

*Topic 9:*  
**Hash function & MAC**


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**PhD. Trương Toàn Thịnh**



KHOA CÔNG NGHỆ THÔNG TIN  
TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC KHOA HỌC TỰ NHIÊN

- ☐ Introduction
- ☐ Properties of hash function
- ☐ Classification of cryptographic hash function
- ☐ Some popular hash function architectures
- ☐ MD5 hash function
- ☐ SHA hash functions
- ☐ MAC and HMAC


# Introduction



- Integrity: the attacker cannot intervene to edit the message content
- **Encryption** is only intended to ensure confidentiality, not to help ensure information integrity
- An attacker can modify the encrypted message without knowing the actual content of the message
- Example:
  - In an online auction, it is possible to change a competitor's bid without knowing the actual content of the bid

# Main ideas of hash function

- $H$  is a lossy compression function
- Collision:  $H(x) = H(x')$  for  $x \neq x'$
- $H$  can apply on data of almost any size
  - Result of  $H$  is a  $n$ -bit string (fixed  $n$ ) “looks random”
  - Easy to compute  $H(x)$  for any  $x$
  - $H$  is one-way function and secure against to “collision”



- The function  $H$  is difficult to reverse transform
  - Given random bit string  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , hard to find bit string  $x$  such that  $H(x) = y$
- Example: brute-force for each value  $x$ , check if  $H(x) = y$  for SHA-1 producing a 160-bit string
  - Assume the hardware allows it to be done  $2^{34}$  computations/s
  - Can perform  $2^{59}$  computations/year
  - Need  $2^{101}$  ( $\sim 10^{30}$ ) years to reverse transform SHA-1 with given random value  $y$

# Safety against collisions

Hard to find  $x$  and  $x'$  such that  $H(x) \equiv H(x')$

Search collision by Brute-force just  $O(2^{n/2})$ , not  $O(2^n)$

Birthday paradox

We have  $t$  values of  $x_i$  and corresponding values  $y_i \equiv h(x_i)$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq t$

For  $x_i, x_j$ , probability of collision is  $1/2^n$

Total number of pairs  $\in {}_t^2 = (t \times (t-1) / 2) \sim O(t^2)$

If  $t \approx 2^{n/2} \Rightarrow$  there are  $\approx 2^{n/2}$  cap  $(x_i, x_j)$


For each pair, the probability of a collision is  $1/2^n$ , then probability of finding a pair of values that collide  $\approx 1$



# Birthday Paradox

- Let  $p(n)$  be the probability of finding 2 people with the same birthday in a group of  $n$  people?
- Let  $\bar{p}(n)$  be the probability that any 2 people in a group of  $n$  people have different birthdays:  $p(n) + \bar{p}(n) = 1$
- For  $n \leq 365$  people, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \square \bar{p}(n) &= 1 \left(1 - \frac{1}{365}\right) \left(1 - \frac{2}{365}\right) \dots \left(1 - \frac{n-1}{365}\right) = \frac{365!}{365^n(365-n)!} \\ \square p(n) &= 1 - \frac{365!}{365^n(365-n)!} \\ \square p(n) &= 1 - \frac{365!}{365^n(365-n)!} \end{aligned}$$






- **Weak Collision Resistance**
- **Given** a randomly chosen bit string  $x$ , **hard to find**  $x'$  such that  $H(x) = H(x')$
- The attacker must find a value that collides with a given  $x$  value. This is **harder to find a pair of  $x$  and  $x'$  colliding each other.**
- Brute-force attack:  $O(2^n)$
- **Comment:** safety against “weak” collisions does not guarantee safety against collisions

# Properties of the hash function


- Safe against “preimage” attacks
  - Preimage resistance or one-wayness
  - Given  $y$ , hard to find  $x$  such that  $H(x) = y$
- Safety against collisions
  - Collision resistance
  - Hard to find 2 distinct values  $x$  and  $x'$  such that  $H(x') = H(x)$
- Safe against “second preimage” attack
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> preimage resistance or weak collision resistance
  - Given  $x$  and  $y = H(x)$ , hard to find  $x' \neq x$  such that  $H(x') = y$

