

### **Prefatory Note**

The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version available based on original files from the FOMC Secretariat at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Please note that some material may have been redacted from this document if that material was received on a confidential basis. Redacted material is indicated by occasional gaps in the text or by gray boxes around non-text content. All redacted passages are exempt from disclosure under applicable provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

Class II FOMC – Restricted (FR)

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# Report to the FOMC on Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy



## Book A

Economic and Financial Conditions:  
Outlook, Risks, and Policy Strategies

April 21, 2017

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Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee  
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

## Comparing the Staff Projection with Other Forecasts

The staff's projection for real GDP growth is below the projections from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Blue Chip consensus forecast in 2017 and lower than the Blue Chip in 2018. The staff's forecast for the unemployment rate is a bit below the Blue Chip and SPF surveys in 2017 and below the Blue Chip in 2018. The staff's CPI inflation projection is below those of outside forecasters in 2017 and is the same as them in 2018. The staff's projections for both overall and core PCE price inflation are below the SPF forecasts in 2017 and 2018.

### Comparison of Tealbook and Outside Forecasts

	2016	2017	2018
<b>GDP (Q4/Q4 percent change)</b>			
April Tealbook	2.0	2.1	2.2
Blue Chip (4/10/17)	2.0	2.2	2.4
SPF median (2/10/17)	1.9	2.3	n.a.
<b>Unemployment rate (Q4 level)</b>			
April Tealbook	4.7	4.4	4.1
Blue Chip (4/10/17)	4.7	4.5	4.3
SPF median (2/10/17)	4.7	4.5	n.a.
<b>CPI inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change)</b>			
April Tealbook	1.8	2.2	2.3
Blue Chip (4/10/17)	1.8	2.4	2.3
SPF median (2/10/17)	1.8	2.4	2.3
<b>PCE price inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change)</b>			
April Tealbook	1.4	1.7	1.8
SPF median (2/10/17)	1.5	2.0	2.0
<b>Core PCE price inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change)</b>			
April Tealbook	1.7	1.7	1.9
SPF median (2/10/17)	1.7	1.9	2.0


Note: SPF is the Survey of Professional Forecasters, CPI is the consumer price index, and PCE is personal consumption expenditures. Blue Chip does not provide results for PCE price inflation. The Blue Chip consensus forecast includes input from about 50 panelists, and the SPF about 40. Roughly 20 panelists contribute to both surveys.  
n.a. Not available.

Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.


## Tealbook Forecast Compared with Blue Chip

(Blue Chip survey released April 10, 2017)


Real GDP




Industrial Production




Unemployment Rate




Consumer Price Index



Treasury Bill Rate




10-Year Treasury Yield




Note: The yield is for on-the-run Treasury securities. Over the forecast period, the staff's projected yield is assumed to be 15 basis points below the off-the-run yield.

# Key Background Factors underlying the Baseline Staff Projection


Federal Funds Rate




Long-Term Interest Rates




Equity Prices




House Prices



Crude Oil Prices



Broad Real Dollar



**Federal Reserve System Nowcasts of 2017:Q1 Real GDP Growth**  
(Percent change at annual rate from previous quarter)

Federal Reserve entity	Type of model	Nowcast as of Apr. 19, 2017
Federal Reserve Bank		
Boston	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mixed-frequency BVAR</li> </ul>	3.1
New York	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Factor-augmented autoregressive model combination</li> <li>Factor-augmented autoregressive model combination, financial factors only</li> <li>Dynamic factor model</li> </ul>	1.6 1.6 2.7
Cleveland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bayesian regressions with stochastic volatility</li> <li>Tracking model</li> </ul>	2.8 -0.3
Atlanta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tracking model combined with Bayesian vector autoregressions (VARs), dynamic factor models, and factor-augmented autoregressions (known as GDPNow)</li> </ul>	.5
Chicago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dynamic factor models</li> <li>Bayesian VARs</li> </ul>	2.7 1.2
St. Louis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dynamic factor models</li> <li>News index model</li> <li>Let-the-data-decide regressions</li> </ul>	2.6 3.3 2.7
Kansas City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Accounting-based tracking estimate</li> </ul>	.5
Board of Governors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Board staff's forecast (judgmental tracking model)</li> <li>Monthly dynamic factor models (DFM-45)</li> <li>Mixed-frequency dynamic factor model (DFM-BM)</li> </ul>	.9 2.8 2.9
Memo: Median of Federal Reserve System nowcasts		2.7

## Summary of the Near-Term Outlook


(Percent change at annual rate except as noted)

Measure	2016:Q4		2017:Q1		2017:Q2	
	Previous Tealbook	Current Tealbook	Previous Tealbook	Current Tealbook	Previous Tealbook	Current Tealbook
<b>Real GDP</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>.9</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Private domestic final purchases	3.1	3.4	2.4	1.8	2.8	3.0
Personal consumption expenditures	3.0	3.5	1.5	.6	3.0	3.1
Residential investment	9.4	9.6	8.0	11.4	-2.5	-1.3
Nonres. private fixed investment	1.9	.9	5.7	5.4	3.7	4.4
Government purchases	.0	.2	-.4	-1.8	1.8	2.4
<i>Contributions to change in real GDP</i>						
Inventory investment <sup>1</sup>	.9	1.0	.0	.0	.0	-.1
Net exports <sup>1</sup>	-1.7	-1.8	-.6	-.3	-.6	-.3
<b>Unemployment rate</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>4.5</b>
<b>PCE chain price index</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.2</b>
Ex. food and energy	1.2	1.3	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.6


1. Percentage points.

### Recent Nonfinancial Developments (1)


Real GDP and GDI




Manufacturing IP ex. Motor Vehicles and Parts



Sales and Production of Light Motor Vehicles




Real PCE Growth




## Recent Nonfinancial Developments (2)

Single-Family Housing Starts and Permits




Note: Adjusted permits equal permit issuance plus total starts outside of permit-issuing areas.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Home Sales




Source: For existing, National Association of Realtors; for new, U.S. Census Bureau.

Nondefense Capital Goods ex. Aircraft




Note: Data are 3-month moving averages.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Nonresidential Construction Put in Place




Note: Nominal CPIP deflated by BEA prices through 2016:Q4 and by the staff's estimated deflator thereafter.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Inventory Ratios



Note: Flow-of-goods system inventories include manufacturing and mining industries and are relative to consumption. Census data cover manufacturing and trade, and inventories are relative to sales.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; staff calculations.

Exports and Non-oil Imports



Note: Forecasts are linear interpolations of quarterly values.  
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Census Bureau.




## Tealbook Forecast Errors: An Update through 2016

The staff's forecast errors for 2016 were relatively small. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2016, although still subject to sizable revisions, is currently estimated to be close to staff forecasts from one and two years ago. As was the case in recent years, the unemployment rate finished 2016 lower than the staff's prior-year forecast, though it was in line with the staff forecast from April 2016. Tealbook forecasts of core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price inflation in 2016 were slightly too low. Here we discuss these recent forecast errors.

In the left panel of figure 1, the gray bars show the currently published Q4/Q4 percent changes in real GDP from 2013 to 2016, the blue squares show the forecasts for GDP growth made in the April Tealbook one year prior, and the green triangles show the forecast from the April Tealbook in the contemporaneous year. The whisker bands demarcate 70 percent forecast error bands, so that unusually large forecast errors are represented by cases where the top edge of a gray bar falls outside of the whisker band.<sup>1</sup> The red dots show the GDP growth estimates for each year from mid-April of the subsequent year, along with 70 percent bands computed from past revisions to those estimates. Staff forecast errors for real GDP growth in 2016 are small, well within the 70 percent whisker bands, although the staff's prior-year GDP projection was too high for the third consecutive year.

The right panel shows the same information for the unemployment rate. The April 2016 forecast was on the mark, a notable improvement over projections from earlier years.<sup>2</sup> However, the April 2015 Tealbook forecast of the unemployment rate in 2016:Q4 was too high, continuing a pattern of one-sided errors in forecasts. Unlike forecasts from earlier in the expansion, when the labor force participation rate was

Figure 1: Real Activity Forecast Errors



Source: Staff forecast and U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

<sup>1</sup> The whisker bands for real activity variables are calculated using forecast errors since 1980; whisker bands around the inflation projections are calculated using forecast errors since 1998.

<sup>2</sup> The staff subsequently raised its unemployment rate forecast for 2016 in the next few Tealbooks, making them too high again. However, the resulting forecast errors (0.1 to 0.2 percentage point) are small by historical standards.


persistently lower than the staff expected (not shown), the labor force participation rate finished 2016 slightly higher than the staff anticipated in 2015. Accordingly, staff prior-year forecasts of the employment-to-population ratio (also not shown) were somewhat more accurate in the few preceding years than in 2016, as forecast errors in the unemployment and labor force participation rates were offsetting in 2013 through 2015 but not in 2016.

The combination of lower-than-expected GDP growth and a lower-than-expected unemployment rate over the past few years has prompted the staff to make a series of adjustments to its supply-side assumptions. Most notably, the staff has lowered its estimate of structural productivity growth on several occasions over this period.

Figure 2 shows the same information for the Q4/Q4 percent changes in total and core PCE prices. The staff's prior-year forecast of 2016 total PCE price inflation was close to the currently published reading, whereas the forecast made in April 2016 was too low. The difference between the forecasts made in April 2015 and April 2016 importantly reflects the staff's oil price projections. Oil prices unexpectedly fell early in 2016 and then rebounded later that year. The staff projection in April 2015 anticipated neither the early-2016 decline nor the later rebound and proved more accurate for oil price inflation than the staff projection in April 2016, which had taken onboard the early 2016 decline but had forecast a smaller rebound.

Staff forecasts for core PCE price inflation in 2016 were a couple of tenths of a percentage point too low. The misses were concentrated in services prices and, in particular, nonmarket prices, which wound up higher than expected. From 2013 to 2015, the staff's year-ahead core inflation forecasts were slightly too high. As it turns out, those forecast errors can be explained by core goods import prices that came in lower than expected. Conditioning on the actual path of import prices and other observable factors, core inflation from 2013 to 2015 was, as in 2016, slightly higher than the staff can explain. These positive residuals might reflect, among other things, a higher inflation trend than the staff assumes or a larger contribution to core inflation from resource utilization, or they may simply be the result of idiosyncratic shocks.

Figure 2: Price Inflation Forecast Errors




Source: Staff forecast and U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

amount of capital available per worker, all else being equal, and might therefore boost average productivity, offsetting to some extent the negative effect on potential GDP from the lower population. Taking into account general equilibrium effects would further complicate the analysis. Of particular interest might be how changes in immigration policy affect capital investment, new firm creation, and the employment of non-immigrant workers.

Finally, it is worth noting that a change in immigration policy would likely have, at most, a small effect on the aggregate statistics used to measure slack in the economy. While labor force participation rates and unemployment rates among the foreign-born population differ somewhat from those of the native-born population, these differences are sufficiently small that a modest change in immigration would not generate large differences in these aggregate statistics.

**Figure 1: Composition of Potential GDP Growth**




\*Other sources of potential GDP growth include the combined contribution of the trends in the labor force participation rate, the average workweek, and labor productivity.


Source: Staff estimates based on Census Bureau data and projections.

# Survey Measures of Longer-Term Inflation Expectations


CPI Next 10 Years




CPI Forward Expectations




PCE Next 10 Years




PCE Forward Expectations



Surveys of Consumers




Survey of Business Inflation Expectations



**Projections of Real GDP and Related Components**  
(Percent change at annual rate from final quarter  
of preceding period except as noted)

Measure	2016	2017		2017	2018	2019
		H1	H2			
<b>Real GDP</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>1.8</b>
Previous Tealbook	1.9	1.7	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.9
Final sales	2.0	1.8	2.5	2.1	2.2	1.9
Previous Tealbook	1.9	1.7	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.0
Personal consumption expenditures	3.1	1.8	2.9	2.4	2.9	2.5
Previous Tealbook	3.0	2.2	2.8	2.5	3.0	2.5
Residential investment	1.1	4.8	3.3	4.1	2.7	4.4
Previous Tealbook	1.1	2.6	1.1	1.9	4.6	5.5
Nonresidential structures	1.9	14.2	3.3	8.6	.2	-.6
Previous Tealbook	1.8	5.2	2.0	3.6	.3	.0
Equipment and intangibles	-.6	2.4	3.6	3.0	3.9	1.8
Previous Tealbook	-.3	4.5	4.3	4.4	3.7	2.3
Federal purchases	-.2	.2	2.0	1.1	.0	-.1
Previous Tealbook	-.2	1.1	.9	1.0	.0	-.1
State and local purchases	.4	.3	1.6	.9	.8	.9
Previous Tealbook	.4	.5	1.8	1.1	1.1	1.1
Exports	1.5	3.3	1.8	2.6	2.6	2.9
Previous Tealbook	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.3	2.3	2.8
Imports	2.6	4.8	4.0	4.4	4.7	4.2
Previous Tealbook	2.5	5.0	4.0	4.5	5.0	4.4
Contributions to change in real GDP (percentage points)						
Inventory change	.0	-.1	-.1	-.1	.0	-.1
Previous Tealbook	.0	.0	-.1	-.1	.0	-.1
Net exports	-.2	-.3	-.4	-.3	-.4	-.3
Previous Tealbook	-.2	-.6	-.4	-.5	-.5	-.3

### Real GDP




Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.


Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

## Components of Final Demand


Personal Consumption Expenditures




Residential Investment




Equipment and Intangibles




Nonresidential Structures



Government Consumption and Investment




Exports and Imports




Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

## Aspects of the Medium-Term Projection


### Personal Saving Rate




### Wealth-to-Income Ratio




### Single-Family Housing Starts




### Equipment and Intangibles Spending



### Federal Surplus/Deficit



### Current Account Surplus/Deficit



Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

### Decomposition of Potential GDP

(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)

Measure	1974-95	1996-2000	2001-07	2008-10	2011-15	2016	2017	2018	2019
Potential real GDP	3.1	3.4	2.6	1.6	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7
Previous Tealbook	3.1	3.4	2.6	1.6	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7
<i>Selected contributions<sup>1</sup></i>									
Structural labor productivity <sup>2</sup>	1.6	2.9	2.8	1.4	.8	.9	1.1	1.1	1.2
Previous Tealbook	1.6	2.9	2.8	1.4	.8	.9	1.1	1.1	1.2
Capital deepening	.6	1.5	1.0	.3	.5	.5	.4	.4	.4
Multifactor productivity	.6	1.0	1.5	.9	.0	.2	.5	.5	.7
Structural hours	1.6	1.2	.8	.0	.6	.7	.1	.4	.4
Previous Tealbook	1.6	1.2	.8	.1	.6	.6	.0	.3	.3
Labor force participation	.4	-.1	-.2	-.5	-.6	-.4	-.4	-.4	-.4
Previous Tealbook	.4	-.1	-.2	-.5	-.6	-.5	-.5	-.5	-.5
Memo:									
GDP gap <sup>3</sup>	-1.9	2.4	.8	-4.2	.0	.5	1.0	1.6	1.8
Previous Tealbook	-1.9	2.4	.8	-4.2	.0	.4	.9	1.5	1.7


Note: For multiyear periods, the percent change is the annual average from Q4 of the year preceding the first year shown to Q4 of the last year shown.

1. Percentage points.

2. Total business sector.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP in the final quarter of the period indicated. A negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.


#### GDP Gap



Note: The GDP gap is the percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.


Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; staff assumptions.

#### Unemployment Rate




Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.

#### Manufacturing Capacity Utilization Rate



Source: Federal Reserve Board, G.17 Statistical Release, "Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization."

#### Structural and Actual Labor Productivity (Business sector)



Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; staff assumptions.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.



**The Outlook for the Labor Market**

Measure	2016	2017		2017	2018	2019
		H1	H2			
Output per hour, business <sup>1</sup>	1.3	.1	1.5	.8	.9	.9
Previous Tealbook	1.3	.6	1.1	.9	.9	.9
Nonfarm payroll employment <sup>2</sup>	187	179	174	176	169	122
Previous Tealbook	187	187	157	172	157	122
Private employment <sup>2</sup>	170	172	165	168	160	113
Previous Tealbook	171	187	153	170	150	113
Labor force participation rate <sup>3</sup>	62.7	62.8	62.7	62.7	62.5	62.3
Previous Tealbook	62.7	62.7	62.6	62.6	62.3	62.1
Civilian unemployment rate <sup>3</sup>	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.1	4.0
Previous Tealbook	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.2	4.1

1. Percent change from final quarter of preceding period at annual rate.

2. Thousands, average monthly changes.

3. Percent, average for the final quarter in the period.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.

**Inflation Projections**

Measure	2016	2017		2017	2018	2019
		H1	H2			
<i>Percent change at annual rate from final quarter of preceding period</i>						
PCE chain-weighted price index	1.4	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9
Previous Tealbook	1.4	2.0	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.9
Food and beverages	-1.7	1.3	2.0	1.7	2.1	2.2
Previous Tealbook	-1.7	1.0	2.2	1.6	2.1	2.2
Energy	.8	2.6	.2	1.4	.3	.7
Previous Tealbook	.8	3.8	-.7	1.5	.2	.6
Excluding food and energy	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.0
Previous Tealbook	1.7	2.0	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.0
Prices of core goods imports <sup>1</sup>	.0	1.4	1.3	1.3	.7	.7
Previous Tealbook	.0	.9	1.4	1.2	.8	.7
	Mar. 2017 <sup>2</sup>	Apr. 2017 <sup>2</sup>	May 2017 <sup>2</sup>	June 2017 <sup>2</sup>	July 2017 <sup>2</sup>	Aug. 2017 <sup>2</sup>
<i>12-month percent change</i>						
PCE chain-weighted price index	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8
Previous Tealbook	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8		
Excluding food and energy	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6
Previous Tealbook	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8		



1. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

2. Staff forecast.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.



## Labor Market Developments and Outlook (1)

### Measures of Labor Underutilization





\* U-5 measures total unemployed persons plus all marginally attached to the labor force, as a percent of the labor force plus persons marginally attached to the labor force.  
 \*\* Percent of Current Population Survey employment.  
 EEB Extended and emergency unemployment benefits.  
 Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

### Level of Payroll Employment\*



\* 3-month moving averages.  
 Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

### Change in Payroll Employment\*




\* 3-month moving averages.  
 Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

## Labor Market Developments and Outlook (2)

### Labor Force Participation Rate\*




\* Published data adjusted by staff to account for changes in population weights.

\*\* Includes staff estimate of the effect of extended and emergency unemployment benefits.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.


### Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims\*



\* 4-week moving average.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

### Hires, Quits, and Job Openings




\* Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment, 3-month moving average.

\*\* Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment plus unfilled jobs, 3-month moving average.

Source: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.

### Average Monthly Change in Labor Market Conditions Index




Source: Labor market conditions index estimated by staff.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

## Inflation Developments and Outlook (1)

(Percent change from year-earlier period)


### Headline Consumer Price Inflation



Note: PCE prices from January to March 2017 are staff estimates (e).

Source: For CPI, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; for PCE, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.


### Measures of Underlying PCE Price Inflation



Note: Core PCE prices from January to March 2017 are staff estimates (e).

Source: For trimmed mean PCE, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; otherwise, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

### Labor Cost Growth



Note: Compensation per hour is for the business sector. Average hourly earnings are for the private nonfarm sector. The employment cost index is for the private sector.


Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.


## Inflation Developments and Outlook (2)

(Percent change from year-earlier period, except as noted)


### Commodity and Oil Price Levels



### Energy and Import Price Inflation



### Long-Term Inflation Expectations and Compensation



Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.


## The Long–Term Outlook

(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)


Measure	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Longer run
Real GDP	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.7
Previous Tealbook	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.7
Civilian unemployment rate <sup>1</sup>	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.9
Previous Tealbook	4.6	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.6	5.0
PCE prices, total	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0
Previous Tealbook	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.0
Core PCE prices	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.0
Previous Tealbook	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.0
Federal funds rate <sup>1</sup>	1.47	2.55	3.46	3.97	4.10	3.99	3.00
Previous Tealbook	1.45	2.46	3.36	3.87	4.02	3.95	3.00
10-year Treasury yield <sup>1</sup>	2.9	3.5	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.5
Previous Tealbook	3.0	3.5	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.5

1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.


Real GDP




Unemployment Rate



PCE Prices




Interest Rates




Note: In each panel, shading represents the projection period, and dashed lines are the previous Tealbook.

## Evolution of the Staff Forecast


### Change in Real GDP



### Unemployment Rate



### Change in PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy



## The Foreign GDP Outlook


Real GDP\*

Percent change, annual rate


	2016			2017			2018	2019
	H1	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	H2		
1. Total Foreign	1.9	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.6
Previous Tealbook	1.9	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
2. Advanced Foreign Economies	1.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7
Previous Tealbook	1.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7
3. Canada	0.7	3.8	2.6	3.0	2.3	1.9	1.8	1.8
4. Euro Area	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
5. Japan	2.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.1
6. United Kingdom	1.5	2.0	2.7	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.6
7. Emerging Market Economies	2.4	3.7	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.5
Previous Tealbook	2.4	3.6	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.5
8. China	6.8	6.8	6.6	7.1	6.6	6.0	5.8	5.7
9. Emerging Asia ex. China	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.9	4.0	3.6	3.6	3.5
10. Mexico	1.1	4.4	2.9	1.9	1.8	2.3	2.4	2.6
11. Brazil	-1.8	-2.9	-3.4	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.1	2.2

\* GDP aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. merchandise exports.

Total Foreign GDP



Foreign GDP





## The Foreign Inflation Outlook

### Consumer Prices\*

Percent change, annual rate


	2016			2017			2018	2019
	H1	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	H2		
1. Total Foreign	1.7	1.6	2.6	3.0	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6
Previous Tealbook	1.7	1.6	2.6	3.6	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.6
2. Advanced Foreign Economies	0.4	0.9	1.8	2.5	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.9
Previous Tealbook	0.4	0.8	1.8	2.4	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.9
3. Canada	1.4	1.0	1.7	2.9	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.0
4. Euro Area	-0.0	1.2	1.9	3.0	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6
5. Japan	-0.3	-0.5	2.4	0.0	0.4	0.7	1.1	2.5
6. United Kingdom	0.4	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.1
7. Emerging Market Economies	2.7	2.2	3.1	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.1
Previous Tealbook	2.7	2.2	3.1	4.4	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.1
8. China	2.4	1.3	2.6	-0.6	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
9. Emerging Asia ex. China	1.7	1.1	2.7	3.6	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.4
10. Mexico	2.6	3.6	4.1	9.9	5.0	3.6	3.2	3.2
11. Brazil	9.6	6.5	2.6	3.2	4.3	4.9	4.4	4.4

\* CPI aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. non-oil imports.


Int'l Econ Devel &amp; Outlook

## Foreign Monetary Policy


### AFE Policy Rates



### AFE Central Bank Balance Sheets




### EME Policy Rates




## Recent Foreign Indicators


### Nominal Exports




### Industrial Production




### Retail Sales




### Employment



### Consumer Prices: Advanced Foreign Economies




### Consumer Prices: Emerging Market Economies




## Evolution of Staff's International Forecast


Total Foreign GDP



Total Foreign CPI




U.S. Current Account Balance



## Policy Expectations and Treasury Yields


### Selected Interest Rates



Note: 5-minute intervals, 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Data shown are for 2017.

Source: Bloomberg.


### Market-Implied Probability Distribution of the Timing of Next Rate Increase



Note: Probabilities implied by a binomial tree fitted to settlement prices on fed funds futures contracts, assuming the next policy action is either no change or a 25 basis point increase in rates and no intermeeting moves. The effective federal funds rate until the next FOMC meeting is assumed to be equal to the observed rate on the previous non-month-end business day. The dashed line shows the probability distribution of the next rate hike after the March meeting.

Source: CME Group; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.


### Implied Federal Funds Rate



Note: Zero term premium path is estimated using overnight index swap quotes with a spline approach and a term premium of zero basis points. Model-based term premium path is estimated using a term structure model maintained by Board staff and corrects for term premium.

Source: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

### Treasury Yield Curve



Note: Smoothed yield curve estimated from off-the-run Treasury coupon securities. Yields shown are those on notional par Treasury securities with semiannual coupons.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

### Inflation Compensation




Note: Estimates based on smoothed nominal and inflation-indexed Treasury yield curves.

\* Adjusted for lagged indexation of Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (carry effect).

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

### Option-Implied Volatilities on 10-Year Swap Rate




Note: Implied volatility on the 10-year swap rate one month and one year ahead is derived from swaptions.

Source: Barclays; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.


## Corporate Asset Markets and Banking Developments

### S&P 500 Sectors




Source: Bloomberg.

### Implied Volatility on S&P 500 (VIX)




Note: Historical average is taken from 1990 onward.  
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange.

### Equity Risk Premium




\* Off-the-run 10-year Treasury yield less Philadelphia Fed 10-year expected inflation.  
+ Denotes latest observation using daily interest rates and stock prices as well as staff forecast of corporate profits.  
Source: Staff projections.

### 10-Year Corporate Bond Spreads




Note: Spreads over 10-year Treasury yield.  
Source: Staff estimates of smoothed yield curves based on Merrill Lynch bond data and smoothed Treasury yield curve.

### S&P 500 and ABA Indexes



Note: Top 6 bank holding companies (BHCs) are Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. ABA is the American Bankers Association. AHCA is the American Health Care Act.  
Source: Bloomberg, Google Finance.


### CDS Spreads




Note: Top 6 bank holding companies (BHCs) are Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. Dashed curve plots the median 5-year spread. CDX.IG is the on-the-run investment-grade credit default swap (CDS) index. CDX.BANK is the median of all available quotes. AHCA is the American Health Care Act.  
Source: Markit.

## Foreign Developments


### 10-Year Nominal Yields




### Exchange Rates




### Euro-USD Risk Reversals




### Equity Market Indexes



### Implied Volatility




### Emerging Market Flows and Spreads




## Short-Term Funding Markets and Federal Reserve Operations


### Selected Money Market Rates




### ON RRP Take-Up, by Type




### Eurodollar Volumes




### MMF Net Yields



### CP and CDs: Totals and Amounts Held by MMFs




### Change in Large Time Deposits




## Business Finance

Gross Issuance of Nonfinancial Corporate Bonds




Note: Bonds are categorized by Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch.  
Source: Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database.

