hoeksema 1987: 110). This holds true for other types of generics also, as I will discuss later. The following sentences contain the bare plural nouns *dogs*, *birds*, *boys* and *English policemen*, all of which are modified by an immediately following free EP with *except* or *except for*:

(48) a. Dogs, except for those that help disabled travelers, do not belong in hotels.[46]

b. While birds, except peacocks, will not generally eat monarch caterpillars, paper wasps kill and dart them away to eat them, slice by slice, at this time of year.[47]

c. Life is relatively uncomplicated and free of hormonal insurgency: boys, except for Dad, are yucky and gross and smell like dirty sneakers.[48]

d. English policemen, except the guards who protect the royal family, do not carry guns.[49]

Each of the sentences (48) above is interpreted generically. The exceptions to the statements containing these bare plurals are, respectively, the dogs that help disabled travelers, peacocks, dad, and the guards who protect the royal family. And thus, for example, sentence (48a) claims that typical dogs, with the exception of the dogs that help disabled travelers, do not belong in hotels.

How is the generic interpretation of bare plurals derived? I shall assume with Chierchia (1998), that bare plural nouns in English denote plural properties, which are shifted to kinds by a covert NOMINALIZATION OPERATOR when they are used as arguments. The generic reading of these sentences is then derived via a GENERIC MODAL OPERATOR which induces generic quantification over instances of the kind.

The bare plural nouns in (49) below occur with the KIND-LEVEL predicates *be/become extinct* and *die out*. Kind-level predicates cannot apply singularly to the objects that instantiate a kind, but only collectively to the kind itself. So these sentences

are about a kind, an abstract entity that is related to concrete realizations or specimens.

(49) a. Today streetcars are extinct, except for the three cars operated by the Minnesota Transportation Museum.[50]

b. Now imagine that mammals became extinct except for bats.[51]

c. By the 1940s, railroads, trucks, and diesel-powered towboats transported most of the nation's freight, and steamboats became extinct except for a few that offered day excursions for tourists.[52]

d. By 1950, American chestnuts had died out except for the few trees that early settlers had carried beyond their normal range and therefore beyond the range of the fungus.[53]

The Condition of Inclusion identifies each of the kind-denoting DPs in (49) above as the associates of their corresponding EPs. As I pointed out before, Chierchia (1998) identifies a kind in any given world with the set containing all of its instances in that world. Making this assumption in regard to the examples in (49) is compatible with the type of analysis of EPs that to be developed in this dissertation, because it suggests that an assertion about a set of entities (the kind) leads to inferences about the individual members of that set (the instances of the kind).

Can EPs also occur in sentences with existentially interpreted bare plural subjects? Kiss (1998) claims that only predicates of existence that take a LOCATIVE ARGUMENT license existential readings of their bare plural subjects. In a similar vein, Dobrovie-Sorin (1997) predicts that stative predicates allow an existential reading of their preverbal subject provided it is localized with respect to a co-argument. As demonstrated by the unacceptability of the following sentences, in which the types of predicates described above were used as a test, EPs may not modify existentially interpreted bare plural subjects:

(50) a. # Except for Rehnquist, Supreme Court Justices are present in the room.

b. # Except for Kim, children played baseball in the courtyard.

I close this section by pointing out that mass nouns resemble bare plurals in their interpretive space and their ability to function as associates of EPs, as shown by the sentences in (51).

(51) a. In fact, bottled water, except for mineral water, must comply with the provisions in the quality standard for bottled water [...].[54]

b. Optical glass, except for quartz, is thus ruled out.[55]

c. Wine, except for sake, has never been particularly popular in Japan, but sales have registered a slight increase in recent years, a result of the increase in the number of women drinkers.[56]

d. At the moment honey, except for Comb or Chunk Honey, can only be prepacked in prescribed quantities of 57g, 113g, 227g, 340g, 454g, 680g, (or multiples of 454g), unless the quantity is less than 50g.[57]

1.5.4 Indefinite singulars

EPs sit comfortably with generically interpreted expressions of various types. I have already presented evidence showing that EPs may modify generically interpreted bare plural nouns and generic definites. In this section, I will concentrate on exceptive modification of sentences comprising indefinite singulars as subjects (or IS sentences).

IS sentences in English may be interpreted generically, just as those containing bare plural subjects. But there are well-known differences between characterizing statements involving bare plural subjects and those involving indefinite singular subjects. The more significant of these differences is perhaps the fact that unlike bare plural nouns, indefinite singulars do not denote kinds (Krifka *et al.* 1995). Also, whereas generic sentences containing bare plurals typically express generalizations which could be portrayed as descriptive or inductive, IS sentences express rule-like generalizations. In other words, the properties predicated of the subjects of IS sentences are in some sense 'essential' (Lawler 1973), 'analytic' (Burton-Roberts 1977), or 'definitional' (Cohen 2001, Greenberg 2003). For this reason, the most prominent reading of sentence (52a) below is the normative statement 'to be a

coupé is to have two doors.' However, sentence (52b) is more naturally interpreted as a simple descriptive generalization about most coupés (although a definitional interpretation is also possible).

(52) a. A coupé has two doors.
b. Coupés have two doors.

Carlson (1995) made a distinction between two opposing approaches to the study of generics: an INDUCTIVIST APPROACH, and a RULES-AND-REGULATIONS approach. According to the first of these proposals, genericity is a quantificational phenomenon. The truth of a generic sentence is verified by the existence of a sufficient number of relevant individuals in the domain of the generic that satisfy the predicate property. The second approach represents a fundamentally different view, allowing the truth of a generic statement to depend not on individual instances, but rather on whether the statement corresponds to a rule or regulation that is in force, where these are ontologically basic entities in the world.

Carlson's distinction is relevant in explaining contrasts such as the one in (52) above. For example, Cohen (2001) and Greenberg (2003) propose that whereas sentences with generically interpreted bare plural subjects ambiguously express a characterizing generic or a rule, IS sentences express rules unambiguously. But these authors diverge on how the notion of 'rule' should be interpreted. Greenberg (2003) does not share the view endorsed by Carlson (1995) and Cohen (2001) that rules are basic irreducible entities, and argues instead that an analysis of IS sentences in terms of universally quantified modal statements is superior. In what follows, I will concentrate on the proposal in Cohen (2001).

Having discussed the interpretation of IS sentences, the question is whether EPs are compatible with the kind of meaning they express. The answer is 'yes': although indefinites typically resist modification by EPs, generically interpreted indefinite singulars are acceptable as associates of EPs, as the following sentences demonstrate:

(53) a. Except for castling, a move is the transfer of a piece from one square to another square which is either vacant or occupied by an opponents

piece.[58]

b. Remember, except for leap years, a year has 365 days and there are four quarts in every gallon of water.[59]

c. Except for breakfast, a meal is an activity for the French that involves eating, conversation, and relaxation.[60]

The co-occurrence of EPs with generically interpreted indefinite singulars is remarkable, because it shows that the range of associates of EPs goes beyond simple quantificational statements, and thus suggests that EPs are licensed in sentences that express generality claims, a fundamental idea that will be developed in the following chapters.

According to Cohen, an IS sentence such as (53b) (minus the EP), does not involve a quantificational logical form, but rather has a simple predicate-argument structure: the argument is the rule or regulation expressed by the generic IS sentence, and the predicate holds of it just in case the rule is 'in effect'.

Although Cohen does not discuss the nature of rules in detail, he suggests the following schematic representation, where the conditional '$\phi(x) \Longrightarrow \psi(x)$' expresses some form of quantification.

(54) $\textbf{year}(x) \Longrightarrow \textbf{has-365-days}(x)$.

The formula (54) is a description of a rule related to sentence (53b). It specifies the proposition that a state of affairs needs to satisfy in order to conform to the rule being described. Cohen further defines a two-valued operator '!' which maps a formula to the rule it describes if such a rule exists, and is undefined otherwise. So (55) is the rule described by (54).

(55) $!(\textbf{year}(x) \Longrightarrow \textbf{has-365-days}(x))$.

Thus, sentence (53b) (minus the EP) predicates of the rule (55) that it is in effect. Notice the effect of the predicate **in-effect**, whose extension is the set of active rules and regulations. Cohen points out that IS sentences such as the ones in (53), especially (53a) and (53b), really describe (partial) definitions, linguistic rules or meaning postulates. In fact, Cohen observes that definitions are a large subset of the

acceptable generic IS sentences. The logical form of these sentences corresponds to (56) below, which states that the definition of a year as having 365 days is in active force, that is, an accepted convention of the linguistic community. In contrast, sentence (53c) expresses that a certain social rule is in effect, or socially accepted among the French, being part of the social normative behavior of the community.

(56) **in-effect**(!(**year**(x) $\Longrightarrow$ **has-365-days**(x))).

The effect of the EP *except for leap years* in (53b) is clear. A leap year is a type of year, hence the statement in (56) that rule (55) is in force leads to the inference that leap years have 365 days. The EP blocks that inference and hence prevents the addressee from reaching an erroneous conclusion in regard to leap years.

1.5.5 Superlatives

Hoeksema (1987) observed that superlatives may be associated with free EPs since they behave like universals in several respects, such as the ability to license negative polarity items in relative clauses, witness the acceptability of the polarity sensitive adverb *ever* in sentence (57a).

(57) a. Except for Harry, Dick is the best friend you ever had.

b. Except for myself, you are the most degenerate of men.
(Hoeksema (1987: 110), examples (28a) and (28b))

Superlatives are often associated with at least two readings: a so-called ABSOLUTE reading and a COMPARATIVE one, the latter arising only in the presence of a licensing operator such as a focus, an interrogative operator or a relative *wh*-phrase (Szabolcsi 1986, Heim 1999, Farkas and Kiss 2000, Sharvit and Stateva 2002). Thus, a sentence like (58) can in principle be interpreted in two ways.

(58) Berlusconi wears the most expensive watch.

On its absolute reading (58) asserts that Berlusconi wears a 1933 gold Patek Philippe, which is the most expensive watch in the world to date. But the truth of (58) can

also come about in a comparative sense. For example, sentence (58) can describe a situation where Berlusconi simply wears a watch that is more costly than anyone else's in the contextually salient domain, say, the heads of state of the European Union; a reading which is particulary prominent when the subject DP is accented. On this interpretation, sentence (58) is true provided no other head of state wears a more costly watch than Berlusconi's, even if in fact the Italian prime minister does not wear the celebrated Patek Philippe.

EPs appear to be acceptable with both types of interpretations of superlatives. For example, sentences (59a)–(59c), all of which are modified by an *except* or *except for*-phrase, are most naturally interpreted in an absolute sense.

(59) a. Carry, the tallest person at the carnival except for the guy on stilts, said he was still disappointed that "Brisco County" never built the audience he thought it deserved.[61]

b. Dillard, 81, is Cleveland's greatest Olympian except for Jesse Owens.[62]

c. Yet when that book can find only 13 pages out of 850-plus to deal with that family's take on the Pentagon Papers, arguably the most important journalistic event except Watergate in the second half of the century, something is out of whack.[63]

However, sentences (60a)–(60c) below must be understood comparatively. For example the EP in sentence (60a), *except for an office in Buffalo*, clearly suggests the comparative interpretation. Note that this EP does not seem to satisfy the Condition of Inclusion relative to the N modified by the superlative (i.e. amount of visas), but rather to the subject of the sentence (i.e. the embassy). Consequently, (60a) is interpreted as saying that the embassy processes an amount of visas that is larger than the amount of visas processed by any other administration agency except for the Buffalo office. Some of the challenges presented by superlative exception DPs will be briefly discussed in chapter 3.

(60) a. The embassy processes the largest amount of visas except for an office in Buffalo.[64]

b. Braves center fielder Marquis Grissom was 19th among outfielders in the final NL voting, getting just 218,423 votes. Of all the Braves' starters, Grissom pulled in the fewest votes except for Ryan Klesko (136,041), who is a part-time starter.[65]

c. He underwent shoulder surgery this season after playing in 108 games, the fewest in his career except for the strike season of 1981.[66]

On the basis of examples involving superlatives such as the ones above, Hoeksema (1996a) argued that sometimes the licensing condition on an EP is the semantic interpretation of the sentence in which it occurs, rather than the form of the sentence: 'absolute superlatives' receive a paraphrase that is roughly equivalent to a definite description, and 'comparative superlatives' can be paraphrased by a sentence with a universal quantifier.

1.5.6 Short summary

The table in (61) summarizes the distribution of EPs relative to a representative sample of expressions:

(61)

ASSOCIATES	CONNECTED	FREE
D-quantifiers	✓	✓
Definites	*	✓
Bare plurals	*	✓
IS sentences	*	✓
Superlatives	✓	✓

What about expressions which do not normally tolerate exceptive modification? Canonical examples involve (*i*) indefinites, (*ii*) numeral DPs, and (*iii*) universal determiners which carry a cardinality restriction, such as *both* and *neither*. Some examples are provided below in (62), (63) and (64).

(62) a. # A friend of mine except Frank visited the Louvre.

b. # Some cats except Felix like Whiskas.

(63) a. # Three professors except Kim came to my graduation party.
b. # At least three dentists except Smith recommend Trident.
c. # At most three French chefs except Pierre watch 'Lidia's Kitchen'.
d. # Exactly three brass players except Peter dislike the baritone horn.

(64) a. # Both defense attorneys except Mason arrived on time.
b. # Neither teenage girl except Lucy likes Brad Pitt.

Examples (64a–b) are particularly difficult to analyze from the perspective of traditional approaches to exceptives, owing to the fact that the determiners *both* and *neither* are universal, and yet cannot support EPs. In chapter 3, an explanation of these seemingly puzzling data will be provided.

1.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided some of the empirical foundations for the study in the semantics of exceptives in the remainder of the dissertation. I introduced some basic terminology and distinctions pertaining to exception constructions, as well as the basic semantic properties of EPs. Novel naturally occurring data were presented showing that a common assumption regarding exception DPs is, in fact, incorrect: EPs are acceptable as modifiers of certain non-universal statements. I also showed how the distinction between connected and free EPs needs to be reappraised.

In the following chapters, I shall develop a new approach to the semantics of exceptives that aims to explain, in a simple and theoretically appealing way, some of the empirical observations discussed in this one.

Chapter 2

Generality and Exception

2.1 Introduction

The theory presented in this and the following chapters represents a substantial departure from traditional accounts of EPs in the literature. In this chapter, I make the following five claims concerning EPs headed by core exceptives such as *but* and *except*:

(1) EPs are sanctioned by statements that express generalizations.

(2) EPs do not directly affect the truth of the statements they modify.

(3) There are no exceptive determiners in English.

(4) Exceptions are invariably propositional.

(5) EPs are not semantic restrictors of quantifier domains.

A detailed discussion of the rationale behind each of these claims will provide the necessary contextual backdrop against which the thrust of the theory will be set. The claims (1)–(5) will also serve to structure the chapter.

Before I begin, I will introduce the term HOST OF THE EP to refer to the result of excising the EP from the sentence in which it occurs. Thus, for example, the host of the EPs *but Lucy* and *except Kim* in (6a) and (6b), will be (7a) and (7b) respectively.

(6) a. Every nurse but Lucy works an eight hour shift.
b. No student except Kim fell asleep during the debate.

(7) a. Every nurse works an eight hour shift.
b. No student fell asleep during the debate.

This notion will play a pivotal role in the theory of EPs presented in the dissertation, as will the concept of expressing a generalization, to which I shall now turn. I should point out, however, that the remarks in sections 2.2 and 2.3 are intended only as a preliminary outline of some of the central aspects of the theory of exceptives defended in this dissertation. These ideas will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapter. The remaining sections in this chapter will address claims (3)–(5) in detail.

2.2 Sanctioning exceptions

The semantics of EPs is generally discussed within the broader context of quantificational phenomena. I will show that this seemingly natural connection is not in reality a defining characteristic of EPs. Instead, a key hypothesis that will be explored in this and the following chapters is that EPs are sanctioned by statements that express generalizations, and that, consequently, a suitable notion of generalization must be a primitive of a successful theory of exceptives. The fact that generalizations in natural language are prototypically expressed by various quantificational means is, as far as the correct semantic characterization of EPs is concerned, merely accidental.

Anticipating later discussion, let me briefly state one of the central claims of the theory of exceptives presented in this dissertation, devoid of all necessary qualifications and supplementations: the use of an EP is felicitous provided it defeats an incorrect inference about its complement that can be plausibly drawn from its host. The inference that gets defeated because of the EP must instantiate the generalization expressed by the host of the EP. Consider one example. Sentence (8),

the host of the connected EP *except furniture* in (9), expresses a generalization about (types of) things, to wit, that they can be donated to the charity.

(8) The charity can take donations of most things.

(9) The charity can take donations of most things except furniture.

The presence of the connected EP *except furniture* in (9) hedges this generalization by giving rise to a proposition (i.e. the proposition that furniture cannot be donated to the charity) that defeats a claim which instantiates the generalization expressed by (8): the claim that the charity can take donations of furniture. Thus, I will argue that an exception sentence such as (9) expresses the conjunction of propositions (or, more simply, the conjoined proposition) in (10).

(10) The charity can take donations of most things, but the charity cannot take donations of furniture.

The technical notion of generalization adopted in this dissertation is the following:

(11) GENERALIZATION
A sentence Σ expresses a generalization iff Σ makes a defeasible (i.e. non-monotonically instantiated) universal claim about a sufficiently large domain.

In the next chapter I will try to show that, relative to this notion, the key semantic properties of connected and free EPs can be satisfactorily explained. My strategy will be to argue that EPs are licensed by hosts that express generalizations, and then seek to explain core interpretive aspects of EPs in terms of features of the generalizations expressed by their hosts.

Granted, the above definition of a generalization only provides a useful approximation, rather than an exhaustive description, of this multifaceted concept. For example, issues pertaining to the perceived intensionality and context-dependence of some generalizations have been left out. Nevertheless, I believe the definition in (11) serves to highlight the key aspects of generalizations which EPs are sensitive to. These aspects are listed in (12).

(12) Generalizations ...

a. ...are universal claims about (sufficiently large) domains.

b. ...may have nonmonotonic instantiations.

c. ...are not cardinality-specific.

d. ...are not persistent under extension of their domains.

Claim (12a) encompasses the idea that generalizations are universal propositions underlyingly. Obviously, sentences (13a) and (13b) do not mean the same thing: the truth of the latter countenances the existence of a minority of strictly self-reliant cooks. By contrast, the truth of the former sentence rules out such a scenario.

(13) a. Every cook relies on other people's recipes.

b. Most cooks rely on other people's recipes.

But this is beside the point. As indicated by claim (12b), an important feature of generalizations is that they may be DEFEASIBLY or NONMONOTONICALLY instantiated; and, from the perspective of what they defeasibly entail, sentences (13a) and (13b) express the same generalization about cooks. In other words, either sentence in (13) may lead us to entertain certain beliefs about an arbitrarily chosen cook. Of course, the extent of our belief would be different in each case (other things being equal), but this is an issue pertaining only to the strength of the generalization expressed, not the generalization itself. This is a very important distinction to make, but yet one that is easy to overlook. I will briefly return to it in the next section.

An inference relation is nonmonotonic if the set of deductively valid conclusions does not increase monotonically with the set of premises. That is to say, a nonmonotonic inference relation may lead to a tentative conclusion which may be subsequently retracted as further evidence becomes available. Communication often involves drawing inferences of this type, most characteristically as hearers seek to optimize the informational value of utterances addressed to them. We might express this fact about communication as the following principle:

(14) JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS!

Exploit defeasible aspects of sentence meaning.

This principle is an injunction to take into account what a sentence nonmonotonically entails as part of its semantic interpretation. It plays a fundamental role in explaining why universal statements do not have exclusive rights in the expression of generalizations, but logically weaker statements may also be used to express such claims. For instance, sentences (15) and (16) are non-universal with respect to what they deductively entail, but nevertheless convey defeasibly instantiated universal propositions, which are in these examples hedged by the connected EPs *except dogs* and *except jam, meringues and ice cream*, respectively.

(15) I have found when trudging around letting agents that landlords appear to be tolerant of most things except dogs.[1]

(16) Try halving sugar in recipes. It works for most things except jam, meringues and ice cream.[2]

Returning to the key aspects of generalizations in (12), claim (12c) reflects the fact that cardinality statements do not make good generalizations, an idea which I will explore in detail in the next chapter. Claim (12d) captures the observation that a generalization about pugs, say, does not involve a general claim about dogs. Obviously, these last two claims follow from the fact that generalizations are universal statements underlyingly, and so they are not explicitly included in the definition of generality claim in (11).

On the basis of the notion of generalization developed in this section, I shall advance a single overarching condition on the meaningfulness of EPs, which will be referred to as THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEPTIONS:

(17) THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEPTIONS
An EP must give rise to the expression of a proposition such that it defeats a non-empty subset of the host's instantiations.

The principle in (17) is posited as a necessary condition on the meaningfulness of exceptives, and so the semantics for connected and free EPs introduced in the following chapter will be shown to entail this constraint. But let me now turn to the question of whether EPs serve to guarantee the truth of the hosts, an issue which also relates to the discussion in section 2.6.

2.3 Guarantors of truth?

According to the influential view defended in von Fintel (1993, 1994), an EP plays a central role in guaranteeing the truth of the statement it modifies by subtracting individuals from the domain of the quantificational determiner in its associate. Thus, a connected EP "rescue[s] the quantificational statement" (1993: 128). Without such restriction, it is argued, the statement would be false. And so, if Smith is the only complainant who did not attend the hearing, the addition of the EP *but Smith* will turn the following false claim into a true one.

(18) Every complainant attended the hearing.

The notion of truth preservation through subtraction (from either the domain of an associated quantifier or the universe of discourse) is prevalent in previous work on exceptives. However, the main empirical support for this idea is the incorrect assumption that connected EPs can be found only with universal associates. When the whole range of naturally occurring EP-associates is considered, it is no longer apparent that EPs serve to guarantee the truth of their hosts. Take the following sentence, which is similar to examples introduced in chapter 2:

(19) Most participants except Mr. Paisley favored a referendum, according to a participant who asked not to be identified because he was not authorized to disclose details of the deliberations.[3]

If asked about examples such as (19), native-speaker informants consistently report that the host of the EP, in this case sentence (20), need not be interpreted as making a false statement whose truth is rescued only by the inclusion of the EP.

(20) Most participants favored a referendum.

For concreteness, let us consider a scenario where the total number of participants was 100, and in which the determiner *most* is synonymous with *more than half (of the)*. In keeping with received wisdom on the meaning of exception sentences, let us also assume that Paisley is a participant who did not favor the referendum. The

question to be addressed is this: must sentence (19) necessarily describe a situation like the one depicted by the Venn diagram in (21)?

(21)



The answer to this question is negative. My informants report that the preferred, and possibly the only, interpretation of sentence (19) describes a scenario in which the participants in favor of a referendum are the majority, whether or not Mr. Paisley is taken into account. These judgments are replicated across similar examples involving non-universal EP-associates, which appears to indicate, assuming the correctness of the orthodox view, that universal exception sentences are not interpretively analogous to non-universal ones.

In chapter 1 it was argued, in line with previous suggestions in this direction (Horn 2000b, García-Álvarez 2003, Peters and Westerståhl 2006), that the distribution of connected EPs is much wider than is generally recognized. If we accept that these data fall within the scope of a semantic theory of exceptives, as in my view we must do, the seeming interpretive distinction between universal and non-universal exception sentences that emerges from the perspective of current theories might lead us to hypothesize different sets of truth-conditions for connected EPs, as determined by the quantificational force of their associates.

I shall take a different approach arguing, first, that the point of using an EP is not to rescue the truth of the claim made by its host and second, that the observed interpretive difference between universal and non-universal exception sentences does not reflect a putative ambiguity in connected EPs, but is due to properties of the host. As will become clear in the following chapter, these ideas make it possible

to maintain a unitary analysis of the meaning of connected EPs, and serve to highlight a key semantic fact concerning EPs in English. In order to establish this fact, however, we must first recognize the distinction that exists between what follows from a generalization expressed by a given statement, in the technical sense described in (11) above, and what makes that statement true. Consider the following example:

(22) Most men have hair on their legs.

Sentence (22) expresses a generalization about men because it licenses nonmonotonic inferences about arbitrary members of the set of men. In other words, this sentence is acceptable as a generalization because, for any $x \in [\![man]\!]$, it nonmonotonically entails (23).[4]

(23) x has hair on his legs.

The truth of sentence (22), however, depends simply on the existence of a majority of hairy-legged men: whether or not all men in fact have the specified property is not an issue. Thus, the inferences that can be plausibly derived from a statement that expresses a generalization typically go beyond what is strictly entailed by the truth of that statement. This is a subtle but critical distinction because, as I will argue in this and the following chapters, connected EPs have an effect on what their hosts express as generalizations, not directly on what the truth of their host classically entails.

For example, the claim made by sentence (22) is rooted in the perceived existence of a preponderance of hairy-legged men. Given the normative status typically accorded to majorities, and in the absence of information to the contrary, an addressee may defeasibly jump to the conclusion that any given man has hair on his legs. However, in due recognition of the fact that male professional cyclists shave their legs, for instance, a speaker may choose to qualify the sentence above with a connected EP to produce sentence (24).

(24) Most men except professional cyclists have hair on their legs.

Without this qualification, the host of the EP might lead us to believe something false about male professional cyclists, to wit, that they have hair on their legs; even though sentence (22), of course, does not actually entail such a claim.

It is important to note that universal statements do not exhibit this asymmetry. Thus, in the case of a sentence like (25) below, the sets of classical and nonmonotonic entailments of the form 'x can perform the Heimlich Manoeuvre', for all $x \in [\![nurse]\!]$, are co-extensive. In other words, the set of statements entailed by the truth of sentence (25), and the set of statements instantiating the generalization it expresses fully overlap.

(25) Every nurse can perform the Heimlich Manoeuvre.

Hence, unlike what happens in sentences involving non-universal EP-associates, defeating one of the nonmonotonic instantiations of sentence (25), for example by the addition of the connected EP *except Lucy*, will have an impact on its truth. Crucially, this distinction is not due to an ambiguity that EPs supposedly give rise to, but can be attributed to a characteristic of the meaning of universal statements. In section 2.6 I shall argue that the impression of semantic restriction in universal exception sentences is simply a "seemingly semantic intuition" (Bach 2002) and that, in actual fact, such restriction takes place at the level of utterance interpretation.

Let me recapitulate. The sentences in (26) tolerate exceptions because they express a generalization: each sentence has nonmonotonic instantiations of the form 'x can perform the Heimlich Manoeuvre', for any $x \in [\![nurse]\!]$.

(26) a. Every nurse can perform the Heimlich Manoeuvre.
b. Most nurses can perform the Heimlich Manoeuvre.

Although sentences (26a) and (26b) express the same generalization, the epistemic entrenchment of their respective instantiations will be different, of course. A generalization can come in varying degrees of strength. That notwithstanding, on the basis of either sentence in (26), addressees would be well advised to seek a nurse's help if choking, and it is precisely this fact which warrants the possibility of exceptive modification.

2.4 Against so-called 'exceptive determiners'

In their seminal study of natural language determiners, Keenan and Stavi (1986) proposed that EPs such as *except John* should be analyzed as constituents of complex one-place determiners with the following truth-conditions:

(27) a. *every ... except* $Kim_E(A, B) \Leftrightarrow (A - B) = \{k\}$

b. *no ... except* $Kim_E(A, B) \Leftrightarrow (A \cap B) = \{k\}$

According to their analysis, these so-called EXCEPTIVE DETERMINERS combine with a common noun and a VP denotation to return a truth value. Thus, the putative complex determiner in (27a) maps any two properties A and B to 1 just in case their set theoretic difference is the singleton $\{k\}$, and that in (27b) maps any two properties A and B to 1 provided that the individual k is the only member of their intersection.

While Keenan and Stavi's original proposal has been superseded by various other theories, the view that connected EPs are constituents of complex determiners is still widely held in the literature, as exemplified by the accounts of EPs in von Fintel (1993, 1994), Keenan (2003), Keenan and Westerståhl (1997), Peters and Westerståhl (2006), and Zuber (1998), among others.

This assumption is perhaps best articulated by von Fintel (1993, 1994), who endorses, albeit tentatively, a determiner-modifier account of the mapping between the syntax and semantics of *but*-phrases. According to von Fintel, connected EPs are part of a composite determiner, and subsequently undergo rightward movement over the NP complement of the determiner. They are thus interpreted as functions from determiner denotations to determiner denotations in the semantics. If this analysis is correct, a DP such as *every linguistics major but Kim* must receive the following syntactic representation, prior to movement of the connected EP to the position where it is phonologically realized:

(28)



But is this, in fact, a satisfactory analysis of the syntax-semantics interface of connected EPs? In this section, I shall argue that it is not. To this end, I shall first inspect the arguments that are often adduced in support of the complex determiner analysis of connected EPs. The key theoretical argument for exceptive determiners advanced by Keenan and Stavi (1986) relies on their FINITE EFFABILITY THEOREM, which purports to show that for a finite universe of discourse E, every conservative function of type $\langle 1, 1\rangle$ over E is syntactically realizable by some (possibly complex) English determiner. Their result rests on the premises that all lexical determiners of English denote conservative functions, and that complex determiners can be built from basic ones in ways that preserve conservativity.

And indeed, it is not difficult to verify that the putative determiners above denote conservative functions. Let us consider the case of *every ... except Kim* in (27a). First, we observe that the lexical determiner *every* denotes a conservative function. A binary CONSERVATIVE function on E is standardly defined as follows:

(29) A function f of type $\langle 1, 1\rangle$ is conservative (on E) iff $\forall A, B \subseteq E$, $f(A, B) \Leftrightarrow f(A, A \cap B)$.

Every clearly meets the condition above because, for example, the sentences *Every Englishman loves ale* and *Every Englishman is an ale loving Englishman* make equivalent statements: we may safely ignore individuals who are not from England when determining the truth of the first of these sentences.

Second, we check that the syntactic combination of a lexical determiner with a connected EP preserves conservativity. Connected EPs such as *except Kim* in

(27a)–(27b) are interpreted by Keenan and Stavi as denoting RESTRICTING functions, that is, functions which map any argument to a subset of that argument. Formally,

(30) A function $f : P(E) \rightarrow P(E)$ is *restricting* iff $\forall A \in P(E), f(A) \subseteq A$.

So for *every* a function $h : [P(E) \rightarrow [P(E) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}]]$, and *except Kim* a restricting function $f : P(E) \rightarrow P(E)$, the denotation of *every ... except Kim* is that function h_f which results from composing f with h as follows:

(31) Let h be an element of D_{Det} and let f be a restricting function. Then h_f is that function from $P(E)$ into $[P(E) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}]$ defined by: $h_f(A, B) =_{df} h(f(A))(B)$.

Keenan and Stavi then prove that the set of conservative functions of type $\langle 1, 1\rangle$ over E is closed under all restricting functions, and so *every ... except Kim* must denote a conservative function. If we take the truth condition in (27a) together with the definition of conservative function in (29), we can easily verify this claim by showing first that the sets $(A - B)$ and $A - (A \cap B)$ have the same extension:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(A - B) &\equiv A - (A \cap B) \\
&\equiv A \cap \overline{(A \cap B)} \\
&\equiv A \cap (\overline{A} \cup \overline{B}) \\
&\equiv (A \cap \overline{A}) \cup (A \cap \overline{B}) \\
&\equiv \emptyset \cup (A \cap \overline{B}) \\
&\equiv A \cap \overline{B} \\
&\equiv (A - B)
\end{aligned}
\tag{32}
$$

Given that strings of the form *every ... except Kim* (and similarly *no ... except Kim*) can be shown to denote type $\langle 1, 1\rangle$ conservative functions, it follows from Keenan and Stavi's Finite Effability Theorem that such strings are expressible by English determiners.

While Keenan and Stavi's position is semantically impeccable, their effability claim cannot be supported on syntactic grounds: natural language determiners are indeed conservative, as has been recognized since the seminal works of Barwise and Cooper (1981), Higginbotham and May (1981) and Keenan (1981), but

conservativity alone is demonstrably not a sufficient condition for syntactic determinerhood. For example, Hoeksema (1996b) points out that the binary connective *and* denotes a conservative function since, for any two properties A and B, *A and B* is logically equivalent to *A and B and A*. Nevertheless, *and* is patently not a determiner of English. On this basis, Hoeksema concludes that conservativity, although a necessary criterion for determinerhood, is not a sufficient one.

Rothstein (1988), who also finds fault with the syntactic implications of Keenan and Stavi's position, argues, correctly in my view, that there exist additional constraints of syntax dictating which of the conservative determiner functions can in fact be realized syntactically by determiners of English and that, accordingly, the correct characterization of the class of English determiners is an "empirical syntactic question" (1988: 1002).

Let us consider a concrete example supporting Rothstein's counterargument. Boolean negation is one of the procedures employed by Keenan and Stavi to generate complex determiner denotations from the set of basic ones, given that the set of conservative functions of type $\langle 1, 1\rangle$ over E is also closed under Boolean operations. They define a COMPLEMENT function $f' : P(E) \rightarrow P(P(E))$, such that for every function f of the same type, f' maps each property s to $(f(s))'$ (1986: 265). Since f' preserves conservativity, the output of this function is also a possible determiner denotation and hence syntactically realizable.

Rothstein (1988: 1005-1007), however, argues that English does not have syntactic phrase structure rules of the form D $\rightarrow$ *not* D, and that existing strings of the form *not* + D + NP do not exhibit the distribution of ordinary DPs, but rather appear to be restricted to subject positions (see also Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 431, 807-808), facts which she explains by assuming that this marker of negation is not in reality a constituent of complex determiners. Note, for instance, that the strings *not* D + NP + VP in (33) are ungrammatical:

(33)
* not the	NP + VP
* not each	
* not most	
* not some	
* not several	
* not both	
* not his	

These arguments show that there are additional restrictions on the determiners that accept *not* as a dependent (see, for example, Horn 1989: 499), and confirm Barwise and Cooper's assessment that the distribution of English subject DPs preceded by the negative marker *not* "cannot be explained purely in terms of the semantics of quantifiers" (1981: 197). The clear implication of this discussion is that, contrary to Keenan and Stavi's effability claim, the set of determiner denotations of English is not homomorphic to the set of syntactic determiners of the language.

The syntactic motivation behind Keenan and Stavi's complex determiner analysis is the apparent co-occurrence restrictions between certain determiners and connected EPs, which they hold as evidence of constituency (1986: 258). The semantic motivation is that strings such as *every/no* + EP admit a compositional semantic interpretation. This rationale is not unreasonable, to be sure, but the question remains whether an alternative compositional account can be put forward that captures the observed co-occurrence restrictions, without being committed to syntactic claims that lack empirical support.

I will now critically evaluate two lines of argument that are often advanced in favor of the complex determiner analysis of connected EPs: the possibility of DP modification by the seemingly exception-like modifier *almost*, and the occurrence of strings of the form *all but n*, where the connected EP is adjacent to a determiner. The validity of these lines of reasoning will be challenged and, in sections 2.4.3 to 2.4.6, four additional arguments will be marshalled against the position that connected EPs form constituents with quantificational determiners in their associates. Section 2.4 will then close by making a positive proposal about the constituent structure of exception DPs. This proposal provides the basis for my exploration of

the syntax-semantics interface of connected EPs in the following chapter.

