

Prefatory Note

The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version available based on original files from the FOMC Secretariat at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

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Class II FOMC – Restricted (FR)

Report to the FOMC on Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy



Book A Economic and Financial Conditions: Outlook, Risks, and Policy Strategies

December 7, 2018

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Comparing the Staff Projection with Other Forecasts

The December Tealbook projection for real GDP growth lies close to both the Blue Chip consensus forecast and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) median forecast for 2018; all three forecasts step down in 2019 and are within a narrow range. The staff's unemployment rate forecast is in line with the others in 2018 and a touch below in 2019. The staff projection for measures of price inflation are also a bit below the Blue Chip consensus and SPF median forecasts in both 2018 and 2019.







Comparison of Tealbook and Outside Forecasts

| | 2018 | 2019 |
|--|------|------|
| GDP (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| Staff forecast (12/7/18) | 3.0 | 2.4 |
| Blue Chip (11/13/18) | 3.1 | 2.3 |
| SPF median (11/13/18) | 3.1 | 2.4 |
| Unemployment rate (Q4 level) | | |
| Staff forecast (12/7/18) | 3.7 | 3.4 |
| Blue Chip (11/13/18) | 3.7 | 3.5 |
| SPF median (11/13/18) | 3.7 | 3.6 |
| CPI inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| Staff forecast (12/7/18) | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| Blue Chip (11/13/18) | 2.4 | 2.3 |
| SPF median (11/13/18) | 2.4 | 2.3 |
| PCE price inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| Staff forecast (12/7/18) | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| SPF median (11/13/18) | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Core PCE price inflation (Q4/Q4 percent change) | | |
| Staff forecast (12/7/18) | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| SPF median (11/13/18) | 2.0 | 2.1 |

Note: SPF is the Survey of Professional Forecasters, CPI is the consumer price index, and PCE is personal consumption expenditures. Blue Chip does not provide results for overall and core PCE price inflation. The Blue Chip consensus forecast includes input from about 50 panelists, and the SPF about 40. Roughly 20 panelists contribute to both surveys.

Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Tealbook Forecast Compared with Blue Chip

Real GDP**Industrial Production****Unemployment Rate****Consumer Price Index****Treasury Bill Rate****10-Year Treasury Yield**

Note: The yield is for on-the-run Treasury securities. Over the forecast period, the staff's projected yield is assumed to be 15 basis points below the off-the-run yield.

Note: The shaded area represents the area between the Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages.

Revisions to the Staff Projection since the Previous SEP

The FOMC most recently published its Summary of Economic Projections, or SEP, following the September FOMC meeting. The following table compares the staff's current economic projection with the one we presented in the September Tealbook.

Incoming data for real GDP growth and the labor market have come in close to our expectations in the September Tealbook. Our projection for real GDP over the medium term has been revised down slightly, on net, reflecting somewhat less favorable trajectories for overall financial conditions (lower equity prices and house prices), and the medium-term forecast for the unemployment rate has revised up a little. All told, resource utilization, as measured by the output gap or the unemployment rate gap, is somewhat less tight than in the September Tealbook.

Our forecast for core inflation in 2018 and over the medium term is a little below our projection in the September Tealbook, based on slightly softer incoming data and a modestly higher unemployment rate. Nonetheless, we continue to expect core inflation to be close to 2 percent over the next few years. Total inflation has revised down more noticeably in the second half of this year and is also down next year, based on declining crude oil prices. In 2020 and 2021, total inflation is forecast to come back in line with core inflation and run at 2 percent.

The path for the federal funds rate derived from the inertial version of the Taylor (1999) rule used in our baseline forecast is lower than its trajectory in September, reflecting the narrower output gap and lower inflation in this projection.

Staff Economic Projections Compared with the September Tealbook

| Variable | 2018 | | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Longer run |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | H1 | H2 | | | | | |
| Real GDP ¹ September Tealbook | 3.2 3.4 | 2.9 2.8 | 3.0 3.1 | 2.4 2.5 | 2.0 1.9 | 1.4 1.5 | 1.7 1.7 |
| Unemployment rate ² September Tealbook | 3.9 3.9 | 3.7 3.7 | 3.7 3.7 | 3.4 3.3 | 3.4 3.2 | 3.5 3.4 | 4.6 4.6 |
| PCE inflation ¹ September Tealbook | 2.2 2.2 | 1.4 1.8 | 1.8 2.0 | 1.8 1.9 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 |
| Core PCE inflation ¹ September Tealbook | 2.1 2.1 | 1.5 1.6 | 1.8 1.9 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.1 | 2.0 2.1 | n.a. n.a. |
| Federal funds rate ² September Tealbook | 1.74 1.74 | 2.22 2.35 | 2.22 2.35 | 3.49 3.71 | 4.30 4.63 | 4.66 5.00 | 2.50 2.50 |
| Memo: Federal funds rate, end of period September Tealbook | 1.88 1.88 | 2.24 2.38 | 2.24 2.38 | 3.51 3.73 | 4.31 4.64 | 4.66 5.00 | 2.50 2.50 |
| Output gap ^{2,3} September Tealbook | 1.6 1.8 | 2.2 2.4 | 2.2 2.4 | 2.8 3.2 | 2.9 3.2 | 2.4 2.7 | n.a. n.a. |

1. Percent change from final quarter of preceding period to final quarter of period indicated.


2. Percent, final quarter of period indicated.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential. A negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.


n.a. Not available.

Key Background Factors underlying the Baseline Staff Projection


Federal Funds Rate




Long-Term Interest Rates




Equity Prices




House Prices



Crude Oil Prices



Broad Real Dollar



The Recent Fall in Oil Prices

Oil prices have dropped by about one-third since early October, with the spot price of Brent crude oil falling from just over \$86 per barrel to about \$62 per barrel at the close of trading on December 4 (figure 1). About \$14 of the decline has occurred since the October Tealbook. Futures prices have also fallen, though by a lesser amount, such that the futures curve over the next three years is now flat. Given recent markdowns in forecasts of global growth and oil consumption, concerns over the strength of global demand have likely played some role in the price change. However, partly because metals prices—which are often correlated with global demand—have been relatively stable, staff models attribute most of the decline to a stronger outlook for oil supply.

The decline in prices partly reflects an easing of some of the factors that pushed up oil prices by almost \$15 per barrel in late summer. In particular, prices rose in September as the United States moved to reimpose sanctions on Iranian oil exports starting in November, potentially removing a large quantity of oil from the global market. However, once it became clear in early October that increases in Russian and OPEC production—both now at record levels—would be enough to cover the expected loss of Iranian exports, prices started falling. Additionally, when the Iranian sanctions took effect in early November, the United States unexpectedly granted temporary sanctions waivers to major buyers of Iranian oil (including China and India), leading short-term oil prices to fall even further.

Robust U.S. oil production and inventory accumulation also have been pushing oil prices down. Despite infrastructure bottlenecks and rising costs, the U.S. shale boom has continued apace, and the United States recently became the largest crude oil producer in the world (figure 2). In recent months, U.S. production rose to close to 12 million barrels per day (mb/d), up nearly 2 mb/d from a year ago and 1 mb/d above U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) projections from a year ago.




Moreover, the DOE has repeatedly revised up its forecasts of U.S. production for 2019, including significant upward revisions in October and November. Finally, U.S. inventories have risen for 10 straight weeks as of late November and are at their highest level of 2018.

We expect oil prices to remain around current levels through 2021, in part supported by a December 7 agreement between OPEC and Russia to address the growing supply glut by cutting production. Relative to the October Tealbook, we have revised down our forecast for the price of imported oil at the end of 2021 by about \$6 per barrel, about half of the decline in spot prices.

The recent decline in oil prices is expected to have only a modest net effect on aggregate demand in the United States. To begin with, lower oil prices redistribute real income from oil producers to oil consumers. Given that the United States consumes more than it produces—though by much less than even in the recent past—lower oil prices provide a boost to aggregate spending: Lower prices increase households' purchasing power and boost consumption and, if large and persistent enough, could boost potential output in the non-energy-producing sectors of the economy by reducing the cost of a key input. However, the effect on consumption will likely be offset somewhat by a drag on capital spending in the large and growing U.S. oil sector. Additionally, lower prices will lead to lower domestic oil production and, thus, a higher volume of imports.

Overall, taking these different factors into account, the decline in oil prices since the October Tealbook has raised our forecast of the level of GDP three years from now by only about 5 basis points.¹ As for consumer prices, as a result of changes in energy prices, our forecast for the level of total PCE prices is lower by 0.2 percent by the end of 2019 and about 0.1 percent by the end of 2021.



¹ The “Lower Oil Prices” scenario in the Risks and Uncertainty section of the Tealbook considers the effects of a more permanent oil price decline on the U.S. economy.


Cyclical Position of the U.S. Economy: Near-Term Perspective

(Percent change at annual rate from final quarter of preceding period except as noted)


| Measure | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2018 Q2 | 2018 Q3 | 2018 Q4 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|---------|---------|---------|
| Output gap¹ | .3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | .4 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
| Real GDP | 1.9 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 2.3 |
| Previous Tealbook | 1.9 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 2.6 |
| Measurement error in GDP | -.3 | .0 | .2 | .9 | .2 | -.3 |
| Previous Tealbook | -.3 | .0 | .1 | .9 | -.4 | .0 |
| Potential output | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Previous Tealbook | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |

Note: The output gap is the percent difference between actual and potential output; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential. The change in the output gap is equal to real GDP growth less the contribution of measurement error less the growth rate of potential output. For quarterly figures, the growth rates are at an annual rate, and this calculation needs to be multiplied by 1/4 to obtain the quarterly change in the output gap.


1. Percent, average for the final quarter in the period.

Judgmental Output Gap

Note: Shaded regions show the distribution of historical revisions to the staff's estimates of the output gap.
Source: Various macroeconomic data; staff assumptions.

Model-Based Output Gap

Note: Shaded regions denote model-computed uncertainty bands.
Source: Various macroeconomic data; staff assumptions.

Unemployment Rate

Note: Shaded regions show the distribution of historical revisions to the staff's estimates of the natural rate.
*Staff estimate including the effect of extended and emergency unemployment insurance benefits.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.

Core PCE Price Inflation

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; staff assumptions.

Summary of the Near-Term Outlook for GDP


(Percent change at annual rate except as noted)

| Measure | 2018:Q3 | | 2018:Q4 | | 2019:Q1 | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | Previous Tealbook | Current Tealbook | Previous Tealbook | Current Tealbook | Previous Tealbook | Current Tealbook |
| Real GDP | 2.9 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Private domestic final purchases | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.6 |
| Personal consumption expenditures | 3.2 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.5 |
| Residential investment | -5.2 | -2.9 | -1.3 | -5.4 | -.3 | -2.6 |
| Nonres. private fixed investment | 4.0 | 2.1 | 7.6 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 4.8 |
| Government purchases | 2.1 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| <i>Contributions to change in real GDP</i> | | | | | | |
| Inventory investment ¹ | 1.8 | 2.3 | -.4 | -.6 | -.3 | .0 |
| Net exports ¹ | -1.8 | -1.9 | -.1 | .1 | .0 | .0 |


1. Percentage points.

Recent Nonfinancial Developments (1)


Real GDP and GDI




Manufacturing IP ex. Motor Vehicles and Parts



Sales and Production of Light Motor Vehicles




Real PCE Growth



Recent Nonfinancial Developments (2)


Single-Family Housing Starts and Permits



Note: Adjusted permits equal permit issuance plus starts outside of permit-issuing areas.


Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Home Sales



Source: For existing, National Association of Realtors; for new, U.S. Census Bureau.


