



# **Hardening MFA web applications to counter evolving transparent phishing attack vectors**

Philipp Liermann 20-475873-20  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Raad Bin Tareaf

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# 1 Overview

## 1.1 Abstract

As of today most online services have implemented multi-factor authentication to prevent malicious third-party actors from using stolen login credentials. Despite this, a new technique referred to as transparent proxy phishing still provides malicious actors the means of acquiring a victims private credentials and MFA tokens during a classical social engineering based phishing attack. The attacker is able to effectively duplicate legitimate services by using specifically configured reverse proxy servers that relay traffic from the victims browser to the original service while collecting and intercepting wanted information like passwords and credit card numbers. Also the ease with which transparent proxy phishing can be executed is alarming. Open-source toolkits and publicly available resources have made it simpler than ever for attackers to deploy such sophisticated schemes without a deep understanding of web development or cybersecurity. This elevation in threat sophistication underscores the urgent need for a corresponding advancement in defensive measures. To resolve this issue, it is imperative to develop and implement effective measures to counteract transparent phishing and alike. This paper will review, evaluate and try to improve different strategies to help developers protect their applications against this new type of phishing attack.

## 1.2 Problem statement

As an online service provider it is crucial to protect the privacy and security of its users. Due to the fact that transparent or so called reverse proxy phishing attacks are becoming more common and sophisticated implementing additional active security measures to detect them is essential. The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current strategies to detect transparent phishing attacks by watching incoming client traffic. As this often requires TLS fingerprinting to detect known reverse proxy software the paper will also try to propose a new approach of enumerating and actually validating supported TLS ciphers of web browsers to make TLS fingerprint spoofing harder for attackers.

## 1.3 Research question

This study centers on developing effective defenses for web applications against the rising threat of transparent proxy phishing attacks. The central question guiding this research is:

- How can web applications be safeguarded against transparent proxy phishing attacks?

From this primary inquiry, several sub-questions emerge, focusing on specific aspects of the threat to better understand and address it:

- What defines traditional phishing attacks, and how are they distinct from transparent proxy phishing attacks?

This question aims to delineate the operational mechanisms of both, highlighting the unique challenges posed by the newer method.

- What is the magnitude of the threat posed by transparent proxy phishing attacks?

Here, we seek to quantify the severity and prevalence of these attacks to better understand their impact on current security frameworks.

- How can a webserver detect that a client connection is being manipulated by a transparent phishing toolkit?

This focuses on identifying the technical indicators that can alert servers to the presence of such phishing activities, forming the basis for developing more robust detection techniques.

These sub-questions are designed to dissect the broader problem into manageable segments, allowing for a more structured and focused inquiry into each aspect of transparent proxy phishing.

## 1.4 Objective

The objectives of this research are threefold. Firstly, it aims to elucidate the mechanics and impact of transparent proxy phishing, underscoring why it is a growing concern in the cybersecurity community. Secondly, the study evaluates the current state of research, identifying gaps in existing defenses against this attack vector. Finally, through rigorous experimentation and practical simulations, the paper proposes new, effective strategies to mitigate this threat, contributing valuable insights to the arsenal of cybersecurity defense mechanisms.

## 1.5 Theoretical foundations

### **Cyberfraud**

is a form of internet-based fraud, usually involving the use of false identities and/or stolen information to illegally obtain money, property, or services. Cyberfraud is an increasingly pervasive problem that is becoming increasingly difficult to combat, as fraudsters become more sophisticated in their methods. In 2020, cyberfraud was estimated to cost the global economy over \$6 trillion[7], with the financial sector suffering the most damages. The social, economic and reputational costs of cyberfraud can be incredibly damaging, and can range from the loss of money, to identity theft, to the disruption of businesses. Cyberfraud has become so pervasive that it is essential for businesses and individuals to take measures to protect themselves from it. This includes using strong passwords and authentication systems that require two or even more external factors for authentication.

### **HTML**

is the standard markup language for creating web pages and web applications. It is used to structure and present content on the web. HTML is used in conjunction with CSS and JavaScript to create interactive and visually appealing web pages.

### **Unicode**

is a standard for encoding, representing, and handling text in most of the world's writing systems. It is used to represent characters from all of the world's writing systems, including Latin, Cyrillic, Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and many others. Unicode is used in many modern software applications, including web browsers, word processors, and operating systems. In computer science literature, Unicode symbols are often represented as U+ followed by a hexadecimal number.

### **A Phishing attack**

is a type of cyberattack in which an attacker attempts to gain confidential information, such as passwords, credit card numbers, or other sensitive information, by sending emails or other messages disguised as legitimate entities. These messages often include malicious links to faked login prompts that will steal the victims credentials upon entering them. These attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated and difficult to recognize, making it important for everyone to remain vigilant and take steps to protect against them.