Selected Components of Net Debt Financing, Nonfinancial Firms




Note: C&I is commercial and industrial.  
\* Period-end basis, seasonally adjusted.  
Source: Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation; Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database; Federal Reserve Board; Thomson Reuters LPC.

Institutional Leveraged Loan Issuance, by Purpose




Source: Thomson Reuters LPC LoanConnector.

Average New-Issue Institutional Spreads




Note: Breaks in the series represent periods with no issuance. Spreads are calculated against 3-month LIBOR. The spreads do not include upfront fees.  
Source: S&P LCD.

CMBS Issuance



Note: Multifamily excludes agency issuance.  
Source: Consumer Mortgage Alert.

NFIB Small Business Optimism Index



Note: NFIB (National Federation of Independent Business) data are monthly and seasonally adjusted; a 3-month moving average is reported.  
Source: National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), Small Business Economic Trends Data.



markets in recent years. According to figure 4, close to 6 percent of these firms started to carry long-term debt on their books between 2011 and 2015; in sharp contrast, less than 1 percent of their non-middle-market counterparts started to carry long-term debt during this period.<sup>7</sup>

While the analysis is limited to public firms because of data availability, it has a broad application, as publicly traded firms constitute about half of nonfinancial domestic firms in terms of total assets.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the trend in credit demand is likely to hold for private firms as well: Direct-lending funds are likely more important for private firms because such firms generally are smaller, are more financially constrained, and have a narrower spectrum of credit sources.

Taken together, recent developments indicate that direct-lending funds are becoming an important source of funding for middle-market firms, which appear to have increasing demand for credit. These nonbank lenders, which typically extend longer-term loans than commercial banks, add to the pool of long-term liquidity for middle-market firms, helping them diversify their sources of credit and possibly become less dependent on bank-intermediated credit.

Figure 1: Total Capital Deployed




Figure 2: Dry Powder




Figure 3: Long-Term Debt of Unrated Middle-Market Firms





Figure 4: Fraction of Firms with Long-Term Debt




<sup>7</sup> Among unrated firms, middle-market firms constitute about 70 percent of publicly traded firms.

<sup>8</sup> For instance, in 2013, publicly traded firms held about \$25 trillion in assets, while the Financial Accounts of the United States report nonfinancial domestic firms in aggregate held about \$50 trillion.


## Bank Lending Conditions

### Core Loan Growth




Note: Business loans include commercial and industrial as well as commercial real estate. Consumer loans include credit card, auto, and other consumer loans. RRE is residential real estate.  
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form 2644, Weekly Report of Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks and U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks.

### Weighted Changes in Standards and Demand across All Loan Categories for Domestic Respondents




Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices.

### Commercial and Industrial Loans




Note: Yearly rates are Q4 to Q4. Half-years are based on Q4 and Q2 average levels, and quarterly and monthly annual rates use corresponding average levels. Large banks are defined as the largest 25 banks by assets.  
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form 2644, Weekly Report of Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks and U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks.

### Demand for C&I Loans




Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. C&I is commercial and industrial.  
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices.

### Commercial Real Estate Loans



Note: Yearly rates are Q4 to Q4. Half-years are based on Q4 and Q2 average levels, and quarterly and monthly annual rates use corresponding average levels.  
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form 2644, Weekly Report of Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks and U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks.


### Standards for CRE Loans



Note: CRE is commercial real estate.  
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices.

## Household Finance


### Mortgage Rate and MBS Yield



Note: The MBS yield is the Fannie Mae 30-year current-coupon rate.

Source: For MBS yield, Barclays; for mortgage rate, Loansifter.


### Purchase and Refinance Activity



Note: The data are seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff. Points represent staff projections.

Source: For values prior to 2016, data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975; for values in 2016 and 2017, staff estimates.


### Changes in Standards for Residential Real Estate Loans at Banks



Note: Series constructed by taking an average of net percentages across all residential real estate asked about in each quarter. Shaded bars indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices.


### Consumer Credit



Note: The data are not seasonally adjusted.


Source: Federal Reserve Board.

### Changes in Standards for Consumer Loans at Banks



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices.

### Gross Consumer ABS Issuance



\* Month to date.


Source: Inside MBS & ABS; Merrill Lynch; Bloomberg.

## A Guidepost for Dropping Effective Lower Bound Risk from the Assessment of Risks

The staff has, for some time, judged that the risks to the projection for real activity are skewed to the downside due to the effective lower bound (ELB) constraint on the federal funds rate. All else being equal, a higher expected path for the federal funds rate lowers the probability that policymakers will be constrained by the ELB in the near future, which reduces downside macroeconomic risks. With the federal funds rate having risen to the range of  $\frac{3}{4}$  to 1 percent and expected to rise further going forward, we will face a decision about when to drop the ELB reference from the Tealbook's assessment of risks. In this discussion, we describe how one specific measure of ELB risk has evolved since liftoff and is expected to evolve in the future. We then lay out one possible way to use this measure to inform our decision on when to drop our reference to the downside economic risk stemming from the ELB.


Figure 1 shows a measure of ELB risk—the probability that the federal funds rate will be at the ELB for at least one quarter during the next three years—computed from 20,000 stochastic simulations of FRB/US around the Tealbook baseline projection using the non-inertial version of the Taylor rule.<sup>1</sup> According to figure 1, the ELB risk measure was above 30 percent throughout 2016 but then moved below 30 percent early this year. The ELB risk measure based on the April 2017 Tealbook projection is 26 percent.<sup>2</sup>

**Figure 1: ELB Risk since Liftoff**



Source: Staff calculation based on FRB/US stochastic simulations.

**Figure 2: Forecasts of ELB Risk**



Source: Staff calculation based on FRB/US stochastic simulations.

<sup>1</sup> We use the non-inertial Taylor rule to capture the fact that policymakers typically cut interest rates aggressively in the face of a looming recession, even though they often increase interest rates gradually in the aftermath of a recession. In sticky-price models that account for the ELB, this asymmetric behavior is consistent with the prescription of optimal commitment policy and other well-performing rules, such as the price-level targeting rule and the rule proposed in David Reifschneider and John C. Williams (2000), “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936–66.

<sup>2</sup> In the stochastic simulation, many of the ELB episodes are short lived, with the federal funds rate touching the ELB in only one or two quarters. According to the April 2017 Tealbook projection, the probability that the federal funds rate will be at the ELB for at least *four quarters* (not necessarily consecutive) during the next three years is about 10 percent.

**Alternative Scenarios**

(Percent change, annual rate, from end of preceding period except as noted)

Measure and scenario	2017		2018	2019	2020	2021-22
	H1	H2				
<i>Real GDP</i>						
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.7	2.4	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.3
Steeper wage Phillips curve	1.7	2.4	2.1	1.7	1.4	1.2
Lower valuation pressures	1.7	2.4	2.1	1.7	1.4	1.2
Broad policy disappointment	1.7	2.4	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.6
Lower natural rate, no misperception	1.7	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.7	1.4
Lower natural rate, misperception	1.7	2.4	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.4
EME turbulence and stronger dollar	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.5
Stronger foreign growth and tighter policy	1.8	2.7	2.6	1.9	1.2	1.1
<i>Unemployment rate<sup>1</sup></i>						
Extended Tealbook baseline	4.5	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.5
Steeper wage Phillips curve	4.5	4.4	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.8
Lower valuation pressures	4.5	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.6
Broad policy disappointment	4.5	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.8
Lower natural rate, no misperception	4.5	4.2	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.5
Lower natural rate, misperception	4.5	4.2	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.8
EME turbulence and stronger dollar	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.9
Stronger foreign growth and tighter policy	4.5	4.3	3.9	3.6	3.8	4.3
<i>Total PCE prices</i>						
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1
Steeper wage Phillips curve	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.0
Lower valuation pressures	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
Broad policy disappointment	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0
Lower natural rate, no misperception	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
Lower natural rate, misperception	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0
EME turbulence and stronger dollar	1.5	.9	1.2	1.7	2.0	2.0
Stronger foreign growth and tighter policy	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.1
<i>Core PCE prices</i>						
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1
Steeper wage Phillips curve	1.9	1.9	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.0
Lower valuation pressures	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
Broad policy disappointment	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9
Lower natural rate, no misperception	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
Lower natural rate, misperception	1.8	1.6	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0
EME turbulence and stronger dollar	1.6	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.0
Stronger foreign growth and tighter policy	1.8	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.2
<i>Federal funds rate<sup>1</sup></i>						
Extended Tealbook baseline	.9	1.5	2.6	3.5	4.0	4.0
Steeper wage Phillips curve	1.0	1.5	2.8	3.9	4.6	4.7
Lower valuation pressures	1.0	1.5	2.5	3.4	3.9	3.8
Broad policy disappointment	.9	1.5	2.1	2.6	2.8	3.0
Lower natural rate, no misperception	.8	1.2	2.2	3.1	3.8	4.0
Lower natural rate, misperception	1.0	1.5	2.8	3.6	4.0	3.8
EME turbulence and stronger dollar	.9	1.3	1.9	2.5	3.1	3.5
Stronger foreign growth and tighter policy	1.0	1.6	3.0	4.1	4.5	4.3


1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.

## Forecast Confidence Intervals and Alternative Scenarios


Confidence Intervals Based on FRB/US Stochastic Simulations

- Extended Tealbook baseline
- Broad policy disappointment
- EME turbulence and stronger dollar
- Steeper wage Phillips curve
- Lower natural rate, no misperception
- Stronger foreign growth and tighter policy
- Lower valuation pressures
- Lower natural rate, misperception


Real GDP




Unemployment Rate



PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy



Federal Funds Rate



**Selected Tealbook Projections and 70 Percent Confidence Intervals Derived  
from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors and FRB/US Simulations**





Measure	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<i>Real GDP</i> (percent change, Q4 to Q4)						
Projection	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.3
Confidence interval						
Tealbook forecast errors	.4–3.6	-.4–3.6	-1.1–3.2	...	...	...
FRB/US stochastic simulations	1.0–3.1	.7–3.7	.2–3.4	-.2–3.2	-.4–3.2	-.5–3.1
<i>Civilian unemployment rate</i> (percent, Q4)						
Projection	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.5
Confidence interval						
Tealbook forecast errors	4.0–4.9	3.3–5.1	2.8–5.4	...	...	...
FRB/US stochastic simulations	3.9–4.9	3.3–4.9	2.9–5.1	2.8–5.3	2.9–5.6	3.1–5.9
<i>PCE prices, total</i> (percent change, Q4 to Q4)						
Projection	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.1
Confidence interval						
Tealbook forecast errors	1.0–2.2	1.0–3.5	1.1–3.4	...	...	...
FRB/US stochastic simulations	1.1–2.3	.9–2.8	.9–2.9	1.0–3.1	1.0–3.3	1.0–3.2
<i>PCE prices excluding food and energy</i> (percent change, Q4 to Q4)						
Projection	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1
Confidence interval						
Tealbook forecast errors	1.3–2.2	1.2–2.8	...	...	...	...
FRB/US stochastic simulations	1.2–2.2	1.1–2.7	1.1–2.9	1.1–3.0	1.1–3.1	1.1–3.1
<i>Federal funds rate</i> (percent, Q4)						
Projection	1.5	2.6	3.5	4.0	4.1	4.0
Confidence interval						
FRB/US stochastic simulations	1.1–1.8	1.6–3.5	1.9–5.0	1.9–6.0	1.8–6.4	1.5–6.5

Note: Shocks underlying FRB/US stochastic simulations are randomly drawn from the 1969–2016 set of model equation residuals. Intervals derived from Tealbook forecast errors are based on projections made from 1980 to 2016 for real GDP and unemployment and from 1998 to 2016 for PCE prices. The intervals for real GDP, unemployment, and total PCE prices are extended into 2019 using information from the Blue Chip survey and forecasts from the CBO and CEA.





... Not applicable.

# Prediction Intervals Derived from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors

## Forecast Error Percentiles



## Historical Distributions



Risks & Uncertainty

Note: See the technical note in the appendix for more information on this exhibit.

1. Augmented Tealbook prediction intervals use 1- and 2-year-ahead forecast errors from Blue Chip, CBO, and CEA to extend the Tealbook prediction intervals through 2019.



**Assessment of Key Macroeconomic Risks (1)****Probability of Inflation Events**

(4 quarters ahead)

Probability that the 4-quarter change in total PCE prices will be . . .	Staff	FRB/US	EDO	BVAR
<i>Greater than 3 percent</i>				
Current Tealbook	.05	.07	.12	.06
Previous Tealbook	.05	.08	.13	.07
<i>Less than 1 percent</i>				
Current Tealbook	.24	.14	.02	.16
Previous Tealbook	.24	.13	.02	.16

**Probability of Unemployment Events**

(4 quarters ahead)

Probability that the unemployment rate will . . .	Staff	FRB/US	EDO	BVAR
<i>Increase by 1 percentage point</i>				
Current Tealbook	.02	.02	.14	.05
Previous Tealbook	.03	.04	.14	.06
<i>Decrease by 1 percentage point</i>				
Current Tealbook	.11	.09	.11	.03
Previous Tealbook	.08	.06	.12	.03


**Probability of Near-Term Recession**

Probability that real GDP declines in the next two quarters	Staff	FRB/US	EDO	BVAR	Factor Model
Current Tealbook	.02	.02	.04	.12	.01
Previous Tealbook	.02	.03	.04	.10	.00


Note: “Staff” represents stochastic simulations in FRB/US around the staff baseline; baselines for FRB/US, BVAR, EDO, and the factor model are generated by those models themselves, up to the current-quarter estimate. Data for the current quarter are taken from the staff estimate for the second Tealbook in each quarter; if the second Tealbook for the current quarter has not yet been published, the preceding quarter is taken as the latest historical observation.

