

Prefatory Note

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Class II FOMC – Restricted (FR)

Report to the FOMC on Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy



Book A Economic and Financial Conditions: Current Situation and Outlook

June 10, 2015

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Revisions to the Staff Projection since the Previous SEP

The FOMC most recently published its Summary of Economic Projections, or SEP, following the March FOMC meeting. The table below compares the staff's current economic projection with the one we presented in the March Tealbook.

Since the March projection, we have revised down our forecast for real GDP growth this year, primarily reflecting the weaker-than-expected incoming data on aggregate spending. Our forecast for real GDP growth in 2016 and 2017 is slightly higher than in March, mostly because our projected path for the foreign exchange value of the dollar is lower. Altogether, these revisions leave our projection for the GDP gap next year and in 2017 weaker than in the March forecast. The unemployment rate has declined a little less than we expected in March and is projected to average 5.3 percent in the fourth quarter of this year. Reflecting both the recent labor data and our lower projected path for aggregate output, the unemployment rate is revised up a little at the end of 2017 to 5.2 percent, equal to the staff's estimate of its natural rate.

The staff's projection for headline PCE inflation has been revised up somewhat in the first half of this year, mostly reflecting recent higher-than-expected readings for consumer energy prices, and projected core PCE inflation is essentially unchanged. Given our assumptions that longer-run inflation expectations will remain stable over the medium term, the earlier declines in energy prices were transitory, and core import prices will start to rise after this year, our forecasts for headline and core inflation in 2016 and 2017 are little changed. We continue to project that inflation will run somewhat below the Committee's 2 percent objective through 2017.

Staff Economic Projections Compared with the March Tealbook

| Variable | 2014 | 2015 | | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Longer run |
|---|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | H1 | H2 | | | | |
| Real GDP ¹ March Tealbook | 2.4 2.4 | 1.0 2.2 | 2.1 2.3 | 1.6 2.2 | 2.4 2.3 | 2.2 2.0 | 1.9 1.9 |
| Unemployment rate ² March Tealbook | 5.7 5.7 | 5.5 5.3 | 5.3 5.2 | 5.3 5.2 | 5.2 5.1 | 5.2 5.0 | 5.2 5.2 |
| PCE inflation ¹ March Tealbook | 1.1 1.1 | .1 .3 | 1.3 1.6 | .6 .6 | 1.6 1.7 | 1.8 1.9 | 2.0 2.0 |
| Core PCE inflation ¹ March Tealbook | 1.4 1.4 | 1.2 1.1 | 1.4 1.5 | 1.3 1.3 | 1.6 1.6 | 1.8 1.8 | n.a. n.a. |
| Federal funds rate ² March Tealbook | .10 .10 | .13 .16 | .35 .66 | .35 .66 | 1.26 1.75 | 2.12 2.67 | 3.50 3.50 |
| Memo: Federal funds rate, end of period March Tealbook | .13 .13 | .13 .20 | .44 .76 | .44 .76 | 1.33 1.84 | 2.19 2.73 | 3.50 3.50 |
| GDP gap ^{2,3} March Tealbook | -1.0 -1.0 | -1.3 -.7 | -1.0 -.4 | -1.0 -.4 | -.4 .2 | .1 .5 | n.a. n.a. |

1. Percent change from final quarter of preceding period to final quarter of period indicated.

2. Percent, final quarter of period indicated.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential. A negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

n.a. Not available.

Since the March Tealbook, our assumption for the date of liftoff of the federal funds rate from its effective lower bound was changed from the second quarter to the third quarter of this year. Reflecting both the later assumed liftoff date and the softer GDP gap in the current forecast, the projected path for the federal funds rate is around $\frac{1}{2}$ percentage point lower at the end of next year and in 2017 than in March.

Because FOMC participants are providing additional information about their expectations of the economic conditions that will exist at the time they anticipate it will first become appropriate to increase the target range for the federal funds rate, we include the table below providing quarterly information from the staff projection. In the third quarter of this year—the quarter when our baseline projection assumes liftoff of the federal funds rate will occur—we forecast the unemployment rate to average 5.4 percent and the trailing four-quarter change in real GDP to be 1.5 percent. We project the trailing four-quarter change in core PCE inflation to be 1.2 percent, and the four-quarter change in headline PCE prices to be only 0.2 percent because of earlier decreases in energy prices. (We do not anticipate that these energy price declines will fall out of the four-quarter change in headline inflation until early next year.) Of course, even the preliminary versions of these readings on economic performance will not become available until after the close of the quarter in question.

Staff Economic Projections Compared with the March Tealbook, Quarterly

| Variable | 2015 | | | | 2016 | | | |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| <i>Four-quarter percent change</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP March Tealbook | 2.8 3.3 | 2.3 2.8 | 1.5 2.2 | 1.6 2.2 | 2.2 2.4 | 2.2 2.3 | 2.4 2.3 | 2.4 2.3 |
| PCE inflation March Tealbook | .3 .3 | .2 .0 | .2 .1 | .6 .6 | 1.5 1.5 | 1.4 1.6 | 1.5 1.6 | 1.6 1.7 |
| Core PCE inflation March Tealbook | 1.3 1.3 | 1.2 1.1 | 1.2 1.2 | 1.3 1.3 | 1.5 1.5 | 1.5 1.5 | 1.5 1.6 | 1.6 1.6 |
| <i>Percent</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Unemployment rate March Tealbook | 5.6 5.5 | 5.5 5.3 | 5.4 5.2 | 5.3 5.2 | 5.3 5.1 | 5.3 5.1 | 5.3 5.1 | 5.2 5.1 |
| Federal funds rate March Tealbook | .11 .13 | .13 .16 | .15 .40 | .35 .66 | .59 .95 | .82 1.23 | 1.04 1.50 | 1.26 1.75 |
| <i>Memo</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Federal funds rate, end of period March Tealbook | .11 .13 | .13 .20 | .19 .49 | .44 .76 | .67 1.05 | .89 1.33 | 1.11 1.59 | 1.33 1.84 |

Comparing the Staff Projection with Other Forecasts

The staff's projection for real GDP growth is, on balance, a little lower than the most recent Blue Chip Consensus outlook and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) median projection (note that the latter survey dates from mid-May). The staff's forecast of the unemployment rate is a little higher than those of the outside forecasters; the staff's inflation projection is a bit lower.

Comparison of Tealbook and Outside Forecasts

| | 2015 | 2016 |
|--|------|------|
| GDP (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| June Tealbook | 1.6 | 2.4 |
| Blue Chip (6/10/15) | 2.0 | 2.7 |
| SPF median (5/15/15) | 2.2 | n.a. |
| Unemployment rate (Q4 level) | | |
| June Tealbook | 5.3 | 5.2 |
| Blue Chip (6/10/15) | 5.1 | 4.8 |
| SPF median (5/15/15) | 5.2 | n.a. |
| Consumer price inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| June Tealbook | .7 | 2.0 |
| Blue Chip (6/10/15) | .8 | 2.3 |
| SPF median (5/15/15) | .7 | 2.1 |
| PCE price inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| June Tealbook | .6 | 1.6 |
| SPF median (5/15/15) | .8 | 1.9 |
| Core PCE price inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| June Tealbook | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| SPF median (5/15/15) | 1.4 | 1.7 |


Note: SPF is the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Blue Chip does not provide results for PCE price inflation. The Blue Chip Consensus contains about 50 panelists, and the SPF about 40. Roughly 20 panelists contribute to both surveys.

n.a. Not available.

Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.


Tealbook Forecast Compared with Blue Chip (Blue Chip survey released June 10, 2015)

Real GDP




Note: The shaded area represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages.


Industrial Production




Unemployment Rate




Consumer Price Index



Treasury Bill Rate




10-Year Treasury Yield




Note: The yield is for on-the-run Treasury securities. Over the forecast period, the staff's projected yield is assumed to be 15 basis points below the off-the-run yield.

Key Background Factors underlying the Baseline Staff Projection


Federal Funds Rate




Long-Term Interest Rates




Equity Prices




House Prices



Crude Oil Prices



Broad Real Dollar



Special Factors Contributing to Weakness in GDP in the First Quarter

A number of transitory factors appear to have restrained aggregate spending in the first quarter, and the unwinding of their effects is expected to provide a boost to spending this quarter. The staff's estimates of the effects of these factors on real GDP are shown in the table below. While we discuss point estimates here, there is, of course, considerable uncertainty around the magnitude of these estimates, and other analysts—including from within the Federal Reserve System—have judged some of these effects to be larger than the staff's estimates.

Residual seasonality is estimated to have subtracted 0.8 percentage point from the change in real GDP last quarter (line 2). Residual seasonality appears evident in real spending for exports, state and local government construction, and private-sector nonresidential construction, along with the change in inventory investment. The staff assumes that much of the first-quarter residual seasonality will be unwound in the second quarter, with the rest showing up in the second half.

Unusually severe winter weather is estimated to have subtracted 0.2 percentage point from the change in real GDP in the first quarter, as PCE and construction spending were held down temporarily (line 3). The bounceback in spending from this weather effect is assumed to raise second-quarter real GDP growth by a similar amount.

Numerous reports suggested that the West Coast port labor dispute restrained international trade and disrupted some manufacturing supply chains. The staff estimates that the port labor dispute shaved 0.2 percentage point off the change in real GDP in the first quarter and assumes that a comparable amount will be added to second-quarter real GDP growth as activity returns to normal (line 4).

Finally, the large declines in retail gasoline prices early this year likely caused some measurement error in the BEA's translation to real PCE of nominal retail sales by some big-box stores that also sell gasoline (line 5). The staff estimates that this measurement error reduced real GDP growth 0.2 percentage point in the first quarter but that it is unlikely to reverse in the near term, as gasoline prices are not projected to return to their earlier levels.

In total, these identifiable transitory factors are judged to have reduced the change in real GDP 1.4 percentage points last quarter (line 6). The corresponding bounceback in spending as these factors dissipate is projected to boost real GDP growth 1 percentage point this quarter.

Estimated Effects of Transitory Special Factors on Real GDP

(Percent change from previous period at an annual rate)

| | 2015:Q1 | 2015:Q2 |
|--|-------------|------------|
| 1. Change in real GDP | -5 | 2.5 |
| Contribution from special factors: | | |
| 2. Residual seasonality | .8 | .6 |
| 3. Weather | -.2 | .2 |
| 4. West Coast port labor dispute | -.2 | .2 |
| 5. Measurement error (retail sales) | -.2 | .0 |
| 6. Total effect of special factors | -1.4 | 1.0 |
| 7. Change in real GDP (line 1) excluding special factors (line 6) | .9 | 1.5 |

Note: Staff estimates.

