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# Electoral Manipulations and Fraud Political Contestation: The Case of Regional Head Election

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**Abstract**— This study questions why anomalies in the form of political banality occur, marked by fraud and money politics practices, so the Pilkada tends to be bungled or flawed in accountability. This research uses a qualitative approach based on case studies. This research takes the case of the East Kalimantan Pilkada as the study locus, which was held in 2015 and 2018, especially in the election of Regents, Mayors, and Governors. The results of this study show the East Kalimantan Pilkada contestation, and it is undeniable how vital the role of capital is to improve the bargaining position of candidates. Candidates can arrange any strategy that is most likely to improve their bargaining position because it is not regulated in the Pilkada legislation. This study result also indicates that regional heads control political parties, which have the strong financial capital to support the party. As a result, all party policies are almost always determined by the regional general chairman. There is no exception in determining the candidate that the party will carry in the Pilkada contestation.

**Keywords**— electoral manipulations; fraud political contestation; pilkada

## I. INTRODUCTION

Democracy as a political system that aims to guarantee the people's political freedom to choose leaders through elections, institutionalize the separation of powers as an authoritative political mechanism that originates from people's sovereignty, and oversee the administration of the state through freedom of opinion, does not provide definite guarantees about the social policies created in it [1], [2]. Meanwhile, Robert Dahl views that democracy has two dimensions: contestation regarding fair and fair general elections among candidates to get the people's vote and citizen participation in the political process [3]. Both require freedom of opinion, assembly to formulate political

goals, and freedom of association to form political organizations. In other words, democracy is only a metaphor for the vital role of the people in the state order [4].

If the basic principle of democracy is to prioritize values that prioritize equality and freedom, and there is a guarantee of justice because everyone is equal under the law, then one ideal type of democratic state that practices it is probably the present United States [5]. Like it or not, the discourse about the modern democratic model that refers to US standards also colors the conceptual thinking and praxis of political democracy in Indonesia [6], even since the beginning of the republic was founded [7].

The obsession with a democratic model "similar to the United States" seemed to be increasingly inscribed in the minds of elite "pro-democracy", who imagined the Republic of Indonesia's future after the New Order [8]. The designers of political change then saw the urgency of the availability of legislation needed to reform politics in this republic [9]. In the transition to democracy, there is an assumption that the rule of law is the primary condition for establishing the rules of the game and the creation of habituation of democratization [10]. With the rule of law, the people can be actively involved in influencing public policy decisions, as happened in Western countries whose democratic politics have matured. To achieve this condition structurally, it must start from political participation in elections because the democratic order requires the people's sovereignty to be formulated [11].

With such a preference for democratic political reforms, several new laws were born which adopted liberalism as an ideology to regulate social order and the rules of politics in the public sphere in Indonesia [12], [13]. Regarding such



preferences, since 2005 in Indonesia, a new democratic procedure has been conditioned to replace and fill the position of Regional Head, conceptually called "regional head election" [14]. In the scenario, it is envisioned that the community members needed a local election [15]. Through the regional head election, residents in a region can freely support a person to become a Regional Head, following their various aspirations and respective rationality [16]. In this regard, each actor who is a candidate is then required to make political commitments, as another interpretation of the importance of the 'social contract', to fight for the aspirations of the people whose main issues are usually not far from issues of people's welfare and sense of social justice [14]. The political commitment was made and delivered during the campaign period by the candidate in the form of a vision and mission of the pro-people policy program, and that political commitment (imagined) could be collected later on when the candidate had been elected ruler [17].

However, in later reality, the ideal scenario for the post-conflict local election did not turn out as it should. In 2010, for example, out of 244 post-conflict local elections held in 33 provinces in Indonesia, 230 (94.26%) ended in disputes because of "cheating" problems, and their cases were included in the Constitutional Court session [18]. The most alleged regional election fraud is the case of using money and abuse of power (political office) for "buying and selling political support" or "bribery pretending to donate" and other things, which can then be categorized as "money politics" [19].

The implementation of the regional head election in Indonesia also does not seem to be an ideal political contestation envisioned by the policymakers [20]. Even with the fact that a large number of regional head election are full of disputes reflect the symptoms of regional head election in Indonesia has experienced a kind of "gaps" [21], [22], or accountability flaws so that theoretically, it is feasible to identify as being in a condition "democratic deficit" [23].

