

Practical Key-Extraction Attacks in Leading MPC Wallets

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Abstract

Multi-Party Computation (MPC) has become a major tool for protecting hundreds of billions of dollars in cryptocurrency wallets. MPC protocols are currently powering the wallets of Coinbase, Binance, Zengo, BitGo, Fireblocks and many other fintech companies servicing thousands of financial institutions and hundreds of millions of end-user consumers.

We present four novel key-extraction attacks on popular MPC signing protocols showing how a single corrupted party may extract the secret in full during the MPC signing process. Our attacks are highly practical (the practicality of the attack depends on the number of signature-generation ceremonies the attacker participates in before extracting the key). Namely, we show key-extraction attacks against different threshold-ECDSA protocols/implementations requiring 10^6 , 256, 16, and *one signature*, respectively. In addition, we provide proof-of-concept code that implements our attacks.

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1 Introduction

In the blockchain domain, integrity and authenticity are guaranteed through digital signatures. Each participant interacting with the blockchain possesses a public key (enabling them to receive digital assets), and knowledge of the corresponding private key permits asset transfer to other participants. The secure management of this secret material is facilitated by a “wallet” which allows the owner to securely sign transactions.

MPC Wallets. In recent years, *Multi-Party Computation* (MPC) [GMW87; Yao86] has emerged as the gold standard for safeguarding digital assets. It is arguably the preferred tool for institutional players, protecting hundreds of billions of dollars through MPC wallets. In a typical setting, several geographically dispersed machines¹ (referred to as *parties*) engage in an interactive key-generation protocol to calculate the public key associated with the wallet, as well as to obtain their individual secret key shares which they will use for calculating signatures in the future. Then, when prompted to sign a message (e.g. at the request of some authenticated user), the parties engage in an interactive signing protocol for calculating the desired signature. In this document, we refer to the interactive signing process as *threshold signing* [Des87; DF89].

Informally speaking, MPC ensures that the underlying “master” private key is never exposed, and the only information revealed by the MPC protocol is the computation output (i.e. the signatures), *even in the presence of corrupted parties*.

ECDSA. The most popular signature scheme in the Blockchain space is the *Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm* (ECDSA) [Nat23]. Unlike other signature schemes that can be “thresholdized” in a natural way (e.g. Schnorr signatures [Sch91] or BLS [BLS04]), ECDSA requires the full power of MPC to support threshold signing, that is, protocols for threshold ECDSA employ a wide spectrum of cryptographic techniques, including *additive homomorphic encryption* (Paillier [Pai99]) and *zero-knowledge proofs* (ZKPs). Protocols for threshold ECDSA are fairly abundant in the literature and they are widely implemented for commercial applications. As prerequisite background, we provide a brief overview of the threshold-ECDSA protocols from [Lin17a] and [GG18; GG20], discussed next.

1.1 Background

Lindell17. For the basic two-party case, perhaps the most popular protocol is the *Lindell17* protocol (CRYPTO’17 [Lin17a], J. Cryptol.’21 [Lin21]). The *Lindell17* protocol crucially relies on Paillier as follows: First, during key-generation, letting x denote B’s secret share of the ECDSA key, party B sends $\text{Enc}(x)$ to A encrypted under a Paillier key that B owns, i.e. only B can decrypt the ciphertext, but A can homomorphically operate on it. Then, during signing, party A sends $\text{Enc}(s')$ to B where s' is a *partial* ECDSA signature, and $\text{Enc}(s')$ is calculated by homomorphically evaluating $\text{Enc}(x)$. In the end, B finalizes the signature by decrypting $\text{Enc}(s')$ and performing some lightweight data-processing.

Among other vendors, the *Lindell17* protocol is used by ZenGo and Coinbase WaaS.

¹Typically, certain machines are located with a vendor, or wallet provider, while others are situated with the client, or end user.

The GG family of Protocols. For the multi-party case, the “GG” family of protocols (CCS’18 [GG18], Manuscript’20 [GG20]²) are implemented widely by vendors and various open-source projects, e.g. [Binance bnb-chain](#), [ING Bank \(Open Source Project\)](#), [BitGo TSS](#), [ZenGo \(Open Source Project\)](#), [Safeheron](#), to name a few. The GG protocols also crucially rely on Paillier, however, Paillier encryption is used for a different purpose; to realize pairwise *oblivious linear evaluation* (OLE) which is defined as follows. OLE takes input γ from A and x, β from B, and returns α to A such that $\gamma \cdot x = \alpha + \beta \pmod N$, where N is the Paillier public key associated with A (looking ahead, x corresponds to the B’s ECDSA key share and β, γ are random ephemeral values, and all parties in the MPC play the roles of A and B with every other party in separate instances of the OLE).

To instantiate the OLE, party A sends $\text{Enc}(\gamma)$ to B who returns $\text{Enc}(\gamma \cdot x - \beta)$ by homomorphically evaluating $\text{Enc}(\gamma)$. To conclude the OLE, A decrypts the received ciphertext to outputs $\alpha = x \cdot \gamma - \beta \pmod N$ (the modulo N reduction occurs implicitly when B homomorphically computes $\text{Enc}(x \cdot \gamma - \beta)$). We note that the roles of A and B have been reversed compared to *Lindell17*, and the owner of the Paillier key is now A, and only A can decrypt the ciphertext).

After concluding all the OLE instances (requiring two rounds of interaction), the parties run an additional seven rounds for [GG18] (or five rounds for [GG20]) in order to produce the final output, i.e. the signature.

MPC Wallet Threat Model. Following the usual convention from the cryptography literature, a single adversary, *Adv*, controls a subset of parties in the multi-party protocol, and *Adv* can send any maliciously-crafted message on their behalf. In the context of MPC wallets, attack outcomes include:

1. *Denial-of-service*: *Adv* prevents the parties from signing.
2. *Signature forgery*: *Adv* obtains a signature on a different message than the prescribed message.
3. *Key Extraction*: *Adv* extracts the honest parties’ secret shares – eventually the entire key.

For signature forgery and key extraction, the main complexity metric for the adversary is the number of sessions they attend before extracting the key. In this paper, we show practical key-extraction requiring few signatures.

1.2 Our Contributions

We present four novel key-extraction attacks; two for the *GG18/20*, one for implementations of *Lindell17* and one for a custom protocol³ (BitGo TSS) that does not closely follow a protocol from the literature. Our attacks exfiltrate the secret key in full, and it suffices for the attacker to corrupt a single party in the MPC. Furthermore, our attacks are highly practical requiring 10^6 (*GG18/20*: Attack 1), 256 (*Lindell17*-Implementations), 16 (*GG18/20*: Attack 2), and *one signature* (BitGo TSS), respectively. In addition, two of our attacks have the potential for stealthiness, where the

²A variant of the main protocol from [GG20] was published in CCS’20 [CGGMP20] (as part of a merge with [CMP20]).

