How Far Can Synchronous BFT Consensus Go?

Nenad Milošević Università della Svizzera italiana (USI)

Consensus


- Distributed computing primitive that allows a set of replicas to agree on a common value, while some of them may fail
 - ◆ Safety: No two honest replicas decide on different values
 - ◆Liveness: Eventually all honest replicas decide

Consensus and SMR

- At the core of State Machine Replication (SMR)
- Consensus and SMR have been deployed for decades to replicate core components of distributed systems:
 - ◆ Distributed databases
 - Cloud computing
 - + Blockchain systems

Blockchain

- Distributed system where 100s or 1000s of mutually untrusted parties build an immutable, ordered history of transactions/requests
- The history is represented as a data structure called blockchain
 - Each block has a cryptographic link to the previous block



Consensus meets Blockchain

- Consensus and SMR ensure all replicas maintain a consistent view of the blockchain
- Consensus determines which block should be appended to the blockchain
- Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus
 - ◆ Faulty replicas can fail arbitrarily, even be malicious
- New environment:
 - ◆Large scale (100s or 1000s), global setup (WAN)
 - Multiple administrative domains
- New environment requires new solutions!

System model

- Set of assumptions about the environment
- Synchrony assumptions
 - The upper bound on process execution time, Φ
 - \star The upper bound on message transmission time, Δ
- They allow proving that if these assumptions are met our protocol will work properly
- FLP: There is no consensus algorithm that can tolerate even 1 crash failure in an asynchronous network!

Partially synchronous BFT consensus

- Partially synchronous system model:
 - ◆ The bound on message delay ∆ exists, but holds only eventually, after an unknown point in time, called Global Stabilization Time (GST)
- Partially synchronous BFT consensus algorithms:
 - → Tendermint, HotStuff
 - ◆ Rely on ∆ to ensure liveness but not for safety
 - ◆ Safe even when messages break Δ, when the network is asynchronous
 - ◆ Tolerate less than 1/3 of Byzantine replicas

Synchronous BFT consensus

- Difinity, Sync HotStuff...
- Tolerate less than 1/2 of Byzantine replicas
- Mostly of theoretical interest
- Rely on ∆ to ensure both safety and liveness
 - ◆ Messages breaking ∆ (synchrony violations) can potentially lead to the safety violations
 - ◆ ∆ impacts performance, especially latency

Synchronous bound Δ

- Determining Δ requires greater accuracy than for partially synchronous protocols
- Conservative Δ
 - → High percentiles (e.g., 99.99%) or significantly higher values (e.g., 10x observed delays)
 - Minimizes the risk of synchrony violations, favor correctness
 - Negatively impacts protocol performance
- Tradeoff: Balancing correctness and performance is a key challenge when determining Δ in synchronous systems!

Our goal

- ullet Investigate the tradeoff between correctness and performance when determining Δ for synchronous BFT consensus protocol
- Explore how robust synchronous BFT consensus really are
 - Robustness = ability to maintain correctness under synchrony violations

Our approach

- We took a BFT consensus algorithm (BoundBFT) proven correct in the synchronous system model
- 2. Analyzed its execution to understand how synchrony violations can compromise its safety and liveness
- 3. Studied how malicious replicas can exploit synchrony violations
- 4. Designed Byzantine attacks based on insights from the analysis 2 and 3
- 5. Implemented and tested the protocol and attacks to evaluate Δ
- 6. Selected a Δ value that ensures consensus properties hold under attack

Experimental setup

- USI cluster: 60 machines
- Emulated wide area network
- XFT (OSDI 2016): 3 month long experiment, 6 AWS regions, ping (hping)


	US East	US West	Europe	Tokyo	Sydney	Sao Paolo
US East	0	44	46	90	134	73
US West	44	0	87	60	93	104
Europe	46	87	0	144	171	117
Tokyo	90	60	144	0	69	197
Sydney	134	93	171	69	0	196
Sao Paolo	73	104	117	197	196	0

• Latencies: 40ms - 200ms

BoundBFT's Δ - Equivocation attack


		Equivocation attack						
	Δ(ms)	f=1		f=19		f=29		
		Safety	Liveness	Safety	Liveness	Safety	Liveness	
99.99% (XFT) =>	1250	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
	600	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
	300	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
Synchrony	150	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	
violations	100	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	6%	
	50	0%	65%	8%	54%	31%	60%	