Federal Reserve System Nowcasts of 2015:Q2 Real GDP Growth
(Percent change at annual rate from previous quarter)

| Federal Reserve entity | Type of model | Nowcast as of June 8, 2015 |
|---|--|----------------------------|
| Federal Reserve Bank | | |
| New York | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Factor-augmented autoregressions • Factor-augmented autoregressions (financials only) | 1.6 2.3 |
| Cleveland | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bayesian regressions with stochastic volatility • Tracking model | 2.2 2.8 |
| Atlanta | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tracking model combined with Bayesian vector autoregressions (VARs), dynamic factor models, and factor-augmented autoregressions (known as GDPNow) | 1.5 |
| Chicago | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dynamic factor models • Bayesian VARs | 1.4 2.5 |
| St. Louis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dynamic factor models • News index model • Let-the-data-decide regressions | 2.8 4.7 2.3 |
| Minneapolis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bayesian VARs | 1.6 |
| Kansas City | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Judgmental tracking model | 1.9 |
| Board of Governors | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Board staff's forecast (judgmental tracking model)¹ • Dynamic factor models | 2.5 .7 |
| Memo: Median of Federal Reserve System nowcasts | | 2.3 |

1. The June Tealbook forecast, which incorporates data received after June 8, is also 2.5 percent.

Summary of the Near-Term Outlook

(Percent change at annual rate except as noted)


| Measure | 2015:Q1 | | 2015:Q2 | | 2015:H2 | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | Previous Tealbook | Current Tealbook | Previous Tealbook | Current Tealbook | Previous Tealbook | Current Tealbook |
| Real GDP | .1 | -.5 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.1 |
| Private domestic final purchases | .9 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 4.1 | 3.5 |
| Personal consumption expenditures | 1.9 | 1.8 | 4.2 | 2.8 | 4.1 | 3.4 |
| Residential investment | 1.8 | 6.3 | 1.1 | 11.3 | 11.2 | 6.5 |
| Nonres. private fixed investment | -4.3 | -2.8 | -1.9 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 2.8 |
| Government purchases | -2.3 | -.6 | 1.3 | 1.3 | .3 | .4 |
| <i>Contributions to change in real GDP</i> | | | | | | |
| Inventory investment ¹ | .4 | .4 | .2 | .1 | -.3 | -.2 |
| Net exports ¹ | -.6 | -1.8 | -.6 | -.2 | -.8 | -.7 |
| Unemployment rate² | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| PCE chain price index | -2.0 | -2.0 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
| Ex. food and energy | .8 | .8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 |

1. Percentage points.


2. Percent.

Recent Nonfinancial Developments (1)


Real GDP and GDI




Manufacturing IP ex. Motor Vehicles and Parts



Sales and Production of Light Motor Vehicles



Real PCE Goods ex. Motor Vehicles




These large domestic and international imbalances could create several challenges for the U.S. and global economy. First, the stretched position of U.S. households leads them, over time, to attempt to rebuild their savings, placing a drag on both consumption and investment and hence upward pressure on unemployment by 2017. A weak rate of investment and elevated borrowing from abroad lower U.S. potential output and national income, placing a persistent drag on U.S. living standards. And the limited savings buffer of U.S. households and the elevated level of U.S. asset prices imply some risk of a painful retrenchment, as households may have limited ability to weather adverse shocks and elevated domestic asset prices could collapse when unexpected adverse developments materialize.

Monetary policy is not well suited to address these challenges: A more accommodative monetary policy stance would only marginally boost inflation (given the flat Phillips curve) and would likely further depress household saving, borrowing from future aggregate demand and leaving households even more vulnerable to adverse shocks. In principle, fiscal policy adjustments that boost domestic saving while supporting domestic productive investment would alleviate these imbalances. More direct tools to alleviate global imbalances would consist of coordinated international adjustments in fiscal and monetary policy (and related structural reforms), including increases in spending in countries with current account surpluses.

While the unsustainable pace of U.S. consumption in the scenario above is importantly due to an alternative perspective on the possible effect of low global interest rates on U.S. asset prices over the next couple of years, these forces are only one set that could lead to similar macroeconomic imbalances. For example, some staff models project that the household saving rate will decline more rapidly than in the staff projection, or the appreciation of the dollar that has already occurred may lead to a wider U.S. current account deficit than anticipated. Alternatively, the global economy would be even more reliant on U.S. household demand if growth among foreign economies were to fall substantially short of expectations, which could also contribute to a stronger dollar and lower U.S. interest rates.

Figure 1. Personal saving rate



Note: The shaded area indicates the projection period (2015:Q2 to 2020:Q4).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; staff calculations.


Figure 2. Current account





Note: The shaded area indicates the projection period (2015:Q2 to 2020:Q4).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; staff calculations.

Alternative Measures of Slack



The red line in each panel is the staff's measure of the unemployment rate gap (right axis).




** EDO is Estimated, Dynamic, Optimization-based model.
Source: Federal Reserve Board; PRISM: Federal Reserve Board Bank of Philadelphia, PRISM Model Documentation (June 2011); FRBNY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 618 (May 2013, revised April 2014).



Note: Percent of small businesses surveyed with at least one "hard to fill" job opening. Seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board Staff.
Source: National Federation of Independent Business, Small Business Economic Trends Survey.



Note: Percent of households believing jobs are plentiful minus the percent believing jobs are hard to get.
Source: Conference Board.




* Plots the negative of the gap to have the same sign as the unemployment rate gap.

Note: The shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Output gaps are multiplied by -0.44 to facilitate comparison with the unemployment rate gap. Manufacturing capacity utilization gap is constructed by subtracting its average rate from 1972 to 2013. Other gaps were constructed by subtracting each series' average in 2004:Q4 and 2005:Q1.

Projections of Real GDP and Related Components
 (Percent change at annual rate from final quarter
 of preceding period except as noted)

| Measure | 2014 | 2015 | 2015 | | 2016 | 2017 |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | | | H1 | H2 | | |
| Real GDP | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.1 |
| Final sales | 2.4 | 1.5 | .8 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Previous Tealbook | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.3 |
| Personal consumption expenditures | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 2.7 |
| Previous Tealbook | 2.9 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 2.5 |
| Residential investment | 2.5 | 7.6 | 8.8 | 6.5 | 12.0 | 8.0 |
| Previous Tealbook | 2.5 | 6.2 | 1.4 | 11.2 | 11.5 | 7.8 |
| Nonresidential structures | 6.5 | -7.3 | -13.8 | -.3 | .2 | .3 |
| Previous Tealbook | 6.5 | -11.5 | -19.5 | -2.8 | .3 | .5 |
| Equipment and intangibles | 6.1 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 4.6 | 3.6 |
| Previous Tealbook | 6.1 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 2.6 |
| Federal purchases | .2 | -1.1 | -.8 | -1.4 | -1.2 | -.8 |
| Previous Tealbook | .2 | -2.3 | -2.9 | -1.7 | -1.3 | -.9 |
| State and local purchases | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| Exports | 2.4 | -.1 | -1.5 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 3.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | 2.4 | -1.2 | -2.7 | .4 | 1.1 | 3.1 |
| Imports | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 3.7 |
| Previous Tealbook | 5.6 | 3.8 | 1.8 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 3.9 |
| Contributions to change in real GDP (percentage points) | | | | | | |
| Inventory change | .0 | .0 | .2 | -.2 | -.1 | -.3 |
| Previous Tealbook | .0 | .0 | .3 | -.3 | .0 | -.1 |
| Net exports | -.6 | -.9 | -1.0 | -.7 | -.8 | -.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | -.6 | -.8 | -.6 | -.8 | -.8 | -.2 |


Real GDP

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.


Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Components of Final Demand


Personal Consumption Expenditures




Residential Investment




Equipment and Intangibles




Nonresidential Structures



Government Consumption & Investment




Exports and Imports




Aspects of the Medium-Term Projection


Personal Saving Rate




Wealth-to-Income Ratio




Single-Family Housing Starts




Equipment and Intangibles Spending



Federal Surplus/Deficit



Current Account Surplus/Deficit



Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Decomposition of Potential GDP

(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)


| Measure | 1974-95 | 1996-2000 | 2001-07 | 2008-10 | 2011-13 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|--|---------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|
| Potential real GDP | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | .5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Previous Tealbook | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | .5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| <i>Selected contributions</i> ¹ | | | | | | | | | |
| Structural labor productivity ² | 1.6 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 1.5 | 1.2 | .5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Previous Tealbook | 1.6 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 1.5 | 1.2 | .5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Capital deepening | .7 | 1.5 | .9 | .5 | .4 | .6 | .7 | .8 | .8 |
| Multifactor productivity | .7 | 1.1 | 1.6 | .9 | .7 | -.2 | .7 | .7 | .7 |
| Structural hours | 1.5 | 1.0 | .7 | .2 | .7 | .7 | .3 | .3 | .3 |
| Previous Tealbook | 1.5 | 1.0 | .7 | .2 | .7 | .7 | .3 | .3 | .3 |
| Labor force participation | .4 | .0 | -.3 | -.4 | -.5 | -.5 | -.5 | -.5 | -.5 |
| Previous Tealbook | .4 | .0 | -.3 | -.4 | -.5 | -.5 | -.5 | -.5 | -.5 |
| Memo: | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP gap ³ | -1.8 | 2.5 | .9 | -4.4 | -2.8 | -1.0 | -1.0 | -.4 | .1 |
| Previous Tealbook | -1.8 | 2.5 | .9 | -4.4 | -2.8 | -1.0 | -.8 | -.1 | .3 |

Note: For multiyear periods, the percent change is the annual average from Q4 of the year preceding the first year shown to Q4 of the last year shown.

1. Percentage points.


2. Total business sector.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP in the final quarter of the period indicated. A negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.




Note: The GDP gap is the percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; staff assumptions.




Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.



Source: Federal Reserve Board, G.17 Statistical Release, "Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization."

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.



Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; staff assumptions.

The Outlook for the Labor Market

| Measure | 2014 | 2015 | 2015 | | 2016 | 2017 |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | | H1 | H2 | | |
| Output per hour, business ¹ Previous Tealbook | -.4 -.4 | 1.1 1.4 | -.3 .4 | 2.6 2.5 | 1.9 1.8 | 1.9 1.8 |
| Nonfarm private employment ² Previous Tealbook | 254 254 | 206 202 | 210 204 | 202 200 | 160 165 | 122 125 |
| Labor force participation rate ³ Previous Tealbook | 62.8 62.8 | 62.7 62.7 | 62.8 62.8 | 62.7 62.7 | 62.6 62.6 | 62.4 62.4 |
| Civilian unemployment rate ³ Previous Tealbook | 5.7 5.7 | 5.3 5.3 | 5.5 5.4 | 5.3 5.3 | 5.2 5.2 | 5.2 5.1 |

1. Percent change from final quarter of preceding period at annual rate.

2. Thousands, average monthly changes.

3. Percent, average for the final quarter in the period.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.

Inflation Projections

(Percent change at annual rate from final quarter of preceding period)


| Measure | 2014 | 2015 | 2015 | | 2016 | 2017 |
|--|--------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| | | | H1 | H2 | | |
| PCE chain-weighted price index Previous Tealbook | 1.1 1.1 | .6 .6 | -.1 -.2 | 1.3 1.5 | 1.6 1.6 | 1.8 1.8 |
| Food and beverages Previous Tealbook | 2.8 2.8 | .3 .6 | -.6 -.2 | 1.1 1.4 | 1.6 1.6 | 1.9 1.9 |
| Energy Previous Tealbook | -6.1 -6.1 | -11.3 -11.4 | -19.9 -24.4 | -1.7 3.8 | 2.3 2.6 | 1.3 1.6 |
| Excluding food and energy Previous Tealbook | 1.4 1.4 | 1.3 1.3 | 1.2 1.2 | 1.4 1.4 | 1.6 1.6 | 1.8 1.8 |
| Prices of core goods imports ¹ Previous Tealbook | .6 .6 | -2.3 -2.3 | -4.2 -4.0 | -.4 -.5 | 1.0 .9 | 1.5 1.6 |

1. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Labor Market Developments and Outlook (1)

Measures of Labor Underutilization




* U-5 measures total unemployed persons plus all marginally attached to the labor force, as a percent of the labor force plus persons marginally attached to the labor force.

