

Server-Aided Two-Party Computation with Simultaneous Corruption

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Abstract

We consider secure two-party computation in the client-server model where there are two adversaries that operate *separately but simultaneously*, each of them corrupting one of the parties and a restricted subset of servers that they interact with. We model security via the local universal composability framework introduced by Canetti and Vald and we show that information-theoretically secure two-party computation is possible if and only if there is always at least one server which remains uncorrupted.

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1 Introduction

This paper considers secure computation, where two parties (Alice and Bob) hold inputs and want to compute an agreed upon function on those inputs in such a way that the intended output is the only new information released.

More specifically our goal is to implement secure two-party computation with information theoretic security. It is well-known that this is impossible without assuming either preprocessing, additional auxiliary functionalities, or help from additional parties. The reason why shooting for unconditional security is nevertheless interesting is that information theoretic methods are typically computationally much more efficient than the heavy public-key machinery ones needs for the two-party case if no additional help is assumed. In our approach, we assume that the two parties get help from n servers. This is essentially the client-server model of MPC introduced in [DI06], with 2 clients and n servers.

The main point where we depart from earlier work in this model is in the way we model adversarial behaviour. The standard model assumes one adversary who may corrupt one of the clients and some number of servers, typically some constant fraction of them. If we want unconditional security, we need to assume an honest majority (or \mathcal{Q}_2 for general adversary structures [HM00]).

In this paper, we ask whether we can tolerate more corruptions and still have unconditional security, if we assume *two adversaries*, \mathbb{A}, \mathbb{B} that operate *separately, but simultaneously*. We will characterise the capabilities of these adversaries by two anti-monotone families of server subsets \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} , so-called adversary structures.

We think of these adversary structures as follows: we want to design protocols such that if you manage to corrupt Alice and a set of servers in \mathcal{A} , you have of course broken Alice's privacy, but you should not be able to break Bob's – and vice versa for \mathcal{B} .

More concretely, \mathbb{A} is allowed to corrupt Alice and a set of servers $A \in \mathcal{A}$ (it may decide to not corrupt servers). Corruption may be semi-honest or malicious. Likewise we allow \mathbb{B} to corrupt Bob and a set $B \in \mathcal{B}$. We call this the *double adversary model*. An obvious question now is how we should define security for a protocol in this model. To this end, one can first observe that if either \mathbb{A} or \mathbb{B} decide to not corrupt anyone, we are back in the standard single adversary model and security means what it usually does. But we also define meaningful security requirements in the more general case where both adversaries operate at the same time. Loosely speaking, we require that an adversary should learn as little information as possible and be unable to affect the result achieved by parties that he did not corrupt. We will discuss this in more detail in a moment. Our main result gives a positive answer to the above question: it says that secure computation is possible in our model even in cases where all but one of the servers has been corrupted by one of the two adversaries, and moreover, this is the best we can hope for.

THEOREM 1.1 (informal). *The pair $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is said to be \mathcal{R}_2 if for any $A \in \mathcal{A}, B \in \mathcal{B}$, $A \cup B$ is not the entire set of servers. Two-party computation is possible in the double adversary model w.r.t. adversary structures \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} if and only if $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is \mathcal{R}_2 .*

The \mathcal{R}_2 property looks syntactically a bit like the well known \mathcal{Q}_2 property for a single adversary structure, introduced by Hirt and Maurer [HM00]¹. \mathcal{Q}_2 is necessary and sufficient for statistically secure MPC in the single adversary case (assuming a broadcast channel). Interestingly, however, there are examples of pairs $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ that are \mathcal{R}_2 , nevertheless neither \mathcal{A} nor \mathcal{B} is in \mathcal{Q}_2 (we provide an example below).

For the case of threshold adversary structures, where we assume that Alice can corrupt at most t_A servers, and Bob can corrupt at most t_B , \mathcal{R}_2 means that $t_A + t_B < n$.

¹ \mathcal{A} is \mathcal{Q}_2 if for all $A, B \in \mathcal{A}$, $A \cup B$ is not the set of all players.

However, more general cases may occur as well: assume, for instance, that there is a cost associated with corrupting each server - which does not have to be the same for all servers. Now, if both adversaries have a certain budget they can spend, this corresponds to certain adversary structures containing the sets that they can corrupt. In this case the \mathcal{R}_2 condition intuitively says that the joint wealth of the adversaries is limited to some extent.