2.4.1 Modification by *almost*

The independent occurrence of the seemingly exception-like modifier *almost* with universal determiners in DPs like (34a) or (34b) is often cited in support of the complex determiner analysis of connected EPs (von Fintel 1993, 1994, Keenan 2003).

(34) a. almost every film made in Hollywood
b. almost no clues for the reader

This conclusion is supposed to follow inductively from the assumptions that *almost* exhibits the relevant properties of core exceptives and that, furthermore, it functions syntactically as a determiner modifier in the nominal domain. However, there are good reasons to reject these assumptions. First, the purported semantic similarity between *almost* and exceptives is questionable. If the implicated existence of a minority of 'film flops' in (35) is enough to grant *almost* an exceptive character, then should we not conclude on the same grounds that the quantificational determiner *most* in (36) is also exception-like?

(35) Almost every film made in Hollywood is a box office success.

(36) Most films made in Hollywood are a box office success.

It seems to me that such a move would blur the clear distinction that exists between either one of the last two sentences and sentence (37), where the existence of an unsuccessful film is not simply a scalar implicature of the speaker, but is in fact asserted as a necessary condition of the truth of the sentence. This is confirmed by the fact that sentences (35) and (36) above, but not (37), can be felicitously continued with *in fact, they all are.*[5]

(37) Every film made in Hollywood except the latest Burton flick is a box office success.

Second, this line of argument is clearly inconsistent with the assumption, also typically accepted by these approaches, that no more than one connected EP may appear in an exception sentence (Geis 1973). For example, von Fintel (1993) argues that *but*-phrases cannot be iterated, as the ungrammatical sentence (38) illustrates, owing to a uniqueness condition on core exceptives (but see Moltmann (1995: 234) for a different view).

(38) * Every student but Bill and but Mary attended the meeting.

(von Fintel 1993: 134, (28a))

However, if this claim is correct and, given the acceptability of naturally occurring examples like (39) and (40), one must conclude that the 'semantic similarity' between core EPs and *almost* is only apparent, because if *almost* were an exceptive-like element it should not be able to co-occur with an EP.

(39) The Nebraska senator is popular with colleagues and regarded as a staunch conservative on almost every issue but the war.[6]

(40) As the name implies, the free fantasy imposes almost no restrictions except those of the instrument in question.[7]

Perhaps more importantly, *almost* and connected EPs differ fundamentally in the range of DPs that they are able to modify. We can observe at least the following five contrasts, illustrated by examples (41)–(45): whereas *almost* in the nominal domain is normally restricted to occur with *every, all* and *no,* or numerals (Carlson 1981, Partee 1986), connected EPs can modify DPs containing less than universal quantifiers, but are not generally acceptable with numerals. *Almost* can modify indefinite measure phrases (Morzycki 2001), but connected EPs cannot. *Almost,* but not connected EPs, can modify the fractional noun *half.* Finally, unlike connected EPs, *almost* does not occur with *each* (Partee 1995).

(41) a. * almost most/many/few states

b. most/many/few states except California

(42) a. almost three girls
b. * three girls except Lucy

(43) a. almost a pound of apples
b. * a pound of apples except two ounces

(44) a. almost half the students in my class
b. * half the students in my class except Kim

(45) a. * almost each month
b. each month except August

Second, DP *almost* need not be analyzed as a determiner modifier. In fact, *almost* must be analyzed as an external or left-peripheral DP adjunct in at least the following constructions:

(46) a. [$_{DP}$ almost [$_{DP}$ the entire chapter]]
b. [$_{DP}$ almost [$_{DP}$ everyone involved]]

Note, for example, that the presence of *almost* in (46a) is possible owing to the occurrence of the internal modifier *entire*, and therefore *almost* must be a dependent of the constituent [$_{DP}$ *the entire chapter*], not of the determiner head: the string **almost the chapter* is not well-formed (Partee 1995: 580). In (46b), *almost* cannot be analyzed as a determiner modifier for obvious reasons: the compound quantifier *everyone* is not a determiner, but has the category status of a full DP (the occurrence of connected EPs with compound quantifiers will be discussed later in section 2.4.4).

Similarly, *almost* cannot be plausibly analyzed as a determiner modifier in any of the DPs in (47a-c), because it functions as a dependent of various predeterminers in these contexts: the quantifier *all* in (47a), the multiplier adverb *twice* in (47b), and the fractional noun *half* in (47c).

(47) a. [$_{DP}$ almost all [$_{DP}$ the students]]
b. [$_{DP}$ almost twice [$_{DP}$ a month]]

c. [$_{DP}$ almost half [$_{DP}$ the babies]]

In conclusion, evidence garnished from the meaning and syntactic distribution of *almost* cannot be used to bolster the complex determiner analysis of EPs, because the supposed exception-like nature of *almost* is questionable and, furthermore, *almost* need not be analyzed as a determiner modifier, an implicit premise in the argument under discussion, but is clearly a left-peripheral modifier of DP in the cases considered in this section.

2.4.2 The argument from *all but n*

The existence of DPs of the form *all but n*, such as (48a)–(48c), where a *but*-phrase is surface adjacent to the quantifier *all*, is often also adduced as evidence for the complex determiner analysis of connected EPs (Hoeksema 1987, von Fintel 1993, 1994, Keenan 2003).[8]

(48) a. all but two incoming patients
b. all but three women activists
c. all but five major fires

Under this proposal the DP [$_{DP}$ *all incoming patients but two*], for example, is derived from (48a), with the structure in (49a), by optional rightward movement of the connected EP over the NP complement of the determiner, as shown in (49b). It is assumed that DPs such as (48a)–(48c) result from the connected EP staying in its base-generated position.

(49) a. [$_{DP}$ [$_{D^0}$ [$_{D^0}$ all][$_{EP}$ but two]][$_{NP}$ incoming patients]]
b. [$_{DP}$ [$_{DP}$ [$_{D^0}$ all t_i][$_{NP}$ incoming patients]][$_{EP}$ but two]$_i$]

This argument, however, is significantly weakened by the fact that the string *every/no but n* is clearly ungrammatical: since *but*-phrases can freely occur to the right of the NP arguments of these determiners, as in *every election but two* or *no children but three*, we would expect to find them as well in the determiner adjacent position.

Such an expectation, however, is not fulfilled. I suggest that the reason for this apparent anomaly is the following: unlike the determiners *every* and *no*, *all* allows for an empty NP complement (Lobeck 1995, 2006), and so in [$_{DP}$ *all but two incoming patients*] the connected EP is in fact a DP modifier. Thus, the correct analysis of (48a) is not (49a), but (50).[9]

(50) [$_{DP}$ [$_{DP}$ [$_{D}$ all [$_{NP}$ *e*]]][$_{EP}$ but [$_{DP}$ two [$_{NP}$ incoming patients]]]]

The driving observation behind my analysis is that the determiners which may occur in the putative structure [$_{D}$ D + *but n*] are a proper subset of those which permit null NP complements. This can be illustrated by examples (51)–(53) below, involving the quantificational determiners *all*, *each*, and *most*. The determiners *both*, *neither* and *some*, as well as numeral determiners, are obviously excluded from this set because they are inherently incompatible with connected EPs.

(51) That political barometer successfully predicted the outcome of all but one of the last 15 presidential elections – and it makes Obama a shoo-in for the White House.[10]

(52) On the face of it, King of Fighters is very attractive. I felt the controls were very daunting. They seemed to be everywhere, with each but one number on the keypad being used up.[11]

(53) In most but two cases the lesion was confined to the cerebellum, but in the two cases mentioned there was slight damage to the dorsolateral part of the lateral vestibular nucleus.[12]

The contrast between sentences (54a) and (54b) demonstrates that the same restriction applies to the upstairs determiners of English partitives of the form [$_{DP}$ Det$_1$ *of* Det$_2$ NP] which, as Hoeksema (1984) originally pointed out, are never TRANSITIVE.

(54) a. Pictures were taken of { all / each / few / many / most / some / three } of the suspects.

b. * Pictures were taken of { a / every / no / the } of the suspects.

As also noted by Hoeksema (1984), the set of determiners that introduce partitives is coextensive with the set of determiners that may occur in NULL-NOMINAL CONSTRUCTIONS. These determiners, as pointed out above, do not obligatorily combine with an NP complement, and thus have the distribution of DPs, witness the contrasting examples (55a) and (55b).

(55) a. The protesters were not scared off, but { all / few / many / most / some / three } left voluntarily.

b. * The protesters were not scared off, but { a / every / no / the } left voluntarily.

The determiners *every* and *no* are permitted in [$_D$ D + *but* + NUMERAL] only as part of the compound quantifiers *everyone* and *none*, which, of course, have the category status of full DPs, as shown below (and so the transformationally derived

strings **everyone crotchety old lady but one* and **none intrepid Englishmen but two* are ungrammatical, and nonsensical):

(56) a. [$_{DP}$ [$_{DP}$ Everyone] but one crotchety old lady] fled the scene of the crime.
b. [$_{DP}$ [$_{DP}$ None] but two intrepid Englishmen] accepted the challenge.

Contrary to the standard analysis of this construction, according to which the determiner *all* invariably occurs with an overt NP complement, my proposal entails that an NP such as *candidates* in *all but two candidates* is not a syntactic argument of the determiner, but rather a constituent of the connected EP. This observation is supported by at least two different types of evidence.

The first involves the observed NUMBER AGREEMENT patterns between *all* and its putative NP complement when the right argument of the *but*-phrase is the cardinal *one*. If the only difference that exists between [$_{DP}$ *all but one* NP] and [$_{DP}$ *all* NP *but one*] is the non-mandatory movement of the connected EP to the right, then the contrast in grammaticality between the members of the following pairs is wholly unexpected:

(57) a. all but one candidate
b. * all candidate but one

(58) a. * all but one candidates
b. all candidates but one

Our judgments of the data in (57) and (58) result from the conflicting requirements of *all* and *one* with regard to the grammatical number of their NP complements. The determiner *all* generally selects either a count plural NP, or a non-count NP (leaving aside DPs in which *all* is in competition with the adjectival modifier *whole*, where this determiner may also occur with count singular NPs). On the other hand, the cardinal numeral *one* must obviously combine with a count singular NP. These contrasts show that the plural NP *candidates* is a syntactic argument of the determiner *all* in (58b) but not in (58a), and that the singular NP *candidate* is in fact the complement of the numeral *one* in (57a).

The second set of facts bearing on my proposal concerns *but*-phrases with cardinal complements occurring as modifiers of partitive DPs. On first examination, the acceptability of pairs like (59a-b) and (60a-b) appears to give weight to the movement analysis embodied in the complex determiner approach.

(59) a. all but one of the ingredients
b. all of the ingredients but one

(60) a. most but two of the captives
b. most of the captives but two

If this analysis were correct, one would expect it to apply productively to the whole range of exception DPs. However, a transformational account of the above data is not generalizable to other analogous cases, as demonstrated by the contrasting pairs (61) and (62).

(61) a. * all but Lucy of the nurses
b. all of the nurses but Lucy

(62) a. * all but me of the absentees
b. all of the absentees but me

Of course, the putative complex determiners *all but Lucy* and *all but me* differ from *all but one* and *most but two* in that the former do not denote LOGICAL QUANTIFIERS, that is, the binary relations between subsets of the universe of discourse denoted by these expressions do not respect arbitrary permutations of the members of those sets. However, this model-theoretic distinction is not correlated with a difference in the constituent structure of these determiners and so the natural expectation, assuming the correctness of the transformational account, is that the DPs (61a) and (62a) should be well-formed. But, as shown above, this expectation is not met.

By contrast, the proposal explored in this section captures these facts. Let us recall that, under this approach, the DPs (61a) and (62a) are assigned the structures in (63a) and (63b), respectively, where the constituent [$_{PP}$ *of* DP] is part of the complement of the connected EP.

(63) a. * [$_{DP}$ [$_{DP}$ [$_{D}$ all [$_{NP}$ *e*]]][$_{EP}$ but [$_{DP}$ Lucy [$_{PP}$ of [$_{DP}$ the nurses]]]]]

b. * [$_{DP}$ [$_{DP}$ [$_{D}$ all [$_{NP}$ *e*]]][$_{EP}$ but [$_{DP}$ me [$_{PP}$ of [$_{DP}$ the absentees]]]]]

These structures allow for a straightforward explanation of the data, because proper names and INDEXICALS, such as demonstratives and personal pronouns, are independently known not to be able to head partitive DPs (Hoeksema 1984, de Hoop 1998). In other words, the ungrammaticality of (61a) and (62a) stems simply from the fact that the DPs (64a) and (64b) are ill-formed.

(64) a. * [$_{DP}$ Lucy [$_{PP}$ of [$_{DP}$ the nurses]]]

b. * [$_{DP}$ me [$_{PP}$ of [$_{DP}$ the absentees]]]

In sum, the two types of evidence discussed above add support to the proposal that the DPs [$_{DP}$ *all but n* NP] and [$_{DP}$ *all* NP *but n*] are not related by a transformational rule, but rather have different constituent structures.

Moreover, my analysis of this construction correctly accounts for an ambiguity that is not captured by the complex determiner analysis of *all but n* in (49). Let me illustrate this deficiency of the standard approach with the sentences (65a) and (65b), which, on this approach, receive the partial structures (66a) and (66b), respectively.

(65) a. All but three philosophers know the answer.

b. All philosophers but three know the answer.

(66) a. [$_{DP}$ [$_{D^0}$ [$_{D^0}$ all][$_{EP}$ but three]][$_{NP}$ philosophers]] know the answer.

b. [$_{DP}$ [$_{DP}$ [$_{D^0}$ all t_i][$_{NP}$ philosophers]][$_{EP}$ but three]$_i$] know the answer.

According to the standard analysis, the subject DPs in the sentences above have the same underlying structure, and differ only with respect to the optional movement of the connected EP to the right edge of the DP, a possibility which is in fact realized in sentence (65b), but not in sentence (65a). Crucially, though, the NP *philosophers* is predicted to remain the first argument of the determiner in either of these scenarios. But this prediction is incorrect precisely because sentence (65a)

gives rise to an ambiguity in the interpretation of the first argument of the determiner that is lacking from sentence (65b): unlike the latter, the former sentence need not be interpreted as making a claim about a majority of philosophers. For example, it admits a paraphrase according to which a preponderance of contextually salient individuals, some of whom may be non-philosophers, are aware of the answer, but three philosophers who are part of that majority are not.

On the other hand, the alternative account of this construction advanced in this section provides a straightforward explanation for this ambiguity, as it postulates different constituent structures for sentences like (65a) and (65b): the subject DP in the former sentence is assigned the structure in (67a), while that in the latter receives the analysis in (67b).

(67) a. $[_{DP}\ [_{DP}\ [_{D}$ all $[_{NP}\ e]]][_{EP}$ but $[_{DP}$ three $[_{NP}$ philosophers$]]]]$

b. $[_{DP}\ [_{DP}\ [_{D}$ all $[_{NP}$ philosophers$]]][_{EP}$ but $[_{DP}$ three $[_{NP}\ e]]]]$

I will not address here the question of how to recover the correct interpretation of the elliptical material in the above representations. I predicate my argument simply on the fact that whereas the meaning of (67b) is fixed by the overt NP argument of the determiner, the interpretation of (67a) critically depends on the way in which the denotation of the empty constituent is resolved. In stark contrast, the occurrence of an empty constituent in example (67b) does not give rise to a similar ambiguity, because the meaning of a connected EP is always dependent on the interpretation of its associate. Thus, the felicitous use of the EP *but three* in the sentence *all philosophers but three know the answer* necessarily requires that the exception be a negative claim about a philosophical trio.

In view of the above considerations, I conclude that the existence of strings of the form *all but n* does not in actual fact substantiate the complex determiner analysis of connected EPs. On the contrary, the arguments presented in this short subsection strongly support the view that connected EPs are right-peripheral modifiers of DP, an analysis which I will ultimately adopt at the end of section 2.4.

2.4.3 Absence of determiner quantification

Perhaps the strongest argument against the view that connected EPs form constituents with the determiners in their associates is the observation that these phrases may be licensed by: (*i*) other quantificational dependents within DP, (*ii*) associates containing determiners which typically do not support connected EPs, and (*iii*) associates that are not overtly quantificational. In support of this claim, I present evidence involving various quantificational nouns and noun modifiers, PERCENT DPs, and MINIMIZERS. The conclusion that I will draw on the basis of these data is that determiner quantification is not an essential feature of associates of connected EPs. Therefore, I shall argue that in order to correctly characterize the licensing criteria of exceptives, we must look beyond the model-theoretic properties of any determiners that may occur in associates of connected EPs.

I shall first consider quantificational nouns that license the occurrence of connected EPs (I follow Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 349-350) in assuming that this is the correct way to categorize these expressions syntactically). The following examples comprise, in this order: the non-count quantificational noun *plenty*, the singular quantificational noun *lot*, the informal plural quantificational noun *lots*, and the colloquial *(the) lot*:

(68) Those at Mladevovac's gymnasium, huddled watching torrential rain bounce off their tractors, said their conditions were good. Three meals a day, army mattresses and blankets and plenty to drink except beer.[13]

(69) Money can buy a lot of things except common sense, which is free.[14]

(70) The best he could do was blame lots of people except himself.[15]

(71) And he is spot on, for barely has the team camped at the base of a mysterious tower than a terrible force erupts, wiping out the lot except Vipinas.[16]

The quantificational nouns *remainder* and *rest*, which take the definite article *the* and occur with a partitive oblique, are also licensers of connected EPs:

(72) Add the remainder of the ingredients except the sultanas and simmer for 20 minutes.[17]

(73) Countries with greater safety records than ours (and that includes the rest of Europe except Greece, I believe) apply brands of varying widths plus or minus.[18]

EPs may be licensed by various modifiers within DP as well, such as the quantificational adjectives *entire*, *whole* or *full*, as illustrated by sentences (74) through (77) below.

(74) The 2004 ruling enjoyed the support of the entire court except Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who are no longer sitting.[19]

(75) Predominantly worn by Iranian women when they venture outside the house, the chador covers the whole body except the face.[20]

(76) Like other famous vexations in history [...] Iraq induces in the current American mind the full range of mentalities except reason.[21]

(77) A new domestic-partner law to be implemented on Jan. 1, 2005, will grant almost the full gamut of marital rights except joint filing of state taxes.[22]

The presence of these quantificational dependents of NP is required in order for connected EPs to be licensed. This is demonstrated by observing that, for example, the strings *the body except the face* or *the range of mentalities except reason* are not well-formed exception DPs.

Hoeksema (1987: 109-110) first noticed that superlatives and the cross-categorial modifier *only* are licensers of free EPs in copular sentences. It is interesting to note that superlative adjectives and the exclusive *only* (and its synonyms), can be associates of connected EPs as well, as shown by the following examples:

(78) Three main reasons for pessimism have been apparent: [...], sales difficulties across Europe for the Fiesta cars and vans that are Dagenham's sole product except engines, and the cost disadvantages caused by the pound's strength against the euro.[23]

(79) They demonstrate their skill as tool users (the only mammals except primates that can do so) by putting rocks on their chests and cracking the clams and mussels on them.[24]

(80) He's about the only person except David Beckham to make inarticulacy a fashion statement, but at least David Beckham is talented at something and deserves our respect.[25]

(81) Some people regard breast of lamb as dog food; many butchers don't even sell it. The cheapest cut of lamb except the aptly named scrag, it is not lean or elegant.[26]

Again, we observe that it is the occurrence of various superlative adjectives and exclusives in the sentences above which warrants connected exceptive modification of the relevant DPs: the strings *Dagenham's product except engines* or *the cut of lamb except the aptly named scrag*, for instance, are not well-formed.

The quantificational adjectives *countless*, *numerous*, and *innumerable*, each requiring that the cardinality of its nominal head's denotation be a large indeterminate natural number, are also licensers of connected EPs, as examples (82)–(85) illustrate.

(82) But for the time being, at least, not only will they be able to delight in being the ones with the best suntans, having been forever exiled to the great outdoors in countless other places except, go figure, Calgary, they'll also get some much-needed exercise.[27]

(83) Morten Frost and Liem Swie King, owners of numerous titles except the World Championships, can take small comfort from the commiserations of the one man who caused them so much heartbreak.[28]

(84) The A run, comprised of steelhead that move up the Columbia into the Wenatchee and Methow rivers and up the Snake to spawn in numerous tributaries except the Clearwater, is big enough to provide excellent fishing at times.[29]

(85) Their design derring-do transforms 60,000 pounds of bulk chocolate per year into innumerable shapes (except things erotic).[30]

So called *percent* DPs provide another case in point. Connected EPs can modify proportional DPs with *percent* (AmE), or *per cent* (BrE), provided that a large proportion is specified. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 504) analyze *percent* as a NUMBER-TRANSPARENT noun which licenses an *of* PP complement. If this analysis is correct, these constructions can be shown to pose a serious challenge to the traditional view. Note that, in sentences (86) and (87), for example, the occurrence of the connected EPs is warranted by the combined contribution of the numeral determiner and the noun *percent*, but not by the conventional meaning of either of these elements alone. Consequently, the co-occurrence restrictions of connected EPs in this case cannot be attributed to properties of a single lexical category within DP, and thus Keenan and Stavi's syntactic criterion for constituency cannot be met.

(86) Executive general manager of distribution Terry Effeney today released Ergon's inaugural Network Management Plan which covers 97 per cent of the state except the south-east corner, which is maintained by Energex.[31]

(87) The Paying Counter has been selling medicines to poor patients at rates about 20 to 60 per cent lower than the market price, as about 90 per cent of the medicines except certain life-saving drugs are being procured directly from the manufacturers, cutting off the distributors' network.[32]

The examples discussed so far in this section show conclusively that connected EPs may, in actual fact, be licensed by various dependents within DP, and not just in the presence of certain quantificational determiners. This is a key point, but more significant perhaps is the realization brought about by these data that there is no single lexical category within DP that warrants the occurrence of connected EPs in every case.

It might be possible to partly address my counterargument within the spirit of the traditional account of exception DPs by analyzing both quantificational determiners and quantitative adjectives as Q heads (Giusti 1991, 1997, Cardinaletti

and Giusti 2006). This strategy, however, cannot be universally applied to the data above. For example, while adjectives like *numerous* and *countless* may be amenable to such an approach (see, for example, Giusti 1997: 116-117), quantificational adjectives like *entire* (and their synonyms), exclusives, superlatives, and *percent* DPs obviously are not.

The type of data which will now be considered shows that, somewhat paradoxically for dominant approaches to exceptives, exception modification can be found in DPs containing determiners which do not countenance connected EPs, and even in DPs which are not overtly quantificational. Although previously unrecognized, connected EPs can be licensed by MINIMIZERS. Minimizers are expressions which conventionally serve to denote a minimal quantity along a certain dimension, or the lower end of some scale (Bolinger 1972, Horn 1989). The examples (88)–(93) below involve negative polarity minimizers occurring under the scope of *not* or a negative adverb.

(88) But I will guarantee that at some point well into the semester, you'll wake up after a refreshing uninterrupted night of glorious sleep to hear not a sound except birds chirping.[33]

(89) So what has it accomplished for $1 billion? Not a thing except to waste money and resources.[34]

(90) Kim Spargo has an excellent voice, and some virtuoso musicians accompanying her. But she utters not a word except a mumbled 'thank you' in between songs.[35]

(91) Inside the coffin there was nothing to see or hear, the darkest place imaginable with not a sound except his breathing, which grew deeper and deeper with each new breath of despair.[36]

(92) Audience members can also ask questions of the actors, who have clues as to who the killer is, but not one of them except the actor playing the killer and the production's director know 'who done it'.[37]

(93) And something should be said about the other army, the one that vanished in just two months leaving hardly a trace except the debris in the streets of Saigon that spoke surrender more eloquently than any truce.[38]

These data are important because they demonstrate that connected exceptive modification is possible in the absence of determiner quantification of the right kind. The minimizers above are not determinerless, but neither the indefinite article *a* nor so-called SINGULATIVE *one* (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 386) can support connected EPs on their own. Rather, the DP as a whole makes the presence of connected EPs possible in the sentence above. I will revisit examples such as these in the following chapter, as they serve to highlight what I consider the fundamental difference between connected and free EPs.

Connected EPs also modify UNLICENSED minimizers (Horn 2001). The following examples comprise the commonly called VULGAR minimizers (Postal 2004) *squat, diddly squat, zilch* and *nada*, all occurring without a negative licenser:

(94) Not that signing a prenup is bad. Au contraire, it's very good and should be used to protect both parties from untoward circumstance, such as one of them getting away with all the money and property, and leaving the other with squat except kids to feed.[39]

(95) No wonder John Bruton was portraying it as a fantasy government, with constitutional power to do diddly squat except arrange for the appointment of a real Taoiseach.[40]

(96) By not being New Labour or the Conservatives, they've gathered positively multitudinous voters who are quite rightly sick to death of these completely worn-out parties. But they offer them zilch except the same weary stuff.[41]

(97) To top it off, Meat Loaf performed for nada except expenses, which saved Big Brother about $100,000.[42]

Postal (2004) argues that these minimizers do not involve negative quantification, in spite of the parallelism to their polarity variants, but suggests instead that they

must be analyzed as containing a phonologically null cardinal numeral *zero*. Be that as it may, the possibility of connected exceptive modification in examples (94)–(97) undermines the thesis that determiner quantification is an essential feature of associates of connected EPs, because the minimizers in these sentences are not overtly quantificational. Incidentally, in this regard, *zero* is generally assumed not to license connected EPs (Moltmann 1995: 230), an observation to which I shall return in section 2.4.6.

2.4.4 'Compound quantifiers'

As was already noticed by von Fintel (1993, 1994), the occurrence of connected EPs with COMPOUND QUANTIFIERS like *everything* and *anybody*, illustrated by the DPs in (98), poses a significant challenge to the complex determiner analysis of these phrases.

(98) a. everything but the car keys
b. anybody except the mayor

The problem lies in the fact that, in examples of this kind, connected EPs cannot plausibly be seen to form complex constituents with determiners, and are most plausibly analyzed as DP modifiers.

Faced with these data, a proponent of the orthodox view might attempt to derive compound quantifiers in the syntax, after movement of the connected EP to the right edge of the DP. Indeed, von Fintel (1993: 135, footnote 17) pointed to a possible syntactic decomposition account of these morphological mergers, as had been suggested by Abney (1987), for example. Under this analysis, the compound quantifier *everyone* is obtained from the heads *every* and *one* by movement of the nominal head into a higher determiner position, as shown in (99).

(99)



(Abney 1987: 181, (309b))

In a more recent incarnation of this type of approach, Kishimoto (2000) argues that compound quantifiers are formed by overt raising of a lexically empty noun to the head position of NumP, a projection in nominal structures immediately below the determiner (Ritter 1991, Cinque 1995). Kishimoto claims that the adjacent heads are then realized phonologically as one word by undergoing merger at PF.

The question that we must address in the context of this section, then, is whether or not an N-raising analysis of compound quantifiers undermines the clear case against exceptive determiners that these data appear to present. The strongest empirical motivation for overt N-raising in English comes from the distribution of attributive adjectives. As illustrated by the contrasts in (100) and (101), attributive adjectives without dependents typically occur in prenominal position in English.

(100) a. every [$_{\text{AdjP}}$ simple][$_{\text{N}}$ thing]
b. * every [$_{\text{N}}$ thing][$_{\text{AdjP}}$ simple]

(101) a. some [$_{\text{AdjP}}$ expensive][$_{\text{N}}$ thing]
b. * some [$_{\text{N}}$ thing][$_{\text{AdjP}}$ expensive]

Interestingly, however, these adjectives depart from this general distribution pattern when they occur with compound quantifiers like *everything* or *something*, which they may modify only postnominally:

(102) a. everything simple

b. * simple everything

(103) a. something expensive

b. * expensive something

N-movement analyses provide a straightforward explanation of this seemingly puzzling fact by suggesting that APs such as *simple* and *expensive* in (102a) and (103a) are in fact prenominal underlyingly, but are subsequently stranded in post-nominal position by movement of the nominal head to a higher position within the DP. Kishimoto (2000), for instance, proposes structures like the following for the grammatical examples above:

(104) a. $[_{DP}$ every $[_{NumP}$ $[_{Num}$ $\emptyset][_{NP}$ $[_{AP}$ simple$][_{N'}$ $[_{N}$ thing$]]]]]$

b. $[_{DP}$ every $[_{NumP}$ $[_{Num}$ thing$_i][_{NP}$ $[_{AP}$ simple$][_{N'}$ $[_{N}$ $t_i]]]]]$

(105) a. $[_{DP}$ some $[_{NumP}$ $[_{Num}$ $\emptyset][_{NP}$ $[_{AP}$ expensive$][_{N'}$ $[_{N}$ thing$]]]]]$

b. $[_{DP}$ some $[_{NumP}$ $[_{Num}$ thing$_i][_{NP}$ $[_{AP}$ expensive$][_{N'}$ $[_{N}$ $t_i]]]]]$

In a reply to Kishimoto, Larson and Marušič (2004) offer a series of arguments that convincingly demonstrate the inadequacy of N-raising approaches to compound quantifiers. Looking at a range of interpretive and distributional evidence that differentiates prenominal from postnominal adjectives, they show that the adjectives which occur with compound quantifiers do not follow the pattern of prenominal forms, but behave like intrinsically postnominal ones.

For example, Larson and Marušič point out that these modifiers admit only the interpretations that typically characterize postnominal adjectives. For instance, unlike prenominal adjectives, they lack individual-level readings and, in addition, they must be interpreted restrictively (Bolinger 1967, Svenonius 1994). But perhaps the strongest evidence presented by Larson and Marušič pertains to the absence of postnominal adjective recursion in this construction. Given that more than one prenominal adjective is generally possible with common nouns such as *thing*, for instance, as illustrated by the tree diagram in (106), it is wholly unexpected under

N-raising analyses that the corresponding derived structure in (107) is ungrammatical.

(106)



(107)



To these arguments, I will add the following. First, there is, as far as I can see, no principled way of extending Abney's N-raising analysis to exception DPs containing compound quantifiers such as (98a-b) because, ex hypothesi, the position

targeted by the nominal head is already occupied by a trace (or, in more recent versions of transformational generative grammar, a phonologically null copy) of the connected EP. Kishimoto's account would face a similar problem, if we adopt the plausible assumption that phonological merger must take place under adjacency.

Furthermore, there are distinctive lexical properties of compound quantifiers that are not exhibited by their purported constituents, which suggests that these compounds are not derived syntactically, but rather formed in the lexicon. While the DP *every one*, for example, may have personal or non-personal reference, *everyone* can be used to refer to persons only (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 379). Interestingly, there are also semantic selectional differences between the simplex and compounded variants of these DPs which are not amenable to a syntactic decomposition account of the sort envisaged by von Fintel. For instance, only compound quantifiers may take the restrictive modifier *else* as a dependent: unlike (108a), sentence (108b) is ungrammatical.

(108) a. Everyone else arrived on time.

b. * Every one else arrived on time.

For these reasons, I conclude that the occurrence of exceptive modification with compound quantifiers indeed demonstrates that connected EPs do not form complex constituents with determiners in their associates, but are modifiers of DP.

2.4.5 Evidence from coordination

Evidence from coordination further calls into question the complex head analysis of connected EPs. I shall first consider data pertaining to NP-coordination within DPs, and then a type of coordinate ellipsis construction in English involving ellipsis of determiners across sentential conjuncts.

Heycock and Zamparelli (2005) provide a recent discussion of some of the interpretations that result from the conjunction of two NPs under a single determiner. They observe that sentences like (109a) and (109b) exhibit what they refer to pretheoretically as the JOINT reading of the DP, whereby the referent of the subject DPs in

(109) is the individual who lies at the intersection of the properties denoted by the NP conjuncts.

(109) a. [$_{DP}$ My [$_{NP}$ friend and colleague]] is writing a paper.

b. [$_{DP}$ That [$_{NP}$ liar and cheat]] is not to be trusted.

(Heycock and Zamparelli 2005: 209, (5a-b))

This construal of the DP is in contrast to that of sentences such as (110a) and (110b), which must be interpreted as expressing a quantification over the set of men and over the set of women, rather than a claim about the empty set of individuals that are both man and woman. Heycock and Zamparelli refer to this interpretation as the SPLIT reading of DP-internal conjunction.[43]

(110) a. Every man and woman has lived alone at some point.

b. Each man and woman had to enter the room alone.

(Heycock and Zamparelli 2005: 209, (18a-b))

Consider the following sentence about elected officials from the U.S. in the context of our discussion:

(111) Every congressman and senator was present at the gala dinner.

Since the set of U.S. congressmen and the set of U.S. senators are necessarily disjoint, sentence (111) obligatorily requires a split construal of the subject DP. In other words, the interpretation of the constituent [$_{DP}$ *every* [$_{NP}$ *congressman and senator*]] in (111) is exactly that of the DP in (112), where the determiner head is distributed over each of the NPs.

(112) every congressman and every senator

That being so, if the complex determiner analysis of connected EPs is correct, the purported exceptive determiner [$_{D}$*every...but Hillary Clinton*] must distribute over each of the coordinated NPs in a sentence that is exactly like (111), but in which *every...but Hillary Clinton* replaces *every*. However, this prediction is not borne out because, although (113) is markedly infelicitous

(113) # Every congressman but Hillary Clinton and every senator but Hillary Clinton was present at the gala dinner.

Sentence (114), by contrast, is fully acceptable.

(114) Every congressman and senator but Hillary Clinton was present at the gala dinner.

This sentence also exemplifies the split reading of the coordinator: it claims that every congressman and every senator other than Hillary Clinton were present at the dinner, but that Clinton herself was not, an interpretation consistent with the presupposition of inclusion triggered by the EP (given that she is presently a senator from New York). Hence, the acceptability of sentence (114), where the determiner head but crucially not the EP, is 'split' over each conjunct, shows that connected EPs are not complex constituents with the determiners in their associates.

The naturally occurring example below can be used to make the same point:

(115) I learned that paddling a kayak can be amazingly easy and a lot of fun. [...] South from Bloor St., the Humber is wide, slow and placid with no rapids or obstructions except a few fallen trees.[44]

Notice that the interpretation of the exception DP *no rapids or obstructions except a few fallen trees* in sentence (115) is obviously that of

(116) [no rapids] and [no obstructions except a few fallen trees]

where the determiner *no*, but critically not the EP, is distributed over each conjunct.

As I will show now, the same conclusion holds with respect to ellipsis of determiners across sentential conjuncts. McCawley (1993a) originally pointed out that in English coordination constructions which involve gapping in the second conjunct, it is sometimes possible to omit the determiner of a subject DP in the second conjunct under identity with the overt determiner of the subject DP in the first conjunct, a phenomenon usually referred to as DETERMINER SHARING (McCawley 1993a, Johnson 2000, Lin 2000, Ackema and Szendrői 2002):

(117) a. Too many Irish setters are named Kelly and German shepherds, Fritz.
b. The duck is dry and mussels, tough.
c. Your daughter is 16 and son, $17\frac{1}{2}$.
d. How many states have a veterinary school or cities, a zoo?