³BitGo’s initial threshold ECDSA offering included a protocol (BitGo TSS) that did not closely follow a protocol from the literature. Namely, BitGo TSS is a bare-bones version of GG18, where all the zero-knowledge proofs are omitted (cf. BitGoJS library [version 16.1.0](#)).

signature-generation process is error-free and it appears benign. Finally, we provide proof-of-concept code implementing three of our attacks (the most practical ones).

Attack	Protocol	# Parties	# Signatures	Stealthiness
Broken Record	Lindell17-Implementations	2	256	✗
6ixteen	GG18/20 (New)	n	16	✓
Death by 1M Cuts	GG18/20 (Old)	n	$\approx (n - 1) \cdot 10^6$	✗
Zero Proof	BitGo TSS	n	1	✓

Table 1: Summary of our key-extraction attacks for each protocol.

Remark 1.1 (Old & New GG18/20). In 2021, Makriyannis and Peled [MP21] discovered an attack affecting both GG protocols allowing a malicious attacker to obtain non-trivial leakage of the ephemeral secret randomness (which was not useful for mounting a practical attack). Following this, both papers were updated with a proposed fix where the size of a crucial parameter of the protocol was modified (namely the size of the beta parameter in the OLE). However, most implementations (e.g., [Binance bnb-chain](#), [ING Bank \(Open Source Project\)](#), [ZenGo \(Open Source Project\)](#)) did not incorporate this modification, leading to a situation where, in recent years, nearly all implementations deviated from the updated paper(s). In this document, our attack(s) apply equally to [GG18] and [GG20], so we will be referring to [GG18; GG20] as a single protocol *GG18/20* with two regimes of parameters, old and new.

1.3 Our Attacks

1.3.1 Broken Record

Our first attack is against implementations of the *Lindell17* protocol. We show how the adversary may craft a *malicious partial signature* that will cause the signature process to fail or succeed depending on the value of a targeted bit of the honest party’s share. In the remainder, recall that A sends $\text{Enc}(s')$ where s' is a partial signature that depends on the honest party’s share.

The Attack. Adv corrupts A and sends $\text{Enc}(\sigma')$ to B such that $\sigma' = s'$ is and only if the least significant bit of x (B’s private share) is zero. Thus, the signature is valid at the end of the signature ceremony if and only if x ’s least significant bit is zero and this value is inadvertently leaked to A when it is notified that the signature failed or succeeded.

The attack can then be iterated (with suitable adjustments) to leak the higher-order bits, and, after approximately two hundred signatures, the key can be recovered in full. We provide a fully working PoC at the following [github repository](#).

Remark 1.2. Our attack does not challenge the security analysis from [Lin17a] because [Lin17a] assumes that failed signatures terminate signature operations and it specifically instructs parties to stop signing, i.e. there are no additional signing sessions once an invalid signature is detected by the honest party.⁴ In fact, the paper even entertains the idea that bits of the key may be leaked with the success/failure of the signature acting as an oracle (bottom paragraph, p. 11 of the full-version document [Lin17b]). In this paper, our contribution lies in demonstrating the attack and providing a proof-of-concept implementation to fully extract the key.

⁴In practical terms, this assumption means that the wallet must be locked (at least temporarily).

1.3.2 6ix1een

Our second attack targets the post-update *GG18/20* protocol (under the new regime of parameters). In the *6ix1een*⁵ attack, a single corrupted party extracts the private key in full after sixteen signature attempts *for any number of honest parties*.

OLE Parameters. Our attack targets the OLE phase of the protocol (so the solitary corrupted party uses malicious inputs in the pairwise OLE instances with each of the other parties). Recall that the OLE takes input γ from A and x, β from B, and returns α to A such that $\gamma \cdot x = \alpha + \beta \pmod N$, where N is the Paillier public key associated with A. Our attack specifically leverages the size of the inputs and outputs in the OLE, so we note that x and k are 256 bits and β is a random number of roughly 1024 bits and so $\alpha = x \cdot \gamma - \beta$ is also 1024 bits (in the “old” regime of parameters, β is chosen from the range $\{1, \dots, N\}$, so $\beta \approx 2^{2048}$, cf. Remark 1.1). Adversary Adv corrupting A extracts B’s secret x as follows.

The Attack. Adv chooses Paillier key $N = p_1 \cdot \dots \cdot p_{16} \cdot q$ where $p_1 \dots p_{16}$ are sixteen random primes of size 2^{16} and q is a large prime chosen randomly to match the expected size of the Paillier public key (we stress that honest Paillier keys have the form $N = p \cdot q$, i.e. a typical RSA number). Then, in the OLE, Adv sets $k = N/p_i$ for a fixed $p_i \in \{p_1, \dots, p_{16}\}$, cheats in the zero-knowledge proof (this is the crux of the attack that we defer to the technical sections), and obtains the value of $x \pmod{p_i}$ because $\alpha = x \cdot (N/p_i) - \beta \pmod N$ and $\beta < N/p_i$ and thus $x \pmod{p_i} \approx \alpha/(N/p_i)$, i.e. the closest multiple of (N/p_i) to the α -value leaks $x \pmod{p_i}$ (the exact calculations are deferred to Section 4).

Iterating the above for each prime yields $x \pmod{p_i}$ for all 16 possible values of p_i . In the end, we reconstruct x using Chinese Remainder Theorem. We provide a fully working PoC at the following [github repository](#).

Remark 1.3. The primary source of the vulnerability is that the zero-knowledge proofs relating to the Paillier moduli only check for square-freeness (i.e. that N and $\varphi(N)$ are coprime). So, the malicious N described above will go undetected. The secondary aspect of the vulnerability, crucial for our attack, arises from a flaw in the range-proof check. Specifically, the proof of soundness of the ZKP breaks down when the verifier’s random challenge in the ZKP is a proper divisor of N ; this happens with noticeable probability (and thus can be brute-forced in our attack) because the malicious N has small factors.

1.3.3 Death by 1M cuts

Our third attack targets the old version of *GG18/20* where the beta parameter is chosen from $\{1, \dots, N\}$. In this regime of parameters, the 6ixteen attack is no longer relevant because A’s output in the OLE, α , completely hides x , for any value of γ . Instead, we will obtain information leakage through the success/failure of the signature process, akin to the broken record attack.

The Attack. The first few steps of the attack are identical to the 6ixteen. Namely, the attacker chooses a Paillier modulus with 16 small prime factors and it sets $\gamma = N/p_i$ during signing, where p_i is one of the small factors. When obtaining α , the attacker reassigns $\alpha := \alpha - y \cdot N/p_i \pmod N$ where

⁵“6ix1een” because it involves sixteen small primes of size sixteen bits, as well as sixteen signatures.

y denotes a *random guess* of the value $x \bmod p_i$, and the attacker proceeds with the remaining steps of the protocol as if it had selected $\gamma = 0$. By noticing that

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha - y \cdot N/p_i \bmod N &= ((x \bmod p_i) - y) \cdot N/p_i - \beta \\ &\begin{cases} = \gamma \cdot x - \beta & \text{if } y = x \bmod p_i \\ \neq \gamma \cdot x - \beta & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

it follows that the adversary's reassigned alpha is consistent with $\gamma = 0$ if and only if the adversary guessed $x \bmod p_i$ correctly, and thus the execution will result in a valid signature only when $y = x \bmod p_i$.