** Percent of Current Population Survey employment.

EEB Extended and emergency unemployment benefits.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.


Level of Payroll Employment*



* 3-month moving averages.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Change in Payroll Employment*




* 3-month moving averages.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Labor Market Developments and Outlook (2)

Labor Force Participation Rate*




* Published data adjusted by staff to account for changes in population weights.

** Includes staff estimate of the effect of extended and emergency unemployment benefits.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.


Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims*



* 4-week moving average.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

Private Hires, Quits, and Job Openings




* Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment, 3-month moving average.

** Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment plus unfilled jobs, 3-month moving average.

Source: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.

Average Monthly Change in Labor Market Conditions Index



* Value shown for Q2 is an average of May and April data.


Note: Labor market conditions index estimated by staff.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Inflation Developments and Outlook (1)


(Percent change from year-earlier period)

Headline Consumer Price Inflation




Source: For CPI, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; for PCE, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Measures of Underlying PCE Price Inflation



Source: For trimmed mean PCE, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; otherwise, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Labor Cost Growth



Note: Compensation per hour is for the business sector. Average hourly earnings are for the private nonfarm sector. The employment cost index is for the private sector.


Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Inflation Developments and Outlook (2)

(Percent change from year-earlier period, except as noted)


Commodity and Oil Price Levels



Note: Futures prices (dotted lines) are the latest observations on monthly futures contracts.


Source: For oil prices, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency; for commodity prices, Commodity Research Bureau (CRB).

Energy and Import Price Inflation



Source: For core import prices, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; for PCE, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Long-Term Inflation Expectations



Note: Based on a comparison of an estimated TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) yield curve with an estimated nominal off-the-run Treasury yield curve, with an adjustment for the indexation-lag effect.

SPF Survey of Professional Forecasters.

Source: For Michigan, University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers; for SPF, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; for TIPS, Federal Reserve Board staff calculations.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.


The Long-Term Outlook

(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)


| Measure | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | Longer run |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Real GDP Previous Tealbook | 1.6 1.8 | 2.4 2.4 | 2.2 2.1 | 1.9 1.8 | 1.7 1.7 | 1.9 1.9 |
| Civilian unemployment rate ¹ Previous Tealbook | 5.3 5.3 | 5.2 5.2 | 5.2 5.1 | 5.1 5.0 | 5.1 5.1 | 5.2 5.2 |
| PCE prices, total Previous Tealbook | .6 .6 | 1.6 1.6 | 1.8 1.8 | 1.9 1.9 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 |
| Core PCE prices Previous Tealbook | 1.3 1.3 | 1.6 1.6 | 1.8 1.8 | 1.9 1.9 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 |
| Federal funds rate ¹ Previous Tealbook | .4 .4 | 1.3 1.4 | 2.1 2.3 | 2.8 2.9 | 3.2 3.2 | 3.5 3.5 |
| 10-year Treasury yield ¹ Previous Tealbook | 2.6 2.6 | 3.1 3.3 | 3.6 3.7 | 3.9 4.0 | 4.1 4.1 | 4.3 4.3 |

1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.


Real GDP




Unemployment Rate



PCE Prices




Interest Rates




Note: In each panel, shading represents the projection period, and dashed lines are the previous Tealbook.

Evolution of the Staff Forecast


Change in Real GDP



Unemployment Rate





Change in PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy



AFE economies.³ According to this approach, the AFE equilibrium interest rate (shown by the red line) has fallen steadily over the past 15 years and is currently negative. A number of possible structural factors have been put forward to account for this decline in the long-run value of the equilibrium interest rate. For example, potential output growth appears to have stepped down, partly reflecting demographic trends and the effects of the global financial crisis on financial intermediation and productivity. In addition, from an open-economy perspective, the sizable upward shift in global savings in the early to mid-2000s may have contributed to lower world interest rates.

The estimates based on the Laubach and Williams (2003) methodology suggest that, absent developments that would push the long-run equilibrium rate back up, aggregate demand and the associated neutral policy rates in the AFEs are likely to be much lower than in the early 2000s and will not return to pre-crisis levels, as in the first approach. An implication is that, going forward, even shallow recessions may take policy rates in the AFEs to the zero lower bound constraint.

All told, both cyclical and trend estimates suggest that equilibrium interest rates in the AFEs are currently low and will likely remain so for many years. However, the degree to which the decline is due to cyclical versus structural factors—in other words, how low the equilibrium rate will be in the long run—remains difficult to disentangle with confidence. Moreover, in either approach, confidence intervals around estimates of the equilibrium interest rate tend to be very large. Finally, some of the structural factors that may have contributed to lower long-run equilibrium interest rates over the past decade may still unwind. For instance, global savings could conceivably fall going forward, as Asian economies rebalance toward domestic demand somewhat, thus putting upward pressure on global interest rates. Choosing an appropriate path of policy rates over time in AFEs will thus require important judgments related to these uncertainties.



³ Our methodology differs from Laubach and Williams (2003) in two respects. First, we use staff estimates of potential output for the AFEs rather than treat this variable as unobserved. Second, we construct real policy rates using survey-based measures of inflation expectations rather than construct inflation expectations using an autoregressive process on estimated inflation data, as these authors do. When we apply our methodology to U.S. data, however, we obtain estimates very similar to the original article, suggesting that these changes have a modest effect on the results.

The Foreign GDP Outlook

Real GDP*


Percent change, annual rate

| | 2014 | | | 2015 | | | 2016 | 2017 |
|--------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | H1 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | H2 | | |
| 1. Total Foreign | 2.2 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.9 |
| 2. Advanced Foreign Economies | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| 3. Canada | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.2 | -0.6 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.0 |
| 4. Euro Area | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| 5. Japan | -1.4 | -2.0 | 1.2 | 3.9 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.4 | -0.2 |
| 6. United Kingdom | 3.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 |
| 7. Emerging Market Economies | 2.9 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.8 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| 8. China | 7.0 | 8.1 | 7.0 | 5.1 | 6.1 | 7.2 | 6.6 | 6.5 |
| 9. Emerging Asia ex. China | 3.3 | 5.1 | 2.3 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.2 |
| 10. Mexico | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| 11. Brazil | -1.4 | 0.6 | 1.1 | -0.6 | -3.2 | -0.0 | 1.8 | 2.3 |


* GDP aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. merchandise exports.

Total Foreign GDP

Percent change, annual rate

**Foreign GDP**

Percent change, annual rate



The Foreign Inflation Outlook

Consumer Prices*

Percent change, annual rate


| | 2014 | | | 2015 | | | 2016 | 2017 |
|--------------------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | H1 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | H2 | | |
| 1. Total Foreign | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.1 | -0.1 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.1 | -0.1 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| 2. Advanced Foreign Economies | 2.2 | 0.8 | -0.4 | -0.8 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.0 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.2 | 0.9 | -0.4 | -0.8 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 2.0 |
| 3. Canada | 3.2 | 1.2 | -0.0 | -0.2 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| 4. Euro Area | 0.4 | 0.4 | -0.6 | -1.5 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| 5. Japan | 4.9 | 1.2 | -0.6 | -0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 2.6 |
| 6. United Kingdom | 1.6 | 1.2 | -0.7 | -1.6 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| 7. Emerging Market Economies | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 0.4 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| 8. China | 1.4 | 2.2 | 1.0 | -0.4 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| 9. Emerging Asia ex. China | 2.8 | 1.9 | 1.4 | -0.2 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| 10. Mexico | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 0.3 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| 11. Brazil | 7.0 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 11.1 | 9.3 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.4 |

* CPI aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. non-oil imports.


Int'l Econ Devel & Outlook

Foreign Monetary Policy


AFE Policy Rates



AFE Central Bank Balance Sheets




EME Policy Rates




Evolution of Staff's International Forecast


Total Foreign GDP



Total Foreign CPI




U.S. Current Account Balance




Treasury Yields and Policy Expectations


Selected Interest Rates




Implied Federal Funds Rate




Distribution of Expected Timing of First Rate Increase from the Desk's Primary Dealer Survey



Treasury Yield Curve



Inflation Compensation




Why Are Net Interest Margins of Large Banks So Compressed?

The extraordinarily low interest rate environment that has prevailed in the wake of the financial crisis has put downward pressure on the net interest margins (NIMs) of all bank holding companies (banks), but especially the largest ones. In particular, over roughly the past five years, NIMs of large banks have fallen about 80 basis points, while NIMs of small banks have decreased approximately 20 basis points (left panel).¹

The more pronounced decline in NIMs at large banks is driven by two main factors related to the low interest rate environment. The first factor accounts for the majority of the difference in the behavior of NIMs at the two bank groups and arises from the liability side of banks' balance sheets, namely from a more pronounced decline in deposit costs at small banks. In general, deposit rates tend to move with short-term interest rates and are typically lower at large banks. With the federal funds rate at the zero lower bound since late 2008, the degree to which large banks have been able to boost their profitability by reducing their deposit rates has been more limited relative to small banks. For example, the arithmetic effect of the decline in deposit rates at small banks has pushed up NIMs about 60 basis points, while the corresponding effect of declining rates at large banks has increased NIMs roughly 20 basis points (red portions of the bars, right panel). So far, at least, large domestic banks have been reluctant to charge negative deposit rates, a step that banks in foreign jurisdictions have been more willing to take.²

The second factor stems from the asset side of the balance sheet: Large banks have experienced a somewhat bigger decline in the interest income they earn on "other" assets, which includes assets held for trading purposes. Interest income on such assets has declined notably since 2010, and large banks hold more of these assets relative to small banks. This factor explains why interest income fell about 150 basis points at large banks while it moved down roughly 130 basis points at small banks (gray portions of the bars, right panel).

These empirical findings have implications for assessing the monetary transmission mechanism around the time of liftoff.³ At that time, for example, large banks could try to boost their profitability in the short term by delaying the increase in deposit rates relative to previous tightening cycles. If that happens, more deposits than usual could leave the banking system, putting some downward pressure on the level of short-term interest rates. However, with interest on excess reserves higher than many deposit rates, banks may act to preserve this funding source, accelerating the pass-through to market interest rates relative to previous tightening cycles. That said, this latter effect may be damped because many large banks face balance sheet constraints in light of the new regulatory environment.




¹ Large banks are defined as those with more than \$50 billion in consolidated assets.

² Some custodial banks in the United States are reportedly currently charging negative rates on nonoperational deposits denominated in euros. Such reports are more common in foreign jurisdictions.

³ See the box "The Transmission of Monetary Policy to Deposit Rates" in the April 2015 Tealbook, Book B.

Federal Reserve Operations and Short-Term Funding Markets


Outstanding Term Deposits



Note: Striped bars denote an offer rate of 1 basis point above the interest on excess reserves and a maximum award amount of \$5 billion per counterparty.

Source: Federal Reserve Board.


ON RRP Take-Up, by Type



Note: ON RRP is overnight reverse repurchase agreement; MMF is money market fund.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.


Expected Overnight Treasury GCF Repo and Federal Funds Rates



Note: Last FOMC is April 28, 2015; most recent is June 9, 2015. Federal funds (FF) rates are estimated using overnight index swap quotes with a spline approach; General Collateral Finance (GCF) rates are calculated using GCF Treasury repurchase agreement (repo) futures quotes.

Source: Bloomberg; staff estimates.