### **A HTTP reverse proxy**

is a type of proxy server that retrieves resources on behalf of a client from one or more servers. This type of proxy is sometimes referred to as a “gateway” or “tunneling” proxy because it acts as a gateway for the traffic to and from the server. A reverse proxy will typically receive a request from a client, then forward that request to an appropriate

server on the same network. It then retrieves the response from the server and sends it back to the client. This type of proxy server is most often used in enterprise networks to protect against malicious traffic, to balance load between multiple servers, and to cache static content.




Figure 1.1: How a HTTP reverse proxy works

### Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks

are a type of cyberattack in which an attacker intercepts and modifies communication between two parties without their knowledge. This type of attack is often used to steal sensitive information, such as login credentials, credit card numbers, or other personal information. MITM attacks can be difficult to detect, as the attacker can intercept and modify communication without the knowledge of the parties involved.




Figure 1.2: How a MITM attack works

### Transparent proxy phishing

is a new technique used by attackers to intercept and steal multi-factor authentication (MFA) tokens from unsuspecting users. Instead of copying HTML code from the original page that the attacker is trying to impersonate, this new attack uses a HTTP reverse

proxy to just redirect the users traffic to the original page. The attacking proxy operator can view and modify all traffic that is going through it while the victim sees a one by one copy of the original login page. By doing so login credentials and 2FA tokens can be extracted easily.

### **TLS**

is a cryptographic protocol that provides end-to-end security for data sent between a client and a server. It is widely used to secure web traffic, email, and other types of data. TLS is the successor to SSL, and is often referred to as SSL/TLS. If a webserver is using TLS its URL starts with the well known https:// prefix.

### **TLS Fingerprinting**

is a technique used to identify the TLS implementation of a client or server by analyzing the handshake process. This can be used to identify which software is used by client or server. Industry standards for fingerprinting algorithms have existed for a long time. These include: JA3, JA3N and the whole JA4+ family.

### **Nginx**

is a popular open-source web server and reverse proxy server. It is used by millions of websites to serve web pages and other content. Nginx is known for its high performance, stability, and low resource usage. It is also known for its flexibility and extensibility, as it can be easily extended with third-party modules and plugins. Because Nginx can easily be configured to act as a reverse proxy and supports TLS, it is often used as a so called TLS terminator, meaning that it terminates the TLS connection and forwards the unencrypted traffic to a HTTP backend app.

### **Containerization**

is a lightweight alternative to full machine virtualization that involves encapsulating an application in a container with its own operating environment. Containers are isolated from one another and from the host system, but share the same kernel. This makes them more lightweight and faster to start up than virtual machines. Containers are often used to deploy applications in a consistent and reproducible way, and are commonly used in cloud computing environments.

### **Docker**

is a platform for developing, shipping, and running applications. It allows developers to package their applications and dependencies into containers, which can then be run on any system that has Docker installed. Docker containers are lightweight, portable, and self-sufficient, making them an ideal platform for deploying applications.



### **Podman**

is a daemonless container engine for developing, managing, and running OCI container images. It is very similar to Docker, but does not require higher privileges to run containers as it fully runs in user space.

### **Socket**

is an endpoint for communication between two machines or processes. Sockets are used to establish a connection between a client and a server, allowing them to exchange data. Sockets can be used to communicate over a network or between processes on the same machine. On Linux hosts a socket can even be represented as a file using the unix domain socket standard.

### **TCP**

is a standard protocol that is used to establish and maintain a connection between two devices on a network. It is used to transmit data between devices in a reliable and ordered manner. TCP is used in many applications, including web servers, email servers, and file transfer protocols. TCP is part of the TCP/IP protocol suite. A TCP connection is established using a three-way handshake, in which the client and server exchange a series of messages to establish a connection. These messages include a SYN message from the client, a SYN-ACK message from the server, and an ACK message from the client. Once the connection is established, data can be transmitted between the client and server in both directions.

### **Wireshark**

is a popular open-source network protocol analyzer that is used to capture and analyze network traffic. It is widely used by network administrators, security professionals, and developers to troubleshoot network problems, analyze network traffic, and detect security vulnerabilities.

## 1.6 Current state of research

The most prominent research on this topic is conducted in the paper "Catching Transparent Phish: Analyzing and Detecting MITM Phishing Toolkits" by Brian Kondracki Et al. [6]. The team of four provides a detailed overview of the most used transparent phishing toolkits and provides a list of statistical features that can be used to detect those by testing the TLS server of the toolkit. This list of features includes TLS fingerprints, User-Agents, simulated global network delay and TCP packet timings from benchmarks of said tools. Their model was able to detect the most common open-source MITM transparent phishing toolkits with an accuracy above 99%. It is intended to be used with a script that scans the internet for phishing sites that are run using MITM phishing toolkits. Both is available as open-source on GitHub under the name PHOCA which means seal in latin.[4] Through this research some of the chosen features for MITM toolkit server detection will be used to watch client traffic for signs of it being relayed through a transparent phishing toolkit.