When all the remainders have been extracted (in 16 different signing sessions resulting in *valid* signatures⁶ signatures ceremonies), the attacker can reconstruct the x in full using Chinese remainder theorem. We note that the complexity of the attack, i.e. the number of signatures it requires, depends on the size of the chosen primes as well as the number of parameters. For a single corrupted party in a n -party protocol, choosing the smallest possible primes, our attack retrieves the private key with probability $1/2^{n-1}$ after approximately $(n-1) \cdot 10^6$ signatures (cf. Section 4.3.1).

1.3.4 Zero Proof

Our last attack targets the BitGo TSS protocol which does not adhere closely to any paper from the literature. One may wonder why we include an attack against a custom protocol in our findings. We believe we have valid reasons for this choice. First, the protocol itself is not particularly exotic; it is a simplified version of the (old) *GG18/20* protocol and it may be viewed as the honest-but-curious version of *GG18/20* where all the ZKPs are omitted. Second, the fact that we exfiltrate the key in *one*⁷ signature is technically noteworthy as, to the best of our knowledge, extracting more than a few bits of the key (in any number of signatures) was previously unknown.

Remark 1.4 ([TS21] does not apply to BitGo TSS). It's important to highlight that the attack outlined in [TS21] (Alpha Rays) is not applicable to BitGo TSS. This is because the attacker in [TS21] leverages the value g^β (where g denotes the generator of the ECDSA group), shared by the honest party during the OLE. In BitGo TSS, however, such values are not exchanged among the parties, rendering the attack ineffective.

The Attack. The first step of our attack is choosing a Paillier key of the form

$$N = b \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{16} p_i \cdot q_i \tag{1}$$

where q_i, p_i are 17/16-bit primes such that $q_i = 2p_i + 1$ (i.e. q_i is a strong prime with inner prime p_i) and b is a large prime chosen to compensate for the expected size of N . Then, in the OLE of first signature session, exploiting the fact there is no ZK proof validating that \mathcal{A} 's message is indeed a ciphertext, we send the value 4 (which is not a possible ciphertext for the chosen key). Then, when \mathcal{B} operates on the message, it returns a value \mathcal{D} which, when reduced modulo N yields

⁶Failed signatures do not result in leakage (we have omitted the details of why in this initial presentation)

⁷To be precise, the key is extracted in less than one signature. Namely, it is extracted in full in the first OLE instance of the first signing session.

4^x (The value -4^x is also possible, but we ignore this case in this initial presentation). Finally, to extract the x , the attacker obtains $x \bmod p_i$ for each of the p_i 's by brute forcing $4^x \bmod q_i$ (because 4 generates a group of size p_i in $\mathbb{Z}_{q_i}^*$). In the end, the secret x be reconstructed using Chinese remainder theorem. We provide a fully working PoC at the following [github repository](#).

1.4 Disclosure

We followed the standard 90-day responsible disclosure process for all the vulnerabilities. Specifically, all affected vendors were notified privately and given ninety days to patch the vulnerabilities (we provided assistance and answered all technical followup questions to help resolve the vulnerabilities with the affected parties).

GG18/20 Vulnerability. The vulnerability was discovered in early May, 2023. Subsequently, we began notifying impacted entities, which included over 10 vendors and open-source libraries. The fixleen attack was then demonstrated on SafeHeron's open-source library.

On August 9th, 2023 we published our findings publicly and attached a CVE for this issue: CVE-2023-33241.

Lindell17 Vulnerability. We validated the vulnerability by extracting the secret share from ZenGo's servers (associated with our own mainnet account) in late March 2023. In the beginning of May 2023, the vulnerability was further confirmed, to varying degrees of exploitability, in an additional 4 vendors.

On August 9th, 2023 we published our findings publicly and attached a CVE for this issue: CVE-2023-33242.

BitGo Vulnerability. We validated the vulnerability and we extracted the private key share against BitGo's servers (associated with our own mainnet account) on December 5th 2022. We notified BitGo of the vulnerability on the same day. The vulnerability was announced on March 17th, 2023.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

Basic notation. Throughout the paper \mathbb{Z} and \mathbb{N} denote the set of rational, integer and natural numbers, respectively, and we write $x \bmod n$ (or $[x]_n$ for conciseness) for the remainder of x modulo n . Further, $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*$ denotes the multiplicative group of inverses modulo $n \in \mathbb{N}$, where $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ is the ring of integers modulo n . We let $\varphi : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ denote Euler's totient function and we write $\gcd(a, b)$ for the greatest common divisor of a and b .

Algorithms & Protocols. We use roman font (Enc, Dec, PailKeys, ...) for algorithms and we write $x = \text{Algo}(m; \rho)$ for computing x according to (probabilistic) algorithm Algo on prescribed input m and *randomizer* (random input) ρ . When the randomizer is omitted, we write $x \leftarrow \text{Algo}(m)$ and it is assumed the randomizer is chosen as prescribed. We use sans-serif letters (Orc*, Prot, ...) to denote oracles and protocols. Oracles are distinguished from protocols using a star (*) identifier.

All oracles except the single-party IntCom^* (Definition 4.6) are two-party oracles, i.e. they receive input and deliver output to both parties during the oracle-call.

Groups & ECDSA. We write (\mathbb{G}, g, q) for the group-generator-order tuple associated with the ECDSA algorithm and we use multiplicative notation for the relevant operations. For an arbitrary set \mathcal{S} , we write $x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}$ for x chosen uniformly at random from \mathcal{S} . Finally, $\text{HASH} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ denotes the cryptographic hash function associated with ECDSA (and is instantiated with SHA2), and we recall the ECDSA signing formula: for secret key $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$, ECDSA signatures consist of pairs (R, s) such that

$$\begin{cases} R = g^k & \text{s.t. } k \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\ s = [k^{-1}(\text{HASH}(\text{msg}) + r \cdot x)]_q & \text{s.t. } r = R|_{\text{proj}} \end{cases},$$

where $(\cdot)|_{\text{proj}} : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ is the so-called “conversion function” associated with ECDSA.

2.2 Paillier Encryption & CRT

Definition 2.1 (Paillier Enc.). Define $(\text{PailKeys}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ as the three-tuple of algorithms below.

1. Let $(N, \sigma) \leftarrow \text{PailKeys}$ where $N = p \cdot p'$ is the public key and $\sigma = (p-1)(p'-1)$ is the secret key such that p, p' are random primes of bit-length 1024.
2. For $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, let $\text{Enc}_N(m; \rho) = (1 + N)^m \cdot \rho^N \bmod N^2$, where $\rho \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.
3. For $\mathcal{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$, letting $\mu = \sigma^{-1} \bmod N$, $\text{Dec}_\sigma(\mathcal{C}) = \left(\frac{[\mathcal{C}^\sigma]_{N^2-1}}{N} \right) \cdot \mu \bmod N$.