(McCawley 1993a: 245, (1a, c, d), and 246, (6a))

Under the complex determiner analysis of connected EPs, one would expect to find sentences similar to those in (117) where a so-called exceptive determiner is present in the first sentential conjunct, but gapped along with a lexical or auxiliary verb in the second. However, this is not the case. EPs cannot be 'shared' along with a determiner, as the ungrammaticality of sentences (118a) and (118b) indicates.

(118) a. * Every employee but Smith received a telegram and customer, a letter.
b. * Every nurse but Lucy was fired and doctor, suspended without pay.

Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the sentences above, to the extent that they are interpretable, have the meaning predicted by the complex determiner analysis. For instance, sentence (118a) does not appear to claim that nearly all customers got a letter, but rather seems to assert that every customer did. Likewise, sentence (118b) states simply that no doctor escaped the disciplinary action: the somewhat bizarre scenario which includes both a nurse and a doctor named Lucy is excluded from consideration.

By contrast, notice that the non-exceptive counterparts of (118a–b), given in (119) below, are both fully grammatical and have the interpretations expected under a determiner sharing construal.

(119) a. Every employee received a telegram and customer, a letter.
b. Every nurse was fired and doctor, suspended without pay.

It is also possible to find exception sentences in which the determiner of the subject DP in the first conjunct is shared, but that nonetheless display exceptive modification just in the second conjunct. The following sentences are cases in point. Sentence (120a) holds that Frank was the only senior who drank scotch and sentence

(120b) that, with the exception of Kim, every boy read Proust; but no exception is made in these sentences to the claims that no freshman drank beer or that every girl read Nietzsche.

(120) a. No freshman drank beer or senior except Frank, scotch.
b. Every girl read Nietzsche and boy except Kim, Proust.

These facts cannot be explained away by resorting to a putative ban on syntactically complex determiners from the determiner sharing construction, because such determiners do occur in this type of coordination ellipsis, as the following examples demonstrate:

(121) a. Most of my nephews speak German and nieces, French.
b. Too many politicians are dishonest and policemen, corrupt.
c. Not more than two of the girls play the piano or boys, the violin.

As we have seen, evidence from determiner sharing contradicts the thesis that connected EPs form complex constituents with the determiners in their associates. In this short section, I have shown how evidence from DP-internal conjunction and determiner sharing suggests a revision of traditional approaches to exceptive determiners.

2.4.6 Contrasting quantificational pairs

A further challenge to traditional approaches is the existence of pairs of quantificational determiners which differ only with respect to the size of the intersection of their semantic arguments' denotations but which, nonetheless, contrast sharply in their ability to license connected EPs. As an example, consider the expressions *exactly half (of the)* and *more than half (of the)*, which are often taken to be syntactic realizations of English determiners with the following denotations, for any subsets A and B of the universe of discourse:

(122) $[_D$ *exactly half (of the)*$]$ $\rightsquigarrow$ $\lambda A \lambda B.\ |(A \cap B)| = \frac{1}{2} \cdot |A|$
$[_D$ *more than half (of the)*$]$ $\rightsquigarrow$ $\lambda A \lambda B.\ |(A \cap B)| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |A|$

Observe that, in spite of having almost identical denotations, *exactly half (of the)* cannot head associates of connected EPs, but *more than half (of the)* can:

(123) a. # Exactly half of the cereal brands except Coco-Pops contain niacin.
b. More than half of the cereal brands except Coco-Pops contain niacin.

These data are problematic for approaches which aim to capture the co-occurrence restrictions of connected EPs in terms of the model-theoretic properties of the determiner denotations involved. The source of this problem is first and foremost that, provided $A \neq \emptyset$, no logically significant class of determiner denotations can be singled out solely on the basis of the difference between the lexical entries in (122).

Furthermore, it is even doubtful that such a difference holds the key to a successful account of the acceptability of connected EPs. The reason for such a bleak assessment is as follows: Let Q be a binary relation on a universe E and let A, $B \subseteq E$. As can be easily verified against the data introduced in the previous chapter, even if the truth of some quantificational claim $Q_E(A, B)$ requires the set $(A \cap B)$ to be large (which is, in fact, a stronger constraint than is needed for *more than half (of the)*), there is no guarantee that connected EPs will be licensed. Likewise, the requirement that the sets $(A \cap B)$ and $(A - B)$ differ in size (a second, but perhaps less obvious, difference between the determiner denotations above) is not a sufficient condition for the acceptability of exceptions. Hence, neither of these differences can by itself explain the contrast between *exactly half (of the)* and *more than half (of the)*. What other model-theoretic distinctions can be found between these determiner denotations? The answer to this question is that there are none.

Broadly similar examples are the pairs *several* versus *a lot of, a number of* versus *a large number of*, and *a few* versus *quite a few*. Again, despite the first members of these pairs differing from the second members mainly just in the required cardinality of their respective $(A \cap B)$ sets, only the latter can head associates of connected EPs, as illustrated below for the determiner *quite a few*:

(124) "We were outchanced and outplayed in quite a few areas except goal," Quinn said.[45]

(125) "Bur oak is very hardy and adaptable," he says, "and Swedish aspen is wind-hardy, adaptable to quite a few conditions except wet, and can grow to 15 metres."[46]

Of course, the interpretive differences between *a few* and *quite a few* (and likewise for the members of the other pairs) go beyond the one noted above. While both of these determiners are vague and may also require a context-dependent 'standard of comparison', only *quite a few* is arguably ambiguous between a CARDINAL and a PROPORTIONAL reading (Partee 1988, Westerståhl 1985b), given below as (126a) and (126b), respectively:

(126) a. $\textit{quite a few}_E(A, B) \Leftrightarrow |(A \cap B)| \geqslant n$

b. $\textit{quite a few}_E(A, B) \Leftrightarrow |(A \cap B)| \geqslant k \cdot |A| \qquad (0 < k < 1)$

If this is correct, sentence (124) for example can, on a cardinal interpretation of the determiner, mean that the number of areas in which the team was outchanced and outplayed is at least n, where n is a reasonably large natural number in the given context, but that goal was not one of those areas. On the other hand, the proportional interpretation of this sentence entails that the opposing team was superior in a relatively significant proportion of the areas, but that goal did not add to that proportion. On this reading, *quite a few* differs from *a few* in two respects: it is neither PERSISTENT nor ANTI-PERSISTENT (i.e. non-monotone on its left argument) and POSITIVE STRONG (Barwise and Cooper 1981). The denotation of cardinal *a few*, by contrast, is both persistent and WEAK.

In summary, the first members of these pairs vary from the second members in at most two respects: the size of the intersection of their argument sets, and whether or not they permit a proportional interpretation. This second distinction is, of course, correlated with two additional model-theoretic properties, since proportional quantifiers are invariably unlike cardinal ones in left-monotonicity and strength.

The fundamental question is, in view of our discussion, the following: can the occurrence of connected EPs in associates headed by the second members of these pairs be explained in terms of any of the above distinctions? Again, the answer must be negative. As I will now show, even a cursory inspection of the data confirms that none of these properties is by itself a necessary or sufficient condition for the acceptability of exceptions.

Let DET_{EP} denote the class of (possibly complex) determiners of English which can head associates of connected EPs. Firstly, not every English determiner which countenances a proportional interpretation is a member of DET_{EP}: *exactly half (of the)*, which was discussed above, and the equivalent *fifty per cent (of the)* are cases in point. On the other hand, the determiners *every* and *no* are, respectively, CO-INTERSECTIVE and INTERSECTIVE (and hence not proportional), but are nevertheless prototypical members of DET_{EP}. Secondly, not every determiner of English which is non-monotone in its left argument can support connected EPs. Consider the determiners *exactly thirty*, *the thirty*, *both*, and *neither*, which are neither persistent nor anti-persistent and yet do not belong in DET_{EP}, as indicated by the unacceptability of the examples in (127).

(127)
Exactly thirty
The thirty
Both
Neither
} applicant(s) except Smith are female.

Conversely, observe that not every member of DET_{EP} is non-monotone in its left argument. For example, the determiners *every* and *no* have membership in DET_{EP} but are anti-persistent, since their first arguments are closed under inclusion. Thirdly, not every positive (or negative) strong English determiner is in DET_{EP}. For instance, the determiners *both* and *neither* are, respectively, positive and negative strong but, as shown above, they do not support exceptions. We find that the reverse is also true: as confirmed by the behavior of the determiner *no*, for example, not every weak determiner is excluded from DET_{EP}.

To complete this argument, it should also be pointed out that the requirement of a large $(A \cap B)$, for any binary relation Q on E and $A, B \subseteq E$, was already rejected

above as providing either a necessary or sufficient condition for membership in DET_{EP}. For example, while the truth of $every_E(A, B)$ places no constraint on the cardinality of the set $(A \cap B)$ (or even on the size of A itself), a large $(A \cap B)$ is needed to satisfy the truth of $exactly\ 2{,}301_E(A, B)$. However, only the first of these determiners is in DET_{EP}, as shown by the following contrast in semantic acceptability:

(128) Every / # Exactly 2,301 } contestant(s) except the singer from Detroit.

As I have shown, none of the model-theoretic properties discussed above can by itself provide a necessary or sufficient criterion for membership in the set DET_{EP}. And given that these properties completely exhaust the differences that exist between the pairs of determiner denotations under consideration, we must conclude that the licensing condition on connected EPs cannot be expressed in terms of any one of them.

To these data, we might also add a third set of contrasting quantificational pairs already discussed in the literature. Moltmann (1995: 230) observed that the determiners *zero, between ten and ten,* and *less than one* cannot head associates of connected EPs, as indicated by the unacceptability of the examples in (129), in spite of the fact that they are semantically equivalent to the determiner *no*, which can.

(129) # Zero / # Between ten and ten / # Less than one } student(s) except John failed the exam.

(Moltmann 1995: 230, ftn. 6 (1))

Since these determiners have co-extensive denotations, the above contrast cannot be accounted for strictly in model-theoretic terms. Moltmann circumvented this difficulty by attributing the infelicity of the sentences in (129) to the perceived marginality of these constructions. However, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. For example, while *zero* is admittedly not a prototypical numeral, its use as a count quantifier within DP is well-established (Bultinck 2005, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 387). Moreover, if Moltmann's argument were correct, we

would expect sentence (130), where the connected EP has been excised, to be only marginally acceptable too.

(130) Zero students failed the exam.

This prediction, however, is not confirmed: there are numerous contexts where such a sentence would occur naturally, for instance, as a response to a question about the exact number of students who failed the exam. The website of Columbia's Teachers College, reporting on the attrition rate of its doctoral program, offers the following similar example, which is also unexceptional in the given context:

(131) Of 52 students entering our program from 2001-2007, zero students failed to complete the program.[47]

For these reasons, I conclude that the reported unacceptability of the first sentence in (129) does not stem from the purported marginality of the cardinal numeral *zero*, but rather from its general inability to head associates of connected EPs. Hence, the challenge presented by the pair *zero* and *no* remains and, although I believe there exists an adequate explanation for this contrast, it must also be emphasized that the source of such an account is not likely to be an examination of the model-theoretic features of these determiners' denotations.

In this section, we have looked at three sets of pairs of determiners which differ markedly with respect to whether or not they license connected EPs. Where relevant, I showed that none of the denotational distinctions between the members of these pairs was by itself a necessary or sufficient condition for supporting exceptions and that, consequently, the primary reason for the observed contrasts in acceptability must reside elsewhere.

I hasten to add that I do not claim that the set DET_{EP} cannot be characterized semantically, for instance by taking all and only those determiners whose denotations satisfy the conjunction of a series of model-theoretic criteria. Rather, the issues raised in this section pertain to the value of such an approach for gaining a correct understanding of exceptives. As an additional argument in this direction notice that, even in examples involving associates headed by determiners, the

acceptability of connected EPs depends crucially on features of the model, not exclusively on properties of the determiner denotations themselves. For instance, the determiner *every* does not license connected EPs in all models in which it is defined. Thus, if the only centenarian in the model is Smith and this individual did not in fact receive a letter from the Queen, sentence (132) is true (and, incidentally, equivalent to a negative existential claim about centenarians) but markedly infelicitous.

(132) Every centenarian but Smith received a birthday letter from the Queen.

I do not wish to suggest either that so-called EXCEPTIVE QUANTIFIERS, such as the binary relation Q defined for all $A, B \subseteq E$ as $Q_E(A, B) \Leftrightarrow |(A - B)| = 3$, are semantically incoherent notions. My claim is merely that such semantic objects do not in general provide an adequate semantic idealization of the meaning of natural language strings like *all but three*, for example, as was already indicated in section 2.4.2.

This general diagnosis is, from the perspective adopted in this dissertation, not only unsurprising, but also entirely expected. Since, as shown in section 2.4.3, the presence of connected EPs can be licensed by constituents of DP other than determiners, or even by associates where no determiners are present, it would not be reasonable to assume that the licensing condition on connected EPs must ultimately be traced back to logical properties of quantificational determiners. Neither would it be appropriate to suppose, for the same reason, that the notion of exception is inextricably tied to the semantics of determiners.

In my view, a far more sensible hypothesis is that connected EPs are sensitive to certain interpretive aspects of their DP associates and that, if and when their associates are headed by quantificational determiners, the semantic properties of these determiners must be compatible with such interpretive aspects. This hypothesis entails, in a substantial departure from previous theories of exceptives, that the link between the semantics of connected EPs and quantificational determiners is only indirect.

In this section, I have presented several lines of argument against the received view that connected EPs are constituents of complex determiners. In bringing this discussion to a close, I will sketch what I consider the correct constituent structure of exception DPs. The following brief comments do not provide a comprehensive syntactic analysis of exceptives. My aim is simply to highlight certain structural features of exception DPs that will figure in my analysis of their semantics.

There are a number of arguments which strongly suggest that connected *but*- and *except*-phrases, which from now on will be referred to as CORE connected EPs, should be analyzed syntactically as right-peripheral adjuncts of DPs, giving rise to structures essentially like the following:

(133)



One piece of evidence for this proposal, having previously ruled out a movement analysis of connected EPs, is the fact that, while standard constituency diagnostics indicate that connected EPs form constituents with their associates, core connected EPs must follow those elements canonically analyzed as external modifiers of their associate DPs. Consider, for instance, the case of so-called HEAD-BOUND EMPHATIC or INTENSIVE REFLEXIVES (Moravcsik 1972, Edmondson and Plank 1978), which must occur immediately after their DP antecedents.

(134) a. * The petition was signed by all the judges except Roberts themselves.

b. The petition was signed by all the judges themselves except Roberts.

The fact that the reflexive *themselves* cannot follow the connected EP *except Roberts* in sentence (134a) but must instead follow the associate of the EP directly, as in

sentence (134b), rules out an account according to which connected EPs are N′ adjuncts syntactically, a possibility considered (but not actually developed) by von Fintel (1993: 135).

The evidence regarding compound quantifiers in section 2.4.4 adds further support to the structure proposed in (133). As indicated by the following examples, the constituent [$_{EP}$ *except Psycho*] must follow the restrictive modifier *else* and any other post-head dependents of the DP *everything*, thus suggesting that core connected EPs occur at the rightmost edge of the DPs they attach to:

(135) a. everything else notable by Hitchcock [$_{EP}$ except Psycho]
b. * everything else notable [$_{EP}$ except Psycho] by Hitchcock
c. * everything else [$_{EP}$ except Psycho] notable by Hitchcock
d. * everything [$_{EP}$ except Psycho] else notable by Hitchcock

Exceptive markers like *but* and *except* are grammatical outcasts. In the structure above, I have avoided the vexed question of what their lexical category is by assigning them a category label of their own. Although traditionally categorized as prepositions, in the following chapter I will present several lines of evidence suggesting that such markers of exception are in fact marginal members of the class of coordinators. Of course, the observation that exceptives have uses as coordinators is not new (see, for example, Harris 1982, Reinhart 1991, Hoeksema 1996a). The novel aspect of my suggestion will be the claim that this observation also applies to core connected EPs in English and that, as a consequence, exception DPs in this language are not unlike DP coordinations in their interface with the interpretive component of the grammar. This avenue of research is countenanced by the proposed structure in (133), if we assume that coordination can be analyzed successfully as adjunction. This assumption finds its motivation in previous work by Munn (1992, 1993), for example, who developed an adjunction analysis of coordination whereby the coordinator head and the second conjunct form a constituent, referred to as a BOOLEAN-PHRASE (BP), which is right-adjoined to the first conjunct:

(136)



In taking the position that core connected EPs should be analyzed syntactically as DP modifiers, I side with Hoeksema (1990, 1996a), Lappin (1988, 1996a,b) and Moltmann (1995, 1996), who proposed an NP-level account of connected EPs. There exists, however, a fundamental difference between these accounts of the interpretation of connected EPs and the theory presented in this dissertation. These approaches pursue the hypothesis that core connected EPs operate semantically on the denotation of their associates. By contrast, I will argue that the semantic contribution of core connected EPs is strictly sentential. My proposal is based in part on the observation that exceptions are propositional entities of a certain kind. This idea is the topic of the next section.

2.5 Exceptions are propositional

In this section I will argue that core connected EPs always carry propositional content and that, consequently, sentences which contain them express more than a single proposition (or, perhaps more simply, a conjunction of propositions). Although the propositional character of exceptions is not difficult to see, it can sometimes be obscured by our everyday use of the term 'exception'. Unfortunately, this usage has also found its way into much of the relevant literature (see, for example, von Fintel 1993, 1994, Moltmann 1995), so I will start by elucidating with a simple case what I take to be the correct understanding of this notion. In a situation where Smith did not enjoy the baseball game, but where every other freshman did, we might say that Smith is the 'exception' to the following generalization:

(137) Every freshman enjoyed the baseball game.

What we mean, of course, is that the proposition that Smith did not enjoy the baseball game is exceptional in view of the above claim. The generalization expressed by sentence (137) is a certain kind of propositional statement, which should not be confused with the individuals that such a statement is about. Individuals are not generalizations. Likewise, Smith is not the exception to sentence (137): the exception is the fact that Smith did not enjoy the baseball game. This point is perhaps too obvious to be worth making, but it allows us nonetheless to approach the notion of exception from the right ontological perspective.

There are two types of argument that support a propositional account of the meaning of core connected EPs. The first argument, which is merely suggestive of such a conclusion, rests on the basic observation that an utterance of a sentence containing a core connected EP of the form *but/except* α always commits us to the truth of some claim about α. Thus, a speaker of (138), for example, is not only asserting that no corporate attorney (other than Smith) wears inexpensive suits, but is crucially making a statement about Smith as well, namely that he wears that type of clothing.

(138) No corporate attorney but Smith wears cheap suits.

Observe that it is not possible to deny knowledge of Smith's dressing habits explicitly and still assert sentence (138), as the unacceptability of the following discourse indicates:

(139) # I don't know about Smith, but no corporate attorney but Smith wears cheap suits.

In this regard, core connected EPs are in marked contrast to negative integrated (or restrictive) relative clauses, whose semantic import is restricted only to the nouns they modify. Compare the following sentences:

(140) a. Everybody but a New Yorker likes New York.

b. Everybody who is not a New Yorker likes New York.

While both of these sentences make the same claim about people who are not from New York, they differ fundamentally in what they say about New Yorkers. In particular, only the first sentence makes an assertion about New Yorkers themselves, to wit that they dislike their city of origin. This proposition, however, is merely implicated pragmatically by the speaker of (140b), and hence can be defeated without difficulty, as shown in (141).

(141) I don't know about New Yorkers, but everybody who is not a New Yorker likes New York.

The additional claim which an utterance of an exception sentence gives rise to, that is, the claim that takes the complement of the connected EP as an argument, is not just a presupposition of the speaker of that utterance. Bill Murray's character in the 1993 comedy film 'Groundhog Day' provides an example which makes this point clearly. In this film Murray plays Phil Connors, a self-centered television weatherman who, during a hated assignment covering the annual Groundhog Day event in Punxsutawney, finds himself repeating the same day over and over again. Consider the following exchange between Phil's producer Rita, played by Andie MacDowell, and Phil:

(142) Rita: You'll never love anybody but yourself!
Phil: That's not true, I don't even like myself.

Rita's accusation was not made only in regard to Phil's attitude to people other than himself, but it also involved a certain claim about Phil's attitude towards himself, as evidenced by the fact that it was the truth of that particular claim which he challenged. An interesting insight can be gained by reflecting on what makes Phil's quip funny. Phil called into question the truth of what we would normally consider the less controversial aspect of Rita's criticism, and thus implicitly suggested that there was some truth to Rita's other claim regarding Phil's selfish nature. This exchange is important in the present context because it is not felicitous to object to a false presupposition in this way, as the following example also illustrates:

(143) a. It was you who fessed up to the judge!

b. # That's not true, nobody fessed up to the judge.

An utterance of (143a) is odd in a context where nobody confessed to the judge. In such a scenario, we might challenge the meaningfulness or contextual felicity of (143a), for example, by uttering the exclamatives *bullshit!, nonsense!* or *what!*. However, as indicated by the unacceptability (or perhaps simply the markedness) of the discourse in (143b), addressees cannot typically question the truth of statements involving a false presupposition.

As pointed out above, these facts are not jointly sufficient to warrant the attribution of propositional content to core connected EPs. Nevertheless, the assumption that the claim resulting from the Negative Condition (after Moltmann 1995), introduced in section 1.4.2, is actually entailed by exception sentences, rather than just presupposed or conversationally implicated is, of course, individually necessary for such an account.

The second, and more compelling, argument in support of the view that exceptions are propositions comes from a wide range of adverbial expressions that may appear, often parenthetically, between exceptive markers and their complements in core connected EPs. On the basis of the semantic selectional requirements of these expressions, I will argue that core connected EPs, while syntactically subsentential, are invariably propositional in their semantics. Consider some types of adverbs which empirically substantiate this argument.

Let us take EVIDENTIAL adverbs first. On a clausal reading, these adverbs indicate the source or perceived quality of the speaker's evidence in support of the truth of their object proposition, or the manner in which the speaker has come to learn of that proposition (Cinque 1999, Ernst 2001, Infantidou 2001). These adverbs can appear in combination with core connected EPs, as illustrated by the following examples containing the evidentials *evidently, obviously,* and *reportedly*:

(144) We are all to some degree disciples of Thompson except evidently Prof. Johnson.[48]

(145) Barry just had this wonderful belief that there was nothing he couldn't do on the field except, obviously, tackle.[49]

(146) [The French TGV] is faster than anything else in France except, obviously, the dash to the lavatory when you have eaten an SNCF sandwich.[50]

(147) He didn't mention that the activists have, in all likelihood, spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on their anti-mining campaign, but have done nothing for La Oroya's people except reportedly to give them some vitamin C tablets, supposedly to help reduce the impact of lead in their bodies.[51]

Sentence (144), for instance, makes the claim that it is evidently true to the speaker that Professor Johnson is not one of Thompson's disciples. Sentence (146) states, in a similar but ostensibly jocular manner, that the proposition that France's high-speed rail service is not faster than the dash to the lavatory is held as obviously true by the speaker. The occurrence of evidential adverbs with core connected EPs provides evidence in support of the view that these phrases have propositional content.

MODAL adverbs can also be frequently found in combination with core connected EPs. These adverbs are often taken to modify the truth of the propositions expressed by the sentences which contain them (Bellert 1977). Consider the following sentences involving the modal adverbs *possibly*, *maybe*, *perhaps* and *probably*:

(148) Adult motorists who do not use seat belts are endangering no one except possibly themselves.[52]

(149) Their supporting cast consists of various Shaolin fighting monks, zombies, elves and pretty much everybody you ever saw in a mall video arcade except maybe the Martians from 'Space Invaders'.[53]

(150) However, very few of Botong's paintings show a strong Gauguin influence except perhaps 'Camote Eaters' (1946) and 'Siesta' (1957), which shout out Gauguin's vivid greens and red-orange.[54]

(151) I might have achieved a few things scientifically but there's nothing that one leaves on the face of the earth that's important except probably one's children.[55]

Sentence (148), for example, claims in part that the proposition that adult motorists who don't use seat belts put themselves in danger is, in the speaker's estimation, possibly true. Given that modal adverbs are sentential modifiers (Thomason and Stalnaker 1973, Bellert 1977, McConnell-Ginet 1982), we might ask how it is possible for them to occur in syntactic environments where only nominal arguments are present in their scope, such as in the examples above. The obvious answer to this question is that core connected EPs can, in fact, provide these adverbs with appropriate propositional arguments.

Next, consider so-called EVALUATIVE adverbs. The adverbial expressions *fortunately, mysteriously, predictably,* and *oddly enough* in the following sentences report the speaker's evaluation of some state of affairs with respect to its degree of desirability, as in example (152), or normality, as in examples (153) through (155).

(152) It may be Upper Holloway in postcode and geography, but the Whitehall Park Conservation Area is really Highgate in architecture, ambience, and most other attributes except, fortunately, price.[56]

(153) But disaster struck in January when a freak fire gutted her shop, covering all of her stock in a thick blanket of soot except, mysteriously, her tarot cards.[57]

(154) It was not much fun for the women who met her, fresh from such preparations, on the Australasian circuit this year, when she won almost everything except, predictably, the New Zealand Open final against Susan Devoy.[58]

(155) HP's new product list covers the gamut except, oddly enough, printers.[59]

The evaluative adverbs in the sentences above receive a clausal interpretation and are, furthermore, FACTIVE, taking true propositions as their arguments (Ernst 2001: 76). Thus, for example, the speaker of (153) expresses a judgment of the fact that the tarot cards were not covered in soot (whereas all other stock in the shop was). Similarly, the speaker of (155) reports the odd nature of the fact that HP's new product list doesn't cover printers. The main point of these examples, of course,

is that, as required by the semantic selection restrictions of the evaluatives *mysteriously* and *oddly enough*, the truth of their respective propositional arguments must be part of the asserted content of these sentences.

I shall now turn to so-called SPEECH-ACT adverbs, which are often taken to comment on the speaker's performance of a speech-act (Bach and Harnish 1979). In the examples below, the adverbial expressions *frankly* and *quite frankly* characterize the manner in which certain propositions are asserted by the speaker:

(156) I had no expectation of anything happening with President Sadat except, frankly, the usual rhetoric that we'd been hearing for many years.[60]

(157) Every single market is doing super good except frankly Alaska.[61]

(158) We've heard from pretty much everyone except, quite frankly, bargaining agents for union members, that this is a great system and that it in fact puts another layer over and above.[62]

It is interesting to note that these adverbials take scope only over the assertion of the proposition expressed by means of the connected EP, but not over the whole utterance. Thus, the speaker of (156) is simply asserting frankly that the usual rhetoric was expected. Likewise, the speaker of (157) gives a candid assurance that the Alaskan market is not doing well, although no such guarantee is explicitly given about the claim that every single market is thriving. Obviously, the connected EPs in the examples above must be able to support a proposition whose assertion by the speaker can be commented on by means of these adverbial expressions.

The occurrence of SUBJECT-ORIENTED adverbs with connected EPs in subject exception DPs offers the following variation of this general line of argument. Subject-oriented, or THEMATICALLY DEPENDENT (Wyner 1998) adverbs, as illustrated in sentences (159a–b) below, typically attribute a certain property, mental attitude, or state to the referent of the subject argument of the sentences in which they occur (Jackendoff 1972, McConnell-Ginet 1982, Parsons 1990, Landman 2000, Ernst 2001).

(159) a. Tactfully, Sandy did not bring up the topic of my divorce.

b. The undercover agent cleverly drove out of sight.

The hypothesis that exceptions have propositional content predicts that these adverbs can be oriented to the complements of connected EPs in subject exception DPs since, by assumption, such complements are the subject arguments of a separate proposition. Is this prediction borne out? Consider the following examples involving the subject-oriented adverbs *reluctantly*, *foolishly*, *wisely*:

(160) Nobody has ever given me a birthday present except, reluctantly, my wife.

(161) She writes eloquently about the differences between the American literary scene and the French, and wonders at all the young Americans who reject their homegrown authors except, reluctantly, Faulkner.[63]

(162) Everyone took cover before the tornado struck except, foolishly, Jim.

(163) Nature smiled, Robert King smiled, twinkling away at the harpsichord; and all his players – except, wisely, his two trumpeters, Steele-Perkins and David Blackadder – smiled with him.[64]

Sentence (160), for instance, claims that nobody has ever given me a birthday present, but that my wife has done so reluctantly. Crucially, this sentence cannot mean that nobody other than my wife has ever been reluctant to give me a birthday present: the truth of the proposition communicated by an utterance of (160) requires that my wife is the only person who has ever given such a present. Similar comments apply also to examples (161) through (163), mutatis mutandis. The observed orientation of the adverbs in the sentences above confirms our prediction, and adds further support to the view that core connected EPs (and *except*-phrases in general, witness sentence (163)) carry propositional content.

Finally, I turn to FREQUENCY adverbs, which also commonly occur with core connected EPs. The following examples involve so-called RELATIVE FREQUENCY adverbs, which are often assumed to take a proposition denoting expression as an argument, and specify the frequency with which that proposition is extensionally true with respect to an ordered set of time intervals (Stump 1981, 1985):

(164) I love everything about Portland except sometimes the rain.[65]

(165) Over the weekend my 9-year-old son, Jacob, noticed that I hadn't put my seat belt on as we started backing out of the driveway (I always buckle up except sometimes for driving to the supermarket around the corner).[66]

(166) Little changes at the Liberal conference except, periodically, the name of the party.[67]

(167) My dear husband, who doesn't watch team sports except occasionally men's pro basketball, goes for a football metaphor as casually as our teenage son reaches for second helpings.[68]

Sentence (164), for instance, entails that sometimes the speaker doesn't like the Portland rain, a proposition which, according to Stump's account, is true relative to an ordered set of time intervals τ just in case it is extensionally true at intervals which occur sometimes in the sequence determined by τ (Stump 1985: 175). The ultimate correctness of Stump's account of relative frequency adverbs is, of course, not at stake here. Of importance, however, is the realization that any reasonable account of frequency adverbs requires that they operate semantically on the proposition, or perhaps the eventuality, denoted by expressions occurring in their scope. The acceptability of the examples above shows conclusively that core connected EPs are able to provide these adverbs with the requisite type of content, which further confirms the thesis that exceptions are propositional entities.

In this section, I have argued that exception sentences such as

(168) No monarch but Queen Elizabeth II likes Spam.

express exceptions, which were shown to be propositional entities, and that, therefore, core connected EPs must be able to support this type of content semantically.

To complete this discussion, I will show that, although propositionality is a hallmark of the meaning of exception, there are members of the class of exceptives which allow for a non-propositional, and hence 'non-exceptive', interpretation. On this interpretation, these markers exhibit the properties of restrictive modifiers.

The more central or core members of the class of exceptives, however, must always give rise to the expression of exceptions. I will suggest that propositionality provides a new basis on which to articulate the typology of exceptives.

The existence of exceptive markers which do not give rise to exceptions (in the sense developed above) is not hard to establish. It can be demonstrated by taking contexts in which speakers cannot commit themselves to the relevant claim regarding the complement of the exceptive marker. In such contexts exceptions are not meaningful, because exceptions must be asserted by the speaker. However, certain phrases traditionally analyzed as markers of exception can be used felicitously. Take the following example: let us suppose that the professors in our (small) department are Tom, Dick, Harry, and Sandy. Sitting outside the Chair's office, we see the first three enter the room. We have not seen Sandy walk into the room, but the possibility that she was there already cannot be ruled out either. Therefore, we can commit ourselves to a claim regarding Sandy's professorial colleagues only. Given this state of affairs, it is interesting to consider which exceptive markers can head the connected EP in the following test sentence (as uttered by us):

(169) Every professor [$_{EP}$ _ Sandy] is now in the Chair's office.

The exceptives in group I below can occur in this position but, according to my informants, those in group II are markedly infelicitous in this context.

(170) GROUP I: *apart from, aside from, other than*
GROUP II: *but, except, save, with the exception of*

The test sentence frame (171), where the labels PN and VP stand in for any proper name and verb phrase which are compatible with the EP-associate (and otherwise pragmatically appropriate), is a more general variant of the one above, but it yields the same outcome: when exceptives from group II are used in this frame, the resulting sentence is semantically odd. Exceptives from group I, however, do not give rise to semantic infelicity (although utterances of the resulting sentences arguably involve the explicit cancellation of a conversational implicature).

(171) I { can't say / won't say / don't know } about PN, but everyone [$_{EP}$ _ PN] + VP.

Trying to draw this sort of distinction between exceptives is not an entirely original strategy. For example, Moltmann (1992, 1995) argues that *other than*-phrases, although superficially similar to core connected EPs, differed crucially from them in that they failed to satisfy the Negative Condition. And indeed, as pointed out above, *other than*-phrases do not give rise to any entailments about their right arguments of the sort predicted by Moltmann's Negative Condition, but are generally interpreted as restrictive relative clauses with a meaning roughly paraphrasable as 'distinct from'. The same comment applies to the other exceptive markers in group I, which are not used to express exceptions. In light of this fact, it might appear more appropriate to refer to these just as MARKERS OF EXCLUSION, since exclusion is a logically weaker notion than exception.

However, simply saying that these phrases do not give rise to exceptive interpretations or, in Moltmann's terms, that they do not satisfy the Negative Condition, fails to capture the correct generalization about these data, because the exceptives in group I above can, in fact, be used to express true exceptions. Let us consider the argument that motivates my claim. If a sentential adverb such as the modal *possibly* is inserted in a connected EP headed by a GROUP I exceptive, as the following minimal pair illustrates, these markers must have an exception meaning, and not simply one of exclusion.

(172) a. Every pilot [$_{EP}$ other than Jones] passed the eye test.

b. Every pilot [$_{EP}$ other than possibly Jones] passed the eye test.

The interpretive difference between sentences (172a) and (172b) is that only the latter makes a statement about Jones' sight: an utterance of this sentence expresses the proposition that all other contextually salient pilots have passed the test, but that Jones may not have passed it. This is further confirmed by the fact that the possibility of Jones failing the eye test can be explicitly denied only in the first of these sentences, as can be shown by the following contrast in acceptability:

(173) Jones passed the eye test ...

a. ...and every pilot other than Jones did too.

b. #...and every pilot other than possibly Jones did too.

Crucially for this argument, sentence (172b) above cannot be interpreted as making a claim about pilots who are possibly different from Jones. In other words, the truth conditions of an utterance of this sentence are accurately captured by the formula (174a), in which the modal possibility operator $\Diamond$ is not within the scope of the universal quantifier, but not by the formula (174b), where that operator is part of the restrictor of the quantifier.

(174) a. $\forall x((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge (x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x)) \wedge \Diamond (\neg \mathbf{passed}'(j))$

b. $\forall x((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge \Diamond(x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x))$[69]

An additional confirmation of this claim comes from inspecting the conditions for the truth of sentence (172a) above, as shown in (175), and comparing them to those of formula (174b), given in (176). Clearly, the difference in meaning between (175) and (176) does not capture adequately the truth-conditional distinction that exists between the sentences in (172), and so the first-order formula (174b) cannot be a suitable translation of sentence (172b).