Besides the research that has been done on this topic already, still we are far away from production ready plug-n-play solutions that can reliably identify transparent phishing toolkits.

## 1.7 Research Design

First, a thorough analysis of existing and scientific papers on transparent proxy phishing toolkits will be undertaken. This literature review will critically evaluate prior research findings, methodologies, and theoretical frameworks deployed in the study of phishing attacks and defense mechanisms. By doing so, it will identify potential gaps in the current body of knowledge and establish a solid theoretical foundation for subsequent experimental work. In parallel, experimental research will be conducted by setting up controlled attack simulations using various open-source transparent proxy phishing toolkits. These toolkits, commonly used by adversaries in real-world scenarios, will be systematically evaluated to uncover flaws and weaknesses in their attack implementations. Each experiment will involve detailed documentation of the setup, execution, and outcomes of the phishing simulations, ensuring reproducibility and transparency in the research process. Experimental phase will involve the following steps:

### Simulation Setup

A virtual lab environment containing a dummy MFA protected login service will be set up. The service will be secured via HTTPS using a self signed TLS certificate so it resembles a real world setup and also allows analysis of TLS handshakes.

### **Selection of Toolkits**

A range of widely-used open-source reverse proxy phishing toolkits will be selected based on criteria such as popularity, functionality and community support. Examples may include Evilginx, Modlishka, and Murena.

### **Evaluating current Countermeasures**

Each selected phishing toolkit will be deployed against the simulated web service. Various countermeasure configurations will be tested to evaluate if relayed client connections can be blocked or flagged successfully.

### **Data Collection and Analysis**

Countermeasures will be tested against a variety of lab setups. These include swapping out MITM toolkits and client browser versions. A automated testing solution may be needed to perform reproducible tests.

### **Validation of Findings**

The results of the experiments with existing and refined approaches will be reviewed and discussed

In conclusion, this research design integrates both the theoretical and practical aspects of cybersecurity research, adopting a rigorous and systematic approach to advance current understandings of reverse proxy phishing toolkits and contribute to the development of effective defense mechanisms.

## 2 Literature Review

### 2.1 Overview of Multi-Factor Authentication

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is a security system that requires more than one method of authentication from independent categories of credentials to verify the user's identity for a login or other transaction. The most common categories of things that can be used as a second or third factor are [8]:

- Something the user knows (e.g., a password or PIN)
- Something the user has (e.g., a smartphone, a hardware token, or a smart card)
- Something the user is (e.g., biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or iris scans)

MFA is used to protect the user from unauthorized access to their accounts, and is widely used in the financial and healthcare industries, as well as in government and military applications. MFA is also used in consumer applications, such as online banking and e-commerce. The use of MFA is growing rapidly, as more and more organizations recognize the need for stronger security measures to protect their users and their data.

MFA is a critical component of a strong security posture, and is an essential tool for protecting against a wide range of cyber threats, including phishing, credential theft, and identity theft. MFA is also an important tool for protecting against insider threats, as it can help to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data and systems. MFA is also an important tool for protecting against the growing threat of cyberfraud, as it can help to prevent unauthorized access to financial accounts and other sensitive information.

### 2.2 Phishing Attacks: Evolution and Impact

Phishing attacks are a type of cyberattack in which an attacker attempts to gain confidential information, such as passwords, credit card numbers, or other sensitive information, by sending emails or other messages disguised as legitimate entities. These messages often include malicious links to faked login prompts that will steal the victims' credentials upon entering them. These attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated and difficult to recognize.

Phishing has evolved over time, from simple scams to sophisticated attacks that are difficult to detect. In the early days of the internet, phishing attacks were relatively

simple and easy to recognize. However, as technology has advanced, so have phishing attacks. Today, phishing attacks are often highly sophisticated and difficult to detect, making them a significant threat to individuals and organizations.

Classical phishing fake login pages were usually simple HTML copies of the original login page, but connected to a fake backend service that would store the entered credentials and redirect the user to the original page or a fake error page. This way victims could recognize that they had fallen for a fake login page and update their credentials before the attacker could use them.

The new transparent proxy phishing attack vector is a new technique used by attackers to intercept and steal multi-factor authentication (MFA) tokens from unsuspecting users. Instead of copying HTML code from the original page that the attacker is trying to impersonate, this new attack uses a HTTP reverse proxy to just redirect the users traffic to the original page. The attacking proxy operator can view and modify all traffic that is going through it while the victim sees a one by one copy of the original login page. By doing so login credentials and 2FA tokens can be extracted easily. Also the victim will not recognize that he has fallen for a phishing attack, because the website actually behaves as expected. The user will not be redirected to a fake error page or the original page after entering his credentials, because a real session is established with the original server.