BoundBFT's latency



- BoundBFT's latency for 1KB and 32KB blocks, respectively:
 - ◆ 5.4× and 3.4× lower than Sync HotStuff
 - ◆ 1.3x and 1.8x lower than HotStuff-2
 - ◆ 1.4x and 2x higher than Tendermint

BoundBFT's throughput



- Similar to Sync HotStuff
- Higher than partially synchronous protocols
 - + From 1.4x to 3x

Key takeaways

- BoundBFT can tolerate some synchrony violations
- As a result, BoundBFT can operate with a significantly lower Δ than typical conservative estimates
- With this refined Δ, BoundBFT achieves performance comparable to partially synchronous protocols while tolerating more Byzantine failures

Large values

99.99% (XFT) =>

Synchrony violations

Δ(ms)	Equivocation attack (128KB)							
	f=1		f=	19	f=29			
	Safety	Liveness	Safety	Liveness	Safety	Liveness		
1250	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%		
600	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%		
300	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	1%		
150	0%	1%	0%	1%	14%	29%		
100	0%	23%	0%	48%	33%	64%		
50	0%	89%	0%	77%	61%	56%		

Study on message delays

- We implemented our own ping program: processes exchange messages and calculate message round trip times (RTT)
- Various message sizes (from 1KB to 1MB)
- Different setups:
 - ◆Single-region
 - ◆ Large-machines
 - ◆ Cross-region
 - ◆ Different-provider
 - ◆Cross-vendor
- The study spawned the period of three months

Key observation

	99.99%			MAX			
	2KB	128KB	Diff	2KB	128KB	Diff	
Single-Region	5.13	120.48	23.49×	10.87	180.10	16.57×	
Large-Machines	1.01	3.99	$3.94 \times$	6.64	107.34	$16.15 \times$	
Cross-Region	197.50	1399.00	$7.08 \times$	2008.50	7295.50	$3.63 \times$	
Different-Provider	383.00	4953.50	$12.93 \times$	591.50	5879.00	$9.94 \times$	
Cross-Vendor	1114.00	5976.00	$5.36 \times$	4625.50	6558.00	$1.42\times$	

- Small messages exhibits low and stable delays
- Large messages experience higher and more variable delays
 - in some cases up to 23× higher than small messages
- This pattern was consistently observed across all experimental setups

Synchronous protocols and message size

- Synchronous protocols must set their bound Δ to accommodate for the delays of large message => this will hurt performance a lot!
- 99.99% for 2KB messages is 250ms while 99.99% for 128KB and 1MB are 2825ms and 6099ms, respectively

Our idea

- Messages should be treated differently depending on their size
- We defined two types of messages:
 - ◆Type S stands for small messages
 - ◆Type L stands for large messages

New system model


• Hybrid synchronous system model:

- ♦ Type S messages will always respect the specified bound Δ_S (synchronous system model)
- ◆ Type L messages will respect the time bound ∆_L only eventually, after GST (partially synchronous system model)

AlterBFT

- First BFT consensus protocol in the new model
- Key idea:
 - ullet Safety relies on the timely delivery of small messages within Δ_S
 - Liveness relies on eventually timely delivery of big messages within Δ_L
- Tolerates the same number of Byzantine failures as synchronous protocols, up to 1/2
- Achieves better performance, especially latency, because its performance only depends on Δ_S

AlterBFT's latency



- Up to 15x lower latency compare to Sync HotStuff
- Comparable to partially synchronous protocols

Key takeaways

- The message size has a huge effect on message delays:
 Delays tend to increase and vary more as the message size increase
- Hybrid model captures assumes small messages will be timely and large message will be eventually timely
- AlterBFT is a new BFT consensus protocol in the hybrid model whose safety relies on small messages and that requires timely large messages only for progress
- AlterBFT achieves comparable performance to partially synchronous protocols while tolerating more Byzantine failures

Final remark

- A step toward understanding the practicality of synchronous protocols
- Opens the door for new research to explore and finally answer:
 - Can synchronous protocols be practical?
 - Or should they remain purely theoretical?

Thank you!