ON RRP and Term RRP Take-Up



Note: ON RRP is overnight reverse repurchase agreement; term RRP is term reverse repurchase agreement.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.


Money Market Rates



Note: GCF is General Collateral Finance; ON RRP is overnight reverse repurchase agreement; PD is primary dealer; repo is repurchase agreement.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.


Agency MBS Issuance and Fed Settlement



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Overall, the widening of the spread between the overnight Treasury GCF repo and general Treasury triparty repo rates seems to be explained in part by regulatory changes and market segmentation. The staff will continue to monitor activity in these markets as the time of policy firming approaches.

GCF Rate and GCF – Triparty Spread



Note: Data are weekly until August 21, 2014, after which data are daily.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Net Lending in GCF Market from January 2013–March 2015 for Overnight U.S. Treasury Collateral (Billions of dollars)


| | U.S. Primary Dealer | Foreign Primary Dealer | U.S. Nonprimary Dealer | Foreign Nonprimary Dealer |
|------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Sample mean | \$ 19.6 | \$ -12.1 | \$ -1.4 | \$ -6.2 |
| Quarter-end mean | \$ 16.7 | \$ -5.7 | \$ -2.3 | \$ -8.8 |
| % Change | -15% | 53% | -66% | -42% |

Forecast Confidence Intervals and Alternative Scenarios


Confidence Intervals Based on FRB/US Stochastic Simulations

- Extended Tealbook baseline
- Lower natural rate of unemployment
- Weaker foreign growth and stronger dollar
- Lower long-run equilibrium fed funds rate
- Faster growth with higher inflation
- Greek exit with severe spillovers
- Near-term slowdown in economic activity


Real GDP




Unemployment Rate



PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy



Federal Funds Rate




**Selected Tealbook Projections and 70 Percent Confidence Intervals Derived
from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors and FRB/US Simulations**

| Measure | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| <i>Real GDP</i> <i>(percent change, Q4 to Q4)</i> | | | | | |
| Projection | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | .2–3.1 | .2–4.0 | -.1–3.8 | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | .7–2.4 | 1.1–4.1 | .8–4.1 | .3–3.8 | .0–3.6 |
| <i>Civilian unemployment rate</i> <i>(percent, Q4)</i> | | | | | |
| Projection | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | 4.9–5.6 | 4.3–6.3 | 3.9–6.8 | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | 4.9–5.8 | 4.3–6.0 | 3.7–6.3 | 3.4–6.3 | 3.3–6.4 |
| <i>PCE prices, total</i> <i>(percent change, Q4 to Q4)</i> | | | | | |
| Projection | .6 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | -.1–1.2 | .8–3.3 | .8–3.4 | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | .1–1.2 | .7–2.6 | .7–2.8 | .8–3.1 | .8–3.1 |
| <i>PCE prices excluding</i> <i>food and energy</i> <i>(percent change, Q4 to Q4)</i> | | | | | |
| Projection | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | .9–1.6 | .8–2.4 | ... | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | .9–1.8 | .7–2.4 | .9–2.7 | 1.0–3.0 | 1.0–3.1 |
| <i>Federal funds rate</i> <i>(percent, Q4)</i> | | | | | |
| Projection | .4 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 3.2 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | .1–.5 | .2–2.1 | .6–3.6 | 1.0–4.9 | 1.2–5.7 |

Note: Shocks underlying FRB/US stochastic simulations are randomly drawn from the 1969–2014 set of model equation residuals. Intervals derived from Tealbook forecast errors are based on projections made from 1980 to 2014 for real GDP and unemployment and from 1998 to 2014 for PCE prices. The intervals for real GDP, unemployment, and total PCE prices are extended into 2017 using information from the Blue Chip survey and forecasts from the CBO and CEA.

... Not applicable.

Prediction Intervals Derived from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors



Note: See the technical note in the appendix for more information on this exhibit.

1. Augmented Tealbook prediction intervals use 1- and 2-year-ahead forecast errors from Blue Chip, CBO, and CEA to extend the Tealbook prediction intervals through 2017.

Alternative Models
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)

| Measure and projection | 2015 | | 2016 | | 2017 | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| | March Tealbook | Current Tealbook | March Tealbook | Current Tealbook | March Tealbook | Current Tealbook |
| <i>Real GDP</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 2.2 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| FRB/US | 2.8 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| EDO | 2.7 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| <i>Unemployment rate¹</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 5.2 |
| FRB/US | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.5 |
| EDO | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.9 |
| <i>Total PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | .6 | .6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| FRB/US | .7 | .7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| EDO | .7 | .9 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| <i>Core PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| FRB/US | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| EDO | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| <i>Federal funds rate¹</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | .7 | .4 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 2.7 | 2.1 |
| FRB/US | .9 | .6 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.1 |
| EDO | 1.4 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 2.7 |

1. Percent, average for Q4.

Assessment of Key Macroeconomic Risks (1)

Probability of Inflation Events

(4 quarters ahead—2016:Q2)

| Probability that the 4-quarter change in total PCE prices will be ... | Staff | FRB/US | EDO | BVAR |
|---|-------|--------|-----|------|
| <i>Greater than 3 percent</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .04 | .07 | .14 | .08 |
| Previous Tealbook | .06 | .06 | .15 | .00 |
| <i>Less than 1 percent</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .29 | .19 | .22 | .16 |
| Previous Tealbook | .24 | .21 | .22 | .64 |

Probability of Unemployment Events

(4 quarters ahead—2016:Q2)

| Probability that the unemployment rate will ... | Staff | FRB/US | EDO | BVAR |
|---|-------|--------|-----|------|
| <i>Increase by 1 percentage point</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .05 | .04 | .25 | .01 |
| Previous Tealbook | .03 | .02 | .24 | .00 |
| <i>Decrease by 1 percentage point</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .10 | .04 | .04 | .35 |
| Previous Tealbook | .13 | .09 | .04 | .40 |

Probability of Near-Term Recession

| Probability that real GDP declines in each of 2015:Q3 and 2015:Q4 | Staff | FRB/US | EDO | BVAR | Factor Model |
|---|-------|--------|-----|------|--------------|
| Current Tealbook | .04 | .03 | .03 | .03 | .41 |
| Previous Tealbook | .05 | .02 | .03 | .03 | .30 |

Note: "Staff" represents Tealbook forecast errors applied to the Tealbook baseline; baselines for FRB/US, BVAR, EDO, and the factor model are generated by those models themselves, up to the current-quarter estimate. Data for the current quarter are taken from the staff estimate for the second Tealbook in each quarter; if the second Tealbook for the current quarter has not yet been published, the preceding quarter is taken as the latest historical observation.

Changes in GDP, Prices, and Unemployment
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

| | Nominal GDP | | Real GDP | | PCE price index | | Core PCE price index | | Unemployment rate ¹ | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------|----------|----------------------|----------|--------------------------------|----------|
| Interval | 04/22/15 | 06/10/15 | 04/22/15 | 06/10/15 | 04/22/15 | 06/10/15 | 04/22/15 | 06/10/15 | 04/22/15 | 06/10/15 |
| <i>Quarterly</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2014:Q1 | .8 | -.8 | -2.1 | -2.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 6.6 | 6.6 |
| Q2 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| Q3 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
| Q4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | -.4 | -.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 5.7 | 5.7 |
| 2015:Q1 | .3 | -.6 | .1 | -.5 | -2.0 | -2.0 | .8 | .8 | 5.6 | 5.6 |
| Q2 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 5.4 | 5.5 |
| Q3 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 5.3 | 5.4 |
| Q4 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| 2016:Q1 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| Q2 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 5.2 | 5.3 |
| Q3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 5.2 | 5.3 |
| Q4 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| <i>Two-quarter²</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2014:Q2 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 | -.8 | -.8 |
| Q4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 3.6 | .4 | .4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | -.5 | -.5 |
| 2015:Q2 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.2 | 1.0 | -.2 | -.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | -.3 | -.2 |
| Q4 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | -.1 | -.2 |
| 2016:Q2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | -.1 | 0 |
| Q4 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | .0 | -.1 |
| <i>Four-quarter³</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2013:Q4 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.3 | -.8 | -.8 |
| 2014:Q4 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | -1.3 | -1.3 |
| 2015:Q4 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.6 | .6 | .6 | 1.3 | 1.3 | -.4 | -.4 |
| 2016:Q4 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | -.1 | -.1 |
| 2017:Q4 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | -.1 | .0 |
| <i>Annual</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2013 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 7.4 | 7.4 |
| 2014 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| 2015 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.0 | .3 | .3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| 2016 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 5.2 | 5.3 |
| 2017 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 5.1 | 5.2 |

- 1. Level, except for two-quarter and four-quarter intervals.
- 2. Percent change from two quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.
- 3. Percent change from four quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.

Greensheets
Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

| Item | 2014 | | | 2015 | | | 2016 | | | 2017 ¹ | | | | | |
|---|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------|------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | 2014 ¹ | 2015 ¹ | 2016 ¹ | 2017 ¹ |
| Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 4.6 | 5.0 | 2.2 | -5 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.2 |
| 4.6 | 5.0 | 2.2 | .1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.1 | |
| Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.2 | 5.0 | 2.3 | -9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| 3.2 | 5.0 | 2.3 | -.3 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | |
| Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 1.3 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.0 |
| 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.5 | .9 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 2.7 |
| Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.5 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 1.8 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.3 |
| 2.5 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 1.9 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 2.5 |
| Durables | 14.1 | 9.2 | 6.2 | 1.1 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 5.3 | 8.1 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 4.2 |
| Nondurables | 2.2 | 2.5 | 4.1 | .1 | 2.3 | 3.8 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.5 |
| Services | .9 | 2.5 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.5 |
| Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 8.8 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 6.3 | 11.3 | 6.8 | 6.2 | 11.6 | 13.1 | 12.4 | 10.8 | 2.5 | 7.6 | 12.0 | 8.0 |
| 8.8 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 9.6 | 12.9 | 12.6 | 12.7 | 11.4 | 9.3 | 2.5 | 6.2 | 11.5 | 7.8 | |
| Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 9.7 | 8.9 | 4.7 | -2.8 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 6.2 | .9 | 3.7 | 2.9 |
| 9.7 | 8.9 | 4.7 | -4.3 | -1.9 | 1.0 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 6.2 | -4 | 3.3 | 2.1 |
| Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 8.9 | 10.1 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 6.1 | 3.4 | 4.6 | 3.6 |
| 8.9 | 10.1 | 4.4 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 6.1 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 2.6 |
| Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 12.6 | 4.8 | 5.9 | -18.9 | -8.3 | -2.2 | 1.7 | -2.1 | 1.6 | .8 | .4 | 6.5 | -7.3 | .2 | .3 |
| 12.6 | 4.8 | 5.9 | -22.7 | -16.0 | -6.5 | 1.0 | -1.6 | 1.1 | 1.0 | .8 | 6.5 | -11.5 | .3 | .5 | |
| Net exports ² <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | -460 | -431 | -471 | -546 | -554 | -591 | -617 | -667 | -699 | -738 | -746 | -453 | -577 | -712 | -785 |
| -460 | -431 | -471 | -497 | -524 | -558 | -596 | -635 | -673 | -710 | -730 | -738 | -453 | -544 | -687 | -766 |
| Exports | 11.1 | 4.5 | 4.5 | -5.9 | 3.0 | .5 | 2.2 | -2.1 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 2.4 | -1 | 1.3 | 3.2 |
| Imports | 11.3 | -.9 | 10.4 | 6.7 | 3.7 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 6.8 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 3.7 |
| Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.7 | 4.4 | -1.9 | -5.6 | 1.3 | .3 | .5 | .6 | .3 | 1.6 | .6 | .8 | .4 | .8 | 1.1 |
| 1.7 | 4.4 | -1.9 | -2.3 | 1.3 | .2 | .3 | .3 | .5 | 1.6 | .7 | .8 | -1 | .8 | 1.1 | |
| Federal | -.9 | 9.9 | -7.3 | -.1 | -1.6 | -1.5 | -1.2 | -1.2 | -2.4 | .8 | -2.0 | .2 | -1.1 | -1.2 | -.8 |
| Defense | .9 | 16.0 | -12.2 | -1.0 | -2.0 | -1.6 | -2.0 | -2.0 | -3.9 | 1.3 | -3.3 | -3 | -1.7 | -2.0 | -1.5 |
| Nonddefense | -3.8 | .4 | 1.5 | 2.0 | -1.0 | -5 | -6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .1 |
| State & local | 3.4 | 1.1 | 1.6 | -1.1 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| Change in priv. inventories ² <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 85 | 82 | 80 | 98 | 100 | 96 | 88 | 92 | 84 | 80 | 67 | 71 | 95 | 81 | 39 |
| 85 | 82 | 80 | 95 | 103 | 96 | 81 | 77 | 66 | 68 | 76 | 71 | 94 | 72 | 69 | |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