In summary the advantages over the classical fake HTML login page based attack are:

- Knowing basic web development techniques including HTML, CSS and JavaScript is not required to setup a phishing attack anymore
- The victim will not recognize that he has fallen for a phishing attack
- The attacker can view and modify all traffic that is going through the proxy, including the entered credentials and 2FA tokens
- Custom HTML and JavaScript can be injected into the original page to steal even more information from the victim using social engineering techniques

### **Punycode Domains**

In April 2017 a John Hopkins University Student named Xudong Zheng published a blog post with a proof of concept on how he used a homoglyph attack to impersonate apple.com [9]. He used the Cyrillic letter "a" (U+0430) instead of the Latin letter "a" (U+0061) in the domain name.

This way he was able to register the domain "xn-80ak6aa92e.com" which looks exactly like "apple.com" in the browser address bar. This attack was possible because the browser displayed the domain name in its punycode representation, which is a way to represent Unicode with the limited character subset of ASCII used for internet host names.

The combination of this attack with a transparent proxy phishing attack is especially dangerous, because the URL in the address bar will look exactly like the original URL and also behave exactly like it due to usage of transparent proxying. It is close to impossible even for a educated user to recognize the he is being lured into a phishing attack. Luckily the browser vendors were quick to react and implemented a fix for this issue.

### Open-Source MITM Phishing Toolkits

By reading literature on this topic, it becomes clear that performing a transparent proxy phishing attack is becoming easier and easier. This is because of the increasing number of open source reverse proxy phishing toolkits that are available on the internet. These toolkits are designed to allow red teams and cyber security researchers to set up and run transparent proxy phishing attacks in a controlled environment. However, these toolkits can also be used by malicious actors to perform real-world attacks.

The following are some of the most popular open source reverse proxy phishing toolkits:

- Modlishka [2] is a low level HTTP reverse proxy framework that allows the attacker to intercept and modify all traffic that is going through it. It is written in Go and can be easily extended with custom plugins. Modlishka also provides a web interface to copy collected session data into an attackers browser to perform session hijacking attacks. It is also capable of injecting custom HTML and JavaScript into the original page to steal even more information from the victim.
- Evilginx2 [1] is a more advanced transparent phishing toolkit that is also written in Go. It provides same capabilities as Modlishka, but also includes ready to use templates and a custom DNS server. Its more user friendly and easier to use than Modlishka, but also less flexible and extensible.
- Murena [3] is a transparent phishing toolkit that is written in Python. It is not as advanced as Modlishka and Evilginx2, but is still capable of intercepting and modifying all traffic that is going through it. It is also capable of injecting custom HTML and JavaScript into the original page.

## 2.3 TLS Fingerprinting Algorithms

To understand what TLS Fingerprinting is one needs to see how TLS encryption works in general. Transport Layer Security or TLS is a widely adopted network encryption protocol . It is the successor of the older SSLv3 that was developed by Netscape back in 1994. The most common use case for TLS encryption is to establish a secure connection between a client and a server. Most commonly these clients are web browsers that are trying to access a website using the HTTPS protocol which uses TLS encryption under the hood. Before data can be transferred over a network securely the TLS client opens

an unencrypted TCP connection to the TLS server. From there a handshake that is described in the TLS specification is performed which begins with the client sending a so called ClientHello packet. This message contains all the needed information for the receiving end to select a matching cipher version later on. To be specific the ClientHello contains multiple ordered lists: supported TLS versions, ciphers and extensions.




Figure 2.1: A TLS session between a web browser and a HTTPS server is created from a TCP connection

In general performing TLS fingerprinting on a client connection works by analyzing the TLS ClientHello message that is sent by the client to the server during the TLS handshake process.

To generate a unique fingerprint out of this information several algorithms already exist. The JA3 algorithm proposed first by Salesforce [?] collects values from the ClientHello into four different array lists and formats them into one comma separated string that gets hashed. In detail the values used from ClientHello are: SSLVersion, Cipher, SSLExtension, EllipticCurve, EllipticCurvePointFormat.

An example derived from a ClientHello looks like this:

"769,47-53-5-10-49161-49162-49171-49172-50-56-19-4,0-10-11,23-24-25,0"

If no SSL extensions are used the field will be left empty. Example:

"769,4-5-10-9-100-98-3-6-19-18-99,,,"



Figure 2.2: A TLS ClientHello packet captured using Wireshark

To generate a unique identifier from this text the MD5 hash function is used. It will leave us with the following 32 characters: "ada70206e40642a3e4461f35503241d5". JA3 also needs to ignore values for non existing extensions, because some TLS clients are using Google's GREASE (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility). This is a feature proposed by Google to break wrongly implemented TLS servers. It may sound controversial at first, but comes with good intentions. In a internet draft paper by D. Benjamin [5] he explains that its better to break some production systems in place instead of risking flawed TLS implementations to spread and risk outages of global scale.