(175) $[\![\forall x((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge (x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x))]\!]^{M,w,g} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$:
$[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or $[\![x = j]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ or $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$

(176) $[\![\forall x((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge \Diamond(x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x))]\!]^{M,w,g} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$:
$[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or for all $w' \in W$ such that $w\ R\ w'$: $[\![x = j]\!]^{M,w',g'[x\,/d]} =$ 1 or $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$

The upshot of this discussion is that, contrary to previous assumptions, group I exception markers admit both an exceptive and a 'non-exceptive' interpretation. On the former reading, these markers give rise to propositional content and, consequently, countenance the presence of sentential adverbs, facts which on analogy to the constituent structure of DPs containing core connected EPs, I will suggest correspond with their being construed syntactically as DP adjuncts, as shown in (177) below.

(177) DP ADJUNCT CONSTRUAL



On the latter and preferred interpretation, these markers cannot be used to express propositions about their right arguments, but rather exhibit the properties of ordinary nominal restrictors in NP structure, and thus should be assigned the following syntactic representation (with some details omitted):

(178) N-BAR ADJUNCT CONSTRUAL



By contrast, group II exceptive markers only have the first of these interpretations. Therefore, the correct empirical generalization is that group II exceptives must give rise to a statement regarding their complements, whereas less prototypical markers

of exception do not need to (and typically do not). This generalization can be stated as the following fact:

(179) GROUP II EXCEPTIVES
Group II exceptives have propositional interpretations only.

This fact suggests that the technical notion of exception (and, thus, propositionality) can be used as a criterion on which to anchor the typology of exceptives. All the core members of the class of exceptives in English must express exceptions. On the other hand, less central members of that class need not do so, since they have additional interpretations as nominal restrictors.

2.6 Quasi-semantic restriction

A popular view of the meaning of core connected EPs is that they are semantic restrictors of quantificational domains which serve to exclude exceptional individuals from consideration so that the truth of the sentences in which they occur can be preserved (von Fintel 1993, 1994). Under the 'exceptives as restrictors' view, connected EPs make a semantic contribution to the interpretation of their DP associates, typically by combining with a quantificational determiner to yield a so-called EXCEPTIVE QUANTIFIER.

Moltmann (1995, 1996) is equally committed to the assumption that the locus of action of connected EPs is confined to the evaluation of the quantificational expression they associate with. For example, this assumption is embodied in her claim that connected EPs involve "only a local semantic operation on the associated quantifier" (Moltmann 1995: 233).

These views are not unreasonable, to be sure, especially given the widespread belief that exceptive modification is inextricably linked to the presence of certain quantificational determiners in a sentence, an idea which may be also reinforced by the perception, mistaken in my view, that connected EPs are the prototypical members of their class.

In this section, however, I shall argue that core connected EPs do not contribute semantic (i.e. locally compositional) restrictions to quantificational determiners in their associates to prevent the falsity of the sentences in which they occur. Rather, they give rise to a proposition that constitutes an exception to the generalization expressed by their hosts, and thus their semantic import is similar to that of free EPs. Of course, the contribution of an EP at the sentential level also has an indirect effect on the primary claim made by the sentence which contains it. For example, the sentence

(180) Every Salvationist except Jones is a teetotaller.

does not entail the sweeping claim about Salvationists given in (181),

(181) $\mathbf{Salvationist}' \subseteq \mathbf{teetotaller}'$

but a qualified version of that claim, according to which every Salvationist other than Jones is a teetotaller:

(182) $(\mathbf{Salvationist}' - \{\mathbf{Jones}'\}) \subseteq \mathbf{teetotaller}'$

Such a qualification is consistent with what sentence (181) semantically entails as a result of the presence of the EP. However, it would be mistaken to conclude from this fact that the 'exceptives as restrictors' approach is on the right track. To see this, consider the following sentence, which would be natural as a report from a clerical assistant who, for example, knows that all of the applications so far received with the exception of Smith's are from women, but still has a small number to process:

(183) Most applicants except Smith are female.

Like (181) above, this sentence semantically entails a restricted quantificational statement where the quantifier ranges over the denotation of its NP argument minus the set containing the denotation of the EP-complement, as shown in (184).

(184) $most_E((\mathbf{applicant}' - \{\mathbf{Smith}'\}), \mathbf{female}')$

But the EP need not be seen as rescuing the quantificational statement expressed by its host in this case, as the truth of sentence (183) can in fact be compatible with that of its non-exceptive counterpart in (185) below.

(185) Most applicants are female.

The kind of restriction exhibited by exception sentences is not strictly semantic (i.e. locally compositional), but QUASI-SEMANTIC. What does this mean? Notice crucially that core connected EPs are neither constituents of quantificational determiners nor nominal modifiers. There are, of course, theories which postulate a DP adjunct analysis of core connected EPs (Moltmann 1995, 1996, Lappin 1996b), but peripheral DP adjuncts do not canonically restrict the domain of quantifiers. Therefore, if we accept a syntactically constrained notion of propositional content, we must come to the conclusion that these phrases do not restrict quantificational determiners in virtue of their compositional semantics.

Instead, I shall argue that an EP's primary semantic contribution to the sentence which contains it is the expression of an exceptional claim about the denotation of its complement. This proposition also serves to hedge the meaning of its host, as the restriction observed in the examples above is entailed by the overall meaning of the sentence.

The term QUASI-SEMANTIC RESTRICTION is intended to capture the fact that EPs do not restrict the denotations of their associates in virtue of their compositional semantics at their level of syntactic attachment, but rather by means of their propositional contribution to the overall meaning of the sentences in which they occur. That notwithstanding, since the restriction is in fact entailed, it must be semantic in nature (rather than pragmatic). This general outlook is consonant with the observation that exception sentences are syntactically monoclausal but semantically biclausal.

One way to capture the effect of quasi-semantic restriction in exception sentences, given that the absence of quantificational determiners does not preclude connected exceptive modification of NPs, might be to adopt an approach to domain restriction which makes use of NOMINAL CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES (Stanley

2000, 2002a,b, Stanley and Szabó 2000), whereby the denotation of a nominal expression is intersected with a contextually supplied set, as I have actually done in examples (182) and (184).

Stanley's nominal restriction theory concentrates on a class of sentences for which a purely pragmatic account, for instance in terms of CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICITURES (Bach 1994a, 2000, 2001b) or EXPLICATURES (Carston 2002a, 2004), might be available. In the case of exception sentences, however, the restriction set is not merely supplied by the utterance context, but is at least partly determined by the linguistic meaning of the sentence.

One consideration suggestive of this approach concerns the fact that the kind of restriction observed in examples such as (180) above is not peculiar to exception sentences, but can also be found in broadly similar examples for which neither a strictly semantic (i.e. locally compositional) nor a strictly pragmatic account of the data seems possible: the former because the said restriction is not projected syntactically in the position where it is detected, the latter because it is nevertheless semantically entailed by the sentence as a whole. Consider the following examples:

(186) a. We've searched every house, but not Smith's.
b. No Californian restaurateur knows our recipe, only Alice Waters.
c. Everyone drank too much last night, and so did I!
d. If nobody's got any money, I'll have to pick up the tab.

These examples contain various universal statements. Sentence (186b), for instance, involves a negative existential claim about Californian restaurateurs. This sentence, however, is not likely to be interpreted as a wholesale assertion about professionals in the restaurant industry from California, because the parenthetical sentence fragment *only Alice Waters* in (186b) semantically entails that the famous owner of Berkeley's Chez Panisse has knowledge of the recipe. Rather, an utterance of the seemingly contradictory sentence (186b) communicates a contingent proposition along the lines of (187):

(187) No other Californian restaurateur knows our recipe, only Alice Waters.

Something similar can be said of the other examples given above, mutatis mutandis. For instance, an utterance of sentence (186c) would be interpreted as making a non-redundant statement about the speaker; and an utterance of sentence (186d) expresses a certain condition about individuals other than the speaker. This restriction is due to the proposition expressed by the main clause, as can be seen by comparing sentence (186d) to sentence (188) below, which conveys no such qualification.

(188) If nobody's got any money, we'll have to make a run for the door.

The theoretical implication of these examples is the following: although the observed local restriction to the quantificational claims made by these sentences is entailed by the conventional meaning of the sentence as a whole, it is not strictly speaking semantic, because the words and phrases whose meaning warrants such a restriction do not form constituents with the relevant quantificational expressions, but rather occur in a different clause. Furthermore, an analysis of these facts based on movement transformations also seems out of the question.

In other words, the restriction to the quantifiers in these sentences is brought about by the overall meaning of the sentences in which they appear. We would not want to claim, for example, that the cross-categorial modifier *only* is a semantic restrictor of quantifier domains just because the domain of *no* in (186b) is restricted owing to the parenthetical occurrence of *only* in that sentence. In order to show that a word or phrase restricts the denotation of a given constituent compositionally, one must also demonstrate that such a word or phrase meets the syntactic requirements for semantic restriction to take place.

Certain instances of PRESUPPOSITION ACCOMMODATION involving the domain of quantificational determiners also present us with a similar type of case. Consider the following quote from Waite Charles Hoyt, a famous pitcher for the New York Yankees during the 1920s:

(189) Every big leaguer and his wife should teach their children to pray, "God bless Mommy, God bless Daddy, and God bless Babe Ruth."

In what is without doubt the ultimate example of accommodation of this type, Hoyt's utterance of (189) makes an exhortation to all male, married big leaguers with children (and their wives). However, the quantifier in the first conjunct of the subject DP is not restricted in this way: as determined by the syntax of the DP it heads, the determiner *every* ranges only over big leaguers.

It would be mistaken to suppose that the definite DPs *his wife* and *their children* semantically restrict the interpretation of *every big leaguer*, even in spite of the fact that *his wife* is part of a larger constituent which also contains the quantifier. Instead, explaining the interpretation of (189) typically involves reference to a pragmatic process of accommodation, whereby the presupposed information is added to the syntactic restrictor of the determiner.[70]

Free EPs are, most obviously, another case in point, although this claim might seem somewhat surprising from the standpoint of previous work on exceptives. There is a general consensus in the literature that free EPs are sentential adjuncts. At the same time, the standard assumption is that such phrases enforce the compositional restriction of a quantifier in their hosts. For instance, the domain of the determiner *every* in sentence (190a) is commonly taken to be the set of former presidents other than Clinton, and that of *no* in (190b) the set of television hosts other than Leno.

(190) a. Except for Bill Clinton, every former president attended the reception.
b. Except for Jay Leno, no television host criticized the Christmas Special.

To preserve the consistency of both of these premises, it is often argued that a free EP must form a constituent with an appropriate quantificational expression in the main clause at the syntactic level of semantic representation (Landman and Moerdijk 1979, Reinhart 1991, von Fintel 1993, 1994), thus, in effect, assimilating the syntax of free EPs to that of connected uses of these phrases.

I disagree with this interpretation of the data. Examples such as (190a) and (190b) above provide, in my view, strong evidence against the claim that free EPs involve the semantic restriction of quantifiers. Given that neither connected nor

free construals of EPs have the syntax canonically associated with semantic restrictors of quantifiers, a far more natural explanation of the fact that sentences containing EPs entail a restricted quantificational statement, is that such restriction is not locally compositional, but quasi-semantic.

I also wish to deny the assumption, implicit in the transformational approach outlined above, that connected EPs provide the best model for the understanding of exceptives. As will become evident from the discussion in the following chapter, free EPs are the less marked, and hence the more prototypical, members of the class of exceptives.

As I have shown in this section, although an EP is licensed by certain interpretive properties of the unqualified host, its inclusion results in the expression of an ancillary proposition which indirectly hedges the meaning of the host. Such a restriction is quasi-semantic because, although it is entailed by the overall meaning of the sentence owing to the presence of the EP, it is not locally compositional.

2.7 Taking stock

In this chapter I have challenged five key assumptions that have characterized much previous work in the semantics of exceptives. These assumptions can be stated as follows:

(191) EPs are sanctioned by universal quantifiers.

(192) EPs preserve the truth of the statements they modify.

(193) EPs are constituents of complex determiners in English.

(194) Exceptions are individuals.

(195) EPs semantically restrict the domain of quantifiers in their associates.

As argued in the foregoing discussion, these premises are not empirically warranted, lead to incorrect predictions, or are manifestly incompatible with a theoretically sound notion of exception. Therefore, I have sought to replace them with the following claims:

(196) EPs are sanctioned by statements that express generalizations.

(197) EPs do not directly affect the truth of the statements they modify.

(198) There are no exceptive determiners in English.

(199) Exceptions are invariably propositional.

(200) EPs are not locally compositional restrictors of quantifier domains.

The statements (196)–(200) make explicit and falsifiable claims about the notion of exception, and how this notion is syntactically realized and semantically expressed in English by means of EPs. Statement (196) also embodies a novel proposal regarding the licensing condition on EPs. The theory of connected EPs that I will present in the following chapter is consistent with and further develops these claims.

The primary motivation for the approach adopted in this chapter is the following: since, in my view, many of the foundational assumptions of current work in this area are inadequate, elucidating the 'big picture' is a prerequisite for successfully addressing the detail of this class of meanings. An additional advantage of this approach is that, as will become evident in the next chapter, postulates (196)–(200) make it possible to frame old questions in new ways, and generate new lines of inquiry into the syntax and semantics of EPs. For example, as I will show in the next chapter, a novel generalization concerning the distinction between connected and free EPs emerges from the theoretical standpoint adopted here.

A central hypothesis of this chapter has been that a successful account of the interpretation of EPs must make reference to the auxiliary notion of generalization. In a nutshell, EPs are licensed by hosts that express generalizations, for only in such hosts can EPs satisfy the condition which I referred to as the Principle of Exceptions, that is, the claim that an EP must contradict a non-empty proper subset of its host's instantiations. A theoretical implication of this hypothesis is that, since generalizations nonmonotonically entail the statements that instantiate them, the interpretation of EPs must be sensitive to defeasible aspects of sentence meaning

and that, consequently, such a level of meaning must fall within the scope of a semantic theory of exceptives.

An advantage of this line of investigation is that it affords the opportunity to account for gradience in the data. This is an important consideration, because the judgments of native speaker informants are often not categorical, but rather reflect a continuum of acceptability among different types of exception sentences. And so, in general, the more prototypical the association between a sentential host and the expression of a generalization, the greater the ability of that host to countenance exceptions. The converse is also true: hosts which represent less conventional means of expressing generalizations are less likely to allow exceptive modification. Exceptions sentences containing EP-associates headed by *every* and *some*, for example, sit at opposite ends of this continuum. When we restrict attention to hosts that license EPs, informants also find that the stronger the generalization expressed by a host, the greater the acceptability of EPs (other things being equal). Conversely, the weaker the generalization expressed by a host, the less acceptable EPs are judged to be (other things being equal).

This last paragraph echoes a suggestion made by Laurence Horn who, on the basis of associates of connected EPs headed by the paucal quantifier *little*, concluded that "an exceptive proposition is never properly formed unless its non-exceptive counterpart is conventionally used to express a universal proposition" (2000b: 79). Horn's perceptive observation turned out to be essentially on the right track given that generalizations are, according to the perspective adopted in this dissertation, universal claims of a certain kind.

Let me now turn to showing that the adoption of assumptions (196)–(200) make it possible to offer a simple explanatory account of the semantics of connected and free EPs.

Chapter 3

The Semantics of EPs

3.1 Introduction

In this and the following chapter, I present a general semantic theory of exceptives in English that incorporates and further develops the ideas introduced in the previous one. The theory is general in the sense that it aims to provide a unitary semantic characterization of connected and free EPs of various types. Accordingly, I will aim to show that, contrary to standard assumptions in the literature on exceptives, connected and free EPs can and should receive the same semantic analysis. Their difference, I shall argue, lies only in the sources of the generality claims they qualify and, therefore, in how they interface with the syntax of their hosts.

The picture that emerges from my proposal is that the core meaning of exception is simple to describe and stable across constructions, and that the perceived interpretive complexity of sentences containing EPs arises from the multiplicity of sources of generalizations licensing such phrases. Therefore, I shall put forward the idea that the key challenge for future research in this area lies mostly in providing a cross-constructional account of the syntax-semantics interface of EPs.

This chapter is structured as follows: first, in section 3.2 I shall discuss in detail the central features of generality claims, introduce defeasible entailment in terms of a PREFERENTIAL model structure, and use it to define a notion of INSTANTIATION (of a generalization) which, I shall argue, is needed to characterize the semantics of

exceptives. In section 3.3, I reassess the traditional understanding of the distinction between connected and free EPs and, on this basis, present a novel generalization concerning their distribution. This discussion is followed in section 3.4 by an explicit semantics for connected EPs, which is applied to a representative subset of the types of data introduced in the first chapter. Finally, several issues arising from the proposed semantics are discussed in section 3.5: cardinal numeral associates of connected EPs, Keenan's objection to an analysis of connected EPs as DP modifiers, and exception sentences that either require the accommodation of the Condition of Inclusion, or express what I shall refer to as UNEXCEPTIONAL exceptions.

3.2 Generality claims and nonmonotonicity

In the previous chapter I argued that, relative to a suitably characterized notion of generalization, a satisfactory account of the core semantic properties of EPs in English can be provided. This idea finds its motivation in the following condition on acceptable hosts of EPs, which the Principle of Exceptions introduced in section 2.2 entails:

(1) ACCEPTABLE HOST CONSTRAINT
EPs are licensed by hosts that express generalizations.

Admittedly, saying that exceptions are licensed by hosts which express generalizations is hardly an original statement. More interesting, however, is the claim that theoretical substance can be given to this truism about exceptions. Let us look again at the definition of generalization put forward in section 2.2, which I repeat below together with the Principle of Exceptions, for ease of reference.

(2) GENERALIZATION
A sentence Σ expresses a generalization iff Σ makes a defeasible (i.e. nonmonotonically instantiated) universal claim about a sufficiently large domain.

(3) THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEPTIONS
An EP must give rise to the expression of a proposition such that, if true, it defeats a non-empty subset of the host's instantiations.

There are three key aspects to definition (2): the assertions (*i*) that generalizations always have universal import, (*ii*) that they are nonmonotonically instantiated, and that (*iii*) that the cardinality of their domains must be sufficiently large. The rationale for the first of these claims was discussed in the previous chapter and so, in this section, I shall concentrate on the other two. First, I will aim to make the definitions of generalization and instantiation formally precise, and provide some background to the notion of nonmonotonicity that underpins these definitions.

3.2.1 Preferential entailment

Shoham (1987, 1988a,b) developed a general semantic approach to nonmonotonic logics by augmenting a standard logic with a PREFERENCE order on its models. In classical monotonic logics the meaning of a given formula is identified with the set of interpretations or models which satisfy that formula. Nonmonotonicity is obtained in this framework by considering only a subset of the satisfying interpretations of a formula, namely those that are preferred relative to some independently specified criterion. This result is not difficult to explain. Let Γ be an arbitrary set of formulae of a language $\mathcal{L}$, and let ϕ and ψ be arbitrary formulae of $\mathcal{L}$. Furthermore, let $\models$ denote a consequence relation between formulae of $\mathcal{L}$. If $\models$ is monotonic, the following statement holds:

(4) If $\Gamma \models \psi$, then $\Gamma \cup \{\phi\} \models \psi$.

Given that $\Gamma \models \psi$ obtains just in case ψ is true in every model satisfying (each formula in) Γ, and that every model of $\Gamma \cup \{\phi\}$ is also a model of Γ, it follows that $\Gamma \cup \{\phi\} \models \psi$. However, when a PREFERENTIAL consequence relation $\models_{\prec}$ is considered, we observe that $\Gamma \models_{\prec} \psi$ holds just in case ψ is true in every preferred model of Γ, relative to the order determined by $\prec$. But since the set of preferred models of $\Gamma \cup \{\phi\}$ and the set of preferred models of ψ need not overlap, monotonicity is lost.

I follow the presentation of a preferential semantics in Shoham (1987, 1988a,b) and Makinson (1989, 1993, 1994) closely, although my discussion is much shorter and departs from these accounts in some respects. A PREFERENTIAL MODEL STRUCTURE for a language $\mathcal{L}$ can be defined as follows:

(5) PREFERENTIAL MODEL STRUCTURE
A preferential model structure for a language $\mathcal{L}$ is a triple $\mathcal{M} = \langle M, \models, \prec \rangle$, where:

i. M is a set of models or interpretations for $\mathcal{L}$.

ii. $\models \subseteq M \times \mathcal{L}$ is a satisfaction relation between elements of M and propositions of the language $\mathcal{L}$ under consideration.

iii. $\prec \subseteq M \times M$ is an strict partial order (i.e. an irreflexive and transitive relation) over M, called the preference relation of the structure.

Given a preferential model structure $\mathcal{M} = \langle M, \models, \prec \rangle$ for a language $\mathcal{L}$, the notion of PREFERENTIAL SATISFACTION (of $\mathcal{L}$), written $\models_{\prec}$, is defined as follows:

(6) PREFERENTIAL SATISFACTION
An interpretation $m \in M$ preferentially satisfies a proposition ϕ, notated $m \models_{\prec} \phi$, iff $m \models \phi$ and there is no other interpretation m' such that $m' \prec m$ and $m' \models \phi$. In this case, m is a preferred interpretation (or model) of ϕ.

Central to my definitions of a generality claim and an instantiation (of that claim), which shall be formulated later, is the notion of PREFERENTIAL ENTAILMENT, given in (7) below:

(7) PREFERENTIAL ENTAILMENT
Let ϕ and ψ be sentences of $\mathcal{L}$. ϕ preferentially entails ψ, written $\phi \models_{\prec} \psi$, iff for all $m \in M$, if $m \models_{\prec} \phi$ then $m \models \psi$.

According to (7), ϕ preferentially entails ψ just in case ψ is satisfied by all the preferred models of ϕ (though not necessarily by all models of ϕ) or, equivalently, if the set of models of ψ is a superset of the preferred models of ϕ. This definition relies on an independently specified preference relation. What makes a given

interpretation more preferred than some other interpretation? Although different preference criteria are possible, I shall hypothesize that a NORMALITY ORDERING, often adopted in preferential logics, is in fact a suitable preference relation for modeling the meaning of generality claims in English. A definition of this preference criterion is given in (8).

(8) NORMALITY ORDERING
A normality ordering $\prec$ over a set of models M is a strict partial order over M. We write $m \prec m'$ if m is strictly more normal than m'.

This ordering provides a qualitative measure of normality over a set of interpretations of a language. As usual, we shall write $m \prec m'$, if $m \preceq m'$ and it is not the case that $m' \preceq m$. Intuitively, as pointed out above, $m \prec m'$ means that m is strictly more normal than m'. (I follow the convention of placing the more normal interpretation on the left of the operator $\prec$.)

The idea behind a nonmonotonic logic formulated in terms of a normality preference relation, is that a proposition ϕ may defeasibly entail another proposition ψ just in case ψ is true in all the minimally ABNORMAL or atypical models which satisfy ϕ. We can illustrate this idea with the help of an example. While sentence

(9) Most Hollywood actors have vacationed in Saint Tropez.

does not classically entail

(10) Clooney has vacationed in Saint Tropez.

the former preferentially entails the latter (provided that Clooney is a Hollywood actor), given that (10) is satisfied by every minimally abnormal model satisfying (9). In other words, all the most normal models of (9) are also interpretations of (10). Granted, it might well be the case that Clooney has never set foot on the French Riviera. Nevertheless, given (9), the proposition that Clooney has not vacationed in Saint Tropez is not strictly more normal than (10). As I will show, capturing the fact that generality claims are nonmonotonically instantiated involves the exploitation of this type of reasoning.

In the previous chapter, I argued that approaching generalizations in terms of their defeasible entailments was crucial to understanding why a statement whose truth does not entail a universal claim about a given class of entities can nevertheless be construed as expressing a well-formed generality claim about that domain. It is equally important to recognize that not all generalizations have the same polarity. For example, sentence (11a) below expresses a positive generalization about fictional lawyers, but sentence (11b) expresses a negative one about film noirs.

(11) a. Most fictional lawyers practice one area of the law.
b. Few film noirs have a happy ending.

This distinction is also applicable to the statements that instantiate generalizations, which are either positive or negative in polarity. Obviously, the polarity of a generalization is the same as the polarity of its instantiations: positive generalizations have positive instantiations; negative generalizations have negative instantiations. Thus, for example, whereas sentence (11a) is instantiated by positive statements such as (12a–d), sentence (11b) is instantiated by negative statements like (13a–d).

(12) a. Atticus Finch practices one area of the law.
b. Perry Mason practices one area of the law.
c. Ally McBeal practices one area of the law.
d. Jack McCoy practices one area of the law.
...

(13) a. 'The Maltese Falcon' does not have a happy ending.
b. 'Key Largo' does not have a happy ending.
c. 'The Big Sleep' does not have a happy ending.
d. 'Double Indemnity' does not have a happy ending.
...

My definition of generalization above does not make this distinction explicit. Consider an English sentence Σ with the structure $[_{TP}\ [_{DP} \ldots [_{N'}\ \alpha]][_{T'} \ldots [_{VP}\ \phi]]]$, where

α and ϕ are expressions of semantic type $\langle e, t\rangle$. Suppose, furthermore, that Σ expresses a generalization. According to (2), the instantiations of Σ can take the form of either $\phi(x)$ or $\neg\phi(x)$, for any $x \in [\![\alpha]\!]$. However, the semantics of EPs are sensitive to the polarity of the generalization expressed by their hosts, as will become clear in section 3.4 below. These considerations lead to the following more formally precise definitions of (expressing) positive and negative generality claims, which also incorporate the notion of preferential entailment developed above:[1]

(14) POSITIVE GENERALIZATION
Let Σ be a sentence of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}} \ldots [_{\text{N}'}\ \alpha]][_{\text{T}'} \ldots [_{\text{VP}}\ \phi]]]$, and let α and ϕ be expressions of type $\langle e, t\rangle$. Σ expresses a positive generalization about α iff the cardinality of $[\![\alpha]\!]$ is sufficiently large and for any $x \in [\![\alpha]\!]$, $\Sigma \models_{\prec} \phi(x)$.

(15) NEGATIVE GENERALIZATION
Let Σ be a sentence of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}} \ldots [_{\text{N}'}\ \alpha]][_{\text{T}'} \ldots [_{\text{VP}}\ \phi]]]$, and let α and ϕ be expressions of type $\langle e, t\rangle$. Σ expresses a negative generalization about α iff the cardinality of $[\![\alpha]\!]$ is sufficiently large and for any $x \in [\![\alpha]\!]$, $\Sigma \models_{\prec} \neg\phi(x)$.

With these definitions comes a derivative notion of instantiation (a central aspect of the Principle of Exceptions), given in (16) and (17) below.

(16) POSITIVE INSTANTIATIONS
Let Σ a sentence of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}} \ldots [_{\text{N}'}\ \alpha : \langle e, t\rangle]][_{\text{T}'} \ldots [_{\text{VP}}\ \phi : \langle e, t\rangle]]]$ which expresses a positive generalization. The set of positive instantiations of Σ is defined as $\text{INST}^{+}(\Sigma) = \{\phi(x) \mid x \in [\![\alpha]\!]\}$.

(17) NEGATIVE INSTANTIATIONS
Let Σ a sentence of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}} \ldots [_{\text{N}'}\ \alpha : \langle e, t\rangle]][_{\text{T}'} \ldots [_{\text{VP}}\ \phi : \langle e, t\rangle]]]$ which expresses a negative generalization. The set of negative instantiations of Σ is defined as $\text{INST}^{-}(\Sigma) = \{\neg\phi(x) \mid x \in [\![\alpha]\!]\}$.

INST^{+} above is a partial function $f : \mathcal{L} \to P(\mathcal{L})$ which maps sentences of $\mathcal{L}$ expressing positive generalizations to the set of sentences of $\mathcal{L}$ which instantiate them. Alternatively, but not equivalently, INST^{+} may be conceived of as a binary relation on $\mathcal{L}$ defined as

(18) $\textsc{Inst}^{+} \subseteq \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} = \{\langle \Sigma, \phi(x) \rangle \mid x \in [\![\alpha]\!]\}$

where Σ must meet the conditions specified in (16), or else $\textsc{Inst}^{+}$ is undefined. The same comments apply to $\textsc{Inst}^{-}$ in (17), mutatis mutandis, which may also be denoted as in (19).

(19) $\textsc{Inst}^{-} \subseteq \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} = \{\langle \Sigma, \neg\phi(x) \rangle \mid x \in [\![\alpha]\!]\}$

These notions make it possible to provide a preliminary characterization of the difference that exists between the sentences in (20) and those in (21) with respect to their ability of the former to support EPs.

(20) All ambassadors / Most ambassadors / Few ambassadors / No ambassadors } enjoyed the prawn cocktail.

(21) An ambassador / Some ambassadors / Several ambassadors / Five ambassadors } enjoyed the prawn cocktail.

The observation that the sentences in (20), but not those in (21), may host EPs can be explained within our theoretical framework by pointing out that only the former sentences express generalizations whose instantiations can be defeated by the inclusion of an EP, as required by the Principle of Exceptions. For concreteness, consider the second sentence in (21), repeated below as (22).

(22) Some ambassadors enjoyed the prawn cocktail.

Clearly, this sentence fails to express a generalization about the set of ambassadors, because it is not true that for any $x \in [\![\textit{ambassador}]\!]$, (22) $\models_{\prec}$ **enjoyed_cocktail'**(x): there are values of x for which the proposition **enjoyed_cocktail'**(x) is not satisfied by all the most preferred (i.e., normal) models of (22). Interpretations of sentence (22) where some ambassador or other was thoroughly disgusted by the prawns

would be no less normal than those in which the prawns were appreciated. In other words, on the basis of sentence (22), it cannot be defeasibly inferred, for an arbitrarily chosen ambassador α, that α enjoyed the prawn cocktail. Similar comments apply to the other sentences in (21).

I now turn to the third essential property of generality claims identified in the previous chapter, to wit, that the cardinality of their domains must be sufficiently large.

3.2.2 Size matters

The definitions of positive and negative generalization in (14) and (15) above stipulate that the domain of a generality claim, in other words, the class of entities that a generalization is about, must be of a large enough size. This requirement seems to be a reasonable assumption about such statements, and can also be motivated empirically by the observed semantic infelicity of examples involving singular definite descriptions like the following:

(23) # The eighth Secretary General of the U.N. but Ban Ki-moon likes scotch.

(24) # The current Bishop of Rome except Joseph Ratzinger drinks mojitos.

At first glance, the oddity of these examples might be attributed to the fact that the semantic contribution of the EP invariably results in a conjunction of mutually contradictory statements, where no pragmatic adjustment of the interpretation of the EP-associates seems possible. For concreteness, consider sentence (23). Given that the associate and complement of the EP have extensionally identical denotations, the truth of this sentence requires, contradictorily, that the same individual be simultaneously in the extension of a property and its complement. This account of the semantic infelicity of sentence (23) is correct, but somewhat shortsighted. The underlying reason behind the unacceptability of these examples is that sentences (25) and (26), their hosts, do not express generalizations (that can be hedged by the inclusion of the EPs *except Ban Ki-moon* and *except Ratzinger*, respectively).

(25) The eighth Secretary General of the U.N. likes scotch.

(26) The current Bishop of Rome drinks mojitos.

One might question the reason why the subject DPs in these sentences are unable to give rise to the expression of a generalization. I believe the answer to this question lies in the lexical entry for the singular definite article, given below for all E and A, $B \subseteq E$:

(27) $the^{sg}_E(A, B) \Leftrightarrow every_E(A, B) \wedge |A| = 1$.

An assertion about the eighth Secretary General of the UN leads naturally to an inference concerning Ban Ki-moon. Likewise, a claim made in regard to the current Bishop of Rome entitles an addressee to hold certain views about Joseph Ratzinger. These facts notwithstanding, a statement that is applicable to just a single individual, as the determiner denotation in (27) requires, does not constitute a generalization, which explains why sentences (23) and (24) are semantically ill-formed.

Generalizations must be 'general', that is, they must provide a defeasible inference schema that applies without exception to a large enough class of individuals. Granted, it is difficult to state precisely how large the domain of a generality claim ought to be. However, although I shall not attempt to elucidate this question here, it might be useful to lay out some basic observations in this regard, and determine whether my preliminary remarks can help explain some well-known observations regarding exception DPs headed by determiners which impose cardinality restrictions on the sets denoted by their nominal arguments.

Let us consider the interpretation of sentence (28) relative to four different models of evaluation, to wit, an atheist, a monotheist, a bitheist, and a polytheist model, which differ at most in the value that the interpretation function $[\![\cdot]\!]$ associated with each one of them assigns to the expressions *god* and *vengeful* of the language under consideration, as shown in table (29).

(28) Every god is vengeful.

(29)

Model	$[\![god]\!]$	$[\![vengeful]\!]$	True?	Generalization?
$M_{atheist}$	$\emptyset$	$\{y\}$	✓	*
$M_{monotheist}$	$\{z\}$	$\{z, y\}$	✓	*
$M_{bitheist}$	$\{p, z\}$	$\{p, z, y\}$	✓	*
$M_{polytheist}$	$\{a, p, z\}$	$\{a, p, z, y\}$	✓	✓

Let a, p and z be the translations of *Aphrodite*, *Poseidon*, and *Zeus*, respectively. Furthermore, suppose that these expressions are the names of real gods. Though sentence (28) is true in each of the above scenarios, it clearly fails to express a generalization in $M_{atheist}$ and $M_{monotheist}$. In other words, this sentence does not truly convey a general claim about actual deities in models where at most one god exists.[2] Thus, utterances of sentences like (30) are predicted to be ill-formed in the corresponding versions of those models in (31), minimally updated to capture the contribution of the connected EP *except Zeus*.

(30) Every god except Zeus is vengeful.

(31)

Model	$[\![god]\!]$	$[\![vengeful]\!]$	True?	Generalization?
$M'_{atheist}$	$\emptyset$	$\{y\}$	*	*
$M'_{monotheist}$	$\{z\}$	$\{y\}$	✓	*
$M'_{bitheist}$	$\{p, z\}$	$\{p, y\}$	✓	*
$M'_{polytheist}$	$\{a, p, z\}$	$\{a, p, y\}$	✓	✓

This prediction is correct: an utterance of (30) is semantically undefined in $M'_{atheist}$, since the speaker cannot take for granted that Zeus is an actual god, and true but pragmatically infelicitous in $M'_{monotheist}$, as it would amount to the claim that no god is grudge-bearing, which is not what this utterance intuitively means.

Owing to the fact that universal statements are conventionally used to express generalizations, one might hypothesize more generally that the preceding remarks can also explain why addressees, perhaps with the notable exception of those with a background in logic, typically regard as infelicitous universal statements whose domains are no bigger than a singleton. This interesting observation is often explained in Gricean terms by pointing out that a cooperative speaker would refrain

from producing an uninformative utterance, or from choosing an unconventional way to convey a certain proposition which could be expressed by simpler means. Notice, in this regard, that in models of evaluation where there is exactly one god, $[\![\textit{every god}]\!]$ and $[\![\textit{the god}]\!]$ are extensionally equivalent, although the use of the singular definite is undoubtedly a more conventional way to make a claim about such an entity. Is the fact that universal statements fail to express generalizations in the circumstances described above a serious competitor to these arguments? An answer to this question must be deferred to another time.