2. Billions of chained (2009) dollars.

Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items
 (Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

| Item | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.8 -2.8 | .2 .2 | 2.7 2.7 | 1.7 1.7 | 1.6 1.6 | 3.1 3.1 | 2.4 2.4 | 1.6 1.8 | 2.4 2.4 | 2.2 2.1 |
| Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.1 -2.1 | -.4 -.4 | 2.0 2.0 | 1.5 1.5 | 2.1 2.1 | 2.6 2.6 | 2.4 2.4 | 1.5 1.8 | 2.6 2.4 | 2.6 2.3 |
| Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -4.1 -4.1 | -2.4 -2.4 | 3.5 3.5 | 2.6 2.6 | 2.6 2.6 | 3.2 3.2 | 3.3 3.3 | 2.8 3.1 | 3.7 3.6 | 3.0 2.7 |
| Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.0 -2.0 | -.2 -.2 | 3.1 3.1 | 1.5 1.5 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.8 2.8 | 2.9 2.9 | 2.9 3.6 | 3.3 3.6 | 2.7 2.5 |
| Durables Nondurables Services | -12.9 -2.7 .3 | 2.5 .2 -.8 | 9.3 3.3 2.0 | 4.8 .4 1.4 | 7.5 1.0 1.4 | 5.9 2.5 2.4 | 8.1 2.2 2.2 | 5.7 2.3 2.2 | 6.5 2.7 3.0 | 4.2 2.7 2.5 |
| Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -24.3 -24.3 | -10.8 -10.8 | -5.2 -5.2 | 6.0 6.0 | 15.8 15.8 | 6.9 6.9 | 2.5 2.5 | 7.6 6.2 | 12.0 11.5 | 8.0 7.8 |
| Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -8.9 -8.9 | -12.2 -12.2 | 8.1 8.1 | 9.0 9.0 | 3.7 3.7 | 4.7 4.7 | 6.2 6.2 | .9 -.4 | 3.7 3.3 | 2.9 2.1 |
| Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -11.8 -11.8 | -6.0 -6.0 | 12.0 12.0 | 9.2 9.2 | 3.3 3.3 | 4.8 4.8 | 6.1 6.1 | 3.4 2.8 | 4.6 4.0 | 3.6 2.6 |
| Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -1.2 -1.2 | -27.1 -27.1 | -4.0 -4.0 | 8.0 8.0 | 4.8 4.8 | 4.4 4.4 | 6.5 6.5 | -7.3 -11.5 | 2 .3 | .3 .5 |
| Net exports ¹ <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -558 -558 | -395 -395 | -459 -459 | -459 -459 | -452 -452 | -420 -420 | -453 -453 | -577 -544 | -712 -687 | -785 -766 |
| Exports Imports | -2.8 -6.0 | .8 -6.2 | 10.1 12.0 | 4.2 3.5 | 2.4 .4 | 5.1 2.5 | 2.4 5.6 | -.1 5.5 | 1.3 5.7 | 3.2 3.7 |
| Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.3 3.3 | 2.3 2.3 | -1.1 -1.1 | -3.0 -3.0 | -1.7 -1.7 | -1.9 -1.9 | .8 .8 | 4 -.1 | .8 -.8 | 1.1 1.1 |
| Federal Defense Nondefense State & local | 8.4 9.4 6.5 .2 | 3.9 3.6 4.6 1.3 | 3.2 2.0 5.5 -4.0 | -4.0 -4.1 -3.9 -2.3 | -2.6 -4.9 1.4 -1.0 | -6.3 -6.1 -6.6 1.2 | 2 -.3 1.1 1.2 | -1.1 -1.7 0 1.3 | -1.2 -2.0 0 2.0 | -.8 -1.5 .1 .2 |
| Change in priv. inventories ¹ <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -34 -34 | -148 -148 | 58 58 | 38 38 | 57 57 | 64 71 | 71 94 | 95 72 | 81 69 | 39 69 |

1. Billions of chained (2009) dollars.

Greensheets
Contributions to Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product
(Percentage points, annual rate except as noted)

| Item | 2014 | | | 2015 | | | 2016 | | | 2014 ¹ | | | 2015 ¹ | | | 2016 ¹ | | | 2017 ¹ | | |
|---|------|-----|------|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------------------|-----|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|--|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | 2014 ¹ | 2015 ¹ | 2016 ¹ | 2017 ¹ | 2014 ¹ | 2015 ¹ | 2016 ¹ | 2017 ¹ | | |
| Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 4.6 | 5.0 | 2.2 | -5 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.1 | | |
| Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.2 | 5.0 | 2.3 | -9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | | |
| Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.7 | -3 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.6 | | |
| Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.8 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.8 | | |
| Durables | 1.0 | .7 | .5 | .1 | .5 | .6 | .6 | .5 | .5 | .4 | .4 | .6 | .4 | .5 | .3 | .4 | .5 | .3 | .4 | | |
| Nondurables | .3 | .4 | .6 | .0 | .3 | .5 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | | |
| Services | .4 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.2 | | |
| Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .3 | .1 | .1 | .2 | .4 | .2 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .1 | .2 | .4 | .3 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .3 | | |
| Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.2 | 1.1 | .6 | -.4 | .1 | .3 | .5 | .4 | .5 | .5 | .5 | .8 | .1 | .5 | .4 | .3 | .4 | .4 | .3 | | |
| Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.2 | 1.1 | .6 | -.6 | -.2 | .1 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .8 | -.1 | .4 | .3 | .5 | .3 | .5 | .4 | | |
| Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .8 | 1.0 | .4 | .2 | .4 | .3 | .4 | .5 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .6 | .3 | .4 | .3 | .4 | .3 | .4 | .3 | | |
| Net exports <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -.3 | .8 | -1.0 | -1.8 | -.2 | -.9 | -.6 | -.9 | -.9 | -.9 | -.9 | -.2 | -.6 | -.9 | -.8 | -.2 | -.8 | -.8 | -.2 | | |
| Exports | -.3 | .8 | -1.0 | -.6 | -.6 | -.8 | -.8 | -.9 | -.9 | -.9 | -.9 | -.4 | -.6 | -.8 | -.8 | -.2 | -.8 | -.8 | -.2 | | |
| Imports | 1.4 | .6 | .6 | -.8 | .4 | .1 | .3 | -.3 | .3 | .2 | .5 | .3 | .0 | .2 | .4 | .2 | .0 | .2 | .4 | | |
| Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .3 | .8 | -.4 | -.1 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .3 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .2 | | |
| Federal Defense | .3 | .8 | -.4 | -.4 | .2 | .0 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.2 | .1 | -.1 | 0 | -.1 | -.1 | 0 | -.1 | | |
| Nondefense | -1 | .7 | -.5 | .0 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.2 | .1 | -.1 | 0 | -.1 | 0 | -.1 | 0 | | |
| State & local | .4 | .1 | .2 | -.1 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .2 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .2 | | |
| Change in priv. inventories <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.4 | 0 | -.1 | .4 | .1 | -.1 | -.2 | .1 | -.2 | -.1 | -.3 | 0 | .0 | -.1 | -.3 | 0 | .0 | .0 | -.1 | | |
| | 1.4 | 0 | -.1 | .4 | .2 | -.2 | -.4 | -.1 | -.1 | -.3 | -.1 | .2 | 0 | .0 | -.1 | -.3 | 0 | .0 | -.1 | | |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

Changes in Prices and Costs
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

| Item | 2014 | | | | 2015 | | | | 2016 | | | | 2017 ¹ | | | |
|---|------|------|-------|-------|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | 2014 ¹ | 2015 ¹ | 2016 ¹ | 2017 ¹ | |
| GDP chain-wt. price index | 2.1 | 1.4 | .1 | -.1 | 2.5 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.1 | 1.4 | .1 | -.3 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| PCE chain-wt. price index | 2.3 | 1.2 | -.4 | -2.0 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.1 | .6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.3 | 1.2 | -.4 | -2.0 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.1 | .6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| Energy | 5.2 | -4.0 | -26.0 | -44.5 | 15.6 | -.7 | -2.8 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.6 | -6.1 | -11.3 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 5.2 | -4.0 | -26.0 | -45.0 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.0 | -6.1 | -11.4 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Food | 4.5 | 3.1 | 2.1 | -.2 | -.9 | .8 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.8 | .3 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 4.5 | 3.1 | 2.1 | -.2 | -.3 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.8 | .6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Ex. food & energy | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.1 | .8 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.1 | .8 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| Ex. food & energy, market based | 1.8 | 1.4 | .7 | .5 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.8 | 1.4 | .7 | .5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| CPI | 2.4 | 1.2 | -.9 | -3.1 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.2 | .7 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.4 | 1.2 | -.9 | -3.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.2 | .7 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Ex. food & energy | 2.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| ECI, hourly compensation ² | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 |
| Business sector | 2.9 | 3.3 | -2.3 | -2.8 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | -.4 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Output per hour | 2.9 | 3.3 | -2.4 | -1.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | -.4 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.9 | 3.3 | -2.4 | -1.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | -.4 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Compensation per hour | -1.0 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -1.1 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Unit labor costs | -3.9 | -1.2 | 5.5 | 6.1 | .4 | .7 | .5 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 3.0 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -3.9 | -1.2 | 4.0 | 5.1 | .2 | .3 | .7 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| Core goods imports chain-wt. price index ³ | .2 | .5 | -.8 | -4.3 | -4.0 | -.6 | -.2 | .5 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | .6 | -2.3 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .2 | .5 | -.8 | -4.0 | -4.0 | -.8 | -.1 | .4 | .9 | 1.2 | 1.2 | .6 | -2.3 | .9 | 1.6 | 1.6 |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

