0.1 CVE-2021-24086

According to Microsoft[3] CVE-2021-24086 is a denial of service vulnerability with a CVSS:3.0 score of 7.5 / 6.5, that is a base score metrics of 7.5 and a temporal score metrics of 6.5. The vulnerability affects all supported versions of Windows and Windows Server. According to an accompanied blog post published by Microsoft [5] at the same time as the patch was released, details that the vulnerable component is the Windows TCP/IP implementation, and that the vulnerability revolves around IPv6 fragmentation. The Security Update guide and the blog post also present a workaround that can be used to temporarily mitigate the vulnerability by disabling IPv6 fragmentation.

Figure out if this should be here

0.1.1 Public information

Due to the Microsoft Active Protetions Program (MAPP)[4] security software providers are given early access to vulnerability information. This information often include Proof of Concept (PoC)s for vulnerabilities to be patched, in order to aid security software providers to create valid detections for exploitation of soon-to-be patched vulnerabilities. Due to MAPP, some security software providers publish relevant information regarding recently patched vulnerabilities. However, the information is usually very vague in details, and can therefore only aid in the initial exploration of the vulnerability. For CVE-2021-24086, both McAfee[8] and Palo Alto[7] posted public information about CVE-2021-24086. However, both articles contained very limited details, and is therefore far from sufficient to reproduce the vulnerability. Before trying to rediscover the vulnerability, the following information is available:

- The vulnerability lies within the handling om fragmented packets in IPv6
- The relevant code lies within the `tcpip.sys` drivers
- The root cause of the vulnerability is a NULL pointer dereference in `Ip｣v6ReassembleDatagram` of `tcpip.sys`
- The reassembled packet should contain around 0xFFFF (65535) bytes of extension headers, which is usually not possible

0.1.2 Binary diffing

The usage of binary diffing to gather information about patched vulnerabilities is well described in current research[6][9], and has been made popular and easy to do by tools such as Bindiff[10] and Diaphora[2].

write a little about how bindiffing works. Or don't idc.

If we look at figure 1 we can compare the function changes of the patched and not-patched `tcpip.sys`. Looking at `Ipv6pReassembleDatagram` we can see that the similarity factor is only 0.38 telling us that a significant amount of code has been changed.

Similarity	Confid	Change	EA Primary	Name Primary	EA Secondary	Name Secondary
0.16	0.27	GI--E--	00000001C018D794	sub_00000001C018D794	00000001C015A1D6	sub_00000001C015A1D6
0.27	0.42	GI--EL-	00000001C01905B5	sub_00000001C01905B5	00000001C01568FC	IppCleanupPathPrimitive
0.31	0.73	GI--E--	00000001C0190F38	Ipv4pReassembleDatagram	00000001C0190F68	Ipv4pReassembleDatagram
0.38	0.98	GI--E--	00000001C0199FAC	Ipv6pReassembleDatagram	00000001C019A0AC	Ipv6pReassembleDatagram
0.42	0.62	-I--E--	00000001C0154959	sub_00000001C0154959	00000001C0001E42	sub_00000001C0001E42
0.54	0.96	GI-----	00000001C019A658	Ipv6pReceiveFragment	00000001C019A7F8	Ipv6pReceiveFragment

Figure 1: Primary matched functions of `tcpip.sys`

Diving into the binary diff of `Ipv6pReassembleDatagram` as seen on listing 1, we can clearly see a change. The first many changes from line *5-39* are simply register changes and other insignificant changes due to how the compiler works. However, on line *41-42* a new comparison is made to ensure that the value of the register `edx` is less than 0xFFFF. This matches the statement given in subsection 0.1.1 (Public information), that the vulnerability is triggered by a package of around 0xFFFF bytes.

```
--- "a/.\\unpatched tcpip.sys"
+++ "b/.\\patched tcpip.sys"
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-sub     rsp, 58h        ; Integer Subtraction
+sub     rsp, 60h        ; Integer Subtraction
 movzx   r9d, word ptr [rdx+88h] ; Move with Zero-Extend
 mov     rdi, rdx
 mov     edx, [rdx+8Ch]
-mov     bl, r8b
+mov     r13b, r8b
 add     edx, r9d        ; Add
-mov     byte ptr [rsp+98h+var_70], 0
-and     [rsp+98h+var_78], 0 ; Logical AND
 mov     [rsp+98h+length], edx
 lea     eax, [rdx+28h]  ; Load Effective Address
-mov     rdx, rdi
 mov     [rsp+98h+var_68], eax
 lea     eax, [r9+28h]   ; Load Effective Address
 mov     [rsp+98h+BytesNeeded], eax
-xor     r9d, r9d        ; Logical Exclusive OR
 mov     rax, [rcx+0D0h]
-lea     rcx, IppReassemblyNetBufferListsComplete ; Load
 ↪  Effective Address
-mov     r13, [rax+8]
-mov     rax, [r13+0]
+mov     r12, [rax+8]
+mov     rax, [r12]
 mov     r15, [rax+28h]
 mov     eax, gs:1A4h
 mov     r8d, eax
-mov     rax, [r13+388h]
+mov     rax, [r12+388h]
 lea     rbp, [r8+r8*2]  ; Load Effective Address
-mov     r12, [rax+r8*8]
-xor     r8d, r8d        ; Logical Exclusive OR
+mov     rcx, [rax+r8*8]
 shl     rbp, 6          ; Shift Logical Left
-add     rbp, [r15+4728h] ; Add
+add     rbp, [r15+4728h] ; Add
+mov     [rsp+98h+var_58], rcx
+cmp     edx, 0FFFFh     ; Compare Two Operands
+jbe     short loc_1C019A186 ; Jump if Below or Equal (CF=1 |
 ↪  ZF=1)
```

Listing 1: Diff of patched and vulnerable `Ipv6pReassembleDatagram`

Looking at the raw assembly without any knowledge of what the registers contain or what parameters are passed to the function can be very confusing. To make it easier for the reader to follow, listing 2 contains the annotated decompiled code of vulnerable and patched `Ipv6pReassembleDatagram` function. Here the patch is easy to spot, as the call to `NetioAllocateAndReferenceNetBufferAndNetBufferList` is replaced with the check that we also observed in listing 1. Line *4-6* also shows how the packet size is calculated using the fragmentable and unfragmentable parts of the reassembled packet.

```
1  --- "a/.\\unpatched tcpip.sys"
2  +++ "b/.\\patched tcpip.sys"
3   void __fastcall Ipv6pReassembleDatagram(__int64 a1,
    ↪  struct_datagram *datagram, char a3) {
4   unfragmentableHeaderLength =
    ↪  datagram->unfragmentableHeaderLength;
5   packetSize = unfragmentableHeaderLength +
    ↪  datagram->fragmentableLength;
6   BytesNeeded = unfragmentableHeaderLength + 40;
7   v6 = *(_QWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 208) + 8i64);
8   v7 = *(_QWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)v6 + 40i64);
9   LockArray_high = HIDWORD(KeGetPcr()[1].LockArray);
10 -v11 = NetioAllocateAndReferenceNetBufferAndNetBufferList(IppRea
   ↪  ssemblyNetBufferListsComplete, datagram, 0i64, 0i64, 0,
   ↪  0);
11 +if ( packetSize > 0xFFFF )
```

Listing 2: Diff of patched and vulnerable `Ipv6pReassembleDatagram`

0.1.3 IPv6 fragmentation primer

0.1.4 Root-cause analysis



Figure 2: IPv6 fragmentation[1]

0.1.5 Triggering the vulnerability