We can already now observe that one part of the Theorem is easy to show, namely if $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is not \mathcal{R}_2 then we cannot hope for an unconditionally secure protocol. This is simply because a secure protocol for a non- \mathcal{R}_2 case would imply general 2-party unconditionally secure computation in the standard model which is well known to be impossible. This follows by a standard emulation argument: Consider semi-honest corruption and assume we have a multiparty protocol secure against corruption of Alice as well as server set A by \mathbb{A} and Bob as well as server set B by \mathbb{B} , where $A \cup B$ is the full set of servers. Then the entire protocol can be emulated by two players where one plays for Alice and servers in A while another plays for Bob and servers in B . This would give us a secure two-party protocol in the standard model.

Techniques and Details We now discuss our security notion. As we said, the corruption (if any) done by \mathbb{A}, \mathbb{B} may be semi-honest or malicious, but not all combinations make sense.

- The first case is when \mathbb{B} does semi-honest corruption. This means that Bob will follow the protocol. Then we require that Bob gets correct output, no matter what \mathbb{A} does. Furthermore, we require that \mathbb{A} learns a minimal amount of information, which means that \mathbb{A} learns (of course) Alice's private input, but nothing more, even under malicious corruption.
- The second case is when \mathbb{B} is malicious. Note that we do not put restrictions on the behaviour of malicious parties, and hence \mathbb{B} could choose to send out his entire view to all players. This means that \mathbb{A} would see information from a set in \mathcal{A} and Alice's view as well, in addition to information from its own corruptions. Therefore, *in general*, we cannot hope to keep anything private from \mathbb{A} in such a case. But a special case where we can give a guarantee is when \mathbb{A} corrupts no one, since then it will of course learn nothing more than \mathbb{B} .

Conditions symmetric to the above two are required when \mathbb{A} is semi-honest, respectively malicious.

We will not treat the case where both adversaries are malicious: since they can choose to broadcast everything they know, it does not make sense to consider this as two separate adversaries.

A technical detail we need to handle is that it may be the case that both adversaries corrupt the same server. In that case we just assume that both players see the entire view of the server in question. So, in particular, if \mathbb{A} is semi-honest and \mathbb{B} is malicious, \mathbb{A} can see the potentially malicious behaviour of \mathbb{B} in that server.

In all cases, we formalise the above ideas using the notion of Universal Composability with local adversaries of Canetti and Vald [CV12]. This allows us to consider separate adversaries and also to give guarantees for composition. On the other hand, some technical issues arise with respect to how we define the ideal functionality we implement, see more details within.

For the case of semi-honest adversaries, we obtain a very simple protocol that is polynomial time (in n) if both \mathcal{A} and its dual structure admits polynomial size linear secret sharing schemes. Our protocol for the malicious case is considerably more involved. The difficulty comes from the fact that none of the adversary structures may be \mathcal{Q}_2 , as mentioned above, and this means that we cannot directly use known solutions for verifiable secret sharing to commit the players to values they hold. Therefore, we cannot make our semi-honest solution be secure in the standard way. Instead, we use specially engineered linear secret sharings schemes for the

two adversary structures to construct a protocol for oblivious transfer (OT) [Rab81, EGL82], and use the fact that OT is complete for two-party computation [Kil88]. The idea for our OT protocol is to let each of the servers implement an OT, which may be faulty because of the corruptions, and we suggest a new technique to make a secure OT from these n imperfect ones.

In this regard, our notion is similar to that of OT combiners [HKN⁺05, HIKN08]. In that model there are also two parties and n servers and where each server is used to implement an OT. The difference with our model is that the adversary can either only corrupt the sender and up to t_s servers or only corrupt the receiver and up to t_r servers. Our work can be thus seen both as a generalization of OT combiners and also as an extension of general adversary structures.

2 \mathcal{Q}_2 structures and \mathcal{R}_2 pairs of structures

We denote by \mathcal{P}_n the set of integers $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$. Furthermore, $2^{\mathcal{P}_n}$ is the family of all subsets of \mathcal{P}_n .

DEFINITION 2.1. *An antimonotone (or adversary) structure $\mathcal{A} \subseteq 2^{\mathcal{P}_n}$ is a family of subsets of \mathcal{P}_n such that: (i) $\emptyset \in \mathcal{A}$, (ii) $A \in \mathcal{A}, B \subseteq A \Rightarrow B \in \mathcal{A}$.*

An adversary structure \mathcal{A} is determined by its maximal sets, i.e., all sets $S \in \mathcal{A}$ such that for every superset T ($S \subset T \subseteq \mathcal{P}_n$), $T \notin \mathcal{A}$. By abuse of notation when we write $\mathcal{A} := \{S_1, \dots, S_m\}$ we mean that \mathcal{A} is the adversary structure with maximal sets S_1, \dots, S_m , i.e., \mathcal{A} consists of S_1, \dots, S_m and all their subsets.

