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Conditional Analysis of Clausal Exceptives[1]

1. Introduction

In this paper I discuss the English exceptive construction introduced by *except* like the one given in (1). I offer novel arguments in favor of the idea that (1) can be derived from (2) by ellipsis and I propose a semantic theory that relates the main clause containing a universal quantification over girls and the *except*-clause in such a way that the inferences that (1) comes with are predicted and the known restrictions on the use of exceptives are derived.

(1) Every girl came except Eva.
(2) Every girl came except Eva did not come.

My arguments in favor of the idea that the complement of *except* has a clausal structure are based on the observation that English *except* can host syntactic elements larger than DPs such as PPs with prepositions making a contribution to the overall meaning of a sentence (as the contrast between (3) and (4) shows).

(3) I got no presents except from my mom.
(4) #I got no presents except my mom.

The ellipsis story also naturally explains the cases originally noted in (Moltmann 1995) where an exceptive contains multiple elements like in the example (5).

(5) Every boy danced with every girl except Eva with Bill.

I argue that the ellipsis site inside reduced *except*-clauses operating on universal quantifiers in examples like (1) contains negation based on NPI licensing inside such clauses.

There are exceptives introduced by other markers in English. Some representative are given in (6) and (7). In this paper I will not make any claims about *except for* and *but*. I will specifically focus on the exceptives introduced by *except*.

(6) Except for Eva every girl came.
(7) Every girl but Eva came.

English exceptives are relatively well studied and there is a significant amount of literature on this topic (Keenan & Stavi 1986, Hoeksema 1987, 1995, von Fintel 1993, 1994, Moltmann 1995, Gajewski 2008, Garcıa Alvarez 2008, Hirsch 2016, etc). It has been established in the existing literature that exceptives, like the ones in (1), (6), and (7), come with the inferences given in (8)

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(the domain subtraction), in (9) (the containment entailment – Eva is in the restrictor set) and in (10) (the negative entailment) (Horn 1989, von Fintel 1993, 1994).

The Domain Subtraction:

(8) Every girl who is not Eva came.

The Containment Entailment:

(9) Eva is a girl.

The Negative Entailment:

(10) Eva did not come.

Another crucial observation about exceptives that goes back to Horn (1989) is that they are not compatible with existential quantifiers as illustrated in (11), (12), (13). Following the existing literature (Gajewski 2008, Hirsch 2016), I will refer to the puzzle of explaining this fact as the distribution puzzle.

(11) * Some girls except Eva came.
(12) * Some girls but Eva came.
(13) * Some girls except for Eva came.

The existing semantic theories of exceptives are based on the assumption that an exceptive introduces a DP that is interpreted as a set (Hoeksema 1987, 1995, von Fintel 1994, Gajewski 2008) or an atomic or plural individual (Hirsch 2016). This set can be used to restrict domains of quantifiers quantifying over individuals in a natural way. The classic theory of exceptives was developed in von Fintel's work (1993, 1994) for exceptives introduced by *but*, like the one in (7). It accounts for the domain subtraction inference in this example by subtracting the singleton set containing Eva from the set of girls. It accounts for the negative inference and the containment inference by adding a claim that if the subtraction does not happen, the quantificational claim is not true: it is not true that every girl came. This idea also gives us a way of dealing with the distribution puzzle (the fact that the example in (12) is ungrammatical): existential claims unlike universal claims cannot be true for a smaller domain and false for a bigger domain. Thus, by providing an exceptive phrase with access to the domain of a quantifier the classic theory captures the inferences the exceptives come with and the restrictions on their usage.

In this paper I argue that this analysis cannot be extended to exceptives introduced by *except*. If the complement of *except* in (1) contains (or at least can contain) a reduced clause, as I will argue, *except* must relate the two clauses in (14) and (15) semantically in such a way that the inferences in (8) and (9) are captured and the restriction observed in (11) is derived. A proposition is an object of type <st> and it cannot be used to restrict the domain of a quantifier quantifying over individuals.

(14) Every girl came.
(15) Eva did not come.

One naturally occurring idea about how the clauses (14) and (15) can be related in the relevant way is that the exceptive clause is interpreted as some sort of a counterfactual conditional. The idea roughly is that the meaning of (1) (or at least a part of the meaning of (1)) can be expressed by the counterfactual conditional in (16), where the exceptive clause provides the antecedent.

(16) If (15) were false, (14) would have been true.

There are certain similarities between the meaning of the sentence with the reduced *except*-clause in (1) and the meaning of the counterfactual conditional in (16). Intuitively, the part of the meaning they share is that the fact that Eva did not come is the thing that stands in a way of the proposition denoted by 'every girl came' being true in the actual world.

However, there are important differences between (1) and (16) as well. First of all, (16) does not entail that Eva is a girl (although (16) does come with the inferences that Eva did not come and that it is not true that every girl came). Compare (16) with (17) where *Eva* is substituted by a male name *John*. The sentence in (17) could be true in a scenario where every girl for some reason does whatever John does or goes wherever he goes.

(17) If 'John did not come' were false, 'every girl came' would have been true.

Moreover, the sentence in (18), where *every* is substituted by *some,* is totally coherent. Thus, the counterfactual paraphrase does not have anything to say about the distribution of exceptives and the fact that they are not acceptable with existential quantifiers.

(18) If 'Eva did not come' were false, 'some girl came' would have been true.

In this paper I propose a novel analysis for clausal exceptives that is built on the idea that the meaning of the sentence with *except* in (1) involves looking at possible situations that differ from what actually happened only with respect to the facts about Eva coming. What this sentence says about those situations is that every girl came in them. In the story I propose exceptive clauses introduce quantification over possible situations and serve as restrictors for this quantification. This explains the similarities in meanings between sentences with exceptives and their counterfactual paraphrases. I will call this part of the meaning Conditional Domain Subtraction because this is a part of the meaning contributed by *except* that is responsible for the domain subtraction inference (that the quantificational claim is true on the domain that does not include Eva). The negative inference is contributed directly by the clause inside the exceptive.

I propose that there is also another aspect of meaning of exceptives that I will call Conditional Leastness. This is a claim that establishes the law-like relation between the main clause containing a quantificational expression and the clause introduced by *except*. In our example Conditional Leastness is a claim that in every situation where Eva did not come, the claim 'every girl came' is false. The role of this meaning component is threefold. It is responsible for the containment inference, in our example this is the inference that Eva is a girl. It is also responsible for the fact that clausal exceptives are not compatible with existential quantifiers. Specifically, with some additional independently motivated assumptions about indefinites, Conditional Leastness is guaranteed to contradict Conditional Domain Subtraction if the quantifier *except* operates on is existential. Thus, under the assumption that contradictions that cannot be repaired by replacing open-class lexical items are perceived as ungrammatical in natural languages (Gajewski 2002), the ungrammaticality of sentences like (11), where an exceptive operates on an existential, is predicted. The third role of this meaning component is that it controls the ellipsis resolution in *except*-clauses.

I show how the analysis proposed here explains all the cases that are explained by the classic theory and how it explains the cases that the classic theory cannot explain, such as examples involving prepositional phrases and multiple constituents, like the one shown here earlier in (3) and (5).

2. The Classic Approach to the Semantics of Exceptives

An approach to the semantics of exceptives that captures the negative entailment and the containment entailment and explains the distribution puzzle was proposed by von Fintel (1993, 1994). I will introduce von Fintel's system by using an example with a *but*-exceptive. This is the exceptive this analysis was designed for.

(19) Every girl but Eva and Mary came.

The sentence in (19) is true if every girl who is not Eva or Mary came. However, as von Fintel observes, it is not enough to simply subtract a set {Eva, Mary} from the domain of *every girl*. This will not guarantee that Eva and Mary are girls and that they did not come. It also does not account for the fact that (20) is not a well-formed sentence. Subtracting a set from the domain of the existential quantifier in (20) would make the sentence more informative: an existential is more informative on a smaller domain. However, *but* is not compatible with *some*.

(20) *Some girl but Eva and Mary came.

According to this theory, the contribution of an exceptive is twofold. An exceptive subtracts a set from the domain of a quantifier and states that this is the minimal set that has to be subtracted in order for the quantificational claim to be true. The last claim is known in the literature as the Leastness Condition (the term is from Gajewski 2008, p.75). The Leastness Condition derives the containment entailment and the negative entailment and explains the distribution puzzle in a straightforward way.

Specifically, in (19) Leastness is the claim that if either Eva or Mary are not removed from the set of girls, the universal quantificational claim is false. Since the subtraction of this set is necessary for the quantificational claim to be true, Mary and Eva have to be girls and have to be among the people who did not come. Otherwise the quantificational claim could not change its truth-value depending on whether we include or exclude those two individuals from the domain of quantification.

Putting things informally, the sentences with existential quantifiers like the one in (11) are predicted by this theory to be ungrammatical because it is not possible for an existential quantificational claim to be true on a reduced domain that does not include Eva and Mary and yet be false if a bigger domain that includes those two individuals is considered. Thus, exceptives with existentials are predicted to yield a contradiction irrespective of the meaning of other lexical items in the sentence. The assumption here is that sentences with those properties are perceived as ungrammatical (Gajewski 2002). The formal implementation of these ideas will be discussed below.

Under the assumption that the *but*-phrase forms a constituent with *girls*, a possible structure of the sentence in (19) is given in (21).

(21)



But has the semantics given in (22). It combines with its own sister (the set denoted by the DP immediately following it), then with a set in the restrictor of the determiner, then with the determiner and with the scope.

(22) [[but]] = $\lambda B_{<et>}$. $\lambda A_{<et>}$. $\lambda D_{<<et><<et>t>>}$. $\lambda P_{<et>}$.
sist of *but* restr set determiner scope
$D(A\text{-}B)(P)$ & $\forall Y[\neg B \subseteq Y \rightarrow \neg D(A\text{-}Y)(P)]$
Domain Subtraction Leastness

The first conjunct in (22) is just the quantificational claim, where the set denoted by the sister of *but* is subtracted from the domain of the quantifier. The second conjunct is the Leastness Condition. It quantifies over sets. It states that it holds for any set that if it is subtracted from the domain of the quantifier and the resulting quantificational claim is true, then this set is already contained in the set denoted by the sister of *but*. The result of interpreting the structure in (21) is given in (23).

(23) $[[(21)]]^g = 1$ iff $\forall x[x \text{ is a girl} \;\&\; x \notin \{Eva, Mary\} \rightarrow x \text{ came}]$ &
$\forall Y[\neg\{Eva, Mary\} \subseteq Y \rightarrow \neg \forall x[x \text{ is a girl} \;\&\; x \notin Y \rightarrow x \text{ came}]]$

The first conjunct in (23) is the domain subtraction: this is a universal quantificational claim made on a domain that excludes Eva and Mary.

The second conjunct is the Leastness Condition. An equivalent formulation of it is given in (24).

(24) $\forall Y[\neg\{Eva, Mary\} \subseteq Y \rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is a girl} \;\&\; x \notin Y \;\&\; \neg\, x \text{ came}]]$

What Leastness says is that if we subtract a set that does not contain at least one of the elements in {Eva, Mary} the quantificational claim is going to be false. For example, if we subtract nothing at all (the empty set, which contains neither Eva nor Mary), the quantificational claim is not true: not every girl came or, equivalently, some girl did not come (shown in (25)).

(25) $\exists x[x \text{ is a girl} \;\&\; x \notin \varnothing \;\&\; \neg\, x \text{ came}]$

Even if we subtract a set that contains all girls who are not Mary, there still will be a girl who did not come. This can be the case only if Mary is a girl who did not come. In a similar way, if we subtract a set that contains all girls who are not Eva, there is still a girl who did not come: that is Eva.

Thus, in this system, the negative entailment (the inference that Eva and Mary were not there) and the containment entailment (the inference that Eva and Mary are girls) follow from the Leastness Condition. As was noted earlier, the solution to the distribution puzzle is also in the Leastness Condition. It guarantees a contradiction between the first conjunct and the second conjunct in cases where a quantifier has an existential force. This accounts for the fact that the example with *some girl* in (20) is ungrammatical.

More formally, under the assumptions about the meaning of *but* that we made in (22), (20) will get the meaning given in (26).

(26) $[[(20)]]^g = 1$ iff $\exists x[x \text{ is a girl } \& \ x \notin \{Eva, Mary\} \& \ x \text{ came}]$ &
$\forall Y[\neg\{Eva, Mary\} \subseteq Y \rightarrow \neg\exists x[x \text{ is a girl } \& \ x \notin Y \& \ x \text{ came}]$

There is no model where the two conjuncts in (26) can be simultaneously true. This is because the existential quantifier has different properties than the universal quantifier: it is upward entailing on its restrictor. The second conjunct in (26) is Leastness. It says 'no girl came'. The reason for this is as follows. Let's consider the empty set $\varnothing$ again. Since the empty set does not contain Eva or Mary, Leastness requires that (27) holds: there is no girl in the universe who came. This contradicts the first conjunct in (26) (the domain subtraction): it cannot be simultaneously true that there is a girl who is not Eva or Mary who came and there is no girl who came at all.

(27) $\neg\exists x[x \text{ is a girl } \& \ x \notin \varnothing \ \& \ x \text{ came}]$

A contradiction of this kind is predicted to always arise if an exceptive is used with an existential quantifier. Consequently, under the assumption that sentences that are contradictory due to the combination of the functional elements in them are perceived as ungrammatical in natural languages (Gajewski 2002), this approach correctly captures the fact that (20) is ungrammatical in English.

In the next section I will argue that there are exceptive constructions that cannot be analyzed in this way.

3. Exceptive Deletion Exists

3.1. English *Except* Does not Introduce a Set of Individuals

In the recent literature it has been observed that there are exceptive constructions where what follows an exceptive marker is a clause and not a DP. Perez-Jimenez and Moreno-Quiben (2010) argue that Spanish *excepto* can host remnants of a clausal structure. Potsdam and Polinsky (2017) argue that clausal exceptives exist in Tahitian. Potsdam and Polinsky (2019) argue that English *except* is a clausal exceptive construction.

In this Section I will review the known arguments in favor of the idea that English *except* introduces a clause. I will also develop new arguments against the idea that it introduces a set of individuals.

Moltmann (1995) observes that English *except* can contain several constituents of different syntactic types as shown in (28).

(28) Every girl danced with every boy everywhere except Eva with Bill in the kitchen.

The sentence in (28) means that Eva did not dance with Bill in the kitchen, but every pair consisting of a girl and a boy other than Eva and Bill danced in every place, even Eva and Bill danced with each other in every place other than the kitchen.

Moltmann (1995) argued that an exceptive can introduce a small clause that semantically is interpreted as a tuple of sets (<{Juan}, {Eva}, {the kitchen}>) that operates on a polyadic quantifier (<every man, every woman, everywhere>)[2]. However, as Perez-Jimenez and Moreno-Quiben (2010) point out, this proposal does not explain why *with* and *in* cannot be omitted in (28) as shown in (29).

(29) *Every girl danced with every boy everywhere, except Eva Bill the kitchen.

Exceptives with multiple remnants cannot be accounted for within the classic theory. One idea that we can immediately reject is that in cases like (28), an exceptive introduces several sets and they are somehow subtracted from the domains of the relevant quantifiers. Then the Leastness Condition is imposed for each of the subtractions. Specifically, the idea would be that in (29), *except* introduces three sets - {Eva}, {Bill}, {the kitchen} and the first of them is subtracted from the set of girls, the second one from the set of boys and the third one from the set of places. First of all, it suffers from the problem noticed by Perez-Jimenez and Moreno-Quiben, illustrated in (29). Secondly, this approach would predict that (30) and (31) should have equivalent meanings. However, that is not the case, as was observed by Moltmann (1995). (30) can be true if Eva danced with Bill: this sentence says that Eva is the only exception to the generalization 'all girls danced with all boys other than Bill and did not dance with Bill'. One way of being an exception to this generalization for Eva is to dance with Bill. (31) cannot be true in this scenario: it requires that Eva and Bill did not dance together: it states that Eva dancing with Bill is the only thing that stands in the way of 'every girl danced with every boy' being true.