Nondefense Capital Goods ex. Aircraft



Note: Data are 3-month moving averages.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.


Nonresidential Construction Put in Place



Note: Nominal CPIP deflated by BEA prices through 2018:Q2 and by the staff's estimated deflator thereafter.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.


Inventory Ratios



Note: Flow-of-goods system inventories include manufacturing and mining industries and are relative to consumption. Census data cover manufacturing and trade, and inventories are relative to sales.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; staff calculations.

Exports and Non-oil Imports



Note: Forecasts are linear interpolations of quarterly values.


Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Census Bureau.

Federal Reserve System Nowcasts of 2018:Q4 Real GDP Growth
(Percent change at annual rate from previous quarter)


| Federal Reserve Entity | Type of model | Nowcast as of Dec. 5, 2018 |
|---|--|----------------------------|
| Federal Reserve Bank | | |
| Boston | • Mixed-frequency BVAR | 1.2 |
| New York | • Factor-augmented autoregressive model combination • Factor-augmented autoregressive model combination, financial factors only • Dynamic factor model | 2.2 2.0 2.6 |
| Cleveland | • Bayesian regressions with stochastic volatility • Tracking model | 2.6 1.4 |
| Atlanta | • Tracking model combined with Bayesian vector autoregressions (VARs), dynamic factor models, and factor-augmented autoregressions (known as GDPNow) | 2.7 |
| Chicago | • Dynamic factor models • Bayesian VARs | 2.0 2.4 |
| St. Louis | • Dynamic factor models • News index model • Let-the-data-decide regressions | 2.8 2.4 2.4 |
| Kansas City | • Accounting-based tracking estimate | 1.6 |
| Board of Governors | • Tealbook estimate (judgmental) • Monthly dynamic factor models (DFM-45) • Mixed-frequency dynamic factor model (DFM-BM) | 2.3 3.0 2.1 |
| Memo: Median of Federal Reserve System nowcasts | | 2.4 |

Alternative Measures of Slack


The red line in each panel is the staff's measure of the unemployment rate gap (right axis).




** EDO is Estimated, Dynamic, Optimization-based model.
Source: Federal Reserve Board; PRISM: Federal Reserve Board Bank of Chicago; Federal Reserve Board Bank of Philadelphia, PRISM Model Documentation (June 2011); FRBNY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 618 (May 2013, revised April 2014).




Source: Federal Reserve Board.




Note: Percent of small businesses surveyed with at least one "hard to fill" job opening. Seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board Staff.
Source: National Federation of Independent Business, Small Business Economic Trends Survey.



Note: Job openings rate is the number of job openings divided by employment plus job openings.
Source: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics; Conference Board, Help Wanted OnLine.



Note: Percent of households believing jobs are plentiful minus the percent believing jobs are hard to get.
Source: Conference Board.




Note: Percent of employment.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.

* Plots the negative of the gap to have the same sign as the unemployment rate gap.

Note: The shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Output gaps are multiplied by negative 0.52 to facilitate comparison with the unemployment rate gap. Manufacturing capacity utilization gap is constructed by subtracting its average rate from 1972 to 2013. Other gaps were constructed by subtracting each series' average in 2004:Q4 and 2005:Q1.


Survey Measures of Longer-Term Inflation Expectations

CPI Next 10 Years




Note: SPF is Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

CPI Forward Expectations




Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; Blue Chip Economic Indicators; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Consensus Economics.

PCE Next 10 Years




Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

PCE Forward Expectations



Note: Primary dealers data begin in August 2012.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Surveys of Consumers



Note: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) Survey of Consumer Expectations reports expected 12-month inflation rate 3 years from the current survey date. FRBNY data begin in June 2013.

(p) Preliminary.

Source: University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers; Federal Reserve Bank of New York Survey of Consumer Expectations.

Survey of Business Inflation Expectations




Note: Survey of businesses in the Sixth Federal Reserve District. Data begin in February 2012.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

Projections of Real GDP and Related Components
 (Percent change at annual rate from final quarter
 of preceding period except as noted)


| Measure | 2017 | 2018 | | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|--|------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | | H1 | H2 | | | | |
| Real GDP | | 2.5 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.0 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 2.5 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 1.9 |
| Final sales | | 2.6 | 3.7 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.0 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 2.6 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 1.9 |
| Personal consumption expenditures | | 2.7 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 2.7 | 2.1 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.2 |
| Residential investment | | 3.8 | -2.4 | -4.2 | -3.3 | .0 | .2 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 3.8 | -2.4 | -3.3 | -2.8 | .5 | .4 |
| Nonresidential structures | | 2.9 | 14.2 | -2.3 | 5.6 | 2.4 | -.7 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 2.9 | 14.2 | -.7 | 6.5 | 2.6 | -.3 |
| Equipment and intangibles | | 7.3 | 8.9 | 5.4 | 7.2 | 3.9 | 2.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 7.3 | 8.9 | 7.8 | 8.4 | 3.9 | 2.0 |
| Federal purchases | | 1.3 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.9 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 1.3 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 2.9 |
| State and local purchases | | -.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 |
| Previous Tealbook | | -.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.0 |
| Exports | | 4.7 | 6.4 | .2 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 3.0 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 4.7 | 6.4 | .3 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.9 |
| Imports | | 5.4 | 1.2 | 6.4 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | | 5.4 | 1.2 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 3.0 |
| Contributions to change in real GDP (percentage points) | | | | | | | |
| Inventory change | | -.1 | -.5 | .9 | .2 | .0 | .0 |
| Previous Tealbook | | -.1 | -.5 | .7 | .1 | .0 | .0 |
| Net exports | | -.2 | .6 | -.9 | -.2 | -.2 | -.1 |
| Previous Tealbook | | -.2 | .6 | -.9 | -.2 | -.1 | .0 |

Real GDP


Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Components of Final Demand


Personal Consumption Expenditures




Residential Investment




Equipment and Intangibles




Nonresidential Structures



Government Consumption and Investment




Exports and Imports



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.


Aspects of the Medium-Term Projection

Personal Saving Rate



Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.


Wealth-to-Income Ratio



Note: Ratio of household net worth to disposable personal income.


Source: For net worth, Federal Reserve Board, Financial Accounts of the United States; for income, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Single-Family Housing Starts




Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Equipment and Intangibles Spending




Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Federal Surplus/Deficit



Source: Monthly Treasury Statement.

Current Account Surplus/Deficit




Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.


Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Cyclical Position of the U.S. Economy: Longer-Term Perspective


Output Gap




Unemployment Rate



Manufacturing Capacity Utilization Rate



Actual and Structural Labor Productivity (Business sector)



Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Decomposition of Potential Output

(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)

| Measure | 1974-95 | 1996-2000 | 2001-07 | 2008-10 | 2011-16 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|--|---------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Potential output | 3.1 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Previous Tealbook | 3.1 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| <i>Selected contributions</i> ¹ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Structural labor productivity ² | 1.7 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| Previous Tealbook | 1.7 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| Capital deepening | .7 | 1.4 | 1.0 | .5 | .8 | .6 | .7 | .7 | .7 | .6 |
| Multifactor productivity | .8 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.1 | .2 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .5 | .6 |
| Structural hours | 1.5 | 1.3 | .8 | .4 | .4 | .3 | .7 | .6 | .6 | .5 |
| Previous Tealbook | 1.5 | 1.3 | .8 | .4 | .4 | .3 | .7 | .6 | .6 | .5 |
| Labor force participation | .4 | -.1 | -.2 | -.5 | -.5 | -.3 | -.2 | -.2 | -.2 | -.2 |
| Previous Tealbook | .4 | -.1 | -.2 | -.5 | -.5 | -.3 | -.3 | -.2 | -.2 | -.2 |
| Memo: | | | | | | | | | | |
| Output gap ³ | -1.2 | 2.5 | .3 | -5.3 | .3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.4 |
| Previous Tealbook | -1.2 | 2.5 | .3 | -5.3 | .4 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.4 |

Note: For multiyear periods, the percent change is the annual average from Q4 of the year preceding the first year shown to Q4 of the last year shown.

1. Percentage points.

2. Total business sector.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential output in the final quarter of the period indicated. A negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

The Outlook for the Labor Market

| Measure | 2017 | 2018 | | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | H1 | H2 | | | | |
| Nonfarm payroll employment ¹ Previous Tealbook | 183 183 | 218 218 | 191 196 | 204 207 | 167 168 | 128 121 | 87 82 |
| Private employment ¹ Previous Tealbook | 180 180 | 215 215 | 185 182 | 200 198 | 156 157 | 118 111 | 77 72 |
| Labor force participation rate ² Previous Tealbook | 62.7 62.7 | 62.8 62.8 | 62.9 62.8 | 62.9 62.8 | 62.9 62.8 | 62.8 62.8 | 62.6 62.5 |
| Civilian unemployment rate ² Previous Tealbook | 4.1 4.1 | 3.9 3.9 | 3.7 3.6 | 3.7 3.6 | 3.4 3.3 | 3.4 3.3 | 3.5 3.4 |
| Employment to population ratio ² Previous Tealbook | 60.1 60.1 | 60.4 60.4 | 60.6 60.5 | 60.6 60.5 | 60.8 60.7 | 60.7 60.7 | 60.4 60.4 |

1. Thousands, average monthly changes.

2. Percent, average for the final quarter in the period.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.

Inflation Projections


| Measure | 2017 | 2018 | | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|---|---------------|--------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | H1 | H2 | | | | |
| <i>Percent change at annual rate from final quarter of preceding period</i> | | | | | | | |
| PCE chain-weighted price index Previous Tealbook | 1.8 1.8 | 2.2 2.2 | 1.4 1.7 | 1.8 2.0 | 1.8 2.0 | 2.0 1.9 | 2.0 1.9 |
| Food and beverages Previous Tealbook | .7 .7 | .7 .7 | .3 .9 | .5 .8 | 2.3 2.5 | 2.3 2.6 | 2.3 2.3 |
| Energy Previous Tealbook | 8.1 8.1 | 6.5 6.5 | 1.5 4.4 | 4.0 5.4 | -3.5 -.2 | -.2 -1.1 | .5 -1.0 |
| Excluding food and energy Previous Tealbook | 1.6 1.6 | 2.1 2.1 | 1.5 1.7 | 1.8 1.9 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 |
| Prices of core goods imports ¹ Previous Tealbook | 1.1 1.1 | 1.6 1.6 | -.1 -1.6 | .7 .0 | .8 .6 | 1.0 .8 | .9 .7 |
| | Sept. 2018 | Oct. 2018 | Nov. 2018 ² | Dec. 2018 ² | Jan. 2019 ² | Feb. 2019 ² | Mar. 2019 ² |
| <i>12-month percent change</i> | | | | | | | |
| PCE chain-weighted price index Previous Tealbook | 2.0 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 | 1.8 1.9 | 1.7 1.9 | 1.6 1.8 | 1.6 1.8 | 1.7 2.0 |
| Excluding food and energy Previous Tealbook | 1.9 1.9 | 1.8 1.9 | 1.9 1.9 | 1.9 1.9 | 1.9 1.9 | 1.9 1.9 | 1.9 1.9 |

1. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

2. Staff forecast.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Labor Market Developments and Outlook (1)




* U-5 measures total unemployed persons plus all marginally attached to the labor force as a percent of the labor force plus persons marginally attached to the labor force.


** Percent of Current Population Survey employment.

EEB Extended and emergency unemployment benefits.


Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.



Change in Total Payroll Employment




Change in Private Payroll Employment



Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Labor Market Developments and Outlook (2)

Labor Force Participation Rate*




* Published data adjusted by staff to account for changes in population weights.

