

# PRO-Face: A Generic Framework for Privacy-preserving Recognizable Obfuscation of Face Images

## Supplementary materials

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## A MORE DETAILS ON EXPERIMENT SETUPS

### A.1 Face recognizers

The recognition models used in our experiments are obtained from publicly available GitHub repositories:

- <https://github.com/timesler/facenet-pytorch> for Inception-ResNet [8].
- [https://github.com/deepinsight/insightface/tree/master/recognition/arcface\\_torch](https://github.com/deepinsight/insightface/tree/master/recognition/arcface_torch) for MobileFaceNet [3], IResNet50 [4] and IResNet100 [4].
- [https://github.com/QuasarLight/Pytorch\\_Face\\_Recognition](https://github.com/QuasarLight/Pytorch_Face_Recognition) for the SEResNet50 [5].

All selected models achieve satisfactory recognition performance on LFW (shown in the main manuscript). We opt for using publicly available pre-trained models instead of training them by ourself for two considerations:

- (1) Those models are trained on another dataset (CISIA-Webface [9]) different from the ones used in our evaluation. This further increases the generalization of the proposed framework, given the fact that training of our protection model is irrelevant to the training of the recognizers.
- (2) This setup also coincides with the realistic scenarios where PRO-Face may be used: An organization (such as university) already possesses a face recognizer either provided by a third-party or trained by themselves, on any face dataset. The organization needs to protect the privacy of individuals captured by their recognition systems. Therefore, it can easily train such a PRO-Face protection model on any other dataset it has access to without retraining the recognizer.

### A.2 More details of user study on MTurk

Figure 1 and 2 illustrate a normal test question for subjective privacy evaluation and a “honygot” question respectively.

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From the faces on the right, select the one that you think has the same identity as the image on the left.



Figure 1: A test image under evaluation on MTurk. We reward each subject 0.02 US Dollars for completing each HIT.

From the faces on the right, select the one that you think has the same identity as the image on the left.




Figure 2: A “honygot” question on Mturk where the test image that also appears in the candidate list, which should be very easy for subjects to identify. This is to eliminate sloppy subjects who give random answers.

## B ADDITIONAL EVALUATION RESULTS

To supplement the main manuscript, we show addition evaluation results of privacy protection and utility preservation on CelebA [7] and VGGFace2 [1]. Table 1 and 2 show the privacy scores measured by similarity metrics on CelebA and VGGFace2 respectively. Table 3 and 4 show the verification performance of different recognizers on PRO-Face protected images on CelebA and VGGFace2 respectively.

Obfuscation ▷ Recognizer ▽	Blur		Pixelate		FaceShifter [6]		SimSwap [2]	
	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓
MobileFaceNet [3]	0.470	0.586	0.638	0.513	0.108	0.851	0.175	0.774
InceptionResNet [8]	0.460	0.618	0.635	0.560	0.099	0.867	0.166	0.791
IResNet50 [4]	0.463	0.604	0.638	0.541	0.102	0.866	0.171	0.781
SEResNet50 [5]	0.473	0.588	0.639	0.517	0.102	0.866	0.172	0.775
IResNet100 [4]	0.454	0.600	0.634	0.555	0.103	0.855	0.168	0.787

Table 1: Objective measurement of privacy by similarity between protected and original images on CelebA [7].

Obfuscation ▷ Recognizer ▽	Blur		Pixelate		FaceShifter [6]		SimSwap [2]	
	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓	LPIPS ↑	SSIM ↓
MobileFaceNet	0.454	0.597	0.638	0.527	0.126	0.831	0.185	0.804
InceptionResNet	0.439	0.633	0.634	0.575	0.115	0.849	0.174	0.822
IResNet50	0.448	0.617	0.638	0.556	0.120	0.848	0.181	0.811
SEResNet50	0.459	0.599	0.639	0.531	0.120	0.847	0.181	0.805
IResNet100	0.439	0.612	0.634	0.573	0.117	0.840	0.174	0.822

Table 2: Objective measurement of privacy by similarity between protected and original images on VGGFace2 [1].