(30) Every girl except Eva danced with every boy except Bill.
(31) Every girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.

It seems to be the case that what follows the exceptive marker in (28) must have a clausal structure. The fact that there are clausal exceptive constructions where only a part of the structure is pronounced does not prove that their surface form is derived by ellipsis. Another possibility is that a part of the structure is shared between the main clause and the *except*-clause. I will not explore this possibility, as I will show in the next section, there is a constituent in the *except*-

[2] Motlmann proposed to do subtraction from every set in the denotation of the generalized quantifier and not from the restrictor set (1995).

clause that is present neither in the main clause nor among the pronounced elements of the *except*-clause, namely, negation.

Exceptives with multiple remnants introduce several new interesting semantic puzzles. As was said in the introduction, one well-established fact about exceptives is that they cannot operate on existential quantifiers (Horn 1989, von Fintel 1994). Exceptives with multiple constituents obey this constraint in their own interesting way: each element of an exceptive phrase has to have a universal quantifier as a correlate in the main clause (as shown by the ungrammatical (32) and (33)).

(32) *Every girl danced with *some* boy except Eva with Bill.
(33) **Some* girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.

In general, there is no prohibition against existential quantifiers in the main clause as long as an exceptive does not contain a corresponding constituent (as shown by the contrast between (34) and (35)). The observation that this contrast exists to my knowledge has not been made in the previous literature[3]. Those are the facts that a semantic theory of clausal exceptives has to capture.

(34) Every girl danced with every boy *somewhere* except Eva with Bill.
(35) *Every girl danced with every boy *somewhere* except Eva with Bill *in the kitchen*.

The novel challenge to the idea that an exceptive introduces a set that can be used to restrict the domain of a quantifier quantifying over individuals that I would like to add is based on the observation that an exceptive introduced by *except* can host a PP with a meaningful preposition. One such example is given in (36). *From Barcelona* denotes a set of things that are from Barcelona. The denotation of this prepositional phrase is shown in (37).

(36) I met a student from every city in Spain except from Barcelona.
(37) {x: x is from Barcelona}

Subtraction of this set from the set of cities cannot restrict the domain of the quantifier in the relevant way here, because things that are from Barcelona are not cities. Subtracting things that are from Barcelona from a set of cities in Spain is equivalent to the set of cities in Spain, as shown in (38).

(38) {x: x is a city in Spain}-{x: x is from Barcelona}={x: x is a city in Spain}

Moreover, we cannot apply von Fintel's idea that an exceptive also contributes a claim that if we subtract a set that does not include one of the things that are from Barcelona, the quantificational claim is not going to be true to derive the inference that Barcelona is a city in Spain and the inference that I did not meet a student from Barcelona. Let us, for example, take the empty set ∅ and subtract it from the domain of *every* in this case. Leastness requires that (40) is true. However,

[3] I thank Kyle Johnson for this observation. The observation that there is a restriction on the types of quantifiers in the main clause is not novel, it goes back to (Moltmann 1995). However, as far as I know, the observation that it is only the type of the correlates of the remnants that matter is novel.

(39) directly contradicts (40) because the quantification in the two cases ends up being restricted to the same set.

(39) $\forall$x[x is a city in Spain & x is not from Barcelona$\rightarrow\exists$y[y is a student from x & I met y]]
(40) $\neg\forall$x[x is a city in Spain & x$\notin\varnothing \rightarrow \exists$y[y is a student from x & I met y]]

Those inferences are however still present in (36). The containment inference is tested in (41). This sentence is infelicitous because New York is not a city in Spain. The negative inference is tested in (42): the sentence is infelicitous. Due to the fact that *except* contributes the negative inference the claim with *except* cannot be conjoined with the claim that contradicts that inference.

(41) #I met a student from every city in Spain except from New York.
(42) #I met a student from Barcelona and I met a student from every city in Spain except from Barcelona.

Another case challenging the phrasal syntactic analysis of exceptives that I will consider is the one where an exceptive phrase contains a prepositional phrase that has no correlate (a corresponding antecedent) in the main clause. The example is given in (43) (this example is based on a structurally similar example from Spanish reported by Perez-Jimenez and Moreno-Quiben (2010), but the argument I develop is a new one). The contrast between (43) and (44), where the PP was substituted by a DP, tells us that the preposition *from* makes an important contribution to the overall meaning of the sentence (Perez-Jimenez and Moreno-Quiben 2010).

(43) I got no presents except from my mom.
(44) #I got no presents except my mom.

Note that in English *from my mom* cannot be derived by ellipsis from *the one from my mom*. This is because *the one* is not the kind of constituent that be deleted in English, as shown by the contrast between (45) and (46).

(45) I got two presents; the one from my mom was nice.
(46) *I got two presents; from my mom was nice.

Here, unlike in the previous example, we could try to take the set of things that are from my mom and subtract it from the set of presents. This move will allow us to restrict the quantification to those presents that are not things from my mom (this is shown in (47) and the full quantification with domain subtraction is shown in (48)).

(47) {y: y is a present}-{x: x is from my mom} = {z: z is a present & z is not from my mom}

(48) $\neg\exists$x[x is a present & x is not from my mom & I got x]

However, extending the analysis von Fintel proposed for *but* to this case with *except* would also require adding the second claim – the Leastness Condition. Leastness in this case would be the claim in (49) (any set such that if it is subtracted from the domain of the quantifier and makes the quantificational claim true contains a set of things from my mom as its subset).

(49) $\forall Y[\neg\exists x[\text{x is a present} \,\&\, x \notin Y \,\&\, \text{I got x}] \rightarrow \{x\text{: x is from my mom}\} \subseteq Y]$

This claim in (49) is equivalent to (50). The proof for that is given in (51)[4].

(50) $\{x\text{: x is from my mom}\} \subseteq \{y\text{: y is a present}\} \cap \{z\text{: I got z}\}$

(51) (49)=

$$\forall Y[\forall x[\text{x is a present} \,\&\, x \notin Y \rightarrow \neg\text{I got x}] \rightarrow \{x\text{: x is from my mom}\} \subseteq Y] =$$
$$\forall Y\, [\{y\text{: y is a present}\} \cap \overline{Y} \subseteq \overline{\{x\text{: I got x}\}} \rightarrow \{x\text{: x is from my mom}\} \subseteq Y] =$$
$$\forall Y\, [\{y\text{: y is a present}\} \cap \{z\text{: I got z}\} \subseteq Y \rightarrow \{x\text{: x is from my mom}\} \subseteq Y] =$$
$$\{x\text{: x is from my mom}\} \subseteq \{y\text{: y is a present}\} \cap \{z\text{: I got z}\}$$

This amounts to the following claim: every object that is from my mom is a present such that I got it. The sentence (43) does not come with this inference. It does not require that my mom gives things only to me or that all the objects that are from my mom are gifts. Thus, this example cannot be accounted for in terms of the classic analysis.

In this section I have argued that English *except* does not introduce a set of individuals that can be used to restrict a domain of a quantifier quantifying over individuals. Specifically, *except* can host multiple constituents or prepositional phrases with meaningful prepositions. In the next section I will show that in some cases the unpronounced part of an *except*-clause contains more material in it than the main clause of the sentence. This is the argument in favor of the idea that the structures of the examples I have shown in this section are derived by ellipsis rather than via some process that results in sharing a part of the structure.

3.2. Evidence for the Polarity Mismatch

In the introduction I suggested that (1) (repeated here as (52)) can be derived from (2) (repeated here as (53)) by ellipsis.

(52) Every girl came except Eva.
(53) Every girl came except Eva did not come.

A reader can observe the polarity mismatch in (53) between the main clause and the *except*-clause: there is negation in the *except*-clause that is not present in the main clause.

Most of English speakers find acceptable the non-elided version of (52) given in (53) and they do not accept a version of it where the *except*-clause is positive (given in (54)).

(54) #Every girl came except Eva came.

Now, let's look at the interaction of *except* with a negative quantifier in (55). No English speaker accepts the full version of the *except*-clause where the polarity of the clause is negative (given in (56)). Some speakers of English accept the full version given in (57). I propose that (55) can derived from (57) by ellipsis.

[4] This proof is built on the general proof that von Fintel (1994) provides.

(55) No girl came except Eva.
(56) #No girl came except Eva did not come.
(57) No girl came except Eva came.

If a reduced *except*-clause operating on a universal quantifier has negation in it and the reduced *except*-clause operating on a negative quantifier does not, the prediction is that we should see differences between those two cases with respect to NPI licensing. Specifically, under the constituent-based approach to NPI licensing (Chierchia 2004; Gajewski 2005; Homer 2011), an NPI is licensed if there is a syntactic constituent containing that NPI which constitutes a downward entailing environment. For instance, in (58) the global position of the NPI *any vegetables* in the sentence is not in DE environment because there are two negations and they cancel each other out. However, the NPI is licensed inside the syntactic constituent in brackets in (58), which is a DE environment.

(58) It's not true that [John did not eat any vegetables].

In a similar way, if what I said about how the exceptive ellipsis is resolved is correct, NPIs are predicted to be licensed inside reduced *except*-clauses providing exceptions for universal quantifiers, but not inside reduced *except*-clauses providing exceptions for negative quantifiers because only in the first case there is a constituent – the sentence following *except* – that is a downward entailing environment because it contains negation.

This prediction is borne out as the contrast between (59) and (60) shows. This observation has not been made in the previous work on exceptives.[5]

(59) John danced with *everyone* except with *any girl* from his class.
(60) *John danced with *no one* except with *any girl* from his class.

Moreover, if we consider the entire sentence (59) the NPI is not in DE environment. The claim with a larger exception does not grant the inference that a claim with a smaller exception is true: from (61) we cannot conclude that (62) is true.

(61) John danced with everyone except with girls from his class.
(62) John danced with everyone except with *blond* girls from his class.

The problem is with what happens with the restrictor of the universal quantifier when we go from (61) to (62): it gets bigger and the inference from a set to a superset on the restrictor of *every* is not granted. Let's consider a situation where there is a girl with black hair in John's class, say Zahra. (61) does not require that John danced with her (he danced with everyone who is not a girl

[5] Interestingly, the English exceptive construction introduced by *but* does not show a similar contrast: NPIs are not licensed inside a *but*-phrase independently of whether the quantifier is universal or negative (shown in (1) and (2)). Another fact about *but* is that it does not show traces of clausal structure: the maximal syntactic constituent it can host is a DP.
(1) *John danced with *everyone* but *any girl* from his class.
(2) *John danced with *no one* but *any girl* from his class.
(3) John danced with everyone but Eva.
(4) *John danced with everyone but with Eva.

in his class), (62) requires him dancing with her (he danced with everyone who is not a *blond* girl in his class). From this I conclude that an NPI in (59) has to be licensed locally[6].

In the story I propose the contrast between (59) and (60) follows from the way the ellipsis is resolved in the two cases (shown in (63) and (64)).

(63) John danced with *everyone* except [~~John did **not** dance~~ with *any girl* from his class].
(64) *John danced with *no one* except [~~John danced~~ with *any girl* from his class].

In the conditional semantic theory of clausal exceptives that I propose the polarity of the clause is forced by the meaning. Nothing in syntax forces or blocks the presence of negation in the elided *except*-clause. We are free to resolve the ellipsis positively or negatively. Choosing a clause with a wrong polarity like in (65) and (66) leads to a meaning that is not well-formed. This is shown in Section 5 where the semantic proposal is introduced and discussed.

(65) #Every girl came except Eva ~~came~~.
(66) #No girl came except Eva ~~did not come~~.

If we are dealing with a negative generalization, the *except*-clause will be positive even if it operates on *every* as illustrated in (67).

(67) Every girl did not come except Eva ~~came~~.

One question that I don't have much to say about is how a positive sentence can be a valid antecedent for ellipsis that contains negation like in (52). Normally ellipsis resists those kinds of mismatches. One example reported in the literature where such a mismatch exists in sluicing is given in (68)

(68) Do this or explain why ~~you did not do this~~. (Rudin (2017) credits (Kroll 2016) for this example.)

As Rudin (2017) points out, not all English speakers find this example completely acceptable. It certainly does not feel as natural as (52) (repeated below as (69)).

(69) Every girl came except Eva.

I think that what is going on in (69) is more similar to the Russian case in (70). In (70) there is a polarity mismatch between the positive antecedent and the negative elided clause. The remnant of ellipsis in (70) contains an n-word. N-words in Russian require the presence of negation, as the contrast between (71) and (72) shows. There is no pronounced negation in (70), but the n-word is

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[6] Note that (61) also does not Strawson-entail (62) (the notion is from von Fintel 1999), thus the position of *any* in (59) is not in a Strawson DE contexts. A sentence A Strawson-entails another sentence B if the truth-conditional content of A entails the truth conditional content of B if the presuppositions of both of the involved sentences are satisfied. In our case the quantificational claim with the relevant restriction must be a part of the truth-conditional content. This can be tested by placing (61) in a question context. The answer of the interlocutor B targets the quantificational claim ('no, there are some people who John did not dance with who are not girls from his class')

(1) A: Did John dance with everyone except girls from his class?
B: No, he also did not dance with Bill.

licensed. Somehow the presence of an n-word licenses ellipsis of a constituent containing negation. Possibly, in a similar way the presence of *except* licenses ellipsis of a constituent containing negation in exceptive deletion.

(70)

Vanya	pročital	tri	knigi,	a	ja	ni	odnoj.
Vanya	read	three	books	and	I	n-word	one

‘Vanya read 3 books and I did not read any’

(71)

Ja	**ne**	pročital	ni	odnoj	knigi.
I	**NEG**	read	n-word	one	book

‘I did not read any books’

(72)

*Ja	pročital	ni	odnoj	knigi.
I	read	n-word	one	book

Intended: ‘I did not read any books’.

4. It is not Just a Conjunction of Two Clauses.

The simplest hypothesis about the meaning of clausal exceptives is that an exceptive and the clause containing a quantifier are simply coordinated. The idea here would be that (73) is structurally identical to (74). Under this hypothesis, the negative entailment is explained directly because it is simply the contribution of the exceptive clause. It is standardly assumed that a quantifier comes with a covert domain restriction variable[7]. Following this assumption, the sentence in (74) is not perceived as contradictory because there is a possible value for the covert domain restriction variable *everyone* comes with that does not include John.

(73) I danced with everyone except with John.
(74) I danced with everyone, but I did not dance with John.

The more challenging problem is the distribution puzzle. Under the assumption that an exceptive clause and a main clause are simply coordinated in clausal exceptives, one can try to explain the badness of *except* with *some* by saying that *except* obligatorily introduces a silent *only*. Thus the badness of (76) would essentially follow from the unacceptability of (75), which must be due to the pragmatic oddness of putting together the two claims: that Alex is the only person who did not help and that some people helped.

(75) #Some of my friends came to help, only not Alex.
(76) #Some of my friends came to help, except Alex.

Of course, the simple coordination analysis has nothing to say about why a sentence with *except* has to have a quantifier in the first place. Contrastive coordination is fine in (77), where no quantifier is present. And (78) where the DP in the second conjunct is associated with *only*, is acceptable. However, (79) is completely infelicitous.

(77) I talked to Mary, but I did not talk to Ann.

[7] This idea is based on von Fintel’s (1994) way of modeling quantifier domain restriction.