The occurrence of various violations of the game's rules in the local election event in Indonesia can be seen as two sides of a pattern that has a cause and effect pattern. On the first hand, violations of the game's rules can be meaningful due to the Regional Election Group, with all the implications. In this connection, the Election Integration is a result [24]. On the other hand, the violation of the game's rules indicates an essential but hidden element that makes the perpetrators trapped in a misguided behavior shown in banal political behavior (superficial) [25]. Banality (shallowness) understanding the meaning of power by political elites is thought to be a significant factor in the act of justifying any means.

When the regional head election is envisioned as a democratization scenario in the local realm, political banality is an "anomaly" of institutionalizing regional head election as a pillar of democratization [26]. This "anomaly" cannot be measured as a steady social reality because it involves a variety of specific but abstract settings of interest (such as the ambition of power) and the rationalization that underlies one's political actions in the public sphere. Even so, political banality, in general, can be seen as actions that tend to ignore normative political rules or manipulate rules as if they prioritize valuable

social values while on the contrary, and or an act that gives the impression as if shows dignified political glory when it is fake.

The question then is, why did the anomaly in the form of political banality occur? Is it a form of "moral damage" perpetrators of political action, or is it a result of a system that does not work to support the presence of a dignified democratic political model? The study by taking the case of the regional head election in East Kalimantan is intended to answer that question by explaining the symptoms from a structural perspective.

## II. RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses a qualitative approach based on case studies. This research focuses intensively on one particular object, which is studied as a case [27]. This research was conducted using systematic methods with stages; first, observing the conditions of the elections in East Kalimantan; second, collecting data on the 2015 and 2018 East Kalimantan elections; third, analyzing the information that has been obtained; fourth, reporting the results in the form of concluding [27].

As a locus of study, this study takes the case of the Regional Election of East Kalimantan Province, which was carried out in 2015 and 2018, especially in the election of Regents, Mayors, and Governors. The East Kalimantan Regional Head Election was undoubtedly not to be used to generalize the issue of the regional head election in Indonesia.

However, there are three reasons why the East Kalimantan regional head election case should be used as an "example of Indonesia". First, the game rules for the East Kalimantan regional head election apply equally to all of Indonesia, with the organizing agency (KPU), which is also no different in its organizational system because the legal considerations are the same. Second, residents who live in East Kalimantan and are involved as constituents in the regional head election are "miniature Indonesians" who are pluralist, both in terms of diverse ethnic groups (though dominated by the Banjar, Javanese, Kutai, and Bugis ethnic groups) or various religions that are embraced by their citizens (although dominated by Islam) [28].

## III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Studies on political financing, especially campaign finance, have been carried out in various circles, both in Indonesia and other countries. By reviewing previous studies, it is hoped that more comprehensive information on campaign finance can be obtained. A study conducted by IDEA [29], obtained information about the practices and patterns of financing political parties and campaigns in various countries. Unfortunately, this International IDEA study is still limited to an overview conducted by comparing the practices of financing political parties and campaigns. It is not surprising because this study aims to find general patterns of financing practices for political parties and campaigns in various countries globally.

If the International IDEA study applies a comparative perspective, another case is the study conducted by Mietzner (2015), who applies a formal legal perspective [30]. In his



study, Meitzner stated that illegal campaign financing in the direct regional head election in Indonesia was alleged to have increased very high. It was stated, many elements of campaign finance were not officially reported, such as contributions from lobbyists and wealthy entrepreneurs. Meitzner found that the practice of illegality in campaign finance was actually "permitted" by the state and "accepted" by the public. Completing the study, it is worth looking at other Meitzner studies conducted in 2007, where Meitzner highlights the phenomenon of increasing fundraising efforts by parties whose legality is questioned [31]. The fundraising effort was allegedly carried out illegally because of cutting state subsidies for political parties in Indonesia in 2005.

Regarding campaign finance, it is interesting to look at studies conducted by Samuels (2012), who look at it from an economic perspective. In his study, Samuels stated that political campaigns had become a kind of "industry" that encouraged economic growth in a new democratic country. The campaign process is envisioned as a market with credible supply, demand, and commitment to supporting a "market exchange" [32]. In another study, Samuels deepened the influence of the "pork barrel" in helping incumbents increase revenue from the interests of the private sector. The author sees the pork barrel to get votes and exchange between the incumbent and its constituents [33]. Research in Brazil shows that a pork barrel is a form of incumbent exchange with campaign fund donors.