** Includes staff estimate of the effect of extended and emergency unemployment benefits.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.


Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims*



* 4-week moving average.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

Hires, Quits, and Job Openings




* Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment, 3-month moving average.

** Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment plus unfilled jobs, 3-month moving average.

Source: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.


Unemployment Rate by Racial/Ethnic Group



Note: These categories are not mutually exclusive, as the ethnicity Hispanic may include people of any race. The Current Population Survey defines Hispanic ethnicity as those who report their origin is Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central American, or South American (and some others). 3-month moving averages.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.

Labor Force Participation Rate by Racial/Ethnic Group, 25 to 54 years old




Note: These categories are not mutually exclusive, as the ethnicity Hispanic may include people of any race. The Current Population Survey defines Hispanic ethnicity as those who report their origin is Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central American, or South American (and some others). 3-month moving averages.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.

Inflation Developments and Outlook (1)


(Percent change from year-earlier period)

Headline Consumer Price Inflation




Source: For CPI, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; for PCE, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Measures of Underlying PCE Price Inflation



Source: For trimmed mean PCE, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; otherwise, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Labor Cost Growth



Note: Compensation per hour is for the business sector. Average hourly earnings are for the private nonfarm sector. The employment cost index is for the private sector.


Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Inflation Developments and Outlook (2)

(Percent change from year-earlier period, except as noted)


Commodity and Oil Price Levels



Note: Futures prices (dotted lines) are the latest observations on monthly futures contracts.


Source: For oil prices, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency; for commodity prices, Commodity Research Bureau (CRB).

Energy and Import Price Inflation



Source: For core import prices, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; for PCE, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Long-Term Inflation Expectations and Compensation



Note: Based on a comparison of an estimated TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) yield curve with an estimated nominal off-the-run Treasury yield curve, with an adjustment for the indexation-lag effect.

(p) Preliminary

SPF Survey of Professional Forecasters.

Source: For Michigan, University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers; for SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; for TIPS, Federal Reserve Board staff calculations.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.


The Long-Term Outlook

(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)


| Measure | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Longer run |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|
| Real GDP Previous Tealbook | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.7 |
| 3.0 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.7 |
| Civilian unemployment rate ¹ Previous Tealbook | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.6 |
| 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.6 |
| PCE prices, total Previous Tealbook | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| Core PCE prices Previous Tealbook | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| Federal funds rate ¹ Previous Tealbook | 2.22 | 3.49 | 4.30 | 4.66 | 4.55 | 4.24 | 3.87 | 2.50 |
| 2.29 | 3.65 | 4.49 | 4.81 | 4.67 | 4.34 | 3.96 | 2.50 | |
| 10-year Treasury yield ¹ Previous Tealbook | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.4 |
| 3.2 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.4 |

1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.


Real GDP




Unemployment Rate



PCE Prices




Interest Rates




Note: In each panel, shading represents the projection period, and dashed lines are the previous Tealbook.

Evolution of the Staff Forecast


Change in Real GDP



Unemployment Rate



Change in PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy



Are Foreign Economies Heading for Recession?

Economic data from abroad have continued to come in weaker than expected, prompting analysts to mark down their growth forecasts. The prospect of slower growth, together with a heightened focus on downside risks, raises concerns that foreign economies might be heading for recession. Here we examine the likelihood that a steep downturn abroad is in the offing.

The staff outlook for foreign growth is fairly similar to that of outside forecasters, though for some key economies such as the euro area, it noticeably less optimistic (table 1). Aggregate growth in the advanced foreign economies (AFEs) is estimated to have slowed significantly in 2018. We, along with outside analysts, see AFE growth remaining near its estimated potential pace next year, but only with the support of highly accommodative monetary policy. In the emerging market economies (EMEs), growth has barely slowed; emerging Asia has continued to expand at a solid pace, offsetting Latin America's continued underperformance.

More worrisome is the fact that both Board staff and other forecasters have been revising down their outlooks repeatedly over the course of 2018. However, these revisions appear more likely to be an artifact of the temporary surge in growth in 2017 rather than a harbinger of a further slide downward. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the staff forecast for foreign growth in 2018. The surprising strength of 2017 led us to revise up our growth forecasts, while the subsequent weakness of data releases pushed our forecast back down. Overall, our forecast for foreign growth in 2018 has returned to the neighborhood of where it was a year ago.

Incoming data have been consistent with the moderation of foreign growth that we have been anticipating but have not signaled a more pronounced downturn. Figure 2 plots two summary measures of the health of the foreign economies. The FCI (in black) is a foreign conditions index, which is constructed using data on foreign industrial production, foreign retail sales, the new export orders component of foreign PMIs, and foreign GDP growth.¹ The FSI (in blue) is a foreign financial stress index constructed from the first principal component of country-specific financial


Table 1: Forecast Comparison of Real GDP Growth¹
(Percent change, annual average over annual average)

| | 2017 Data | 2018 | | | 2019 | | |
|---------------|--------------|-----------|-----|-----|-----------|-----|-----|
| | | Consensus | FRB | IMF | Consensus | FRB | IMF |
| Total Foreign | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
| AFE | 2.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.9 |
| Euro area | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.9 |
| EME | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.4 |
| China | 6.9 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 6.1 | 6.2 |

¹ Aggregates are weighted by shares of U.S. merchandise exports.

Source: Consensus forecasts are from the November 2018 Consensus Economics surveys. FRB forecasts are from the December Tealbook. IMF forecasts are from the October 2018 World Economic Outlook.

Figure 1: Evolution of the Staff 2018 GDP Forecast





¹ For a detailed description of the methodology, see Pablo Cuba-Borda, Alexander Mechanick, and Andrea Raffo (2018), "Monitoring the World Economy: A Global Conditions Index," IFDP Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 15), <https://dx.doi.org/10.17016/2573-2129.45>.

variables, such as interest rate spreads as well as equity and bond volatilities. Both series are highly correlated with the business cycle, with the FCI dropping markedly in foreign recessions and the FSI rising notably. In recent months, the FCI edged down slightly and the FSI rose a bit, but neither index showed the large movements that typically precede recessions.

To quantify the risk of a sharp downturn in the foreign economies, we estimate a probit model that computes the probability of a foreign recession based on the evolution of the FCI and the FSI indexes. As shown in figure 3, current estimates point to only a small increase in the recession probability since the October Tealbook. Of course, uncertainty around these estimates is large, reflecting the difficulty in predicting cyclical turning points, given that recessions are infrequent episodes. In addition, these estimates sometimes turn upward only shortly before the oncoming recession, as was the case on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis.





Summing up, we do not see much evidence that a foreign recession is imminent. The weakening of foreign growth appears to reflect a reversal of last year's unsustainable surge rather than a more sustained deterioration, and our baseline has the foreign economies expanding near potential over the medium run. That said, our ability to predict recessions is admittedly poor, and we recognize that downside risks have become more prominent.



Output in the Asian EMEs (figure 3) rises relative to baseline as stronger net exports—because of higher U.S. activity and a depreciation of their currencies—more than offset a slight tightening of financial conditions in these economies. While Latin American net exports also rise, financial conditions in those economies tighten enough that their GDP contracts modestly relative to baseline (figure 4). In particular, currency depreciation weakens corporate balance sheets by boosting the local currency value of foreign debt and induces Latin American central banks to tighten aggressively to mitigate inflationary pressures.

The second scenario assumes that the stronger demand in the first scenario is accompanied by a steepening of the Phillips curve, which pushes U.S. inflation to $2\frac{3}{4}$ percent by early 2022 (not shown) and the funds rate to over 5 percent (green line in figure 1). While EME net exports still improve relative to baseline, EME financial conditions tighten substantially and cause a pronounced slowing in EME GDP, especially in the more vulnerable Latin American economies.

All told, these simulations support our view that most EMEs will likely weather the further increases in U.S. interest rates assumed in the staff outlook, which are driven by continued solid growth of the U.S. economy. Even in the growth-driven scenario, however, we cannot rule out the possibility of disruptive effects, especially on more vulnerable EMEs. Moreover, if U.S. inflation surprises on the upside and leads to even more monetary tightening than assumed in our forecast, the probability of more widespread financial distress and economic downturns in the EMEs would rise significantly.

Figure 1. Policy Rate**Figure 2. Unemployment Rate****Figure 3. EME Asia GDP****Figure 4. EME Latin America**

The Foreign GDP Outlook



Real GDP*

Percent change, annual rate

| | 2017 | 2018 | | | | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|-----|------|-----|------|------|------|
| | | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | | | |
| 1. Total Foreign | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| Previous Tealbook | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| 2. Advanced Foreign Economies | 2.6 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Previous Tealbook | 2.6 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| 3. Canada | 2.9 | 1.7 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| 4. Euro Area | 2.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | .7 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
| 5. Japan | 2.0 | -1.1 | 3.0 | -1.2 | 2.0 | .3 | .9 | .8 |
| 6. United Kingdom | 1.4 | .4 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| 7. Emerging Market Economies | 3.2 | 4.9 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.6 |
| Previous Tealbook | 3.2 | 4.7 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 |
| 8. China | 6.8 | 7.2 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.7 |
| 9. Emerging Asia ex. China | 4.2 | 5.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| 10. Mexico | 1.5 | 4.3 | -.4 | 3.4 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
| 11. Brazil | 2.2 | .6 | .7 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 |

* GDP aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. merchandise exports.

Int'l Econ Devel & Outlook

Total Foreign GDP**Foreign GDP**

The Foreign Inflation Outlook

Consumer Prices*

Percent change, annual rate


| | 2017 | 2018 | | | | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | | | |
| 1. Total Foreign Previous Tealbook | 2.6 2.6 | 2.6 2.6 | 1.7 1.7 | 3.7 3.7 | 2.8 2.9 | 2.3 2.6 | 2.4 2.4 | 2.4 2.4 |
| 2. Advanced Foreign Economies Previous Tealbook | 1.5 1.5 | 2.5 2.6 | 1.0 1.0 | 2.5 2.5 | 1.6 2.1 | 1.5 1.9 | 1.6 1.7 | 1.7 1.7 |
| 3. Canada | 1.8 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 4. Euro Area | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| 5. Japan | .6 | 2.5 | -2.3 | 2.7 | .9 | 2.0 | .9 | 1.1 |
| 6. United Kingdom | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| 7. Emerging Market Economies Previous Tealbook | 3.4 3.4 | 2.7 2.7 | 2.2 2.2 | 4.6 4.6 | 3.7 3.5 | 2.9 3.1 | 2.9 2.9 | 2.9 2.9 |
| 8. China | 1.8 | 1.5 | .7 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| 9. Emerging Asia ex. China | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| 10. Mexico | 6.6 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 6.8 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| 11. Brazil | 2.8 | 3.1 | 4.3 | 6.6 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.3 |

* CPI aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. non-oil imports.


Int'l Econ Devel & Outlook

Foreign Monetary Policy


AFE Policy Rates



AFE Central Bank Balance Sheets




EME Policy Rates




Recent Foreign Indicators

Nominal Exports




* Includes Australia, Canada, euro area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.
** Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.

Industrial Production




* Includes Canada, euro area, Japan, Sweden, U.K.
** Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.

Retail Sales




* Includes Canada, euro area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.
** Includes Brazil, Chile, China, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan.

Employment




* Includes Australia, Canada, euro area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.
** Includes Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey.

Consumer Prices: Advanced Foreign Economies



Note: Includes Canada, euro area, Japan, U.K.
* Excludes all food and energy; staff calculation.
Source: Haver Analytics.