(78) I will talk to Mary and Olga, only not to Ann.
(79) *I will talk to Mary and Olga except to Ann.

The most challenging problem for the semantic analysis of clausal exceptives is the containment entailment. It is quite clear that a simple coordination analysis in (80) or a coordination analysis plus exhaustification by *only* in (81) cannot explain why (80) and (81) are well-formed, but (82) sounds contradictory.

(80) None of my girlfriends helped me, but Peter, who is a complete stranger, did.
(81) None of my girlfriends helped me, only Peter, who is a complete stranger (did).
(82) #None of my girlfriends helped me, except Peter, who is a complete stranger.

In a similar way, (83) does not impose containment, whereas (84) requires that your computer is one of your textbooks or notes and this is why this sentence is infelicitous.

(83) You can use any textbooks or notes, only not your computer.
(84) #You can use any textbooks or notes except your computer.

We can conclude from this that the simple coordination analysis cannot work for exceptives because it cannot capture some of their most basic properties.

5. The Proposal

In this section I propose a semantic analysis for clausal exceptives. The analysis I develop is conditional in a sense that there is quantification over possible situations and *except*-clauses restrict this quantification. I show how this analysis captures the facts that the classic analysis for exceptives captures, such as the inferences that the exceptives come with and the restrictions on their usage. The semantic theory I develop also explains why an *except*-clause providing an exception for a universal claim has to have negation in it and an *except*-clause providing an exception to a negative claim cannot have negation in it.

In (85) *except* needs to relate the two clauses in (86) and (87) in such a way that the inferences discussed in the beginning of this section (the domain subtraction, the containment and the negative entailment) are derived.

(85) Every girl came except Eva ~~did not come~~.
(86) **Quantificational claim:** Every girl came.
(87) ***Except*-clause:** Eva did not come.

Speaking informally, I propose that the *except*-clause in (85) contributes three things. It states that what follows *except* is true (shown in (88)). This captures the negative inference. It also establishes a law-like relationship between the clause following *except* and the main clause; it is not just two random propositions thrown together: because Eva was not there, it is not true that every girl was there (this can be put informally as shown in (89)). This aspect of the meaning captures the containment inference. The third contribution of *except* is that nothing else stands in a way of the quantificational claim being true. This captures the domain subtraction inference. Informally this can be expressed as shown in (90).

(88) Eva did not come.
(89) In every situation where Eva did not come, the quantificational claim is not true.
(90) Had Eva come while everything else remained the same, it would have been true that every girl came.

In what follows I show how to implement those three contributions of *except* formally. I start by expressing (90) (the claim responsible for the domain subtraction inference) in formal terms in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2 I discuss (88) and (89).

5.1. Modeling Domain Subtraction

5.1.1. What Kind of Conditional?

It is standardly assumed that conditionals are interpreted as restrictors of covert or overt quantifiers over possible worlds or situations (Lewis 1975, Kratzer 1978, 1986). The conditional in (91) roughly gets the meaning given in (92).

(91) If it were not true that Eva did not come, it would have been true that every girl came.
(92) In all of the possible worlds that are most similar to the actual world among those where Eva came, it holds that every girl came.

When we try to give the conditional semantics to exceptives one problem we face is the notion of the most similar world or situation. Specifically, the sentence in (91) can be true if no girl in the actual world came at all. Let's consider a scenario where the actual world is such that Eva is the leader of all girls and they do whatever she does. In this case in the worlds where Eva came that are the most similar to the actual world, Eva's coming would make every girl come, because this is what they usually do in the actual world. Thus, if the actual world is such that changing Eva's behavior can guarantee that other girls change their behavior, the sentence in (91) can be true even if in real life it is not true that not counting Eva, every girl came.

Our intuitions are different for the sentence with an exceptive in (85). This sentence cannot be true in the scenario described above: (85) can only be true if in the actual world every girl other than Eva came.

Exceptive constructions are less flexible than their conditional paraphrases with respect to the notion of the similarity between the worlds (or situations). When we interpret (85), we only look at possible worlds (situations) where the facts about other people coming are exactly the same as in the actual world. The difference with the example with a counterfactual is that in that case we could also look at worlds where facts about other girls coming are allowed to change. Any analysis of clausal exceptives should take this difference into consideration.

5.1.2. Finding the Right Similarity Relation Between Situations.

My goal here is to model the domain subtraction inference as a claim that in all situations where the exceptive clause is false and the rest of the relevant facts are the same, every girl came. The question is what are 'the relevant facts'. One thing we concluded from the last section is that we want to look at situations where facts about other people coming remain the same as in the situation with respect to which we evaluate the sentence.

The question is how we get access to the information about other individuals given that the reduced exceptive clause that is supposed to characterize the restriction on the possible situations we are looking at is simply 'Eva did not come'. One fact we could use here is that according to the standard assumptions about ellipsis, a remnant of an elided clause is marked with focus. Thus, in (85) we have access not only to the proposition denoted by 'Eva did not come', but also to its focus alternatives. Focus alternatives are formed by making a substitution in the position corresponding to the focused phrase (Rooth 1985). In our case the focused phrase is *Eva*. The focus value of the sentence 'Eva_F did not come' is given in (93).

(93) $[[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not come}]]^{g,F} = \lambda p.\exists x[p=[\lambda s'.x \text{ did not come in } s']]=$
$\{\lambda s.\text{Eva did not come in s}, \lambda s.\text{Sveta did not come in s}, \lambda s.\text{Maria did not come in s},$
$\lambda s.\text{Anna did not come in s}, \lambda s.\text{ Bill did not come in s}, \lambda s.\text{John did not come in s, etc}\ldots\}$

Given that ellipsis provides us with access to focus alternatives, the situations where facts about Eva are different than in the actual topic situation[8] s_0 and the facts about other people are the same can be described by the function in (94).

(94) $\lambda s.\text{ Eva came in s}$
$\& \forall p[p\neq[\lambda s'.\neg\text{Eva came in } s'] \ \&\ p\in[[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not come}]]^{g,F} \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]$

This is a set of situations where Eva came but the propositions describing facts about other people coming retain the same truth value as in s_0. If Maria did not come in s_0, then the situations we are looking at in (94) are the situations where Maria did not come. If Maria came in s_0, then the situations were looking at are the situations where Maria came.

It is worth noting that in the situations described by the function in (94), the facts related to coming remain the same as in the topic situation not only for girls, but also for all the remaining individuals. This is because the focus alternatives to *Eva* include *John*, *Bill*, etc. One advantage of using this strategy is that we do not need to know in advance who is a girl in order to restrict the quantification over situations in the relevant way.

There is still some work that has to be done in order to capture the right notion of similarity between the possible situations where we will evaluate the truthfulness of the quantificational claim 'every girl came' and the actual topic situation.

What we have in (94) will not be enough. As the first approximation, we could try to express the domain subtraction in our example as (95): in all situations that are picked by (94) every girl came. This formula, however, does not reflect the truth conditions of the sentence with an exceptive that was given in (85).

(95) $\forall s[(\text{Eva came in s} \ \&\ \forall p[p\neq[\lambda s'.\ \neg\text{Eva came in } s'] \ \&\ p\in[[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not come}]]^{g,F} \rightarrow$
$p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \forall x[x \text{ is a girl in s} \rightarrow x \text{ came in s}]]$

[8] Here and everywhere in this paper s_0 is the actual topic situation.

What we have in (95) is too strong. Let's consider a scenario where all girls other than Eva came in s_0, but John and Bill did not come. This is totally compatible with the sentence we are considering here given in (85). There is a possible situation where John and Bill are girls, because of that (95) is false: it is not true that in all possible situations where facts regarding people (other than Eva) coming are the same as in s_0 all girls came, because there is a situation where John and Bill are girls and did not come.

We are only interested in people who are girls in the actual topic situation. In order to capture this, we can use the fact that a predicate inside a DP can be evaluated with respect to a different situation than the situation with respect to which the main predicate of the sentence is evaluated (Fodor, 1970; Enc, 1986; Cresswell, 1990, Percus, 2000, Kratzer, 2007, Keshet, 2008, Schwarz, 2009, Schwarz, 2012, von Fintel & Heim, 2011).

In other words, we want to fix the extension of the predicate 'girl' - we are only interested in individuals who are girls the actual topic situation.

This is what (96) does: it says that in all possible situations, where the facts about every person's (other than Eva's) not coming are the same as in the actual situation and where Eva came, it holds that all girls from the actual situation came. The relevant difference between the first attempt to express the domain subtraction in (95) and the improved version of it in (96) is boxed in (96): it is the situation variable.

(96) $\forall s[(\text{Eva came in s} \ \& \ \forall p[p \neq [\lambda s'. \neg\text{Eva came in s'}] \ \& \ p \in [[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not come}]]^{g,F} \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \forall x[\text{x is a girl in } \boxed{s_0} \rightarrow \text{x came in s}]]$

The extension of the predicate denoted by 'girl' is fixed: it is evaluated with respect to the actual topic situation and does not vary across possible situations. With (96) we have achieved what we wanted: we are saying that if that one fact about the actual situation were changed (specifically, the fact that Eva did not come), it would be true that all girls came.

This claim in (96) can be true only if every girl other than Eva came in s_0. This is because we are only looking at situations where facts about other people coming remained the same as in s_0. We have only changed one fact – a fact about Eva. What we have discovered about those situations is that everyone who is a girl in s_0 came.

Note that (96) does not entail that Eva is a girl or that she did not come. Let's consider the formula in (97) that is just like (96), but a clearly female name *Eva* is substituted by a clearly male name *John*. If all girls in the topic situation came, (97) is true. We keep all the facts about the actual situation constant across the possible situations in the domain of the universal quantifier over situations and we are looking at the situation where John came. But since he is not in the actual extension of the predicate 'girl' it does not matter if he came or not in the actual topic situation s_0. His coming or not coming cannot have any effect on the truthfulness of the quantificational claim.

(97) $\forall s[(\text{John came in s} \ \& \ \forall p[p \neq [\lambda s'.\neg\text{John came in s'}] \ \& \ p \in [[\text{John did not came}]]^{g,F} \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \forall x[\text{x is a girl in } s_0 \rightarrow \text{x came in s}]]$

With (96) we have captured the domain subtraction inference: the quantificational claim is true if we are not looking at Eva. I will call this Conditional Domain Subtraction. We still need to figure out how to capture the containment inference (the inference that Eva is a girl). This will be done in the next section.

5.2. Modeling Negative Entailment and Containment

We are now ready to explain the two remaining aspects of the meaning contributed by an exceptive in (85) (repeated here as (98)): the negative entailment (the fact that Eva did not come) and the containment (the fact that Eva is a girl).

(98) Every girl came except Eva ~~did not come~~.

Given the assumptions about the underlying syntactic structure of the elided *except*-clause that I made here, we do not need to do any work to capture the inference that Eva did not come. This information is provided directly by the clause following *except*.

In von Fintel's system the containment inference is one of the entailments of the Leastness Condition. This conditions states that the quantificational claim is not going to be true if not all of the elements of the set introduced by an exceptive are subtracted from the domain of a quantifier.

We can implement a similar idea in the conditional system in order to capture the containment inference. We can say that if the fact about Eva coming remains the same and the extension of the predicate 'girl' remains the same, the quantificational claim cannot be not true. The formula in (99) captures this idea (again, in (99) s_0 is the topic situation). As the reader can verify, (99) is equivalent to (100).

(99) $\forall s[\neg \text{Eva came in } s \rightarrow \neg \forall x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \rightarrow x \text{ came in } s]]$
(100) $\forall s[\neg \text{Eva came in } s \rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \; \& \; \neg x \text{ came in } s]]$

What (100) is saying is that in every situation where 'Eva came' is true, there is a girl from the topic situation who did not come. This can only be true if Eva is a girl in the topic situation. This is because there is only one way in which Eva's not coming can guarantee that there is a girl from the actual situation who did not come in all possible situations – Eva is that girl who did not come.

Let's consider a situation where Eva is not a girl in s_0. The formula in (100) cannot be true in this scenario. This is because there is a possible situation where everyone who is a girl from the topic situation s_0 came. It is not the true that there is a girl from the topic situation that did not come in that situation.

I will call this claim Conditional Leastness. This is the claim that stablishes a law-like relation between the quantificational claim and the clause introduced by *except*. Conditional Leastness is a part of the meaning contributed by an exceptive that is responsible for the containment inference. As I will show later, this is also the part of the meaning that provides the solution for the distribution puzzle. I will take Conditional Leastness to be the presuppositional component of the sentence in (98).

Applying the classic negation test shows that this is on the right track: (101) still requires that Eva is a girl.

(101) It is not true every girl came except Eva.

The question is whether the negative inference (that Eva did not come) has to be a part of the presuppositional content or not. I will assume here that it has to be mainly because if the negative claim were contributed as a conjunct to domain subtraction, we would not expect that (102) would be a well-formed discourse. We would expect it to be like (103), which is not well-formed.

(102) Eva did not come. Every girl except Eva came.
(103) #Eva did not come. Every girl other than Eva came and Eva did not come.

So far I have shown how the meaning of a specific sentence (98) with an exceptive clause can be expressed via three claims: Conditional Domain Subtraction, the claim expressed by the clause following *except* (the Positive or the Negative claim), and Conditional Leastness. In what follows I will show how this result can be achieved in a compositional manner.

5.3 Compositional Semantics

5.3.1 My assumptions about situations

In this subsection I explain my assumptions about situations and about how the intensional independence of DPs is captured.

It is a well-established fact that a DP can be evaluated with respect to a world and a time that is not identical to the world and time with respect to which the main predicate of the sentence is evaluated (Fodor, 1970; Enc, 1986; Cresswell, 1990, Percus, 2000, Kratzer, 2007, Keshet, 2008, Schwarz, 2009, Schwarz, 2012, von Fintel & Heim, 2011).

The necessity of intensional independence of DPs can be illustrated by the example in (104) from Keshet's work (Keshet, 2008).

(104) If everyone in this room were outside, the room would be empty.

If 'everyone in this room' in (104) were evaluated with respect to the same world and time (or the same situation) as the predicate 'were outside', then the meaning of the antecedent would be contradictory. Given the well-motivated assumption that the entire sentence is interpreted as a universal quantifier over possible worlds with the *if*-clause serving as its restrictor (following Lewis 1975, Kratzer 1978, 1986), the sentence would be predicted to be vacuously true, since there are no worlds where the contradictory statement is true. However, the sentence in (104) has a contentful reading where the *if*-clause is not interpreted as a contradiction. It means that if everyone who is actually present in the room were to leave the room, the room would become empty.

This reading can be accounted for via the mechanism of indexed world variables introduced in syntax (Percus, 2000, Kratzer, 2007, Keshet, 2008, Schwarz 2009, Schwarz 2012, von Fintel & Heim, 2011). Situations, being parts of possible worlds, can also do this job (Kratzer 2007, Schwarz, 2009, Schwarz, 2012). In this work I will use situations rather than possible worlds because situations can also be relevant restrictors for the domain of quantification (Kratzer 2007, Schwarz 2009, Schwarz 2012). I will assume a possibilistic situation semantics, where situations are viewed as parts of possible worlds and they are viewed as particulars (Kratzer 1989). However nothing in this work requires the use of situations as opposed to possible worlds.

The idea that I adopt here is that each predicate including the ones that are inside a DP comes with its own unpronounced situation variable. Those variables are bound in syntax by lambda abstractors. Schematically the LF for (104) is given in (105). The variable inside the DP 'one in this room' carries an index different than the index on the variable of the main predicate and it is bound by the matrix lambda abstractor. Thus, the predicate will be evaluated with respect to the actual topic situation and not with respect to the situations that are quantified over by *would*.