Obfuscation ▷ Recognizer ▽	Blur		Pixelate		FaceShifter		SimSwap	
	ADR	XDR	ADR	XDR	ADR	XDR	ADR	XDR
MobileFaceNet	0.754/0.916	0.806/0.923	0.744/0.921	0.769/0.919	0.844/0.937	0.681/0.870	0.868/0.947	0.706/0.879
InceptionResNet	0.763/0.939	0.860/0.956	0.702/0.921	0.809/0.944	0.876/0.957	0.866/0.955	0.898/0.960	0.882/0.957
IResNet50	0.771/0.931	0.840/0.940	0.768/0.922	0.800/0.927	0.891/0.958	0.814/0.926	0.895/0.962	0.782/0.926
SEResNet50	0.737/0.915	0.820/0.932	0.705/0.905	0.758/0.916	0.880/0.957	0.834/0.929	0.891/0.960	0.795/0.920
IResNet100	0.866/0.942	0.931/0.950	0.701/0.909	0.857/0.930	0.941/0.973	0.906/0.946	0.937/0.978	0.894/0.946

Table 3: Face verification performance of PRO-Face in terms of TAR w.r.t. different obfuscations and recognizers on CelebA [7]. Two values split by / indicate TAR @ FAR = 0.01 and 0.1 respectively. ADR/XDR indicate Anonymous-/Cross-domain respectively.

Obfuscation ▷ Recognizer ▽	Blur		Pixelate		FaceShifter		SimSwap	
	ADR	XDR	ADR	XDR	ADR	XDR	ADR	XDR
MobileFaceNet	0.406/0.842	0.559/0.842	0.530/0.846	0.610/0.864	0.622/0.830	0.441/0.803	0.644/0.842	0.514/0.805
InceptionResNet	0.613/0.895	0.713/0.911	0.435/0.832	0.581/0.890	0.769/0.926	0.756/0.921	0.764/0.939	0.762/0.935
IResNet50	0.572/0.842	0.629/0.871	0.583/0.847	0.644/0.858	0.647/0.900	0.539/0.861	0.612/0.866	0.528/0.840
SEResNet50	0.468/0.854	0.589/0.863	0.475/0.781	0.562/0.827	0.677/0.874	0.576/0.863	0.648/0.874	0.537/0.829
IResNet100	0.734/0.902	0.842/0.915	0.620/0.844	0.732/0.874	0.823/0.909	0.828/0.892	0.783/0.898	0.786/0.876

Table 4: Face verification performance of PRO-Face in terms of TAR w.r.t. different obfuscations and recognizers on VGGFace2 [1]. Two values split by / indicate TAR @ FAR = 0.01 and 0.1 respectively. ADR/XDR indicate Anonymous-/Cross-domain respectively.


## C ADDITIONAL EXAMPLE IMAGES

Furthermore, additional example images protected by PRO-Face with respect to different obfuscations and face recognizers are given in Figures 3 to 7.


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
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
**Figure 3: Example images in different protected forms with respect to the face recognizer MobileFaceNet. The symbol  $\star$  indicates PRO-Face protected image corresponding to the obfuscation.**




**Figure 4: Example images in different protected forms with respect to the face recognizer InceptionResNet. The symbol \*** indicates PRO-Face protected image corresponding to the obfuscation.



**Figure 5: Example images in different protected forms with respect to the face recognizer IResNet50. The symbol  $\star$  indicates PRO-Face protected image corresponding to the obfuscation.**



**Figure 6: Example images in different protected forms with respect to the face recognizer SEResNet50. The symbol  $\star$  indicates PRO-Face protected image corresponding to the obfuscation.**



**Figure 7: Example images in different protected forms with respect to the face recognizer IResNet100. The symbol  $\star$  indicates PRO-Face protected image corresponding to the obfuscation.**