# Classification of cryptographic hash function




# Merkle-Damgård architecture

- Authors: Ralph Merkle, Ivan Damgård
- Most hash functions use this structure
- Example: SHA-1, MD5




# Matyas-Meyer-Oseas architecture



- Architecture “dual” with architecture **Davies-Mayer**
- At the 1<sup>st</sup> block ( $i = 1$ ), need using initial value  $H_0$
- If function  $E$  uses key and block with different sizes, function  $g$  need converting  $H_{i-1}$  to key suitable for function  $E$

$$H_i = E_{g(H_{i-1})}(m_i) \oplus m_i$$


# Davies-Meyer architecture



- Architecture “dual” with architecture **Matyas-Meyer-Oseas**
- At the 1<sup>st</sup> block ( $i = 1$ ), need using initial value  $H_0$
- If function  $E$  is not safe, then applying method of fixed-point attack to attack corresponding hash function

$$H_i = E_{m_i}(H_{i-1}) \oplus H_{i-1}$$

# Miyaguchi-Preneel architecture




- Expansion of architecture **Matyas-Meyer-Oseas**
- At the 1<sup>st</sup> block ( $i = 1$ ), need using initial value  $H_0$
- If function  $E$  uses key and block with different sizes, then function  $g$  need converting  $H_{i-1}$  to key suitable for function  $E$

$$H_i = E_{g(H_{i-1})}(m_i) \oplus H_{i-1} \oplus m_i$$




# Message-Digest algorithm (MD5)

- Message Digest 4 hash proposed by Rivest in 1990. In 1991, improved version called MD5 was proposed.
- Notes:
  - Little-endian value, for example of a 32-bit integer 0x0A0B0C0D



- Big-endian value, for example of 32-bit integer 0x0A0B0C0D



# Message-Digest algorithm (MD5)

- Steps in algorithm:
  - Declare: `int i, s[64], K[64]` //32-bit variables & mod  $2^{32}$  when computing
  - Define values for left rotation coefficient  $R[i]$  of each cycle:
    - $s[0..15] = \{7, 12, 17, 22, 7, 12, 17, 22, 7, 12, 17, 22, 7, 12, 17, 22\}$
    - $s[16..31] = \{5, 9, 14, 20, 5, 9, 14, 20, 5, 9, 14, 20, 5, 9, 14, 20\}$
    - $s[32..47] = \{4, 11, 16, 23, 4, 11, 16, 23, 4, 11, 16, 23, 4, 11, 16, 23\}$
    - $s[48..63] = \{6, 10, 15, 21, 6, 10, 15, 21, 6, 10, 15, 21, 6, 10, 15, 21\}$
  - Initialize variables:
    - $a_0 = 0x67452301$
    - $b_0 = 0xEFCDAB89$
    - $c_0 = 0x98BADCFE$
    - $d_0 = 0x10325476$

# Message-Digest algorithm (MD5)

## □ Steps in algorithm:

### □ Compute constants $K[i]$ using below loop:


□ **for**  $i$  **from** 0 **to** 63 {  $K[i] = \text{floor}(\text{abs}(\sin(i + 1)) \times 2^{32})^*$

### □ Pre-processing:

□ Add bit 1 at the end of the message

□ Add  $k$  bit 0 such that length of message congruent 448 (mod 512)

□ Add 64 bits to represent the length of original message (little-endian stored value)



- [illegible]

[illegible]