(105)



For simplicity I assume that *would* is looking for its scopal argument before it is looking for its restrictor, as shown in (106). The overall predicted meaning for (104) is as shown in (107). As the reader can verify, this solves the problem Keshet pointed out: the extension of the predicate 'person in this room' is fixed to the situation of evaluation of the entire sentence.

(106) $[[\text{would}]] = \lambda s'.\lambda p_{<st>}.\ \lambda q_{<st>}.\ \forall s[\text{s is similar to s' \& } q(s) \rightarrow p(s)]$
(107) $[[(104)]] = \lambda s'.\ \forall s[\text{s is similar to s' \& every person in this room in s' is outside in s} \rightarrow \text{the room in s is empty in s}]$

I assume that the predicates, such as *girl* and *came* denote functions of type <s<et>>, they combine with a situation variable first. This is shown below.

(108) $[[\text{girl}]]^g = \lambda s.\ \lambda x.\ \text{x is a girl in s}$
(109) $[[\text{came}]]^g = \lambda s.\ \lambda z.\ \text{z came in s}$

The assumption I will make about a simple quantificational sentence like the one in (110) is that it has an LF shown in (111), where both situation variables are bound by the matrix lambda abstractor.

(110) Every girl came.

(111)



5.3.2. Compositional Analysis for Clausal Exceptives.

A possible LF our example in (98) is shown in (112). In (112) the exceptive phrase moves from its connected position and leaves a trace s_1 of type s. In (112) it is shown as rightward movement because in English exceptive phrases introduced by *except* can only move rightwards[9]. Following the standard assumptions, a binder for this trace λs_1 is merged in syntax. This binder is merged above the binder λs_2 that binds the situation variable inside the vP – the variable with respect to which the main predicate of the quantificational sentence is evaluated. There is another situation variable s_3 inside the exceptive phrase – it is bound by the matrix lambda abstractor. The exceptive marker *except* is a sister of an IP *Eva did not come*. Following the standard assumptions, the remnant of ellipsis is marked with focus.

Here and everywhere in this paper I do not show situation variables inside the clause following *except* unless it is necessary for simplicity, but my assumption is that they are present in the structure as well.

[9] In this respect English except behaves like a typical connected exceptive by Hoeksema's (1987, 1995) criteria. It can only appear in the position directly adjacent to a quantificational DP or at the end of a sentence.
(i) Every girl except Eva came.
(ii) Every girl came except Eva.
(iii) * Except Eva every girl came.
Compare this with a free exceptive 'except for', which is fine in all three positions.
(iv) Every girl except for Eva came.
(v) Every girl came except for Eva.
(vii) Except for Eva every girl came.
The assumption I make in this paper is that (ii) is derived from (i) via movement.

(112)



The denotation of the sister of the Exceptive Phrase$_2$ is shown in (113).

(113) $\lambda s'.\lambda s''.\ \forall x[x \text{ is a girl in } s' \rightarrow x \text{ came in } s'']$

The denotation for the node named Exceptive Phrase$_1$ (ExP$_1$) is given in (114): this is a function that is looking for a possible situation, then an argument of type <s<st>> - the type of the sister of the exceptive phrase$_2$ and outputs a truth-value. Note that no independent semantics is given to the word *except*. The denotation is assigned to the constituent consisting of *except* and a sentence (φ). This is done because we need to make reference to focus alternatives of φ.

(114) $[[\text{except } \varphi]]^g = \lambda s'.\lambda M_{<s<st>>}: \forall s[\ [[\varphi]]^g(s) \rightarrow \neg M(s')(s)]\ \&\ [[\varphi]]^g(s').$
$\forall s[(\neg[[\varphi]]^g(s)\ \&\ \forall p[(p \neq [[\varphi]]\ \&\ p \in [[\varphi]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s')]) \rightarrow M(s')(s)]$

The exceptive phrase introduces a condition of definedness (Conditional Leastness and the claim following *except*): it is modeled as a restriction on the domain of this function. It also introduces the assertive component (Conditional Domain Subtraction).

Under these assumptions the predicted interpretation for the LF in (112) is shown in (115).

(115) $[[(112)]]^g\ (s_0) = 1$ iff $\forall s[(\text{Eva came in } s\ \&\ \forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'.\ \neg\text{Eva came in } s']\ \&\ p \in [[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not come}]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \forall x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \rightarrow x \text{ came in } s]]$

$[[(112)]]^g\ (s_0)$ is defined only if $\forall s[\neg\text{Eva came in } s \rightarrow \neg\forall x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \rightarrow x \text{ came in } s]]\ \&\ \neg\text{Eva came in } s_0$

As the reader can verify the presupposition in (115) is Conditional Leastness conjoined with the Negative claim and the at-issue content is Conditional Domain Subtraction.

I said earlier in this paper that the presence of negation in the *except*-clause has to be forced by the meaning because it has to be there if the quantifier is universal and not be there if the quantifier is negative. In the semantic theory I proposed this is forced by Conditional Leastness. Let me illustrate this on a specific example. Consider what happens if the ellipsis site does not contain negation as shown in (116).

(116) Every girl came except Eva ~~came~~.

In this case the presupposition generated by the system is as shown in (117), which is equivalent to (118). This presupposition will not be satisfied because of the first conjunct. Consequently, the sentence will not be defined. This is because there is no way to guarantee that in every situation where Eva came there is a girl who did not come. The only restriction on the universal quantification over situations in (118) is that those are the situations where Eva came. Regardless of whether Eva is a girl or not, there is a possible situation where every individual who is a girl in s_0 came. In that possible situation, it is not going to be the case that there is a girl from s_0 who did not come.

(117) $[[(116)]]^g$ (s_0) is defined only if
$\forall s$[Eva came in s $\rightarrow \neg\forall x$[x is a girl in $s_0 \rightarrow$ x came in s]] & Eva came in s_0

(118) (117)=$\forall s$[Eva came in s $\rightarrow \exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\neg$x came in s]] & Eva came in s_0

5.3.3. Negative Quantifiers

This proposal makes the correct prediction about the interaction of *except* with a negative quantificational claim. The assumed LF for the sentence with a negative quantifier in (119) is given in (120). Again, the remnant of ellipsis (*Eva*) is focused.

(119) No girl came except Eva_F ~~came~~.

(120)



The denotation of the sister of the exceptive phrase_2 is shown in (121).

(121) $\lambda s'\lambda s''. \neg\exists x$[x is a girl in s' & x came in s'']

Given the denotation for the *except*-clause in (114), the predicted interpretation for the entire sentence (119) is in (122). It again has a presuppositional component (Conditional Leastness and the Positive claim) and an at-issue component - Conditional Domain Subtraction.

(122) $[[(119)]]^g (s_0) = 1$ iff $\forall s[\neg$Eva came in s & $\forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'$. Eva came in s'] & $p \in [[\text{Eva}_F$ came$]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \neg\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & x came in s]]

$[[(119)]]^g (s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s$[Eva came in s$\rightarrow \exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & x came in s]] & Eva came in s_0

From the first conjunct in the presuppositional component we know that every possible situation that where Eva came has a girl from the topic situation who came in that possible situation. This can only be the case if Eva is a girl in the actual topic situation. Thus the containment entailment comes as a result of Conditional Leastness. The second conjunct states that Eva came in s_0.

From the assertive component we learn that if we change one thing – namely the fact about Eva coming – and kept all the other facts about other people coming the same, it would be the case that no girl from the actual topic situation came. This correctly captures the domain subtraction inference.

Conditional Leastness is also responsible for the fact that there is only one way to resolve the ellipsis. Let's look at what happens if the ellipsis is resolved in the wrong way as shown in (123).

(123) *No girl came except Eva$_F$ ~~did not come~~.

The predicted presupposition in that case cannot be satisfied. It is shown in (124): there is no way the first conjunct can be true because Eva not coming cannot guarantee that some girl came in every possible situation.

(124) $[[(123)]]^g (s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s[\neg$Eva came in s$\rightarrow \exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & x came in s]] & $\neg$Eva came in s_0

5.4 The Distribution Puzzle

5.4.1 Existentials

The conditional analysis proposed here has a solution to the distribution puzzle. However, unlike von Fintel's original proposal, it does not derive in a straightforward way a contradiction if the denotation given in (114) is applied to a constituent containing an existential quantifier instead of a universal. An additional assumption is required in order to derive the incompatibility of exceptives with existential quantifiers. This assumption is that an existential cannot be used when it is known that the restrictor denotes a singleton set, in other words, when it is known that the conditions for the usage of the definite are met.

Let's consider the ungrammatical example in (125). The LF analogous to the LFs for sentences with a universal quantifier and a negative quantifier is shown in (126).

(125) *Some girl came except Eva$_F$ ~~did not come.~~

(126)



The denotation of the sister of the exceptive phrase$_2$ is given in (127).

(127) $\lambda s' \lambda s''. \exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s' \ \& \ x \text{ came in } s'']$

The interpretation that is predicted for this sentence is shown in (128) (the presupposition) and (129) (the assertive part).

(128) Presupposition: $[[(125)]]^g (s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s[\neg \text{Eva came in } s \rightarrow \neg\exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \ \& \ x \text{ came in } s]] \ \& \ \neg \text{ Eva came in } s_0$

(129) Assertion: $[[(125)]]^g (s_0) = 1$ iff
$\forall s[(\text{Eva came in } s \ \& \ \forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'. \neg \text{Eva came in } s'] \ \& \ p \in [[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not come}]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \ \& \ x \text{ came in } s]]$

What we learn from the presupposition given in (128) is that it is either the case that Eva is the only girl in s_0 or that there are no girls in s_0. The two possible outcomes come from two possible scenarios: one where Eva is a girl and the other one where she is not a girl.

Let's first consider the scenario where Eva is not a girl in s_0. In this case, her presence or absence does not have anything effect on the truth-value of the quantificational claim 'all girls from s_0 came in s' in a possible situation s. How can the presupposition be true under this assumption? Only if there are no girls at all in s_0 can it be the case that in all situations where a non-girl Eva did not come, no girl from the actual topic situation came. Imagine there is a girl, say Sveta in s_0. Then there is a possible situation where Eva (non-girl) did not come and where Sveta came. Thus the simple existence of a girl in s_0 would make the presupposition in (128) impossible to satisfy under the assumption that Eva is not a girl.

This possibility – that there are no girls in the actual topic situation – is, however, not compatible with the assertion in (129) that states that in all situations where Eva came and the facts about other people are the same, there is some girl from s_0 who came. This can only be true if there are girls in s_0.

Now let's consider a scenario where Eva is a girl. In this case she has to be the only girl in s_0. Here is the reason for this. Let's imagine that there are other girls in s_0, say Sveta and Olga. It cannot be true that in all situations where she did not come, there are no girls from s_0 who came. Let's look at situations where Eva did not come. Among them, there are possible situations, where Olga or Sveta – other girls from s_0 came, so (128) cannot be true. There is only one way Eva's not coming can absolutely guarantee that no girl from s_0 came: specifically, it can be the case only if she is the only girl in s_0.

The assertion is compatible with the possibility that Eva is the only girl in s_0. If she is the only girl and she did not come, no girls came, but if we changed this one fact about her coming while keeping the rest of the coming facts the same, there would be a girl who came. Thus, the presupposition in (128) and the assertion in (129) can be true together. This requires Eva being the only girl in the actual topic situation.

Because there is a scenario under which the sentence containing an existential and an exceptive is predicted to be defined and true, the conditional semantics for clausal exceptives, unlike von Fintel's semantics for phrasal exceptives, requires some additional assumption in order to rule out (125). However, the assumption required here has an independent motivation. The ungrammatical sentence in (125) is only predicted to be coherent if Eva is the only girl in s_0. There is a well-established restriction against the use of an indefinite article (such as 'a' and 'some') in a situation where the conditions for the use of a definite article are met, i.e. there is a unique individual that is in the extension of the predicate denoted by the NP inside the DP.

The observation that indefinites come with an anti-uniqueness inference goes back to the work of Hawkins (1978, 1991) and Heim (1991). The sentence in (130) cannot be felicitously uttered if it is known that a person can only have one wife. In the same way, the sentence in (131) comes with an inference that the victim has more than one father. The sentence in (132) is infelicitous because there is only one number in the extension of the predicate denoted by *weight of our tent*.

(130) # Yesterday, I talked to a wife of John's (Alonso-Ovalle, Menéndez-Benito, Schwarz 2011)
(131) # I interviewed a father of the victim. (Hawkins 1991)
(132) # A weight of our tent is under 4 lbs. (Heim 1991)

Heim (1991) proposed to derive this anti-uniqueness inference via the principle known as Maximize Presuppositions.

(133) Maximize Presuppositions: Among a set of alternatives, use the felicitous sentence with the strongest presupposition. (Chemla 2008, as cited in Alonso-Ovalle, Menéndez-Benito, Schwarz 2011)

The idea is that in a situation where an indefinite competes with another expression that presupposes that there is only one individual that satisfies the predicate in the restrictor of the determiner, namely a definite, and it is in fact known that there is only one such individual, an expression with the maximal presupposition, namely the definite, has to be used.

I propose that the sentence in (125) is ungrammatical because the presupposition of this sentence can only be satisfied and compatible with the assertion only if there is just one girl in the topic situation - Eva -, and in this case the use of an indefinite is blocked.

There is also another principle on top of the anti-uniqueness condition imposed by indefinites that blocks the use of (125) in case Eva is the only girl in the topic situation. This principle is the anti-familiarity condition. Let's consider the discourse in (134). This discourse is not coherent if Eva is the girl who came into the room.

(134) #Some girl$_1$ came into the room. Eva$_1$ was wearing red.

It can be the case that there are many girls in the topic situation; this girl who entered need not be the only one. But we cannot use the proper name *Eva* to refer back to her, because if we initially knew that this was Eva we could not have used *some girl*. There is a family of approaches to the semantics of definite descriptions where familiarity is considered to be the major part of their meaning (Heim 1982, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1990, Chierchia 1995, Kamp 1981, Kamp and Reyle 1993, Schwarz 2009). It is possible that anti-familiarity also comes as a result of competition with definite descriptions and applying Maximize Presuppositions. I will not speculate on this point here, as this is not important for the purposes of this project. What is important is that there is a principle that prohibits the use of an indefinite in a sentence where the identity of a referent is known[10].

I propose that the reason why sentences where an exceptive operates on an existential like the one in (194) are perceived as ungrammatical is that the meaning they get is ill-formed. The use of an existential signals that the speaker does not believe that there is only one object that satisfies the restrictor of the existential. The only other way the presupposition generated by an exceptive can be satisfied is if the restrictor is empty. However, in that case whenever the sentence is defined, it is false. There is no way for it to be true. This problem cannot be fixed by substituting all non-functional elements of a sentence by different lexical items: this problem is predicted to arise whenever a clausal exceptive is put together with an existential. Following Gajewski (2002), who proposed that contradictions that cannot be repaired by changing all non-functional elements are perceived as ungrammatical, I propose that (194) is ungrammatical because of its meaning.

We run into the same issue with numeral indefinites as well. Let's consider the ungrammatical sentence in (135). The analysis suggested here predicts no conflict between the presupposition and the assertion if there are exactly five girls overall in the situation. To put it informally, the analysis predicts that this sentence carries the presupposition that if the value of the proposition denoted by 'Eva came' is not changed, there is no way to make '5 girls came' true. The predicted meaning is that if we change only this fact, it is going to be true that 5 girls came.

