Dynamic Detection of Vulnerability Exploitation in Windows

Dynamisk detektion af udnyttelse af sårbarheder i Windows

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Todo list

Add proper description of what ETW is	3													
Mention that we do not look at this from a developers perspective, but														
from analyzing already made applications/drivers	3													
figure out if the components should just be subsections	3													
add ref to figure	4													
Figure out if this should be here	5													
write a little about how bindiffing works. Or don't idc	5													
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Abstract

Write something very clever here and read it through 10000 times

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Introduction

Introduce something here

1.1 Purpose

Purpose

1.2 Thesis overview

Thesis overview

1.3 Related work

Purpose

Tracing and logging

2.1 Windows telemetry

2.2 Event tracing for Windows

In the architecture of Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) events are at the centerpiece where they are created, managed and consumed by different event components[3]. These differentiate between event *providers*, event *consumers*, and event *controllers*. All of these event components handle the workflow of ETW, either by reading or writing, or by controlling the events in some way.

2.2.1 Event components

Controllers

Providers

Providers are the system- and userland applications that provide events and data. They do so by registering themselves as a provider, allowing a controller to enable or disable events. By having the controller control whether events are enabled or not, allows an application to have tracing without generating alerts all the time. This is especially interesting for debugging purposes, which is usually not needed during regular usage.

Microsoft define four different types of providers depending on the version of Windows and type of application you are interested in.

Managed Object Format (MOF) (classic) providers

Windows softwarre trace preprocessor (WPP) providers

Manifest-based providers

TraceLogging providers

Consumers

Consumers are applications that consume events from providers. This is done through event *trace sessions*, where one session is created per provider. Consumers have the ability to both receive events in real time from *trace sessions*, or later on by events stored in log files. Furthermore, events can be filtered by many attributes such as timestamps.

Add proper description of what ETW is.

Mention that we do not look at this from a developers perspective, but from analyzing already made applications/drivers

figure out if the components should just be subsections

2.2. EVENT TRACING FOR WINDOWS

Figure shows how the different components of ETW works together to produce and consume events $\,$

add ref to figure

2.2.2 Finding providers

2.2.3 Consuming events

Vulnerability analysis

3.1 CVE-2021-24086

According to Microsoft[4] CVE-2021-24086 is a denial of service vulnerability with a CVSS:3.0 score of 7.5 / 6.5, that is a base score metrics of 7.5 and a temporal score metrics of 6.5. The vulnerability affects all supported versions of Windows and Windows Server. According to an accompanied blog post published by Microsoft [6] at the same time as the patch was released, details that the vulnerable component is the Windows TCP/IP implementation, and that the vulnerability revolves around IPv6 fragmentation. The Security Update guide and the blog post also present a workaround that can be used to temporarily mitigate the vulnerability by disabling IPv6 fragmentation.

Figure out if this should be here

3.1.1 Public information

Due to the Microsoft Active Protetions Program (MAPP)[5] security software providers are given early access to vulnerability information. This information often include Proof of Concept (PoC)s for vulnerabilities to be patched, in order to aid security software providers to create valid detections for exploitation of soon-to-be patched vulnerabilities. Due to MAPP, some security software providers publish relevant information regarding recently patched vulnerabilities. However, the information is usually very vague in details, and can therefore only aid in the initial exploration of the vulnerability. For CVE-2021-24086, both McAfee[9] and Palo Alto[8] posted public information about CVE-2021-24086. However, both articles contained very limited details, and is therefore far from sufficient to reproduce the vulnerability. Before trying to rediscover the vulnerability, the following information is available:

- The vulnerability lies within the handling om fragmented packets in IPv6
- The relevant code lies within the tcpip.sys drivers
- The root cause of the vulnerability is a NULL pointer dereference in Ip v6ReassembleDatagram of tcpip.sys
- The reassembled packet should contain around 0xFFFF (65535) bytes of extension headers, which is usually not possible

3.1.2 Binary diffing

The usage of binary diffing to gather information about patched vulnerabilities is well described in current research[7][10], and has been made popular and easy to do by tools such as Bindiff[11] and Diaphora[2].

write a little about how bindiffing works. Or don't idc. If we look at figure 3.1 we can compare the function changes of the patched and not-patched tcpip.sys. Looking at Ipv6pReassembleDatagram we can see that the similarity factor is only 0.38 telling us that a significant amount of code has been changed. Diving into the binary diff of Ipv6pReassembleData gram as seen on listing 1, we can clearly see a change. The first many changes from line 5-39 are simply register changes and other insignificant changes due to how the compiler works. However, on line 41-42 a new comparison is made to ensure that the value of the register edx is less than 0xFFFF. This matches the statement given in subsection 3.1.1 (Public information), that the vulnerability is triggered by a package of around 0xFFFF bytes.