2. Private-industry workers.

3. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

Greensheets**Changes in Prices and Costs**
(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

| Item | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|
| GDP chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.9 | .4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.8 |
| PCE chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 1.1 | .6 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| Energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -8.2 | 2.3 | 6.4 | 12.0 | 2.1 | -2.6 | -6.1 | -11.3 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
| Food <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 6.9 | -1.8 | 1.3 | 5.1 | 1.2 | .7 | 2.8 | .3 | 1.6 | 1.9 |
| Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| Ex. food & energy; market based <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.2 | 1.8 | .7 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| CPI <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 3.3 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.2 | .7 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.0 | 1.8 | .6 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| ECI, hourly compensation ¹ <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.4 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Business sector | | | | | | | | | | |
| Output per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -.2 | 5.6 | 1.7 | .0 | .2 | 2.3 | -.4 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Compensation per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.9 | 1.3 | 1.2 | .6 | 5.6 | -.1 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Unit labor costs <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.2 | -4.2 | -4 | .6 | 5.6 | -.1 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Core goods imports chain-wt. price index ² <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.9 | -1.9 | 2.3 | 4.3 | .2 | -1.0 | .6 | -2.3 | 1.0 | 1.5 |
| | 3.9 | -1.9 | 2.3 | 4.3 | .2 | -1.0 | .6 | -2.3 | .9 | 1.6 |

1. Private-industry workers.

2. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

Other Macroeconomic Indicators

| Item | 2014 | | | | 2015 | | | | 2016 | | | | 2014 ¹ | 2015 ¹ | 2016 ¹ | 2017 ¹ |
|---|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | | | | |
| <i>Employment and production</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nonfarm payroll employment ² | .8 | .7 | .9 | .8 | .6 | .7 | .6 | .6 | .6 | .5 | .5 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.7 | |
| Unemployment rate ³ | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 |
| Natural rate of unemployment ³ | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| Employment-to-Population Ratio ³ | 58.9 | 59.0 | 59.2 | 59.3 | 59.4 | 59.4 | 59.4 | 59.3 | 59.3 | 59.3 | 59.3 | 59.2 | 59.4 | 59.3 | 59.2 | 59.1 |
| Employment-to-Population Trend ³ | 60.2 | 60.1 | 60.0 | 60.0 | 59.9 | 59.8 | 59.7 | 59.7 | 59.6 | 59.5 | 59.4 | 60.0 | 59.7 | 59.4 | 59.3 | 59.1 |
| GDP gap ⁴ | -2.3 | -1.3 | -1.0 | -1.5 | -1.3 | -1.2 | -1.0 | -1.0 | -.9 | -.7 | -.5 | -4 | -1.0 | -1.0 | -4 | .1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁴ | -2.3 | -1.3 | -1.0 | -1.3 | -1.2 | -1.0 | -1.2 | -1.0 | -.6 | -.5 | -.3 | -1 | -1.0 | -.8 | -.1 | .3 |
| Industrial production ⁵ | 5.7 | 4.1 | 4.6 | -.7 | -1.8 | 1.3 | -.5 | 1.2 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 4.6 | -.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁵ | 5.7 | 4.1 | 4.6 | -.7 | -1.0 | -.8 | .7 | .6 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 4.6 | -.1 | 2.2 | 1.5 | |
| Manufacturing industr. prod. ⁵ | 7.0 | 4.4 | 3.8 | -1.0 | .1 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 4.1 | .4 | 1.9 | 1.7 | |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁵ | 7.0 | 4.4 | 3.8 | -1.2 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 4.1 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.5 | |
| Capacity utilization rate - mfg. ³ | 77.1 | 77.5 | 77.8 | 77.3 | 77.0 | 76.9 | 76.8 | 76.7 | 76.9 | 76.9 | 76.9 | 77.8 | 76.8 | 76.9 | 76.8 | 76.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 77.1 | 77.5 | 77.8 | 77.2 | 77.3 | 77.3 | 77.4 | 77.5 | 77.6 | 77.6 | 77.7 | 77.7 | 77.8 | 77.7 | 77.7 | 77.4 |
| Housing starts ⁶ | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 | |
| Light motor vehicle sales ⁶ | 16.5 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.6 | 17.0 | 16.9 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.4 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.7 | |
| <i>Income and saving</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal GDP ⁵ | 6.8 | 6.4 | 2.4 | -.6 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 4.1 | 4.1 | |
| Real disposable pers. income ⁵ | 3.1 | 2.4 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.5 | |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁵ | 3.1 | 2.4 | 3.6 | 6.5 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2.5 | |
| Personal saving rate ³ | 5.1 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 4.0 | |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 5.1 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 5.6 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.8 | |
| Corporate profits ⁷ | 38.3 | 12.8 | -.5 | -23.0 | 17.1 | -.5 | -1.5 | -3.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 6.3 | -.2 | -4.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Profit share of GNP ³ | 12.0 | 12.2 | 12.0 | 11.2 | 11.6 | 11.3 | 11.2 | 11.0 | 10.9 | 10.8 | 10.9 | 12.0 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 10.5 | |
| Gross national saving rate ³ | 17.9 | 18.1 | 18.2 | 18.4 | 18.0 | 17.6 | 17.5 | 17.2 | 17.3 | 17.1 | 17.2 | 18.2 | 17.5 | 17.2 | 17.0 | |
| Net national saving rate ³ | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.5 | |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise indicated.

2. Change, millions.

3. Percent; annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

4. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential. Annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

5. Percent change, annual rate.

6. Level, millions; annual values are annual averages.

7. Percent change, annual rate, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

Greensheets**Other Macroeconomic Indicators**
(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

| Item | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|---|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <i>Employment and production</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nonfarm payroll employment ¹ | -2.8 | -5.6 | .8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
| Unemployment rate ² | 6.9 | 9.9 | 9.5 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 7.0 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 6.9 | 9.9 | 9.5 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 7.0 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.1 |
| Natural rate of unemployment ² | 5.6 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 5.6 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| Employment-to-Population Ratio ² | 61.4 | 58.4 | 58.3 | 58.5 | 58.7 | 58.5 | 59.2 | 59.4 | 59.3 | 59.2 |
| Employment-to-Population Trend ² | 62.0 | 61.3 | 60.9 | 60.6 | 60.3 | 60.2 | 60.0 | 59.7 | 59.4 | 59.1 |
| GDP gap ³ | -3.8 | -5.5 | -4.4 | -4.2 | -4.1 | -2.8 | -1.0 | -1.0 | -4 | -1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | -3.8 | -5.5 | -4.4 | -4.2 | -4.1 | -2.8 | -1.0 | -1.0 | -1 | -1 |
| Industrial production ⁴ | -8.9 | -5.5 | 6.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 4.6 | -4 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁴ | -8.9 | -5.5 | 6.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 4.6 | -1 | 2.2 | 1.5 |
| Manufacturing industr. prod. ⁴ | -11.6 | -6.1 | 6.4 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 4.1 | .4 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁴ | -11.6 | -6.1 | 6.4 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 4.1 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.5 |
| Capacity utilization rate - mfg. ² | 70.0 | 67.1 | 72.7 | 74.6 | 75.5 | 76.4 | 77.8 | 76.8 | 76.9 | 76.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 70.0 | 67.1 | 72.7 | 74.6 | 75.5 | 76.4 | 77.8 | 77.4 | 77.7 | 77.4 |
| Housing starts ⁵ | .9 | .6 | 11.5 | 12.7 | .8 | .9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| Light motor vehicle sales ⁵ | 13.1 | 10.4 | 4.6 | 11.5 | 12.7 | 14.4 | 15.5 | 16.4 | 16.8 | 16.7 |
| <i>Income and saving</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal GDP ⁴ | -.9 | .1 | 4.6 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Real disposable pers. income ⁴ | 1.1 | -.7 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 5.0 | -1.9 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.5 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁴ | 1.1 | -.7 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 5.0 | -1.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2.5 |
| Personal saving rate ² | 6.1 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 8.6 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 4.0 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 6.1 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 8.6 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Corporate profits ⁶ | -30.8 | 53.7 | 18.0 | 6.8 | 3.8 | 4.7 | -2 | -4.2 | 1.5 | 5 |
| Profit share of GNP ² | 6.9 | 10.6 | 12.0 | 12.3 | 12.4 | 12.4 | 12.0 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 10.5 |
| Gross national saving rate ² | 14.9 | 14.6 | 15.2 | 16.1 | 17.8 | 17.9 | 18.2 | 17.5 | 17.2 | 17.0 |
| Net national saving rate ² | -1.6 | -1.7 | -.4 | .8 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.5 |

1. Change, millions.

2. Percent; values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

Values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

4. Percent change.

5. Level, millions; values are annual averages.

6. Percent change, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

Staff Projections of Federal Sector Accounts and Related Items
(Billions of dollars except as noted)

| Item | Fiscal year | | | | 2014 | | | | 2015 | | | | 2016 | | | |
|--|-------------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Q1 ^a | Q2 ^a | Q3 ^a | Q4 ^a | Q1 ^a | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| Unified budget | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Receipts | 3,021 | 3,257 | 3,419 | 3,550 | 656 | 938 | 760 | 739 | 680 | 1,025 | 812 | 753 | 719 | 1,082 | 865 | 803 |
| Outlays | 3,504 | 3,697 | 3,863 | 4,020 | 897 | 890 | 877 | 916 | 943 | 945 | 894 | 991 | 949 | 951 | 971 | 969 |
| Surplus/deficit | -482 | -441 | -444 | -470 | -241 | 47 | -117 | -177 | -263 | 81 | -82 | -239 | -230 | 130 | -106 | -166 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -482 | -453 | -472 | -491 | -241 | 47 | -117 | -177 | -263 | 76 | -90 | -249 | -235 | 124 | -112 | -173 |
| Means of financing: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Borrowing | 798 | 327 | 551 | 589 | 262 | -46 | 211 | 240 | 67 | -37 | 57 | 249 | 252 | -80 | 129 | 193 |
| Cash decrease | -70 | -52 | 13 | 1 | 20 | 3 | -19 | -65 | 123 | -131 | 20 | 19 | 8 | -21 | 7 | 3 |
| Other ¹ | -245 | 166 | -120 | -120 | -42 | -4 | -74 | 1 | 73 | 87 | 5 | -30 | -30 | -30 | -30 | -30 |
| Cash operating balance, end of period | 158 | 211 | 197 | 196 | 142 | 139 | 158 | 223 | 100 | 231 | 211 | 191 | 183 | 204 | 197 | 194 |
| NIPA federal sector | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Receipts | 3,267 | 3,430 | 3,574 | 3,715 | 3,243 | 3,277 | 3,342 | 3,349 | 3,469 | 3,500 | 3,532 | 3,544 | 3,587 | 3,632 | 3,680 | |
| Expenditures | 3,844 | 3,977 | 4,150 | 4,356 | 3,803 | 3,875 | 3,953 | 3,901 | 3,907 | 4,030 | 4,068 | 4,061 | 4,158 | 4,161 | 4,219 | 4,274 |
| Consumption expenditures | 963 | 961 | 966 | 981 | 957 | 956 | 988 | 961 | 963 | 961 | 960 | 960 | 968 | 966 | 971 | 970 |
| Defense | 617 | 612 | 617 | 617 | 610 | 610 | 614 | 614 | 612 | 612 | 610 | 610 | 614 | 611 | 613 | 611 |
| Nondefense | 346 | 349 | 354 | 364 | 347 | 345 | 347 | 347 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 355 | 356 | 357 | 359 |
| Other spending | 2,882 | 3,015 | 3,184 | 3,376 | 2,846 | 2,920 | 2,965 | 2,944 | 3,069 | 3,108 | 3,102 | 3,190 | 3,195 | 3,249 | 3,304 | 3,304 |
| Current account surplus | -577 | -547 | -576 | -641 | -560 | -599 | -611 | -552 | -506 | -562 | -568 | -529 | -613 | -575 | -587 | -594 |
| Gross investment | 256 | 254 | 249 | 248 | 251 | 255 | 254 | 256 | 253 | 252 | 251 | 250 | 248 | 249 | 249 | 248 |
| Gross saving less gross investment ² | -561 | -522 | -541 | -598 | -539 | -580 | -589 | -532 | -482 | -535 | -539 | -498 | -580 | -537 | -550 | -553 |
| Fiscal indicators | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| High-employment (HEB) surplus/deficit ³ | -404.2 | -452.1 | -494.3 | -587.6 | -342.8 | -427.0 | -488.7 | -457.3 | -403.9 | -469.9 | -477.3 | -439.1 | -526.3 | -493.6 | -518.1 | -532.2 |
| Change in HEB, percent of potential GDP | -1.0 | .2 | .2 | .4 | -.1 | .5 | .3 | -.2 | -.3 | .3 | .0 | -.2 | .4 | -.2 | .1 | .1 |
| Fiscal impetus (FI), percent of GDP ⁴ | -.1 | .2 | .3 | .3 | -.6 | .0 | .7 | -.4 | -.1 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .4 | .2 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -.1 | .2 | .3 | .3 | -.6 | .0 | .7 | -.4 | -.5 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .1 | .2 | .4 | .2 |
| Federal purchases | .0 | -1 | -1 | .0 | .0 | -1 | .7 | .7 | .0 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -.1 | -2 | .1 | -1 |
| State and local purchases | .1 | .1 | .2 | .2 | -.1 | .4 | .1 | .2 | .1 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 |
| Taxes and transfers | -.2 | .2 | .1 | .1 | -.5 | .1 | -.3 | -.1 | .0 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 |