(135) *Five girls came except Eva ~~came~~

If there are more than five girls in the topic situation, however, the semantics developed here predicts a conflict between the presupposition and the assertion. The presupposition requires that in every situation where facts about Eva coming are the same as in the actual topic situation it is not true that five girls came. Let's imagine that there are six girls. Then there is one situation where all of the girls other than Eva came, and thus there are five girls who came and the

[10] One exception to this generalization is sentences with namely: some girl, namely Eva, came.

presupposition is false. Therefore, the presupposition can be satisfied only if there are exactly five girls in the topic situation or less then five girls overall. The latter possibility is ruled out because it is not compatible with the assertion.

Again, since the meaning proposed here is well-formed under this unique scenario where an existential is true when the universal is true, we would have to appeal to some principle external to the theory to rule (135) out. Specifically, we would have to appeal to Maximize Presupposition again and say that the sentence is ruled out because an indefinite cannot be used in a situation where it is known that there are exactly five girls.

We can construct an example similar to the ones in (130)-(132) illustrating that the same restriction exists for bare numerals. For example, (136) cannot be said in the scenario where it is known that there are only two parents for each individual.

(136) #I interviewed two parents of the victim.

5.4.2 Definite Descriptions

I proposed that the reason why exceptives are not compatible with existential quantifiers was that the presupposition introduced by an exceptive can only be satisfied and compatible with the assertion if the individual introduced by an exceptive was the only individual satisfying the restrictor of the indefinite in the topic situation. However, in this case the usage of an existential is blocked by an independent principle prohibiting using existentials when a definite can be used. One naturally can ask at this point: what about definites? Why is (137) ungrammatical?

(137) *The girl came except Eva$_F$ ~~did not come~~.

The components of the meaning predicted by the proposed system for (137) is given in (138) and (139).

(138) Presupposition: $[[(137)]]^g$ (s_0) is defined only if
$\forall s[\neg$Eva came in s $\rightarrow \neg(\iota x[$x is a girl in $s_0])$ came in s] & $\neg$Eva came in s_0

(139) Assertion: $[[(137)]]^g$ (s_0) = 1 iff
$\forall s[($Eva came in s & $\forall p[(p\neq[\lambda s'.\ \neg$Eva came in s'] & $p\in[[$Eva$_F$ did not come$]]^{g,F})\rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow (\iota x[$x is a girl in $s_0])$ came in s]

The presupposition and the assertion are consistent with each other. From the presupposition we learn that Eva is the girl and that she did not come in s_0. Obviously, if the fact about Eva coming was different, the fact about the girl coming would be different as well, given that Eva is the girl.

There are two problems with (137). The first is that there is the presupposition requires that Eva is the girl. However, there is a general prohibition against referring to one and the same individual with a definite description and with a name in the same sentence even if there is no c-command (shown in (140)).

(140) *Because [the girl]$_1$ was late, Eva$_1$ was fired.

The second problem is that whenever the presupposition is defined, the at-issue content is true: from the presupposition we learn that [λs. ¬Eva came in s] and [λs. ¬ (ιx[x is a girl in s_0]) came in s] are equivalent. We do not need to assert that whenever the first one is false, the second one is false too, that is not novel information; this is just an analytical fact that follows from the presupposition.

In other words, the meaning (137) produces is ill-formed. This sentence is predicted to be a tautology in a sense that whenever it is defined, it is true, there is no way for it to be false. Again, this problem cannot be fixed by changing the non-functional elements of the sentence. I adopt Gajewski's idea (2002) that tautologies with this property are perceived as ungrammatical and propose that this explains the badness of (137).

It is also the case that plural definite descriptions are not compatible with *except* (as shown in (141)). Adding *all* before *the girls* makes the sentence grammatical (142).

(141) *The girls came except Eva_F ~~did not come~~.
(142) All the girls came except Eva ~~did not come~~.

I propose that the problem with (141) is in the presupposition generated by the system. One of the contributions of *except* is that there is a law-like relationship between the two clauses. In (141) it would be the claim that in every situation where Eva did not come, it is not true that the girls of s_0 came. Now we need to consider what happens when negation is applied to a claim containing a plural definite. One observation that was made in the literature is that plurals come a homogeneity presupposition (von Fintel 1997): applying negation to the claim 'the girls came' gives us 'the girls (all of them) did not come'. The claim that that in every situation where Eva did not come, the girls of s_0 (all of them) did not come can be true only if Eva is the only girl in s_0. Then (141) is predicted to be ill-formed due to the conflict between the plural marking on the noun and the requirement that Eva is the only girl in s_0 introduced by the presupposition. My tentative explanation for the fact that adding *all* makes the sentence grammatical is that *all* removes the homogeneity presupposition from the plural and essentially makes the plural definite behave like a universal quantifier with respect to negation.

6. The Advantages of the Proposed Analysis

6.1. A General Overview

In the previous section I proposed a novel semantic analysis for *except*. This analysis differs from the existing analyses in that it is based on the assumption that an exceptive marker introduces a clause and not just a DP. I have shown how this analysis captures the facts that are captured by the classic analysis, specifically I have shown how the analysis developed here captures the inferences *except* comes with in cases it applies to a universal and a negative quantifier and how the distribution facts (the observation that like all other exceptives *except* cannot be applied to an existential quantifier) are explained in the conditional system. The goal of this section is to show how this new analysis captures the cases that are not captured in the classic von Fintel's system.

I will apply my analysis to the three crucial types of cases here that were introduced in Section 3. The first two are built on the observation that *except*-phrases in English can host PPs. The first one is given in (143). The exceptive phrase here contains a PP with a meaningful preposition.

(143) I met a student from every city in Spain except from Barcelona.

Based on the discussion in Section 3, I suggest that the underlying syntactic structure of (143) is as shown in (144). This structure is derived from (145) by moving the PP *from Barcelona* out of a DP and eliding the rest of the clause.

(144) I met a student from every city in Spain except from Barcelona$_F$ ~~I did not meet a student.~~
(145) I met a student from every city in Spain except I did not meet [a student from Barcelona].

The second case I will consider is the one where an exceptive phrase contains a prepositional phrase that has no correlate (a corresponding antecedent) in the main clause (146). I will show how the contrast between (146) and (147) follows from the analysis I have proposed in a natural way.

(146) I got no presents except from my mom.
(147) #I got no presents except my mom.

I propose that (146) is derived from (149) via movement of the PP out of a DP and deleting the rest of the structure, as shown in (148).

(148) I got no presents except from [my mom]$_F$ ~~I got a present.~~
(149) I got no presents except I got [a present from my mom].

I will call this case *sprouting* because a similar phenomenon exists in sluicing and it bares this name in the literature describing that phenomenon (Chung et al. 1995). A parallel example with sluicing is given in (150).

(150) I got a present but I don't remember from whom.

The ellipsis site in this case contains an existential quantificational expression *a present*, whereas its corresponding antecedent in the main clause is a negative quantifier *no presents.* There is independent evidence that such a mismatch is possible in ellipsis. One example of such a mismatch involving VP-ellipsis is given in (151).

(151) I got no presents. But John did ~~get a present.~~

The third case I will consider is a case where an exceptive contains multiple syntactic constituents, like the one in (152).

(152) Every girl danced with every boy everywhere except Eva with Bill in the kitchen.

I suggest that the source for (152) is (153). It is derived by moving the three phrases to the edge of the clause and eliding the rest of the material in the clause as shown in (154).

(153) Every girl danced with every boy everywhere except Eva did not dance with Bill in the kitchen.

(154) Every girl danced with every boy everywhere except Eva$_F$ with Bill$_F$ in the kitchen$_F$ ~~did not dance.~~

It is worth reminding the reader of the generalization we came to regarding these cases: if an exceptive contains multiple elements, each of those elements has to have a corresponding universal quantifier in the main clause. This is the restriction that we observe in (155) and (156).

(155) *Every girl danced with some boy except Eva with Bill.

(156) *Some girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.

Another fact that we want to derive is that this is not a general prohibition on the presence of existential quantifiers in sentences with multiple remnants as is shown by the well-formed example (157), which contains an existential *somewhere.*

(157) Every girl danced with every boy somewhere except Eva with Bill.

One important clarification is due here. All correlates have to be universal quantifiers in the context of the entire sentence. For example, the sentence in (158) is grammatical, even though given the standard assumption an NPI *any* is interpreted as an existential. However, in the context of the entire sentence under the scope of the negative quantifier it gets an interpretation where it is equivalent to a universal quantifier. In (159) and (160) we observe the opposite situation. In the ungrammatical example (159) both quantifiers *no girl* and *every boy* taken in isolation are universal, however, when *every boy* appears under the scope of a negative quantifier its interpretation is equivalent to an existential quantifier. The same problem makes (160) ungrammatical: the lower negative quantifier *no boy* under the scope of another negative quantifier gets the interpretation that is equivalent to an existential quantifier.

(158) No girl danced with any boy except Eva with Bill.

(159) *No girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.

(160) *No girl danced with no boy except Eva with Bill.

Those are the facts that a theory of clausal exceptives has to capture. In what follows I will show how the theory developed in the previous sections does that in a natural way.

6.2. Meaningful Prepositions

In this section I will provide a derivation for the sentence with the PP *from Barcelona* in the exceptive phrase repeated below in (161).

(161) I met a student from every city in Spain except ~~I did not meet [a student~~ from Barcelona$_F$].

This sentence comes with the following aspects of meaning:

(162) Domain subtraction: I met a student from every city in Spain that is not Barcelona.

(163) Containment: Barcelona is a city in Spain.
(164) Negative entailment: I met no student from Barcelona.

These are the inferences that the analysis captures. The LF for this sentence is given in (165). Following the standard assumption, the quantificational object of the main clause (*a student from every city in Spain except from Barcelona*) is raised. A trace of type e (t_3) bound by the lambda abstractor (3) is left on its original place. Further, the quantificational phrase inside this object (*every city in Spain except from Barcelona*) undergoes QR, leaving a trace of type e (t_2) that is bound by the abstractor 2. This is done in order to get the right scope for *every city in Spain*: it has to be interpreted in the position higher than the existential *a student from…* because a reasonable interpretation for this sentence requires there to be a different student for each city. Again, I follow the standard practice in assuming that the situation variable (s_4) of the main predicate *met* is bound by the lambda abstractor (λs_4) at LF. The same abstractor binds the situation variable inside the restrictor of an indefinite.

Following the assumptions I made here about exceptives, the exceptive phrase starts as a sister to NP (*city in Spain*). It undergoes QR, leaves a trace of type s (s_1). It is bound by the lambda abstractor (λs_1). I reconstructed the PP inside the *except*-clause for simplicity.

(165)



With those assumptions about the structure of the main clause, the sister of Exceptive Phrase_2 gets the interpretation given in (166).

(166) $\lambda s.\lambda s'.\forall x$[x is a city in Spain in s$\rightarrow\exists y$[y is a student from x s' & I met y in s']]

The remnant of ellipsis inside the clause following except is focused (*Barcelona*). The denotation for the *except*-clause is given in (167). It combines with a situation with respect to which the entire sentence is evaluated and with the sister of the Exceptive Phrase_2 given above. In its presupposition it says that I did not meet a student from Barcelona and in every situation where that happened the quantificational phrase is false (thus, there is a city in Spain such that met no student from that city). In its assertive part it says that if we change the value for the *I did not meet a student from Barcelona* while keeping the truth-value for all of its focus alternatives (i.e. the propositions denoted by *I did not meet a student from Madrid*, *I did not meet a student from Valencia*, *I did not meet a student from Moscow*, *I did not meet a student from New York*) the same, the quantificational phrase will be true (every city in Spain is such that I met a student from it).

(167) $[[\text{except I did not meet a student from Barcelona}_F]]^g =$
$\lambda s'.\lambda M_{<s<st>>}$**:** $\forall s[[[\text{I did not meet a student from Barcelona}_F]]^g(s) \rightarrow \neg M(s')(s)]$
$\&\ [[\text{I did not meet a student from Barcelona}_F]]^g\ (s')$ **.**
$\forall s[(\neg[[\text{I did not meet a student from Barcelona}]]^g\ (s)\ \&\ \forall p[(p \neq [[\text{I did not meet a student from Barcelona}]]^g\ \&\ p \in [[\text{ I did not meet a student from Barcelona}_F]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s')]) \rightarrow M(s')(s)]$

The predicted resulting interpretation for the sentence (161) is given in (168) and (169). The formulas in (168) and (169) are rather long, but the intuition behind them is simple. The first conjunct in the presupposition says that in every situation where I did not meet a student from Barcelona there is a thing that is a city in Spain in s_0 such that I met no student from that city. This can only be the case if Barcelona is a city in Spain. This captures the containment inference. The second conjunct states that I met no student from Barcelona (this is the negative inference).

(168) Presupposition: $[[(161)]]^g\ (s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s[\neg\exists z[\text{z is a student from Barcelona in s \& I met z in s}] \rightarrow \exists x[\text{x is a city in Spain in } s_0\ \&\neg\exists y[\text{y is a student from x in s \& I met y in s}]]]\ \&$
$\neg\exists b[\text{b is a student from Barcelona } s_0\ \&\ \text{I met b in } s_0]$

The assertion says that if we look at the situations where I did meet a student from Barcelona and the facts about me meeting a student from all other cities are the same, we will discover that in all of them I met a student from every city in Spain. This captures the intuition that meeting a student from Barcelona is the only thing that stands in a way of 'I met a student from every city' being true.

(169) Assertion: $[[(161)]]]^g\ (s_0) = 1$ iff
$\forall s[(\exists z[\text{z is a student from Barcelona in s \& I met z in s}]\ \&\ \forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'.\ \neg\exists a[\text{a is a student from Barcelona s' \& I met a in s'}]]\ \&\ p \in [[\text{I did not meet a student from Barcelona}_F]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \forall x[\text{x is a city in Spain in } s_0 \rightarrow \exists y[\text{y is a student from x s \& I met y in s}]]$

To sum up the key findings here, the presupposition predicted by this analysis captures the containment (Barcelona is a city in Spain) and the negative entailment (I met no student from Barcelona). The assertion captures the domain subtraction inference: the sentence is true if I met a student from every city in Spain other than Barcelona.

6.3 Sprouting

In this section I will discuss the case in (146) (repeated here as (170)) where an exceptive clause contains a PP that does not have a correlate in the main clause. I suggested that the underlying syntactic structure of (170) is as shown in (171).

(170) I got no presents except from my mom.
(171) I got no presents except ~~I got a present~~ from my mom.

Before going to the details of the analysis of this case, let me list the meaning components of this sentence. (171) comes with the set of inferences in (172)-(174). The containment entailment is somewhat uninformative. And given that the quantifier is negative, there is a positive entailment contributed by the exceptive.

(172) Domain subtraction: I got no presents from people other than my mom.
(173) Containment: A present from my mom is a present.
(174) Positive entailment: I got a present from my mom.

The LF for (171) is shown in (175). The assumptions about the structure of the main clause are pretty standard. *No presents* undergoes QR, leaves a trace of type e (t_1) that is bound by the lambda abstractor 1. The situation variable of the main predicate *got* (s_5) is bound by the lambda abstractor (λs_5). The Exceptive Phrase starts as a sister of the predicate inside the DP (*present*), undergoes extraposition, leaving a trace of type s (s_2), this trace is bound by the lambda abstractor (λs_2). I reconstructed the PP inside the *except*-clause.

(175)



Under these assumptions the meaning of the sister of the exceptive-clause is as shown in (176).