I return to sentence (28) above. I take it as uncontroversial that this sentence expresses a generalization in $M_{polytheist}$ and that, consequently, sentence (30) is a well-formed exception sentence in $M'_{polytheist}$. However, this question is slightly more difficult to settle when models containing exactly two gods are considered. For example, although (30) is a true statement about actual deities in $M'_{bitheist}$, the presence of the connected EP *except Zeus* seems odd. Could this indicate that generalizations in natural language must have domains comprising at least three individuals? The medieval English logician William of Sherwood appears to have had a similar constraint in mind when he formulated his aptly named 'Rule of Three' (William of Sherwood 1968: 23), given in (32).

(32) THE RULE OF THREE

The sign 'every' or 'all' requires that there be at least three appellata.[3]

In line with Sherwood and the preceding discussion, it seems reasonable to suppose that well-formed generalizations in natural language, which, as we have seen, have universal import with respect to their defeasible entailments, must have domains whose cardinality is at least three. If correct, this observation can be used to explain some recalcitrant facts for traditional approaches to exceptives concerning the unacceptability of the determiners *both* and *neither* in exception sentences.

The judgments in the literature are quite clear. The determiners *both* and *neither* cannot head associates of EPs:

(33) # Neither/both students except John

(Moltmann 1995: 228, ftn. 3, (1a))

(34) * Both/neither student(s) except John arrived.

(Lappin 1996b: 207, (22))

However, as a cursory inspection of their respective denotations in (35a-b) reveals, these judgments are entirely unexpected on standard accounts of EP licensing.

(35) a. $both_E(A)$ $\begin{cases} = every_E(A), \text{ provided } |A| = 2 \\ \text{undefined otherwise} \end{cases}$

b. $neither_E(A)$ $\begin{cases} = no_E(A), \text{ provided } |A| = 2 \\ \text{undefined otherwise} \end{cases}$

Owing to the fact that *both* and *neither* are universal determiners, one would expect them to behave like other members of this class in their ability to license EPs, an expectation which is not fulfilled, as we have seen. Traditional theories often make this incorrect prediction, and must thus rely on various stipulations to adequately capture these facts (see e.g., Moltmann (1995: 228) and Lappin (1996b: 209-210)).

By contrast, the alternative explanation of these data that the discussion in this section afford us is both intuitive and straightforward: exception sentences involving *both* and *neither* are infelicitous precisely because the host of the EP fails to express a generality claim, as the presuppositional requirements of these determiners are incompatible with the minimum cardinality necessary for making such claims. The key observation behind this argument is rooted in our ordinary, pre-theoretical understanding of the essential features of generalizations.

3.3 The distribution of EPs

In the 1996 paper 'The Semantics of Exception Phrases', Jacob Hoeksema outlines his proposal concerning the typology of EPs in English as follows:

(36) "I assume two distinct but related types of exception phrases, which I have termed free exception phrases and connected exception phrases in Hoeksema (1987). Connected exception phrases are linked to a phrase, usually

> a noun phrase, while free phrases are sentential operators and occur wherever sentential operators may occur."
>
> (Hoeksema 1996a: 151)

The above paragraph provides, in my view, a descriptively adequate characterization of the distributional distinction between connected and free EPs. However, I shall argue in this section that the various interpretive differences often discussed in connection with this dichotomy are not real. I will also aim to show that the notion of generalization developed in this chapter makes it possible to offer a theoretical rationale for Hoeksema's typology. This discussion anticipates the suggestion offered later in the chapter that connected and free EPs have the same semantics, and differ only in their interface with the syntax of their hosts.

In his discussion of the semantics of exceptives, von Fintel (1993, 1994) contrasted examples involving *but*-phrases and *except for*-phrases. Building on previous descriptive observations in Hoeksema (1987), Horn and Bayer (1984), and Geis (1973), he argued that free EPs are dissimilar from *but*-phrases in three main regards: (*i*) their co-occurrence with less than universal determiners, (*ii*) their ability to support the expression of informative questions, and (*iii*) the fact that they can be coordinated. On this basis, a weaker semantics for free EPs was offered. Thus, according to von Fintel, the dichotomy between *but*-phrases and free EPs does not simply reflect a difference in syntactic distribution, but is crucially correlated with a distinction in the lexical meaning of these phrases as well.

While I agree that *but*-phrases and *except for*-phrases exhibit a difference in behavior with respect to aspects (*ii*) and (*iii*) above, a strategy of generalizing from these differences to a claim about connected and free EPs (which is not, in fact, explicitly adopted in von Fintel (1993, 1994), but is tacitly suggested in Hoeksema (1987), for example) is, in my opinion, fundamentally flawed.

The key problem with such a strategy is one of 'hasty generalization': a conclusion is reached about connected EPs on the basis of observations that are not generally applicable to the class of exception markers which permit connected uses, but are characteristic of *but*-phrases only. The reason behind this problem is perhaps

the early focus in the literature on the semantics of *but*-phrases, coupled with the mistaken but widespread assumption that the syntactic distribution of a marker of exception can be reliably predicted from its form. Although this is indeed the case for *but*-phrases, which may occur in connected construals only, it is not so for the vast majority of exception markers in English, as shown in the table below.

(37)

CONNECTED ONLY	CONNECTED OR FREE	FREE ONLY
but	*apart from, bar, barring, besides, except, except for, excluding, other than, save, saving, with the exception of*	*not counting, not including*

The terms 'connected' and 'free' EP must be used with considerable caution because, as table (37) indicates, there is no such thing as a connected exception marker or a free exception marker, barring at most three cases. Rather, we may speak only of connected or free *uses* of exception markers. The theoretical implication of acknowledging this fact about exceptives is thus subtle but clear: if one is aiming to study the properties of these construals (rather than those of particular exception markers), the best strategy is to select an exemplar that allows for both uses, and then examine its behavior in each construal. Obviously, *but*-phrases are not suited to this approach, and so in the subsequent discussion I will demonstrate how this strategy can be implemented successfully for *except*-phrases to yield a novel insight into Hoeksema's descriptive typology.

Returning to the descriptive observations discussed by von Fintel, let me point out that the possibility of co-occurrence with non-universal determiners cannot be employed as a differentiating criterion between connected and free uses of EPs. Even granting, for the sake of the argument, that EPs are licensed by certain quantificational determiners (a claim which was contested in the previous chapter), the empirical facts discussed in this dissertation indicate conclusively that connected

uses of EPs in contexts which involve non-universal determiners are both semantically acceptable and natural.

But-phrases are, of course, not exceptional in this regard. The ability of such phrases to occur with the quantifier *little* is well-documented in the literature (see, for example, von Fintel (1993, 1994), Horn (2000b, 2005)), and naturally occurring examples involving the proportional determiners *most* and *few* (though admittedly less frequent than similar ones involving connected *except*-phrases) are not hard to find, as evidenced by sentences (38)–(43).

(38) The American woodcock is a shy, retiring bird that lingers in the dank, dark shadows of new-growth forests, rooting among the musty leaves for grubs and worms. Few people but a small group of dedicated shotgunners have ever seen a live woodcock, and chances are few people but those who thrill at the sight of a dog on point and the towering flush of the bird through the autumn birch and aspen would know a woodcock by name even if it was staring them in the face.[4]

(39) Few people but Glen Fritzler would speak of the Denver Broncos and corn in the same breath.[5]

(40) Few people but the surfers make it up to the fabulous beaches of the wild east coast, where fierce Atlantic breakers make swimming risky and surfing – in the "Bathsheba soupbowl" – magnificent.[6]

(41) The success of CITIC doubtless owed much to the acumen of Rong Yiren, whose personal riches often seemed a source of embarrassment to him, despite the Communist Party's new endorsement of capitalism in most things but name.[7]

(42) At the other end Stuart Ripley – who can also do most things but score – shot just over the bar.[8]

(43) Karadzic is a moderate man in most things but politics.[9]

(44) Not many people but him know I secretly love McDonald's.[10]

Therefore, this foundational assumption, albeit not a priori unreasonable, should be abandoned in future work on the semantics of EPs (independently of the ultimate correctness of the rest of my proposals).

I now turn to the second and third aspects discussed by von Fintel. Although it might be true that *but*-phrases can occur in interrogatives sentences only if these are interpreted rhetorically, this datum alone cannot be turned into a claim concerning the behavior of connected uses of EPs. In fact, there are naturally occurring examples involving connected uses of *except*, which is also a core exception marker, in non-rhetorical questions, such as (45).

(45) Put it down on my desk blotter and don't touch it again. Has anyone else handled it except you?[11]

In this example, a guard is asked about a note recovered from the infamous doctor Lecter's cell, in order to find out who, other than the guard, may have touched it.

Furthermore, connected uses of *besides*-phrases can be found in interrogatives both with and without a rhetorical interpretation, as in examples (46) and (47) below, respectively.

(46) Who would have imagined a commercial jetliner used as a missile to attack a skyscraper? Who besides Tom Clancy? Who would have imagined a mail room as a point of vulnerability? Who besides Michael Crichton? Current events could have been predicted only by those of us with the wildest imaginations.[12]

(47) The pressure to silence "Fitna," however, reveals the extent to which Islamic law has already eroded core conceptions of Western liberty. Mr. Wilders refuses to submit. [...] But who besides courageous Mr. Wilders will act to uphold Dutch law against Islamic-style censorship?[13]

Connected uses of *other than*-phrases are another case in point. For instance, whilst the interrogative sentence (48) rhetorically asserts a certain claim about the Mafia, example (49) has no rhetorical flavor: the addressee is simply asked to reveal the identity of individuals other than Bruce Solie meeting the specified description.

(48) Who other than Mafiosi could conjure a business where millions of dollars of untraceable cash is handed over the table every day, mostly after dark, in surroundings so ostentatious as to make the Vatican look tasteful?[14]

(49) Who other than Bruce Solie did you talk to about correcting your earlier statements?[15]

Conversely, free uses of *besides*- and *other than*-phrases are also possible in rhetorically interpreted interrogative hosts, as illustrated by examples (50) and (51) below. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that there isn't a unique correspondence between connected uses of EPs in interrogative hosts and rhetorical interpretations of the hosts.

(50) Who, besides Angelo, would spend 10 hours untangling old sets of Christmas lights attempting to turn the García home into a makeshift gingerbread house? Who, besides Angelo, was going to wear the Santa Claus suit? If Angelo wasn't there, then it wasn't going to be Christmas.[16]

(51) When 'Crème de la Mer' launched its £115 moisturiser seven years ago, we all said it couldn't last. Who, other than Joan Collins and Victoria Beckham, would be silly enough to spend three figures on a face cream?[17]

Concerning the third aspect discussed by von Fintel, observe that connected uses of *except*-phrases can be coordinated, as shown by examples (52)–(54) below. And so, while it might be true that *but*-phrases cannot be conjoined, this property does not hold of connected uses of EPs in general (see Moltmann (1995: 234–235, footnote 9) for further discussion of this point).

(52) The rule is "*i* before *e* except after *c* and except in words like *weigh* and *neigh*."[18]

(53) Deus ex machina endings are never acceptable except in comedy and except when the character has suffered too much and the audience says: "Oh hell, give it to him."[19]

(54) Still, Mr. Osgood said, "I would not do any commercials except on the radio and except on my broadcasts."[20]

Perhaps the most straightforward and strongest piece of evidence against the suggestion that connected and free uses of EPs are correlated with an underlying difference in the semantics of these phrases, is the fact that one would be hard pressed to identify a truth-conditional distinction between pairs of sentences like the following:

(55) a. Every billionaire heiress except Sandy owns a Chihuahua.
b. Except Sandy, every billionaire heiress owns a Chihuahua.

Sentence (55a) involves a connected use of the EP *except Sandy*, and sentence (55b) a free use of that phrase. But an utterance of either sentence would be true in exactly the same circumstances: just in case every billionaire heiress distinct from Sandy owns a Chihuahua, but Sandy (is a billionaire heiress who) doesn't. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, theoretical parsimony dictates that we postulate a single lexical entry for *except*, only allowing for a difference concerning the type of syntactic object that the EP modifies in each construal: a DP in (55a), and a full sentence in (55b).

Moreover, no truth-conditional differences in meaning between (55a) and (55b) arise when we replace *except* by any other exception marker which permits both connected and free uses. It is critical, of course, that the same exceptive be used in each sentence, for only in this case can we rule out the possibility that any observed differences in meaning are due to the idiosyncratic properties of a given marker.

I do not wish to deny that there might exist differences in meaning between, for instance, sentences (56a) and (56b), as discussed at some length by Hoeksema and von Fintel. My argument is simply that those differences cannot be unequivocally attributed to properties of the EP construal itself.

(56) a. Every billionaire heiress but Sandy owns a Chihuahua.
b. Except for Sandy, every billionaire heiress owns a Chihuahua.

Given these considerations, I shall argue in the ensuing discussion that connected and free uses of an EP are not correlated with an underlying lexical ambiguity in the exception marker and differ just with respect to the source of the generalization that the EP serves to qualify. I shall argue, furthermore, that this line of reasoning provides an important theoretical insight into Hoeksema's descriptive typology: whereas connected uses of EPs (occurring in exception DPs) hedge generalizations whose expression is solely dependent on the denotation of their associates, free uses of EPs hedge generalizations that arise at the sentential level only, typically as a result of the interaction of various interpretive factors. My suggestion finds its basis in the observed distribution patterns of connected and free uses of EPs. I shall now review some of the basic facts pertaining to these patterns.

3.3.1 Generalization-inducing expressions

Several examples illustrating Hoeksema's original observation that English bare plurals license EPs were given in section 1.5.3 (Hoeksema 1987: 110). For clarity of presentation, one further example is provided below:

(57) Deputies diverted drivers, except those who live or work in the area, until the mess was cleared by road crews, Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office spokeswoman Debbie Carter said.[21]

Sentence (57) asserts that, with the exception of local motorists, drivers were diverted. Notice that the acceptability of sentence (57) crucially depends on the EP being free: the string *drivers except those who live or work in the area*, which results from a connected use of the *except*-phrase, is not a syntactic constituent.

Hoeksema (1987: 111) also points out that EPs may occur in sentences containing plural definites which have "clear-cut distributive readings", but not in those involving plural definites which receive collective interpretations. This contrast can be illustrated by the following pair of sentences:

(58) a. Except for Jim, the men were content.

b. # Except for Jim, the men were not numerous.

(Hoeksema 1987: 111, examples (33a) and (34a))

Hoeksema does not acknowledge, however, the fact that a free use of the EP is obligatory in sentence (58a). The alternative sentence (59), which involves a connected use of the EP, is semantically ill-formed.

(59) # [$_{DP}$ The men except for Jim] were content.

The infelicity of plural definite associates of connected EPs is even more marked when *except*-phrases are considered, as the following pair of sentences illustrates:

(60) a. Except Smith, the PARC engineers received a cash bonus.
b. # [$_{DP}$ The PARC engineers except Smith] received a cash bonus.

To these data, I add a novel observation regarding the occurrence of EPs in hosts containing indefinite singulars and hosts involving indefinites under the scope of negation. As discussed in chapter 1, certain sentences comprising indefinite singulars may license EPs. Interestingly for our discussion, only free uses of EPs are possible in association with such hosts. Connected uses of EPs are ruled out in these contexts, as the following contrasting pairs illustrate:

(61) a. Except cardiologists, a senior resident must be on a ward rotation.
b. # [$_{DP}$ A senior resident except cardiologists] must be on a ward rotation.

(62) a. Except Rottweilers, a shelter dog is grateful to be rescued.
b. # [$_{DP}$ A shelter dog except Rottweilers] is grateful to be rescued.

An interesting contrast can also be detected by comparing exception sentences containing indefinites under the scope of constituent and non-constituent negation. In the previous chapter, I presented naturally occurring examples like (63) below, where a connected EP was used in combination with an indefinite under the scope of *not* occurring in the same constituent.

(63) What do Britney Spears, J. Lo, Garth Brooks, Mick Jagger and N Sync have in common? Not a thing except odd clothing choices and a monopolization of TV this month.[22]

Observe that a free use of the EP in example (63) would also have been possible. In stark contrast, if the indefinite occurs under the scope of non-constituent negation, as in example (64) below, only free uses of EPs are allowed.

(64) Nancy Reagan had the upstairs quarters redone, even down to the plumbing and other fixtures, as well as the floors. So much so that Barbara Bush raves about it and says that she did not have to do a thing, except turn the living quarters into a home with her personal furnishings and belongings after she moved in.[23]

(65) It was a huge shock coming home and I still go back to London quite a lot to get a buzz. I didn't know a soul, except family, when I first moved back.[24]

In other words, assuming with Kim and Sag (2002) that constituent negation *not* is adjoined to an XP that it modifies, we note that while both strings of the form

(66) a. $[_{TP} \ldots [_{DP}$ *not a(n)* NP + EP$] \ldots]$

b. EP, $[_{TP} \ldots [_{DP}$ *not a(n)* NP$] \ldots]$

are semantically acceptable, the strings

(67) a. # $[_{TP} \ldots$Neg$\ldots [_{DP}$ *a(n)* NP + EP$] \ldots]$

b. EP, $[_{TP} \ldots$Neg$\ldots [_{DP}$ *a(n)* NP$] \ldots]$

contrast in their acceptability: an indefinite NP can be the associate of an EP only if it occurs under the scope of constituent negation.

The distribution facts discussed in the above paragraphs are summarized in the following table:

(68)

	CONNECTED USE	FREE USE
Bare plurals	*	✓
Plural definites	*	✓
Indefinite singulars	*	✓
Neg > a(n)	*	✓

It should be emphasized that, as was suggested in the preceding discussion, these distribution facts do not focus on the behavior of a specific exception marker, but are rather intended as descriptive generalizations applying to connected and free construals of EPs across the board. Accordingly, most of the examples provided above consisted of uses of *except*-phrases, which occur naturally in both construals.

Several important insights can be gained by comparing the information in table (68) with a sample of the distribution data discussed in the previous chapters, which is also presented succinctly in table form below.

(69)

	CONNECTED USE	FREE USE
every/no NP	✓	✓
most/many/few NP	✓	✓
minimizers	✓	✓
not a(n) NP	✓	✓

A comparison of these sets of data suggests that connected uses of EPs are more marked than free uses. Thus, if one restricts attention to exception markers which allow for either use, we find that a free use of an EP is possible whenever a connected use is, but not vice versa. There are hosts which permit free uses of EPs only. In order to capture this generalization about the distribution of EPs, I propose that connected EPs, notwithstanding the fact that they carry the same semantic content as free EPs, are subject to additional interpretive constraints.

Let me explore this idea further. In chapter 2, I put forward the idea that EPs are licensed by hosts that express generalizations. Accordingly, the so-called Principle of Exceptions was formulated to guarantee that EPs are meaningful only if they defeat some of the statements which instantiate the generalization expressed by their hosts. The distribution patterns described in this section suggest that the semantics of EPs is not just sensitive to the expression of a generalization, but crucially also to the linguistic basis of that generalization. To be precise, I shall argue that the connected and free dichotomy is a direct reflection of that sensitivity. Connected uses of EPs are possible only in hosts where the expression of a generalization can be traced back uniquely to the semantic contribution of a constituent (i.e. the

associate of the EP). Free EPs, on the other hand, modify hosts that express generalizations arising through the interaction of various interpretive factors occurring within the sentence.

These considerations regarding connected and free uses of EPs suggest a notion of a generalization-inducing expression, which can be defined as follows (for subject DPs):

(70) GENERALIZATION-INDUCING EXPRESSION
Let Σ be a sentence of the form $[_{TP}\ [_{DP}\ \beta][_{T'}\ldots\phi\ldots]]$. β is a generalization-inducing expression iff, for any ϕ, Σ expresses a generalization.

According to definition (70), a subject DP is a generalization-inducing expression if and only if the expression of a generalization by the sentence which contains it does not depend on a particular choice of predicate (i.e., iff it is ϕ-invariant). The expressions in table (69) are all generalization-inducing (or rather can be, since, to take the case of *every* for example, whether or not a generalization is expressed will also depend on the size of its domain, as we have seen. I ignore such a qualification in this discussion). Thus, for instance, the sentence *Every psychiatrist* ϕ expresses a generalization about psychiatrists, irrespective of the meaning of ϕ. Likewise, one can establish that *Not an athlete* ϕ expresses a generalization about athletes without having first to ascertain what the denotation of ϕ is.

The expressions in table (68), on the other hand, do not have this property. For instance, whether or not the bare plural *Rottweilers* gives rise to the expression of a generality claim in the sentence

(71) $[_{TP}$ Rottweilers $[_{T'}\ \phi]]$.

is not contingent on the denotation of the bare plural alone. Additional interpretive features are responsible for bestowing generic readings to bare plurals which may lead to the expression of generalizations, and hence to possible modification by EPs (see e.g., Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002), Cohen (2004), Glasbey (2006), Guéron (2006), and Cohen (2007) for recent discussion of relevant factors). This, I submit, explains why bare plural NPs cannot be associates of EPs, but sentences containing bare plurals may license their presence, as first pointed out by Hoeksema (1987).

Turning to plural definite DPs, notice that sentence (72) does not express a generality claim for any choice of ϕ.

(72) $[_{TP}$ The boys $[_{T'}\ \phi]]$.

Why is this so? Hoeksema (1987: 111) argued correctly that sentences such as (72) cannot license free EPs if they receive a collective interpretation, whereas similar sentences with "clearcut distributive readings" may do so. Although he did not elaborate on what 'clearcut' means in this context, some form of qualification is needed, because on so-called PARTIAL and PARTICIPATORY distributivity readings (Lasersohn 1995: 105), sentences containing plural definites can be compatible with essentially existential scenarios, and thus may lose their ability to license EPs at all (see also Landman (2000) and Brisson (2003) for further discussion).

Consider an example of the latter type of distributive reading. Both exception sentences in (73), adapted from an example in Lasersohn (1995: 106), seem equally infelicitous, since the host of the EP cannot be interpreted as making a generality claim about the set of boys being referred to by the speaker, but merely reports the successful result of team effort.

(73) a. # Except Kim, the boys scored a goal.

b. # The boys except Kim scored a goal.

Thus, the host of the EP in the sentences above cannot be instantiated by statements of the form 'x scored a goal', for any $x \in [\![boy]\!]$, because the boys can be credited for scoring a goal only collectively. One boy might have gained possession of the ball, another might have outrun the central defenders, and so on, but these actions obviously do not count as scoring a goal, although they represent useful individual contributions towards this end.

Examples involving partial distributivity provide a more benign environment for EPs, and typically allow for free construals of these phrases. For instance, sentence (74a), also adapted from Lasersohn (1995: 106), but crucially not (74b), seems to be marginally acceptable, possibly because the host of the EP is taken to mean that a sizeable number of the students were engaged in question-asking.

(74) a. ? Except Sandy, the students asked questions after the lecture.
b. # The students except Sandy asked questions after the lecture.

The upshot of this discussion then is that plural definite NPs cannot by themselves express generalizations, but must also rely on the semantic contribution of their predicates for this purpose. Hence, whether or not a generality claim is expressed by a sentence containing a plural definite subject can only be determined once the subject's denotation is semantically composed with that of the VP.

Similar comments apply to indefinites occurring under the scope of negation, and indefinite singular subjects which, as was discussed in chapter 1, support exceptive modification only if their predicates denote properties which are 'essential' (Lawler 1973), 'analytic' (Burton-Roberts 1977), or 'definitional' (Cohen 2001, Greenberg 2003), since only in such circumstances does the resulting sentence express a rule-like generalization. We might try to capture these distribution facts in terms of the following generalization:

(75) THE ASSOCIATE CONSTRAINT
Associates of connected EPs must be generalization-inducing expressions.

Restricting attention to those exception markers which allow for connected and free uses, the Associate Constraint aims to explain why connected EPs are not possible in combination with the expressions listed in table (68) above. As the preceding discussion suggests, the notions of generalization and generalization-inducing expression developed in this chapter are pivotal in accounting for the distribution patterns witnessed in tables (68) and (69): while every sentence containing a generalization-inducing expression conveys a generalization (by definition), not every sentence which communicates a generalization encompasses a generalization-inducing expression.

There is one type of exception construction that escapes the descriptive generalization in (75). It involves predicative uses of superlative exception DPs. Consider an example. Exceptive modification in the following sentence is licensed by the occurrence of the attributive adjective *richest* in the DP containing the connected EP *except for Gates*:

(76) I'm [$_{DP}$ the richest American except for Gates].

An utterance of (76) is true, on an absolute reading of the superlative, if and only if both the speaker is richer than any American other than Gates, and Gates is at least as wealthy as the speaker. Notice, however, that it is not possible to report being introduced to Warren Buffett (who, according to Forbes Magazine, was the second-richest American in 2007) but, crucially, a lack of acquaintance with Gates by an utterance of (77).

(77) I met the richest American except for Gates.

From our theoretical perspective, the contrast between sentences (76) and (77) is not hard to explain: whereas the host of the EP in (76) expresses a generalization about Americans, the host of the EP in (77) does not. Hence, only the first of these sentences permits exceptive modification. But this is precisely the reason why this construction is problematic: the descriptive generalization in (75) incorrectly predicts that a connected use of the EP in (76) is not possible, because the DP *the richest American* is not a generalization-inducing expression (given an appropriately generalized version of definition (70)), as shown by the inability of sentence (77) to express the canonical meaning of exception. In other words, since it is not true that for any property P, $[\![$*the richest American*$]\!](P)$ expresses a generalization, my account rules out the presence of a connected EP in (76), contrary to fact.

I leave this as an open problem, pointing out, however, that the rather atypical set of properties that this exception construction displays might ultimately explain why it falls outside the scope of the general constraint stated above. For instance, whereas exception DPs can appear in any argumental position within a sentence, superlative exception DPs are restricted to occur as predicative complements only. More importantly, the generalizations expressed by sentences containing predicative uses of superlative DPs are not instantiated in the usual way. Thus, for example, while the host of the EP in each of the following sentences expresses a generalization about gamblers, only the first of these generalizations is instantiated by statements that are obtained, as is standardly the case, by λ-abstraction over the associate of the EP:

(78) a. [$_{DP}$ Every gambler except for Jones] is superstitious.

b. Sandy is [$_{DP}$ the most superstitious gambler except for Smith].

The generalization that the DP *the most superstitious gambler* in sentence (78b) gives rise to is coherent but wholly unexpected from the perspective of the data we have looked at so far: it is instantiated by statements of the form 'Sandy is more superstitious than x', for any $x \in [\![gambler]\!]$, which make explicit reference to the denotation of the EP-associate. Ordinarily, the nominal projection in the associate of a connected EP simply determines the domain of the generalization expressed by the host. In a sentence such as (78b), however, the denotation of *most superstitious gambler* serves a double purpose: not only does it fix the domain of the generalization, in this case the set of gamblers in the model, but it partially specifies the claim that is being made of every element of that domain as well. Thus, sentence (78b) states that Sandy is not more prone to superstition than Smith (as a gambler). As we can see, the correct semantic characterization of superlative exception DPs may indeed warrant a separate analysis, which I hope to undertake in future work.

3.4 The semantics of connected uses of EPs

I recapitulate some key aspects of the preceding discussion by considering what the following sentence means:

(79) Every pensioner except Smith is entitled to a free bus pass.

An utterance of (79) is true just in case every pensioner other than Smith has a free bus pass entitlement, but Smith (is a pensioner who) does not. A connected EP is licensed in this sentence because the Principle of Exceptions is satisfied (and, in addition, the subject DP is a generalization-inducing expression). In other words, the EP is meaningful here because the proposition that Smith is not entitled to a free bus pass defeats at least one of the statements instantiating the generalization expressed by the host of (79), namely, that Smith is entitled to such a pass.

It is important to notice at this point that whenever the Principle of Exceptions or the Associate Constraint are not satisfied, the semantic value of an exception

sentence is undefined, rather than false (see Moltmann (1995: 239) for discussion of a similar contrast which follows from her analysis). For example, the sentences

(80) a. # Some pensioners except Smith are entitled to a free bus pass.
b. # Pensioners except Smith are entitled to a free bus pass.

involve, respectively, a violation of each of these conditions: the host of the EP in sentence (80a) does not express a generalization, and therefore lacks instantiations; the putative 'associate' of the EP in sentence (80b) is not a generalization-inducing expression. Interestingly, my informants report that these sentences are semantically infelicitous, even if pensioners generally have the specified entitlement but Smith does not, and so our characterization of the semantics of EPs should aim to capture this intuition. A third cause of exception sentences being semantically undefined is failure of the presupposition of inclusion. Thus for instance, sentence (79) is infelicitous rather than false if Smith is not a pensioner. We should recall (see section 1.4.1), as a brief aside, that Moltmann defines the Condition of Inclusion thus:

(81) THE CONDITION OF INCLUSION
The exceptions must belong to the restriction of the associated quantifier.

(Moltmann 1995: 226, (9))

This definition rests on the mistaken assumption that connected EPs always modify quantificational determiners. And so, in line with ideas developed in this and the previous chapters, the intended condition above is correctly phrased as follows:

(82) THE PRESUPPOSITION OF INCLUSION
The denotation of the EP-complement must be included in the domain of the generalization expressed by the host of the EP.

According to the revised constraint in (82), the denotation of the EP-complement is required to fall within the scope of the generalization expressed by the host of the EP. Notice, however, that from our theoretical perspective this condition need

not be stipulated in addition to the notions of positive and negative instantiation given earlier, owing to the fact that these already entail inclusion (for individual denoting EP-complements).

What semantic contribution do EPs make to the interpretation of the sentences in which they occur? I shall approach this question in two stages, focusing initially on the propositional nature of exceptions.

As argued in this and the previous chapter, EPs give rise to the expression of a proposition that constitutes an exception to the generalization expressed by their hosts. Given that EPs are syntactically subsentential, they must critically rely on the interpretation of their hosts for the expression of propositional content. In the simplest scenario involving subject exception DPs, the function denoted by the verbal predicate is applied to each nominal argument of the exception marker, thus exploiting the hypothesized conjunctive semantics of EPs. In the case of sentence (79) above, for instance, the function

(83) $\lambda x.[\textbf{entitled\_to\_fbp}'(x)]$

combines with the denotation of the associate of the EP to yield the proposition (**every**′(**pensioner**′))(**entitled_to_fbp**′), which is the interpretation of the unrestricted host of the EP. This function also takes the denotation of the so-called complement of the EP as an argument, and returns the proposition in (84) as its output.

(84) **entitled_to_fbp**′(s)

Naturally, given that *every pensioner* is only interpretable in the domain of generalized quantifiers, the individual denoted by *Smith* must be 'lifted' to the principal ultrafilter generated by that individual (i.e. s must be mapped on to $\lambda P.[P(s)]$) prior to composition with the denotation of the verbal predicate (Partee and Rooth 1983).

Although the mechanism described above yields a complete proposition which incorporates the denotation of the EP-complement, (84) does not, as it stands, constitute an exception to the generalization expressed by the host of the EP in (79). This proposition is positive in polarity, yet according to the Principle of Exceptions

an EP must defeat one or more statements instantiating its host, which in this case are also positive. Hence, the semantic contribution of an EP must also ensure that the polarity of the exception it gives rise to has the opposite polarity of its host's instantiations. It is reasonable to conclude, then, that besides leading to the expression of propositional content, EPs must involve a POLARITY REVERSAL operation: if the statements which instantiate the host of an EP have positive polarity, the exceptional proposition that the EP gives rise to must be negative. Conversely, if the instantiations of the host of an EP are negative, the proposition conveyed by the EP must have positive polarity. This basic aspect of the meaning of EPs can be stated as the following fact:

(85) POLARITY GENERALIZATION
The proposition expressed by the host of an EP and that which the EP gives rise to must have different polarity.

These considerations lead to the following proposal regarding the semantics of connected uses of EPs (the semantics of free uses of EPs will be discussed in the following chapter), where the variables C, A, and P are, respectively, the denotations of the complement of the EP, the EP-associate, and the VP (or T'):

(86) $[\![except_c]\!]\ C, A, P \iff P(A) \wedge \ominus_c(P(C))$,

$$\text{where } [\![\ominus_c]\!] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \lambda X_t.\neg X, \text{ if for all appropriate } P', \textsc{Inst}^+(P'(A), P'(C)) \\ \lambda X_t.X, \text{ if for all appropriate } P', \textsc{Inst}^-(P'(A), \neg P'(C)) \\ \text{undefined otherwise} \end{cases}$$

According to this semantics, an exception sentence containing a connected EP expresses a conjunction of two propositions, each resulting from the application of the VP (or T') node denotation to the nominal arguments of the exception marker. The proposition $P(A)$ is the interpretation of the host of EP, while $P(C)$ provides the grammatical blueprint for the expression of an exception.

As argued above, the semantic contribution of an EP must also guarantee that $P(C)$ constitutes an exception to the generalization expressed by $P(A)$, so that the Principle of Exceptions is satisfied. The rule in (86) involves a propositional EXCEPTION OPERATOR, written $\ominus$, which takes $P(C)$ as an argument and ensures that this

proposition has the required polarity, as determined by the polarity of the statements which instantiate the generalization expressed by the host of the EP.

The exception operator $\ominus$ denotes either SENTENCE NEGATION (i.e., $\lambda X_t.[\neg X]$), or the IDENTITY MAP from any proposition to itself (i.e., $\lambda X_t.[X]$) depending, broadly, on whether the host of the EP expresses a generalization that is either positively or negatively instantiated by a claim concerning the right argument of the exception marker. If neither of these conditions obtain, the exception operator is not defined. Some arguments suggesting that the notion of instantiation must play a central role in the interpretation of $\ominus$, rather than simply defeasible or preferential entailment, say, shall also be discussed later in section 3.4.1.

As an aside, note that this suggestion shall be revised in the following chapter to argue instead that the exception operator $\ominus$ is interpreted as either PREDICATE NEGATION (i.e., $\lambda X_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.\lambda x.[\neg X(x)]$), or the identity function from any property onto itself (i.e., $\lambda X_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.\lambda x.[X(x)]$). Accordingly, the denotation of exceptives will be adjusted to

(87) $\lambda X_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,\, t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,\, t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge X(\ominus(P))]$

where $\ominus$ first takes a VP denotation as an argument, and the output is subsequently composed with the denotation of the EP-complement. The reasons for deferring this discussion until the next chapter are two-fold. First, the types of evidence that justify such a change, involving quantified and disjoined complements of EPs, as in examples (88a–b) below, have not been discussed in this chapter.

(88) a. every student except [some undergraduates]
b. every district judge but [Kim or Sandy]

Second, the complements of EPs considered so far are not sensitive to the distinction between sentence and predicate negation: proper names, pronouns, and singular definite NPs (when defined) are SELF-DUAL expressions (Barwise and Cooper 1981, Zwarts 1996), and thus satisfy the equivalence in (89),

(89) $Q \equiv \neg(Q\neg)$

and the schemata in (90) (from Zwarts (1996: 396, Corollary 6)).

(90) a. *NEG (NP VP)* $\leftrightarrow$ *NP (NEG VP)*

b. *NP VP* $\leftrightarrow$ *NEG (NP (NEG VP))*

Hence, these EP-complements cannot throw light into the correct interpretation of the exception operator. This is the end of the aside, and I now return to the main discussion of the semantic rule in (86).