Consumer Prices: Emerging Market Economies




* Includes Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.
** Excludes all food; staff calculation. Latin America excludes Argentina and Venezuela.

Evolution of Staff's International Forecast


Total Foreign GDP



Total Foreign CPI




U.S. Current Account Balance



Int'l Econ Devel & Outlook


Policy Expectations and Treasury Yields

Selected Interest Rates



Note: Data are for 2018 and spaced at 5-minute intervals from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Source: Bloomberg.


Long-Term Yield Spread and Near-Term Forward Spread



Note: The 0-to-6-quarter forward spread is the difference between the 3-month yield and the implied forward rate between 6 and 7 quarters ahead based on a smoothed Treasury yield curve. Data through November 2018 are monthly averages. Data for December 2018 based on values for December 6. The shaded bars indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

Market-Implied Probability of a Rate Increase at Each of the Next 4 FOMC Meetings




Note: Probabilities implied by a binomial tree fitted to settlement prices on federal funds futures contracts, assuming the policy action at each meeting is either no change or a 25 basis point increase in rates and no intermeeting moves.

*Adjusted under the assumption that the policy action for the December 2018 meeting is either no change or a 20 basis point increase in rates.

Source: CME Group; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.


Daily TIPS-Based Inflation Compensation



Note: Estimates based on smoothed nominal and inflation-indexed Treasury yield curves.

* Adjusted for lagged indexation of Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (carry effect).
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

Implied Federal Funds Rate




Note: Zero term premium path is estimated using overnight index swap quotes with a spline approach and a term premium of zero basis points. Model-based term premium path is estimated using a term structure model maintained by Board staff and corrects for term premium. The Blue Chip path is the average of respondents' expectations for the federal funds rate in the survey taken November 19 and 20.


Source: Bloomberg; Wolters Kluwer Legal and Regulatory Solutions U.S., Blue Chip Financial Forecasts; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

Corporate Asset Market Developments


Intraday S&P 500 Index




Selected Stock Indexes




Implied and Realized Volatilities on S&P 500



10-Year Corporate Bond Yields




10-Year Corporate Bond Spreads




Foreign Developments

Equity Indexes




Note: Indexes denominated in local currency.
Source: Bloomberg.

Implied Volatilities




Source: Bloomberg; Haver.

10-Year AFE Sovereign Yields




Source: Bloomberg.

Euro-Area Peripheral Spreads




Note: Spread over 10-year German bonds.
Source: Bloomberg.

Exchange Rates




Source: Bloomberg.

Oil and Metals Prices



Source: Bloomberg.


Selected Money Market Rates



Note: Federal funds rate is a weighted median. Shaded area is the target range for the federal funds rate. SOFR is secured overnight financing rate. IOER is interest on excess reserves. TGCR is triparty general collateral rate.


Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form FR 2420, Report of Selected Money Market Rates.

Selected Money Market Volumes



Note: SOFR is secured overnight financing rate. TGCR is triparty general collateral rate.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Reserve Board, Form FR 2420, Report of Selected Money Market Rates.


ON RRP, Take-Up by Type



Note: ON RRP is overnight reverse repurchase agreement; MMF is money market fund.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.


Negotiable Certificate of Deposit Spreads



Note: Spreads are relative to overnight index swap rates and are computed as a 5-day moving average.

Source: Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation.


Implied Basis Spreads from 1-Month FX Swaps



Note: FX is foreign exchange.

Source: Bloomberg and staff calculations.

Commercial Paper Spreads




Note: Overnight spreads are to the effective federal funds rate.

Source: Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation.


Business Finance

Gross Issuance of Nonfinancial Corporate Bonds




Note: Bonds are categorized by Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch.
Source: Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database.

Institutional Leveraged Loan Issuance, by Purpose




(e) Estimate.
Source: Thomson Reuters LPC.

Commercial and Industrial Loans




Note: Large banks are defined as the largest 25 banks by assets.
(e) Estimate.
Source: Staff calculations, Federal Reserve Board, Form FR 2644, Weekly Report of Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks and U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks.

Nonfinancial Rating Changes, by Sector




* Computed as a percent of nonfinancial bonds outstanding.
Source: Staff calculations using Moody's ratings from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database.

Revisions to S&P 500 Year-Ahead Earnings per Share



Note: Weighted average of the percent change in the consensus forecasts of current-year and following-year earnings per share.
Source: Thomson Reuters Financial.

Non-agency CMBS Issuance




* Month to date.
Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert.

Mortgage Rate and MBS Yield


Note: The mortgage-backed securities (MBS) yield is the Fannie Mae 30-year current-coupon rate.

Source: For mortgage rate before 2010, Freddie Mac; after 2010, Loansifter; for MBS yield, Barclays.


Purchase and Refinance Activity

Note: The data are seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff.

Source: For values before 2017, data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975; for values in 2018, staff estimates.


Consumer Credit

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Consumer Interest Rates


Note: Credit card data reflect rates at commercial banks on all credit card plans; data are reported quarterly and not seasonally adjusted. Auto loans data are reported weekly and seasonally adjusted.

Source: For credit cards, Federal Reserve Board; for auto loans, J.D. Power.

Selected ABS Spreads (3-Year Triple-A)

Note: Spreads are to swap rate for credit card and auto asset-backed securities (ABS) and to 3-month LIBOR for student loans. Student loans are from the Federal Family Education Loan Program.

Source: J.P. Morgan.


Gross Consumer ABS Issuance

* Month to date.

Source: Merrill Lynch; Bloomberg.

Selected Financial Conditions Indexes


Staff FCI for Nonfinancial Corporations



Note: The index is the deviation from the long-run relation between the systematic components of the cumulative log returns of 2 portfolios of firms with credit ratings above and just below investment grade. The systematic components are derived from the 5-factor Fama–French asset pricing model, augmented with the momentum and quality minus junk factors.

Source: CRSP; Yahoo Finance; Moody's Bond Ratings; Ken French website; AQR Capital Management website.


Mean and Range of External FCIs



Note: Mean FCI represents the mean of FCIs developed by Goldman Sachs and the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City. The blue shaded region represents the range of these 4 standardized FCIs.

Source: Bloomberg; The Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City.

Goldman Sachs FCI




Note: The index is a weighted average of 5 financial variables: the federal funds rate, the 10-year Treasury yield, the triple-B yields spreads to Treasury, the S&P price-to-earnings ratio, the broad value of the U.S. dollar. Weights are pinned down by the contribution of each financial variable on real gross domestic product growth over the following year using a vector auto-regression model.

Source: Bloomberg.

For all panels: Indexes are standardized. Values above (below) zero represent tighter (easier) than average financial conditions. The shaded bars indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The dashed boxes denote monetary policy tightening cycles.

Chicago Fed NFCI


Selected Financial Conditions Indexes



Note: The index is based on 100 financial variables related to money markets (28 indicators), debt and equity markets (27 indicators), and the banking system (45 indicators). The index is weekly and is derived using a dynamic factor model.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.


St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index



Note: The index is the principal component of 18 variables including short- and long-term Treasury yields, corporate yields, money market and corporate bond spreads, bond and stock market volatility indicators, breakeven inflation rate, and the S&P 500 index.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Kansas City Fed Financial Stress Index




Note: The index is the principal component of 11 financial variables including short- and long-term interest rates, corporate and consumer yield spreads, the VIX, and the volatility of bank stock prices.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.


For all panels: Indexes are standardized. Values above (below) zero represent tighter (easier) than average financial conditions. The shaded bars indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The dashed boxes denote monetary policy tightening cycles.

Time-Varying Macroeconomic Risk


Unemployment Rate



GDP Growth




CPI Inflation




Note: The exhibit shows estimates of quantiles of the distribution of errors for four-quarter-ahead staff forecasts. The estimates are conditioned on indicators of real activity, inflation, financial market strain, and the volatility of high-frequency macroeconomic indicators. The tables show selected quantiles of the predictive distributions for the respective variables as of the current Tealbook. Dashed lines denote the median 15th and 85th percentiles. Gray shaded bars indicate recession periods as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Effective Lower Bound Risk Estimate

ELB Risk since Liftoff



ELB Risk over the Projection Period



Note: The figures show the probability that the federal funds rate reaches the effective lower bound (ELB) over the next 3 years starting in the given quarter. Details behind the computation of the ELB risk measure are provided in the box "A Guidepost for Dropping the Effective Lower Bound Risk from the Assessment of Risks" in the Risks and Uncertainty section of the April 2017 Tealbook A. The lower panel computes ELB risk over a forward-looking moving 3-year window using stochastic simulations in FRB/US beginning in the current quarter. The simulations are computed around the Tealbook baseline.

Alternative Scenarios
(Percent change, annual rate, from end of preceding period except as noted)

| Measure and scenario | 2018 | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| | H2 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023-24 |
| <i>Real GDP</i> | | | | | | |
| Tealbook baseline and extension | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Financial-based recession | 2.9 | -.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Stronger supply side | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Supply constraints | 2.9 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Greater interest rate sensitivity | 2.9 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.8 |
| Foreign slowdown | 2.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| Lower oil prices | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| <i>Unemployment rate¹</i> | | | | | | |
| Tealbook baseline and extension | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.2 |
| Financial-based recession | 3.7 | 4.9 | 6.4 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.8 |
| Stronger supply side | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.6 |
| Supply constraints | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.4 |
| Greater interest rate sensitivity | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 |
| Foreign slowdown | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.5 |
| Lower oil prices | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.2 |
| <i>Total PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Tealbook baseline and extension | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| Financial-based recession | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Stronger supply side | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Supply constraints | 1.4 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.2 |
| Greater interest rate sensitivity | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Foreign slowdown | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| Lower oil prices | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| <i>Core PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Tealbook baseline and extension | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Financial-based recession | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Stronger supply side | 1.5 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Supply constraints | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.2 |
| Greater interest rate sensitivity | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Foreign slowdown | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Lower oil prices | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| <i>Federal funds rate¹</i> | | | | | | |
| Tealbook baseline and extension | 2.2 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 3.9 |
| Financial-based recession | 2.2 | 2.8 | .6 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 2.1 |
| Stronger supply side | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.6 |
| Supply constraints | 2.2 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.0 |
| Greater interest rate sensitivity | 2.2 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.1 |
| Foreign slowdown | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.4 |
| Lower oil prices | 2.2 | 3.4 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 3.9 |


1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.