(176) $\lambda s'.\lambda s.\neg\exists x[\text{x is a present in s' \& I got x in s}]$

In the LF in (175) I have shown the structure of the *except*-clause in more detail than in the LFs shown before. This is done because we need to pay attention to the situation variables inside the *except*-clause in this specific case. This is an IP that contains two predicates: NP *present from my mom* and the main predicate *got*. Potentially, there are two possible options for the situation variable inside the NP: it can be bound by the lambda abstractor inside its own clause (λs_6) or it can be bound by the highest abstractor (λs_3) (in this case the predicate will get the transparent evaluation – will be always evaluated with respect to the topic situation s_0, it will not be bound by the quantifier over situations). In the LF in (175) I have chosen the latter option and I will explain the reasoning behind that choice after I provide the truth-conditions for this sentence.

The predicted presupposition of this sentence is shown in (177). The first conjunct is kind of uninformative here: it says that if we look at situations where I got a present from my mom we will find that in all of them there is a present that I have gotten. From the second conjunct we learn that I did get a present from my mom.

(177) Presupposition: $[[(171)]]^g (s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s[\exists x[x \text{ is a present in } s_0 \ \& \text{ I got x from my mom in } s] \rightarrow \exists y[y \text{ is a present in } s_0 \ \& \text{ I got y in } s]]$
$\& \ \exists z[z \text{ is a present } s_0 \ \& \text{ I got z from my mom in } s_0]$

The predicted assertion is in (178). This is the claim that if we look at situations where all focus alternatives for *I got a present from [my mom]*$_F$ (i.e. propositions denoted by *I got a present from John, I got a present from Mary, I got a present from Ann etc*) have the same truth value as in s_0 and the value for the proposition denoted by *I got a present from my mom* is the opposite (if we look at situations where I did not get a present from my mom) we will find that I got no presents in those situations.

(178) Assertion: $[[(171)]]]^g (s_0) = 1$ iff
$\forall s[(\neg\exists x[x \text{ is a present in } s_0 \ \& \text{ I got x from my mom in } s] \ \& \ \forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'. \ \exists y[y \text{ is a present in } s_0 \ \& \text{ I got y from my mom in } s'] \ \& \ p \in [[\text{I got a present from [my mom]}_F]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \neg\exists z[z \text{ is a present in } s_0 \ \& \text{ I got z in } s]]$

Those two aspects of meaning (the presupposition and the assertion) capture the inferences the sentence comes with. The presupposition can only be satisfied if I got a present from my mom in s_0. This captures the positive entailment. The containment, as I said, is vacuous here. This is because the ellipsis site of the *except*-clause contains the predicate *present* – the same predicate that is in the restrictor of the quantifier *no present*. The assertion gives us the domain subtraction inference: this is the claim that I got no presents from anyone who is not my mom.

Now, let's go back to the question of why we cared about the situation variables inside the *except*-clause. If both of them (the one on the predicate *get* and the one on the NP *present from my mom*) were bound by λs_6, then the first conjunct of the presupposition generated given our assumptions about the meaning of the *except*-clause is as shown in (179), where the variable that has changed is boxed.

(179) $\forall s[\exists x[x \text{ is a present in } \boxed{s} \ \& \text{ I got x from my mom in } s] \rightarrow \exists y[y \text{ is a present in } s_0 \ \& \text{ I got y in } s]]$

This presupposition is very hard to satisfy. The reason for this is that something can be a present in one situation and not be a present in another. According to (179) every situation that has a thing that is a present in that situation is such that it has a thing that it is a present in s_0. This condition can only be met by a predicate that does not change it extension from situation to situation. It does not seem likely that the predicate denoted by *presents* has this property. However, we do not need to worry about the derivation that leads to this very strong presupposition that is hard to satisfy. Nothing in the system forces the two situation variables to be the same. What is important is that there is an LF – the one shown in (175) – that leads to the correct interpretation.

The remaining issue I would like to discuss here is why (180) is infelicitous. The explanation for this fact naturally follows from what is independently known about ellipsis.

(180) #I got no presents except my mom.

The way of ellipsis resolution that could lead to the LF equivalent to the one in (175) is shown in (181). In (181) the DP *my mom* moves from a PP inside the ellipsis site and the rest of the structure together with the preposition is deleted. This structure is not possible because it violates a well-established constraint on ellipsis given in (182).

(181) *I got no presents except my mom 1 ~~[I got a present from t_1]~~

(182) Chung's generalization: A preposition can be stranded in an ellipsis site only if it has an overt correlate in the antecedent. (Chung 1995)

This constraint can be illustrated by the following pair of examples containing sluicing: the well-formed one in (183) where the ellipsis site contains a preposition that has a correlate in the antecedent and the infelicitous one in (184) where the ellipsis site contains a preposition that has no correlate in the antecedent.

(183) I got a present from someone but I don't remember who ~~I got a present from.~~
(184) #I got a present but I don't remember who ~~I got a present from.~~

Now, given that the possibility of the derivation in (181) is ruled out by the Chung's constraint, the two remaining options for ellipsis resolution are given in (185) and (186).

(185) I got no present except ~~I got~~ my mom.
(186) I got no present except my mom ~~got a present.~~

Interpreting (185) will generate the presupposition that is responsible for the funny inference that the sentence comes with – that my mom is a present that I got. It is given in (187): the first conjunct here states that every situation where I got my mom has a thing that is a present in s_0 that I got. That can only be true if my mom is a present in s_0.

(187) $\forall$s[I got my mom in s $\rightarrow$ $\exists$x[x is a present in s_0 & I got x in s]] & I got my mom in s_0

Interpreting (186) will generate the presupposition that is impossible to satisfy. It is given in (188). This claim can only be true if I am my mom. This is because it states that in every situation my mom got a present, I got a present. It can be true that in every situation where my mom gets a present, I get a present only if me and my mom are the same individual.

(188) $\forall s[\exists x[x$ is a present in s_0 & my mom got x in s$] \rightarrow \exists y[y$ is a present in s_0 & I got y in s$]]$ & $\exists z[z$ is a present in s_0 & my mom got z in $s_0]$

We have exhausted all possible ways of deriving the meaning of (180) and we have found no way of generating the same meaning as the one the sentence in (170) (repeated below as (189)) has. This explains the contrast between those two sentences.

(189) I got no presents except from my mom.

6.4 Exceptives with Multiple Remnants

6.4.1 Every-every

In this Section I will show how the conditional system developed here can account for the multiple remnants cases initially observed by Moltmann (1995) like the one in (190).

(190) Every girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill ~~did not dance~~.

This system derives the right meaning for the sentence in (190) in a very straightforward way. Intuitively, this sentence means that 'Eva did not dance with Bill' is the exception to the generalization 'every girl danced with every boy'. This requires Eva being a girl and Bill being a boy.

The analysis I developed specifies what counts as being an exception. Being an exception in this case means that Eva did not dance with Bill; in every situation where that happen the generalization is not true; had that not happen, the generalization would have been true. Below I show how this result is derived in a compositional way.

I propose that the sentence in (190) has the LF shown in (191). For simplicity I reconstructed both of the DPs inside the clause introduced by *except*.

(191)



Let's focus on the sister of the exceptive phrase. Following standard assumptions I QRed both of the DPs *every girl* and *every boy*, left traces and bound them by the lambda abstractors (the numerical indices 4 and 5). The situation variable s_2 that comes with the verb *dance* is bound by the lambda abstractor as well.

There is a separate lambda abstractor that binds situation variables inside DPs. It is crucial here that those two variables are co-indexed and are bound by the same abstractor. If a situation variable in one of the DPs is bound by the same abstractor that binds the main predicate of the sentence we will derive a presupposition that cannot be satisfied. I will ignore this option for now and go over it in the end of this section. Note that this only holds for situation variables that are inside DPs that are correlates of remnants in an *except*-clause. The system makes no commitments about situation variables inside any other DPs that may be present in a sentence.

I will remain agnostic here about how the *except*-clause gets to the sentence final position. One option is that here like in all previous cases the *except*-clause originates inside a DP. It may be the case that the exceptive clause moves simultaneously from both DPs in the across the board manner. Another possibility is that it moves from one of the DPs (and it has to be the higher one to avoid a weak crossover violation). Another option is that the *except*-clause in (191) is base-generated.

What is crucial for the proposed analysis is that the *except*-clause is placed above both of the correlates in the main clause. For now, I will simply assume that in cases where an elided exceptive clause contains multiple remnants it has to move high enough to c-command both of the correlates. There is an empirical evidence for this. I will discuss it in detail in the next subsection.

All of the remnants of the ellipsis inside the clause following *except* are focused (*Eva, Bill*). For simplicity I reconstructed the DPs inside the *except*-clause to their base-positions in (191).

No additional assumptions are required. The predicted denotation for the sister of the exceptive phrase is in (192).

(192) $\lambda s'. \lambda s''. \forall x[x \text{ is a girl in } s' \rightarrow \forall y[y \text{ is a boy in } s' \rightarrow x \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s'']]$

Given the denotation for the exceptive clause proposed here in (114), the predicted meaning of this sentence is shown in (193).

(193)
At issue content:
$[[(190)]]^g(s_0)=1$ iff $\forall s[\text{Eva danced with Bill in } s\ \&$
$\forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'.\neg \text{Eva danced with Bill in } s']\ \& p \in [[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not dance with Bill}_F]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)])$
$\rightarrow \forall x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \rightarrow \forall y[y \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \rightarrow x \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s]]]$

Presupposition:
$[[(190)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s[\neg \text{Eva danced with Bill in } s \rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0\ \&\ \exists y[y \text{ is a boy in } s_0\ \&\ \neg\ x \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s]]]\ \&\ \neg \text{Eva danced with Bill in } s_0$

The presupposition requires that every situation where Eva did not dance with Bill, there is a girl from a topic situation and a boy from a topic situation such that the girl did not dance with the boy. This is only possible if Eva is a girl and Bill is a boy in the topic situation[11]. We also learn from the presupposition that Eva did not dance with Bill.

The predicted at-issue content requires that in every situation where facts about dancing are the same as in the actual topic situation for every pair of individuals other than Eva-Bill and for Eva-Bill the dancing facts are different than in the actual topic situation (thus where the dancing has occurred), every girl from the topic situation danced with every boy from the topic situation. This means that if we change one fact - the fact regarding Eva dancing with Bill, it would be true that all girls danced with all boys.

To conclude, the account I developed in this paper captures the meaning of this sentence in a very straightforward way.

Now let me answer the question about what is going to happen if it is not the case that the situation variables inside all correlates of the remnants in the *except*-clause are bound by the same lambda abstractor. I said earlier that this structure is ruled out because it will generate a presupposition that cannot be satisfied. The situation I have in mind is the one where the sister of the exceptive phrase has the structure shown (194), where the situation variable that comes with the predicate *girl* is bound by a different lambda abstractor than the one binding the variable that comes with *boy*. The exceptive phrase would combine with the constituent with the denotation given in (195). The presupposition generated by the system for such a structure will be as the one shown in (196).

[11] Following Moltmann (1995), I assume that *dance with* is not a symmetric predicate. The assumption is that there is a possible situation where Eva danced with Bill, but Bill did not dance with Eva (say, he was unconscious, and she just carried him during the dance).

(194) [λs_4 [λs_3[every girl s_3 [2 [every boy s_4 [1 [t_2 danced s_3 with t_1]]]]]]

(195) $\lambda s'. \lambda s''. \forall x[x \text{ is a girl in } s'' \rightarrow \forall y[y \text{ is a boy in } s' \rightarrow x \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s'']]$

(196) $\forall s[\neg \text{Eva danced with Bill in } s \rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s \;\&\; \exists y[y \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \;\&\; \neg\, x \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s\ ]]] \;\&\; \neg \text{Eva danced with Bill in } s_0$

This presupposition is impossible to satisfy because it requires that Eva is a girl in every situation. Otherwise there is no way it can be true that in every situation where Eva did not dance with Bill there is an individual who is a girl in that situation who did not dance with a boy from the topic situation s_0.

6.4.2 The Syntactic Position of an Exceptive Clause in Cases with Multiple Remnants

In the analysis of the case where an exceptive clause contains multiple remnants I proposed in the previous section I made an assumption that an exceptive clause has to c-command all correlates of all remnants. In this section I provide empirical support for this claim (given in (197)).

(197) **Generalization about the Height of an Exceptive with Multiple Remnants:**
If an elided exceptive clause contains multiple elements, then this exceptive clause has to be higher than all of the correlates in the main clause.

I will illustrate this generalization by using the example in (198).

(198) Every girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.

Normally, the subject c-commands the *except*-phrase associated with the object and can bind into it, as shown in (199).

(199) Every girl$_1$ danced with every boy except her$_1$ brother.

As the next step, let me point out that (200) with multiple remnants, where [in Jack's kitchen] is extraposed (so it should not be construed as a part of the exceptive), is a grammatical sentence.

(200) Every girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill [in Jack's kitchen].

Another fact that we need to establish for this argument is that (201), where [except Eva with Bill] is extraposed is grammatical under the reading where *her* in [in her$_1$ kitchen] is a variable bound by *every girl*.

(201) Every girl$_1$ danced with every boy in her$_1$ kitchen except Eva with Bill.

Now, let's construct an example that minimally differs from (200), where [in Jack's kitchen] is substituted by [in her$_1$ kitchen]. The native speakers of English I have consulted with report that the resulting sentence given in (202) is unacceptable under the intended interpretation, where *every girl* binds the pronoun *her*. Given that the extraposition of the PP is by itself acceptable as was shown in (200) and given that normally the subject can bind into the locative PP as was shown in in (201), the absence of binding in (202) is surprising.

(202) * Every $girl_1$ danced with every boy except Eva with Bill [in her_1 kitchen].

Moreover, if an exceptive does not contain multiple remnants and contains only one element as in (203) where it simply operates on the object DP, the subject can bind into an extraposed PP.

(203) Every $girl_1$ danced with every boy except Bill [in her_1 kitchen].

What I take this to mean is that in (202) the exceptive clause has to be situated high in the structure. Under the hypothesis that it is higher than the subject, the unavailability of binding in (202) finds a natural explanation. If an exceptive with multiple remnants has to c-command both of the correlates (the subject and the object of the main clause in this case), then the extraposed PP [in her_1 kitchen] in (202) has to be even higher than that. This means that the subject will not c-command this PP and the absence of the bound reading is predicted.

In other words, in (202) the *except*-clause either has moved rightwards to the position higher than the position of the subject or was merged in that position. Interestingly, the extraposition of *except*-clauses in English is obligatory if an *except*-clause contains multiple remnants. This observation goes back to the work by Moltmann (1995). This is shown by the contrast between (204) and (205). The ungrammaticality of (204) complies with the generalization in (197): in (204) an exceptive does not c-command all of its remnants.

(204) *Every girl except Eva with Bill danced with every boy.
(205) Every girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.

The example that shows that the restriction that we observe in (204) is about multiple remnants is given in (206). This grammatical example minimally differs from the one in (204): the exceptive phrase only has one element in it.

(206) Every girl except Eva danced with every boy.

At this point I can only offer a speculation about the fact that an exceptive clause with multiple remnants has to be placed in the position where it c-commands both of its correlates. Most likely, it has something to do with ellipsis resolution. My preliminary hypothesis is that an exceptive clause with multiple remnants has to c-command all of the correlates in order to establish scope-parallelism between the DPs in the *except*-clause that contains ellipsis and the DPs in the main clause.

Another option is that if we adopt an idea that an exceptive with multiple remnants moves from both of the DPs in the across the board manner – the idea expressed in the previous section, then this fact about the height of an exceptive with multiple remnants finds a natural explanation[12]. If it moves from both positions, it must be higher than both of those positions.

[12] Thanks to Kyle Johnson who made this point to me.