## Assessment of Key Macroeconomic Risks (2)


Probability that Total PCE Inflation Is above 3 Percent  
(4 quarters ahead)




Probability that Total PCE Inflation Is below 1 Percent  
(4 quarters ahead)




Probability that the Unemployment Rate Increases 1 ppt  
(4 quarters ahead)



Probability that the Unemployment Rate Decreases 1 ppt  
(4 quarters ahead)



Probability that Real GDP Declines in Each of the Next Two Quarters



Note: See notes on facing page. Recession and inflation probabilities for FRB/US and the BVAR are real-time estimates. See Robert J. Tetlow and Brian Ironside (2007), "Real-Time Model Uncertainty in the United States: The Fed, 1996–2003," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, vol. 39 (October), pp. 1533–61.

## Policy Rules and the Staff Projection


### Near-Term Prescriptions of Selected Simple Policy Rules<sup>1</sup>

(Percent)


	<u>2017:Q2</u>	<u>2017:Q3</u>
Taylor (1993) rule	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.85</b>
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.85	2.87
Taylor (1999) rule	<b>3.10</b>	<b>3.22</b>
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	3.11	3.19
Inertial Taylor (1999) rule	<b>1.07</b>	<b>1.39</b>
<i>Previous Tealbook projection</i>	1.07	1.39
First-difference rule	<b>1.00</b>	<b>1.24</b>
<i>Previous Tealbook projection</i>	0.88	1.07
<i>Addendum:</i>		
Tealbook baseline	<b>0.95</b>	<b>1.20</b>

### Key Elements of the Staff Projection


Federal Funds Rate



GDP Gap



PCE Prices Excluding Food and Energy  
Four-quarter change



### A Medium-Term Equilibrium Real Federal Funds Rate<sup>2</sup>

(Percent)


	<i>Current Tealbook</i>	<i>Current-Quarter Estimate Based on Previous Tealbook</i>	<i>Previous Tealbook</i>
Tealbook-consistent FRB/US $r^*$	1.76	1.62	1.42
Average projected real federal funds rate	0.56	0.49	0.27

1. For rules that have a lagged policy rate as a right-hand-side variable, the lines denoted "Previous Tealbook projection" report prescriptions based on the previous Tealbook's staff outlook for inflation and the output gap, but conditional on the current-Tealbook value of the lagged policy rate.


2. The "Tealbook-consistent FRB/US  $r^*$ " is the level of the real federal funds rate that, if maintained over a 12-quarter period (beginning in the current quarter) in the FRB/US model, sets the output gap equal to zero in the final quarter of that period. The "average projected real federal funds rate" is calculated under the Tealbook baseline projection over the same 12-quarter period as the Tealbook-consistent FRB/US  $r^*$ .

# Simple Policy Rule Simulations


Nominal Federal Funds Rate




Unemployment Rate




Real Federal Funds Rate



PCE Inflation  
Four-quarter average




Real 10-year Treasury Yield




Note: The policy rule simulations in this exhibit are based on rules that respond to core inflation. This choice of rule specification was made in light of a tendency for current and near-term core inflation rates to outperform headline inflation rates as predictors of the medium-term behavior of headline inflation.

## Optimal Control Simulations under Commitment



Nominal Federal Funds Rate




Unemployment Rate



Real Federal Funds Rate

PCE Inflation  
Four-quarter average

Real 10-year Treasury Yield




Note: Each set of lines corresponds to an optimal control policy under commitment in which policymakers minimize a discounted weighted sum of squared deviations of four-quarter headline PCE inflation from the Committee's 2 percent objective, of squared deviations of the unemployment rate from the staff's estimate of the natural rate, and of squared changes in the federal funds rate. The weights vary across simulations. See the appendix for technical details and the box "Optimal Control and the Loss Function" in the June 2016 Tealbook B for a motivation.


# Simulations with a Steeper Wage Phillips Curve

Monetary Policy Strategies


Nominal Federal Funds Rate




Unemployment Rate




Real Federal Funds Rate



PCE Inflation  
Four-quarter average



Real 10-year Treasury Yield



**Outcomes of Simple Policy Rule Simulations**

(Percent change, annual rate, from end of preceding period except as noted)

Measure and policy	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
<i>Nominal federal funds rate<sup>1</sup></i>					
Taylor (1993)	3.0	3.5	3.8	3.9	3.8
Taylor (1999)	3.3	3.9	4.2	4.3	4.2
Inertial Taylor (1999)	1.7	2.8	3.6	4.0	4.1
First-difference	1.8	2.9	3.5	3.6	3.4
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.5	2.6	3.5	4.0	4.1
<i>Real GDP</i>					
Taylor (1993)	1.9	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.5
Taylor (1999)	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.5
Inertial Taylor (1999)	2.0	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.3
First-difference	2.1	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.5
Extended Tealbook baseline	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.3
<i>Unemployment rate<sup>1</sup></i>					
Taylor (1993)	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.1
Taylor (1999)	4.6	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.3
Inertial Taylor (1999)	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.3
First-difference	4.4	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.9
Extended Tealbook baseline	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.3
<i>Total PCE prices</i>					
Taylor (1993)	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2
Taylor (1999)	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1
Inertial Taylor (1999)	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1
First-difference	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1
<i>Core PCE prices</i>					
Taylor (1993)	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2
Taylor (1999)	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
Inertial Taylor (1999)	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1
First-difference	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1

1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.

**Outcomes of Simple Policy Rule Simulations, Quarterly**

(Four-quarter percent change, except as noted)

Measure and policy	2017				2018			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
<i>Nominal federal funds rate<sup>1</sup></i>								
Taylor (1993)	0.7	2.8	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.5
Taylor (1999)	0.7	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.9
Inertial Taylor (1999)	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.8
First-difference	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.9
Extended Tealbook baseline	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.6
<i>Real GDP</i>								
Taylor (1993)	2.0	2.3	1.8	1.9	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1
Taylor (1999)	2.0	2.3	1.8	1.8	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9
Inertial Taylor (1999)	2.0	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1
First-difference	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.1	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3
Extended Tealbook baseline	2.0	2.3	1.9	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2
<i>Unemployment rate<sup>1</sup></i>								
Taylor (1993)	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2
Taylor (1999)	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4
Inertial Taylor (1999)	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.1
First-difference	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.0
Extended Tealbook baseline	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1
<i>Total PCE prices</i>								
Taylor (1993)	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9
Taylor (1999)	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.8
Inertial Taylor (1999)	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8
First-difference	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0
Extended Tealbook baseline	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8
<i>Core PCE prices</i>								
Taylor (1993)	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9
Taylor (1999)	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9
Inertial Taylor (1999)	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9
First-difference	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9

1. Percent, average for the quarter.



**Outcomes of Optimal Control Simulations under Commitment**

(Percent change, annual rate, from end of preceding period except as noted)

Measure and policy	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
<i>Nominal federal funds rate<sup>1</sup></i>					
Equal weights	2.5	4.3	5.3	5.6	5.4
Aymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	1.1	1.6	2.2	2.8	3.3
Large weight on inflation gap	2.5	4.2	5.1	5.3	5.1
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.5	5.8
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.5	2.6	3.5	4.0	4.1
<i>Real GDP</i>					
Equal weights	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5
Aymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	2.2	2.6	2.0	1.5	1.1
Large weight on inflation gap	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	1.4	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.6
Extended Tealbook baseline	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.3
<i>Unemployment rate<sup>1</sup></i>					
Equal weights	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.8
Aymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	4.3	3.8	3.6	3.7	4.0
Large weight on inflation gap	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.8
Extended Tealbook baseline	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.3
<i>Total PCE prices</i>					
Equal weights	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Aymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
Large weight on inflation gap	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1
<i>Core PCE prices</i>					
Equal weights	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Aymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1
Large weight on inflation gap	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1

1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.

**Outcomes of Optimal Control Simulations under Commitment, Quarterly**

(Four-quarter percent change, except as noted)

Measure and policy	2017				2018			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
<i>Nominal federal funds rate<sup>1</sup></i>								
Equal weights	0.7	1.3	1.9	2.5	3.0	3.5	3.9	4.3
Asymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6
Large weight on inflation gap	0.7	1.3	1.9	2.5	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.2
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	0.7	3.4	4.7	5.3	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.5
Extended Tealbook baseline	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.6
<i>Real GDP</i>								
Equal weights	2.0	2.3	1.8	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.5
Asymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6
Large weight on inflation gap	2.0	2.3	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.6
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	2.0	2.3	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.2	1.2
Extended Tealbook baseline	2.0	2.3	1.9	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2
<i>Unemployment rate<sup>1</sup></i>								
Equal weights	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6
Asymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.0	3.8
Large weight on inflation gap	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.9
Extended Tealbook baseline	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1
<i>Total PCE prices</i>								
Equal weights	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7
Asymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9
Large weight on inflation gap	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7
Extended Tealbook baseline	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8
<i>Core PCE prices</i>								
Equal weights	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7
Asymmetric weight on <i>ugap</i>	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9
Large weight on inflation gap	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7
Minimal weight on rate adjustments	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7
Extended Tealbook baseline	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9

1. Percent, average for the quarter.

**Changes in GDP, Prices, and Unemployment**  
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

Interval	Nominal GDP		Real GDP		PCE price index		Core PCE price index		Unemployment rate <sup>1</sup>	
	03/03/17	04/20/17	03/03/17	04/20/17	03/03/17	04/20/17	03/03/17	04/20/17	03/03/17	04/20/17
<i>Quarterly</i>										
2016:Q1	1.3	1.3	.8	.8	.3	.3	2.1	2.1	5.0	5.0
Q2	3.7	3.7	1.4	1.4	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8	4.9	4.9
Q3	5.0	5.0	3.5	3.5	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	4.9	4.9
Q4	4.0	4.2	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.2	1.3	4.7	4.7
2017:Q1	4.3	3.3	1.4	.9	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.0	4.7	4.7
Q2	3.7	3.9	2.1	2.6	1.4	1.2	1.7	1.6	4.7	4.5
Q3	3.8	4.1	2.1	2.2	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	4.7	4.5
Q4	4.0	4.4	2.3	2.6	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	4.6	4.4
2018:Q1	4.5	4.8	2.4	2.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	4.5	4.3
Q2	4.1	4.1	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	4.4	4.2
Q3	4.1	4.0	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	4.3	4.2
Q4	4.1	4.1	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	4.2	4.1
<i>Two-quarter<sup>2</sup></i>										
2016:Q2	2.5	2.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.9	1.9	-1	-1
Q4	4.5	4.6	2.7	2.8	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	-2	-2
2017:Q2	4.0	3.6	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.8	.0	-2
Q4	3.9	4.2	2.2	2.4	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	-1	-1
2018:Q2	4.3	4.4	2.3	2.3	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	-2	-2
Q4	4.1	4.0	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	-2	-1
<i>Four-quarter<sup>3</sup></i>										
2015:Q4	3.0	3.0	1.9	1.9	.4	.4	1.4	1.4	-7	-7
2016:Q4	3.5	3.5	1.9	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.7	-3	-3
2017:Q4	3.9	3.9	2.0	2.1	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	-1	-3
2018:Q4	4.2	4.2	2.2	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	-4	-3
2019:Q4	4.0	3.9	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	-1	-1
<i>Annual</i>										
2015	3.7	3.7	2.6	2.6	.3	.3	1.4	1.4	5.3	5.3
2016	2.9	3.0	1.6	1.6	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.7	4.9	4.9
2017	4.1	4.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	4.7	4.5
2018	4.1	4.3	2.2	2.3	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	4.4	4.2
2019	4.0	4.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	4.2	4.0