Forecast Confidence Intervals and Alternative Scenarios


Confidence Intervals Based on FRB/US Stochastic Simulations

- Tealbook baseline and extension
- Supply constraints
- Foreign slowdown
- Financial-based recession
- Greater interest rate sensitivity
- Lower oil prices
- Stronger supply side


Real GDP




Unemployment Rate



PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy



Federal Funds Rate



**Selected Tealbook Projections and 70 Percent Confidence Intervals Derived
from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors and FRB/US Simulations**



| Measure | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| <i>Real GDP</i> (percent change, Q4 to Q4) | | | | | | | |
| Projection | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | 2.4–3.9 | 1.1–4.2 | -.2–3.8 | -1.0–2.9 | ... | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | 2.8–3.4 | 1.2–3.9 | .4–3.7 | -.3–3.1 | -.7–2.9 | -.8–3.1 | -.7–3.2 |
| <i>Civilian unemployment rate</i> (percent, Q4) | | | | | | | |
| Projection | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | 3.5–3.8 | 2.6–3.8 | 2.3–4.4 | 2.2–5.1 | ... | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | 3.5–3.8 | 2.7–4.0 | 2.3–4.2 | 2.2–4.7 | 2.4–5.2 | 2.6–5.5 | 2.8–5.8 |
| <i>PCE prices, total</i> (percent change, Q4 to Q4) | | | | | | | |
| Projection | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | 1.7–2.1 | 1.2–3.3 | 1.1–3.5 | 1.1–3.3 | ... | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | 1.7–2.0 | .9–2.7 | .8–3.0 | .8–3.1 | .9–3.1 | .9–3.2 | .8–3.2 |
| <i>PCE prices excluding</i> <i>food and energy</i> (percent change, Q4 to Q4) | | | | | | | |
| Projection | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | | | |
| Tealbook forecast errors | 1.7–2.1 | 1.7–2.6 | 1.4–2.9 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | 1.7–1.9 | 1.2–2.8 | 1.0–2.9 | 1.0–3.0 | 1.0–3.1 | .9–3.1 | .9–3.2 |
| <i>Federal funds rate</i> (percent, Q4) | | | | | | | |
| Projection | 2.2 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| Confidence interval | | | | | | | |
| FRB/US stochastic simulations | 2.2–2.3 | 3.0–4.1 | 3.2–5.6 | 3.0–6.5 | 2.5–6.8 | 1.9–6.6 | 1.4–6.3 |

Note: Shocks underlying FRB/US stochastic simulations are randomly drawn from the 1969–2017 set of model equation residuals. Intervals derived from Tealbook forecast errors are based on projections made from 1980 to 2017 for real GDP and unemployment and from 1998 to 2017 for PCE prices. The intervals for real GDP, unemployment, and total PCE prices are extended into 2021 using information from the Blue Chip survey and forecasts from the CBO and CEA.

... Not applicable.


Prediction Intervals Derived from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors

Forecast Error Percentiles




Risks & Uncertainty





Real GDP Growth



Core PCE Inflation



Historical Distributions



Note: See the technical note in the appendix for more information on this exhibit.

1. Augmented Tealbook prediction intervals use 2- and 3-year-ahead forecast errors from Blue Chip, CBO, and CEA to extend the Tealbook prediction intervals through 2021.


Alternative Model Forecasts

(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)

| Measure and projection | 2018 | | 2019 | | 2020 | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| | September Tealbook | Current Tealbook | September Tealbook | Current Tealbook | September Tealbook | Current Tealbook |
| <i>Real GDP</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| FRB/US | 3.2 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| EDO | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| <i>Unemployment rate¹</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.4 |
| FRB/US | 3.8 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
| EDO | 4.0 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 4.5 |
| <i>Total PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| FRB/US | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| EDO | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| <i>Core PCE prices</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| FRB/US | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| EDO | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| <i>Federal funds rate¹</i> | | | | | | |
| Staff | 2.4 | 2.2 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 4.3 |
| FRB/US | 2.3 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.0 |
| EDO | 2.2 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.5 |

1. Percent, average for Q4.

Estimates of the Short-Run Real Natural Rate of Interest



Note: Estimates are based on the four models from the System DSGE project; for more information, see the box "Estimates of the Short-Run Real Natural Rate of Interest" in the March 2016 Tealbook. The gray shaded bar indicates a period of recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Assessment of Key Macroeconomic Risks

Probability of Inflation Events

(4 quarters ahead)

| Probability that the 4-quarter change in total PCE prices will be . . . | Staff | FRB/US | EDO | BVAR |
|---|-------|--------|-----|------|
| <i>Greater than 3 percent</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .08 | .05 | .04 | .05 |
| Previous Tealbook | .10 | .08 | .03 | .04 |
| <i>Less than 1 percent</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .16 | .22 | .09 | .20 |
| Previous Tealbook | .13 | .17 | .10 | .23 |

Probability of Unemployment Events

(4 quarters ahead)

| Probability that the unemployment rate will . . . | Staff | FRB/US | EDO | BVAR |
|---|-------|--------|-----|------|
| <i>Increase by 1 percentage point</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .02 | .18 | .22 | .03 |
| Previous Tealbook | .00 | .09 | .19 | .03 |
| <i>Decrease by 1 percentage point</i> | | | | |
| Current Tealbook | .12 | .00 | .01 | .10 |
| Previous Tealbook | .23 | .01 | .02 | .09 |

Probability of Near-Term Recession

| Probability that real GDP declines in the next two quarters | Staff | FRB/US | EDO | BVAR | Factor Model |
|---|-------|--------|-----|------|--------------|
| Current Tealbook | .01 | .02 | .06 | .02 | .00 |
| Previous Tealbook | .01 | .02 | .05 | .02 | .03 |

Note: "Staff" represents stochastic simulations in FRB/US around the staff baseline; baselines for FRB/US, BVAR, EDO, and the factor model are generated by those models themselves, up to the current-quarter estimate. Data for the current quarter are taken from the staff estimate for the second Tealbook in each quarter; if the second Tealbook for the current quarter has not yet been published, the preceding quarter is taken as the latest historical observation.

Changes in GDP, Prices, and Unemployment
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

Class II FOMC – Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

December 7, 2018

| | Nominal GDP | | Real GDP | | PCE price index | | Core PCE price index | | Unemployment rate ¹ | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------|----------|----------------------|----------|--------------------------------|----------|
| Interval | 10/25/18 | 12/07/18 | 10/25/18 | 12/07/18 | 10/25/18 | 12/07/18 | 10/25/18 | 12/07/18 | 10/25/18 | 12/07/18 |
| <i>Quarterly</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2018:Q1 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Q2 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| Q3 | 4.3 | 5.0 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Q4 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| 2019:Q1 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| Q2 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Q3 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| Q4 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| 2020:Q1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| Q2 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| Q3 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| Q4 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| <i>Two-quarter²</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2018:Q2 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | -2 | -2 |
| Q4 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.5 | -3 | -2 |
| 2019:Q2 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | -2 | -2 |
| Q4 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | -1 | -1 |
| 2020:Q2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Q4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 0 | 0 |
| <i>Four-quarter³</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2017:Q4 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | -6 | -6 |
| 2018:Q4 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.8 | -5 | -4 |
| 2019:Q4 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | -3 | -3 |
| 2020:Q4 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2021:Q4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>Annual</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2017 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 4.4 | 4.4 |
| 2018 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| 2019 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| 2020 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| 2021 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 3.4 |

- 1. Level, except for two-quarter and four-quarter intervals.
- 2. Percent change from two quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.
- 3. Percent change from four quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.

Greensheets
Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

| Item | 2018 | | | 2019 | | | 2020 | | | 2018 ¹ | | | 2019 ¹ | | | 2020 ¹ | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|--|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | 2018 ¹ | 2019 ¹ | 2020 ¹ | 2021 ¹ | | | |
| Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 4.2 4.2 | 3.5 2.9 | 2.3 2.6 | 2.6 2.4 | 2.4 2.3 | 2.3 2.1 | 2.1 2.2 | 2.1 2.0 | 2.0 1.9 | 1.9 1.8 | 1.9 1.8 | 3.0 3.0 | 2.4 2.4 | 2.0 1.9 | 2.0 1.9 | 1.4 1.4 | | |
| Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 5.4 5.4 | 1.2 1.1 | 2.8 3.0 | 2.6 2.8 | 2.4 2.5 | 2.2 2.1 | 2.2 2.1 | 2.2 2.0 | 1.8 1.7 | 1.9 1.9 | 1.9 1.9 | 2.8 2.9 | 2.3 2.4 | 2.0 1.9 | 1.6 1.6 | | | |
| Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 4.3 4.3 | 3.2 3.0 | 2.9 3.3 | 2.6 2.9 | 2.7 2.6 | 2.5 2.3 | 2.4 2.2 | 2.2 2.1 | 2.1 2.0 | 2.1 1.9 | 2.0 1.9 | 3.1 3.1 | 2.6 2.5 | 2.1 2.1 | 1.7 1.7 | | | |
| Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.8 3.8 | 3.7 3.2 | 3.0 2.7 | 2.5 2.4 | 2.5 2.3 | 2.5 2.2 | 2.5 2.2 | 2.4 2.2 | 2.3 2.2 | 2.3 2.1 | 2.2 2.1 | 2.8 2.5 | 2.5 2.5 | 2.3 2.2 | 1.9 1.9 | | | |
| Durables | 8.6 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 3.6 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.3 | | | |
| Nondurables | 4.0 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.0 | | | |
| Services | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.0 | | | |
| Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -1.3 -1.3 | -2.9 -5.2 | -5.4 -1.3 | -2.6 -3.3 | 1.0 .7 | .8 .5 | 1.0 .5 | .8 .6 | .4 .2 | .3 .2 | .1 .3 | -3.3 .5 | .0 -.2 | .2 .5 | .2 .4 | 1.6 1.6 | | |
| Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 8.7 8.7 | 2.1 4.0 | 5.1 7.6 | 4.8 4.8 | 4.0 4.0 | 3.1 3.0 | 2.5 2.4 | 1.5 1.7 | 1.4 1.5 | 1.7 1.4 | 1.6 1.3 | 6.8 7.9 | 3.6 3.6 | 1.5 1.5 | .9 .8 | | | |
| Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 7.1 7.1 | 3.8 7.4 | 7.1 8.3 | 5.0 5.3 | 4.7 4.3 | 3.5 3.2 | 2.5 2.6 | 2.1 2.1 | 2.1 2.0 | 2.3 1.9 | 2.4 1.9 | 7.2 8.4 | 3.9 3.9 | 2.2 3.0 | 1.6 1.7 | | | |
| Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 14.5 14.5 | -3.4 -6.5 | -1.2 5.4 | 3.8 3.1 | 1.7 2.4 | 2.3 1.9 | 2.3 1.9 | -3 .3 | -1.3 -.2 | -.5 -.5 | -.7 -.8 | 5.6 6.5 | 2.4 2.6 | -.7 -.3 | -1.7 -2.1 | | | |
| Net exports ² <i>Previous Tealbook²</i> | -841 -841 | -946 -939 | -946 -945 | -946 -944 | -963 -952 | -983 -973 | -997 -973 | -998 -979 | -1010 -1007 | -1032 -1004 | -1034 -1004 | -909 -907 | -972 -959 | -1018 -995 | -1046 -1018 | | | |
| Exports | 9.3 | -4.4 | 4.9 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.2 | | |
| Imports | -.6 | 9.2 | 3.6 | 1.8 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | | | |
| Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.5 2.5 | 2.5 2.1 | 1.5 1.8 | 1.9 1.8 | 1.9 1.8 | 1.9 1.8 | 2.0 2.0 | 1.7 1.7 | 2.1 2.0 | 1.9 1.9 | 1.1 1.1 | 2.0 2.0 | 1.9 1.9 | 1.7 1.7 | 1.0 1.1 | | | |
| Federal | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 1.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 1.0 | | | |
| Defense | 6.0 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 1.0 | | | |
| Nonddefense | .5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 1.0 | | | |
| State & local | 1.8 | 1.9 | .7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | | | |
| Change in priv. inventories ² <i>Previous Tealbook²</i> | -37 -37 | 89 56 | 52 33 | 53 20 | 56 19 | 64 27 | 60 30 | 51 32 | 59 41 | 58 33 | 34 21 | 58 24 | 55 34 | 47 15 | | | | |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.
2. Billions of chained (2012) dollars; annual values show annual averages.

Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items
 (Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

| Item | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
| Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 |
| Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.9 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.6 |
| Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.6 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 1.6 |
| Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.6 | 1.9 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 1.9 |
| Durables | 1.6 | 1.9 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| Nondurables | 6.3 | 5.0 | 9.2 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 7.7 | 3.6 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.3 |
| Services | .7 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.0 |
| Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 15.4 | 7.1 | 7.8 | 8.9 | 4.5 | 3.8 | -3.3 | .0 | .2 | .2 |
| Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 5.6 | 5.4 | 6.4 | -.7 | 1.8 | 6.3 | 6.8 | 3.6 | 1.5 | .9 |
| Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 5.6 | 5.4 | 6.4 | -.7 | 1.8 | 6.3 | 7.9 | 3.6 | 1.5 | .8 |
| Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 6.1 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 3.9 | 2.2 | 1.6 |
| Net exports ¹ <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -569 | -533 | -578 | -725 | -786 | -859 | -909 | -972 | -1018 | -1046 |
| Exports | 2.1 | 6.0 | 3.0 | -1.6 | .8 | 4.7 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| Imports | .6 | 3.0 | 6.7 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.8 |
| Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.1 | -2.4 | .2 | 2.2 | .9 | .1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.0 |
| Federal | -2.1 | -2.4 | .2 | 2.2 | .9 | .1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.1 |
| Defense | -2.6 | -6.1 | -1.2 | 1.2 | .2 | 1.3 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 1.0 |
| Nondefense | -4.7 | -6.5 | -3.6 | -.2 | -.7 | 1.3 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 1.0 |
| State & local | 1.2 | -5.5 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 1.0 |
| Change in priv. inventories ¹ <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 71 | 109 | 87 | 129 | 23 | 23 | 34 | 58 | 55 | 47 |
| | 71 | 109 | 87 | 129 | 23 | 21 | 24 | 34 | 34 | 15 |

1. Billions of chained (2012) dollars; annual values show annual averages.

Contributions to Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product
 (Percentage points, annual rate except as noted)

| Item | 2018 | | | 2019 | | | 2020 | | | 2018 ¹ | | | 2019 ¹ | | | 2020 ¹ | | | 2021 ¹ | | |
|---|------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------------------|-----|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|--|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | 2018 ¹ | 2019 ¹ | 2020 ¹ | 2021 ¹ | 2018 ¹ | 2019 ¹ | 2020 ¹ | 2021 ¹ | | |
| Real GDP <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 4.2 | 3.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 | | |
| Final sales <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 5.3 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.6 | | |
| Priv. dom. final purch. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.7 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.6 | | |
| Personal cons. expend. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.3 | | |
| Durables | .6 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .3 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | | |
| Nondurables | .6 | .7 | .4 | .5 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .4 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | | |
| Services | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | .9 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | .9 | .9 | .9 | .9 | | |
| Residential investment <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -1 | -1 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Nonres. priv. fixed invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.2 | .3 | .7 | .6 | .5 | .4 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .5 | .5 | .2 | .1 | | |
| Equipment & intangibles <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.2 | .5 | 1.0 | .7 | .6 | .4 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .5 | .5 | .2 | .1 | | |
| Nonres. structures <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .7 | .4 | .7 | .5 | .5 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .4 | .4 | .2 | .2 | | |
| Net exports <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.2 | -1.9 | .1 | 0 | -3 | -3 | -2 | 0 | -2 | -3 | 0 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Exports | 1.2 | -1.8 | -1 | 0 | -1 | -2 | -1 | -1 | -2 | -3 | -1 | -2 | -3 | -1 | -2 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Imports | 1.1 | -6 | .6 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .2 | .3 | .3 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .4 | .3 | .4 | .3 | .4 | .4 | | |
| Gov't. cons. & invest. <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .4 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .4 | .4 | .3 | .2 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .2 | | |
| Federal Defense | .4 | .4 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .3 | .4 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | | |
| Nondefense | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | | |
| State & local | .2 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | | |
| Change in priv. inventories <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -1.2 | 2.3 | -6 | 0 | .1 | .1 | -1 | -2 | 0 | .1 | .1 | .2 | .1 | .2 | .0 | .0 | .0 | .0 | -2 | | |
| | -1.2 | 1.8 | -4 | -.3 | .0 | .2 | .0 | .0 | .0 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .0 | .0 | .0 | .0 | -2 | | |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

Changes in Prices and Costs
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)

Class II FOMC – Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

December 7, 2018

| Item | 2018 | | | | 2019 | | | | 2020 | | | | 2018 ¹ | | | | 2019 ¹ | | 2020 ¹ | | 2021 ¹ | |
|---|------|------|------|-------|------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------|-------------------|------|-------------------|------|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | 2018 ¹ | 2019 ¹ | 2020 ¹ | 2021 ¹ | | | | | | |
| GDP chain-wt. price index | 3.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| PCE chain-wt. price index | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Energy | .7 | 3.4 | -.4 | -12.9 | -.8 | .0 | .2 | -.4 | -.4 | -.1 | -.1 | 0 | 4.0 | -3.5 | -2 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.0 | .5 | .5 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .7 | 3.5 | 5.3 | -.4 | .4 | -.2 | -.8 | -1.0 | -1.1 | -1.2 | -1.1 | 0 | 5.4 | -2 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.0 | -1.0 | -1.0 |
| Food | 1.2 | .4 | .2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.2 | .4 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| Ex. food & energy | 2.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.1 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Ex. food & energy, market based | 2.2 | 1.2 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.2 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| CPI | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| Ex. food & energy | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| ECI, hourly compensation ² | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Business sector | 3.6 | 2.0 | .9 | .7 | .6 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| Output per hour | 3.4 | 1.4 | 1.1 | .7 | .7 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.4 | 1.4 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| Compensation per hour | .5 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.3 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Unit labor costs | -2.9 | .8 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -1.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Core goods imports chain-wt. price index ³ | .6 | -1.2 | 1.0 | .3 | .8 | .9 | 1.0 | .9 | .9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | .8 | .8 | .7 | .7 | .6 | .6 | .8 | .8 | .7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .6 | -2.2 | -1.1 | .1 | .6 | 1.0 | .9 | .9 | .9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | .8 | .8 | .7 | .7 | .6 | .6 | .8 | .8 | .7 |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

2. Private-industry workers.

3. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

Greensheets

Changes in Prices and Costs (Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

| Item | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|---|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| GDP chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.6 | .9 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| PCE chain-wt. price index <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.8 | 1.2 | 1.2 | .3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.1 | -2.9 | -6.9 | -16.4 | 2.1 | 8.1 | 4.0 | -3.5 | -.2 | .5 |
| Food <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.1 | -2.9 | -6.9 | -16.4 | 2.1 | 8.1 | 5.4 | -.2 | -1.1 | -1.0 |
| Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.3 | .7 | 2.8 | .3 | -1.8 | .7 | .5 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| Ex. food & energy; market based <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.3 | .7 | 2.8 | .3 | -1.8 | .7 | .8 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.3 |
| CPI <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.2 | .4 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.4 |
| Ex. food & energy <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.2 | .4 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| ECI, hourly compensation ¹ <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Business sector | | | | | | | | | | |
| Output per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .2 | 1.8 | .1 | .7 | 1.1 | .8 | 1.8 | .9 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Compensation per hour <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 5.9 | -3 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.8 |
| Unit labor costs <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 5.7 | -2.0 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 2.3 | .8 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Core goods imports chain-wt. price index ² <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -4 | -2.2 | -4 | -4.4 | -7 | 1.1 | .7 | .8 | 1.0 | .9 |
| | -4 | -2.2 | -4 | -4.4 | -7 | 1.1 | .0 | .6 | .8 | .7 |

1. Private-industry workers.

2. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

Other Macroeconomic Indicators

| Item | 2018 | | | 2019 | | | 2020 | | | 2018 ^l | 2019 ^l | 2020 ^l | 2021 ^l |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | | | |
| <i>Employment and production</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nonfarm payroll employment ² | 217 | 190 | 192 | 187 | 171 | 163 | 147 | 144 | 131 | 121 | 117 | 204 | 167 |
| Unemployment rate ³ | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| Natural rate of unemployment ³ | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 |
| Employment-to-Population Ratio ³ | 60.4 | 60.4 | 60.6 | 60.7 | 60.7 | 60.8 | 60.8 | 60.8 | 60.7 | 60.7 | 60.6 | 60.8 | 60.7 |
| Employment-to-Population Trend ³ | 59.8 | 59.8 | 59.8 | 59.7 | 59.7 | 59.6 | 59.6 | 59.6 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 59.8 | 59.6 | 59.5 |
| Output gap ⁴ | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 2.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁴ | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.9 |
| Industrial production ⁵ | 5.3 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.0 | .9 | 4.1 | 1.7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁵ | 5.3 | 3.3 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 1.1 | .9 | 3.3 | 1.9 |
| Manufacturing industr. prod. ⁵ | 2.3 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | .7 | 2.9 | 1.4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁵ | 2.3 | 2.8 | 1.9 | .8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | .8 | 2.2 | 1.5 |
| Capacity utilization rate - mfg. ³ | 75.5 | 75.9 | 76.3 | 76.5 | 76.6 | 76.6 | 76.7 | 76.8 | 76.9 | 77.0 | 77.0 | 76.3 | 76.7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 75.5 | 75.8 | 75.9 | 75.8 | 76.0 | 76.1 | 76.2 | 76.3 | 76.4 | 76.5 | 75.9 | 76.2 | 76.5 |
| Housing starts ⁶ | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Light motor vehicle sales ⁶ | 17.2 | 16.9 | 17.4 | 17.1 | 17.0 | 17.0 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.7 | 17.2 | 17.0 |
| <i>Income and saving</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal GDP ⁵ | 7.6 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 4.1 |
| Real disposable pers. income ⁵ | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 2.7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ⁵ | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 2.4 |
| Personal saving rate ³ | 6.7 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.3 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.8 |
| Corporate profits ⁷ | 12.5 | 13.8 | .7 | -7 | 1.8 | .4 | -2.3 | -1.1 | 1.6 | 1.5 | .7 | 7.9 | -2 |
| Profit share of GNP ³ | 10.8 | 11.1 | 11.0 | 10.9 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 10.6 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 11.0 | 10.6 |
| Gross national saving rate ³ | 18.5 | 18.6 | 18.4 | 18.4 | 18.4 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 18.1 | 18.1 | 18.0 | 18.0 | 18.4 | 18.3 |
| Net national saving rate ³ | 3.3 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 3.4 | 2.9 |

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise indicated.