JA3 seems to be a good candidate for fingerprinting transparent phishing toolkits at first, but it after some testing it comes clear that JA3 can not be used to fingerprint instances of Google Chrome, due to it's reliance on the order of the cipher extension list in the ClientHello package. Google chrome uses a feature called "TLS ClientHello extension permutation" that prevents TLS fingerprinting for said reason. This can be bypassed by sorting the numeric values by size. Open source implementations of the JA3 algorithm with normalized extension orders exist under the name "JA3N". Sadly in our experimentation we were not able to reliably identify versions of Google Chrome using JA3 for yet unknown reasons. Luckily a better alternative to the JA3 algorithm exists. The JA4+ family is a set of new network fingerprinting algorithms developed by FoxIO [?]. The JA4+ family also comes with a fingerprinting algorithm for TLS called JA4. JA4 is superior to JA3 in many ways. It supports HTTP 3 including its UDP based transport protocol QUIC and normalized the order of ciphers and extensions by default. It uses a different output format than JA3 which consists of three seperatable parts that more verbose and human readable in general. JA4 provides a more reliant and expressive fingerprinting solution for this papers use case. Other open-source implementations of JA4 are avaiable and include a wireshark addon and an nginx fork. The later one will be



used in our lab setup to collect JA4 fingerprints.




Figure 2.3: JA4 TLS client fingerprint format

## 2.4 Existing Countermeasures

### 2.4.1 Round Trip Time Analysis

The round trip time (RTT) of a network connection is the time it takes for a packet to travel from the sender to the receiver and back. It is an important metric for measuring network performance and can be used to detect network anomalies, such as packet loss or congestion. In the context of this research RTT analysis can also be used to detect the usage of reverse proxy software and MITM phishing toolkits. In the previously mentioned paper by Kondracki the team was able to identify the most common open-source MITM phishing toolkits by analyzing the RTT of specific TCP handshake related packets. Because relaying traffic from a HTTPS secured web server, through the reverse proxy's own HTTPS server and then to the client, there will be always two TCP connections for each client HTTP request. This will lead to increased RTT values that can be measured. In real world scenarios the delay added by physical and global routing factors, will be a hundred times larger than the delay added by a reverse proxy implementation. To account for this the team measured the normal RTT of thousands of test connections across the globe. In their final statistical model this was enough to detect and identify the reverse proxy servers of transparent phishing toolkits with high reliability based on their TCP round trip timings alone.

### 2.4.2 Mismatch of User-Agent and TLS Fingerprint

A broader and more flexible approach than the previous blacklist solution which tries to block or flag client requests using the TLS implementation of known transparent phishing toolkits, is to focus on detecting requests from TLS reverse proxies in general. The attack vector that is facilitated by abusing reverse proxies to spy on a user's TLS encrypted session is more commonly known as a TLS MITM (Man in the Middle) Attack. The American content delivery network operator Cloudflare which is also known for DDoS mitigation and other cyber security related services is running an open-source monitoring service called MALCOLM which stands for "Measuring Active Listeners, Connection Observers, and Legitimate Monitors". It provides statistics about observed HTTPS Interceptions. A HTTPS Interception defined in Cloudflare's own terms is a request that comes from either a "A device has a root certificate installed that allows an intermediary to decrypt and inspect traffic" or "An origin server provides its TLS private key to a third party (like a reverse proxy) that does TLS termination" [?]. The second definition means exactly the kind of TLS MITM attacks which we are trying to detect.

The monitoring platform is powered by "MITMEngine" (Monster-In-The-Middle Engine) that Cloudflare describes as their HTTPS interception detector. MITMEngine is an open-source software written in go. It works by matching TLS fingerprints of requests to known browser User-Agent strings. If a mismatch is found the request is marked as

potentially crafted by HTTPS Interception. This strategy again relies on maintaining a huge database of User-Agent and TLS Fingerprint pairs. Cloudflare states on the MALCOLM dashboard website that they can only identity 60% of the clients that are served by their internal network. Especially the detection of Android based devices is not reliably possible due to the large amount of different Android based operating systems and browsers. Readers of the MALCOLM website are encouraged to contribute User-Agent TLS fingerprint pairs to the MITMEngine git repository to help overcome this issue.


# 3 Experimentation

## 3.1 Simulation of Transparent Phishing Attacks

To test and analyze the capabilities of the most popular open source transparent phishing toolkits a controlled lab environment will be set up. The goal is to find flaws in their attack implementation and to develop and test new or improved countermeasures against these attacks.

First a web application will be set up that is secured with a multi-factor authentication system. Then the open source transparent phishing toolkits will be used to set up attack simulations against this web application. The local web application will be running on a local machine, but still be secured with a valid self-signed TLS certificate. Our own certificate authority will have to be installed in the browser used for testing, a recent version of google chrome in this case. In a real world scenario an attacker would also have to buy a valid domain name. For our simulated attacks an entry in the hosts file will be sufficient to redirect the traffic to the local machine.