1. Level, except for two-quarter and four-quarter intervals.

2. Percent change from two quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.

3. Percent change from four quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.

## Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items

(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

Item	2016			2017				2018				2016 <sup>1</sup>	2017 <sup>1</sup>	2018 <sup>1</sup>	2019 <sup>1</sup>
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.4 1.4	3.5 3.5	2.1 1.9	.9 1.4	2.6 2.1	2.2 2.1	2.6 2.3	2.6 2.4	2.0 2.1	2.0 2.1	2.1 2.1	2.0 1.9	2.1 2.0	2.2 2.2	1.8 1.9
Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.6 2.6	3.0 3.0	1.1 .9	.9 1.4	2.7 2.1	2.3 2.1	2.7 2.4	2.7 2.5	2.0 2.1	2.0 2.2	2.1 2.1	2.0 1.9	2.1 2.0	2.2 2.2	1.9 2.0
Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	3.2 3.2	2.4 2.4	3.4 3.1	1.8 2.4	3.0 2.8	2.8 2.8	3.2 3.0	3.6 3.5	2.9 3.0	2.7 2.9	2.6 2.7	2.5 2.5	2.7 2.7	2.9 3.0	2.4 2.6
Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	4.3 4.3	3.0 3.0	3.5 3.0	.6 1.5	3.1 3.0	3.0 2.9	2.8 2.7	3.4 3.4	3.0 3.0	2.8 2.7	2.7 2.7	3.1 3.0	2.4 2.5	2.9 3.0	2.5 2.5
Durables	9.8	11.6	11.4	-1.0	5.4	4.7	5.5	5.6	5.0	4.5	4.0	7.9	3.6	4.8	2.0
Nondurables	5.7	-5	3.3	1.5	3.6	3.3	2.7	3.6	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.8	3.1	2.6
Services	3.0	2.7	2.4	.6	2.5	2.7	2.4	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.0	2.6	2.6
Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-7.7 -7.7	-4.1 -4.1	9.6 9.4	11.4 8.0	-1.3 -2.5	-1.5 -1.6	8.3 3.9	5.2 3.8	2.6 4.5	2.1 5.2	.9 4.9	1.1 1.1	4.1 1.9	2.7 4.6	4.4 5.5
Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.0 1.0	1.4 1.4	.9 1.9	5.4 5.7	4.4 3.7	3.0 3.4	4.1 4.2	4.6 3.5	2.6 3.0	2.5 3.2	2.5 2.1	-1 .2	4.2 4.2	3.1 2.9	1.2 1.8
Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.8 1.8	-1.3 -1.3	1.7 3.0	2.4 5.7	2.4 3.4	2.4 3.5	4.9 5.1	6.0 4.6	3.0 3.6	3.3 3.9	3.4 2.6	-6 -3	3.0 4.4	3.9 3.7	1.8 2.3
Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-2.1 -2.1	12.0 12.0	-1.9 -2.1	17.1 5.8	11.4 4.6	5.3 3.1	1.4 .9	-2 -3	1.5 .7	-1 .6	-5 .4	1.9 1.8	8.6 3.6	.2 .3	-6 .0
Net exports <sup>2</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>2</sup>	-558 -558	-522 -522	-605 -600	-619 -626	-635 -655	-657 -677	-670 -696	-693 -725	-718 -752	-737 -773	-747 -788	-563 -562	-645 -663	-724 -759	-785 -828
Exports	1.8	10.0	-4.5	5.5	1.3	1.6	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.7	1.5	2.6	2.6	2.9
Imports	.2	2.2	9.0	6.4	3.3	4.4	3.5	5.1	5.4	4.7	3.4	2.6	4.4	4.7	4.2
Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-1.7 -1.7	.8 .8	.2 .0	-1.8 -.4	2.4 1.8	2.2 1.6	1.3 1.4	.7 .8	.5 .7	.5 .7	.4 .6	.2 .2	1.0 1.1	.5 .7	.5 .7
Federal	-4	2.4	-1.2	-2.7	3.1	3.2	.8	.4	-1	-1	-3	-2	1.1	.0	-1
Defense	-3.2	2.0	-3.6	-5.6	4.5	4.5	1.0	.5	.5	.5	.5	-2.0	1.0	.5	.5
Nondefense	3.8	3.0	2.3	1.6	1.2	1.3	.5	.3	-9	-9	-1.3	2.5	1.2	-7	-8
State & local	-2.5	-2	1.0	-1.3	2.0	1.6	1.6	.8	.8	.8	.8	.4	.9	.8	.9
Change in priv. inventories <sup>2</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>2</sup>	-9 -9	7 7	50 46	46 48	42 46	39 43	34 37	30 36	29 35	28 33	28 31	22 21	40 44	29 34	22 15

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

2. Billions of chained (2009) dollars.

**Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items**  
(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

Item	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.7 2.7	1.7 1.7	1.3 1.3	2.7 2.7	2.5 2.5	1.9 1.9	2.0 1.9	2.1 2.0	2.2 2.2	1.8 1.9
Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.0 2.0	1.5 1.5	1.7 1.7	2.0 2.0	2.7 2.7	2.0 2.0	2.0 1.9	2.1 2.0	2.2 2.2	1.9 2.0
Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	3.5 3.5	2.6 2.6	2.3 2.3	2.6 2.6	3.8 3.8	2.7 2.7	2.5 2.5	2.7 2.7	2.9 3.0	2.4 2.6
Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	3.1 3.1	1.5 1.5	1.3 1.3	2.0 2.0	3.5 3.5	2.6 2.6	3.1 3.0	2.4 2.5	2.9 3.0	2.5 2.5
Durables	9.3	4.8	7.2	5.2	8.6	5.5	7.9	3.6	4.8	2.0
Nondurables	3.3	.4	.8	2.6	2.8	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.1	2.6
Services	2.0	1.4	.6	1.3	2.9	2.2	2.5	2.0	2.6	2.6
Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-5.2 -5.2	6.0 6.0	15.7 15.7	6.8 6.8	6.2 6.2	13.1 13.1	1.1 1.1	4.1 1.9	2.7 4.6	4.4 5.5
Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	8.1 8.1	9.0 9.0	5.2 5.2	4.8 4.8	5.0 5.0	.8 .8	-1 .2	4.2 4.2	3.1 2.9	1.2 1.8
Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	12.0 12.0	9.2 9.2	5.5 5.5	4.5 4.5	4.1 4.1	3.8 3.8	-6 -3	3.0 4.4	3.9 3.7	1.8 2.3
Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-4.0 -4.0	8.0 8.0	4.1 4.1	5.8 5.8	8.0 8.0	-8.8 -8.8	1.9 1.8	8.6 3.6	.2 .3	-6 .0
Net exports <sup>1</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>1</sup>	-459 -459	-459 -459	-447 -447	-405 -405	-426 -426	-540 -540	-563 -562	-645 -663	-724 -759	-785 -828
Exports	10.1	4.2	2.2	5.9	3.1	-2.2	1.5	2.6	2.6	2.9
Imports	12.0	3.5	.3	2.5	6.1	2.5	2.6	4.4	4.7	4.2
Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-1.1 -1.1	-3.0 -3.0	-2.2 -2.2	-2.8 -2.8	.3 .3	2.2 2.2	.2 .2	1.0 1.1	.5 .7	.5 .7
Federal	3.2	-4.0	-2.1	-6.7	-1.3	1.7	-2	1.1	.0	-1
Defense	2.0	-4.1	-3.9	-7.1	-4.1	.6	-2.0	1.0	.5	.5
Nondefense	5.5	-3.9	1.0	-6.0	3.4	3.4	2.5	1.2	-7	-8
State & local	-4.0	-2.3	-2.3	-1	1.3	2.5	.4	.9	.8	.9
Change in priv. inventories <sup>1</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>1</sup>	58 58	38 38	55 55	79 79	58 58	84 84	22 21	40 44	29 34	22 15

1. Billions of chained (2009) dollars.

**Contributions to Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product**  
(Percentage points, annual rate except as noted)

Item	2016			2017				2018				2016 <sup>1</sup>	2017 <sup>1</sup>	2018 <sup>1</sup>	2019 <sup>1</sup>
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.4 1.4	3.5 3.5	2.1 1.9	.9 1.4	2.6 2.1	2.2 2.1	2.6 2.3	2.6 2.4	2.0 2.1	2.0 2.1	2.1 2.1	2.0 1.9	2.1 2.0	2.2 2.2	1.8 1.9
Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.6 2.6	3.0 3.0	1.1 .9	.9 1.4	2.7 2.1	2.3 2.1	2.7 2.4	2.7 2.5	2.0 2.1	2.0 2.2	2.1 2.1	2.0 1.9	2.1 2.0	2.2 2.2	1.9 2.0
Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.7 2.7	2.1 2.1	2.9 2.6	1.5 2.0	2.6 2.4	2.4 2.3	2.7 2.6	3.1 2.9	2.5 2.6	2.3 2.5	2.2 2.3	2.1 2.1	2.3 2.3	2.5 2.6	2.1 2.2
Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.9 2.9	2.0 2.0	2.4 2.1	.4 1.0	2.1 2.0	2.1 2.0	1.9 1.9	2.3 2.4	2.0 2.0	1.9 1.9	1.9 1.9	2.1 2.0	1.6 1.7	2.0 2.0	1.8 1.8
Durables	.7	.8	.8	-1	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.3	.3	.6	.3	.4	.1
Nondurables	.8	-1	.5	.2	.5	.5	.4	.5	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.5	.4
Services	1.4	1.3	1.1	.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.2
Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-3 -3	-2 -2	.4 .3	.4 .3	-1 -1	-1 -1	.3 .2	.2 .1	.1 .2	.1 .2	.0 .2	.0 .0	.2 .1	.1 .2	.2 .2
Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	.1	.2	.1	.7	.5	.4	.5	.6	.3	.3	.3	.0	.5	.4	.2
Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	.1	.2	.2	.7	.5	.4	.5	.4	.4	.4	.3	.0	.5	.4	.2
Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	.2	-1	.3	.5	.2	.2	.5	.6	.3	.3	.3	-1	.3	.4	.2
Net exports <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-1 -1	.3 .3	-1 -1	.4 .2	.3 .1	.1 .1	.0 .0	.0 .0	.0 .0	.0 .0	.0 .0	.0 .0	.2 .1	.0 .0	.0 .0
Exports	.2	.9	-1.8	-3	-3	-5	-3	-5	-5	-4	-2	-2	-3	-4	-3
Imports	.2	.9	-1.7	-6	-6	-5	-4	-6	-6	-4	-3	-2	-5	-5	-3
Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	.2	1.2	-6	.6	.2	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.2	.3	.3	.3
Federal	.0	-3	-1.3	-9	-5	-7	-5	-8	-8	-7	-5	-4	-7	-7	-6
Defense	-3	.1	.0	-3	.4	.4	.2	.1	.1	.1	.1	.0	.2	.1	.1
Nondefense	-3	.1	.0	-1	.3	.3	.2	.1	.1	.1	.1	.0	.2	.1	.1
State & local	.0	.2	.1	-2	.2	.2	.2	.0	.0	.0	.0	-1	.0	.0	.0
Change in priv. inventories <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-1.2 -1.2	.5 .5	1.0 .9	.0 .0	-1 .0	-1 -1	-1 -1	-1 .0	.0 .0	.0 -1	.0 .0	.0 .0	-1 -1	.0 .0	-1 -1

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

**Changes in Prices and Costs**  
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

Item	2016			2017				2018				2016 <sup>1</sup>	2017 <sup>1</sup>	2018 <sup>1</sup>	2019 <sup>1</sup>
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
GDP chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.3 2.3	1.4 1.4	2.1 2.0	2.4 2.8	1.3 1.6	1.8 1.7	1.8 1.7	2.1 2.0	2.0 2.0	2.0 1.9	2.0 1.9	1.6 1.6	1.8 1.9	2.0 2.0	2.1 2.1
PCE chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.0 2.0	1.5 1.5	2.0 1.9	2.4 2.6	1.2 1.4	1.6 1.5	1.6 1.5	1.9 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.4 1.4	1.7 1.7	1.8 1.8	1.9 1.9
Energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	15.5 15.5	2.1 2.1	26.3 26.1	15.2 16.0	-8.5 -7.1	-4 -8	.8 -6	.6 .0	.4 .4	.0 .1	.3 .4	.8 .8	1.4 1.5	.3 .2	.7 .6
Food <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-1.8 -1.8	-2.1 -2.1	-1.2 -1.2	.4 .0	2.3 2.0	1.9 2.3	2.0 2.0	2.2 2.2	2.1 2.1	2.1 2.2	2.2 2.2	-1.7 -1.7	1.7 1.6	2.1 2.1	2.2 2.2
Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.8 1.8	1.7 1.7	1.3 1.2	2.0 2.3	1.6 1.7	1.7 1.6	1.6 1.5	1.9 1.9	1.9 1.9	1.9 1.8	1.9 1.8	1.7 1.7	1.7 1.8	1.9 1.9	2.0 2.0
Ex. food & energy, market based <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.6 1.6	1.6 1.6	1.3 1.2	2.0 2.3	1.4 1.6	1.5 1.5	1.5 1.4	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.5 1.5	1.6 1.7	1.8 1.8	1.9 1.9
CPI <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.3 2.3	1.8 1.8	3.0 3.0	3.1 3.6	1.3 1.7	2.1 2.1	2.2 2.0	2.3 2.2	2.3 2.3	2.2 2.3	2.3 2.3	1.8 1.8	2.2 2.4	2.3 2.3	2.4 2.4
Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.1 2.1	2.1 2.1	2.0 2.0	2.5 2.9	1.9 2.3	2.3 2.3	2.2 2.2	2.4 2.4	2.4 2.4	2.4 2.4	2.5 2.4	2.2 2.2	2.2 2.4	2.4 2.4	2.5 2.5
ECI, hourly compensation <sup>2</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>2</sup>	2.3 2.3	1.9 1.9	1.9 1.9	2.5 2.5	2.2 2.2	2.2 2.2	2.2 2.2	2.3 2.3	2.4 2.4	2.4 2.4	2.4 2.4	2.2 2.2	2.3 2.3	2.4 2.4	2.5 2.5
Business sector Output per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-3 -4	3.7 3.9	2.4 2.3	-8 .4	1.0 .8	1.4 1.0	1.5 1.2	.9 .9	.8 .7	.9 1.0	.9 1.0	1.3 1.3	.8 .9	.9 .9	.9 .9
Compensation per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	5.7 5.6	4.3 4.6	3.9 4.3	1.8 2.9	3.3 3.2	3.2 3.0	3.2 3.0	3.3 3.1	3.4 3.2	3.4 3.3	3.4 3.3	3.2 3.3	2.9 3.0	3.3 3.2	3.4 3.4
Unit labor costs <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	6.0 6.0	.6 .7	1.5 2.0	2.6 2.4	2.3 2.4	1.8 2.0	1.6 1.7	2.4 2.2	2.5 2.4	2.4 2.4	2.4 2.3	1.9 2.0	2.1 2.1	2.4 2.4	2.5 2.5
Core goods imports chain-wt. price index <sup>3</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>3</sup>	.5 .5	2.0 2.0	-4 -4	1.1 -1	1.7 2.0	1.9 1.7	.7 1.0	.6 .8	.8 .8	.7 .7	.7 .7	.0 .0	1.3 1.2	.7 .8	.7 .7