(We use calligraphic letters to denote Paillier ciphertexts)

Claim 2.2. *Paillier encryption is additively homomorphic. Namely, for every $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\gcd(N, \varphi(N)) = 1$, it holds that $\text{Enc}_N(m; \rho)^\alpha = \text{Enc}_N(\alpha \cdot m; \rho^\alpha) \bmod N^2$ and $\text{Enc}_N(m; \rho) \cdot \text{Enc}_N(m'; \rho') = \text{Enc}_N(m + m'; \rho \cdot \rho') \bmod N^2$, for every $m, m' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and $\rho, \rho' \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.*

Theorem 2.3 (Chinese Remainder Theorem.). *Let p_1, \dots, p_n denote n distinct primes and write $M = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$ and $u_i = [(M/p_i)^{-1}]_{p_i} \cdot M/p_i$. For $x \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $x < M$, it holds that*

$$x = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i \cdot [x]_{p_i} \bmod M.$$

3 Our Attack on Implementations of *Lindell17*

In this section, we present our attacks on implementations of *Lindell17*. Specifically those implementations that ignore failed signatures. To simplify the presentation, we have opted to describe *Lindell17* (Protocol 3.3) in the presence of oracles that help the parties calculate certain correlated values. These oracles don’t impact the attack and are solely for presentation purposes (the oracles are defined below together with the protocol).

In our attack (Attack 3.5), corrupted A extracts B's secret share share, x_B , in 256 separate signature sessions, and the adversary uses prior knowledge of the secret share to advance to the next iteration of the overall attack. That is, in the ℓ -th attack, the adversary uses the bits of x_B that it extracted in the first $\ell - 1$ attacks in order to craft a malicious partial signature that will leak the ℓ -th bit of x_B via the failure/success of the signature-generation process.

3.1 Protocol Description

Definition 3.1 (KeyGen*). Define KeyGen* on input (\mathbb{G}, g, q) from A and B such that KeyGen* returns the tuple $(X, x_A, N, \mathcal{C}) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ to A and the tuple $(X, x_B, N, \sigma) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}$ to B where $x_A, x_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ are uniformly random and $(X, N, \sigma, \mathcal{C})$ are set as follows

$$(N, \sigma) \leftarrow \text{PailKeys} \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{cases} X = g^{x_A + x_B} \\ \mathcal{C} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_N(x_B) \end{cases}.$$

(PailKeys and Enc denote the key-generation and encryption algorithms from Definition 2.1)

Definition 3.2 (MulShare*). Define MulShare* taking common input (\mathbb{G}, g, q) and secret inputs k_A and $k_B \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ from A and B respectively such that MulShare* returns $R = g^{k_A \cdot k_B} \in \mathbb{G}$.

Protocol 3.3 (Lindell17 (A, B)).

Oracles: KeyGen*, MulShare*

Operations: (Key-Generation)

Upon activation, parties call KeyGen*(\cdot) and obtain the following output:

- (a) Common Output: ECDSA pk $X = g^{x_A + x_B} \in \mathbb{G}$ and Paillier pk $N \in \mathbb{Z}$.
- (b) Secret output: A gets $x_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\mathcal{C} = \text{Enc}_N(x_B)$
- (c) Secret output: B gets $x_B \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and Paillier secret key $\sigma \in \mathbb{Z}$.

Operations: (Signing) When prompted on message msg, set $m = \text{HASH}(\text{msg})$ and do:

1. A, B, sample $k_A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $k_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ respectively.
2. Parties call MulShare*(\mathbb{G}, g, q) on input k_A and k_B and obtain $R = g^{k_A \cdot k_B}$.
3. A sets $r = R|_{\text{proj}}$ and sends $\mathcal{D} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ to B where

$$\mathcal{D} = \text{Enc}_N([k_A^{-1}(m + rx_A)]_q) \cdot \mathcal{C}^{[r \cdot k_A^{-1}]_q} \mod N^2$$

4. B outputs (R, s) where $s = k_2^{-1} \cdot \text{Dec}_\sigma(\mathcal{C}) \mod q$ iff (R, s) is a valid signature.

3.2 Broken Record Attack

Claim 3.4. Under Attack 3.5, party B finalizes the signature correctly if and only if

$$x_B - y_B \mod 2^\ell = 0.$$

Proof. Recall that the s -part of the signature in an honest execution of Protocol 3.3 satisfies $s = (2^\ell k_B)^{-1}(m + r(x_A + x_B)) \bmod q$ when **A** chooses $k_A = 2^\ell$. Next, we calculate express $\text{Dec}(\mathcal{D}')$ as a function of s . Namely, for $\zeta = [2^{-\ell}(m + rx_A)]_q$ and $\zeta' = y_B \cdot r' \cdot [2^{-\ell}]_q$,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Dec}(\mathcal{D}') &= (\zeta + y_B \cdot r' \cdot \varepsilon) + [x_B \cdot r' \cdot 2^{-\ell}]_N \bmod N \\ &= \zeta + \zeta' + (x_B - y_B) \cdot r' \cdot [2^{-\ell}]_N \bmod N \\ &= \begin{cases} \zeta + \zeta' + \frac{x_B - y_B}{2^\ell} \cdot r' & \text{if } [x_B - y_B]_{2^\ell} = 0 \\ \zeta + \zeta' + \frac{x_B - y_B - 2^{\ell-1}}{2^\ell} \cdot r' + \frac{N+1}{2} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

and thus

$$\text{Dec}(\mathcal{D}') = \begin{cases} s \cdot k_B \bmod q & \text{if } [x_B - y_B]_{2^\ell} = 0 \\ s \cdot k_B + \frac{N-q}{2} \bmod q & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

□

The claim above that if $x_B - y_B \bmod 2^\ell = 0$ if and only if ℓ -the least significant bit of x_B is zero. In conclusion, **B** recovers the happy-flow formula and obtains s if $x_A - y_B = 0 \bmod 2^\ell$. (Otherwise, s is offset by $[k_B^{-1} \cdot (N - q)/2]_q$ and the resulting signature is invalid).

Attack 3.5 (Broken Record: Corrupted **A** in Protocol 3.3).

Auxiliary input: **Adv** holds $y_B = x_B \bmod 2^{\ell-1}$

(the attack is initialized with $\ell = 1$ and $y_B = \perp$, and y_B is updated after each attack.)

Operations:

1. Call MulShare^* on inputs $k_A = 2^\ell$ (chosen by **Adv**) and k_B (chosen by **B**).

All parties obtain $R = g^{2^\ell \cdot k_B} \in \mathbb{G}$ from MulShare^* .