6.4.3 *Some-Every

One of the facts that any account of clausal exceptives has to capture is that if an elided exceptive clause contains multiple remnants each remnant has to have a universal quantifier as its associate. There is a contrast between the ungrammatical example in (207) and the grammatical one in (208). This shows that in general, there is no prohibition against existential quantifiers in sentences with exceptive clauses. Note that in the grammatical example (208) what comes after the exceptive marker is a prepositional phrase, which shows that it is a clausal exceptive – so the restriction we observe in (207) does not have anything to do with the fact that the exceptive is clausal, the issue is with the multiple remnants. The contrast we observe here is predicted by the proposed analysis.

(207) *Some girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.
(208) Some girl danced with every boy except with Bill[13].

Let's assume that (207) is derived from (209).

(209) *Some girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill ~~did not dance~~.

Given our assumptions about the meaning of an exceptive clause, the predicted presupposition of the sentence in (207) is shown in (210) and the at-issue content in (211).

(210) Presupposition: $[[(207)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if:
$\forall s[\neg$Eva danced with Bill in $s \rightarrow \neg\exists x[x$ is a girl in s_0 & $\forall y[y$ is a boy in $s_0 \rightarrow x$ danced with y in s]]] & $\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s_0

(211) At issue content: $[[(207)]]^g(s_0) = 1$ iff
$\forall s[$(Eva danced with Bill in s & $\forall p[p \neq [\lambda s'.\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s'] & $p \in [[\text{Eva}_F$ did not dance with $\text{Bill}_F]]^{g,F} \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)])\rightarrow$
$\exists x[x$ is a girl in s_0 & $\forall y[y$ is a boy in $s_0 \rightarrow$ x danced with y in s]]]

The presupposition requires that every situation where Eva did not dance with Bill there is no girl from the topic situation such that she danced with every boy from the topic situation. That can only be true if Eva is the only girl in the topic situation or there are no girls (and Eva is not a girl).

Let me first discuss the possibility that Eva is a girl in s_0. Here is why the presupposition cannot be satisfied if there are some girls in the topic situation other than Eva. Let's consider a scenario where there is another girl in the topic situation, say Masha. There is a possible situation where Eva did not dance with Bill, but another girl from the topic situation, namely Masha, danced with every boy from the topic situation, thus the presupposition is not satisfied. The requirements (210) imposes cannot be met if the number of girls in the actual topic situation is more than one. If, however, there is exactly one girl, then the presupposition given in (210) and the at issue content given in (211) are consistent with each other (in the sense that they can be true together). Since Eva is the only girl it is entirely possible that in every situation where she did not dance with Bill for every girl there is a boy she did not dance with and in every situation where Eva did dance

[13] Not all speakers of English find this sentence grammatical. For many speakers the phrasal version of the sentence is preferred. I do not know why this is the case.

with Bill and the rest of the facts regarding dancing are the same, there is a girl who danced with every boy from the topic situation. We have already faced wiht this problem earlier, and I suggest that we use the same solution in this case: this interpretation is ruled out by a general semantic constraint against using an existential DP when it is known that the head noun denotes a singleton set.

The only option left is that there are no girls in the topic situation. The presupposition will be satisfied in that case, however, it will contradict the assertion. This is because the assertion says that if we change the fact about Eva dancing at Bill we will find that there is a girl who danced with every boy. This meaning is not well-formed. Whenever the sentence is defined, it is false. There is no way for it to be true. I propose that this is the reason the sentence is perceived as ungrammatical.

Things are different with the sentence in (208), where the existential does not have a corresponding remnant in the *except*-clause, and no such prediction is made by the theory for this example. This is because the ellipsis is resolved differently in (208).

There are two ways the ellipsis can be resolved in this case. The two possibilities come from the two possible positions of the quantifier *some girl*. It can be below *every boy* and then the ellipsis site includes *some girl*, which is shown in (212). It can also be above *every boy* and then the ellipsis includes its trace which is shown in (213).

(212)



(213)



In (212) the *except*-clause provides an exception to the generalization: 'every boy danced with some girl'. It combines with a constituent with the meaning given in (214).

(214) $\lambda s.\lambda s'. \forall y[y \text{ is a boy in } s \rightarrow \exists z[z \text{ is a girl in } s' \;\&\; z \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s']]$

The predicted presupposition resulting from interpreting the LF in (212), where the ellipsis site contains *a girl*, is in (215).

(215) Presupposition: $[[(212)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if:
$\forall s[\neg\exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s \;\&\; x \text{ danced with Bill in } s] \rightarrow \neg\forall y[y \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \rightarrow \exists z[z \text{ is a girl in } s \;\&\; z \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s]]] \;\&\; \neg\exists a[a \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \;\&\; a \text{ danced with Bill in } s_0]$

This is equivalent to (216), from which we learn that no girl danced with Bill in the actual topic situation and that he is a boy.

(216) Presupposition: $[[(212)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if:
$\forall s[\neg\exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s \;\&\; x \text{ danced with Bill in } s] \rightarrow \exists y[y \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \;\&\; \neg\exists z[z \text{ is a girl in } s \;\&\; z \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s]]] \;\&\; \neg\exists a[a \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \;\&\; a \text{ danced with Bill in } s_0]$

The predicted at issue content given in (217). It says that if we change the facts about some girl dancing with Bill and keep all other facts of the form [not a girl danced with x] (where x varies over people) the same, it would be true that for every boy there is some girl that danced with him. To sum up, the sentence (208) is predicted to mean that no girl danced with Bill and he is the only such boy, because for every other boy it is true that some girl danced with him. This is one of the readings the sentence in (208) has.

(217) At issue content: $[[(212)]]^g(s_0) = 1$ iff:
$\forall s[(\exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s \ \&\ x \text{ danced with Bill in } s] \ \&$
$\forall p[p \neq [\lambda s'. \neg\exists z[z \text{ is a girl in } s' \ \&\ z \text{ danced with Bill in } s'] \ \&\ p \in [[\text{not a girl danced with Bill}_F]]^{g,F}$
$\rightarrow p(s) = p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \forall y[y \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \rightarrow \exists a[a \text{ is a girl in } s \ \&\ a \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s\ ]\ ]\ ]$

The second LF given in (213) is predicted to get the meaning where *some girl* scopes above *every* and its exceptive phrase. In this case, the *except*-clause combines with a constituent with the meaning given in (218), where 5 is the numerical index on the trace left by *some girl*.

(218) $\lambda s.\ \lambda s'.\ \forall y[y \text{ is a boy in } s \rightarrow g(5) \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s'\ ]]$

The predicted meaning is shown in (219). The sentence is predicted to be defined only if there is a girl such that she did not dance with Bill and in every situation where she did not dance with Bill there is a boy from the actual topic situation who she did not dance with. Thus, Bill has to be a boy in the actual topic situation. The at-issue content says that this same girl has to be such that if we change the facts about her dancing with Bill and keep the rest of the dancing facts the same, it would be true that she danced with every boy.

(219) $[[(213)]]^g(s_0) = 1$ iff
$\exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \ \&$
$[\lambda z\mathbf{:}\ \forall s[\neg z \text{ danced with Bill in } s \rightarrow \exists y[y \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \ \&\ \neg\ z \text{ danced with } y \text{ in } s]] \ \&\ \neg z \text{ danced with Bill in } s_0\mathbf{.}$
$\forall s[(z \text{ danced with Bill in } s \ \&\ \forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s. \neg z \text{ danced with Bill in } s] \ \&\ p \in [[z \text{ did not dance with Bill}_F]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s) = p(s_0)]) \rightarrow \forall a[a \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \rightarrow z \text{ danced with } a \text{ in } s\ ]\ ]\ (x)]$

6.4.4. *Every-Some

The system developed here explains the ungrammaticality of the *every/some* case (the example is shown in (220)) in exactly the same way. To preview, in case of the ungrammatical sentence (220), where the exceptive clause contains multiple remnants and one of the remnants does not have a universal associate, the prediction is that the presupposition can only be satisfied if Bill is the only boy in the actual topic situation, like it was in case of *some-every* combination we considered earlier. Again, there is no general prohibition against existential quantifiers in a sentence with exceptives (221) and this is also predicted by the analysis for clausal exceptives developed here.

(220) *Every girl danced with some boy except Eva with Bill.
(221) Every girl danced with some boy except Eva.

Under the assumption that (220) is derived from (222) by ellipsis, the presupposition predicted by the analysis proposed here for (220) is given in (223).

(222) *Every girl danced with some boy except Eva with Bill ~~did not dance~~.

(223) Presupposition: $[[(220)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if:
$\forall s[\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s $\rightarrow$
$\neg\forall x$[x is a girl in $s_0 \rightarrow \exists y$[y is a boy in s_0 & x danced with y in s]]]
& $\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s_0

What we have in (223) is equivalent to (224).

(224) $\forall s[\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s$\rightarrow$
$\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\neg\exists y$[y is a boy in s_0 & x danced with y in s]]]
& $\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s_0

This presupposition can only be satisfied if Bill is the only boy in the actual topic situation or if there are no boys in the topic situation. There is no other way to guarantee that in every situation where Eva did not dance with Bill, there is a girl from s_0 who danced with no boy from s_0.

If Bill is the only boy in s_0, Eva not dancing with him would guarantee that in every situation where Eva did not dance with Bill, there is a girl from s_0 who danced with no boys from s_0, so the presupposition would be satisfied. However, this option is ruled out by the general principle prohibiting the use of an existential when it is known that its restrictor is a singleton set.

If there are no boys in s_0, the presupposition is satisfied as well. However, this option is ruled out because it is not compatible with the at issue content shown in (225): if we change the fact about Eva dancing with Bill while keeping all the other dancing facts the same, it would be true that every girl danced with some boy from the topic situation, which requires there to be some boys in s_0.

(225) At issue content: $[[(220)]]^g(s_0)$=1 iff
$\forall s$[(Eva dance with Bill in s & $\forall p[(p\neq[\lambda s'. \neg$Eva danced with Bill in s'] & $p\in[[$Eva$_F$ did not dance with Bill$_F]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)$]) $\rightarrow$
$\forall x$[x is a girl in $s_0 \rightarrow \exists y$[y is a boy in s_0 & x danced with y in s]]]

Thus, we found no way of constructing a well-formed meaning for (222). This explains the fact that it is perceived as ungrammatical.

No such issue is predicted to arise in the case where the exceptive clause has only one remnant like the one in (221). There are two possible interpretations due to the fact that there are two possible scopal configurations between *every* and *some*. The two options are shown in (226)[14], where *every girl* outscores *some boy* the ellipsis site contains the DP *some boy*, and in (227), where *some boy* scopes high, the ellipsis site only contains its trace.

(226) [λs_4 [[except [Eva ~~did not dance with a boy~~]]s_4]
[λs_1[λs_2[every girl s_1 [3 some boy s_2 [5 [t_3 danced s_2 with t_5]]]]]]]

[14] For simplicity, the movement of the *except*-clause in this schematic representation is shown here as a leftward movement.

(227) [λs_4 [some boy s_4 [5
[[except [Eva ~~did not dance with t_5~~] s_4]
[λs_1[λs_2 [every girl s_1 [3[t_3 danced s_2 with t_5]]]]]]]]]

Here I will only illustrate one derivation that results from interpreting the LF in (226). In (226) the claim *Eva did not dance with a boy* is construed as an exception to the generalization *every girl danced with some boy*. The interpretation of this LF predicts that the sentence comes with the presupposition given in (228).

(228) Presupposition: $[[(226)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if:
$\forall s[\neg\exists x[x \text{ is a boy in } s \ \&\ \text{Eva danced with } x \text{ in } s] \rightarrow \neg\forall y[y \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \rightarrow \exists a[a \text{ is a boy in } s \ \&\ y \text{ dance with } a \text{ in } s\ ]]] \ \&\ \neg\exists z[z \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \ \&\ \text{Eva danced with } z \text{ in } s_0]$

The presupposition given in (228) is equivalent to (229): it gives us that Eva is a girl and that she did not dance with any boy. The containment follows from the first conjunct. It says that every situation Eva did not dance with any boy has a girl from the topic situation that did not dance with any boy. This is only possible if Eva is a girl in s_0.

(229) $\forall s[\neg\exists x[x \text{ is a boy in } s \ \&\ \text{Eva danced with } x \text{ in } s] \rightarrow \exists y[y \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \ \&\ \neg\exists a[a \text{ is a boy in } s \ \&\ y \text{ dance with } a \text{ in } s\ ]]] \ \&\ \neg\exists z[z \text{ is a boy in } s_0 \ \&\ \text{Eva danced with } z \text{ in } s_0]$

The predicted at-issue content in (230) says that in all situations where facts about other people dancing with some boy are the same as in s_0 and where Eva did dance with a boy it is true that every girl from s_0 danced with some boy.

(230) At issue content: $[[(226)]]^g(s_0)=1$ iff
$\forall s[\ (\exists x[x \text{ is a boy in } s \ \&\ \text{Eva danced with } x \text{ in } s]\ \ \&$
$\forall p[(p\neq[\lambda s'.\ \neg\exists z[z \text{ is a boy in } s' \ \&\ \text{Eva danced with } z \text{ in } s']] \ \&\ p\in[[\text{Eva}_F \text{ did not dance with a boy}]]^{g,F}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)])\rightarrow\forall y[y \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \rightarrow\exists a[a \text{ is a boy in } s \ \&\ y \text{ danced with } a \text{ in } s\ ]\ ]\ ]$

6.4.5. No –Any, *No-Every

I said in the introduction to Section 6 that the restriction on the possible quantifiers observed in cases where an exceptive clause contains multiple remnants is not about the form of the individual quantifiers, but is about the interpretation – in the context of the sentence each correlate of each remnant should contribute a quantifier equivalent to a universal quantifier. This is predicted by the analysis suggested here.

The explanation for this fact lies in the presupposition generated by the system. The presupposition always looks at situations that match the actual topic situation with respect to the fact described by an elided *except*-clause and states that the quantificational claim is not true in those situations. In other words, it negates the quantificational claim. If a quantifier corresponding to a remnant is existential, this negation will turn it into a universal. As a consequence of this, we will always find ourselves in a configuration where a fact about one individual (the remnant) has to guarantee something for all individuals in all situations. This is only possible if this one individual is the only element in the restrictor of the quantifier (or if the restrictor is empty). As was mentioned in the discussion of existentials, it is not possible to use an existential if it is known that there is only one element that satisfies the restrictor of the existential. A similar restriction exists for such natural language quantifiers as 'every' and 'no'. Pragmatically they cannot be used if it is known that there is only one individual that satisfies the restrictor.

I will illustrate these points by using the examples involving the grammatical combination *no-any* and the ungrammatical combinations *no-every*.

Let's start from the grammatical *no-any* combination shown in (231).

(231) No girl danced with any boy except Eva with Bill ~~danced~~.

The presupposition generated by the system for this sentence is shown in (232), and after we simplify it by getting rid of the double negation, it is as shown in (233). The first conjunct says that every situation that where Eva danced with Bill has a girl from s_0 and a boy from s_0 and a girl danced with boy. It can only be true if Eva is a girl in s_0 and Bill is a boy in s_0. The second conjunct simply states that Eva danced with Bill in s_0.

(232) Presupposition: $[[(231)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if:
$\forall s$[Eva danced with Bill in s$\rightarrow$
$\neg\neg\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\exists y$[y is a boy in s_0 & x danced with y in s]]]
& Eva danced with Bill in s_0

(233) (232)= $\forall s$[Eva danced with Bill in s$\rightarrow$
$\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\exists y$[y is a boy in s_0 & x danced with y in s]]]
& Eva danced with Bill in s_0

The at-issue value is given in (234). It says that in all situations where Eva did not dance with Bill and the rest of the dancing facts are the same as in s_0 no girl danced with any boy. This captures the intuition that Eva dancing with Bill is the only exception to the generalization 'No boy danced with any girl'.