The subscript *c* in (86) above marks a connected use of the exception marker. As emphasized previously, and as will become apparent when the interpretation of free EPs is discussed, the distribution of an EP is not correlated with a truth-conditional distinction in the lexical meaning of the exception marker. The effect of the Associate Constraint, introduced in section 3.3.1 above, is reflected in the semantics simply as a definedness condition on the operator $\ominus_c$: by requiring that other predicate denotations P' be considered, we guarantee that this operator is defined only for those values of A which are denoted by generalization-inducing expressions. Thus, exception sentences involving connected uses of EPs which do not comply with this requirement are ruled out as infelicitous.

Notice, however, that the qualification introduced by 'appropriate' in (86) is intended to exclude from consideration those predicate denotations P' for which the statements $P'(A)$ or $P'(C)$ are ill-formed or undefined. Thus, for example, the predicates *be numerous* or *talk to each other* would not be suitable for either *every pensioner* or *Smith*, the nominal arguments of the exception marker in sentence (79) above.

This approach to capturing the constraints on the distribution of connected EPs is in keeping with the idea, discussed in section 3.3.1, that violations of the Associate Constraint result in the semantic infelicity, rather than the outright falsity, of the sentences involved. In addition, this approach acknowledges the fact that the denotation of the VP should not affect the interpretation of the exceptive operator in connected uses of EPs, as independently required by semantic compositionality.

The exception operator $\ominus_c$ is also undefined in sentences where the so-called Presupposition of Inclusion is not satisfied. For example, if the individual Smith is

not, in actual fact, a pensioner, sentence (79) above is predicted to be infelicitous by the semantics in (86), since it is neither the case that for all appropriate predicate denotations P', $\langle P'([\![\textit{every pensioner}]\!]), P'([\![\textit{Smith}]\!])\rangle \in \textsc{Inst}^{+}$, nor is it the case that $\langle P'([\![\textit{every pensioner}]\!]), \neg P'([\![\textit{Smith}]\!])\rangle \in \textsc{Inst}^{-}$, for all appropriate P'.

The best way to understand my proposal above is to see how it can be applied to the analysis of exception sentences involving connected uses of EPs. To this end, I shall discuss the interpretation of four key examples, providing a step-wise derivation of their truth-conditions. First, let us consider an exception sentence which comprises a universal associate DP in subject position. Under the proposal in (86), the following sentence receives the interpretation in (92), where I also show the effect of quasi-semantic restriction on the meaning of the host of the EP (as I shall continue to do in this and the following chapter).

(91) Every cook except Alice wears an apron at Chez Panisse.

(92) $([\![\textit{except}]\!]([\![\textit{Alice}]\!]))([\![\textit{every cook}]\!]))([\![\textit{wears an apron}]\!]) \iff$
$((\mathbf{cook}' - \{a\}) \subseteq \mathbf{wear\_apron}') \wedge \ominus_c(\mathbf{wear\_apron}'(a)) \iff$
$((\mathbf{cook}' - \{a\}) \subseteq \mathbf{wear\_apron}') \wedge \lambda X_t.[\neg X](\mathbf{wear\_apron}'(a)) \iff$
$((\mathbf{cook}' - \{a\}) \subseteq \mathbf{wear\_apron}') \wedge \neg(\mathbf{wear\_apron}'(a))$.

Observe that $\ominus_c$ is interpreted as external negation in this sentence because it holds that, for all appropriate P', $\langle P'([\![\textit{every cook}]\!]), P'([\![\textit{Alice}]\!])\rangle \in \textsc{Inst}^{+}$. In other words, the sentence *Every cook* + VP expresses a generalization that is positively instantiated by the sentence *Alice* + VP, for any appropriate VP denotation. That being so, the negation of the latter sentence is an exception to the generalization expressed by the former, in compliance with the Principle of Exceptions. A derivation of the truth-conditions of sentence (91) is provided below (but some details which are not directly relevant to the semantics of EPs are omitted for ease of presentation):

(93)



[1] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[X \subseteq Y]$

[2] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{cook}'(x)]$

[3] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(X(P))]$

[4] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Z_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[Z(a)]$

[5] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[\mathbf{cook}' \subseteq Y]$

[6] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(P(a))]$

[7] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda P_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[((\mathbf{cook}' - \{a\}) \subseteq P) \wedge \neg(P(a))]$

[8] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{wear\_apron}'(x)]$

[9] $\rightsquigarrow ((\mathbf{cook}' - \{a\}) \subseteq \mathbf{wear\_apron}') \wedge \neg(\mathbf{wear\_apron}'(a))$

Sentence (94), which encompasses a negative universal associate, is assigned the interpretation in (95) by the semantics above.

(94) No attorney but Perry Mason likes John Grisham's books.

(95) $((\llbracket except \rrbracket(\llbracket Perry\ Mason \rrbracket))(\llbracket no\ attorney \rrbracket))(\llbracket likes\ John\ Grisham's\ books \rrbracket) \iff$
$((\mathbf{attorney}' - \{m\}) \cap \mathbf{like\_jgbooks}') = \emptyset \wedge \ominus_c(\mathbf{like\_jgbooks}'(m)) \iff$
$((\mathbf{attorney}' - \{m\}) \cap \mathbf{like\_jgbooks}') = \emptyset \wedge \lambda X_t.[X](\mathbf{like\_jgbooks}'(m)) \iff$
$((\mathbf{attorney}' - \{m\}) \cap \mathbf{like\_jgbooks}') = \emptyset \wedge \mathbf{like\_jgbooks}'(m).$

In this case, $\ominus_c$ denotes the identity map on propositions since, for all appropriate P', $\langle P'([\![no\ attorney]\!]), \neg(P'([\![Perry\ Mason]\!]))\rangle \in \text{INST}^-$ or, put differently, the sentence *No attorney* + VP expresses a generalization that is negatively instantiated by the sentence *Perry Mason* + *Neg* + VP, for all appropriate VP denotations. Accordingly, mapping the proposition $P(C)$ to itself yields an exception to the generalization expressed by $P(A)$. Notice, in this regard, that the expression of exceptions to negative generalizations exploits the fact that the input to the exception operator has positive polarity by default. The following is a step by step derivation of the truth-conditions of sentence (94):

(96)



[1] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle e,t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[(X \cap Y) = \emptyset]$

[2] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{attorney}'(x)]$

[3] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(X(P))]$

[4] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Z_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Z(m)]$

[5] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[(\mathbf{attorney}' \cap Y) = \emptyset]$

[6] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(P(m))]$

[7] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[((\mathbf{attorney}' - \{m\}) \cap P = \emptyset) \wedge (P(m))]$

[8] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{like\_jgbooks}'(x)]$

[9] $\rightsquigarrow ((\mathbf{attorney}' - \{m\}) \cap \mathbf{like\_jgbooks}') = \emptyset \wedge \mathbf{like\_jgbooks}'(m)$

The following exception sentence involves the proportional determiner *most* as the head of the DP associate of an EP. The interpretation that (86) assigns to this sentence is given in (98) below, where $most_E(A, B) \Leftrightarrow$ *more than half (of the)*$_E(A, B)$, for all E and $A, B \subseteq E$.

(97) Most researchers except Dr. Hoffman have relied on evidence from relatives or actuaries for their data; people with Alzheimer's make poor respondents.[25]

(98) $((\llbracket except \rrbracket(\llbracket Hoffman \rrbracket))(\llbracket most\ researchers \rrbracket))(\llbracket relied\ on\ evidence \rrbracket) \iff$
$(|(\mathbf{researcher}' - \{h\}) \cap \mathbf{relied}')| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |\mathbf{researcher}'|) \wedge \ominus_c(\mathbf{relied}'(h)) \iff$
$(|(\mathbf{researcher}' - \{h\}) \cap \mathbf{relied}')| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |\mathbf{researcher}'|) \wedge$
$\lambda X_t.[\neg X](\mathbf{relied}'(h)) \iff$
$(|(\mathbf{researcher}' - \{h\}) \cap \mathbf{relied}')| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |\mathbf{researcher}'|) \wedge \neg(\mathbf{relied}'(h))$.

As in sentence (91) above, the exception operator $\ominus_c$ is interpreted here as external negation because, for all appropriate predicate denotations P', $P'(\llbracket Hoffman \rrbracket)$ positively instantiates the generalization expressed by $P'(\llbracket most\ researchers \rrbracket)$, the interpretation of the EP-host. In symbols, $P'(\llbracket Hoffman \rrbracket) \in \text{INST}^+(P'(\llbracket most\ researchers \rrbracket))$. The Principle of Exceptions is satisfied in this case since the exception $\neg(\mathbf{relied}'(h))$ defeats the statement $\mathbf{relied}'(h)$, which instantiates the generalization expressed by the host of the EP. A derivation of the truth-conditions of this sentence is as follows:

(99)



[1] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle e,t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[|(X \cap Y)| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |X|]$

[2] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{researcher'}(x)]$

[3] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(X(P))]$

[4] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Z_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Z(h)]$

[5] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[|(\mathbf{researcher'} \cap Y)| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |\mathbf{researcher'}|]$

[6] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(P(h))]$

[7] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[(|((\mathbf{researcher'} - \{h\}) \cap P)| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |\mathbf{researcher'}|) \wedge \neg(P(h))]$

[8] $\rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{relied'}(x)]$

[9] $\rightsquigarrow (|((\mathbf{researcher'} - \{h\}) \cap \mathbf{relied'})| > \frac{1}{2} \cdot |\mathbf{researcher'}|) \wedge \neg(\mathbf{relied'}(h))$

As was pointed out earlier, the acceptability of exception sentences containing associates of connected EPs headed by *few* is not predicted by traditional approaches to exceptives. In fact, such sentences are predicted to be either infelicitous or contradictory by these approaches, which, I have argued, runs counter to the empirical evidence. Perhaps more seriously, naturally occurring examples of this type also undermine the following condition, which is often regarded as a basic semantic property of exception constructions:

(100) THE NEGATIVE CONDITION
Applying the predicate to the exceptions yields the opposite truth value from applying the predicate to the nonexceptions.

(Moltmann 1995: 226, (5))

The reason for this is that the truth of exception sentences of this type requires that both nominal arguments of the exception marker have the predicate property. For example, sentence (101) below asserts that director Frank Capra expected the film to succeed and that, besides Capra, the number of people who had this expectation was small. Thus, contrary to the descriptive generalization above, an utterance of this exception sentence is a claim about both Capra and few other individuals (or possibly, but not necessarily, about just Capra himself).

(101) Few people except director Frank Capra expected the 1946 film 'It's a Wonderful Life' to become a classic piece of Americana.[26]

Consider the interpretation that the semantics in (86) assigns to this sentence:

(102) $((\llbracket except \rrbracket(\llbracket Capra \rrbracket))(\llbracket few\ people \rrbracket))(\llbracket expected\ film \rrbracket) \iff$
$(|((\mathbf{people}' - \{c\}) \cap \mathbf{expected\_film}')| \leqslant k \cdot |\mathbf{people}'|) \wedge$
$\ominus_c(\mathbf{expected\_film}'(c)) \iff$
$(|((\mathbf{people}' - \{c\}) \cap \mathbf{expected\_film}')| \leqslant k \cdot |\mathbf{people}'|) \wedge$
$\lambda X_t.[X](\mathbf{expected}'(c)) \iff$
$(|((\mathbf{people}' - \{c\}) \cap \mathbf{expected\_film}')| \leqslant k \cdot |\mathbf{people}'|) \wedge$
$\mathbf{expected\_film}'(c)$.

The interpretation of the exception operator in this sentence is the same as in sentence (94). $\ominus_c$ denotes the identity map on propositions because, for all appropriate predicate denotations P', $\neg(P'(\llbracket Capra \rrbracket)) \in \text{INST}^-(P'(\llbracket few\ people \rrbracket))$ or, equivalently, because the sentence *Few people* + VP expresses a generalization that is negatively instantiated by *Capra* + *Neg* + VP, for all appropriate VP denotations. An exception to the generalization expressed by the host of the EP can thus be obtained by mapping the proposition $\mathbf{expected\_film}'(c)$ to itself, which defeats the negative instantiation $\neg(\mathbf{expected\_film}'(c))$. Here is a step-wise derivation of the truth-conditions of this sentence:

(103)



$[1] \rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle e,t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[|(X \cap Y)| \leqslant k \cdot |X|]$

$[2] \rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{people}'(x)]$

$[3] \rightsquigarrow \lambda X_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(X(P))]$

$[4] \rightsquigarrow \lambda Z_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Z(c)]$

$[5] \rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[|(\mathbf{people}' \cap Y)| \leqslant k \cdot |\mathbf{people}'|]$

$[6] \rightsquigarrow \lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(P(c))]$

$[7] \rightsquigarrow \lambda P_{\langle e,t\rangle}.[(|((\mathbf{people}' - \{c\}) \cap P)| \leqslant k \cdot |\mathbf{people}'|) \wedge (P(c))]$

$[8] \rightsquigarrow \lambda x_e.[\mathbf{expected\_film}'(x)]$

$[9] \rightsquigarrow (|((\mathbf{people}' - \{c\}) \cap \mathbf{expected\_film}')| \leqslant k \cdot |\mathbf{people}'|) \wedge$
$\mathbf{expected\_film}'(c)$

Unlike Moltmann's Negative Condition, the Polarity Generalization (which is entailed by the semantic rule given in (86)) above makes an accurate prediction concerning associates of EPs headed by the determiner *few*, by revealing a mismatch in polarity between the propositions that exception constructions express. And so, although the verbal predicate in sentence (101) may indeed apply truthfully to both nominal arguments of the exceptive, the host of the EP in that sentence expresses a negative generalization which must, therefore, be hedged by an exception of positive polarity.

The following pattern emerges from our discussion of these examples: in sentences where the host of an EP expresses a positive generalization (thus leading to instantiations of the same polarity), the operator $\ominus_c$ denotes external negation to yield an exception of negative polarity. If, on the other hand, the host of an EP expresses a negative generalization, and is thus negatively instantiated, $\ominus_c$ gives rise to an exception of positive polarity by denoting the identity function on propositions, as the input to this operator is never marked by propositional negation.

3.4.1 Instantiation is needed

One of the main goals of this and the previous chapter is to show that the notion of generalization plays a pivotal role in the semantics of EPs. Accordingly, the semantics in (86) makes explicit reference to the derivative notion of INSTANTIATION

of a generalization. As I have shown, this made it possible to assign accurate truth-conditions to exception sentences of various types. But just how important is this notion to the meaning of exception? Could the exception operator $\ominus_c$ be defined in terms of a different relation?

For ease of presentation, and given that the following remarks are intended to apply to free uses of EPs as well, consider an exception operator $\ominus$, which differs from $\ominus_c$ only in that its definition ignores the constraints pertaining to connected uses of EPs described above. Rephrasing my question: is there an alternative way to characterize the relation holding between the propositions $P(A)$ and either $P(C)$ or $\neg P(C)$ in (104) which makes correct predictions about the interpretation of $\ominus$ and, more generally, the meaning of exception constructions?

$$(104)\quad [\![\ominus]\!] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \lambda X_t.\neg X, \text{ if } \ldots ? \ (P(A), P(C)) \\ \lambda X_t.X, \text{ if } \ldots ? \ (P(A), \neg P(C)) \\ \text{undefined otherwise} \end{cases}$$

It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the consequence relation of classical entailment is not a suitable alternative, as the operator $\ominus$ would then only be defined for universal hosts, contrary to the empirical evidence. A more likely candidate is the consequence relation of preferential entailment $\models_\prec$, as illustrated in (105) below.

$$(105)\quad [\![\ominus]\!] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \lambda X_t.\neg X, \text{ if } P(A) \models_\prec P(C) \\ \lambda X_t.X, \text{ if } P(A) \models_\prec \neg P(C) \\ \text{undefined otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The difference between (86) and (105) as regards the definition of the exception operator is that, in the former, the consequence relation $\models_\prec$ serves to define a notion of instantiation, which is then used to state the relation between propositions $P(A)$ and either $P(C)$ (for $\textsc{Inst}^+$) or $\neg P(C)$ (for $\textsc{Inst}^-$). In the latter, however, $\models_\prec$ specifies that relation directly. This distinction can be stated thus: for any two propositions ϕ and ψ, the statement $\phi \models_\prec \psi$ means that ψ follows defeasibly from ϕ. By contrast, the claim $\textsc{Inst}^+(\phi, \psi)$, for instance, means that ψ follows defeasibly from the fact that ϕ expresses a positive generalization about a class of individuals which

comprises an argument of ψ. I shall present two lines of reasoning suggesting that the notion of instantiation is in fact needed.

Consider the sentence

(106) Few trained mathematicians can prove the Poincaré conjecture.

If Smith is an amateur mathematician, the following exception sentence is semantically infelicitous, owing to the fact that the set of trained and amateur mathematicians are disjoint:

(107) # Except Smith, few trained mathematicians can prove the Poincaré conjecture.

Sentences that violate the so-called Condition of Inclusion, such as (107) above, were argued to lead to a presupposition failure. Anticipating the discussion of free EPs in the following chapter, one might try to link the infelicity of this sentence to the undefinedness of the exception operator, as indeed I have done in the case of connected EPs, given that the generalization expressed by the (unrestricted) host of the EP, to wit (**few**′(**trained_ mathematician**′))(**prove_conjecture**′), is not negatively instantiated by the proposition ¬(**prove_conjecture**′(k)).

The definition of $\ominus$ in (105), however, predicts no such failure of presupposition for sentence (107). The reason for this is that ¬(**prove_conjecture**′(k)) is indeed true in every preferred model of sentence (106): the preferred models in which the number of trained mathematicians who can prove the notoriously difficult conjecture is small are models in which amateur mathematicians lack the necessary know-how. Consequently, $\ominus$ is defined.

It may appear that the problem with the alternative proposal in (105) is artificial, in that it could be circumvented easily by making explicit reference to the Condition of Inclusion in the lexical entry for *except*, as in Lappin (1996b: 208) for instance, instead of requiring that this condition be entailed by the definitions of positive and negative instantiation. It is precisely this contrast in approach that the type of example under discussion tries to highlight. The Condition of Inclusion must be postulated as a separate semantic constraint on EPs under the proposal in (105), but not under that in (86), since inclusion is manifestly a necessary

component of the concept of instantiation: any given generalization about a domain of individuals can only be instantiated by statements about members of that domain.

Acknowledging that the Condition of Inclusion ought to be derived from, rather than imposed upon, the semantics of EPs, Moltmann (1995: 240–241) aims to show that this basic constraint follows logically from her HOMOGENEITY CONDITION. This condition involves a relation HOM that holds between a generalized quantifier (i.e. a set of subsets of the universe of the model) and a set if and only if the latter is homogeneously included or homogeneously excluded from every set in the former. In symbols:

(108) THE HOMOGENEITY CONDITION
A (generalized) quantifier Q satisfies the Homogeneity Condition with respect to a set C, HOM(Q, C), iff either $C \subseteq X$ for all $X \in Q$ or $(C \cap X) = \emptyset$ for all $X \in Q$.

(Moltmann 1995: 239, (37))

Moltmann (1995: 241) then proves that, for any determiner D and any sets A and C, if HOM($D(A)$, C), then $C \subseteq A$. Because the Homogeneity Condition is incorporated into her semantics for connected EPs, any EP-associate denotation $D(A)$ satisfying this condition guarantees that the denotation of the EP-complement is a subset of the nominal restrictor of the determiner.

As pointed out above, I share Moltmann's view that the Condition of Inclusion must be shown to follow from the semantics of EPs. It is clear, however, that the Homogeneity Condition does not hold the key to a satisfactory explanation of this basic property of exception constructions. The reason for this assessment is that the generalized quantifiers denoted by DPs such as *most clairvoyants* or *few archbishops* fail to satisfy Homogeneity relative to any set (other than $\emptyset$), and yet these DPs can support connected EPs which, as expected, give rise to a presupposition of inclusion.

A second problem for the alternative proposal in (105) is posed by the semantic infelicity of exception sentences such as the following:

(109) # Sandy likes some indie films but 'Reservoir Dogs'.

Given that Quentin Tarantino's debut feature film is generally regarded as the best independent motion picture of all time and something of a cult hit, the host of the EP in (109), namely sentence (110) below, preferentially entails sentence (111), because every interpretation satisfying both (110) and (111) is strictly more preferred that any interpretation satisfying (110) but not (111). In other words, the most normal models of (110) satisfy (111) as well.

(110) Sandy likes some indie films.

(111) Sandy likes 'Reservoir Dogs'.

Since $\ominus$ is defined, sentence (109) is incorrectly predicted to be acceptable. Hence, the fact that $P(A)$ preferentially entails $P(C)$ in (109), where A and C are, respectively, the denotations of the associate and the complement of the EP, and P the property $\lambda x.[\mathbf{likes}'(\mathbf{Sandy}', x)]$, clearly does not suffice to license the exceptive. In contrast, the infelicity of sentence (109) can be easily accounted for by a semantics that makes use of the relation of instantiation. The reason for this is that the host of the EP in this sentence clearly fails to express a generalization about independent films, even though it defeasibly entails a certain claim about a particular film, as I have shown.

The last two types of example show that a basic notion of defeasible entailment is not sufficient to correctly capture the meaning of exception constructions, owing to the fact that a sentence may preferentially entail certain propositions which nonetheless cannot be defeated by exceptive modification of that sentence. For the same reason, it would be mistaken to attribute an ordinary DENIAL OF EXPECTATION use to EPs, of the kind often discussed in connection with adversative *but* (Lakoff 1971, Blakemore 1989).

Although EPs may indeed serve to deny an expectation which arises from the expression of a generalization, if by this we refer narrowly to statements instantiating that generalization, they cannot be used to defeat an expectation which stems

from other interpretive or contextual factors. In section 3.5.4, I will present an argument showing that, in some cases, EPs do not just involve a denial of expectation (not even in this narrow sense).

3.4.2 Link to the Principle of Exceptions

I shall now return to the semantics in (86) and the Principle of Exceptions introduced in chapter 2, both of which are repeated below for ease of reference:

(112) THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEPTIONS
An EP must give rise to the expression of a proposition such that it defeats a non-empty subset of the host's instantiations.

(113) $[\![except_c]\!]\ C, A, P \iff P(A) \wedge \ominus_c(P(C))$,
where $[\![\ominus_c]\!] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \lambda X_t.\neg X, \text{ if for all appropriate } P', \textsc{Inst}^+(P'(A), P'(C)) \\ \lambda X_t.X, \text{ if for all appropriate } P', \textsc{Inst}^-(P'(A), \neg P'(C)) \\ \text{undefined otherwise} \end{cases}$

Note that the Principle of Exceptions is entailed by rule (113): this general constraint on the meaningfulness of EPs is satisfied whenever $\ominus_c$ is defined. This is a positive outcome, as the condition on the semantic well-formedness of sentences containing connected EPs can be seen to follow from the semantic rule that interprets these phrases, rather than being imposed separately.

This principle (and, consequently, also the semantic rule above) captures the basic semantic properties of exception constructions. Recall that Moltmann's (1995: 225–231) Condition of Inclusion, Negative Condition and Quantifier Constraint were rejected and replaced, respectively, by the Presupposition of Inclusion in (82), the Polarity Generalization in (85), and the Acceptable Host Constraint in (1), as summarized in the following table:

(114)

Moltmann (1995, 1996)		Replaced by
Condition of Inclusion	--→	Presupposition of Inclusion
Negative Condition	--→	Polarity Generalization
Quantifier Constraint	--→	Acceptable Host Constraint

It is important to emphasize that the generalizations in the second column above were not introduced as axioms of the theory, but rather simply as empirically correct characterizations of semantic properties which are often attributed to exception constructions. These generalizations stem from an overarching condition on the meaningfulness of EPs, the so-called Principle of Exceptions, which by contrast is given axiomatic status. This principle aims to grant theoretical substance to the commonsense notion that the exception an EP gives rise to is a proposition which hedges the generalization expressed by the sentence it modifies.

Both the Principle of Exceptions and the semantic rule in (113) make explicit reference to the concept of instantiation of a generalization. As can be easily verified, in exception sentences which do not comply with the Presupposition of Inclusion and the Acceptable Host Constraint, the nominal arguments of the exception marker do not give rise to pairs of statements which are in the extension of either INST^+ or INST^-, and so such sentences are correctly predicted to be semantically ill-formed (due to $\ominus_c$ being undefined).

Exception sentences which satisfy these constraints are also guaranteed by the semantics of $\ominus_c$ to validate the Polarity Generalization in (85). As mandated by the Principle of Exceptions, which requires that an exception contradict one or more statements following defeasibly from the expression of a generalization, the rule in (113) guarantees that the propositions $P(A)$ and $\ominus_c(P(C))$ differ in polarity whenever the operator $\ominus_c$ is defined.

There is one final aspect of the proposed semantics for connected EPs which I have not touched upon in detail so far. It pertains to the conjunctive interpretation assigned by the semantics in section 3.4 to exception DPs like (115a) and (115b), with denotations in (116a) and (116b), respectively.

(115) a. every detective except Briscoe
b. no billionaire heiress but Paris

(116) a. $\lambda P.[((\textbf{detective}' - \{\textbf{Briscoe}'\}) \subseteq P) \wedge \neg P(\textbf{Briscoe}')]$
b. $\lambda P.[((\textbf{billionaire\_heiress}' - \{\textbf{Paris}'\}) \cap P = \emptyset) \wedge P(\textbf{Paris}')]$

The λ-term in (116a) denotes the characteristic function of the set of all properties that every detective has but Briscoe doesn't. The λ-expression in (116b) picks out the characteristic function of the set of all properties that no billionaire heiress has, but which include Paris in their extension. The DP denotations in (116) result from applying the function

(117) $\lambda X_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,\, t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,\, t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge \ominus_c(X(P))]$

to the nominal arguments of the exceptive. Admittedly, this denotation is unusual for a class of expressions often categorized syntactically as prepositions, and hence needs to be further justified. This issue is discussed in the following chapter.

3.5 Additional issues

In this section, I shall address some additional issues in the semantics of exceptives which I have not tackled so far. They are set apart here partly owing to their self-contained nature, but also because the discussion will make reference to ideas which were introduced only in the last few sections. First, I shall look at the question whether exception sentences must entail that the exceptions they express are unique. Second, numeral associates of EPs will be considered, pointing out the implications which examples of this type raise for a semantic theory of exceptives. Third, an interesting argument put forward by Edward Keenan in support of the view that an EP must be able to access the determiner in its associate will be discussed. In the remaining two subsections, I will discuss exception sentences where EPs not only serve to hedge the generalizations expressed by their hosts, but also contribute to their hosts' interpretation in additional ways.

3.5.1 Uniqueness

Must an exception to a given quantificational claim be unique? More precisely, does a well-formed exception sentence allow for more than one exception to the generality claim expressed by the host of the EP? A UNIQUENESS CONDITION on

exceptive constructions was first postulated by von Fintel (1993, 1994), who argues that uniqueness is a lexical entailment of *but*-phrases. Thus, on this view, sentence (118) entails, as required by the lexical meaning of the exceptive, that Wayne is the only Buddhist of the speaker's acquaintance who does not think that Karma is real.

(118) Every Buddhist I know but Wayne believes in Karma.

Since the satisfaction of this condition is only guaranteed by universal determiners (von Fintel 1993: 131), von Fintel uses it to account for the assumed co-occurrence restrictions of *but*-phrases by incorporating it explicitly into their semantics. As a quick inspection of (119) reveals, C, which corresponds to the set containing the denotation of the complement of the exceptive, is required to be the smallest set for which the quantificational statement $Q(A-C, P)$ holds.

(119) Semantics for *but*-phrases (von Fintel 1993, 1994)
$Q\ A\ [\![but]\!]\ C\ P = 1 \iff Q(A-C, P) \wedge \forall S(Q(A-S, P) \rightarrow C \subseteq S)$.

Although I agree with von Fintel that sentences such as (118) above entail the uniqueness of the exception, I shall argue here that this condition cannot in fact be part of the lexical meaning of EPs, but is entailed only by some exception sentences owing to the combined semantic contribution of EPs and their hosts.

Consider an argument that can be leveled against von Fintel's approach to uniqueness in exception sentences: as we have seen, connected uses of EPs in English, including *but*-phrases, are acceptable as modifiers of both universal and (some) non-universal hosts. If uniqueness were a lexical entailment of *but*-phrases and, by extension, of connected uses of EPs more generally, then it must also be part of the truth-conditional contribution of EPs occurring in non-universal hosts, since connected EPs are not felt to be systematically ambiguous in this respect. However, as von Fintel himself points out, uniqueness is only guaranteed by universal associates of EPs. Therefore, uniqueness cannot be part of the lexical meaning of connected EPs.

It is indeed not difficult to establish that exception sentences containing non-universal hosts do not entail uniqueness. For instance, restricting attention to

quantificational associates of EPs in the interest of brevity, we can easily observe that only universal determiner denotations validate the following inference pattern:

(120) a. For UPWARD MONOTONIC *Q*s,
Q A but/except *C VP* ⇒ *C* is the only *A* that not *VP*.

b. For DOWNWARD MONOTONIC *Q*s,
Q A but/except *C VP* ⇒ *C* is the only *A* that *VP*.

As expected, whilst sentence (121a), for example, semantically entails (121b), sentence (122b) is not entailed by sentence (122a).

(121) a. Every connoisseur except Smith liked the wine. ⇒

b. Smith is the only connoisseur who did not like the wine.

(122) a. Few connoisseurs except Smith liked the wine. ⇏

b. Smith is the only connoisseur who liked the wine.

Although exception sentences comprising non-universal hosts clearly do not entail that an exceptional claim is unique, it is appropriate to ask the related question of whether their interpretation is nevertheless compatible with contexts of this type.

The answer to this question is that such scenarios are logically possible but pragmatically anomalous, as only the corresponding claims comprising universal hosts would generally meet the required standard of informativeness. Thus, by way of example, a cooperative speaker who believes that Jones is the only passenger unaccounted for, say, after an emergency landing, should choose to utter (123a) rather than produce a contextually under-informative utterance of (123b).

(123) a. Every passenger except Jones was accounted for.

b. Most passengers except Jones were accounted for.

On the other hand, an utterance of (123b) would be entirely justified if the speaker cannot determine whether other passengers in addition to Jones have not been accounted for, but is certain that the majority of them have. In this context, a speaker

who instead chooses to utter (123a) would be saying something for which they obviously lack sufficient evidence, thus rendering this utterance pragmatically infelicitous.

As we have seen, not every exception sentence gives rise to the expression of a unique exception to a generality statement. Only in constructions involving universal hosts of EPs, such as sentence (118) above, is the uniqueness of the exception actually entailed.

In examples of this type, the uniqueness of the exception results from the combined semantic contribution of the propositions they express, rather than from the meaning of either one of them in isolation. By way of example, the statement that Wayne is the only Buddhist known to the speaker of (118) who does not believe in Karma follows logically from the conjunction of the statements in (124), which correspond, respectively, to the meanings of the generality claim and the exception expressed by an utterance of this sentence.

(124) a. $(\mathbf{Buddhist\_I\_know}' - \{\mathbf{Wayne}'\}) \subseteq \mathbf{believes\_in\_Karma}'$

b. $\neg\mathbf{believes\_in\_Karma}'(\mathbf{Wayne}')$

3.5.2 Numeral associates of EPs

It is a well-known observation that DPs headed by numeral (or modified numeral) determiners, as well as universal DPs containing numeral specifiers, are excluded from the class of associates of connected EPs. The following are just a few representative judgments from the literature:

(125) * Three of my friends but Chris

(von Fintel 1993: 126, (10))

(126) a. # Three boys but/except John came.

b. # At least three boys but/except John came.

(Moltmann 1995: 227, (12))

(127) # All three students except John

(Moltmann 1995: 228, fn. 3, (1b))

(128) a. * Five students except John arrived.

b. * At most five students except John arrived.

c. * All three student(s) except John arrived.

(Lappin 1996b: 202, (13a); 204, (22b); 207, (22))

These judgments are not intended to apply only to connected uses of EPs, but to free construals of such phrases as well (Moltmann 1995: 228, fn. 2). A small sample of sentences where free uses of an EP modify hosts which make certain cardinality claims is offered in (129).

(129) # Except Kim, { three students can prove the theorem. / at least three freshmen enjoyed the baseball game. / at most three pensioners are entitled to a free bus pass. }

The relevant facts to be considered are thus summarized in table (130).

(130)

	CONNECTED USE	FREE USE
three NP	*	*
at least three NP	*	*
at most three NP	*	*

Examples involving DPs of the form [$_{DP}$ *all n* NP] have not been included in table (130) above because, contrary to the linguistic intuitions reported in the literature and as I shall show later in this subsection, they are, in fact, fully acceptable (and, incidentally, provide an important source of evidence for my analysis of this general type of data).

Unsurprisingly, my account of this data is, to put it simply, that true cardinality statements do not make good generalizations. Therefore, the presence of EPs is not licensed by such hosts. For instance, the host of the EP in (126a) above cannot be construed as expressing a generalization about the boys, and neither does the host

of the EP in (128b) manage to convey a generality claim in regard to the students. Thus, as predicted by the Principle of Exceptions, the use of an EP is not warranted in these sentences.

Interestingly, however, there are circumstances in which cardinality statements may constitute bona fide generality claims. In such contexts, EPs are both acceptable and appropriate, as one would expect. We shall consider three types of case: (*i*) examples involving numeral determiners which denote indeterminately large numbers, (*ii*) examples containing numerals in which an inference to a whole class of individuals is invited, and (*iii*) sentences comprising universally quantified DPs with numeral specifiers.

The first of these scenarios can be illustrated by naturally occurring examples like (131)–(136) below, which involve, in this order, the cardinal numeral determiners *dozens and dozens*, *a hundred*, *hundreds*, *thousands*, and the colloquial American English forms *a zillion* and *a gazillion*:

(131) [...] there is the Kyoto Treaty, designed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. That's been signed by dozens and dozens of nations except the U.S.[27]

(132) Many people were working simply to pay their bills at the end of the month, or working because they were conditioned to work in a certain way, or because it was expected of them by society, or by family or for a hundred other reasons except the reason that really matters – which is that they enjoy their work.[28]

(133) The MotoRizr can hold over 500 songs from a user's collection or purchased from hundreds of online stores – except iTunes, of course.[29]

(134) Thousands of screaming teenage fans were entertained by the man who gazed down from a dozen posters in my bedroom. Thousands, that is, except for me, the victim of an over-protective mum who said I was too young at age 11 to go to gigs.[30]

(135) Today, the skull is among the 62 sets of remains authorities have uncovered around the state since 1969 but have been unable to identify. In each case,

the bones and clothing give slight clues into a person's life. But one thing is always missing. "I can tell you a zillion things, except the one thing I need most: who they are," Mr. Snow said.[31]

(136) Windows XP Home had not been updated in some time. A gazillion security updates installed except for seven that refuse to install repeatedly while I'm connected to Microsoft.[32]

Why are EPs allowed in these examples? The correct answer to this question is, I believe, that the sentences which contain them are not interpreted primarily as cardinality statements, but instead as generality claims in regard to nations, reasons, online stores, teenage fans, and so on. Take sentence (133), for instance. The point of an utterance of this sentence is not that the number of online stores which have a certain stock exceeds 199. Rather, the speaker of (133) communicates the claim that online stores in general sell songs that can be played on the phone manufactured by Motorola. Sentence (131), to take another example, is not primarily a statement about the cardinality of the set of countries which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but rather an assertion that many nations have done so. The EP is sensitive to this subtle distinction. Thus, even if we suppose (perhaps somewhat arbitrarily) that the numeral determiner *dozens and dozens* is semantically equivalent to *at least 48*, the fact remains that only the former expression may license an EP, as the following contrast indicates:

(137) a. dozens and dozens of nations except the U.S.

b. # at least 48 nations except the U.S.