# Message-Digest algorithm (MD5)

## Steps in algorithm:

### Divide message (padded $m$ ) into **512-bit blocks**

#### For each 512-bit block (ex: $q^{\text{th}}$ block)

#### Divide into 16 words (little-endian 32-bit word) $w[0..15]$

#### Create 4 variables $A = a_0, B = b_0, C = c_0, D = d_0$

#### Start 64 cycles processing $A, B, C, D$

#### $a_0 += A, b_0 += B, c_0 += C, d_0 += D$

### Final digest message: $a_0 \mid b_0 \mid c_0 \mid d_0$

### Example of describing **one cycle** from 64 cycles


#### $A, B, C, D$ are 4 words (32 bits) of a state

#### $F$ is non-linear function (changed with $i^{\text{th}}$ cycle)

#### $\lll_s$ is left-rotate $s$ positions taken from $s[64]$

#### $\boxplus$ add modulo $2^{32}$ .

#### $K_i$ is a constant from $K[64]$



Describe **one cycle** in 64 cycles

# Processing cycle of MD5

## □ Pseudo-code of 64 cycles

### □ **for** $i$ **from** 0 **to** 63

□ **int**  $f, g$

□ **if**  $0 \leq i \leq 15$  **then** {  $f = (B \wedge C) \vee ((\neg B) \wedge D)$ ;  $g = i$  }

□ **if**  $16 \leq i \leq 31$  **then** {  $f = (D \wedge B) \vee ((\neg D) \wedge C)$ ;  $g = (5 \times i + 1) \bmod 16$  }

□ **if**  $32 \leq i \leq 47$  **then** {  $f = B \oplus C \oplus D$ ;  $g = (3 \times i + 5) \bmod 16$  }

□ **if**  $48 \leq i \leq 63$  **then** {  $f = C \oplus (B \vee (\neg D))$ ;  $g = (7 \times i) \bmod 16$  }

□  $f = f + A + K[i] + M[g]$

□  $A = D$ ;  $D = C$ ;  $C = B$ ;  $B = B + (f \lll_{s[i]})$  //  $f$  left-rotates  $s[i]$  positions

## □ Test-vector:

□ MD5("") = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e

□ MD5("fit.hcmus") = 22227c3065cbf40733e9a11ffa07124a

# Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1)

- The Secure Hash Standard (SHS or SHA1) method developed by NIST and NSA was published in the Federal Register on January 31, 1992, and then officially became the standard method on May 13, 1993..
- Messages are processed in 512-bit blocks
- Digested message 160-bit length
- Steps in algorithm
  - Initialize variables:
    - $h_0 = 0x67452301$
    - $h_1 = 0xEFCDAB89$
    - $h_2 = 0x98BADCFE$
    - $h_3 = 0x10325476$
    - $h_4 = 0xC3D2E1F0$




# Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1)

## Steps in algorithm

### Pre-processing data:

- Add bit 1 at the end of the message
- Add  $k$  bits '0' such that the length of message  $\cong 448 \pmod{512}$
- Add 64 bits to represents the length of the original message (value stored in big-endian format)



# Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1)

- [illegible]

[illegible]

# Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1)

## Steps in algorithm

- Divide message (padded  $m$ ) into 512-bit blocks
  - For each 512-bit block:
    - Divide into 16 words (32 bits, big-endian)  $w[0..15]$
    - for  $i$  from 16 to 79 // Extend 16 words (32 bits) to 80 words (32 bits)
      - $w[i] = (w[i-3] \oplus w[i-8] \oplus w[i-14] \oplus w[i-16]) \lll 1$  ( $16 \leq i < 80$ )

- $A = h_0, B = h_1, C = h_2, D = h_3, E = h_4$
- **Start 80 cycles processing**
- $h_0 += A, h_1 += B, h_2 += C, h_3 += D, h_4 += E$

- Result =  $h_0 \parallel h_1 \parallel h_2 \parallel h_3 \parallel h_4$

- For example, describing **one cycle** in 80 cycles

- $t$  is an ordinal number of the cycle ( $0 \leq t \leq 79$ )

- $A, B, C, D, E$  are 5 words (32 bits) of a state


- $F$  is a non-linear function (changed with cycle)  $0 \leq t \leq 19$

- $\lll n$  is a left-rotate  $n$  positions  $20 \leq t \leq 39$

- $\boxplus$  add modulo 232.