Adv sets $\varepsilon = [2^{-\ell}]_q - [2^{-\ell}]_N$ and

$$r' = \begin{cases} r & \text{if } r \text{ is even (recall } r = R|_{\text{proj}}) \\ r + q & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

2. **Adv** sends $\mathcal{D}' \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ to **B** where, for $\zeta = [k_A^{-1}(m + rx_A)]_q$,

$$\mathcal{D}' = \text{Enc}_N(\zeta + y_B \cdot r' \cdot \varepsilon) \cdot (C^{r'})^{[2^{-\ell}]_N} \bmod N^2$$

3. **Adv** deduces that

$$x_B \bmod 2^\ell = \begin{cases} y_B & \text{if sig succeeds} \\ y_B + 2^{\ell-1} & \text{if sig fails} \end{cases}$$

4 Our Attack(s) on *GG18/20*

In this section, we present our attacks on *GG18/20*. To simplify the presentation, we describe our attacks against a generic two-party protocol (Protocol 4.2)⁸ and we only briefly mention how the attack generalizes to the multiparty case. We recall that each of our attacks applies to a certain parameter choice of the protocol (specified further below), and, as before, the adversary is corrupting A. In order to keep the description of Protocol 4.2 simple, we use a number of different oracles and subprotocols according to the diagram in Figure 1 (where each edge denotes an oracle or subprotocol invocation).

Each of our attacks is relevant to a certain value of parameter λ in AffComb_λ^* , and λ is hardcoded as one of two possible values: q^5 (where q is the order of the ECDSA group) or 2^{2048} (the size of the Paillier modulus). Specifically, when $\lambda = q^5$, Attack 4.8 applies which recovers the key in sixteen signatures regardless of the number of parties, and, when $\lambda = 2^{2048}$, Attack 4.11 applies which recovers the key in approximately one million signatures per honest party because each share is extracted separately (so each additional honest party incurs an additional 1M signatures to recover their share).

4.1 Protocol Description

As shown in Figure 1 the signing protocol invokes two subprotocols *VeVole* (*Verifiable VOLE*) and *RngProof* (*Range Proof*), and four oracles AffComb_λ^* (*Affine Combination*), PaillierWF^* (*Paillier Well-Formedness*), SumShare^* (*Additively Share*), and IntCom^* (*Integer Commitment*). We describe each (sub)protocol starting from the root of the tree to the leaves, and each oracle is described together with the relevant protocol.




Figure 1: Illustration of the GG protocol dependencies. We note that (both of) our attacks target the two subprotocols, that is, corrupted party A uses maliciously-chosen values in *VeVole* and *RngProof* when calculating the messages to be sent to B.

4.1.1 Signing (*GG18/20*)

Definition 4.1 (SumShare^*). Define SumShare^* taking secret inputs v_A and $v_B \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ from A and B respectively such that SumShare^* returns $R = g^{v_A + v_B} \in \mathbb{G}$. (This oracle simply returns a random

⁸Protocol 4.2 may be viewed as a Paillier-based variant of [DKLS23]

a random group element to the parties as well as an additive share v_P of the discrete log to each $P \in \{A, B\}$.)

Protocol 4.2 (*GG18/20* (A, B)).

Oracle & Sub-protocol: $\text{SumShare}^*(\cdot)$ and $\text{VeVole}(\cdot)$

Common Input: Group-generator-order tuple (\mathbb{G}, g, q)

Operations: (Key-Generation)

Parties call $\text{SumShare}^*(\mathbb{G}, g, q)$ and obtain:

- (a) Common Output: ECDSA pk $X = g^{x_A + x_B} \in \mathbb{G}$.
- (b) Secret Output: P gets $x_P \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.

Operations: (Signing) When prompted on message msg , set $m = \text{HASH}(\text{msg})$ and do:

1. Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ samples $k_P \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$.
2. Parties call SumShare^* on input k_P from $P \in \{A, B\}$ and obtain $R = g^{k_A + k_B}$.
3. Parties execute $\text{VeVole}(\dots)$ on input (R, X, k_P, x_P) from $P \in \{A, B\}$ and obtain:
 - (a) Common Output: Empty
 - (b) Secret Output: P gets random $\alpha_P, \beta_P, \hat{\alpha}_P, \hat{\beta}_P, \gamma_P \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ such that: letting $Q = \{A, B\} \setminus P$

$$\begin{cases} \alpha_P + \beta_Q = \gamma_P \cdot x_Q \pmod{q} \\ \hat{\alpha}_P + \hat{\beta}_Q = \gamma_P \cdot k_Q \pmod{q} \end{cases}$$

4. Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ sets $r = R|_{\text{proj}}$ and sends $(\hat{s}_P, \delta_P) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2$ to $Q \in \{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$ where

$$\begin{cases} \hat{s}_P = \gamma_P \cdot m + r \cdot (x_P \gamma_P + \alpha_P + \beta_P) \pmod{q} \\ \delta_P = k_P \gamma_P + \hat{\alpha}_P + \hat{\beta}_P \pmod{q} \end{cases}$$

5. Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ outputs (R, s) where $s = (\delta_A + \delta_B)^{-1} \cdot (\hat{s}_A + \hat{s}_B) \pmod{q}$ iff (R, s) is a valid signature.

4.1.2 Verifiable VOLE

Definition 4.3 (PaillierWF^*). Define PaillierWF^* taking secret input (N_P, σ_P) from each $P \in \{A, B\}$ such that PaillierWF^* returns (N_A, N_B) to A and B if $\varphi(N) = \sigma$ and $\gcd(N, \sigma) = 1$. Else, return \perp . (This oracle takes a paillier key and the corresponding secret key from each party and validates that the secret key is coprime to the public key.)

Definition 4.4 (AffComb_λ^*). Define AffComb_λ^* taking common input $(\mathcal{C}_A, N_A, \mathcal{C}_B, N_B, X, R)$ and secret input $(x_P, k_P) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2$ from each $P \in \{A, B\}$ such that

1. If $g^{x_A + x_B} \neq X \in \mathbb{G}$ or $g^{k_A + k_B} \neq R \in \mathbb{G}$, AffComb_λ^* returns \perp .

2. Else, AffComb_λ^* returns $(\mathcal{D}_P, \hat{\mathcal{D}}_P, \beta_P, \hat{\beta}_P) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_P^2}^* \times \mathbb{Z}_q^2$ to $P \in \{A, B\}$ where (for $Q \in \{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$)

$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{D}_P = \mathcal{C}_P^{x_Q} \cdot \text{Enc}_{N_P}(\nu_Q) \mod N_P^2 & \text{for } \nu_Q \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_\lambda \\ \hat{\mathcal{D}}_P = \mathcal{C}_P^{k_Q} \cdot \text{Enc}_{N_P}(\nu_Q) \mod N_P^2 & \text{for } \hat{\nu}_Q \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_\lambda \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{cases} \beta_P = -\nu_P \mod q \\ \hat{\beta}_P = -\hat{\nu}_P \mod q \end{cases}.$$

(This oracle finalizes the VOLE operation in a verifiable way)

Protocol 4.5 (VeVole (A, B)).