By using three indicators Habibi & Suswanta (2019), prove the phenomenon of the pork barrel that occurred in Samarinda City Regional Head Election. Allocation of regional discretionary funds with incumbent candidates before and during regional head election experienced a drastic increase in the lead up to the regional head election and social assistance spending decreased by a tendency to fluctuate. However, there were findings of the allocation of goods expenditure in 2015 distributed through 100 Technical Regional Work Units (SKPD) of Rp. 504,938,020,140.34 to the public at a time when regional financial conditions are in deficit. There is an increase in grant and social assistance spending, still occurring despite the financial condition of the 2013-2015 budget deficit. It indicates that the incumbent keeps attracting voters' interest in the regional head election 2015. There is an increase in grant and social assistance spending, still occurring despite the financial condition of the 2013-2015 budget deficit. It also indicates that the incumbent keeps attracting voters' interest in Regional Head Election 2015 [34].

Another study conducted by Mas'ood & Savirani (2011) did not directly touch on campaign finance. From a socio-historical perspective, the study of Mas'ood and Savirani alludes to political financing, not just campaign finance. The study explained strategies at the individual level to carry out political financing and factors that helped explain their performance. This study shows that political finance with money politics is no longer relevant because cultural capital, political capital, and social capital can support one's political career [35].

Likewise, a study conducted by Aspinall (2014) challenged the role of "brokers" in elections [36]. Unfortunately, the

Aspinall study does not explicitly link with campaign financing. Reality shows that the role of the "broker" can not be separated from the funds provided by the candidate pair to mobilize voters. The Aspinall Study explains broker behavior into its three types. First are "activist brokers", who support candidates based on politics, ethnicity, religion, or other commitments; second, "clientelist brokers", who want a longer-term relationship with a candidate or more senior "broker", to receive future prizes; and thirdly, "opportunistic brokers", brokers who seek short-term material benefits during the campaign. Formed and the presence of 'broker', whatever the type, can not be separated from the funding issued by the candidate pair; this certainly affects the campaign financing of the candidate pair earlier.

From several studies that have been carried out, it appears that the common thread under the inevitable campaign financing practices for political parties involved in election contestation. In practice, wide-open campaign financing activities are carried out in ways that are of questionable legality. Besides, it is also possible for campaign financing to be dragged into the vortex of "industry" because campaign activities have become a kind of "industrial commodity". Likewise, previous studies show the involvement of actors present as third parties who play a role in campaign finance.

#### A. Context of Construction of Democratization Habituation

The dynamics of local politics in East Kalimantan is a "part of" the dynamics of national politics that are never devoid of latent conflicts and the conspiracy of political elites to gain power. Frictions and political factions at the national level undoubtedly impact the dynamics of local politics, although it does not have to be the opposite. Even when political conflicts occur in the local realm, conflict resolution is almost always resolved by parties holding authority at the central level.

In the regional head election contestation in East Kalimantan, it is undeniable how vital the role of capital is to improve the bargaining position of candidates. The candidate can arrange any strategy that is most likely to improve his bargaining position because the matter is not regulated in the rules of the post-conflict local election. The problem is when to improve the bargaining position, political actions taken by candidates can be categorized as inhibiting the desirable political democratization scenario, namely negating the aspects of transparency and honesty.

In terms of transparency, it is crucial to know how candidates provide many political funds and where the funds' sources come from. The organizer of the General Election should implement normative rules. Nevertheless, that scenario cannot be carried out when the candidate deals with "bohir politics", who give him funds without the public knowing how much they will be. Bohir politics are funders who play a role similar to patrons. In the East Kalimantan Regional Head Election, this political forum is usually a wealthy coal-mining entrepreneur. The lack of transparency in the source of funds from the political bohir was not without reason. Candidates do not want to be known as "owed" to Bohir. On the other hand, Bohir himself did not want to be tracked how much money he gave to candidates.