1. Other means of financing include checks issued less checks paid, accrued items, and changes in other financial assets and liabilities.

2. Gross saving is the current account surplus plus consumption of fixed capital of the general government as well as government enterprises.

3. HEB is gross saving less gross investment (NIPA) of the federal government in current dollars, with cyclically sensitive receipts and outlays adjusted to the staff's measure of potential output and the natural rate of unemployment. The sign on Change in HEB, as a percent of nominal potential GDP, is reversed. Quarterly figures for change in HEB are not at annual rates.

4. Fiscal impetus measures the contribution to growth of real GDP from fiscal policy actions at the general government level (excluding multiplier effects). It equals the sum of the direct contributions to real GDP growth from changes in federal purchases and state and local purchases, plus the estimated contribution from real consumption and investment that is induced by discretionary policy changes in transfers and taxes.

a Actual.

Greensheets
Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries
(Quarterly percent changes at an annual rate)

| Measure and country | 2014 | | | | 2015 | | | | Projected 2016 | | | |
|------------------------------------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|-----|----------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| Real GDP¹ | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| Advanced foreign economies | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.9 | .9 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| Canada | 1.0 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 2.2 | -.6 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.2 |
| Japan | 4.4 | -6.8 | -2.0 | 1.2 | 3.9 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| United Kingdom | 3.6 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Euro area | .9 | 4 | .7 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Germany | 3.1 | -.3 | .3 | 2.8 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Emerging market economies | 2.5 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 |
| Asia | 4.4 | 4.9 | 6.2 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| Korea | 4.4 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 1.1 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| China | 6.4 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 7.0 | 5.1 | 6.1 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 |
| Latin America | .8 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | .9 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Mexico | 2.0 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Brazil | 2.9 | -5.5 | .6 | 1.1 | -.6 | -3.2 | -.8 | .8 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| <i>Consumer prices²</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 1.1 | -.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 1.1 | -.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Advanced foreign economies | 1.4 | 3.1 | .8 | -.4 | -.8 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Canada | 3.2 | 3.3 | 1.2 | .0 | -.2 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Japan | .7 | 9.3 | 1.2 | -.6 | -.3 | .5 | .7 | .8 | .9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| United Kingdom | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.2 | -.7 | -1.6 | .9 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Euro area | .4 | .4 | .4 | -.6 | -1.5 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Germany | .4 | .3 | 1.5 | -.5 | -1.7 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| Emerging market economies | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.3 | .5 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| Asia | 1.4 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.2 | -.3 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| Korea | 1.4 | 2.2 | .6 | -.2 | -.3 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| China | .8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.0 | -.4 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Latin America | 5.3 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Mexico | 4.8 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 4.2 | .3 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Brazil | 6.5 | 7.4 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 11.1 | 9.3 | 6.2 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.6 |

¹Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.²Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries
 (Percent change, Q4 to Q4)

| Measure and country | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Real GDP¹ | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | .9 | 4.8 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .9 | 4.7 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 2.9 |
| Advanced foreign economies | -1.5 | 3.1 | 1.8 | .3 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| Canada | -1.4 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 2.0 |
| Japan | -.6 | 3.6 | .3 | .0 | 2.3 | -.9 | 2.1 | 1.4 | -.2 |
| United Kingdom | -1.5 | 2.2 | 1.5 | .4 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.3 |
| Euro area | -2.4 | 2.3 | .6 | -.9 | .5 | .9 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| Germany | -3.0 | 4.4 | 2.4 | .1 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| Emerging market economies | 3.7 | 6.7 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| Asia | 7.5 | 8.4 | 4.9 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.0 |
| Korea | 4.9 | 6.1 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.8 |
| China | 11.4 | 9.7 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 6.5 |
| Latin America | .0 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 3.0 |
| Mexico | -1.2 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Brazil | 5.2 | 5.8 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | -.3 | -1.0 | 1.8 | 2.3 |
| Consumer prices ² | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | 1.2 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.2 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| Advanced foreign economies | .2 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.2 | .8 | 1.6 | 2.0 |
| Canada | .8 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| Japan | -2.0 | -.3 | -.3 | -.2 | 1.4 | 2.5 | .4 | 1.0 | 2.6 |
| United Kingdom | 2.2 | 3.4 | 4.6 | 2.6 | 2.1 | .9 | .7 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| Euro area | .4 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 2.3 | .8 | .2 | .8 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| Germany | .3 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 1.3 | .4 | .9 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| Emerging market economies | 2.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| Asia | 1.2 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| Korea | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| China | .6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Latin America | 3.9 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 3.7 |
| Mexico | 4.0 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Brazil | 4.3 | 5.6 | 6.7 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 6.5 | 8.1 | 5.6 | 5.4 |

¹ Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.

² Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

**U.S. Current Account
Quarterly Data**

| | 2014 | | | | 2015 | | | | 2016 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| <i>Billions of dollars, s.a.a.r.</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| U.S. current account balance | -411.5 | -383.1 | -403.4 | -459.0 | -499.4 | -496.2 | -535.4 | -561.7 | -628.4 | -630.0 | -676.9 | -697.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -403.9 | -389.1 | -395.7 | -453.8 | -472.1 | -462.5 | -499.9 | -537.0 | -596.4 | -607.1 | -657.3 | -685.4 |
| Current account as percent of GDP | -2.4 | -2.2 | -2.3 | -2.6 | -2.8 | -3.0 | -3.1 | -3.4 | -3.4 | -3.4 | -3.6 | -3.7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.4 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -2.6 | -2.7 | -2.6 | -2.8 | -2.9 | -3.2 | -3.3 | -3.5 | -3.6 |
| Net goods & services | -501.7 | -514.8 | -503.5 | -513.3 | -521.0 | -496.1 | -541.1 | -573.1 | -626.9 | -649.4 | -692.1 | -710.1 |
| Investment income, net | 218.6 | 228.8 | 248.5 | 211.8 | 175.7 | 147.7 | 156.1 | 159.4 | 164.9 | 167.3 | 165.7 | 160.3 |
| Direct, net | 293.2 | 293.1 | 314.9 | 281.1 | 258.7 | 240.3 | 254.1 | 266.4 | 281.8 | 295.2 | 307.7 | 318.0 |
| Portfolio, net | -74.6 | -64.3 | -66.5 | -69.3 | -83.0 | -92.5 | -97.9 | -107.0 | -116.8 | -127.9 | -142.0 | -157.7 |
| Other income and transfers, net | -128.4 | -97.0 | -148.4 | -157.5 | -154.1 | -147.8 | -150.4 | -148.0 | -166.5 | -147.8 | -150.4 | -148.0 |
| <i>Annual Data</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| U.S. current account balance | -380.8 | -443.9 | -459.3 | -459.9 | -402.3 | -414.2 | -523.2 | -523.2 | -523.2 | -636.6 | -636.6 | -747.6 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -380.8 | -443.9 | -459.3 | -459.3 | -460.8 | -400.3 | -410.6 | -410.6 | -410.6 | -492.9 | -636.6 | -739.3 |
| Current account as percent of GDP | -2.6 | -3.0 | -3.0 | -2.8 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.9 | -3.5 | -3.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.6 | -3.0 | -3.0 | -2.9 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.7 | -3.4 | -3.8 |
| Net goods & services | -383.8 | -494.7 | -548.6 | -536.8 | -478.4 | -508.3 | -532.8 | -532.8 | -532.8 | -669.6 | -754.6 | |
| Investment income, net | 132.3 | 185.7 | 229.0 | 211.4 | 208.5 | 226.9 | 159.7 | 164.5 | 164.5 | 160.2 | | |
| Direct, net | 257.7 | 288.0 | 298.6 | 281.6 | 290.9 | 295.6 | 254.9 | 300.7 | 300.7 | 365.4 | | |
| Portfolio, net | -125.4 | -102.3 | -69.5 | -70.2 | -82.3 | -68.7 | -95.1 | -136.1 | -136.1 | -205.2 | | |
| Other income and transfers, net | -129.3 | -135.0 | -139.8 | -134.6 | -132.4 | -132.8 | -150.1 | -150.1 | -150.1 | -153.2 | | |

Abbreviations

| | |
|------------|--|
| AFE | advanced foreign economy |
| BHC | bank holding company |
| BOC | Bank of Canada |
| BOE | Bank of England |
| BOJ | Bank of Japan |
| C&I | commercial and industrial |
| CMBS | commercial mortgage-backed securities |
| CPI | consumer price index |
| CRE | commercial real estate |
| Desk | Open Market Desk |
| DSGE model | dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model |
| ECB | European Central Bank |
| ECI | employment cost index |
| EFSF | European Financial Stability Facility |
| EME | emerging market economy |
| FOMC | Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee |
| FX | foreign exchange |
| GCF | General Collateral Finance |
| GDI | gross domestic income |
| GDP | gross domestic product |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| JOLTS | Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey |
| M&A | mergers and acquisitions |
| MBS | mortgage-backed securities |
| MERS | Middle East Respiratory Syndrome |
| OIS | overnight index swap |
| ON RRP | overnight reverse repurchase agreement |
| PCE | personal consumption expenditures |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| PMI | purchasing managers index |
| PRISM model | Philadelphia Research Intertemporal Stochastic Model |
| repo | repurchase agreement |
| SCOOS | Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms |
| SOMA | System Open Market Account |
| S&P | Standard & Poor's |
| TIPS | Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities |

Class I FOMC – Restricted Controlled (FR)

Report to the FOMC on Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy



Book B Monetary Policy: Strategies and Alternatives

June 11, 2015

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Policy Rules and the Staff Projection

Near-Term Prescriptions of Selected Policy Rules



| | <u>2015Q3</u> | <u>2015Q4</u> |
|----------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Taylor (1993) rule | 1.78 | 1.95 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.85 | 2.07 |
| Taylor (1999) rule | 1.18 | 1.44 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.36 | 1.68 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) rule | 0.29 | 0.46 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook outlook</i> | 0.31 | 0.52 |
| First-difference rule | 0.16 | 0.26 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook outlook</i> | 0.21 | 0.31 |

Memo: Equilibrium and Actual Real Federal Funds Rates

| | Current Tealbook | <i>Previous Tealbook</i> |
|---|---------------------|------------------------------|
| Tealbook-consistent FRB/US r^* estimate | −0.30 | −0.09 |
| Actual real federal funds rate | −1.18 | −1.18 |


Note: The lines denoted "Previous Tealbook outlook" report rule prescriptions based on the previous Tealbook's staff outlook using the current rule specifications, which have intercept terms that have been adjusted, where applicable, to reflect the staff's downward revision to the longer-run real federal funds rate. Rules that have the lagged policy rate as a right-hand-side variable jump off from the average value of the policy rate thus far in the current quarter.