Similarity	Confid	Change	EA Primary	Name Primary	EA Secondary	Name Secondary
0.16	0.27	GIE	00000001C018D794	sub_00000001C018D794	00000001C015A1D6	sub_00000001C015A1D6
0.27	0.42	GIEL-	00000001C01905B5	sub_00000001C01905B5	00000001C01568FC	IppCleanupPathPrimitive
0.31	0.73	GIE	00000001C0190F38	lpv4pReassembleDatagram	00000001C0190F68	Ipv4pReassembleDatagram
0.38	0.98	GIE	00000001C0199FAC	lpv6pReassembleDatagram	00000001C019A0AC	Ipv6pReassembleDatagram
0.42	0.62	-IE	00000001C0154959	sub_00000001C0154959	00000001C0001E42	sub_00000001C0001E42
0.54	0.96	GI	00000001C019A658	Ipv6pReceiveFragment	00000001C019A7F8	Ipv6pReceiveFragment

Figure 3.1: Primary matched functions of tcpip.sys

3.1.3 Root-cause analysis

3.1.4 IPv6 extension headers




Figure 3.2: IPv6 fragmentation[1]

3.1.5 Triggering the vulnerability

```
--- "a/.\\unpatched tcpip.sys"
   +++ "b/.\\patched tcpip.sys"
   @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
            rsp, 58h
                            ; Integer Subtraction
                             ; Integer Subtraction
   +sub
            rsp, 60h
    movzx
            r9d, word ptr [rdx+88h]; Move with Zero-Extend
            rdi, rdx
    mov
            edx, [rdx+8Ch]
    mov
            bl, r8b
   -mov
            r13b, r8b
   +mov
10
   add
            edx, r9d
                             ; Add
   -mov
            byte ptr [rsp+98h+var_70], 0
12
             [rsp+98h+var_78], 0; Logical AND
   -and
13
            [rsp+98h+length], edx
    mov
14
            eax, [rdx+28h] ; Load Effective Address
    lea
15
            rdx, rdi
   -mov
16
    mov
             [rsp+98h+var_68], eax
17
            eax, [r9+28h] ; Load Effective Address
    lea
18
             [rsp+98h+BytesNeeded], eax
19
            r9d, r9d
                       ; Logical Exclusive OR
   -xor
20
            rax, [rcx+0D0h]
    mov
21
   -lea
            rcx, IppReassemblyNetBufferListsComplete ; Load

→ Effective Address

            r13, [rax+8]
23
   -mov
            rax, [r13+0]
   -mov
24
            r12, [rax+8]
25
   +mov
            rax, [r12]
   +mov
26
            r15, [rax+28h]
    mov
            eax, gs:1A4h
    mov
28
            r8d, eax
    mov
            rax, [r13+388h]
   -mov
30
            rax, [r12+388h]
31
   +mov
    lea
            rbp, [r8+r8*2] ; Load Effective Address
32
   -mov
            r12, [rax+r8*8]
33
            r8d, r8d
   -xor
                            ; Logical Exclusive OR
34
   +mov
            rcx, [rax+r8*8]
35
                            ; Shift Logical Left
            rbp, 6
36
   {	t shl}
  -add
            rbp, [r15+4728h]; Add
37
            rbp, [r15+4728h]; Add
   +add
   +mov
            [rsp+98h+var_58], rcx
39
            edx, OFFFFh ; Compare Two Operands
  +cmp
             short loc_1C019A186; Jump if Below or Equal (CF=1 |
  +jbe
    \hookrightarrow ZF=1)
```

Listing 1: Difference between unpatched and patched ${\tt Ipv6pReassembleData}_{\rfloor}$ gram

Detection

- 4.1 Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)
- 4.2 Hooking and DTrace
- 4.3 Implementation

Scaling and extensibility

Conclusion

Conclude something please

Abbreviations

 $\mathbf{ETW}\;$ Event Tracing for Windows. 3, 4, 9

 ${\bf MAPP}\,$ Microsoft Active Protetions Program. 5

MOF Managed Object Format. 3

PoC Proof of Concept. 5

WPP Windows softwarre trace preprocessor. 3

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List of code snippets

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Appendices

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