Oracles & Sub-protocol: $\text{PaillierWF}^*(\cdot)$, $\text{AffComb}_\lambda^*(\cdot)$ and $\text{RngProof}(\cdot)$

Common Input: Group Elements $(R, X) \in \mathbb{G}^2$

Secret Input: Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ holds field elements $(x_P, k_P) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2$

Operations: (One-time setup)

1. Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ samples Paillier key pair $(N_P, \sigma_P) \leftarrow \text{PailKeys}$.
2. Parties call PaillierWF^* on inputs (N_A, σ_A) and (N_B, σ_B) and obtain (N_A, N_B) .
(If $(N_A, N_B) = \perp$, abort)

Operations: (VOLE)

1. Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ samples $\gamma_P \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\rho_P \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_P}$ and sets $\mathcal{C}_P = \text{Enc}_P(\gamma_P; \rho_P)$.
2. Parties execute RngProof on inputs $(\mathcal{C}_A, \gamma_A, \rho_A)$ and $(\mathcal{C}_B, \gamma_B, \rho_B)$. Obtain:
 - (a) Common Output: $(\mathcal{C}_A, \mathcal{C}_B) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_A^2}^* \times \mathbb{Z}_{N_B^2}^*$. (If $(\mathcal{C}_A, \mathcal{C}_B) = \perp$, abort)
 - (b) Secret Output: N/A
3. Call AffComb_λ^* on input $(\mathcal{C}_A, N_A, \mathcal{C}_B, N_B, X, R)$ and secret input (x_P, k_P) from $P \in \{A, B\}$.
 - (a) Common Output: $(\mathcal{D}_A, \hat{\mathcal{D}}_A) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_A^2}^*$ and $(\mathcal{D}_B, \hat{\mathcal{D}}_B) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_B^2}^*$.
 - (b) Secret Output: Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ gets $\beta_P, \hat{\beta}_P$.
4. Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ sets $\begin{cases} \alpha_P = \text{Dec}_P(\mathcal{D}_P) \mod q \\ \hat{\alpha}_P = \text{Dec}_P(\hat{\mathcal{D}}_P) \mod q \end{cases}$ and outputs $(\gamma_P, \alpha_P, \hat{\alpha}_P, \beta_P, \hat{\beta}_P)$.

4.1.3 Range Proof

Definition 4.6 (IntCom^*). Define IntCom^* to be a single-party oracle such that:

1. On input (com, α) , IntCom^* returns $\mathbf{X} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$ and stores (\mathbf{X}, α) in memory.
2. On input $(\text{eval}, z, \mathbf{X}, e, Y)$, IntCom^* retrieves (\mathbf{X}, α) and (Y, β) from memory and returns **true** if $z = \alpha \cdot e + \beta$. Else, return **false**.

For conciseness, we write $\mathbf{X} \leftarrow \text{IntCom}^*(\alpha)$ and **true/false** $\leftarrow \text{IntCom}^*(\text{eval}, z, \mathbf{X}, e, Y)$ respectively. (This single-party oracle serves as an integer commitment scheme that verifies linear combination of committed values over \mathbb{Z} – rather than some finite algebraic structure)

Protocol 4.7 (RngProof (A, B)).*Oracles:* $\text{IntCom}^*(\cdot)$ Common Input: Paillier pks $(N_A, N_B) \in \mathbb{N}^2$ and Ring Elements $(C_A, C_B) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_A}^* \times \mathbb{Z}_{N_B}^*$ Secret Input: Each $P \in \{A, B\}$ holds $(\gamma_P, \rho_P) \in \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_{N_C}^*$ s.t. $C_P = \text{Enc}_P(\gamma_C; \rho_P)$ *Operations:*

1. Each
- $P \in \{A, B\}$
- does

- (a) Call $X_P \leftarrow \text{IntCom}^*(\text{com}, \gamma_P)$.
- (b) Call $Y_P \leftarrow \text{IntCom}^*(\text{com}, u_P)$ where $u_P \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q^3}$.
- (c) Sample $\mu_P \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_P}^*$, and set $\mathcal{F}_P = \text{Enc}_P(u_P; \mu_P) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_P}^*$.
- (d) Send $(C_P, \mathcal{F}_P, X_P, Y_P, z_P, w_P)$ to $Q \in \{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$, where

$$\begin{cases} z_P = u_P + e_P \cdot \gamma_P & (\text{no modulo reduction}) \\ w_P = \rho_P \cdot \mu_P^e & \text{mod } N_P \\ e_P = \text{HASH}(P, C_P, \mathcal{F}_P, X_P, Y_P) \end{cases}$$

2. When
- $P \in \{A, B\}$
- obtains
- $(C_Q, \mathcal{F}_Q, X_Q, Y_Q, z_Q, w_Q)$
- from
- $Q \in \{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$
- , do:

- (a) Set $e_Q = \text{HASH}(P_Q, C_Q, \mathcal{F}_Q, X_Q, Y_Q)$ and $b \leftarrow \text{IntCom}^*(\text{eval}, z_Q, X_Q, e_Q, Y_Q)$.
- (b) Verify that $\text{Enc}_Q(z_Q; w_Q) = \mathcal{F}_Q \cdot C_Q^{e_Q} \text{ mod } N_Q^2$ and $z_Q \in \{1, \dots, q^3\}$
- (c) If no error was detected and $b = \text{true}$, output (C_A, C_B) .

Else, output \perp .**4.2 Sixteen Attack**

We now describe our attack on GG_{q^5} that extracts the key in 16 signatures. As mentioned in the introduction, the attacker corrupting \mathcal{A} chooses a malicious Paillier modulus comprising of sixteen small primes. Then, in the j -th signature ceremony, the attacker sets $C_A = \text{Enc}_{N_A}(N_A/p_j)$ where p_j is the j -th small factor of N_A . Observe that $N_A/p_j > 2^{2000}$, suggesting that the verification in Item 2b of Protocol 4.7 or the integer commitment RngProof in Item 2a of Protocol 4.7 should detect such a malicious input. As we shall see next, however, there is a way for the \mathcal{C} to slip through without detection.

The attacker cheats in RngProof by brute-forcing e_A until $e_A = 0 \text{ mod } p_j$ (such an e_A will be found with overwhelming probability because p_j is small). We note that such a value of e_A allows the attacker to cheat because $\mathcal{F}_A \cdot C_A^{e_A} = \mathcal{F}_A \cdot \text{Enc}_{N_A}(0) \text{ mod } N_A^2$, and thus the range proof will not yield an error for $z_A = u_A + e_A \cdot 0$ when using $\gamma_A = 0$.

Then, when the honest party operates on B and returns \mathcal{D}_A , simple data processing will yield the value of $x_B \text{ mod } p_i$. Iterating the attack sixteen times with different primes allows the attacker to obtain x_B in full, using CRT (Theorem 2.3).

Multi-Party Case. In multiparty GG18/20 , each pair of parties essentially execute Protocol 4.2, except that they need to adjust the last round messages. Specifically, letting $\alpha_{i,j}$ denote P_i 's output in the OLE with P_j (when playing A) and $\beta_{i,j}$ denote P_i 's ephemeral input in the OLE with P_j

(when playing B), party P_i sends \hat{s}_i, δ_i where

$$\begin{cases} \hat{s}_i = \gamma_i \cdot m + r \cdot (x_{P_i} \gamma_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{i,j}) \mod q \\ \delta_i = k_{P_i} \gamma_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \mod q \end{cases}$$

The signature is set as (r, s) where $s = (\sum_j \hat{s}_j) \cdot (\sum_j \delta_j)^{-1} \mod q$. It is not hard to see that Adv can perform Attack 4.8 on all counterparties simultaneously, thus obtaining the key in full after sixteen signatures.