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

2. Private-industry workers.

3. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

## Greensheets

## Changes in Prices and Costs

(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

Item	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GDP chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.8 1.8	1.9 1.9	1.9 1.9	1.6 1.6	1.5 1.5	1.1 1.1	1.6 1.6	1.8 1.9	2.0 2.0	2.1 2.1
PCE chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.3 1.3	2.7 2.7	1.8 1.8	1.2 1.2	1.2 1.2	.4 .4	1.4 1.4	1.7 1.7	1.8 1.8	1.9 1.9
Energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	6.4 6.4	12.0 12.0	2.3 2.3	-2.5 -2.5	-6.2 -6.2	-15.8 -15.8	.8 .8	1.4 1.5	.3 .2	.7 .6
Food <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.3 1.3	5.1 5.1	1.2 1.2	.7 .7	2.7 2.7	.3 .3	-1.7 -1.7	1.7 1.6	2.1 2.1	2.2 2.2
Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.0 1.0	1.9 1.9	1.8 1.8	1.5 1.5	1.6 1.6	1.4 1.4	1.7 1.7	1.7 1.8	1.9 1.9	2.0 2.0
Ex. food & energy, market based <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	.7 .7	1.9 1.9	1.5 1.5	1.1 1.1	1.2 1.2	1.1 1.1	1.5 1.5	1.6 1.7	1.8 1.8	1.9 1.9
CPI <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.2 1.2	3.3 3.3	1.9 1.9	1.2 1.2	1.2 1.2	.4 .4	1.8 1.8	2.2 2.4	2.3 2.3	2.4 2.4
Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	.6 .6	2.2 2.2	1.9 1.9	1.7 1.7	1.7 1.7	2.0 2.0	2.2 2.2	2.2 2.4	2.4 2.4	2.5 2.5
ECL, hourly compensation <sup>1</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>1</sup>	2.1 2.1	2.2 2.2	1.8 1.8	2.0 2.0	2.3 2.3	1.9 1.9	2.2 2.2	2.3 2.3	2.4 2.4	2.5 2.5
Business sector Output per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.6 1.6	-1 .0	-1 -2	1.9 2.0	-1 -1	.5 .5	1.3 1.3	.8 .9	.9 .9	.9 .9
Compensation per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.2 1.2	.5 .5	5.9 5.8	-1 .0	2.7 2.7	3.2 3.1	3.2 3.3	2.9 3.0	3.3 3.2	3.4 3.4
Unit labor costs <i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-4 -4	.6 .6	6.0 6.0	-2.0 -2.0	2.8 2.8	2.6 2.6	1.9 2.0	2.1 2.1	2.4 2.4	2.5 2.5
Core goods imports chain-wt. price index <sup>2</sup> <i>Previous Tealbook</i> <sup>2</sup>	2.3 2.3	4.3 4.3	.1 .1	-1.5 -1.5	.5 .5	-3.3 -3.3	.0 .0	1.3 1.2	.7 .8	.7 .7

1. Private-industry workers.

2. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.



## Other Macroeconomic Indicators

Item	2016			2017				2018				2016 <sup>1</sup>	2017 <sup>1</sup>	2018 <sup>1</sup>	2019 <sup>1</sup>	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4					
<i>Employment and production</i>																
Nonfarm payroll employment <sup>2</sup>	164	239	148	178	180	174	174	174	174	174	169	159	187	176	169	122
Unemployment rate <sup>3</sup>	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.7	4.4	4.1	4.0
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>3</sup></i>	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.7	4.6	4.2	4.1
Natural rate of unemployment <sup>3</sup>	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>3</sup></i>	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Employment-to-Population Ratio <sup>3</sup>	59.7	59.8	59.7	60.0	59.9	59.9	59.9	59.9	59.9	60.0	59.9	59.9	59.7	59.9	59.9	59.8
Employment-to-Population Trend <sup>3</sup>	59.8	59.7	59.7	59.6	59.6	59.5	59.5	59.5	59.4	59.3	59.3	59.2	59.7	59.5	59.2	59.0
GDP gap <sup>4</sup>	-1	.3	.5	.3	.6	.8	1.0	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	.5	1.0	1.6	1.8
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>4</sup></i>	-1	.3	.4	.4	.5	.7	.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5	.4	.9	1.5	1.7
Industrial production <sup>5</sup>	-7	.8	.7	1.5	4.6	2.7	1.7	1.7	1.2	.6	1.3	1.3	-1	2.6	1.2	.8
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>5</sup></i>	-8	1.7	.4	1.4	2.6	.4	1.0	1.5	1.1	.7	1.3	1.3	-1	1.4	1.2	1.0
Manufacturing industr. prod. <sup>5</sup>	-1.1	-1	1.7	2.7	1.3	1.3	.8	.7	1.0	.7	.6	.6	.3	1.5	.7	.7
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>5</sup></i>	-1.1	.4	1.4	2.4	1.2	.2	.6	.8	.9	.8	.8	.8	.2	1.1	.8	.9
Capacity utilization rate - mfg. <sup>3</sup>	75.1	74.9	75.1	75.4	75.6	75.7	75.8	75.8	75.9	76.0	76.0	76.0	75.1	75.8	76.0	76.3
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>3</sup></i>	74.9	74.9	75.0	75.2	75.2	75.1	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0
Housing starts <sup>6</sup>	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4
Light motor vehicle sales <sup>6</sup>	17.1	17.5	18.0	17.2	17.1	17.0	16.9	17.0	16.9	16.8	16.8	16.8	17.5	17.0	16.8	16.6
<i>Income and saving</i>																
Nominal GDP <sup>5</sup>	3.7	5.0	4.2	3.3	3.9	4.1	4.4	4.8	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.1	3.5	3.9	4.2	3.9
Real disposable pers. income <sup>5</sup>	2.9	2.9	2.0	1.7	2.3	2.4	1.8	8.3	2.4	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.1	4.0	2.1
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>5</sup></i>	2.9	2.9	2.0	.9	2.2	2.3	2.0	8.4	2.4	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.5	1.9	4.1	2.3
Personal saving rate <sup>3</sup>	5.9	5.9	5.5	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.2	6.3	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.1	5.5	5.2	6.1	5.7
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>3</sup></i>	5.9	5.9	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.1	5.0	6.1	5.9	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.6	5.0	6.0	5.7
Corporate profits <sup>7</sup>	-2.4	25.4	2.1	-7.5	.8	.5	.4	2.7	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	9.3	-1.5	2.5	2.3
Profit share of GNP <sup>3</sup>	10.8	11.3	11.2	11.0	10.9	10.8	10.7	10.7	10.6	10.6	10.6	10.6	11.2	10.7	10.6	10.4
Gross national saving rate <sup>3</sup>	18.2	18.6	18.3	18.4	18.5	18.3	18.1	17.9	17.9	17.8	17.7	17.7	18.3	18.1	17.7	17.2
Net national saving rate <sup>3</sup>	3.1	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.5	3.4	2.9	2.2

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise indicated.

2. Average monthly change, thousands.

3. Percent; annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

4. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

Annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

5. Percent change, annual rate.

6. Level, millions; annual values are annual averages.

7. Percent change, annual rate, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

## Greensheets

## Other Macroeconomic Indicators

(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

Item	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<i>Employment and production</i>										
Nonfarm payroll employment <sup>1</sup>	88	174	179	192	250	226	187	176	169	122
Unemployment rate <sup>2</sup>	9.5	8.7	7.8	7.0	5.7	5.0	4.7	4.4	4.1	4.0
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>2</sup></i>	9.5	8.7	7.8	7.0	5.7	5.0	4.7	4.6	4.2	4.1
Natural rate of unemployment <sup>2</sup>	5.9	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>2</sup></i>	5.9	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Employment-to-Population Ratio <sup>2</sup>	58.3	58.5	58.7	58.5	59.2	59.4	59.7	59.9	59.9	59.8
Employment-to-Population Trend <sup>2</sup>	61.1	60.7	60.3	60.2	60.1	59.9	59.7	59.5	59.2	59.0
GDP gap <sup>3</sup>	-4.2	-3.7	-3.7	-2.5	-9	.0	.5	1.0	1.6	1.8
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>3</sup></i>	-4.2	-3.7	-3.7	-2.5	-9	.0	.4	.9	1.5	1.7
Industrial production <sup>4</sup>	6.0	2.8	2.3	2.2	3.4	-2.7	-1	2.6	1.2	.8
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>4</sup></i>	5.9	2.6	2.3	2.0	3.5	-1.6	-1	1.4	1.2	1.0
Manufacturing industr. prod. <sup>4</sup>	5.9	2.5	1.7	.9	1.5	-6	.3	1.5	.7	.7
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>4</sup></i>	5.9	2.5	1.7	.8	2.0	.0	.2	1.1	.8	.9
Capacity utilization rate - mfg. <sup>2</sup>	72.3	74.4	74.6	74.7	75.9	75.4	75.1	75.8	76.0	76.3
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>2</sup></i>	72.4	74.4	74.3	74.6	76.0	75.4	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0
Housing starts <sup>5</sup>	.6	.6	.8	.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4
Light motor vehicle sales <sup>5</sup>	11.6	12.7	14.4	15.5	16.5	17.4	17.5	17.0	16.8	16.6
<i>Income and saving</i>										
Nominal GDP <sup>4</sup>	4.6	3.6	3.2	4.3	4.1	3.0	3.5	3.9	4.2	3.9
Real disposable pers. income <sup>4</sup>	2.6	1.7	5.1	-2.8	4.5	3.0	2.5	2.1	4.0	2.1
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>4</sup></i>	2.6	1.7	5.1	-2.8	4.5	3.0	2.5	1.9	4.1	2.3
Personal saving rate <sup>2</sup>	5.5	5.8	9.2	4.7	5.6	6.0	5.5	5.2	6.1	5.7
<i>Previous Tealbook<sup>2</sup></i>	5.5	5.8	9.2	4.7	5.6	6.0	5.6	5.0	6.0	5.7
Corporate profits <sup>6</sup>	18.0	6.8	.6	4.7	6.6	-11.2	9.3	-1.5	2.5	2.3
Profit share of GNP <sup>2</sup>	12.0	12.3	12.0	12.0	12.4	10.7	11.2	10.7	10.6	10.4
Gross national saving rate <sup>2</sup>	15.2	16.1	18.0	18.2	19.2	18.8	18.3	18.1	17.7	17.2
Net national saving rate <sup>2</sup>	-.3	.8	2.9	3.1	4.3	3.9	3.5	3.4	2.9	2.2

