This is a high-level algorithm in which a set of processes cooperatively choose a value.

EXTENDS Integers

CONSTANT Value,

The set of choosable values.

Acceptor, Quorum A set of processes that will choose a value.

The set of "quorums", where a quorum" is a

"large enough" set of acceptors

Here are the assumptions we make about quorums.

ASSUME QuorumAssumption $\triangleq \land \forall Q \in Quorum : Q \subseteq Acceptor$

 $\land \forall \ Q1, \ Q2 \in \ \textit{Quorum} : \ Q1 \cap \ Q2 \neq \{\}$

THEOREM $QuorumNonEmpty \triangleq \forall Q \in Quorum : Q \neq \{\}$

Ballot is a set of "ballot numbers". For simplicity, we let it be the set of natural numbers. However, we write Ballot for that set to distinguish ballots from natural numbers used for other purposes. $Ballot \stackrel{\triangle}{=} Nat$

In the algorithm, each acceptor can cast one or more votes, where each vote cast by an acceptor has the form $\langle b, v \rangle$ indicating that the acceptor has voted for value v in ballot b. A value is chosen if a quorum of acceptors have voted for it in the same ballot.

The algorithm's variables.

Variable votes,

maxBal

votes[a] is the set of votes cast by acceptor a

maxBal[a] is a ballot number. Acceptor a will cast further votes only in ballots numbered $\geq maxBal[a]$

The type-correctness invariant.

 $\begin{array}{ccc} TypeOK & \triangleq & \land votes \in [Acceptor \rightarrow \texttt{SUBSET} \ (Ballot \times Value)] \\ & \land maxBal \in [Acceptor \rightarrow Ballot \cup \{-1\}] \end{array}$

为什么直接说vote,不说phase 1户 因为未形成决议的phase1,需要保证

We now make a series of definitions an assert some simple theorems about those definitions that lead to the algorithm.

 $VotedFor(a, b, v) \triangleq \langle b, v \rangle \in votes[a]$

vote是带了b和v的,已经有v。不是phase 1

True iff acceptor a has voted for v in ballot b.

 $ChosenAt(b, v) \triangleq \exists Q \in Quorum :$

対 $a \in Q: VotedFor(a,\ b,\ v)$ 判断出现了chosen,即形成决议

True iff a quorum of acceptors have all voted for v in ballot b.

 $chosen \triangleq \{v \in Value : \exists b \in Ballot : ChosenAt(b, v)\}$ —系列已经chosen的value The set of values that have been chosen.

 $DidNotVoteAt(a, b) \triangleq \forall v \in Value : \neg VotedFor(a, b, v)$

Server a,没有为ballot b透过票。也就是被更大的ballot跳过了

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that a has not and will never cast a vote in ballot b.
                                                                     如果都vote了(b,v),那么就不能换v了。还有可能,就是部分server的maxBal > b,也不可
                                NoneOtherChoosableAt(b, v) \triangleq
 Π果别人要求用ballot c,
                                   \exists Q \in Quorum :
          那么必须有个quorum
                                                                     所以肯定不会接受(b,w), w/=v。 注意,这是针对ballot b来说的。换更大的,不一定如此
        但是已经存在quorum Q1,
                                    \forall a \in Q : VotedFor(a, b, v) \lor CannotVoteAt(a, b)
选择了(b,v),或者maxb>c
则不可能存在Q2,凑不够,因为
                                 If this is true, then ChosenAt(b, w) is not and can never become true for any w \neq v.
                                Q1和Q2必然相交。
                                 If this is true, then no value other than v has been or can ever be chosen in any ballot numbered
                                 less than b.
                                THEOREM AllSafeAtZero \triangleq \forall v \in Value : SafeAt(0, v)
                                THEOREM ChoosableThm \triangleq
                                             \forall b \in Ballot, v \in Value:
                                                                                                       这是最关键的保证:一旦形成决议,b不可能再选择别
                                               ChosenAt(b, v) \Rightarrow NoneOtherChoosableAt(b, v)
                                VotesSafe \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \forall a \in Acceptor, b \in Ballot, v \in Value :
                                                  VotedFor(a, b, v) \Rightarrow SafeAt(b, v) 注意SafeAt的参数b
                                                対于任意指定server a , 如果两次为同一个b vote , VotedFor(a,\,b,\,v) \wedge VotedFor(a,\,b,\,w) \Rightarrow (v=w)^{那 \Delta \text{value} - 定是一个}
                                OneVote \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \forall a \in Acceptor, b \in Ballot, v, w \in Value :
                                One Value Per Ballot \triangleq
                                                                                               与上一行不同,这里考虑的是同一b,不同a之间的关系。如果vote了,那么必须是相同值。
                                   \forall a1, a2 \in Acceptor, b \in Ballot, v1, v2 \in Value:
                                      VotedFor(a1, b, v1) \land VotedFor(a2, b, v2) \Rightarrow (v1 = v2)
                                THEOREM OneValuePerBallot \Rightarrow OneVote
                               THEOREM VotesSafeImpliesConsistency \stackrel{\Delta}{=}
                                              \land TypeOK
                                              \land VotesSafe
                                              \land OneVote
                                              \Rightarrow \lor chosen = \{\}
                                                                                                                 个元素。只有ballot number,没有
                                                  \vee \exists v \in Value : chosen = \{v\}
                                                                                     instance number
从quorum Q看来,(b,v)是安全的
                                ShowsSafeAt(Q, b, v) \triangleq
                                                                            注意,这个是用来蕴含其他的,而不是被蕴含
                                  \land \forall a \in Q : maxBal[a] \geq b 都大于b了
                                  \wedge \exists c \in -1 \ldots (b-1) : 存在一个c < b , a在ballot=c时 , 选了v , 其次后再也没有投票过。
                                      \wedge \ (c 
eq -1) \Rightarrow \exists \ a \in \ Q : VotedFor(a, \ c, \ v) \ \ 对于非-1的c , 一定有a , 选择了v
                                      \land \  \, \forall \ d \in (c+1) \ldots (b-1), \ a \in \ Q: DidNotVoteAt(a,\ d) 大于c的,任意d,以及任意a属于Q,都没有为d投票
                               THEOREM ShowsSafety \stackrel{\triangle}{=}
                                              TypeOK \land VotesSafe \land OneValuePerBallot \Rightarrow
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 $CannotVoteAt(a, b) \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \land maxBal[a] > b$

