The linguistics of desire (5)

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Today's target

(1) If there's dessert, I want you to stop me from ordering all of it, because I will want all of it.

A plan

- reminder: how conditionals might work
- conditionals and expressions of priority/preference
- two layers vs. one layer
- one and a half layers
- trying the severed complement view

The basic intuition about conditionals

- *if p* takes us to a region of the sea of possibilities where *p* is true
- the consequent is asserted to be true throughout that region
- which *p*-worlds constitute that region depends on
    - the evaluation world *w* we start from
    - what particular constraints there are on the mapping from *w* to the *p*-region

Stalnaker/Lewis

- *if p* takes us to the *p*-worlds that are most similar to *w*
- there is considerable context-dependency / vagueness in determining the criteria for similarity

Three Implementations

These differ in the compositional distribution of the three components of a modal/conditional operation:

- quantificational force
- modal base
- ordering

Implementation I: Tradition

- *if* as a modal operator that incorporates quantificational force ($\forall$), modal base *f* (possibly trivial, all of *W*), ordering source *g* (similarity-based)

$$[\![\text{if}]\!]^w = \lambda f.\lambda g.\lambda p.\lambda q.\ \forall w' :\ \ \text{BEST}_g(f(w) \cap p) :\ w' \in q$$

Implementation II: Kratzer's restrictor theory

- *if* as a mere restricting operator; *if p* narrows the modal base of some modal operator, covert or overt

[many options for precise implementation, underexplored]

Implementation III: referential theory

- *if p* as a definite plural description of the plurality of *p*-worlds that are f/g-best from *w*

[Schein, Schlenker, underexplored]

Conditionals with an overt operator in the consequent

- conditionals and deontic modality (Frank, Zvolenszky, ...)
- conditionals and imperatives (Kaufmann & Schwager)

Today, we add conditionals and desideratives

Two analyses

- 1L: restricted one-layer analysis

  [only available in restrictor analysis]

- 2L: two layer analysis [available for anyone]

Foreshadowing

- 1L makes a wrong prediction
- 2L is also not quite right
- 1.5L? how?

An example we already know

(2) If Howard returned the book late, he has to pay a fine.

Let's think through the 1L vs. 2L analyses.

If p, Op p

(3) If Jesse robbed the bank, Jesse should rob the bank. (Frank 1996: 30 (32b))

(4) If Britney Spears drinks Coke in public, then she must drink Coke in public. (Zvolenszky 2002: (10))

(5) If you drink Pepsi, drink Pepsi! Kaufmann & Schwager 2009: (15b)

(6) If you drink Pepsi, I want you to drink Pepsi.

Excursus: the puzzling absence of trivial readings

(7) If it's raining, it's raining.

(8) If it's raining, it must be raining.

If p can change the ordering source

(9) If the new laws for opening hours of shops go through, salespeople will have to work longer. (Frank, 1996: p199 (51))

(10) If Emma has another glass of wine, she will want dessert.

Another argument for 2L

K&S: we can detect the higher layer via stereotypicality effects

(11) If you lose your job, take a lower-paying one!

(12) But if you lose your job and have a comparable offer, don't take a lowerpaying one.

Frank

"There are in fact no truly deontically modalized if-conditionals. Instead, we assume conditionals with a deontic modal operator in the consequent clause to be analyzed throughout in terms of an implicit or explicit epistemically (or circumstantially) based modal operator. The deontic modal adverb is then to be analyzed within the scope of the 'higher' epistemic modal operator."

Conditional desires

(13) If there’s dessert, I want you to stop me.

A puzzle

(14) If there's dessert, I want baklava.

(15) If there's dessert and dessert wine, I want dark chocolate.

Q: do I have a preference against dessert wine?

The conundrum

We want a 1L restricted reading (since we're talking about actual preferences), but we also want stereotypicality.

1.5L?

Can we have a semantics for *if* that

- introduces stereotypicality
- but doesn't move the priority operators's evaluation point away from the actual world?

Yes, 1.5L!

Use the plural definite analysis and restrict the overt operator to those worlds.

if p, want q

x wants $(f \cap [\text{if } f' g' p])(g)(q)$

- f: DOX (in w)
- g: x's desires (in w)
- f': W or DOX (in w)
- g': similarity (to w)

NB: *want* can be restricted

The fact that we have conditional desires of the 1L or 1.5L kind is a strong argument for the modal analysis of attitudes with its manipulatable parameters.

Other conditional attitudes?

- Seth Yalcin 2016: Iffy knowledge
- Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín 2018: Embedded Attitudes

(16) If Bill is on a plane to Cuba, then I am surprised that he left without saying goodbye. Blumberg & Holguín 2018

But what if attitudes are not modal?

Remember Friday's sketch of the non-modal analysis of attitudes due to Kratzer etc.

The idea, again

- Attitude predicates are not possible worlds quantifiers.
- They are predicates of eventualities (event/states).
- Their complements aren’t complements but also predicates of (the same eventualities).
- Quantification over possible worlds is introduced by the “complement”.

(17) Naby believes that Brianna is in Rethymno.

- There is an eventuality *s*
  - that is the belief state of Naby's in *w*
  - and in all worlds compatible with *s*, Brianna is in Rethymno

x believes that p

$$\exists s: \quad \text{belief}(s, x, w) \;\&\; \forall w' \in f(s): \; p(w') = 1$$

How can we get 1L/1.5L readings of conditionals in this theory?

Some slides from Kratzer 2013 (“Constructing domains for deontic (and other) modals”, Talk at USC)

First, conditional obligation

(48) There should be no poverty.

(49) If there is poverty, you should help the poor.

Mechanics of restricting *should*

- [[if there is poverty]] =

  $\lambda R\, \lambda c\, \lambda s\;\; R(c \cap \{w\text{: there is poverty in } w\})(s)$.

- [[should]](p) =

  $\lambda c\, \lambda s\, \forall w\, (w \in \text{BEST}_s(c) \rightarrow$

  $\exists s'(s' \leq w \;\&\; \text{exemplify}(p)(s') \;\&\; \text{satisfy}(s)(s')))$.

High type “if” that takes a quantifier waiting for a restriction and returns a claim waiting for a restriction (while having restricted the quantifier’s restriction to its p).

Conditional requests

(50) I request that you make no mistake, but that, if you do make a mistake, you correct it right away.

- The embedded *if*-clause restricts a non-overt modal delivered by subjunctive mood. The modal has a situation argument that is identified with my request.

1.5L, again

Even in Kratzer's new setup, we still need the extra component of stereotypicality.

Summary

No matter how we implement conditional semantics and attitude semantics,

- conditionals need to be able to restrict modal operators without introducing an additional layer of quantification over worlds
- but they need to simultaneously restrict the restricting to stereotypical worlds

That is, we need a 1.5L analysis, an analysis where *if p* does not introduce quantification but does introduce a narrowing to stereotypical *p* worlds.