2. Average monthly change, thousands.

3. Percent; annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

4. Percent difference between actual and potential output; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

Annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

5. Percent change, annual rate.

6. Level, millions; annual values are annual averages.

7. Percent change, annual rate, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

Greensheets

Other Macroeconomic Indicators

(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)

| Item | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|---|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <i>Employment and production</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nonfarm payroll employment ¹ | 179 | 192 | 250 | 226 | 195 | 182 | 204 | 167 | 128 | 87 |
| Unemployment rate ² | 7.8 | 7.0 | 5.7 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 7.8 | 7.0 | 5.7 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| Natural rate of unemployment ² | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 |
| Employment-to-Population Ratio ² | 58.7 | 58.5 | 59.3 | 59.4 | 59.8 | 60.1 | 60.6 | 60.8 | 60.7 | 60.4 |
| Employment-to-Population Trend ² | 60.3 | 60.2 | 60.1 | 60.0 | 59.9 | 59.9 | 59.8 | 59.6 | 59.5 | 59.3 |
| Output gap ³ | -3.7 | -2.8 | -8 | -2 | -3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ³ | -3.7 | -2.8 | -8 | -2 | -4 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.4 |
| Industrial production | 2.2 | 2.3 | 3.4 | -3.3 | -5 | 3.0 | 4.1 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.2 | 2.3 | 3.4 | -3.3 | -5 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 5 |
| Manufacturing industr. prod. | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.4 | -1.6 | -1 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 1.4 | .9 | 2 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.4 | -1.6 | -1 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 4 |
| Capacity utilization rate - mfg. ² | 74.7 | 75.1 | 76.3 | 75.4 | 74.4 | 75.2 | 76.3 | 76.7 | 77.0 | 76.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 74.7 | 75.1 | 76.3 | 75.4 | 74.4 | 75.2 | 75.9 | 76.2 | 76.5 | 76.5 |
| Housing starts ⁴ | .8 | .9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Light motor vehicle sales ⁴ | 14.4 | 15.5 | 16.5 | 17.4 | 17.5 | 17.1 | 17.2 | 17.0 | 16.8 | 16.7 |
| <i>Income and saving</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal GDP | 3.6 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.6 |
| Real disposable pers. income | 4.9 | -2.5 | 5.2 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.8 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 4.9 | -2.5 | 5.2 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.9 |
| Personal saving rate ² | 10.2 | 6.3 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.1 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> ² | 10.2 | 6.3 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 6.7 |
| Corporate profits ⁵ | 7 | 3.9 | 5.9 | -10.7 | 7.6 | 3.3 | 7.9 | -.2 | .7 | -4 |
| Profit share of GNP ² | 11.9 | 11.8 | 12.0 | 10.4 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 11.0 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 9.9 |
| Gross national saving rate ² | 18.8 | 19.2 | 20.2 | 19.4 | 18.3 | 18.4 | 18.3 | 18.0 | 17.7 | 17.7 |
| Net national saving rate ² | 3.7 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 4.3 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 1.9 |

1. Average monthly change, thousands.

2. Percent; values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

3. Percent difference between actual and potential output; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.

Values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.

4. Level, millions; values are annual averages.

5. Percent change, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

Staff Projections of Government-Sector Accounts and Related Items

| Item | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2018 | | 2019 | |
|---|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | | | | | | | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 |
| Unified federal budget¹ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Receipts | 3,268 | 3,316 | 3,329 | 3,413 | 3,576 | 3,707 | 788 | 763 | 711 | 1,103 |
| Outlays | 3,853 | 3,982 | 4,108 | 4,403 | 4,743 | 5,022 | 960 | 1,132 | 1,089 | 1,121 |
| Surplus/deficit | -585 | -665 | -779 | -991 | -1,167 | -1,315 | -172 | -369 | -378 | -18 |
| Surplus/deficit | -3.2 | -3.5 | -3.8 | -4.7 | -5.3 | -5.7 | -3.4 | -7.2 | -7.3 | -3 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -3.2 | -3.5 | -3.9 | -4.5 | -5.3 | -5.7 | -3.4 | -6.5 | -7.8 | .3 |
| Primary surplus/deficit | -1.9 | -2.1 | -2.2 | -2.9 | -3.1 | -3.3 | -2.2 | -4.7 | -5.8 | 2.1 |
| Net interest | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 2.4 |
| Cyclically adjusted surplus/deficit | -3.1 | -3.7 | -4.5 | -5.7 | -6.5 | -7.0 | -4.2 | -8.1 | -8.3 | -1.5 |
| Federal debt held by public | 76.4 | 76.1 | 77.8 | 78.8 | 80.9 | 83.8 | 77.8 | 78.9 | 78.6 | 78.8 |
| Government in the NIPA² | | | | | | | | | | |
| Purchases | .9 | .1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Consumption | .9 | -.1 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.2 | .7 | 2.2 | .7 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Investment | .7 | 1.4 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 3.4 | 2.1 | 3.9 | 5.1 | 4.4 | 4.4 |
| State and local construction | 1.8 | -2.9 | 4.2 | 2.5 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Real disposable personal income | 1.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 2.8 |
| Contribution from transfers ³ | .3 | .2 | .5 | .8 | .5 | .6 | .5 | .4 | 1.9 | .6 |
| Contribution from taxes ³ | -.1 | -.6 | .0 | -.8 | -.6 | -.7 | -.7 | -.2 | -.7 | -.7 |
| Government employment | 3 | -1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Federal | 14 | 3 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 15 | 15 | -6 | 9 |
| State and local | | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| Fiscal indicators² | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fiscal effect (FE) ⁴ | .4 | .1 | .5 | .8 | .6 | .4 | .6 | .6 | .9 | .9 |
| Discretionary policy actions (FI) | .3 | .2 | .7 | .6 | .5 | .2 | .8 | .6 | .7 | .6 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | .3 | .2 | .7 | .6 | .5 | .2 | .7 | .7 | .7 | .6 |
| Federal purchases | .0 | .1 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .1 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 |
| State and local purchases | .1 | -.1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .2 | .1 | .1 | .1 |
| Taxes and transfers | .1 | .1 | .3 | .3 | .2 | .0 | .3 | .3 | .4 | .3 |
| Cyclical | -.1 | -.1 | -.2 | -.2 | -.1 | .0 | -.2 | -.2 | -.2 | -.2 |
| Other | .2 | .1 | .0 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .1 | .2 | .4 | .4 |

1. Annual values stated on a fiscal year basis. Quarterly values not seasonally adjusted.

2. Annual values refer to the change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

3. Percentage point contribution to change in real disposable personal income, annual basis.

4. The FE measure captures the total contribution of the government sector to the growth of aggregate demand (excluding any multiplier effects and financial offsets). It equals the sum of the direct contributions to aggregate demand from all changes in federal purchases and state and local purchases, plus the estimated contribution to real household consumption and business investment that is induced by changes in transfer and tax policies. FI (fiscal impetus) is the portion of FE attributable to discretionary fiscal policy actions (for example, a legislated change in tax revenues).

Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries
 (Quarterly percent changes at an annual rate)

| Measure and country | 2018 | | | | 2019 | | | | 2020 | | | |
|------------------------------------|------|------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| Real GDP¹ | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | 3.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 3.0 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Advanced foreign economies | 1.4 | 2.4 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Canada | 1.7 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| Japan | -1.1 | 3.0 | -1.2 | 2.0 | 1.0 | .9 | 3.2 | -3.9 | .8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | .9 |
| United Kingdom | .4 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Euro area | 1.5 | 1.7 | .6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Germany | 1.5 | 1.8 | -.8 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| Emerging market economies | 4.9 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| Asia | 6.3 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| Korea | 4.1 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| China | 7.2 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.9 |
| Latin America | 3.6 | -1.0 | 2.7 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Mexico | 4.3 | -.4 | 3.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Brazil | .6 | .7 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| <i>Consumer prices²</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | 2.6 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.6 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Advanced foreign economies | 2.5 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 1.6 | .7 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Canada | 3.6 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Japan | 2.5 | -2.3 | 2.7 | .9 | .0 | .7 | 1.0 | 6.3 | .9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| United Kingdom | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Euro area | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 1.1 | .6 | .9 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Germany | 1.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Emerging market economies | 2.7 | 2.2 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Asia | 1.7 | 1.0 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Korea | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| China | 1.5 | .7 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Latin America | 4.8 | 4.9 | 8.1 | 5.6 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Mexico | 4.1 | 3.8 | 6.8 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Brazil | 3.1 | 4.3 | 6.6 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 |

1. Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.
 2. Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries
 (Percent change, Q4 to Q4)

Class II FOMC – Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

December 7, 2018

| Measure and country | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Projected |
|------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----------|
| Real GDP¹ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| Advanced foreign economies | 3.3 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 9 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Canada | .7 | 3.4 | 2.8 | -4 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| Japan | .3 | 2.8 | -.3 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 2.0 | .7 | .3 | .9 | .9 | .8 |
| United Kingdom | 1.6 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Euro area | -1.1 | .7 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
| Germany | .2 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 |
| Emerging market economies | 4.1 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 |
| Asia | 5.8 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.3 |
| Korea | 2.1 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 |
| China | 8.0 | 7.6 | 7.1 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.7 |
| Latin America | 2.9 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Mexico | 3.0 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
| Brazil | 2.2 | 2.6 | -.1 | -5.5 | -1.9 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| <i>Consumer prices²</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total foreign | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Advanced foreign economies | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.2 | .4 | .9 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| Canada | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Japan | -.2 | 1.4 | 2.6 | .1 | .3 | .6 | .9 | 2.0 | .9 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| United Kingdom | 2.6 | 2.1 | .9 | .1 | 1.2 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Euro area | 2.3 | .8 | .2 | .2 | .7 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| Germany | 1.9 | 1.4 | .4 | .2 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| Emerging market economies | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Asia | 2.6 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Korea | 1.7 | 1.1 | 1.0 | .9 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| China | 2.1 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Latin America | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 3.4 | 4.3 | 6.7 | 5.8 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| Mexico | 4.1 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 6.6 | 4.7 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Brazil | 5.6 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 10.4 | 7.1 | 2.8 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 |

1. Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.
 2. Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

| | Quarterly Data | | | | 2020 | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| | 2018 | | 2019 | | 2019 | | Projected 2020 | |
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| <i>Billions of dollars, s.a.a.r.</i> | | | | | | | | |
| U.S. current account balance | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -486.8 | -405.8 | -495.1 | -550.5 | -585.0 | -593.0 | -628.5 | -654.5 |
| Current account as percent of GDP | -486.8 | -405.8 | -519.8 | -564.7 | -608.6 | -608.9 | -638.3 | -658.3 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.4 | -2.0 | -2.4 | -2.6 | -2.8 | -2.8 | -3.0 | -3.0 |
| Net goods & services | -2.4 | -2.0 | -2.5 | -2.7 | -2.9 | -2.9 | -3.0 | -3.0 |
| Investment income, net | -616.0 | -535.2 | -629.5 | -622.1 | -609.2 | -606.1 | -617.5 | -630.8 |
| Direct, net | 258.2 | 256.9 | 258.4 | 190.5 | 152.1 | 129.8 | 111.9 | 95.2 |
| Portfolio, net | 310.4 | 309.9 | 325.6 | 299.4 | 279.9 | 277.4 | 281.7 | 287.2 |
| Other income and transfers, net | -52.2 | -53.0 | -67.2 | -108.9 | -127.8 | -147.6 | -169.8 | -192.1 |
| | -129.1 | -127.5 | -124.0 | -118.9 | -127.8 | -116.8 | -122.9 | -118.9 |
| <i>Annual Data</i> | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Billions of dollars</i> | | | | | | | | |
| U.S. current account balance | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -426.2 | -349.5 | -365.1 | -409.7 | -434.3 | -449.1 | -484.6 | -615.3 |
| Current account as percent of GDP | -426.2 | -349.5 | -365.1 | -409.7 | -434.3 | -449.1 | -494.3 | -628.5 |
| <i>Previous Tealbook</i> | -2.6 | -2.1 | -2.1 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -2.3 | -2.3 | -2.4 |
| Net goods & services | -2.6 | -2.1 | -2.1 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -2.3 | -2.3 | -2.4 |
| Investment income, net | -536.8 | -461.9 | -489.5 | -500.4 | -503.5 | -552.3 | -600.7 | -615.9 |
| Direct, net | 216.1 | 215.4 | 229.0 | 214.7 | 205.7 | 235.1 | 241.0 | 122.2 |
| Portfolio, net | 285.5 | 283.3 | 284.2 | 284.6 | 272.6 | 298.4 | 311.3 | 281.6 |
| Other income and transfers, net | -69.4 | -67.9 | -55.3 | -70.0 | -66.9 | -63.3 | -70.3 | -159.3 |
| | -105.5 | -103.1 | -104.6 | -123.9 | -136.6 | -132.0 | -124.9 | -121.6 |

Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|--|
| AFE | advanced foreign economy |
| BLS | Bureau of Labor Statistics |
| BOC | Bank of Canada |
| BOE | Bank of England |
| BOJ | Bank of Japan |
| BOM | Bank of Mexico |
| CCAR | Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review |
| C&I | commercial and industrial |
| CMBS | commercial mortgage-backed securities |
| CPH | compensation per hour |
| CPI | consumer price index |
| DB | Deutsche Bank |
| DOE | U.S. Department of Energy |
| DSGE | dynamic stochastic general equilibrium |
| EBA | European Banking Authority |
| ECB | European Central Bank |
| ECI | employment cost index |
| EFFR | effective federal funds rate |
| EME | emerging market economy |
| EU | European Union |
| FCI | financial conditions index |
| FOMC | Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee |
| FPLT | flexible price-level targeting |
| FRB/US | A large-scale macroeconometric model of the U.S. economy |
| FSI | financial services institution |

| | |
|--------|--|
| FX | foreign exchange |
| GDP | gross domestic product |
| GNP | gross national product |
| G-SIB | global systemically important bank |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IOER | interest on excess reserves |
| LFPR | labor force participation rate |
| MBS | mortgage-backed securities |
| OIS | overnight index swap |
| ON RRP | overnight reverse repurchase agreement |
| OPEC | Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| PCE | personal consumption expenditures |
| PMI | purchasing managers index |
| QS | quantitative surveillance |
| SEP | Summary of Economic Projections |
| SIGMA | A calibrated multicountry DSGE model |
| SOMA | System Open Market Account |
| S&P | Standard & Poor's |
| SPF | Survey of Professional Forecasters |
| TIPS | Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities |
| VAR | vector autoregression |
| VIX | one-month-ahead option-implied volatility on the S&P 500 index |

Prefatory Note

The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version available based on original files from the FOMC Secretariat at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Please note that some material may have been redacted from this document if that material was received on a confidential basis. Redacted material is indicated by occasional gaps in the text or by gray boxes around non-text content. All redacted passages are exempt from disclosure under applicable provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

Class I FOMC – Restricted Controlled (FR)

Report to the FOMC on Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy




Book B Monetary Policy Alternatives

December 13, 2018

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Figure 1: Market-Implied Probability of a Rate Increase at Each of the Next Four FOMC Meetings




Note: Probabilities implied by a binomial tree fitted to settlement prices on federal funds futures contracts, assuming the policy action at each meeting is either no change or a 25-basis point increase in rates and no intervening moves.

*Adjusted under the assumption that the policy action for the December 2018 meeting is either no change or a 20-basis point increase in rates.

Source: CME Group; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.


Figure 3: Desk Survey Average Probability Distribution of the Federal Funds Rate, Year-End 2019



Note: Probabilities are averages of the probabilities assigned by respondents to different ranges of the federal funds rate at the end of 2019.

Source: FRBNY.

Figure 5: Federal Funds Rate Projections



*Estimated using overnight index swap quotes with a spline approach and a term premium of zero basis points.


**Adjusting for premiums using a term structure model maintained by Board staff.

***Median of respondents' modal paths for the federal funds rate.

****Calculated by averaging over individual respondents' year-end probability distributions.

Source: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates; FRBNY, Summary of Economic Projections.


Figure 2: Market-Implied Probability Distribution of the Federal Funds Rate, Year-End 2019



Note: Estimated from Eurodollar futures options, accounting for the differences in the levels and option-implied volatilities of LIBOR and the federal funds rate, but not adjusted for risk premiums.

Source: CME Group; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.


Figure 4: Market-Implied Federal Funds Rate Expectations



Note: Zero term premium path is estimated using overnight index swap quotes with a spline approach and a term premium of zero basis points. Model-based term premium path is estimated using a term structure model maintained by Board staff and corrects for term premium.

Source: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve Board staff estimates.

Figure 6: Measures of Longer-Run Federal Funds Rate Expectations



*Monthly average 5-to-10-year forward rate derived from prices of Treasury securities.

**Monthly average 5-to-10-year forward rate adjusted for three alternative model-based term premium estimates using Kim and Wright (2005), D'Amico, Kim, and Wei (2018), and Prebsch (2017).

Source: Blue Chip; FRBNY; Board staff estimates.

Redemptions and Reinvestments of SOMA Principal Payments

Projections for Treasury Securities (Billions of dollars)

| | Redemptions | | Reinvestments | |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | Period | Since Oct. 2017 | Period | Since Oct. 2017 |
| | | | | |
| 2017: Oct - | 198.9 | 198.9 | 195.0 | 195.0 |
| 2018: Oct | | | | |
| 2018: Nov - | 278.5 | 477.4 | 125.3 | 320.3 |
| 2019: Oct | | | | |
| 2018 | 229.1 | 247.1 | 197.1 | 224.2 |
| 2019 | 270.8 | 517.9 | 114.2 | 338.4 |
| 2020* | 75.8 | 593.6 | 23.6 | 362.0 |


*Until projected normalization in May 2020.

Projections for Agency Securities (Billions of dollars)

| | Redemptions | | Reinvestments | |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | Period | Since Oct. 2017 | Period | Since Oct. 2017 |
| | | | | |
| 2017: Oct - | 138.5 | 138.5 | 152.3 | 152.3 |
| 2018: Oct | | | | |
| 2018: Nov - | 170.3 | 308.8 | 0.0 | 152.3 |
| 2019: Oct | | | | |
| 2018 | 156.5 | 168.5 | 87.6 | 152.3 |
| 2019 | 164.7 | 333.2 | 0.0 | 152.3 |
| 2020* | 46.7 | 380.0 | 0.0 | 152.3 |


*Until projected normalization in May 2020.

SOMA Treasury Securities Principal Payments




Note: Projection dependent on assumed distribution of future Treasury issuance.

SOMA Agency Debt and MBS Principal Payments



Note: Projection dependent on future interest rates and housing market developments.

Total Assets and Selected Balance Sheet Items



Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
Month-end Projections -- December Tealbook
(Billions of dollars)

| | Historical* | | | Projections | | | | |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Aug 2014 | Sep 2017 | Oct 2018 | Dec 2018 | Dec 2020 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2025 | Dec 2030 |
| Total assets | 4,416 | 4,460 | 4,140 | 4,050 | 3,519 | 3,693 | 3,951 | 4,456 |
| Selected assets | | | | | | | | |
| Loans and other credit extensions** | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Securities held outright | 4,157 | 4,240 | 3,942 | 3,867 | 3,363 | 3,555 | 3,833 | 4,363 |
| U.S. Treasury securities | 2,437 | 2,465 | 2,270 | 2,223 | 2,022 | 2,451 | 2,962 | 3,782 |
| Agency debt securities | 42 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Agency mortgage-backed securities | 1,678 | 1,768 | 1,669 | 1,642 | 1,338 | 1,103 | 869 | 578 |
| Unamortized premiums | 209 | 162 | 143 | 140 | 110 | 89 | 68 | 42 |
| Unamortized discounts | -19 | -14 | -14 | -13 | -10 | -8 | -7 | -5 |
| Total other assets | 66 | 66 | 68 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 |
| Total liabilities | 4,360 | 4,419 | 4,101 | 4,011 | 3,479 | 3,650 | 3,901 | 4,394 |
| Selected liabilities | | | | | | | | |
| Federal Reserve notes in circulation | 1,249 | 1,532 | 1,648 | 1,669 | 1,881 | 2,028 | 2,244 | 2,669 |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | 277 | 557 | 237 | 230 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 |
| Deposits with Federal Reserve Banks | 2,825 | 2,323 | 2,210 | 2,107 | 1,368 | 1,392 | 1,427 | 1,495 |
| Reserve balances held by depository institutions | 2,762 | 2,073 | 1,772 | 1,763 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |
| U.S. Treasury, General Account | 49 | 159 | 367 | 279 | 303 | 327 | 362 | 430 |
| Other deposits | 15 | 91 | 72 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 |
| Earnings remittances due to the U.S. Treasury | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Federal Reserve Bank capital*** | 56 | 41 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 43 | 49 | 62 |

Source: Federal Reserve H.4.1 daily data and staff calculations.

Note: Components may not sum to totals due to rounding.



*August 2014 corresponds to the peak month-end value of reserve balances; September 2017 corresponds to the last month-end before the initiation of the normalization program; October 2018 is the most recent historical value.

**Loans and other credit extensions includes discount window credit; central bank liquidity swaps; and net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane LLC.


***Total capital includes capital paid-in and capital surplus accounts.

Projections for the Characteristics of SOMA Treasury Securities Holdings

Balance Sheet & Income

**Maturity Composition of SOMA Treasury Portfolio**

Income Projections



Projections for the 10-Year Treasury Term Premium Effect *
(Basis Points)

| Date | December Tealbook, \$1 trillion reserves | November Tealbook, \$500 million reserves |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Quarterly Averages | | |
| 2018:Q4 | -78 | -75 |
| 2019:Q4 | -70 | -65 |
| 2020:Q4 | -64 | -57 |
| 2021:Q4 | -61 | -52 |
| 2022:Q4 | -58 | -48 |
| 2023:Q4 | -55 | -45 |
| 2024:Q4 | -51 | -42 |
| 2025:Q4 | -49 | -39 |
| 2026:Q4 | -46 | -37 |
| 2027:Q4 | -44 | -35 |
| 2028:Q4 | -42 | -33 |
| 2029:Q4 | -40 | -31 |
| 2030:Q4 | -39 | -30 |

* The figures show the estimated effects on the 10-year Treasury term premium resulting from the Federal Reserve's large-scale asset purchases.

Abbreviations

| | |
|----------|---|
| ABS | asset-backed securities |
| AFE | advanced foreign economy |
| BEA | Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce |
| BHC | bank holding company |
| CDS | credit default swaps |
| CFTC | Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
| C&I | commercial and industrial |
| CLO | collateralized loan obligation |
| CMBS | commercial mortgage-backed securities |
| CPI | consumer price index |
| CRE | commercial real estate |
| DEDO | section in Tealbook A: “Domestic Economic Developments and Outlook” |
| Desk | Open Market Desk |
| DFMU | Designated Financial Market Utilities |
| ECB | European Central Bank |
| EFFR | effective federal funds rate |
| ELB | effective lower bound |
| EME | emerging market economy |
| EU | European Union |
| FAST Act | Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act |
| FDIC | Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation |
| FOMC | Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee |
| GCF | general collateral finance |
| GDI | gross domestic income |
| GDP | gross domestic product |
| GSIBs | globally systemically important banking organizations |
| HQLA | high-quality liquid assets |
| IOER | interest on excess reserves |

| | |
|--------|--|
| ISM | Institute for Supply Management |
| LIBOR | London interbank offered rate |
| LSAPs | large-scale asset purchases |
| MBS | mortgage-backed securities |
| MMFs | money market funds |
| NBER | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| NI | nominal income |
| NIPA | national income and product accounts |
| OIS | overnight index swap |
| ON RRP | overnight reverse repurchase agreement |
| PCE | personal consumption expenditures |
| QS | Quantitative Surveillance |
| repo | repurchase agreement |
| RMBS | residential mortgage-backed securities |
| RRP | reverse repurchase agreement |
| SCOOS | Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms |
| SEP | Summary of Economic Projections |
| SFA | Supplemental Financing Account |
| SLOOS | Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices |
| SOMA | System Open Market Account |
| TBA | to be announced (for example, TBA market) |
| TCJA | Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 |
| TGA | U.S. Treasury's General Account |
| TIPS | Treasury inflation-protected securities |
| TPE | Term premium effects |
| ZLB | zero lower bound |