The test environment web application implements a very basic credential based login



**XU Insecure Bank**

**Exponential University**  
of applied sciences

Username

Password

2FA-Code

Login

2FA Code Generator:  
**731060**

Figure 3.1: Web application secured with a demo two-factor authentication system

system with two-factor authentication. For demo purposes the two-factor authentication logic will accept any 6 digit number as valid token.

### 3 Experimentation

The frontend of this application is connected to a NodeJS based backend that is using express.js for routing and parsing of incoming requests. After one provides login credentials in the frontend a authentication endpoint in the backend will be called with the provided credentials. If the credentials are valid the backend will redirect the user to his profile page. This response will also contain a session cookie that will be used to authenticate the user in the future.

For an attacker, stealing the content of that session cookie is enough to gain full access to that account. This is also true for most real world web applications where cookie based authentication is used, but this alone is not a security issue. Nearly 99% of all websites are TLS secured today [?] meaning that no one except the user and server can see the content of that HTTP request including the session cookie.

In our simulated attack scenario it will be our goal to steal the content of this session cookie to overtake the victims session. In the real world an attacker is likely saving login credentials eg. email and password from all requests he intercepts with his transparent phishing toolkit's mitm proxy. Additionally he may inject custom HTML and JavaScript into the original page to steal even more information from the victim using social engineering techniques, for example by asking for an additional multi factor authentication token that he can use in the future. For the purpose of this experiment we will only focus on stealing the session cookie.




Figure 3.2: Profile page containing confidential information

## 3.2 Testing of Countermeasures

### 3.2.1 Blacklisting well known TLS Fingerprints

The first countermeasure that we are trying to implement into our lab setup is to blacklist TLS fingerprints of well known transparent phishing toolkits. This way we can detect if a client connection is relayed through a transparent phishing toolkit and show the user a warning or ignore the whole request. This approach comes with some obvious downsides:

- The attacker can change the TLS fingerprint of his transparent phishing toolkit by modifying the TLS stack of the toolkit or by using a different toolkit with an unknown fingerprint
- The attacker can spoof the TLS fingerprint of the victim's client
- The attacker downgrades to HTTP and does not use TLS at all

Following is an example implementation of a basic blacklist implemented using a custom Nginx fork that supports JA4 fingerprinting. If the client's TLS fingerprint is on the blacklist, the request will be blocked and the client will receive a 403 Forbidden response. Instead of blocking the request, passing down information about whether a malicious fingerprint was detected or not to the underlying backend app, a HTTP header could be added.

```
server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name xu-bank.com;

    # ... other ssl configuration

    # blacklist
    map $http_ssl_ja4 $allowed_client {
        default 1;
        "t13d191000_9dc949149365_e7c285222651" 0; # evilginx2
    }

    location / {
        # block the request if the clients fingerprint is on the blacklist
        if($allowed_client = 0) {
            return 403;
        }

        # forward the request to the backend
        proxy_pass http://backend;
    }
}
```

```
}
}
```

The same approach can be turned into a whitelist by inverting the logic. This way only clients with a known good TLS fingerprint will be allowed to access the web application. This approach is more secure, but also comes with the downside that new clients will not be able to access the web application until their TLS fingerprint is added to the whitelist. Maintaining a trusted JA4 fingerprint database would require a lot of fingerprint collecting before said whitelist can be used in production as many different browsers and TLS implementations exist and change frequently.

### 3.2.2 Validation of client cipher list

A TLS ClientHello packet sent by a client always contains a list of supported ciphers. The list of ciphers and its orders can be used to fingerprint the client. Many open-source MITM reverse proxy solutions are already capable of spoofing the supported cipher list in the ClientHello package. To detect client requests crafted by said reverse proxies more reliably, verifying the implementation of each cipher could be helpful. A proof of concept cipher spoofing tool would need to support many different ciphers. To overcome this issue using a TLS server stack that supports as many ciphers as possible is required. In the cryptographic world many battle tested libraries exist that support a wide range of ciphers. The list includes OpenSSL, GnuTLS, mbedTLS and BoringSSL. As OpenSSL has a long history in development and adoption, it is a good candidate for this task. OpenSSL 3.1.1 supports 159 ciphers in the build that is shipped with Fedora39 Linux.

```
$ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:eNULL'
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any      Enc=AESGCM(256)      Mac=AEAD
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any      Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any      Enc=AESGCM(128)      Mac=AEAD
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256     TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any      Enc=AESECCM(128)     Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=ECDSA    Enc=AESGCM(256)      Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=RSA      Enc=AESGCM(256)      Mac=AEAD
DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384  TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=DSS      Enc=AESGCM(256)      Mac=AEAD
DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384  TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=RSA      Enc=AESGCM(256)      Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=ECDSA    Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
...
$ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:eNULL' | wc -l # Count the number of ciphers
159
```