(234) At issue content: $[[(231)]]^g(s_0)$ =1 iff
$\forall s$[($\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s &
$\forall p$[(p$\neq$[λs'. Eva danced with Bill in s']&p$\in$[[Eva$_F$ danced with Bill$_F$]]^{g,F}) $\rightarrow$ p(s)=p(s_0)]) $\rightarrow$
$\neg\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\exists y$[y is a boy in s_0 & x danced with y in s]]]

As the reader can verify, the predicted truth conditions and the presupposition capture the meaning this sentence has.

Now, let's look at the ungrammatical combination *no-every* shown in (235). The presupposition generated for this case is shown in (236) and it is equivalent to (237).

(235) *No girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill ~~danced~~.

(236) Presupposition: $[[(235)]]^g(s_0)$ is defined only if:
$\forall s$[Eva danced with Bill in s$\rightarrow$
$\neg\neg\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\forall y$[y is a boy in $s_0 \rightarrow$ x danced with y in s]]]
& Eva danced with Bill in s_0

(237) (236) =
$\forall s$[Eva danced with Bill in s $\rightarrow$
$\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\forall y$[y is a boy in $s_0 \rightarrow$ x danced with y in s]]]
& Eva danced with Bill in s_0

The first conjunct in (237) says that every situation that where Eva danced with Bill has a girl from s_0 that danced with all boys in s_0. This can only be true if Eva is a girl in s_0 and Bill is the only boy or there are no boys in s_0 (in that case the universal quantification in (237) is vacuous). This is the only way a fact about Bill can guarantee something for all boys in all possible situations.

The option of there being no boy is ruled out by the at-issue content. It is shown in (238), which is equivalent to (239). It says that if we change the fact about Eva dancing with Bill while keeping all other dancing facts the same, it will be true that every girl did not dance with some boy.

(238) At issue content: $[[(235)]](s_0)$ =1 iff
$\forall s$[($\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s &
$\forall p$[(p$\neq$[λs'. Eva danced with Bill in s']&p$\in$[[Eva$_F$ danced with Bill$_F$]]^{g,F}) $\rightarrow$ p(s)=p(s_0)]) $\rightarrow$
$\neg\exists x$[x is a girl in s_0 & $\forall y$[y is a boy in $s_0 \rightarrow$ x danced with y in s]]]

(239) (238)=
$\forall s$[($\neg$Eva danced with Bill in s &
$\forall p$[(p$\neq$[λs'. Eva danced with Bill in s']&p$\in$[[Eva$_F$ danced with Bill$_F$]]^{g,F}) $\rightarrow$ p(s)=p(s_0)]) $\rightarrow$
$\forall x$[x is a girl in $s_0 \rightarrow \exists y$[y is a boy in s_0 & $\neg$x danced with y in s]]]

Now, what about the possibility of Bill being the only boy in s_0? In order to rule this option out we need to appeal to a principle that does not allow the use of 'every boy' when it is known that there is only one boy and his name is Bill. Saying that such a principle exists would not be novel. Partee (Partee 1986 p.371) appeals to this principle in her explanation of the fact that *every boy* cannot be type-shifted to type e. This type shifting is predicted to be possible in case there is only one boy. However, she points out in that case the usage of *every boy* is blocked pragmatically. This is supported by the facts. The sentence in (240) implies that there is more than one satellite of Earth.

(240) #Every satellite of the Earth is yellow.

7. Necessary Truths

The conditional analysis of clausal exceptives I have proposed here involves looking at situations where the facts about the event described by the exceptive clause are different than in the actual topic situation. One question arising at this point is what is going to happen if the exceptive clause expresses a necessary truth and there are no situations where the facts described by the exceptive clause are different than in s_0. Let me illustrate the issue with the example in (242).

(241) 2, 4, 5, 7
(242) All numbers in (241) are odd except 4 ~~is not odd~~.

According to the conditional analysis I have developed here, the at-issue meaning of the sentence (242) is the universal quantificational claim over possible situations where the proposition denoted by *4 is not odd* is false while other facts about oddness remain the same as in s_0. This claim is given in (244). Given that mathematical truths are necessary truths, there cannot be a situation where *4 is odd*. The prediction of the analysis for such a case is that the sentence is vacuously true because the domain of quantification over situations is empty. This is clearly not a welcomed prediction given that 2 is not odd in (241) and because of this the sentence (242) is not perceived as true.

(243) Presupposition: $[[(242)]]^g\,(s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s[\neg 4 \text{ is odd in } s \rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is number in (241) in } s_0 \,\&\, \neg x \text{ is odd in } s]] \,\&\, \neg 4 \text{ is odd in } s_0$

(244) Assertion: $[[(242)]]^g\,(s_0) = 1$ iff
$\forall s[(4 \text{ is odd in } s \,\&\, \forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'.\ \neg 4 \text{ is odd in } s'] \,\&\, p \in [[4_F \text{ is not odd}]]^{gf}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)])$
$\rightarrow \forall x[x \text{ is number in (241) in } s_0 \rightarrow x \text{ is odd in } s]]$

A similar problem arises with the interpretation of indefinites. Let's consider the ungrammatical sentence in (246), where a clausal exceptive operates on an existential claim. The predicted presupposition in (247) is satisfied, due to the fact that there are no even numbers in (245). The assertion in (248) is vacuously true, simply because there is no possible situation where the value for '3 is even' is true. Of course, this is not the right result, because the sentence in (246) is not true, but is ungrammatical.

(245) 3, 5, 7
(246) *Some numbers in (245) are even except 3 ~~is not even~~.

(247) Presupposition: $[[(246)]]^g\,(s_0)$ is defined only if
$\forall s[\neg 3 \text{ is even in } s \rightarrow \neg\exists x[x \text{ is number in (245) in } s_0 \,\&\, x \text{ is even in } s]] \,\&\, \neg 3 \text{ is even in } s_0$

(248) Assertion: $[[(246)]]^g\,(s_0) = 1$ iff
$\forall s[(3 \text{ is even in } s \,\&\, \forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'.\ \neg 3 \text{ is even in } s'] \,\&\, p \in [[3_F \text{ is not even}]]^{gf}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)])$
$\rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is number in (245) in } s_0 \,\&\, x \text{ is even in } s]]$

In order to solve this problem, we can slightly modify the analysis proposed here. The idea is that we could keep the presupposition introduced by *except* the same, but in the at issue content instead of universally quantifying over situations where the proposition following *except* is false and all of its focus alternatives (excluding the original) have the same value as they do in s_0, we could simply existentially quantify over situations where focus alternatives of the proposition following *except* (excluding the original) have the same value as in s_0. The modified at-issue content for the problematic sentence (242) is in (249). It says that there is a situation where all facts about non-oddness of numbers other than 4 remain the same and where all numbers in (241) are odd. This quantification cannot be vacuous, because there is at least one situation, namely s_0, that satisfies the restrictor. (249) is clearly false, because 2 is not odd.

(249) Assertion: $[[(242)]]^g (s_0) = 1$ iff
$\exists s[\forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'. \neg 4 \text{ is odd in } s'] \ \&\ p \in [[4_F \text{ is not odd}]]^{gf}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]$
$\&\ \forall x[x \text{ is number in (241) in } s_0 \rightarrow x \text{ is odd in } s]]$

The same goes for the problematic (246): if we give it the at-issue content in (250), the quantification is not going to be vacuous and in fact this assertion is going to be false because there are no even numbers in (245). Trying to introduce an even number into (245) will result in the presupposition that is not satisfied in that situation. There is no way to make both the presupposition and the at-issue content true together.

(250) Assertion: $[[(246)]]^g (s_0) = 1$ iff
$\exists s[\forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'. \neg 3 \text{ is even in } s'] \ \&\ p \in [[3_F \text{ is not even}]]^{gf}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]) \ \&$
$\exists x[x \text{ is number in (245) in } s_0 \ \&\ x \text{ is even in } s]]$

Unfortunately, this modification does not help with the intuitively true sentence in (252). The problem here is that the assertion generated by the system (shown in (253)) can be true only if there is a possible situation where everything that is a number in the actual example (251) is odd. If 4 is even in every possible situation, then such possibility does not exist.

(251) 4, 5, 7, 9
(252) All numbers in (251) are odd except 4 ~~is not odd~~.

(253) Assertion: $[[(252)]]^g (s_0) = 1$ iff
$\exists s[\forall p[(p \neq [\lambda s'. \neg 4 \text{ is odd in } s'] \ \&\ p \in [[4_F \text{ is not odd}]]^{gf}) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s_0)]$
$\&\ \forall x[x \text{ is number in (251) in } s_0 \rightarrow x \text{ is odd in } s]]$

What I think is going on in this example is that our language does not behave as if ‘4 is not an odd number’ is a necessary truth. Evidence for this comes from the conditional paraphrase of (252) given in (254). It is also perceived as true in the situation presented in (251). Under the assumption that mathematical facts are the same in all possible situations, we will run into the same problem with interpretation of conditional sentences. Whatever strategy we use to explain what is going on in (254), we could use it also to explain (252). After all, the switch from the universal quantification over situations to the existential quantification does not give us much given that we still need to make it possible for a number to change its properties from a situation to a situation.

(254) If 4 were an odd number, all numbers in (251) would have been odd.

8. Plural Remnants in Exceptive Clauses

Throughout this discussion I made a simplifying assumption, namely, I pretended that all remnants inside the exceptive clauses are proper names. This is, of course, is not right. In (255) the elided clause must be 'Eva and Mary came'.

(255) No girl came except Eva and Mary.

Given the assumptions that we made about the meaning of *except*, the predicted interpretation for this sentence is as shown in (256).

(256) $[[(255)]]^{g}(s_0)$ is defined if $\forall$s[Eva and Mary came in s$\rightarrow \exists$x[x is a girl in s_0 & x came in s]] & Eva and Mary came in s_0

$[[(255)]]^{g}(s_0)$=1 iff
$\forall$s[(Eva did not come in s or Mary did not come in s &$\forall$p[(p$\neq$[[Eva and Mary came]] & p$\in$[[[Eva and Mary]$_F$ came]]^{g,F})$\rightarrow$ p(s)=p(s'))])$\rightarrow \neg\exists$x[x is a girl in s_0 & x came in s]]

What we have in (256) is too weak. From the presupposition we learn that it is either Eva or Mary who is a girl. One of them being a girl is enough to guarantee that in every situation where this person came, there is a girl from s_0 who came. The denotation we were working with so far successfully accounted for examples we looked at because we have only looked at cases where the remnant in an exceptive clause was an individual denoting expression.

The strategy I will suggest here is to find a way of going from (257) to (258) – the set of propositions where each proposition has an individual denoting expression in the position of the remnant. Then, we could go through those individual propositions and state that it holds for all of them that in every situation where one of them is true the quantificational claim is not true (shown in (259)). The reader can verify that (259) requires that Eva is a girl and that Mary is a girl.

(257) λs'. Eva and Mary came in s'
(258) {λs'. Eva came in s', λs'. Mary came in s'}

(259) $\forall$p[p$\in${λs'. Eva came in s', λs'. Mary came in s'}$\rightarrow\forall$s[p(s)$\rightarrow \neg\neg\exists$x[x is a girl in s_0 & x came in s]]]=
$\forall$p[p$\in${λs'. Eva came in s', λs'. Mary came in s'}$\rightarrow\forall$s[p(s)$\rightarrow \exists$x[x is a girl in s_0 & x came in s]]]

The question is how to get from (257) to (258). I propose that we appeal here to the idea that we have already used elsewhere: the remnant of ellipsis is focused. The list of focus alternatives for the clause following *except* in our example are as shown in (260). We need to narrow it down to the set given in (258) and there is a property that the two proposition in (258) have that no other proposition in (260) has, this is the property of being entailed by the original: the original [λs. Eva and Mary came] does not entail that John came, but it does entail that Eva came and that Mary came. So the relevant set of propositions is picked by the function shown in (261).

(260) $[\![\ [\text{Eva and Mary}]_F \text{ came}]\!]^f = \{\lambda s'.\ \text{Eva came in } s', \lambda s'.\ \text{Mary came in } s', \lambda s'.\ \text{John came in } s', \lambda s'.\ \text{Anna came in } s', \text{etc}\}$

(261) $\lambda p.\ p \in [\![\ [\text{Eva and Mary}]_F \text{ came}]\!]^f \ \&\ [\lambda s'.\ \text{Eva and Mary came in } s'] \subseteq p = \{\lambda s'.\ \text{Eva danced came in } s', \lambda s'.\ \text{Mary came in } s'\}$

The way to capture the meaning of this specific sentence (255) is shown in (262) (the presupposition) and (263) (the at-issue content). The at-issue content had to be modified as well. Now we are saying that in all situations where the propositions in (261) get the opposite value compared to in s_0, and the rest of the propositions retain the same value, the quantificational claim holds.

(262) $[\![(255)]\!]^g(s_0)$ is defined if

$$\forall p[p \in [\![\ [\text{Eva and Mary}]_F \text{ came}]\!]^f \ \&\ [\lambda s.\ \text{Eva and Mary came in } s] \subseteq p \rightarrow \forall s[p(s) \rightarrow \exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \ \&\ x \text{ came in } s\ ]]] \ \&\ \text{Eva and Mary came in } s_0$$

(263) $[\![(255)]\!]^g(s_0)=1$ iff

$$\forall s[(\forall p[p \in [\![\ [\text{Eva and Mary}]_F \text{ came}]\!]^f \ \&\ [\lambda s.\ \text{Eva and Mary came in } s] \subseteq p \rightarrow p(s) \neq p(s_0) \ \&\ \forall q[q \in [\![\ [\text{Eva and Mary}]_F \text{ came}]\!]^f \ \&\ [\lambda s.\ \text{Eva and Mary came in } s] \not\subseteq q \rightarrow q(s)=q(s_0)) \rightarrow \neg\exists x[x \text{ is a girl in } s_0 \ \&\ x \text{ came in } s\ ]\ ]$$

The updated version of *except* φ is given in (264).

(264) $[\![\text{except } \varphi]\!]^g = \lambda s'.\lambda M_{<s<st>>}$:

$$\forall p[(p \in [\![\varphi]\!]^{gf} \& [\![\varphi]\!]^g \subseteq p) \rightarrow \forall s[p(s) \rightarrow \neg M(s')(s)]] \ \& [\![\varphi]\!]^g.$$
$$\forall s[(\forall q[q \in [\![\varphi]\!]^{gf} \& \ [\![\varphi]\!]^{go} \subseteq q \rightarrow q(s) \neq q(s') \ \&\ \forall p[(p \in [\![\varphi]\!]^{gf} \ \&\ [\![\varphi]\!]^{go} \not\subseteq p) \rightarrow p(s)=p(s')]) \rightarrow M(s')(s)]$$

9. Conclusions

In this paper I have argued that exceptive deletion exists as a type of ellipsis. I have empirically established some of the properties of exceptive deletion in English, namely that this kind of ellipsis allows for polarity mismatch between the antecedent and the ellipsis site.

I have proposed a novel conditional semantic analysis for clausal exceptives. The analysis is conditional in the sense that there is quantification over possible situations and exceptive clauses restrict the domain of this quantification. I have shown how this analysis derives the inferences exceptives come with as well as their distribution. I have shown how the analysis proposed here explains the cases that the phrasal analysis cannot capture such as the cases where a remnant is a PP with a meaningful preposition, sprouting cases and multiple remnant cases. I proposed that an exceptive claim introduces an exception to a claim expressing a generalization. I suggested a specific way of thinking about what 'being an exception' means. It has 3 components. A claim X is an exception to a generalization Y if (i) X happened; (ii) in every situation where X happened Y is not true; (iii) had X not happened, Y would have been true.

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