Attack 4.8 (6ixteen: Corrupted A in Protocol 4.2 – $\lambda = q^5$).

Operations:

1. Sample p_1, \dots, p_{16} primes of size 2^{16} and prime b such that $b \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{16} p_j \approx 2^{2048}$.

Set $N_A = b \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{16} p_j$ and $\sigma_A = \varphi(N_A)$

2. In the VeVole execution of the j -th signature session do:

(a) Set $\gamma_A = 0$ and $\mathcal{C}_A = \text{Enc}_A(N_A/p_j)$ (all other values are sampled as prescribed).

(b) When executing RngProof do:

- Brute force $u_A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ until $e_A = \text{HASH}(\dots) = 0 \mod p_j$.
(if no such value is found after 2^{32} tries, output **NoCheat**)

(c) When obtaining \mathcal{D}_A , set

$$y_j = \frac{\text{Dec}_{\sigma_A}(\mathcal{D}_A) - [\text{Dec}_{\sigma_A}(\mathcal{D}_A)]_{N_A/p_j}}{N_A/p_j}$$

Stealthiness. To avoid causing failures, Attack 4.8 can be made stealthy as follows. The attacker reassigns $\mathcal{D}_A := \mathcal{D}_A \cdot (y_j \cdot N_A/p_j)^{-1} \mod N_A^2$ and $\hat{\mathcal{D}}_A := \hat{\mathcal{D}}_A \cdot (\hat{y}_j \cdot N_A/p_j)^{-1} \mod N_A^2$ where

$$\hat{y}_j = \frac{\text{Dec}_{\sigma_A}(\hat{\mathcal{D}}_A) - [\text{Dec}_{\sigma_A}(\hat{\mathcal{D}}_A)]_{N_A/p_j}}{N_A/p_j}$$

and subsequently proceeding with the protocol as prescribed. That is, the attacker “corrects” \mathcal{D}_A and $\hat{\mathcal{D}}_A$ by the offset it caused with the malicious input, and then proceeds normally.

4.2.1 Quality of the Attack

We conclude this section by estimating the quality of Attack 4.8. Namely, we heuristically model the hash function as a random oracle and we find that Adv recovers the key after sixteen signatures, almost surely (cf. Claims 4.9 and 4.10).

Claim 4.9. *For fixed j , attacker Adv outputs NoCheat with probability at most 2^{-1000} .*

Proof. Modelling the hash function as a random oracle, it holds that $\Pr[e_A \neq 0 \mod p_j] = (1 - 1/p_j)$ in one single trial. Thus, $\Pr[\text{NoCheat}] = (1 - 1/p_j)^{2^{32}} \leq \exp(-2^{32}/p_j) < 2^{-1000}$ since $p_j \approx 2^{16}$. \square

Claim 4.10. For fixed j , it holds that $x_B \bmod p_j = \frac{\text{Dec}_{\sigma_A}(\mathcal{D}_A) - [\text{Dec}_{\sigma_A}(\mathcal{D}_A)]_{N_A/p_j}}{N_A/p_j}$.

Proof. By the definition of the AffComb_λ^* oracle, notice that $\mathcal{D}_A = \text{Enc}_{N_A}([x_B \cdot N_A/p_j + \nu_B]_{N_A})$ where $\nu_B \in \{1, \dots, q^5\}$. Thus, since $\nu_B < N_A/p_j$ (because N_A is 2048 bits and p_j is roughly 16 bits) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Dec}_{N_A}(\mathcal{D}_A) - [\text{Dec}_{N_A}(\mathcal{D}_A)]_{N_A/p_j} &= [x_B \cdot N_A/p_j + \nu_B]_{N_A} - \nu_B \\ &= [x_B]_{p_j} \cdot N_A/p_j \end{aligned}$$

□

4.3 Death by 1M Cuts Attack

We now describe our attack on $\text{GG}_{2^{2048}}$ that extracts the key in 16 *successful* signatures (i.e. leakage is only obtained when the signature process yields a valid signature). The attack proceeds almost identically to Attack 4.8 except that, when the attacker obtains \mathcal{D}_A and $\hat{\mathcal{D}}_A$, it reassigns those value according to a (random) guess of the pair $(x_B, k_B) \bmod p_j$ and it continues the execution as the protocol prescribes.

In the end, if the the execution leads to valid signature, the attacker deduces the value of $(x_B, k_B) \bmod p_j$. In the event that the signature is invalid, no leakage is obtained on x_B (because of the k_B which is a fresh random value every time) and thus the attack must be repeated with the same p_j .

Attack 4.11 (Death by 1M Cuts: Corrupted A in Protocol 4.2 for $\lambda = 2^{2048}$).

Operations:

1. Same as items Item 1 in Attack 4.8.
2. In the VeVole execution of the j -th signature session sample $(a, b) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}$ and do:
 - (a) Same as items Items 2a and 2b in Attack 4.8.
 - (b) When obtaining $\mathcal{D}_A, \hat{\mathcal{D}}_A$, reassign (continue the process as the protocol prescribes hereafter)

$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{D}_A &:= \mathcal{D}_A \cdot \text{Enc}_{N_A}(-a \cdot (N_A/p_j)) \bmod N_A^2 \\ \hat{\mathcal{D}}_A &:= \hat{\mathcal{D}}_A \cdot \text{Enc}_{N_A}(-b \cdot (N_A/p_j)) \bmod N_A^2 \end{cases}$$

- (c) If the process terminates in a valid signature deduce that $(x_B, k_B) = (a, b) \bmod p_j$.

4.3.1 Quality of the Attack

We conclude this section by estimating the quality of Attack 4.11.

Claim 4.12. For fixed j , attacker Adv outputs NoCheat with probability at most 2^{-1000} .

Proof. Same as Claim 4.9.