1. Average monthly change, thousands.

2. Percent; values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

Values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

4. Percent change.

5. Level, millions; values are annual averages.

6. Percent change, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

**Staff Projections of Federal Sector Accounts and Related Items**  
(Billions of dollars except as noted)

Item	Fiscal year				2016				2017				2018				
	2016	2017	2018	2019	Q1 <sup>a</sup>	Q2 <sup>a</sup>	Q3 <sup>a</sup>	Q4 <sup>a</sup>	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	
Unified budget	Receipts	3,267	3,410	3,427	3,585	711	993	798	741	732	1,103	834	793	691	1,122	822	802
	Outlays	3,852	3,940	4,104	4,383	956	932	984	951	1,049	967	973	997	1,115	1,026	967	1,106
	Surplus/deficit	-586	-530	-677	-798	-245	61	-186	-210	-317	136	-138	-204	-424	96	-145	-304
	<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-587	-554	-673	-817	-245	61	-186	-208	-329	112	-129	-202	-393	61	-138	-309
	Means of financing:																
	Borrowing	1,052	240	924	926	251	8	241	259	-68	-13	62	302	488	-49	183	339
	Cash decrease	-155	289	-127	-8	20	-50	10	-46	419	-104	20	-68	-34	-17	-8	-4
	Other <sup>1</sup>	-311	1	-120	-120	-25	-18	-65	-5	-33	-18	56	-30	-30	-30	-30	-30
	Cash operating balance, end of period	353	64	192	199	314	364	353	399	-19	84	64	132	166	183	192	196
	NIPA federal sector																
Receipts	3,495	3,585	3,614	3,737	3,442	3,485	3,537	3,561	3,564	3,594	3,620	3,668	3,553	3,602	3,634	3,674	
Expenditures	4,124	4,269	4,495	4,775	4,111	4,137	4,189	4,215	4,270	4,262	4,329	4,373	4,478	4,529	4,600	4,668	
Consumption expenditures	974	995	1,020	1,033	969	975	985	984	990	999	1,008	1,013	1,020	1,023	1,025	1,027	
Defense	589	590	604	613	587	586	591	586	586	592	597	599	604	605	607	608	
Nondefense	386	405	417	420	382	389	394	397	404	408	411	414	416	417	419	419	
Other spending	3,150	3,274	3,475	3,742	3,142	3,163	3,204	3,232	3,280	3,263	3,321	3,360	3,458	3,507	3,574	3,640	
Current account surplus	-629	-684	-881	-1,038	-668	-652	-652	-655	-706	-668	-709	-705	-924	-928	-965	-994	
Gross investment	266	271	281	287	265	265	267	269	267	272	277	278	280	282	283	284	
Gross saving less gross investment <sup>2</sup>	-623	-683	-887	-1,049	-662	-646	-647	-652	-700	-667	-713	-709	-931	-935	-973	-1,003	
Fiscal indicators																	
High-employment (HEB)																	
surplus/deficit <sup>3</sup>	-636.7	-728.1	-981.1	-1,180.6	-670.2	-657.4	-671.5	-689.3	-731.4	-716.7	-775.0	-784.7	-1,018.4	-1,035.7	-1,085.8	-1,128.3	
Change in HEB, percent of potential GDP	.4	.4	1.2	.8	.7	-1.1	.0	.1	.2	-1.1	.3	.0	1.2	.0	.2	.2	
Fiscal impetus (FI), percent of GDP <sup>4</sup>	.2	.3	.4	.3	.5	-1.1	.3	.2	-2.2	.5	.5	.3	.7	.3	.3	.3	
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	.2	.3	.4	.3	.5	-1.1	.3	.2	.0	.4	.4	.3	.8	.3	.3	.3	
Federal purchases	.0	.1	.0	.0	-1.1	.0	.2	-1.1	-2.2	.2	.2	.1	.0	.0	.0	.0	
State and local purchases	.0	.1	.1	.1	.4	-3.3	.0	.1	-1.1	.2	.2	.2	.1	.1	.1	.1	
Taxes and transfers	.2	.1	.3	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	.1	.1	.1	.6	.2	.2	.2	

1. Other means of financing include checks issued less checks paid, accrued items, and changes in other financial assets and liabilities.

2. Gross saving is the current account surplus plus consumption of fixed capital of the general government as well as government enterprises.

3. HEB is gross saving less gross investment (NIPA) of the federal government in current dollars, with cyclically sensitive receipts and outlays adjusted to the staff's measure of potential output and the natural rate of unemployment. The sign on Change in HEB, as a percent of nominal potential GDP, is reversed. Quarterly figures for change in HEB are not at annual rates.

4. Fiscal impetus measures the contribution to growth of real GDP from fiscal policy actions at the general government level (excluding multiplier effects). It equals the sum of the direct contributions to real GDP growth from changes in federal purchases and state and local purchases, plus the estimated contribution from real consumption and investment that is induced by discretionary policy changes in transfers and taxes.

a. Actual.

### Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries

(Quarterly percent changes at an annual rate)

Measure and country	2016				2017				Projected			
	2016				2017				2018			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
<b>Real GDP<sup>1</sup></b>												
Total foreign	2.4	1.4	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	2.4	1.4	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
Advanced foreign economies	2.3	.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7
Canada	2.7	-1.2	3.8	2.6	3.0	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8
Japan	1.9	2.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.0	.9	.8	.9
United Kingdom	.6	2.4	2.0	2.7	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Euro area	2.2	1.3	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
Germany	2.9	1.9	.5	1.7	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6
Emerging market economies	2.5	2.3	3.7	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Asia	4.4	5.2	4.9	4.7	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Korea	2.0	3.7	1.9	2.0	2.9	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
China	6.6	7.1	6.8	6.6	7.1	6.6	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.8
Latin America	.8	-5	3.0	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4
Mexico	1.9	.3	4.4	2.9	1.9	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5
Brazil	-2.4	-1.3	-2.9	-3.4	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
<b>Consumer prices<sup>2</sup></b>												
Total foreign	1.4	2.0	1.6	2.6	3.0	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	1.4	2.1	1.6	2.6	3.6	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5
Advanced foreign economies	-3	1.1	.9	1.8	2.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6
Canada	.5	2.2	1.0	1.7	2.9	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9
Japan	-3	-4	-5	2.4	.0	.4	.6	.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
United Kingdom	.2	.7	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1
Euro area	-1.1	1.1	1.2	1.9	3.0	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5
Germany	-1.2	1.1	1.3	3.0	2.2	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Emerging market economies	2.7	2.7	2.2	3.1	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Asia	2.0	2.3	1.2	2.6	.9	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Korea	.5	1.0	.4	4.0	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0
China	2.5	2.3	1.3	2.6	-6	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Latin America	4.3	3.9	4.5	4.5	9.8	5.5	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.7
Mexico	2.8	2.4	3.6	4.1	9.9	5.0	3.8	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Brazil	11.8	7.5	6.5	2.6	3.2	4.3	4.9	4.9	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.4

<sup>1</sup> Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.

<sup>2</sup> Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

**Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries**  
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4)

Measure and country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	-----Projected-----	
								2018	2019
<b>Real GDP<sup>1</sup></b>									
Total foreign	3.2	2.3	2.9	2.6	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	3.2	2.3	2.9	2.5	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6
Advanced foreign economies	1.8	.3	2.4	1.8	1.2	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.7
Canada	3.1	.7	3.6	2.2	.4	1.9	2.3	1.8	1.8
Japan	.2	.3	2.7	-3	1.2	1.6	1.2	.9	.1
United Kingdom	1.3	1.3	2.4	3.5	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.6
Euro area	.5	-1.1	.7	1.3	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
Germany	2.4	.2	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.4
Emerging market economies	4.6	4.3	3.4	3.3	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.4	3.5
Asia	5.1	5.7	5.4	5.0	4.4	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.4
Korea	2.9	2.1	3.5	2.8	3.3	2.4	3.0	3.0	2.9
China	8.7	8.0	7.6	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.5	5.8	5.7
Latin America	4.1	3.4	1.6	1.9	1.3	1.3	2.0	2.4	2.6
Mexico	4.2	3.4	1.0	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.4	2.6
Brazil	2.7	2.6	2.6	-3	-5.8	-2.5	2.2	2.1	2.2
<b>Consumer prices<sup>2</sup></b>									
Total foreign	3.4	2.3	2.4	2.0	1.4	1.9	2.6	2.4	2.6
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	3.4	2.3	2.4	2.0	1.4	1.9	2.8	2.5	2.6
Advanced foreign economies	2.2	1.3	1.0	1.2	.5	.9	1.7	1.6	1.9
Canada	2.7	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.3	1.4	2.1	1.9	2.0
Japan	-3	-2	1.4	2.6	.2	.3	.4	1.1	2.5
United Kingdom	4.6	2.6	2.1	.9	.1	1.2	2.9	2.2	2.1
Euro area	2.9	2.3	.8	.1	.2	.7	1.7	1.4	1.6
Germany	2.6	1.9	1.4	.4	.2	1.0	1.7	1.8	2.0
Emerging market economies	4.3	3.1	3.4	2.7	2.1	2.7	3.2	3.1	3.1
Asia	4.4	2.6	3.1	1.8	1.5	2.0	2.1	2.8	2.9
Korea	3.9	1.7	1.1	1.0	.9	1.5	2.6	3.0	3.0
China	4.6	2.1	2.9	1.5	1.5	2.2	1.5	2.5	2.5
Latin America	4.1	4.4	4.1	4.8	3.4	4.3	5.9	3.8	3.5
Mexico	3.5	4.1	3.6	4.2	2.3	3.2	5.5	3.2	3.2
Brazil	6.7	5.6	5.8	6.5	10.4	7.1	4.3	4.4	4.4

<sup>1</sup> Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.<sup>2</sup> Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

## Greensheets

## U.S. Current Account

## Quarterly Data

	2016				2017				Projected-----2018			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
	-----											
	<i>Billions of dollars, s.a.a.r.</i>											
<b>U.S. current account balance</b>	<b>-532.3</b>	<b>-479.0</b>	<b>-464.0</b>	<b>-449.5</b>	<b>-527.9</b>	<b>-539.1</b>	<b>-562.7</b>	<b>-596.8</b>	<b>-645.2</b>	<b>-658.9</b>	<b>-691.6</b>	<b>-724.2</b>
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-531.6	-477.3	-456.0	-528.2	-551.3	-547.0	-583.2	-625.1	-684.5	-699.6	-732.2	-770.0
Current account as percent of GDP	-2.9	-2.6	-2.5	-2.4	-2.8	-2.8	-2.9	-3.0	-3.3	-3.3	-3.4	-3.5
<i>Previous Tealbook</i>	-2.9	-2.6	-2.4	-2.8	-2.9	-2.8	-3.0	-3.2	-3.5	-3.5	-3.6	-3.8
Net goods & services	-504.8	-503.2	-464.9	-529.3	-563.4	-578.3	-600.8	-621.9	-653.4	-661.2	-674.6	-690.9
Investment income, net	146.0	186.5	177.5	257.1	218.5	211.2	216.2	199.2	191.2	174.3	161.1	140.8
Direct, net	218.6	254.5	254.0	343.2	298.5	303.0	324.6	326.5	338.8	343.4	353.0	355.8
Portfolio, net	-72.6	-68.1	-76.5	-86.1	-80.0	-91.7	-108.4	-127.3	-147.6	-169.1	-192.0	-215.0
Other income and transfers, net	-173.4	-162.2	-176.6	-177.3	-183.0	-172.0	-178.1	-174.1	-183.0	-172.0	-178.1	-174.1

## Annual Data

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019

## Abbreviations

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ABS	asset-backed securities
AFE	advanced foreign economy
AHCA	American Health Care Act
BHC	bank holding company
BOE	Bank of England
BOJ	Bank of Japan
CDS	credit default swaps
C&I	commercial and industrial
CMBS	commercial mortgage-backed securities
CPH	compensation per hour
CPI	consumer price index
CRE	commercial real estate
ECB	European Central Bank
ECI	employment cost index
E&I	equipment and intangibles
EME	emerging market economy
EU	European Union
FOMC	Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee
FX	foreign exchange
GDP	gross domestic product
GSE	government-sponsored enterprise
M&A	mergers and acquisitions
MBS	mortgage-backed securities
MMF	money market fund
LFPR	labor force participation rate
NFIB	National Federation of Independent Business
OIS	overnight index swap
ON RRP	overnight reverse repurchase agreement

OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCE	personal consumption expenditures
PMI	purchasing managers index
PPI	producer price index
QM	qualified mortgage
QS assessment	QS Assessment of Financial Stability
SEP	Summary of Economic Projections
SLOOS	Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
SOMA	System Open Market Account
S&P	Standard & Poor's
TIPS	Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities



## BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS

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**Date:** May 12, 2017  
**To:** Federal Open Market Committee  
**From:** David Wilcox  
**Subject:** Corrected Probabilities of Returning to the Effective Lower Bound

---

In the Risk and Uncertainty section of the April Tealbook A, the box “A Guidepost for Dropping Effective Lower Bound Risk from the Assessment of Risks” (on pages 68-69) presented calculations of the probability that the federal funds rate would return to the effective lower bound (ELB). The calculations were constructed using stochastic simulations of the FRB/US model around the staff baseline projection and were shown in figures 1 and 2 of the box.


During the process of preparing to show updated versions of these probabilities in subsequent Tealbooks, a small error was found in the code that constructed these calculations. This note provides corrected calculations of the probabilities that had been shown in the box. The red lines in figures 1 and 2 show the correct probabilities, and the black lines show what was in the April Tealbook. In a few places in the text, the correct calculations are shown in red and the incorrect ones are shown in black ~~strikeout~~. Even with these corrections, the main point of the box is unchanged: Given the baseline April forecast, the probability of returning to the ELB will probably be low enough around the third quarter of this year that we will consider dropping it as a factor that contributes importantly to our assessment of a downside skew in the risks for our projection of economic activity.

## A Guidepost for Dropping Effective Lower Bound Risk from the Assessment of Risks

The staff has for some time judged that the risks to the projection for real activity are skewed to the downside due to the effective lower bound (ELB) constraint on the federal funds rate. All else being equal, a higher expected path for the federal funds rate lowers the probability that policymakers will be constrained by the ELB in the near future, which reduces downside macroeconomic risks. With the federal funds rate having risen to the range of  $\frac{3}{4}$  to 1 percent and expected to rise further going forward, we will face a decision about when to drop the ELB reference from the Tealbook's assessment of risks. In this discussion, we describe how one specific measure of ELB risk has evolved since liftoff and is expected to evolve in the future. We then lay out one possible way to use this measure to inform our decision on when to drop our reference to the downside economic risk stemming from the ELB.


Figure 1 shows a measure of ELB risk—the probability that the federal funds rate will be at the ELB for at least one quarter during the next three years—computed from 20,000 stochastic simulations of FRB/US around the Tealbook baseline projection using the non-inertial version of the Taylor rule.<sup>1</sup> According to figure 1, the ELB risk measure was above ~~40~~ ~~30~~ percent throughout ~~most of~~ 2016 but then moved below ~~40~~ ~~30~~ percent early this year. The ELB risk measure based on the April 2017 Tealbook projection is ~~28~~ ~~26~~ percent.<sup>2</sup>

**Figure 1: ELB Risk since Liftoff**



Source: Staff calculation based on FRB/US stochastic simulations.