- $K_t$  is a constant following  $\Rightarrow$

$$K_{tt} = \begin{cases} 0x5a827999, & 0 \leq t \leq 19 \\ 0x6ed9eba1, & 20 \leq t \leq 39 \\ 0x8f1bbcd3, & 40 \leq t \leq 59 \\ 0xc9a62c1d, & 60 \leq t \leq 79 \end{cases}$$



Describe **one cycle** in 80 cycles

# Processing cycle of SHA-1

## □ Pseudo-code of 80 cycles


### □ for $i$ from 0 to 79

- if  $0 \leq i \leq 19$  then {  $f = (B \wedge C) \vee ((\neg B) \wedge D)$ ;  $K = 0x5A827999$  }
- if  $20 \leq i \leq 39$  then {  $f = B \oplus C \oplus D$ ;  $K = 0x6ED9EBA1$  }
- if  $40 \leq i \leq 59$  then {  $f = (B \wedge C) \vee (B \wedge D) \vee (C \wedge D)$ ;  $K = 0x8F1BBCDC$  }
- if  $60 \leq i \leq 79$  then {  $f = B \oplus C \oplus D$ ;  $K = 0xCA62C1D6$  }
- $\text{temp} = (A \lll 5) + f + E + K + w[i]$
- $E = D$ ;  $D = C$ ;  $C = B \lll 30$
- $B = A$
- $A = \text{temp}$

## □ Test-vector:

- $\text{SHA-1}("") = \text{da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709}$
- $\text{SHA-1}(\text{"fit.hcmus"}) = 86cb71d2190be898de94356d59e5f0138f8d8496$

# A group of SHA hash functions




# SHA algorithms

Algorithm	Result (bit)	State (bit)	Block (bit)	Maximum message (bit)	Cycle	Operation	Collision
SHA-0	160	160	512	$2^{64} - 1$	80	+, and, or, xor, rotl	Yes
SHA-1							$2^{63}$ operations
SHA-256/224	256/224	256	1024	$2^{128} - 1$	64	+, and, or, xor, shr, rotr	No
SHA-512/384	512/384	512			80		
SHA3-224/256/384/512	224/256/384/512	1600	1152/1088/832/576	No limit	24	and, xor, rot, not	
SHAKE-128/256	Tùy ý		1344/1088				

# Message authentication code (MAC)


- Purpose: determine the origin of information (digital signature)
  - Generate MAC & check MAC shared secret key
  - The sender & receiver must agree on the secret key in advance
  - Does not support non-repudiation
  - The MAC can be generated from a cryptographic hash function (HMAC) or from a block cipher (OMAC, CBC-MAC, PMAC).



Decision: if same then **authentic** and **integrity** checked else something is wrong



# Keyed-hash message authentication code



## Pseudo-code:

```

function HMAC( $K, m$ )
   $opad = [0x5c \times \text{blocksize}]$ 
   $ipad = [0x36 \times \text{blocksize}]$ 
  if ( $\text{length}(K) > \text{blocksize}$ ) then
     $K = \text{hash}(K)$ 
  end if
  for  $i$  from 0 to  $\text{length}(K)$  step 1
     $ipad[i] \wedge= K[i]$ 
     $opad[i] \wedge= K[i]$ 
  end for
  return  $\text{hash}(opad \parallel \text{hash}(ipad \parallel m))$ 
  
```


$$\text{HMAC}_K(m) = h((K \oplus opad) \parallel h((K \oplus ipad) \parallel m))$$

0x5c5c5c...5c5c

0x363636...3636

# CBC-MAC

- See more:
  - How to attack?
  - Reference: CMAC



Example DES or AES