 $\wedge DidNotVoteAt(a, b)$

Because acceptor a will not cast any more votes in a ballot numbered $\langle maxBal[a],$ this implies

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 \forall \ Q \in \textit{Quorum}, \ b \in \textit{Ballot}, \ v \in \textit{Value}: \\ ShowsSafeAt(Q, \ b, \ v) \Rightarrow SafeAt(b, \ v)  任意一个Q,如果从它的角度,b,v安全,则整个(不仅仅是Q),对于b,v都是安全的。
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We now write the specification. The initial condition is straightforward

$$Init \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \land votes = [a \in Acceptor \mapsto \{\}] \\ \land maxBal = [a \in Acceptor \mapsto -1]$$

Next are the actions that make up the next-state action.

An acceptor a is allowed to increase maxBal[a] to a ballot number b at any time.

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IncreaseMaxBal(a, b) \triangleq \\  \land b > maxBal[a] \\  \land maxBal' = [maxBal \ \text{EXCEPT } ![a] = b] \\  \land \text{UNCHANGED } votes
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Next is the action in which acceptor a votes for v in ballot b. The first four conjuncts re enabling conditions. The first maintains the requirement that the acceptor cannot cast a vote in a ballot less than maxBal[a]. The next two conjuncts maintain the invariance of OneValuePerBallot. The fourth conjunct maintains the invariance of VotesSafe.

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\begin{aligned} VoteFor(a, b, v) &\triangleq\\ &\wedge & maxBal[a] \leq b\\ &\wedge &\forall vt \in votes[a] : vt[1] \neq b\\ &\wedge &\forall c \in Acceptor \setminus \{a\} :\\ &\forall vt \in votes[c] : (vt[1] = b) \Rightarrow (vt[2] = v)\\ &\wedge &\exists \ Q \in Quorum : ShowsSafeAt(Q, b, v)\\ &\wedge &votes' = [votes \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![a] = @ \cup \{\langle b, v \rangle\}]\\ &\wedge &maxBal' = [maxBal \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![a] = b] \end{aligned}
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The next-state action and the invariant.

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Next \triangleq \exists \ a \in Acceptor, \ b \in Ballot: 为什么只有acceptor? 没有纳入Proposal的过程? 但是paxos有?  \lor IncreaseMaxBal(a,\ b) \\ \lor \exists \ v \in Value: VoteFor(a,\ b,\ v)  Spec \triangleq Init \land \Box[Next]_{\langle votes,\ maxBal \rangle}
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 $Inv \stackrel{\Delta}{=} TypeOK \wedge VotesSafe \wedge OneValuePerBallot$

THEOREM Invariance $\stackrel{\triangle}{=} Spec \Rightarrow \Box Inv$

The following statement instantiates module Consensus with the constant Value of this module substituted for the constant Value of module Consensus, and the state function chosen defined in this module substituted for the variable chosen of module Value. More precisely, for each defined identifier id of module Value, this statement defines C!id to equal the value of id under these substitutions.

 $C \triangleq \text{Instance } Consensus$

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THEOREM Spec \Rightarrow C!Spec \langle 1 \rangle 1. \ Inv \wedge Init \Rightarrow C!Init \langle 1 \rangle 2. \ Inv \wedge [Next]_{\langle votes, \, maxBal \rangle} \Rightarrow [C!Next]_{chosen} \langle 1 \rangle 3. \ \text{QED} \langle 2 \rangle 1. \Box Inv \wedge \Box [Next]_{\langle votes, \, maxBal \rangle} \Rightarrow \Box [C!Next]_{chosen} BY \langle 1 \rangle 2 and temporal reasoning \langle 2 \rangle 2. \Box Inv \wedge Spec \Rightarrow C!Spec BY \langle 2 \rangle 1, \ \langle 1 \rangle 1 \langle 2 \rangle 3. \ \text{QED} BY \langle 2 \rangle 2, \ Invariance
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