Listing 3.1: Listing supported ciphers and counting them in a shell

OpenSSL may be more well known as a library for cryptographic functions, but it also contains with a command line interface. The openssl binary comes with a built-in TLS and HTTP server implementation called s\_server. It can be used to quickly setup TLS servers for testing and debugging purposes. The list of supported ciphers for a server can be configured using the -ciphers option for TLSv1.2 and below and the -ciphersuites option for TLSv1.3 and above. For the sake of this paper a proof of concept solution was implemented using a simple bash script to spawn various instances of OpenSSL's s\_server with different cipher configurations. To validate if a client actually supports his claimed ciphers, each instance of s\_server will be configured to only support one cipher. The client will then be forced to use this cipher to establish a connection. If the client is

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not able to establish a connection an error will be written to a log file that is supervised by our bash script.

```
...
# List of default ciphers supported by openssl s_server
ciphers=$(cat <<-END
TLSv1.3      :TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLSv1.3      :TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
...
END)

# Spawn static https server to serve check.html and api
www_port=8443
openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert cert.pem -accept $www_port -WWW 2>&1 &

# Start of test s_server port range
port=8000

while IFS= read -r line; do
cs=$(echo $line | sed 's/.*:/' )
echo "Spawning server with cipher: $cs"

cipher_param=""

# Detect if its TLSv1.3 or lower
is_tls13=$(echo $line | grep -c "TLSv1.3")

# Use the correct openssl command based on TLS version
if [ $is_tls13 -eq 1 ]; then
cipher_param="-ciphersuites $cs -no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1 -no_tls1 -no_ssl3"
else
cipher_param="-cipher $cs -no_tls1_3"
fi

# Spawn s_server instance and redirect output log to file
openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert cert.pem -accept $port -www \
$cipher_param -debug >> "logs/$port-$cs.txt" 2>&1 &

port=$((port+1))
done <<< "$ciphers"

# Check all log files for errors and print overview of server status ...
```



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


Figure 3.3: Using iframes to connect to all spawned s\_server instances

Now the testing browser needs to connect to each of the spawned TLS sockets. There are multiple ways to achieve this. A "iframe" is a HTML element that allows web developers to embed other website into the current page. Also it is possible to use JavaScript's fetch API to create a connection, but the iframe approach is more verbose as it directly shows connection errors inside each iframe. To simplify the process of creating the iframes a simple JavaScript script will be used:

```
let framesDone = 0;
const onFrameDone = () => {
  framesDone++;
  if(framesDone === SERVER_AMOUNT){
    // Provide browser information to bash script & exit
    fetch(`https://${DOMAIN}:8444/`);
  }
}
const frames = document.getElementById('frames');
for(let i = 0; i < SERVER_AMOUNT; i++){
  const port = 8000+i;
  const url = `https://${DOMAIN}:${port}`;
  const frame = document.createElement('iframe');
  frame.src = url;
  frame.onload = onFrameDone;
  frame.onerror = onFrameDone;
  frames.appendChild(frame);
}
```

After all iframes have either loaded successfully or failed the script performs a final fetch request to another s\_server that is running with the brief option. This server will collect the clients UserAgent and supported TLS ciphers. After that, before the bash script exits, it will write a result JSON file that contains information about each tested cipher including logs of each s\_server instance that was used for cipher validation.

### 3 Experimentation

To verify that this approach is working as expected across different versions of browser and TLS implementations a testing setup needed to be created. As installing different versions of the same browser on the same machine is not intended by the browser vendors and some automated setup that is reasonably fast and reproducible is of interest, a containerized setup was chosen. Docker is the most popular containerization platform and is supported on all major operating systems. Due to the fact that this project is only intended for testing purposes and not for production use, a more lightweight alternative to Docker called Podman was used. It does not require root privileges to run containers and is fully compatible with Docker images and containers.




Figure 3.4: The bash script spawns multiple instances of the `cipher_checker_tests` which includes `check.sh` and a browser for testing

To parse the result JSON files of each browser test, a python script was made. It parses each JSON file, compares the supported ciphers with the list of ciphers that the client told the server it supports and also visualizes the results in a HTML table. The resulting table shows all tested browser versions on the vertical axis and all sent client ciphers on the other.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Findings from Simulations

#### **Effectiveness of Toolkits**

The tested open-source transparent phishing toolkits were able to extract login credentials and session cookies from the demo login site flawlessly. There was no visual difference in the relayed page as expected. Using Evilginx2 was the most user-friendly experience, besides the fact that it requires the user to create some special NS records to forward DNS queries to the Evilginx instance. Also it comes with many configuration examples.