Similar comments apply to the other sentences above, mutatis mutandis.

This interesting interpretive possibility arises precisely because the cardinal numeral determiners in the examples above denote natural numbers which are both indeterminate and large. In fact, one might even hypothesize that, in general, the higher the number denoted by an indeterminate cardinal numeral, the easier it is to construe the sentence that contains it as expressing a generalization (although, of course, not all of them do).

To be sure, these two factors are not wholly independent of each other since, broadly speaking, numerals denoting a large number normally countenance PRAGMATIC LOOSENING (Carston 1997) of their truth-conditional contribution to a greater degree than those which denote a small one. Thus, for instance, if only three soldiers were actually involved in the event described by (138a), we would judge an utterance of this sentence to be definitely false. This is not quite so for an utterance of sentence (138b), however. Other things being equal, if the number of soldiers in the march is exactly 999, an utterance of (138b) may not be immediately dismissed as false, but rather taken to communicate a proposition that is loosely true.

(138) a. Four soldiers marched through the streets.

b. A thousand soldiers marched through the streets.

It should be emphasized, however, that the reason why examples (131)–(136) may license EPs is not simply that the cardinal numerals involved allow the possibility of pragmatic loosening of their truth-conditional content. The connection between these facts is more indirect, and can be stated as follows: the more relaxed standard of precision that characterizes the use of the numeral determiners in the examples above makes it possible to construe them as giving rise to a proposition that is not, first and foremost, a cardinality statement.

My suggestion that the sentences above are not true statements of cardinality, and that this fact is connected to their ability to license EPs, is further supported by the observation, made to me by John Beavers (p.c.), that increasing the standard of precision of the numeral determiners involved, and thus precluding the possibility of pragmatic loosening of their truth-conditional content, makes the presence of an EP unacceptable. For example, all of the following variations of the DP *thousands except for me* in sentence (134) would be infelicitous in the same context, as they are more likely to be interpreted as giving rise to a genuine cardinality claim:

(139) a. # exactly two thousand except for me.

b. # between two thousand and two thousand and five except for me.

c. # two thousand three hundred and fifty seven except for me.

d. # no more than three thousand and four hundred except for me.

A final piece of evidence in this direction is the fact that the numeral determiners *zillion* and *gazillion*, which denote significantly large but crucially indeterminate natural numbers, can also be found in association with EPs in the sentences above. When numerals have these 'ballpark' denotations, their meaning is similar to that of the quantificational determiner *many*, or the quantificational adjectives *countless* and *numerous* which, as we have seen, also license EPs.

I now turn to the second type of examples. Consider the following exception sentences made in reference to, respectively, the population of South America around 1949, and the individuals in attendance at a rough hockey game between the Calgary Flames and the Toronto Maple Leafs:

(140) For almost three hundred million people (except professional internationalists and the foreign affairs officials), it would have contained nothing that affected them directly and in a way they could readily understand.[33]

(141) Eighteen-thousand people except the three officials saw it.[34]

These sentences are unlike the examples in the previous category in that the numeral determiners do not specify a natural number that is indeterminate or vague. In fact, conveying a genuine cardinality statement seems to be central to the point of these utterances. What justifies the presence of an EP in this case? Notice that, in each sentence above, it is contextually salient that the number denoted by the determiner corresponds to the actual size of the set of individuals that the sentence makes a claim about. Thus, for instance, the numeral *eighteen-thousand* in sentence (141) gives the total number of people who attended the game at the Saddledome. Likewise, *almost three hundred million* in (140) specifies the total population of South America in the late nineteen forties. It is this fact which makes exceptive modification possible: by making explicit reference to the cardinality of a class of individuals, these sentences convey a generalization in regard to that class as a whole. The semantic import of the numerals in this second category of examples is, therefore, not unlike that of universals.

Let us consider the third and final category of examples, involving sentences which comprise universally quantified DPs with cardinal numeral specifiers. Contrary to the received linguistic intuitions regarding the acceptability of these data, naturally occurring examples of this type are not difficult to find:

(142) For the theory had long maintained that no prime minister could be dislodged who possessed physical and mental health and an adequate parliamentary majority. Lady Thatcher fulfilled all three criteria except, possibly, the second one.[35]

(143) The three defendants Mohammad Amawi, Marwan El-Hindi and Wassim Mazloum have pleaded not guilty to conspiring to kill or maim people outside the United States. [...] All three are U.S. citizens except Mazloum, who came to the U.S. legally from Lebanon.[36]

(144) The story proceeds, with the voice now in one ear, now the other, occasionally further off; you are touched, too, here and there, by feathers, fabric or fingers. Things are offered to your mouth, soft petals drift over you, sweet fluid splashes on your face or hands. Thus, all five senses are engaged except the one in which we usually put most store – sight.[37]

(145) By western standards, the stock markets of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are puny. [...] Capital gains are exempt from tax in all six countries except Indonesia.[38]

Interestingly, both Moltmann (1995: 228) and Lappin (1996b: 218, fn. 11) acknowledge that sentences involving exception DPs of the form [$_{DP}$ *all n* NP + EP] improve in acceptability when high cardinality values for the numeral are considered. Thus, Lappin offers the following contrast (from Moltmann (p.c. to Lappin))

(146) a. ? all 100 students except John
b. * all three students except John

(Lappin 1996b: 218, fn. 11, (ia–b))

which he tentatively explains by arguing that, depending on the cardinality value of n, either the string *all* + n plays the grammatical role of a determiner (if n is a small natural number), or n functions as an appositive cardinality modifier which is independent of the determiner (if n is large). This explanation is consistent with Lappin's semantic analysis of exceptives, which aims to rule out, incorrectly in my view, any determiners which impose cardinality conditions on the set denoted by their nominal arguments. Lappin concludes his discussion of the contrast in (146) above by suggesting that if n is construed as an appositive modifier, the constituent [$_{\text{DP}}$ *all* n NP] is interpreted as 'all NP, and, incidentally, the number of $\bar{\text{N}}$s is n'.

I agree with Lappin's concluding remark that this is the correct way to approach exception sentences of this type. However, the suggestion that such an interpretation is appropriate only for high cardinality values of n is unwarranted, and cannot be maintained empirically, as examples (142)–(145) above show. This is unsurprising from the perspective adopted here, because generality claims may indeed have domains which are objectively small. An EP may be licensed provided that its host sentence expresses a generality claim regarding a class of entities that includes the denotation of the EP-complement as a member, a criterion which is clearly met by the sentences above. For instance, a generalization about all five senses in sentence (144) is instantiated by a suitably relevant statement in regard to sight. Similarly, a certain claim about Indonesia instantiates a generalization concerning all six aforementioned countries in sentence (145).

I recapitulate briefly. In this section, we have looked at examples involving numeral determiners in association with EPs. It was suggested that cardinality statements typically fail to express generalizations and thus preclude modification by EPs, which corroborates some of the acceptability judgments in the literature. However, as we saw, there are circumstances in which such statements can be construed as communicating genuine generality claims. In each type of case, the factors which would favor such an interpretation were considered.

The existence of naturally occurring examples of this type does not bode well for traditional approaches to EPs. As pointed out in chapter 2, these approaches

have sought to explain the co-occurrence restrictions of EPs in terms of the model-theoretic properties of the quantificational determiners involved. But the data discussed in this section is not amenable to this kind of analysis, because the numeral determiners which may co-occur with EPs cannot be identified solely on the basis of their denotations. Furthermore, as a cursory inspection of (147) and (148) below reveals, cardinal numerals and *some* have almost identical denotations. However, unlike the former, which may or may not allow for exceptive modification, *some* is quintessentially a bad associate of EPs.

(147) $n_{E}(A, B) \Leftrightarrow |A \cap B| \geqslant n$

(148) $some_{E}(A, B) \Leftrightarrow |A \cap B| \geqslant 1$

Although the denotations above differ, of course, with respect to the cardinality of the set $(A \cap B)$ required by the truth-condition of the determiner, this factor alone does not govern the acceptability of EPs, as we have seen.

I close this subsection by briefly returning to my discussion of the determiner *zero*. In the previous chapter it was noted that *zero*, unlike the denotationally equivalent *no*, cannot license EPs. Such a contrast can be accounted for, according to the picture presented in this section, by observing that *zero* is typically used to express cardinality statements, rather than generalizations. That fact notwithstanding, and also in line with the evidence regarding other numeral determiners presented here, there are circumstances in which *zero* supports exceptive modification. Consider the following examples:

(149) Yet he was still a rookie with zero negotiating power except to offer vague comments about not wanting to leave his wife and children for another season in Los Angeles.[39]

(150) "I had zero risk factors except for a genetic predisposition," Bennett said.[40]

(151) "I have zero political ambitions except to do the job I was elected to do," he said.[41]

What makes these exception sentences acceptable? The central observation seems to be that the cardinal numeral *zero* also has uses as a minimizer. Consider sentence (150), for example. The host of the EP does not express a null cardinality statement in regard to risk factors, but simply reports that Bennett was completely protected from disease. Similarly, the host of the EP in sentence (151) is not an answer to a question regarding the exact amount of political ambition that drives the speaker, but to the question whether the speaker has any political ambitions at all.

3.5.3 Keenan's argument

Keenan (2003: 204) observed that DPs with identical denotations may nonetheless differ in their ability to support *but*-phrases. He argued that there may be models in which, for instance, *every engineer* and *Kim, Peter and Sandy* are co-extensive, but yet only the former DP can license a connected use of an EP such as *but Kim*, as the following contrast shows:

(152) a. Every engineer but Kim received a cash bonus.
b. # Kim, Peter and Sandy but Kim received a cash bonus.

Similarly, sentence (153a), but not sentence (153b), permits exceptive modification.

(153) a. No scientist but Kim engaged the audience.
b. * Neither Kim, nor Peter nor Sandy but Kim engaged the audience.

From these contrasts involving coordinate DPs, the conclusion was drawn that the compositional interpretation of exception DPs must make reference to the relevant model-theoretic properties of the determiners occurring in the EP-associates, and that, therefore, connected EPs must be able to access the denotation of those determiners directly. While Keenan's observation regarding pairs such as (152a–b) and (153a–b) is entirely correct, I disagree with his verdict that one needs to 'look inside' DP associates of connected EPs in order to explain these contrasts.

In fact, the theory of connected EPs defended in this dissertation points to an alternative but equally straightforward account of the distinction between, for instance, sentences (152a) and (152b): in a nutshell, while the host of the EP in (152a)

expresses a positive generalization (about the engineers), that in (152b) does not. Generalizations are statements about classes of individuals, not about particular members of those classes. Accordingly, the definition of positive generalization given in (14), for example, repeated below as (154), explicitly requires that the domain of a generalization be obtained from an expression of semantic type $\langle e, t\rangle$.

(154) POSITIVE GENERALIZATION
Let Σ be a sentence of the form $[_{TP}\ [_{DP} \ldots [_{N'}\ \alpha]][_{T'} \ldots [_{VP}\ \phi]]]$, and let α and ϕ be expressions of type $\langle e, t\rangle$. Σ expresses a positive generalization about α iff the cardinality of $[\![\alpha]\!]$ is sufficiently large and for any $x \in [\![\alpha]\!]$, $\Sigma \models_{\prec} \phi(x)$.

The host of sentence (152b) is a claim about particular individuals, and thus cannot be construed as expressing a generalization about the domain that these individuals belong to. Hence, the use of an EP is not licensed. Likewise, the anomaly of (153b) lies in the fact that the host of the EP cannot be taken to express a negative generality claim about scientists. In short, a conjunction of proper names is unable to support an EP because it cannot denote in the powerset of the domain E of entities in the model, but rather denotes either an individual sum (of semantic type e), or a Montagovian individual (of type $\langle\langle e, t\rangle, t\rangle$) after type-shifting.

The alternative explanation of Keenan's data offered in this section is in line with my suggestion that EPs can be licensed only in those hosts that express generalizations. This account is also independently supported by the evidence discussed in the previous chapter, which showed that EPs are not constituents of complex determiners and that, in fact, the semantic properties of determiners do not hold the key to understanding the linguistic behavior of these phrases.

3.5.4 Reappraising the presupposition of inclusion

As pointed out in chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, exception sentences give rise to a presupposition of inclusion concerning the complement of the EP. Thus, for example, the speaker of (155a) takes for granted that Lucy is a nurse, and similarly the speaker of (155b) treats the proposition that Smith is a district judge as a given in the context of utterance.

(155) a. Every nurse except Lucy can perform the Heimlich Manoeuvre.
b. No district judge but Smith disclosed a conflict of interest.

This interpretive property of exceptive constructions is typically formulated as the claim that the denotation of the $\bar{N}$ restriction of the associated quantifier comprises the denotation of the complement of the EP (e.g., Moltmann (1995: 226) and Lappin (1996a: 202)). In section 3.4 above I drew attention to the fact that, since associates of connected EPs need not contain quantificational determiners, the characterization of this property ought to make reference to the 'domain of the generalization' expressed by the host of the EP instead. Finding a procedure which can ascertain, for any given sentence which licenses an EP, the domain of the generalization it expresses is not an inconsequential task, to be sure. It is an instance of the perennial problem of correctly determining the domain of quantificational statements in natural language.

The definitions of generalization and instantiation (either positive or negative) in section 3.2.1 assume that the denotation of the nominal projection within the EP-associate corresponds to the domain of the generalization expressed by the host. Admittedly, this is a gross oversimplification (adopted in the interest of brevity), because it is not true that the syntax of every potential EP-host can be mapped in the same way to the expression of a generality claim. For example, the sentences in (156) express generalizations whose domains are determined by the underlined constituents (and typically by additional contextual factors).

(156) a. Every cockatoo has bright plumage.
b. Rodents eat seeds, fruit and berries.
c. We ate the whole Thanksgiving bird!
d. Nothing was clean or new at the roadside motel.
e. Sandy bought the presents, and I took care of the rest.
f. I'll have whatever you're having.
g. Sandy knows diddly squat about the company's finances.

While the domain of the generalization expressed by sentence (156a), for example, corresponds to the nominal argument of the determiner (ignoring contextual factors), this statement is not generalizable to the other sentences above. Sentence (156c) provides an extreme illustration of this fact, because the domain of the generalization it expresses, namely the set of all edible Thanksgiving bird parts, cannot be traced back to any single constituent in the sentence. Something similar could be said of sentence (156e), since it is not possible to ascertain the topic of the generalization expressed by this sentence solely on the basis of its syntactic structure. I shall set these matters aside in the following discussion.

The current understanding of this basic semantic condition on EPs is only partially correct, because the Presupposition of Inclusion is in almost every case a logically stronger proposition than the claim that the so-called 'exceptional individuals' are members of the restriction of the associated quantifier. This can be demonstrated most clearly by, first, taking sentences involving quantificational associates of EPs which range over the domain of individuals in the model, thus trivially satisfying the condition; and, second, noticing that these sentences are nonetheless semantically infelicitous, owing to a presuppositional failure, in contexts where the conversational COMMON GROUND (Stalnaker 1974, 1998, 2002) fails to entail a more relevantly specific proposition about the complement of the EP. Consider the following examples:

(157) a. Everything except the stool was heavy.
b. Nobody but Smith arrived on time.

Just as the speaker of sentence (157a) is not simply taking for granted that the stool exists, the speaker of sentence (157b) does not merely presuppose that Smith is an actual individual. Thus, for example, if an utterance of (157a) is made in reference to a truckload of furniture, it carries the presupposition that the stool was part of the cargo. Likewise, if the host of the EP in (157b) is a claim about our list of house guests, the Presupposition of Inclusion is the proposition that Smith was one of the visitors under discussion.

Take a conversational common ground which entails the propositions in (158) and suppose, furthermore, that the facts are as reported by the antecedent of the conditional statements in the paragraph above.

(158) a. The stool was not inside the truck.
b. Smith was not invited to our house.

It can be observed that both sentences in (157) would be semantically ill-formed in this scenario, even though the common ground of the conversation can be taken to entail, trivially in this case, that the stool and Smith are members, respectively, of the set of things and people in the model, in full compliance with a simple-minded notion of this basic semantic condition on EPs.

This general observation is not dependent on the presence of compound quantifiers in the sentence, but can also be shown to obtain when the associate of an EP is restricted to range over a smaller subset of the domain of individuals. Consider the following sentence involving a plural definite DP:

(159) Except for Kim, the boys enjoyed the baseball game.

What does the speaker of (159) take as a given? The proposition that Kim is also being referred to by the use of the plural definite *the boys*. Consequently, this sentence will result in a presupposition failure unless the common ground entails a more relevantly specific proposition than the basic claim that Kim is a member of the set of boys in the model. Granted, it would be unreasonable to assume that the common ground must entail the Presupposition of Inclusion in every case, as can be illustrated by the following examples:

(160) My ex-wife left with everything I owned but the car.

(161) I didn't send a postcard to any relative except my sister-in-law.

These sentences can be uttered felicitously even if it is not already common ground that the speaker of (160) owned a car, or that one of the siblings of the speaker of (161) is married. One might thus question the role that EPs serve in examples of

this type, an issue first pointed out to me by Peter Sells (p.c.). Since the generalizations expressed by the EP-hosts in the sentences above, which are given below as (162) and (163), need not be assumed to involve in every context of utterance, respectively, a claim about the speaker's car or sister-in-law, they need not be instantiated by statements concerning the EP-complements in (160) and (161).

(162) My ex-wife left with everything I owned.

(163) I didn't send a postcard to any relative.

The obvious answer to this apparent problem is that EPs often give rise to INFORMATIVE presuppositions (Stalnaker 1973), triggering a pragmatic process of accommodation of the presupposed information (Lewis 1979). And so, an utterance of (160), for example, informs the addressee that the proposition that the speaker was a car-owner is true (or, at least, believed to be true). As would be expected in "good conversational practice", this material is both "uncontroversial and unsurprising" (Heim 1992: 212), and manifestly subordinate to the main point of the utterance, namely the speaker's unfavorable divorce settlement.

The generalization expressed by the host of the EP in (160) following this process of accommodation can be instantiated by the claim that the speaker's ex-wife gained possession of his car, as is required by the semantics of the EP. This way of approaching examples like (160) and (161) above highlights the fact that EPs may play a decisive role in determining the generalizations expressed by their hosts. Indeed, in the following section we shall encounter another class of examples which illustrate this important point.

Let me take stock of some of the main arguments in this section. The Presupposition of Inclusion is the statement that the denotation of the complement of the EP falls within the scope of or, as was phrased in definition (82) above, belongs in the domain of the generalization expressed by the host of the EP. As we have seen, this domain need not, and typically does not, correspond to the denotation of the syntactic restrictor of an associated quantifier, but its identification critically depends on additional pragmatic factors (and possibly also on the pragmatic accommodation of the Presupposition of Inclusion), which is to be expected given

the inherent context-dependency of generalizations.

Finally, as remarked in the previous section, the Presupposition of Inclusion stems from the Principle of Exceptions, because any generality claim about a given domain, whose presence is required by the semantics of EPs, can only be instantiated by propositions which have the members of that domain as arguments.

3.5.5 'Unexceptional' exceptions

In the previous section we looked at exception sentences in which the denotation of the EP-complement need not be assumed to belong in the domain of the generalization expressed by the host of the EP. I argued that in such cases the Presupposition of Inclusion must be accommodated for the exception operator (and, hence, the EP) to be defined. While examples of this type do not contradict the assumption that EPs hedge the generalizations expressed by their hosts, they show that EPs can also play an active role in fixing the domains of those generalizations.

In this section I turn my attention to a similar class of examples. It involves exception sentences comprising overtly quantificational EP-associates where the host of the EP expresses a generalization whose domain most typically excludes the denotation of the complement of the EP in the given context, but where, in contrast to some of the examples in the previous section, it is nevertheless common ground that such denotation falls within the $\bar{N}$ restrictor of the quantifier, thus satisfying a simple-minded version of the Presupposition of Inclusion. In this scenario, the proposition that an EP gives rise to appears to lose its distinctive 'exceptional' character. We may thus refer to examples of this type as involving UNEXCEPTIONAL EXCEPTIONS.

The following example, taken from a travel novel about an isolated region of the Sahara desert, provides a clear illustration of this type of case:

(164) "I don't see anything but sand," I said.[42]

The most likely interpretation of an utterance of the host of the EP in (164), given below as (165), does not involve the speaker's total loss of vision, but rather simply

a complete absence of camels, palm trees, nomads, and other things one might expect to see.

(165) I don't see anything.

The denotation of the EP-complement in sentence (164) satisfies the Presupposition of Inclusion (as this condition is currently understood in the literature) because it is common ground that sand is part of the set of things or, in this particular case, stuff in the model. However, sand would normally be excluded from consideration in interpreting an utterance of sentence (165) in the above context, as I have pointed out. At the heart of this observation lies the context-dependency of generalizations, of course. Thus, if sentence (165) were uttered in regard to the contents of a chest, for instance, as a report of the disappointing conclusion of a large-scale relic hunt, sand would likely be taken to fall within the scope of the generalization it expresses.

Exception sentences of this type, often marked by such EMPHASIZERS as *obviously* and *of course*, which give an indication of the apparent truth (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 583) and perhaps also the 'expected' character of the exception, are not difficult to find. Some naturally occurring examples are given in (166)–(170) below.

(166) Everyone loves a David and Goliath story – except, of course, the Philistines.[43]

(167) As of now, no one – except, obviously, the perpetrators – knows who is responsible.[44]

(168) For such an iconic animal, it seems strange that we know next to nothing about the dodo – except, of course, that it is dead.[45]

(169) The interior looks like a busy casino, except the price tags refer to the cost of the equipment rather than the cash in play. Shoppers can buy or rent tables, roulette wheels, chips, cards, indeed everything except, of course, for a winning streak.[46]

(170) There were women everywhere in the office – except, of course, in the men's room.[47]

Consider the role played by the EPs in these examples. The host of the EP in (166)–(170) does not normally lead to an inference regarding, respectively, the Philistines, the perpetrators, the conservation status of the renowned bird species from Mauritius, a winning streak, or the men's lavatory in the office. The reason for this is, as was pointed out above, that these are excluded on pragmatic grounds from the domain of the generality claim expressed by their respective hosts. What is, then, the point of the EPs?

The answer to this question involves, in my view, acknowledging that EPs may affect the interpretation of their hosts in more ways than one. While EPs are preeminently hedges of generality claims, they can also make a contribution towards fixing the domain of those generalizations pragmatically. In other words, EPs may help create a generalization-linked expectation which they then defeat. The ability to bring about the pragmatic adjustment of quantificational domains is, of course, not peculiar to EPs, and can be observed in a wide range of constructions in natural language (von Fintel 1994, Roberts 1995, Hajičová *et al.* 1998). EPs are therefore not special in this regard.

This 'unexceptional' use of EPs carries additional interpretive effects. Compare the following two sentences about the people from our office whom Lucy, who is also a work colleague, has been romantically involved with:

(171) a. Lucy has dated everyone!

b. Lucy has dated everyone but herself!

In a context where every relevant individual in the office has gone out with Lucy, an utterance of either sentence in (171) conveys the same information (although the underlying sentences have different meanings, of course). One key difference between these utterances is that, whereas an utterance of (171a) typically excludes Lucy from the domain of the quantifier, this individual must be part of the domain of the generalization expressed by the host of the EP in an utterance of (171b). Were this not the case, it could not be true that for all appropriate predicate denotations P', $P'([\![Lucy]\!])$ positively instantiates the generalization expressed by $P'([\![everyone]\!])$,

and consequently the operator $\ominus_c$ could not be defined in (171b), which runs contrary to our intuition, since the generalization expressed by this sentence is hedged in the usual way.

The seemingly unnecessary prolixity of sentence (171b) is justified in that 'unexceptional' EPs act as SLACK REGULATORS (Lasersohn 1999), indicating that whatever pragmatic leeway might be allowed in fixing the domain of quantification in sentence (171a), for example by ignoring Sandy's married or teenage office associates, must be curtailed owing to the presence of the EP in (171b). Thus, the domain of the quantifier in the latter sentence is widened to incorporate individuals which might otherwise not have been considered sufficiently relevant in evaluating the truth of the simpler (171a). In other words, the presumed existence of an unlikely individual in the domain of the generalization expressed by the host of the EP in (171b), i.e. Lucy, indicates that the threshold of pragmatic relevance for inclusion in that domain has been lowered.

The examples discussed in this section are interesting for several reasons. First, like those considered in the previous section, they militate against a simple-minded notion of the Presupposition of Inclusion. As we have seen, the information actually presupposed is often more specific than the basic claim that the EP-complement falls within the $\bar{N}$ restrictor of the associated quantifier. Second, these examples suggest that EPs may affect the interpretation of the sentences which contain them in at least two different ways: not only do EPs hedge the generalizations expressed by their hosts, but they can also help to delimit the domain of those generalizations in the first place. In turn, this realization reinforces the idea that the role of EPs goes beyond a rudimentary notion of denial of expectation. Finally, exception sentences of this type highlight the fact that the inherent context-dependency of generalizations and its interaction with the semantics of EPs should be investigated further.

3.6 Interim summary and conclusions

In this chapter, I have aimed to show that the core interpretive properties and distribution of EPs can receive a satisfactory account in terms of a small set of notions

and empirical generalizations that arguably reflect our intuitive understanding of what constitutes a generality claim and an exception. The two basic definitions are repeated in (172) and (173) below:

(172) GENERALIZATION
A sentence Σ expresses a generalization iff Σ makes a defeasible (i.e. non-monotonically instantiated) universal claim about a sufficiently large domain.

(173) THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEPTIONS
An EP must give rise to the expression of a proposition such that it defeats a non-empty subset of its host's instantiations.

On the basis of (172), a derivative notion of instantiation of a generality claim was formulated. It was argued that this notion, in effect a specialized defeasible consequence relation, lies at the core of the meaning of exceptives. Accordingly, and also in compliance with the overarching constraint on the meaningfulness of exceptives in (173), the semantic rule which interprets connected uses of EPs utilizes this notion as part of the characterization of the exception operator. The operation of this rule was illustrated by providing a step-by-step derivation of the truth-conditions of several key examples.

One of the main theoretical claims of this and the previous chapters is that both generality claims and exceptions are propositions of a certain kind. When approached form this perspective, the semantic contribution of EPs is not difficult to describe, for it simply involves (*i*) a mechanism which generates a proposition using the host of the EP as a blueprint, and (*ii*) an operation which ensures that the polarity of this proposition is such that it constitutes an exception to the host.

In this chapter, I also suggested that the distribution and co-occurrence restrictions of EPs are governed by the following two constraints:

(174) ACCEPTABLE HOST CONSTRAINT
EPs are licensed by hosts that express generalizations.

(175) THE ASSOCIATE CONSTRAINT
Associates of connected EPs must be generalization-inducing expressions.

These constraints serve to explain why a free use of an *except*-phrase, for instance, is possible whenever a connected use is allowed, but not vice versa: as pointed out above, every sentence which contains a generalization-inducing expression conveys a generality claim, but not every sentence which communicates such a claim encompasses a generalization-inducing expression. An additional contribution of the chapter in this area is the thesis that the uses of an exception marker cannot be predicted on the basis of its form, with very few exceptions. Therefore, we should properly speak of connected or free 'uses' or 'construals' of EPs, rather than 'connected' or 'free' EPs simpliciter.

The chapter provides novel formulations of two basic semantic properties of exceptive constructions previously identified in the literature. Conditions (176) and (177) below, which are entailed by the Principle of Exceptions, respectively replace Moltmann's Condition of Inclusion and Negative Condition (Moltmann 1995: 225-227). A third semantic property often associated with exceptives, namely, the Quantifier Constraint (Moltmann 1995: 227), was shown to be empirically incorrect, and thus plays no formal role in this theory.

(176) THE PRESUPPOSITION OF INCLUSION
The denotation of the EP-complement must be included in the domain of the generalization expressed by the host of the EP.

(177) POLARITY GENERALIZATION
The proposition expressed by the host of an EP and that which the EP gives rise to must have different polarity.

Much of the discussion in this chapter has revolved around the hypothesis that the licensing condition on EPs in English is pragmatic in nature. I have argued that only by taking into account defeasible aspects of the meaning of potential hosts can the properties of EPs be correctly understood. In spite of the undeniable pragmatic underpinnings of my approach, I have aimed to lay out a theory that makes precise

and ultimately falsifiable predictions about the meaning of EPs, their distribution, and the conditions under which such phrases are licensed.

Chapter 4

Further Topics in the Semantics of EPs

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall look at three additional topics in the semantics of EPs. The first topic pertains to an aspect of the semantics proposed in the previous chapter, the other two are core issues in the semantics of exceptive constructions: quantified EP-complements, and free construals of EPs. Part of my aim here is to show that the theoretical proposals developed thus far can be naturally extended to account for these types of data as well.

The chapter has the following structure: in section 4.2, I provide several lines of evidence in support of the conjunctive semantics of exception DPs advanced in the preceding chapter. We have looked so far at examples in which only referring terms occurred as complements of EPs. But what is the interpretation of exception sentences involving quantificational EP-complements? The answer to this important question will be addressed in section 4.3, leading to a revision in the interpretation of the exception operator. Section 4.4 continues the discussion of the meaning of exceptives by presenting a semantics for free uses of EPs. The rule that interprets such phrases will be shown to resemble very closely that which was postulated for connected construals of EPs, although it will not be required that EPs modify generalization-inducing expressions. Finally, section 4.5 summarizes the discussion in this chapter, outlines the main contributions of the dissertation,

and identifies several areas for further work.

4.2 Conjunctive semantics

In the previous chapters, I suggested that exception DPs are not unlike conjoined DPs in their interface with the syntax of the sentences which contain them. This idea aims to capture such observations as the following: (*i*) connected uses of EPs form constituents with the DPs they are adjoined to, (*ii*) sentences involving connected uses of EPs are syntactically monoclausal but semantically biclausal, (*iii*) the proposition that a connected use of an EP gives rise to differs from that expressed by its host (in the simplest cases) only with respect to the interpretation of the nominal arguments of the exceptive, and (*iv*) these arguments must have the same grammatical function, and bear the same thematic role.

The first of these observations is uncontroversial, and the second was already discussed in detail in chapter 2. Remarks (*iii*) and (*iv*) above can be illustrated as follows. Note that sentence (1) below might intuitively be considered an exception to the generalization of the same polarity expressed by sentence (2), provided that Sandy is one of the tourists under discussion.

(1) Sandy was immunized.

(2) Every tourist contracted malaria.

Crucially, however, sentence (3) cannot possibly carry the semantic content of (4).

(3) Every tourist but Sandy contracted malaria.

(4) Every tourist contracted malaria, but Sandy was immunized.

In fact, no simple exception sentence has a meaning paraphrasable by (4). Rather, the interpretation of an utterance of (3) is just that every contextually salient tourist other than Sandy became affected by the disease but Sandy did not, an interpretation which results from applying the VP denotation to the nominal arguments of

the exceptive, and changing the polarity of the proposition that has the denotation of the EP-complement as a constituent.

As for (*iv*), note that both nominal arguments of the exceptive must have the grammatical function of the DP which contains them: a subject in a sentence such as (5a), and a direct object in one like (5b).

(5) a. [$_{DP}$ Every nurse but Lucy] saw me.
b. I saw [$_{DP}$ every nurse but Lucy].

Likewise, in sentence (6) below it must be the case that either both arguments of the exceptive marker are AGENTIVE subjects, or both NON-AGENTIVE CAUSE subjects (Van Valin and Wilkins 1996), but a combination of different thematic roles is ruled out. And so, (6) cannot be interpreted as saying, for instance, that no suspect (other than Smith) has killed a man accidentally, but that Smith has previously been involved in an act of homicide.

(6) [$_{DP}$ No suspect but Smith] has killed a man before.

However, as conceded in the previous chapter, the assumption that exceptive markers might be specialized coordinators which serve to integrate syntactically a single argument (typically) into a host clause, rather than run-of-the-mill prepositions, needs to be further justified. Let me consider four lines of evidence suggestive of such an assumption.

First, as observed in Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 641-643), exceptives take a much wider range of complements than canonical prepositions do, a fact which the following list of sentences clearly illustrates:

(7) a. Sandy is mild-mannered except [$_{CP}$ when she's drunk].
b. We don't know much about Smith, except [$_{CP}$ that he likes scotch].
c. Lucy offered no response, except [$_{TP}$ to say she was sorry].
d. What else can we do except [$_{VP}$ pay the fine]?
e. The patient doesn't remember a lot, except [$_{VP}$ driving at full speed].
f. Everybody smoked during the reception except [$_{DP}$ the Senator].

g. This neighborhood is anything except [$_{AdjP}$ clean or safe].

h. Mona still can't read music, except [$_{AdvP}$ very slowly].

i. Izzy's opens daily except [$_{PP}$ on Mondays].

Huddleston and Pullum (2002), while arguing that exception markers are prepositions, insightfully point out that exceptives have the unusual property that their right arguments are licensed by grammatical features of their hosts, and thus refer to the bracketed expressions in (7a–i) as MATRIX-LICENSED complements of *except*. Of interest to us is the fact that, whereas canonical prepositions cannot directly license the range of bracketed complements in (7a–i), coordinators are not restricted in this way.

The evidence pertaining to the presence of propositional adverbs in complements of EPs, which was discussed in chapter 2, may also be brought to bear on this matter. While that evidence showed, first and foremost, that EPs have propositional content, it is interesting to note that this general observation has been connected in the literature to the underlying presence of conjunction. For instance, Collins (1988a,b), also cited in Camacho (2003: 24-25), who discusses similar facts in Spanish, noticed that propositional adverbs may modify DPs in English only if they are conjoined, as the following contrasting pair of examples illustrates:

(8) a. * At the store, I saw [$_{DP}$ possibly Mary].

b. At the store, I saw [$_{DP}$ Lucy and possibly Mary].

This observation supports the claim that exception DPs, which typically allow the presence of propositional adverbs, as illustrated by examples (9a) and (9b), are also underlyingly conjunctive.

(9) a. every nurse [$_{EP}$ except possibly Lucy]

b. no heiress [$_{EP}$ other than possibly Mary]

A third line of evidence is the fact that, as Quinn (2005: 280-282) points out, citing Jespersen and Haislund (1949: 228-230) as the source of the observation, a

personal pronoun occurring as the complement of an EP may appear in the NOMINATIVE CASE-FORM (although the ACCUSATIVE CASE-FORM is also possible). This variation is exemplified by phrases (10a) and (10b) below.