**Figure 2: Forecasts of ELB Risk**



Source: Staff calculation based on FRB/US stochastic simulations.

<sup>1</sup> We use the non-inertial Taylor rule to capture the fact that policymakers typically cut interest rates aggressively in the face of a looming recession, even though they often increase interest rates gradually in the aftermath of a recession. In sticky-price models that account for the ELB, this asymmetric behavior is consistent with the prescription of optimal commitment policy and other well-performing rules, such as the price-level targeting rule and the rule proposed in David Reifschneider and John C. Williams (2000), “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936–66.

<sup>2</sup> In the stochastic simulation, many of the ELB episodes are short lived, with the federal funds rate touching the ELB in only one or two quarters. According to the April 2017 Tealbook projection, the probability that the federal funds rate will be at the ELB for at least *four quarters* (not necessarily consecutive) during the next three years is about 10 percent.

Note that ELB risk fluctuated during 2016 even though the actual federal funds rate remained constant in the range of  $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{2}$  percent. These movements reflect the fact that the ELB risk measure depends not only on the current federal funds rate, but also on the projected path of the federal funds rate. When the projected path of the federal funds rate becomes flatter (steeper), ELB risk increases (decreases). For example, when the staff reduced its estimate of the long-run equilibrium value of the federal funds rate—the intercept in the Taylor rule—in the June 2016 Tealbook projection, the projected path of the federal funds rate flattened appreciably. As a result, the ELB risk increased, from about ~~37~~ ~~34~~ percent in April 2016 to more than ~~52~~ ~~34~~ percent in June 2016.

Figure 2 shows the projected path of the ELB risk according to the current Tealbook forecast. In this figure, the ELB risk at any given date shows the model-implied probability that the federal funds rate will be at the ELB for at least one quarter during the subsequent three years if the economy has evolved according to the current Tealbook projection up to that time. Because the federal funds rate is expected to rise, ELB risk is expected to decline further from its current level. It declines even below its steady-state value of 18 percent—shown by the dashed line—reflecting the projected overshooting of the federal funds rate above its long-run value of 3 percent.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, as a result of the forward-looking nature of the ELB risk measure, the ELB risk is expected to decline below its steady-state value in ~~late 2017~~ ~~early 2018~~, when the federal funds rate is still expected to be substantially below its long-run value of 3 percent.

We plan to consult this ELB risk measure to inform our decision about when to drop the ELB reference in our assessment of risks in the Tealbook. Our provisional plan is to stop highlighting the ELB risk sometime after our measure of ELB risk is below 25 percent. The choice of 25 percent is somewhat arbitrary, and others may see a different threshold level as more appropriate. As can be seen in figure 2, according to the April Tealbook projection, the ELB risk measure is likely to dip below 25 percent for the first time in 2017:Q3, when the federal funds rate is projected to be a little above 1 percent. The date when this measure moves below 25 percent will depend on the actual evolution of the economy as well as the evolution of the staff projection. If the federal funds rate rises more slowly or the staff projection of the funds rate path becomes flatter than anticipated by the current Tealbook projection—possibly because the staff further lowers its estimate of the long-run equilibrium natural rate—the threshold will be breached later than 2017:Q3.

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<sup>3</sup> The steady-state value of the ELB risk is the model-implied probability that the federal funds rate will be at the ELB for at least one quarter during the next three years, conditional on the economy being at its steady state today. This concept is distinct from the unconditional probability that the federal funds rate is at the ELB. To compute the steady-state ELB risk shown in figure 2, we begin stochastic simulations from a steady state consistent with that shown in the Long-Term Outlook exhibit of the April Tealbook projection.

Class I FOMC – Restricted Controlled (FR)

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# Report to the FOMC on Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy




## Book B Monetary Policy Alternatives

April 27, 2017

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Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee  
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System


Figure 1: Market-Implied Probability Distribution of the Timing of Next Rate Increase



Note: Probabilities implied by a binomial tree fitted to settlement prices on fed funds futures contracts, assuming the next policy action is either no change or a 25 basis point increase in rates and no intermeeting moves. The effective federal funds rate until the next FOMC meeting is assumed to be equal to the observed rate on the previous non-month-end business day. The dashed line shows the probability distribution of the next rate hike after the March meeting.

Source: CME Group; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.


Figure 3: Market-Implied Probability Distribution of the Federal Funds Rate, Year-End 2017



Note: Estimated from Eurodollar futures options, accounting for the differences in the levels and option-implied volatilities of LIBOR and the federal funds rate, but not adjusted for risk premiums.

Source: CME Group; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

Figure 5: Market-Implied Rate Expectations with and without Term Premium Adjustment




\* Estimated using overnight index swap quotes with a spline approach and a term premium of zero basis points.

\*\* Estimated using a term structure model maintained by Board staff and adjusted for term premiums.

Source: Bloomberg; Blue Chip Financial Forecasts; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.


Figure 2: Probability Distribution of the Timing of Next Rate Increase from the Desk Surveys



Note: Average probabilities across the surveys of primary dealers and market participants, conditional on the next policy action being an increase in rates.

Source: FRBNY.


Figure 4: Probability Distribution of the Federal Funds Rate, Year-End 2017, from the Desk Surveys



Note: Average unconditional probabilities across the surveys of primary dealers and market participants for different ranges of the federal funds rate at the end of 2017.

Source: FRBNY.

Figure 6: Federal Funds Rate Projections



\* Estimated using overnight index swap quotes with a spline approach and a term premium of zero basis points.

\*\* Estimated using a term structure model maintained by Board staff and adjusted for term premiums. The longer-run model-implied forecast is for the expected federal funds rate 5 to 10 years ahead.


\*\*\* Median of the respondents' modal paths for the federal funds rate.

Source: Bloomberg; Blue Chip Financial Forecasts; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates; FRBNY.


# Total Assets and Selected Balance Sheet Items

— April Tealbook baseline (LR RB \$100 B)    ··· 18-month phaseout (LR RB \$500 B)  
 - - - March Tealbook baseline


**Total Assets**




**Reserve Balances**



**SOMA Treasury Holdings**



**SOMA Agency MBS Holdings**



**Federal Reserve Balance Sheet**  
**End-of-Year Projections -- April Tealbook baseline (LR RB \$100 B)**  
 (Billions of dollars)

	Mar 31, 2017	2017	2019	2021	2023	2025	2030
Total assets	4,473	4,351	3,202	2,451	2,575	2,733	3,203
Selected assets							
Loans and other credit extensions*	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Securities held outright	4,247	4,155	3,038	2,309	2,448	2,619	3,113
U.S. Treasury securities	2,464	2,421	1,617	1,140	1,466	1,778	2,556
Agency debt securities	13	4	2	2	2	2	2
Agency mortgage-backed securities	1,769	1,729	1,419	1,167	980	838	555
Unamortized premiums	169	156	122	97	80	67	41
Unamortized discounts	-15	-14	-11	-8	-7	-6	-4
Total other assets	45	47	47	47	47	47	47
Total liabilities	4,432	4,310	3,159	2,403	2,523	2,676	3,133
Selected liabilities							
Federal Reserve notes in circulation	1,489	1,556	1,752	1,877	2,010	2,163	2,619
Reverse repurchase agreements	600	353	353	253	253	253	253
Deposits with Federal Reserve Banks	2,336	2,396	1,048	268	255	255	255
Reserve balances held by depository institutions	2,152	2,241	893	112	100	100	100
U.S. Treasury, General Account	92	150	150	150	150	150	150
Other deposits	92	5	5	5	5	5	5
Earnings remittances due to the U.S. Treasury	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total capital**	41	41	44	47	52	56	71

Source: Federal Reserve H.4.1 statistical releases and staff calculations.

Note: Components may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Loans and other credit extensions includes primary, secondary, and seasonal credit; central bank liquidity swaps; and net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane LLC.

\*\*Total capital includes capital paid-in and capital surplus accounts.

**Federal Reserve Balance Sheet**  
**End-of-Year Projections -- 18-month phaseout (LR RB \$500 B)**  
 (Billions of dollars)

	Mar 31, 2017	2017	2019	2021	2023	2025	2030
Total assets	4,473	4,408	3,562	2,840	2,977	3,137	3,611
Selected assets							
Loans and other credit extensions*	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Securities held outright	4,247	4,210	3,392	2,693	2,847	3,020	3,520
U.S. Treasury securities	2,464	2,460	1,857	1,434	1,795	2,127	2,940
Agency debt securities	13	4	2	2	2	2	2
Agency mortgage-backed securities	1,769	1,746	1,532	1,257	1,050	891	578
Unamortized premiums	169	158	127	101	84	69	42
Unamortized discounts	-15	-14	-11	-8	-7	-6	-4
Total other assets	45	47	47	47	47	47	47
Total liabilities	4,432	4,367	3,518	2,792	2,926	3,080	3,541
Selected liabilities							
Federal Reserve notes in circulation	1,489	1,556	1,752	1,879	2,012	2,167	2,627
Reverse repurchase agreements	600	353	353	253	253	253	253
Deposits with Federal Reserve Banks	2,336	2,453	1,408	655	655	655	655
Reserve balances held by depository institutions	2,152	2,297	1,253	500	500	500	500
U.S. Treasury, General Account	92	150	150	150	150	150	150
Other deposits	92	5	5	5	5	5	5
Earnings remittances due to the U.S. Treasury	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total capital**	41	41	44	47	52	56	71

Source: Federal Reserve H.4.1 statistical releases and staff calculations.

Note: Components may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Loans and other credit extensions includes primary, secondary, and seasonal credit; central bank liquidity swaps; and net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane LLC.


\*\*Total capital includes capital paid-in and capital surplus accounts.




## Income Projections

— April Tealbook baseline (LR RB \$100 B)    ··· 18-month phaseout (LR RB \$500 B)  
 - - - March Tealbook baseline


### Interest Income




### Interest Expense




### Realized Capital Gains




### Earnings Remittances to Treasury



### Deferred Asset



### Memo: Unrealized Gains/Losses




**Projections for the 10-Year Treasury Term Premium Effect**  
(Basis Points)

Date	April Tealbook baseline (LR RB \$100 B)	March Tealbook baseline	18-month phaseout (LR RB \$500 B)
Quarterly Averages			
2017:Q2	-83	-83	-91
Q3	-79	-79	-88
Q4	-75	-75	-84
2018:Q4	-61	-61	-71
2019:Q4	-50	-50	-59
2020:Q4	-42	-41	-51
2021:Q4	-36	-36	-45
2022:Q4	-33	-32	-42
2023:Q4	-30	-29	-38
2024:Q4	-26	-26	-35
2025:Q4	-24	-23	-32
2026:Q4	-21	-21	-30
2027:Q4	-19	-18	-27
2028:Q4	-17	-16	-25
2029:Q4	-15	-15	-23
2030:Q4	-14	-13	-21

## Redemptions

### April Tealbook (Full Cessation)




#### Redemptions (\$ bil)

Year	MBS	TSY
2018	167	426
2019	144	384
2020	132	243

#### Rollovers (\$ bil)

Year	MBS	TSY
2018	0	0
2019	0	0
2020	0	0

### 18-Month Phaseout



#### Redemptions (\$ bil)


Year	MBS	TSY
2018	89	220
2019	150	388
2020	143	310

#### Rollovers (\$ bil)


Year	MBS	TSY
2018	83	207
2019	2	7
2020	0	0

## Projections for the Characteristics of SOMA Holdings

### SOMA Weighted-Average Treasury Duration



### Maturity Composition of SOMA Treasury Portfolio



## Abbreviations

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ABS	asset-backed securities
BEA	Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce
BHC	bank holding company
CDS	credit default swaps
CFTC	Commodity Futures Trading Commission
C&I	commercial and industrial
CLO	collateralized loan obligation
CMBS	commercial mortgage-backed securities
CPI	consumer price index
CRE	commercial real estate
DEDO	section in Tealbook A, “Domestic Economic Developments and Outlook”
Desk	Open Market Desk
ECB	European Central Bank
ELB	effective lower bound
EME	emerging market economy
EU	European Union
FAST Act	Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FOMC	Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee
GCF	general collateral finance
GDI	gross domestic income
GDP	gross domestic product
GSIBs	globally systemically important banking organizations
HQLA	high-quality liquid assets
IOER	interest on excess reserves
ISM	Institute for Supply Management
LIBOR	London interbank offered rate

LSAPs	large-scale asset purchases
MBS	mortgage-backed securities
MMFs	money market funds
NBER	National Bureau of Economic Research
NI	nominal income
NIPA	national income and product accounts
OIS	overnight index swap
ON RRP	overnight reverse repurchase agreement
PCE	personal consumption expenditures
repo	repurchase agreement
RMBS	residential mortgage-backed securities
RRP	reverse repurchase agreement
SCOOS	Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms
SEP	Summary of Economic Projections
SFA	Supplemental Financing Account
SLOOS	Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
SOMA	System Open Market Account
TBA	to be announced (for example, TBA market)
TGA	U.S. Treasury's General Account
TIPS	Treasury inflation-protected securities
TPE	Term premium effects