#### **Detecting incoming relayed phishing traffic**

Detecting that an incoming HTTPS connection has been relayed reliably requires analysis of many factors. Most importantly inspection of the TLS ClientHello packet to fingerprint and verify the authenticity of the used client software. Other factors like round trip time and TCP handshake timings can also be used to detect MITM toolkit, but they require a large statistical model or usage of artificial intelligence.

### 4.2 Proposed Solutions

#### **Detecting TLS cipher list spoofing**

To make the existing solutions that flag and or block incoming traffic that is likely relayed through a reverse proxy of a transparent phishing toolkit, more reliable and harder to circumvent, we proposed a proof of concept solution that enumerates all the received client ciphers and checks if they are actually implemented.

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|                      | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 | ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 | ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 | ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 | ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 | ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 | AES128-GCM-SHA256 | AES256-GCM-SHA384 |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Chromium 59.0.3071.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 60.0.3112.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 61.0.3163.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 62.0.3202.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 63.0.3239.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 64.0.3262.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 65.0.3325.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 66.0.3359.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 67.0.3396.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 68.0.3440.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 69.0.3497.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 70.0.3538.0 | error                  | error                  | error                        | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 71.0.3578.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 72.0.3626.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 73.0.3683.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 74.0.3729.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 75.0.3770.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 76.0.3809.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 77.0.3865.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 78.0.3904.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 79.0.3945.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 80.0.3987.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 81.0.4044.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 86.0.4240.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 87.0.4280.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 88.0.4324.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 89.0.4389.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 90.0.4430.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 91.0.4472.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 92.0.4515.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 93.0.4577.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 94.0.4606.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |
| Chromium 95.0.4638.0 | ok                     | ok                     | ok                           | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                            | ok                          | ok                | ok                |

Figure 4.1: Cutoff results table screenshot of 56 different versions of the Chromium browser

# 5 Discussion

## 5.1 Implications of Findings

### **TLS client enumeration frameworks do not exist**

Besides that many TLS fingerprinting standards and implementations exist for clients, all of them assume that the client's cipher list has not been altered. For TLS server on the other hand a lot of open-source enumeration frameworks exist. These mostly focus on validating certificates and cipher implementations. More of this is needed for web browsers and TLS clients in general.

### **Lack of TLS fingerprint database**

From literature and our own experimentation it comes clear that simple TLS fingerprinting based detection methods, especially those which flag known malicious clients or whitelist fingerprints of commonly used browsers, heavily rely on huge TLS fingerprint databases. Creating and maintaining such a large dataset is a tedious task. It requires a vast user base that is using different devices and browsers. Mobile users are way harder to fingerprint, due to the variety that android based phones and browser apps come in. Also collecting TLS fingerprints and performing TLS fingerprinting in general could rise some ethical concerns as it could be used for user tracking or targeted advertisement.

### **Need for open-source browser testing framework**

While testing our proof of concept client cipher validation script we noticed that there is no open-source browser testing project available that supports out of date versions of web browsers. Browser testing and automation frameworks like Puppeteer or Playwright only support recent releases of for example Google Chrome or Firefox. Download URLs of the browser binaries usually are hard coded and pushed manually by the maintainer. Many commercial cloud based browser testing providers exist and advertise that they support thousands of different browser products and versions, but in reality only support the recent releases.

The findings from this research underscore the pressing need for enhanced detection mechanisms against transparent proxy phishing attacks. The implementation of advanced TLS fingerprinting techniques, such as JA4, demonstrates significant improvements over older methods, offering a more robust approach to identifying and mitigating these sophisticated threats. However, challenges remain in the areas of spoofing detection, user experience impact, and the necessity for comprehensive data collection.

## 5.2 Limitations and Future Research

### Validation of client cipher list

The proof of concept solution shell script `check.sh` was able to validate the supported client ciphers of the 59 versions of chromium that we tested it with. Unfortunately all of those tested browsers had the exact same client cipher list which mean they use the same or a very similar TLS implementation. The client cipher list only overlapped with 14 ciphers that our openssl s\_server based testing setup could verify.

### TLS fingerprinting vs large statistical models and AI

This paper has shown that detecting transparent phishing relayed traffic by either comparing the client TLS fingerprinting against known MITM phishing toolkits or normal browser fingerprints. From there browsers can be either whitelisted or known phishing toolkits be blocked. Other research, most importantly the paper "Catching Transparent Phish" by Brian Kondracki Et al. has shown that with the usage of more detection factors and artificial intelligence a more reliable result can be achieved. This comes at the price of higher complexity and the requirement of a even larger dataset.

This study identifies several limitations and avenues for future research in the quest to combat transparent proxy phishing attacks. The primary limitations include the reliance on a comprehensive TLS fingerprint database, the dynamic nature of TLS fingerprints, and the need for more sophisticated spoofing detection methods. The current lack of open-source tools for extensive browser testing further constrains the ability to validate detection mechanisms across a wide range of browser versions and configurations.

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