Key Elements of the Staff Projection




Policy Rule Simulations



Effective Nominal Federal Funds Rate




Unemployment Rate



Real Federal Funds Rate






PCE Inflation
Four-quarter average

Real 10-year Treasury Yield




Note: The policy rule simulations in this exhibit are based on rules that respond to core inflation. This choice of rule specification was made in light of the tendency for current and near-term core inflation rates to outperform headline inflation rates as predictors of the medium-term behavior of headline inflation.

Optimal Control Policy under Commitment




Implications of Alternative Values of the Long-Run Real Federal Funds Rate (r^{LR})


Prescribed Federal Funds Rate for Selected Quarters



Probability of Departure from Current Target Range in Each Quarter



Effective Nominal Federal Funds Rate



Outcomes under Alternative Policies

(Percent change, annual rate, from end of preceding period except as noted)

| Measure and policy | 2015 | | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|------|-----|------|------|------|------|
| | H1 | H2 | | | | |
| <i>Real GDP</i> | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 1.0 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| Taylor (1993) | 1.0 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Taylor (1999) | 1.0 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 1.0 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| First-difference | 1.0 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
| Optimal control | 1.0 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| <i>Unemployment rate²</i> | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 |
| Taylor (1993) | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 |
| Taylor (1999) | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.3 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.1 |
| First-difference | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 4.9 |
| Optimal control | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.1 |
| <i>Total PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | -0.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Taylor (1993) | -0.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Taylor (1999) | -0.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | -0.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| First-difference | -0.1 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Optimal control | -0.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| <i>Core PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Taylor (1993) | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Taylor (1999) | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| First-difference | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Optimal control | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| <i>Effective nominal federal funds rate²</i> | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.3 |
| Taylor (1993) | 0.1 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Taylor (1999) | 0.1 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.3 |
| First-difference | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.9 |
| Optimal control | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 3.2 |

1. In the Tealbook baseline, the federal funds rate first departs from an effective lower bound of 1½ basis points in September of 2015. Thereafter, the federal funds rate follows the prescriptions of the inertial Taylor (1999) rule.

2. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.

Outcomes under Alternative Policies, Quarterly

(Four-quarter percentage change, except as noted)





| Measure and policy | 2015 | | | | 2016 | | | |
|---|------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| <i>Real GDP</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Taylor (1993) | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Taylor (1999) | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| First-difference | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Optimal control | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| <i>Unemployment rate²</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 |
| Taylor (1993) | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| Taylor (1999) | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| First-difference | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| Optimal control | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 |
| <i>Total PCE prices</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| Taylor (1993) | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| Taylor (1999) | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| First-difference | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| Optimal control | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| <i>Core PCE prices</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| Taylor (1993) | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Taylor (1999) | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| First-difference | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| Optimal control | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| <i>Effective nominal federal funds rate²</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Extended Tealbook baseline ¹ | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| Taylor (1993) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| Taylor (1999) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| Inertial Taylor (1999) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| First-difference | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| Optimal control | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 |

1. In the Tealbook baseline, the federal funds rate first departs from an effective lower bound of 12½ basis points in September of 2015. Thereafter, the federal funds rate follows the prescriptions of the inertial Taylor (1999) rule.

2. Percent, average for the quarter.

Total Assets and Selected Balance Sheet Items

— June Tealbook - - April Tealbook

Total Assets**Reserve Balances****SOMA Treasury Holdings****SOMA Agency MBS Holdings**

Projections

Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
End-of-Year Projections -- June Tealbook
(Billions of dollars)

| | May 31, 2015 | 2015 | 2017 | 2019 | 2021 | 2023 | 2025 |
|--|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Total assets | 4,465 | 4,452 | 3,752 | 2,727 | 2,339 | 2,523 | 2,729 |
| Selected assets | | | | | | | |
| Loans and other credit extensions* | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Securities held outright | 4,219 | 4,224 | 3,562 | 2,567 | 2,202 | 2,396 | 2,612 |
| U.S. Treasury securities | 2,461 | 2,462 | 2,117 | 1,394 | 1,241 | 1,613 | 1,978 |
| Agency debt securities | 36 | 33 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Agency mortgage-backed securities | 1,722 | 1,729 | 1,441 | 1,171 | 959 | 781 | 632 |
| Unamortized premiums | 199 | 192 | 152 | 117 | 93 | 81 | 71 |
| Unamortized discounts | -18 | -17 | -13 | -10 | -8 | -7 | -6 |
| Total other assets | 43 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| Total liabilities | 4,407 | 4,392 | 3,681 | 2,636 | 2,224 | 2,377 | 2,545 |
| Selected liabilities | | | | | | | |
| Federal Reserve notes in circulation | 1,323 | 1,364 | 1,538 | 1,669 | 1,807 | 1,960 | 2,128 |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | 317 | 256 | 256 | 156 | 156 | 156 | 156 |
| Deposits with Federal Reserve Banks | 2,759 | 2,766 | 1,881 | 805 | 255 | 255 | 255 |
| Reserve balances held by depository institutions | 2,401 | 2,611 | 1,726 | 649 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| U.S. Treasury, General Account | 199 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| Other deposits | 159 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Interest on Federal Reserve Notes due to U.S. Treasury | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total capital | 58 | 60 | 72 | 91 | 115 | 146 | 184 |

Projections







Source: Federal Reserve H.4.1 statistical releases and staff calculations.

Note: Components may not sum to totals due to rounding.

*Loans and other credit extensions includes primary, secondary, and seasonal credit; central bank liquidity swaps; and net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane LLC.

Income Projections

— June Tealbook - April Tealbook

Interest Income**Interest Expense****Realized Capital Gains****Remittances to Treasury****Deferred Asset****Memo: Unrealized Gains/Losses**

Projections

Projections for the 10-Year Treasury Term Premium Effect
(Basis Points)

| Date | June Tealbook | April Tealbook |
|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Quarterly Averages | | |
| 2015:Q2 | -112 | -109 |
| Q3 | -107 | -104 |
| Q4 | -102 | -100 |
| 2016:Q1 | -98 | -95 |
| Q2 | -93 | -90 |
| Q3 | -88 | -86 |
| Q4 | -84 | -81 |
| 2017:Q4 | -69 | -66 |
| 2018:Q4 | -57 | -55 |
| 2019:Q4 | -48 | -45 |
| 2020:Q4 | -40 | -38 |
| 2021:Q4 | -35 | -32 |
| 2022:Q4 | -30 | -28 |
| 2023:Q4 | -24 | -23 |
| 2024:Q4 | -19 | -18 |
| 2025:Q4 | -14 | -13 |

Projections

Projections for the Monetary Base
 (Percent change, annual rate; not seasonally adjusted)

| Date | June Tealbook | April Tealbook |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Quarterly</i> | | |
| 2015:Q2 | 8.4 | 32.6 |
| Q3 | 14.4 | 3.3 |
| Q4 | 0.2 | -0.3 |
| 2016:Q1 | -0.2 | 0.2 |
| Q2 | -5.3 | -5.0 |
| Q3 | -10.5 | -10.6 |
| Q4 | -9.6 | -9.6 |
| <i>Annual</i> | | |
| 2017 | -10.2 | -10.4 |
| 2018 | -15.4 | -15.2 |
| 2019 | -14.1 | -13.8 |
| 2020 | -14.0 | -13.5 |
| 2021 | -4.4 | -4.6 |
| 2022 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| 2023 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| 2024 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| 2025 | 3.7 | 3.6 |

MONEY

M2 growth is expected to moderate a bit in the second quarter of 2015; thereafter, M2 is projected to contract notably through mid-2016 and then to move up slowly over the remainder of the forecast period as the projected increase in the target range for the federal funds rate and the associated rise in the opportunity cost of holding money restrains money demand. The increase in the opportunity cost is expected to hold M2 growth below that of nominal GDP in 2016 and, to a lesser extent, in 2017. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the M2 forecast. For example, it is possible that banks may respond to increases in short-term interest rates somewhat differently than in the past, in particular because of important changes to bank regulation. (See accompanying box, “Bank Regulation, Deposit Outflows, and Demand for ON RRP.”)

| M2 Monetary Aggregate Projections (Percent change, annual rate; seasonally adjusted)* | | |
|--|------|------|
| <i>Quarterly</i> | | |
| 2015: | Q1 | 7.6 |
| | Q2 | 4.9 |
| | Q3 | -0.3 |
| | Q4 | -3.8 |
| 2016: | Q1 | -2.9 |
| | Q2 | -0.6 |
| | Q3 | 1.0 |
| | Q4 | 1.4 |
| 2016: | Q1 | 1.6 |
| | Q2 | 1.7 |
| | Q3 | 1.7 |
| | Q4 | 1.9 |
| <i>Annual</i> | | |
| | 2015 | 2.1 |
| | 2016 | -0.3 |
| | 2017 | 1.7 |

Note: This forecast is consistent with nominal GDP and interest rates in the Tealbook forecast. Actual data through June 1, 2015; projections thereafter.

* Quarterly growth rates are computed from quarter averages. Annual growth rates are calculated using the change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|---|
| ABS | asset-backed securities |
| BEA | Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce |
| BHC | bank holding company |
| CDS | credit default swaps |
| C&I | commercial and industrial |
| CLO | collateralized loan obligation |
| CMBS | commercial mortgage-backed securities |
| CPI | consumer price index |
| CRE | commercial real estate |
| Desk | Open Market Desk |
| ECB | European Central Bank |
| EME | emerging market economy |
| FDIC | Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation |
| FOMC | Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee |
| GCF | general collateral finance |
| GDI | gross domestic income |
| GDP | gross domestic product |
| GSIBs | globally systemically important banking organizations |
| HQLA | high-quality liquid assets |
| ISM | Institute for Supply Management |
| LIBOR | London interbank offered rate |
| MBS | mortgage-backed securities |
| MMFs | money market funds |
| NIPA | national income and product accounts |
| OIS | overnight index swap |
| ON RRP | overnight reverse repurchase agreement |
| PCE | personal consumption expenditures |

| | |
|-------|--|
| repo | repurchase agreement |
| RMBS | residential mortgage-backed securities |
| RRP | reverse repurchase agreement |
| SCOOS | Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms |
| SEP | Summary of Economic Projections |
| SFA | Supplemental Financing Account |
| SLOOS | Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices |
| SOMA | System Open Market Account |
| TBA | to be announced (for example, TBA market) |
| TGA | U.S. Treasury's General Account |
| TIPS | Treasury inflation-protected securities |
| TPE | Term premium effects |