(10) a. no man on this planet [$_{EP}$ but I/me]

b. every defense attorney [$_{EP}$ except I/me]

Quinn remarks that the case-form variation observed in personal pronouns occurring as EP-complements is not unlike that witnessed in coordination constructions more generally, a fact which she suggests might be explained by the assumption that connected uses of exception markers involve prepositions REANALYZED as coordinate conjunctions (2005: 281). If Quinn's hypothesis is on the right track, and assuming also that conjunction phrases are transparent to CASE, the possibility of nominative complements of EPs could be accounted for in terms of structures like the following, where a ConjP is located in the Specifier of a finite T:[1]

(11)



(Quinn 2005: 282, example (209))

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1312), who also discuss data pertaining to the variation in morphological case-form described above, conclude that examples such as (10a) and (10b) might indicate that exceptive "*but* can be construed as either a coordinator or a preposition."

A final piece of evidence in this general direction is that core exceptives such as *but* and *except* have independent uses as coordinating conjunctions (Mourin 1980, Hoeksema 1987, 1996a), as can illustrated by the following sentences:

(12) a. The proof might be simple, but Kim doesn't understand it.
b. I'd gladly visit Sandy, except I don't have a car.

The four lines of evidence presented above, while cumulatively suggestive in my view, are not entirely conclusive, as exceptives can also be shown to differ from canonical coordinators in several important respects. For example, exception DPs cannot be derived by CONJUNCTION REDUCTION (Chomsky 1957), an analysis which is, however, typically available for examples involving DP coordination. Furthermore, only EPs can undergo extraposition to the end of the clause in which they occur, as the contrast between the sentences in (13) and those in (14) shows:

(13) a. Every girl [$_{EP}$ but Sandy] left the ballroom in tears.
b. Every girl left the ballroom in tears [$_{EP}$ but Sandy].

(14) a. Every girl [$_{Conj'}$ and Sandy] left the ballroom in tears.
b. * Every girl left the ballroom in tears [$_{Conj'}$ and Sandy].

Consequently, although the conjunctive semantics explored in the previous chapter makes correct predictions concerning simple exception sentences where both arguments of the exceptive are DPs, and in which the generalization expressed by the host of the EP closely matches its syntactic structure, providing a fully general and accurate picture of how EPs interface with the syntax of their hosts requires further research.

4.2.1 Are EPs 'merely multidimensional'?

In his seminal discussion of conventional implicature, Potts (2005a) suggests that exceptive constructions do not give rise to the expression of this type of content, but are MERELY MULTIDIMENSIONAL; a category of expressions which, according to Potts, also includes those traditionally (though mistakenly) said to involve conventional implicatures, such as adversative *but*, *even*, and the additive modifiers.

The content of 'merely multidimensional' expressions is not invariably speaker-oriented, a hallmark of true conventional implicatures, and can be reasonably regarded as AT-ISSUE. Such expressions are 'multidimensional' in that they give rise to more than a single proposition. For example, following ideas in Bach (1999a), Potts (2005a: 213) points out that adversative *but*, as used in sentences such as (15), comprises the meaning components indicated in (16a–b):

(15) Lucy is shy but flirtatious.

(16) a. primary entailment: $\mathbf{shy}'(\mathbf{Lucy}') \wedge \mathbf{flirtatious}'(\mathbf{Lucy}')$

b. ancillary entailment: $\mathcal{G}(x)[\mathbf{shy}'(x) \rightarrow \neg\mathbf{flirtatious}'(x)]$

Drawing a distinction between the primary and non-primary entailments of a sentence makes it possible to capture the fact that, though both propositions in (16) are part of the semantic content of (15), the truth of this utterance must be determined only in relation to its primary entailment. Therefore, 'merely multidimensional' *but* cannot be seen to express the conjunction of these propositions (see also Bach (1999a: 350–355)).

I am in agreement both with this general outlook, and the particulars of Potts' analysis of adversative *but*. However, I shall argue that exceptive constructions do not fit the 'merely multidimensional' mold, and should be regarded instead as expressing a truly conjunctive proposition. Let us consider two arguments in support of this view: the first concerns the behavior of connected EPs occurring under the scope of verbs of wagering, the second that of certain propositional adverbs which may appear in exception sentences.

Potts (2005a: 214–215) points out that, whereas a verb of saying can target both

dimensions of the meaning of adversative *but* occurring in its sentential complement, verbs such as *wager* or *bet* target only the primary assertion. Thus, the truth or falsity of the ancillary entailment given in (16) is irrelevant in determining the result of the following bet:

(17) I bet that Lucy is shy but flirtatious.

Exceptive constructions behave differently. For example, if we utter (18), the truth or falsity of both propositions in (19) will clearly affect the outcome of our bet.

(18) I bet that every nurse except Lucy is flirtatious.

(19) a. $(\mathbf{nurse}' - \{\mathbf{Lucy}'\}) \subseteq \mathbf{flirtatious}'$

b. $\neg\, \mathbf{flirtatious}'(\mathbf{Lucy}')$

Thus, the behavior of connected EPs occurring under the scope of verbs of wagering suggests that sentences such as (18) actually have the conjunctive proposition in (20) as their primary entailment.

(20) $((\mathbf{nurse}' - \{\mathbf{Lucy}'\}) \subseteq \mathbf{flirtatious}') \wedge \neg\, \mathbf{flirtatious}'(\mathbf{Lucy}')$

Let us turn to the second argument. As shown in chapter 2, speech-act adverbs may occur in connected EPs. The adversative sentence in (21a) and the exception sentence in (21b) exemplify clausal interpretations of the speech-act adverb *frankly*. Interestingly, there is a fundamental difference in what the adverb may modify in each sentence.

(21) a. Lucy is shy but, frankly, flirtatious.

b. Every nurse except, frankly, Lucy is flirtatious.

Although, as suggested above, sentence (21a) gives rise to both a primary and an ancillary proposition, the speaker of that sentence cannot be taken to give a frank assurance that there exists a contrast between shyness and flirtatiousness. The adverb *frankly* may only be interpreted here as providing a comment on the assertion that Lucy is prone to flirting, a proposition which is the primary entailment of the sentence.

By contrast, the occurrence of *frankly* in sentence (21a) is interpreted as a remark on the speech act involving the exception, as it serves to indicate that the assertion that Lucy is not flirtatious is sincere. Like the evidence involving EPs under the scope of verbs of wagering, this contrast suggests that exceptions are not ancillary entailments, but in fact primary entailments of exceptive constructions.

As I have shown in the foregoing discussion, a generality claim and an exception are both part of the asserted content of utterances of exception sentences. Still, one might hypothesize that these primary entailments differ in their informational status, the exception perhaps being secondary to the generalization it modifies in this regard.

But even this intuitive distinction appears to depend crucially on independent contextual assumptions. For instance, exceptions arguably provide addressees with the most pertinent information in positive permission sentences, such as examples (22a–b) below, and with at least as relevant information in exception sentences occurring as part of prohibitions or commands, as in examples (23a–b).

(22) a. You may sleep on any inflatable pillow but mine.

b. We can park anywhere except next to the river bank.

(23) a. Turn off every switch except the ignition.

b. Under no circumstances, except fire emergencies, should you leave the back door open!

Thus, the most important point of sentence (22a), for example, is that borrowing the speaker's pillow is likely to get us in trouble. Likewise, leaving the ignition switch on is fundamental in order to fulfill the command expressed by an utterance of sentence (23a). A clearer understanding of the informational status of, and the relationship between, the different propositional components of exception sentences should be the topic of further research.

4.3 Quantified complements of EPs

In the previous chapter, I discussed the semantics of exception sentences in which the right arguments of the exceptives were referring expressions, a simplifying assumption often adopted in the literature (von Fintel 1993, 1994, Hoeksema 1996a). However, as was pointed out, the range of expressions which occur in this position is much wider, even if we restrict attention only to quantificational DPs, as I shall do in this section.

The type of exception DPs that I have in mind can be illustrated by the following examples, collected from the web and vetted by native speaker informants:

(24) a. every living creature except dogs
b. everything except most foreign films
c. every human culture except some nomadic societies
d. every catastrophe except some cases of death by lightning
e. every point except many of the ethics and morals questions

(25) a. no heirs except several nieces
b. no marked complications except three cases of skin irritation
c. no beggars except the gypsies

As was the case concerning the examples discussed in the previous chapters, quantificational complements of EPs naturally occur in combination with non-universal EP-associates. The examples in (26) and (27) illustrate this fact, respectively, for associates of EPs headed by the determiners *most* and *few*.

(26) a. most pages except at least one
b. most habitats except the dry desert regions
c. most vehicles except all models of Porsche
d. most adult budgies except some color varieties

(27) a. few photos except some group shots
b. few complications except one case of infection

c. few animals except the monkeys

Looking at examples of this type is important not only for the purposes of increasing the empirical coverage of the theory, but also because they suggest a need for revision both in our current understanding of the exception operator, and in the notion of instantiation of a generality claim. With respect to the first of these revisions, consider the interpretation of the following sentence, where the complement of the EP is the quantificational DP *some Sundays*:

(28) "We rowed every day except some Sundays," he said.[2]

The speaker of (28) simply states that they took some Sundays off, not that no rowing ever took place on a Sunday. But this claim, of course, is only consistent with interpreting the exception operator as predicate negation. Hence, the assumption that $\ominus_c$ denotes sentential negation whenever the host of the EP expresses a positive generalization (that is positively instantiated by a claim regarding the denotation of the EP-complement, as in (28) above) must be revised.

Take another example. According to sentence (29),

(29) Every film but some minor productions received a positive review.

some minor productions did not receive a positive review. But this sentence leaves open the possibility that some other minor productions fared better with the critics. In other words, the interpretation of the proposition that the EP gives rise to in (29) is (30a), rather than (30b).

(30) a. $\mathbf{some\_mp'}(\ominus_c(\mathbf{received\_pr'})) \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{some\_mp'}(\neg\mathbf{received\_pr'})$

b. $\ominus_c(\mathbf{some\_mp'}(\mathbf{received\_pr'})) \Leftrightarrow \neg(\mathbf{some\_mp'}(\mathbf{received\_pr'}))$

The same conclusion can be reached on the basis of exception sentences involving disjoined DP complements of EPs. Sentence (31) below, for instance, is clearly compatible with a scenario in which, say, only Kim was not interviewed (but where every other district judge was, including Sandy).

(31) Every district judge except Kim or Sandy was interviewed.

Therefore, the semantic contribution of the EP in (31) can be captured by assuming that negation occurs under the scope of a DP disjunction, but not vice versa, which shows that $\ominus_c$ must also denote predicate negation in sentences of this type.

These considerations suggest that the semantic rule which interprets connected uses of EPs should be generalized in the following way, where, for all X, $\bar{X}$ denotes the complement of X:

(32) $[\![except_c]\!]\ C, A, P \iff P(A) \wedge (\ominus_c(P))(C)$,

where $[\![\ominus_c]\!] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$
- $\lambda X.\lambda x.\neg X(x)$, if for all appropriate P', $\text{INST}^+(P'(A), P'(C))$
- $\lambda X.\lambda x.X(x)$, if for all appropriate P', $\text{INST}^-(P'(A), \bar{P}'(C))$
- undefined otherwise

Replacing sentential negation by its subsentential counterpart in the semantic rule above also entails that exceptives now receive a translation according to which the exception operator first applies to a predicate denotation, yielding another predicate denotation which the semantic value of the EP-complement then takes as an argument, as shown in (33).

(33) $\lambda X_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,\, t\rangle}.\lambda Y_{\langle\langle e,\, t\rangle,\, t\rangle}.\lambda P_{\langle e,\, t\rangle}.[Y(P) \wedge X(\ominus(P))]$

This revision still captures the interpretation of the exception sentences discussed in the previous chapter because, as shown in section 3.4, self-dual expressions are not sensitive to the semantic distinction that exists between these two alternative forms of negation. And so, the meaning of sentences (34) and (35) is described correctly in the table in (36) below.

(34) { Every / No } senior nurse except Lucy [$_{\text{VP}}$ works an eight-hour shift].

(35) { Every / No } district judge but Kim [$_{\text{VP}}$ disclosed a conflict of interest].

(36)

EP-Complement	Gen	Interpretation
Proper Name	+	*Proper Name (NEG VP)*
	−	*PN VP*
the$_{sg}$ NP	+	*the*$_{sg}$ *NP (NEG VP)*
	−	*the*$_{sg}$ *NP VP*

A close inspection of the exception DPs in (24) through (27) confirms that they also follow the general pattern predicted by the semantic rule in (33). A representative sample of interpretations (of their EP-complements) is provided in the following table:

(37)

EP-Complement	Gen	Interpretation
Bare plural	+	*Bare plural (NEG VP)*
	−	*BP VP*
some NP	+	*some (NEG VP)*
	−	*some NP VP*
n NP	+	*n NP (NEG VP)*
	−	*n NP VP*
at least n NP	+	*at least n* NP (NEG VP)
	−	*at least n NP VP*

Although I shall return to the semantics of quantified complements of EPs later in this section, let me now consider the second revision suggested by examples of this type. So far, we have looked at generalizations instantiated by sets of literals. For instance, the generality claim expressed by sentence (38) is positively instantiated by statements of the form 'x visited the museum', for any $x \in [\![student]\!]$.

(38) Every student visited the museum.

If Smith is a student under discussion, the proposition

(39) Smith visited the museum.

is one of the instantiations referred to above, and hence an utterance of the exception sentence in (43) might be warranted, depending on the facts of the matter.

(40) Every student except Smith visited the museum.

Likewise, the generality claim that sentence (41) expresses is instantiated by negative statements which involve individual constants as arguments, each one corresponding to a member of the class of individuals that the generalization is about. If Smith falls under the scope of the generalization expressed by this sentence, and is privy to the arrival of the inquisitors from Spain, an utterance of (44) is justified.

(41) Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition.

(42) Nobody but Smith expects the Spanish Inquisition.

The exception sentences below are different.

(43) Every student except some undergraduates visited the museum.

(44) Nobody but two high-ranking cardinals expects the Spanish Inquisition.

Although the notion of generalization developed in the previous chapter need not be altered, examples such as (43) and (44) show that generality claims can in fact be instantiated by quantificational statements.

The connection with the former notion of instantiation is intuitive: a statement $\phi(Q)$, Q being a type $\langle 1 \rangle$ quantifier, positively instantiates a sentence Σ of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}} \ldots [_{\text{N}'}\ \alpha]][_{\text{T}'} \ldots [_{\text{VP}}\ \phi]]]$ which expresses a generalization just in case it characterizes a set of literals of the form $\phi(x)$, $x \in [\![\alpha]\!]$, which follow defeasibly from Σ. Likewise for negative instantiation, mutatis mutandis.

We might express these facts in terms of the following revised definitions:

(45) POSITIVE INSTANTIATION (Revised)
Let Σ a sentence of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}} \ldots [_{\text{N}'}\ \alpha : \langle e, t \rangle]][_{\text{T}'} \ldots [_{\text{VP}}\ \phi : \langle e, t \rangle]]]$ which expresses a positive generalization. The set of positive instantiations of Σ is $\text{INST}^{+}(\Sigma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\phi(Q) \mid \bigcup_{X \in \mathcal{W}([\![Q]\!])} X \subseteq [\![\alpha]\!]\}$

(46) NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION (Revised)
Let Σ a sentence of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}} \ldots [_{\text{N}'}\ \alpha : \langle e, t \rangle]][_{\text{T}'} \ldots [_{\text{VP}}\ \phi : \langle e, t \rangle]]]$ which expresses a negative generalization. The set of negative instantiations of Σ is $\text{INST}^{-}(\Sigma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\bar{\phi}(Q) \mid \bigcup_{X \in \mathcal{W}([\![Q]\!])} X \subseteq [\![\alpha]\!]\}$

These definitions make reference to an operation $\mathcal{W}$ (discussed in Moltmann (1996: 155), but employed here for a different purpose), which takes a type $\langle 1 \rangle$ quantifier denotation Q as an argument, and yields the set of WITNESS SETS of Q as a value. The notion of a witness set of a type $\langle 1 \rangle$ quantifier (Barwise and Cooper 1981), is defined as follows:

(47) WITNESS SET
A set X is a witness of a type $\langle 1 \rangle$ quantifier denotation Q just in case:
(*i*) $X \in Q$, and
(*ii*) $X \subseteq S$, where S is the smallest live-on set of Q.

Taking the generalized union of $\mathcal{W}([\![Q]\!])$ and requiring that every member of this set belong in the class of entities that the generalization expressed by Σ is about, guarantees inclusion: any quantificational statement $\phi(Q)$ which instantiates a generalization must live on a subset of that generalization's domain.

Is this simple requirement on the set of quantificational expressions which may occur as complements of EPs too weak? Perhaps. An advantage is that it parallels the condition proposed for non-quantificational complements and, more importantly, that it is consonant with the fact that the range of expressions appearing in this position is relatively unrestricted. However, the remarks in this section are only preliminary, and likely to be incomplete.

It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that the proposals advanced here make accurate predictions concerning the interpretation of the exceptions that the examples in (24) through (27) give rise to, and so constitute a good starting point for future research on this topic. For example, the semantic rule in (32) correctly assigns the truth conditions in (49) to sentence (43), repeated below as (48). I leave aside the important question of how to capture the effect of quasi-semantic restriction in examples of this type, simply using a set variable X as a nominal restriction.[3]

(48) Every student except some undergraduates visited the museum.

(49) $((\![\textit{except}]\!](\![\textit{some undergraduates}]\!]))(\![\textit{every student}]\!]))(\![\textit{visited}]\!]) \iff$
$((\mathbf{student}' - X) \subseteq \mathbf{visit}') \wedge (\ominus_c(\mathbf{visit}'))(\mathbf{some\_undergrad}') \iff$

$$((\textbf{student}' - X) \subseteq \textbf{visit}') \wedge (\lambda X.\lambda x.[\neg X(x)](\textbf{visit}'))(\textbf{some\_undergrad}') \iff$$
$$((\textbf{student}' - X) \subseteq \textbf{visit}') \wedge (\neg\textbf{visit}')(\textbf{some\_undergrad}') \iff$$
$$((\textbf{student}' - X) \subseteq \textbf{visit}') \wedge (\textbf{undergrad}' - \textbf{visit}') \neq \emptyset.$$

The operator $\ominus_c$ is interpreted as predicate negation in this case because, for all appropriate denotations P', $P'([\![\textit{some undergraduates}]\!]) \in \textsc{Inst}^+(P'([\![\textit{every student}]\!])$. This statement holds owing to the fact that $P'([\![\textit{every student}]\!])$ expresses a positive generalization, and the quantifier denoted by the complement of the EP lives on a subset of the set of students that this generality claim is about.

Likewise, sentence (44), repeated below as (50), is assigned the truth conditions in (51), in accordance with our understanding of its meaning (again ignoring quasi-semantic restriction).

(50) Nobody but two high-ranking cardinals expects the Spanish Inquisition.

(51) $([\![\textit{except}]\!]([\![\textit{two cardinals}]\!]))([\![\textit{nobody}]\!]))([\![\textit{expects}]\!]) \iff$
$((\textbf{person}' - X) \cap \textbf{expect\_si}') = \emptyset \wedge (\ominus_c(\textbf{expect si}'))(\textbf{two cardinals}') \iff$
$((\textbf{person}' - X) \cap \textbf{expect si}') = \emptyset \wedge$
$(\lambda X.\lambda x.[X(x)](\textbf{expect\_si}'))(\textbf{two cardinals}') \iff$
$((\textbf{person}' - X) \cap \textbf{expect\_si}') = \emptyset \wedge (\textbf{expect\_si}')(\textbf{two\_cardinals}') \iff$
$((\textbf{person}' - X) \cap \textbf{expect\_si}') = \emptyset \wedge (\textbf{cardinal}' \cap \textbf{expect\_si}') \geqslant 2.$

In this sentence, the operator $\ominus_c$ is interpreted as $\lambda X.\lambda x.[X(x)]$ given that, for all appropriate denotations P', $\bar{P}'([\![\textit{two high-ranking cardinals}]\!]) \in \textsc{Inst}^-(P'([\![\textit{nobody}]\!]))$. As above, the process of instantiation is indirect: this membership claim is satisfied because, for any appropriate P', $P'([\![\textit{nobody}]\!])$ expresses a negative generalization, and $\bar{P}'([\![\textit{two cardinals}]\!])$ is one way to characterize a subset of its instantiations.

4.4 On free uses of EPs

Free EPs have received less attention in the literature than their connected counterparts. Nevertheless, free EPs should arguably be the prototypical exceptive constructions, not only because they are less constrained in the range of hosts which

may license them, but also because their parenthetical syntax provides a better indication of their propositional semantics. In this section, I shall briefly present the main features of two current analyses of free EPs, and then discuss against this backdrop how the theory developed in this dissertation applies to free uses of EPs.

Hoeksema (1996a: 165) provides the following preliminary account of free uses of EPs:

(52) Let A be a proper name with denotation a, and S be a sentence with a distinguished position B, such that $[\![S]\!] = \phi([\![B]\!])$, then whenever $[\![S]\!] = \bigcap_{x \in X} \{\phi(\psi(x))\}$, where X is some subset of E, the domain of (first-order) quantification:

$$[\![\textit{except for } A, S]\!] = 1 \Longleftrightarrow \bigcap(\{\phi(\psi(x)) \mid x \in X\} - \{\phi(\psi(a))\}) = 1$$

According to this semantics, a sentence such as (53) below is true just in case the condition in (54) holds.

(53) Except for Smith, every pensioner was frugal.

(54) $\bigcap(\{\textbf{frugal}'(x) \mid x \in \textbf{pensioner}'\} - \{\textbf{frugal}'(\textbf{Smith}')\})$

The host of the EP in sentence (53) is taken to denote the MEET over a finite set of singular statements of the form $\{\textbf{frugal}'(x) \mid x \in \textbf{pensioner}'\}$, and the semantic effect of the EP is the subtraction of the statement $\textbf{frugal}'(\textbf{Smith}')$ from that set. Thus, the meaning of sentence (53) corresponds to the conjunction of a set of statements about the frugality of individual pensioners minus the one regarding Smith.

Hoeksema's account exploits a SUBSTITUTIONAL analysis of quantification that shares certain features with the theory of exceptive constructions developed in this dissertation. For example, exceptions are also accorded propositional status. However, the semantic rule in (52) suffers from two important shortcomings: first, exception sentences involving free uses of EPs are not predicted to make a negative assertion about the denotation of the complement of the EP by this rule, which, as I have shown, is contrary to fact; second, the requirement that the host of a free EP denotes the meet over a set of statements about individuals incorrectly excludes non-universal statements from the class of acceptable hosts.

In his discussion of free uses of EPs, von Fintel (1993, 1994) introduces a taxonomy of these constructions based on the perceived level of semantic integration into their hosts. He distinguishes between two main uses of free EPs: an APPOSITIVE use, illustrated by the sentences in (55), and a RESTRICTIVE one, exemplified by the sentences in (56).

(55) a. Except for Joan, most cabinet members liked the proposal.
b. Except for John, few employees accepted the pay cut.
(von Fintel 1993: 137, (33a–b))

(56) a. Except for Jim, no one really liked the soup.
b. Except for Jane, my relatives are (all) total bores.
c. Except for the assistant professors, most faculty members liked the dean.
(von Fintel 1993: 137, (34a–c))

According to von Fintel, the preferred interpretation of sentence (55a), for example, is one where the denotation of the right argument of the EP "is a notable exception to the generalization that cabinet members liked the proposal" (1994: 116). On the other hand, the most prominent reading of sentence (56c), for instance, is one in which, were it not for the assistant professors, it would be true that a majority of faculty members liked the dean.

Von Fintel concentrates on the restrictive use of free EPs, for which he proposes the analysis in (57).

(57) $[\![\textit{except for}]\!]\ C, Q\ A\ P = 1 \iff Q(A-C, P) \wedge \neg Q(A, P)$

According to this analysis, a sentence such as (53), repeated as (58) below, is assigned the interpretation in (59).

(58) Except for Smith, every pensioner was frugal.

(59) $(\mathbf{pensioner}' - \{\mathbf{Smith}'\} \subseteq \mathbf{frugal}') \wedge \neg(\mathbf{pensioner}' \subseteq \mathbf{frugal}')$

The main problem with this account is that, while a so-called restrictive reading may be possible for *except for*-phrases occurring in sentence initial position, such

an interpretation is not generally available to free construals of EPs.[4] Thus, for instance, the meaning of the slight variants of sentence (56c) given below cannot be captured by von Fintel's semantics.

(60) Most faculty members, except for the assistant professors, liked the dean.

(61) Except the assistant professors, most faculty members liked the dean.

In addition, it is not clear how a principled distinction can be drawn between appositive and restrictive uses of EPs, or how appositive uses of EPs should be analyzed. The interpretation of a sentence like (62), which presumably ought to involve an appositive use of the EP, is compatible with the quantificational claims in (63) being true together, thus contradicting the prediction made by the semantic rule in (57).

(62) Most guests, except for Smith, liked the dessert.

(63) a. $most_E(\mathbf{guest}' - \{\mathbf{Smith}'\}, \mathbf{like\_dessert}')$

b. $most_E(\mathbf{guest}', \mathbf{like\_dessert}')$

The semantics for free uses of EPs that I will now briefly present does not suffer from the problems outline above, and is in fact a natural extension of the theory of exceptive constructions developed in this dissertation. Consider the rule in (64).

(64) Let Σ be a sentence of the form $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{DP}}\ A][_{\text{T}'}\ldots P\ldots]]$.

$[\![except_f]\!]\ C, \Sigma \iff \Sigma \wedge ((\ominus_f P)(C))$,

where $[\![\ominus_f]\!] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \lambda X.\lambda x.\neg X(x), \text{ if } \textsc{Inst}^+(P(A), P(C)) \\ \lambda X.\lambda x.X(x), \text{ if } \textsc{Inst}^-(P(A), \bar{P}(C)) \\ \text{undefined otherwise} \end{cases}$

This rule is entirely analogous to the one discussed in section 3.4 for connected uses of EPs. The only difference lies in the interpretation of the exception operator $\ominus_f$: since free uses of EPs need not combine with generalization-inducing expressions, there is only property P to consider.

But how is this property obtained from the interpretation of the host of the EP? One might hypothesize, following the representation and resolution approach to

ellipsis in Dalrymple *et al.* (1991) (see also Lappin (1996a), Prüst *et al.* (1994) and Culicover and Jackendoff (2005)), that such a process involves: identifying an expression in the host which parallels the right argument of the EP; solving an equation which involves the interpretation of the host by abstracting over the meaning of the parallel expression; and applying the resulting property to the denotation of the EP-complement (after the semantic effect of the exception operator $\ominus_f$ has been taken into account).

Thus according to the analysis in (64), sentence (65), with the structure indicated in (66), is assigned the interpretation in (67).

(65) Except Wayne, every guest liked the log cabin.

(66)



(67) $((\llbracket \textit{except} \rrbracket(\llbracket \textit{Wayne} \rrbracket))(\llbracket \textit{every guest} \rrbracket))(\llbracket \textit{liked the log cabin} \rrbracket) \iff$
$((\textbf{guest}' - \{w\}) \subseteq \textbf{like\_cabin}') \wedge (\ominus_f(\textbf{like\_cabin}'))(w) \iff$
$((\textbf{guest}' - \{w\}) \subseteq \textbf{like\_cabin}') \wedge$
$(\lambda X.\lambda x.[\neg X(x)](\textbf{like\_cabin}'))(w) \iff$
$((\textbf{guest}' - \{w\}) \subseteq \textbf{like\_cabin}') \wedge (\neg\textbf{like\_cabin}')(w).$

Likewise, sentence (68), with the structure indicated in (69), receives the truth-conditions in (70).

(68) Except Gilda, few film noirs have a happy ending.

(69)



(70) $((\llbracket except \rrbracket(\llbracket Gilda \rrbracket))(\llbracket few\ film\ noirs \rrbracket))(\llbracket have\ a\ happy\ ending \rrbracket) \iff$
$(|(\textbf{film noir}' - \{g\}) \cap \textbf{have\_happy\_ending}'| \leqslant k \cdot |\textbf{film\_noir}'|) \wedge$
$(\ominus_f(\textbf{have\_happy\_ending}'))(g) \iff$
$(|(\textbf{film noir}' - \{g\}) \cap \textbf{have\_happy\_ending}'| \leqslant k \cdot |\textbf{film\_noir}'|) \wedge$
$(\lambda X.\lambda x.[\neg X(x)](\textbf{expected}'))(g) \iff$
$(|(\textbf{film noir}' - \{g\}) \cap \textbf{have\_happy\_ending}'| \leqslant k \cdot |\textbf{film\_noir}'|) \wedge$
$(\neg\textbf{have\_happy\_ending}')(g)$.

The truth-conditions in (67) and (70) correctly capture the meaning of these sentences.

4.5 Summary and conclusion

Natural languages are exceptionally well-suited for the expression of generalizations. Hoeksema (1987: 100) observed that the ability to express universally quantified statements, the strongest type of generalization, appears to be a property of every human language. Equally widespread among natural languages is the ability to express generalizations weaker than universal ones. And so, in English, for example, we are able to express not only the universal claim in (71a), but also the weaker ones in (71b) through (71e).

(71) a. Every attorney likes John Grisham's books.
b. Almost every attorney likes John Grisham's books.

c. Most attorneys like John Grisham's books.

d. Many attorneys like John Grisham's books.

e. Attorneys like John Grisham's books.

In this dissertation, I have looked at the role that generality claims of different types and degrees of strength play in the licensing of EPs. Starting from a detailed discussion of naturally-occurring data, I have shown that the empirical domain of exceptives is substantially larger than was previously assumed, and that several interpretive properties which are often associated with EPs in the literature must be reappraised.

In the dissertation, I have challenged some received views on exceptive constructions and argued, on the basis of syntactic and semantic evidence, for the following novel hypotheses: (*i*) EPs are sanctioned by statements that express generality claims; (*ii*) EPs do not directly affect the truth of the statements they modify; (*iii*) there are no exceptive determiners in English; (*iv*) exceptions are invariably propositional; and (*v*) EPs are not semantic (i.e. locally compositional) restrictors of quantifier domains. I have also advanced several new generalizations concerning exceptive constructions and, after reappraising the distribution of EPs in English, provided a semantics for connected and free uses of these phrases.

A central component of the theory developed in the dissertation is the hypothesis that exception sentences express a conjunctive proposition consisting of a generality claim and an exception to that statement. From this theoretical perspective, the licensing condition on EPs is not difficult to formulate: an EP is licensed only by sentences which give rise to the expression of a generalization about a given domain which includes the denotation of the right argument of the exceptive. Since generality claims may be instantiated defeasibly, I have argued that EPs are sensitive to defeasible aspects of sentence meaning.

There are a number of questions relating to the interpretation of EPs that have not been addressed in the dissertation, but which I hope to investigate in future research. I shall consider two examples. First, what is the right analysis of connected EPs which appear in association with categories other than DPs? For instance, in

naturally occurring sentences like the following, the EPs do not modify overtly quantificational expressions, but rather the lexical meaning of various adjectival predicates:

(72) a. He was naked except for a scarf.

b. The room is fully furnished except for linens and towels.

c. Smith is craft-challenged except for needlework.

Another important area which I hope to investigate further is the relationship between the meanings of exclusion, exception and addition, and how these meanings are carried by various expressions which have been traditionally assigned to the category of exceptives.

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5. This claim presupposes a view of the semantics of *almost* according to which an utterance of *almost* ϕ does not analytically entail *not* ϕ, as argued extensively and convincingly by Atlas (2005). Thus, for example, if I wager $100 that almost every film made in Hollywood will be a success this year, I expect to collect my winnings at the end of the year even if in fact all Hollywood films were successful.

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   (i) Sadly, the peace process has all but failed.

   (ii) Mary has all but said he won't talk to Kim.

9. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the quantifier expression *all* projects a DP in (48a)–(48c) and not a QP. See Sportiche (1988), Giusti (1991), Ritter (1991), Cardinaletti and Giusti (2006) for further discussion of this topic.

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69. Full derivations are provided below:

(73) $[\![\forall x((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge (x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x)) \wedge \Diamond(\neg\mathbf{passed}'(j))]\!]^{M,w,g} = 1$ iff
for all $d \in D$: $[\![((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge (x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x))]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ iff
for all $d \in D$: $[\![((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge (x \neq j))]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$
iff for all $d \in D$: $[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or $[\![(x \neq j)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or
$[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$: $[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or
$[\![x \neq j]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$:
$[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or $[\![x = j]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ or $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ and
for some $w' \in W$ such that $w\ R\ w'$: $[\![\neg\mathbf{passed}'(j)]\!]^{M,w',g} = 1$ iff
for some $w' \in W$ such that $w\ R\ w'$: $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(j)]\!]^{M,w',g} = 0$.

(74) $[\![\forall x\ ((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge \Diamond(x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x))]\!]^{M,w,g} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$:
$[\![((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge \Diamond(x \neq j)) \rightarrow \mathbf{passed}'(x))]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$:
$[\![((\mathbf{pilot}'(x) \wedge \Diamond(x \neq j))]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ iff for all
$d \in D$: $[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or $[\![\Diamond(x \neq j)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or
$[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$: $[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or
there is no $w' \in W$ such that $w\ R\ w'$: $[\![x \neq j]\!]^{M,w',g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ or
$[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ iff for all $d \in D$: $[\![\mathbf{pilot}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 0$ or for all
$w' \in W$ such that $w\ R\ w'$: $[\![x = j]\!]^{M,w',g'[x\,/d]} = 1$ or $[\![\mathbf{passed}'(x)]\!]^{M,w,g'[x\,/d]} = 1$.

70. The status of intermediate accommodation remains controversial. See, for example, Beaver (2001, 2004) and Beaver and Zeevat (2007).

Notes to Chapter 3

1. David Beaver and Paul Kiparsky (p.c.) provide counterexamples to the definition of generality claim given in this section like the following:

   (i) Most prime numbers are greater than four.

   Sentences of this type show that not every intuitively well-formed generalization can be reduced to a defeasible claim about any of the members of a given domain. Interestingly, sentence (i) does not seem to allow modification by EPs, which might suggest that whilst the definition in this section does capture the kinds of generalization that EPs are sensitive to, it is nevertheless inadequate as a universal definition of a generality claim. I hope to return to this important issue in future research.

2. The qualification introduced by 'actual' in the previous sentence is important, because it is possible to construe sentences like (28) as making a claim about individual god concepts, rather than simply about individual gods.

3. The 'Rule of Three' is justified as follows (William of Sherwood 1968: 23):

   > "The sign 'every' or 'all' distributes for the whole and complete plurality belonging to the term to which it is attached, but every totality and completion consists in at least three; therefore it requires a trio of appellata. As Aristotle says, "Of two men we say that they are two, or both, and not that they are all.""

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Notes to Chapter 4

1. This structure is similar to the one I proposed for exception DPs in section 2.4.6 of chapter 2.

2. Mackrell, A. "Farmer Beautified His Land." *The Sunday Star-Times*, January 4, 1998, p. 7. [Online]. Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/universe.

3. Since quantified DPs do not denote sets of individuals, the nominal restrictions in these examples should perhaps be obtained by taking just (one of) the MINIMAL WITNESS SET(S) of the quantifier.

4. This interpretation roughly corresponds to the NEGATIVE CONDITION reading of *except for* described in Quirk *et al.* (1985: 709).

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