□

Claim 4.13. *Using the notation from Attack 4.11, in the j -th iteration, if $(x_B, k_B) \neq (a, b) \pmod{p_j}$ and $m \neq -(x_A + x_B)r \pmod{q}$ then the protocol yields an invalid signature with probability at least $1 - p_j^2/q \approx 1$.*

Proof. Let $\varepsilon = -[x_B - a]_{p_j} \cdot N/p_j \pmod{q}$ and $\hat{\varepsilon} = -[k_B - b]_{p_j} \cdot N/p_j \pmod{q}$. Write s' for the signature string reconstructed by the parties, and note that

$$\begin{aligned} s' &= (\delta_A + \delta_B + \varepsilon) \cdot (\hat{s}_A + \hat{s}_B + \hat{\varepsilon})^{-1} \\ &= (\gamma \cdot (m + rx) + \varepsilon) \cdot (k\gamma + \hat{\varepsilon})^{-1} \\ &= (s + \varepsilon \cdot (k\gamma)^{-1}) \cdot (1 + \hat{\varepsilon} \cdot (k\gamma)^{-1})^{-1} \pmod{q}, \end{aligned}$$

where $x = x_A + x_B$, $\gamma = \gamma_B$ and $k = k_A + k_B \pmod{q}$. So, assuming $m = \text{HASH}(\text{msg}) \neq -xr \pmod{q}$, note that the signature verifies if $s' = s \pmod{q}$ which, letting $\rho = (k\gamma)^{-1}$, is equivalent to $s \cdot (1 + \hat{\varepsilon}\rho) = (s + \varepsilon \cdot \rho) \pmod{q}$ and thus $s = \varepsilon \cdot (\hat{\varepsilon})^{-1} \pmod{q}$ (assuming $\rho, \hat{\varepsilon} \neq 0$). For random $k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, $\varepsilon \cdot (\hat{\varepsilon})^{-1}$ has at most p_j^2 possible values whereas s has q . Thus, with probability at least $1 - p_j^2/q$, it holds that $s \neq s'$ and the signature invalid. \square

On the number of required signatures for extracting the key. We conclude this section by estimating the number of signature sessions required in order to extract the key. Recall that Attack 4.11 yields a valid signature (and thus useful leakage) only when $(a, b) = (x_B, k_B) \pmod{q}$, i.e. the attacker correctly guesses the remainders of both x_B and k_B modulo p_j . The claim below relates the key-extraction probability to the the number of signatures, with respect to parameter $\tau \in [0, 1]$ (which captures the probability that a single remainder was extracted successfully).

Claim 4.14. *For fixed $\tau \in [0, 1]$ and $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, Attack 4.11 successfully extracts the key with probability at least τ^ℓ after $\sum_{i=1}^n f_\tau(p_i)$ signatures, where $f_\tau(p) = \lceil \log(\tau) / \log(1 - 1/p^2) \rceil$.*

Proof. We know that the attack yields a valid signature for a given p_j with probability $(1 - 1/p_j^2)$. Thus, after $f_\tau(p_j)$ tries, our attack yields leakage $[x_B]_{p_j}$ with probability $(1 - 1/p_j^2)^{f_\tau(p_j)} \geq \tau$ (by the definition of f_τ), and the claim follows immediately. \square

In conclusion, when combining with brute-force techniques, Attack 4.11 extracts the key with probability 0.44 after 1.4×10^6 signatures (choosing $\{p_1, \dots, p_n\} = \{3, 5, 7, \dots, 173\}$, i.e. the first 39 odd primes). If the Paillier moduli are checked for very small factors (as many implementations do), then the malicious modulus can be suitably chosen to avoid detection (though it makes the attack more expensive in terms of signatures required to extract the key). For instance, choosing $\{p_1, \dots, p_n\} = \{6481, 6491, \dots, 6653\}$, Attack 4.11 extracts the key with probability 0.15 after 1.8×10^9 signatures.

5 Out Attack on BitGo TSS

In this section, we present the Zero Proof attack on BitGo TSS. Since the protocol is quite similar to Protocol 4.2 (in fact it is a bare-bones version), we only explain how it differs from Protocol 4.2.




Figure 2: Illustration of the BitGo TSS protocol dependencies. Zero Proof targets the VeVole subprotocol, and the beta parameter is chosen from the maximum range ($\lambda = 2^{2048}$).

BitGo TSS. In a nutshell, BitGo TSS protocol is the same as Protocol 4.2 except that there is no range proof subprotocol (RngProof) or well-formedness check (PaillierWF*) when invoking the Verifiable VOLE protocol. Instead, each party simply sends the relevant values over the communication channel, namely the Paillier public key N_A and ciphertext \mathcal{C}_A , which are used to carry out the protocol to its conclusion.

5.1 Zero Proof Attack

Attack 5.1 (Zero Proof: Adv corrupting A in BitGo TSS).

Operations:

1. Sample q_1, \dots, q_{16} strong primes of size 2^{17} , i.e. such that q_j and $p_j = (q_j - 1)/2$ are both primes, for all $j \in \{1, \dots, 16\}$. Sample arbitrary prime b s.t. $b \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{16} q_j p_j \approx 2^{2048}$.

$$\text{Set } N_A = b \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{16} q_j p_j.$$

2. When signing, do: (only one signature ceremony)
 - (a) Set $\mathcal{C}_A = 4$. After obtaining \mathcal{D}_A , do:
 - (b) For $j \in \{1, \dots, 16\}$, brute force $y_j \in \{1, \dots, p_j\}$ such that

$$4^{y_j} = \mathcal{D}_A^{2 \cdot [2^{-1}]_{p_j}} \mod q_j.$$

- (c) When obtaining $y_j = x_B \mod p_j$ for all j , reconstruct x_B using CRT (Theorem 2.3).

Claim 5.2. It holds that $y_j = x_B \mod p_j$ for every $j \in \{1, \dots, 16\}$.

Proof. For some $\mu, \nu \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ chosen by B, note that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{D}_A &= 4^{x_B} \cdot (1 + \mu \cdot N) \cdot \nu^{N_A} \mod N_A^2 = 4^{x_B} \cdot \nu^{N_A} \mod N_A \\ &= 4^{x_B} \cdot (\nu^{p_j})^{q_j \prod_{\ell \neq j} p_\ell q_\ell} \mod q_j = \begin{cases} 4^{x_B} & \text{if } \nu \text{ is a square mod } q_j \\ -4^{x_B} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality holds by Lagrange's theorem (because $\mathbb{Z}_{q_j}^*$ has order $2p_j$). In conclusion,

since 4 has order p_j in \mathbb{Z}_{q_j} , we deduce that $\mathcal{D}_A^{2 \cdot [2^{-1}]_{p_j}} = 4^{2 \cdot [2^{-1}]_{p_j} \cdot x_B} = 4^{x_B} \pmod{q_j}$ and $y_j = x_B \pmod{p_j}$, as desired. \square

Multi-Party Case. Similarly to Attack 4.8, Attack 5.1 retrieves the key in a single signature regardless of the number of parties, because all the honest party fall into the same trap and calculate the \mathcal{D} -value in the same way.

Stealthiness. “Stealthifying” Attack 5.1 is somewhat tricky because the Paillier key is so distorted that it is not obvious how use it in order to “decrypt” \mathcal{D}_A (since \mathcal{D}_A is not even a ciphertext for the chosen Paillier key). However, with the knowledge of x_B , the attacker can compute $\mathcal{D}_A \cdot 4^{-x_B} = \text{Enc}_{N_A}(\nu_B) \pmod{N_A^2}$ and subsequently infer ν_B . By following a similar process for $\hat{\mathcal{D}}_A$, the attacker can extract k_B and deduce $\hat{\nu}_B$, and, in conclusion, the attacker sets $\gamma_A = 0$ and

$$\begin{cases} \hat{s}_A = \nu_B + \beta_A & \pmod{q} \\ \delta_A = \hat{\nu}_B + \hat{\beta}_A & \pmod{q} \end{cases}$$

which yields an error-free signature process.

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