The interview results stated below: *There are rumors that funding from the Bohir has something to do with money laundering and tax fraud. The issue of money laundering cannot be proven by its empirical data because it involves illicit money transactions (usually related to corruption), which are always covered closely by the perpetrators.*

While the agency authorized to prove transparency in funding "political costs" was not very clear performance. The Election Commission has never been able to track it thoroughly. Moreover, for various reasons, Election Oversight Committee (Panwaslu) justifies the institution's inability. Whereas law enforcement agencies always reason that the origin of political funds is not their realm. Therefore, although the role of bohir is crucial in the regional head election, its role is usually behind the scenes, so it is difficult to trace what tactics are being carried out in the affairs of the regional head election.

In terms of honesty, the candidates must present themselves as they are so that that voter groups can assess their capacity. However, the scenario was never carried out when the candidate took political imaging actions to capture the sympathy of the masses. Candidates appear "not as he is". In a political imaging scenario, the candidate's appearance is always polished in such a way to enchant and invite constituents' sympathy. However, imaging politics is not prohibited and is allowed and carried out by candidates who reason.

Whether voters will be fascinated by imaging politics is one thing. That there is "dishonesty" demonstrated in the politics of imaging is another matter [37]. The researcher thinks that dishonesty hinders the idea of the democratization scenario that wants to be realized through the regional head election contestation. Imagine the voting community has been "deceived" by information deliberately built by the candidate (and his Success Team) regarding social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital displayed by the candidate.

Such is the case of the post-conflict local election habituation, which involves the interaction of actors on the one hand with the election and with voter groups on the other hand. The concept of habitus does not determine agents' actions as 'practical operators of object construction' [38]. It is a conscious action developed through objective structure and personal history. This micro-oriented definition allows habitus to adjust and accommodate dynamic meso-level structures that involve other actors in a durable disposition. As stressed by Bourdieu, habitus is the "product of structural internalization" of the social world [39].

Habitus was obtained as a result of the long position in social life occupied. In this sense, habitus can also be a collective phenomenon. Habitus is a historical product that creates individual and collective action and, therefore, follows the patterns evoked by history. In that context, voter preferences are determined by his long experience as a community member in which he is located. Therefore, if we agree with Bourdieu, we certainly cannot force specific lives to be imposed uniformly on all agents. Because habitus produces and is produced by social life. Habitus is a structuring structure of social life. On the other hand, habitus is a structured structure by the social world [40].

In other words, there is nothing strange in creating a power habitus in the political sphere, such as the Regional head election, including manipulation by actors to win contestation. The problem is that the actual conditions that support the habitus seem to be a serious problem when we look at it from the quality of democracy that accompanies the election contestation. Because, if the quality of democracy becomes the focus of our attention, the local election habitus that tends to side with the owners of capital (economy) to control the arena may not be following the scenario of democratization, which is committed to the principles of equality, justice, and honesty in the arena of political contestation. The negative impacts will arise in the form of oligarchic politics that threaten democracy in such conditions.

This study found that in the 2018 Regional head election, issuing mining permits increased dramatically. At least it can be read with the extension of several mining permits, which have increased in several areas. There were 170 mining permits issued during 2017 and 2018, with details of 34 mining permits in West Java issued on February 13rd, 2018, two weeks before the announcement of the West Java regional head candidate. Central Java, on January 30th, 2018, the local government was recorded to have sold 120 mining permits. Likewise, in East Kalimantan where six illegal coal mining points are not enforced by law.

Concerning the East Kalimantan Regional Head Election, it is clear that there is an oligarchic role for local political parties. In 2005, it was undeniable that some local political parties, such as PPP, PKB, and Golkar Party, were only determined by the general chairperson and several core officials. Why? Because they are the ones who "finance" the party and cause the political party to exist. In 2010, in addition to three political parties mentioned previously. The oligarchic tendency of the local party was also shown by PAN (whose head of the regional board is a Mayor), the United Nations (whose head of the regional board is a Regent), PBR (who chairs the council, the area manager is a coal businessman; and the Gerindra Party (whose head of the regional board is also a coal businessman).

The only local political party whose existence is still determined by its cadres is PKS. PKS as a cadre party is still consistent with the party platform it supports and is not dependent on several ruling elites. Whereas PDIP, since 2012, is also inevitable from oligarchies because the political party is finally controlled by regional heads, which are known to have the strong financial capital to support the party. As a result, all party policies are almost always determined by the regional chairperson—no exception in the determination of candidates to be carried by the party in the General Election contestation. Sometimes the determination of candidates who can advance in the regional head election battle is determined exclusively by the core management. As a result of such tendencies, local political parties are inevitably merely tools of the interests of a handful of people who have contributed to political parties, which can open up space for transactional politics under certain conditions.



### B. Context of Banality of Action

Political behavior is a person's social action (actor) in the political sphere, and whether for some reason, sometimes tends to deviate alias is not following existing norms or political ethics. Therefore the terms banal and banalitas can be used to describe political entities, and they should include political contestation such as the regional head election. However, political banality is not an entity but a direction of behavior (direction) that allows a political actor to do (or not to do) a specific action. There is a kind of scenario, and political banality is part of that scenario. Banal political actors are naturally aware of what they are doing, but consciousness can be interpreted by the person concerned as merely a scene that is supposed to exist, following the agreed scenario, even though it is not pleasing to him.

Political banality, when embodied in a social act, may represent despicable and rotten political actions. Therefore, political crime can be justified by political banality; however, it is not political. Political banality is perhaps more appropriate if positioned as a conditional supporting factor, and political crime is the result. An example is when an actor practices slanderous politics in the form of an evil campaign (black campaign) to his political opponents, simply because he thinks it can condition his victory in political battles in the arena of political contestation he is following. Because of that, political banality can be positioned as an intervening variable of a horrible political act, political fraud, or whatever factors influence the quality of political democracy. As a precondition of events, political banality becomes a problem because it can frame a political act that is evil or rotten as if there is a justification so that it makes sense.

In other words, ethical issues, or moral issues, are the main issues in political banality. The problem is that political morality is often only regarded as a philosophical problem because it is difficult to measure indicators and validity empirically. Various moral systems are impossible to compare and evaluate differentially. However, borrowing Bauman's reflection, the needs served by each system were born in the community where the system is nested, and importantly, in every society, there must be a moral system, not the substance of a particular community's moral norms which happen to be imposed to maintain its unity [41]. If morality is considered as a consequence of society or a product of society, then moral behavior becomes a synonym of social conformity and obedience to the norms implemented by the majority [41]. Because such awareness encourages Bauman to argue that "the factors responsible for the presence of moral capacity must be sought in the social, or the social context, but the appearance of moral behavior is not the result of the presence of an agency which is a social context" [41].

In harmony with Bauman's argument, the analytical focus in Levinas's writings is on the relationship between humans and others. Subjectivity is understood in an ethical sense. The node from the subjective is intertwined in ethics which is understood as accountability. Moreover, that responsibility is described as "the structure of essential and fundamental subjectivities"[42]. Contrary to the tradition of mainstream philosophy in the West, there is a correlation between

knowledge, understood as impartial contemplation, and the meaning of an event; for Levinas, ethics was the first composer of philosophy [42].

However, the ethical accountability relationship that constitutes human existence is recognized by Levinas to be deadlocked when sociality extends beyond face-to-face interaction. Because in his view, after more than two people were involved, the ethical relationship changed and became political. In the "sociopolitical order that organizes and enhances our survival," this is morality in the sense that a series of regulations relating to social behavior and civic obligations comes into force. Levinas (2013) argues that ethics, namely the sensitivity of a subject to the call of other subjects, "becomes morality and hardens the skin once we move into the world of impersonal third-party politics such as the world of government, judiciary, correctional institutions, and schools " [42]. Alternatively, in other words, essential issues of political morality must be understood in a social context, not a matter of which society it should be placed, because it is a reality that is not a product of society [41].

Based on this understanding, political morals related to the merits of contestation, such as honesty, openness, and justice, however difficult it is to measure, are ideals that can be understood by every member of society but may not be carried out by each individual. It cannot be carried out if it is done consciously and deliberately. It should be suspected because the individual concerned has been trapped in political banality that superficially understands the meaning of power.

Kutai Kartanegara Regency, for example, in 2009 was recorded as issuing 93 Mining Business Permits (IUP). Then in 2010, the year the district held the regional head election, there were 191 new IUPs issued by Kutai Kartanegara Regency, twice as many as the previous year.

On September 26th, 2017, the Regent of Kutai Kartanegara Rita Widyasari was named a suspect in the alleged licensing corruption case by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Even the KPK used this dandy regent on suspicion of gratification and money laundering; Rita bought 45 luxury bags of various brands from Hermes, Chanel, and Louis Vuitton to disguise the corruption that she committed [43].

Rita is just the "tip of the iceberg" of the evil practice of oligarchs as a product of the simultaneous local elections in Indonesia's liberal democracy today; cases of abuse of authority, corruption in licensing, and other violations of law are a vicious circle that continues every time before and after the regional head election.

In the case of the East Kalimantan Regional Head Election, the phenomenon of political banality was quite evident in the contestation arena. It was empirically recorded at least three symptoms. First, party political support means having to provide cash. Although they still need an intermediary agent, the transaction is more overt regarding the price paid to whom and for what. It does not need many alibis as a transaction-smoothing language. All parties seem to be in the condition of knowing and knowing what their job is. If they do not have money, do not try to find support by taking the party's path in a more open phrase. Just choose individual channels (and even



then, in practice, need money, but less than the path of political parties).

Second, people's political participation must be converted with money. Whether the euphoria of political reform is over, it turns out that more and more groups of people weigh how much money they get from their involvement in the campaign. In a general case, the emergence of "constituent rationality" has to do with the increasing difficulty of lower-middle-income groups getting jobs that generate money. It is evident from the enthusiasm of marginalized groups to offer "money politics." However, this phenomenon does not apply to marginal groups who already have a choice. That is why the phenomenon does not seem to be generally accepted.

The time allotted to attend a political forum packaged in the form of a political gathering must also be compensated. Whatever it is called, whether gasoline or cigarette money, certain community members are no longer shy about asking for compensation for the time they have provided to attend political campaigns or gatherings with candidates. The logic that develops in society is, who needs support? Time is money. For what a waste of valuable time (and can be used to find another fortune) by attending political meetings that do not directly affect the improvement of their welfare. Therefore, there are "gifts" given by the candidate (or Team of Success), at least in a political gathering. The most gift given is in the form of sarong for prayer. So the reason for giving gifts is packaged under the pretext of "put on for prayer" (worn to pray). Those who give can be rewarded, while those given a gift can do worship that can undoubtedly be rewarded. If not, the political gathering might threaten to fail.

Third, there is support for votes if paid in advance. The term "dawn attack" is considered ancient. For certain constituent groups, whenever the "money politics" can be done. The positive aspect is that constituents who have received advance payments usually do not want to accept money from other candidates. There is a certain kind of commitment that the promise must be kept. In the 2018 regional head election, it was tracked that a few days before the voting day, a member of the Team of Success and his guerrillas were guerrillas from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. They offer monetary compensation to constituents to elect a candidate who fights in political contestation. There was no coercion, let alone intimidation.

Nevertheless, usually, an agreement occurs if the "price" paid is considered appropriate by the constituents. The money is received, and the middleman only needs to record the person's name who received the money as a receipt. One person can receive compensation money for several members of his family. Usually, the "price" paid varies between Rp 100,000 and Rp 250 thousand per person. Nevertheless, if the constituent does not like the candidate's name offered by the Success Team or his accomplice, he will refuse compensation money, and the transaction does not occur. However, such cases of money politics generally only occur among the lower-middle-class people, especially the poor marginalized and unemployed groups.

For the upper-middle class, there is almost no such mode. Why did it not happen? Maybe because the compensation

money was considered too small. It may also be that the upper-middle-class community groups are considered well-established in their political choices, so they do not need to be bribed and cannot be bribed with coins. Indeed, the upper-middle-class tends to be more independent in making their choices; and more considering the track record in selecting candidates.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

In the study, it can be concluded that anomalies in the form of political banality occur marked by fraud and money politics so that the regional head elections tend to be bungled or flawed in accountability. In the case of the election contestation in East Kalimantan, the ownership of economic capital is the most powerful resource to compete in the contestation stage, accommodating the practice of imaging politics and the proper support from political parties. By having a strong economic capital, political parties will take a person into account to carry himself as a candidate.

By having sufficient economic capital, candidates will have more freedom to conduct political campaigns to seek mass support. Even by having economic capital, an actor can "buy" other capital, including symbolic capital owned by certain people. However, the election contestation that adheres to the zero-sum game rule does not accommodate the second place winner. In terms of using money to achieve victory, it is also a rational choice for candidates fighting in the contestation. That it is considered a violation of the rules of the game is another matter.

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