DEFINITION 2.2. *We say that an adversary structure \mathcal{A} is \mathcal{Q}_2 if for all $A, B \in \mathcal{A}$, we have $A \cup B \neq \mathcal{P}_n$.*

DEFINITION 2.3. *We say that a pair $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ of adversary structures is \mathcal{R}_2 if for all $A \in \mathcal{A}$, $B \in \mathcal{B}$, we have $A \cup B \neq \mathcal{P}_n$.*

We would like to note that \mathcal{R}_2 is a generalization of \mathcal{Q}_2 . More precisely, the pair of adversary structures $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A})$ is \mathcal{R}_2 if and only if \mathcal{A} is \mathcal{Q}_2 .

LEMMA 2.4. *There exist adversary structures \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} such that neither \mathcal{A} nor \mathcal{B} are \mathcal{Q}_2 , however the pair $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is \mathcal{R}_2 .*

Indeed, consider the following example: $n := 4$, $\mathcal{A} := \{\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\}\}$, $\mathcal{B} := \{\{1, 3\}, \{2, 4\}\}$.

DEFINITION 2.5. *For an adversary structure \mathcal{A} , the dual adversary structure $\bar{\mathcal{A}}$ is defined as follows: $A \in \bar{\mathcal{A}}$ if and only if $\bar{A} \notin \mathcal{A}$, where $\bar{A} = \mathcal{P}_n \setminus A$.*

LEMMA 2.6. *If $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is \mathcal{R}_2 , then $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{A}}$.*

Indeed, if $B \in \mathcal{B}$, then $\bar{B} \notin \mathcal{A}$ by \mathcal{R}_2 , and then $B \in \bar{\mathcal{A}}$ by definition of the dual adversary structure.

3 Secret sharing

Our protocols make use of secret sharing, a well-known cryptographic primitive introduced by Shamir [Sha79] and, independently, Blakley [Bla79]. We recall some terminology and results which will be needed later on. Let \mathcal{S} be a secret sharing scheme with n shares, that we index with the set $\mathcal{P}_n = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

We say that a set $A \subseteq \mathcal{P}_n$ is unqualified if the set of shares corresponding to A gives no information about the secret. Note that the family $\mathcal{A} \subseteq 2^{\mathcal{P}_n}$ of all unqualified sets of a secret sharing scheme is an adversary structure. We then say this family is the adversary structure of \mathcal{S} . A set $A \subseteq \mathcal{P}_n$ is qualified if the set of shares corresponding to A uniquely determines the secret. The family of all qualified sets is called the access structure of \mathcal{S} . We say that a secret sharing scheme is perfect if every set $A \subseteq \mathcal{P}_n$ is either qualified or unqualified (there are no sets of shares which give partial information about the secret).

For a secret sharing scheme \mathcal{S} , $\text{Share}_{\mathcal{S}}$ is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input s and outputs a valid sharing for it. We also define $\text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}}$, an algorithm that takes as input a set of pairs $\{(i, a_i) : i \in A\}$ where $A \subseteq \mathcal{P}_n$ and for every i , a_i is an element of the space of shares corresponding to player i and outputs s if A is a qualified set for \mathcal{S} and the values $a_i, i \in A$ are part of a valid sharing of the secret s , and outputs \perp otherwise (note that if A is qualified, at most one secret can be consistent with the values $\{a_i : i \in A\}$).

Let \mathbb{F} be a finite field. A linear secret sharing scheme \mathcal{S} (over \mathbb{F}), LSSS for short, is defined by a sequence of integers $\ell_0, \ell_1, \dots, \ell_n \geq 1$ and matrices $M_i \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell_i \times (\ell_0 + e)}$ for some integer $e \geq 0$. The space of secrets is then \mathbb{F}^{ℓ_0} and the space of the i -th shares is \mathbb{F}^{ℓ_i} for $i = 1, \dots, n$; on input a secret $s \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell_0}$, the sharing algorithm $\text{Share}_{\mathcal{S}}$ chooses a uniformly random vector $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}^e$ and outputs the shares $\mathbf{v}_i = M_i \cdot (s, \mathbf{u})^T \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell_i}$.

Let $\ell = \sum_{i=1}^n \ell_i$, and let $M \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell \times (\ell_0 + e)}$ be the matrix resulting of stacking the matrices M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n on top of each other, in this order. We use the notation $[s, \mathbf{u}]_{\mathcal{S}}$ as a shorthand for $M \cdot (s, \mathbf{u})^T$, which is the concatenation of the shares corresponding to secret s and randomness \mathbf{u} . When we do not need to make the randomness explicit, then we write $[s]_{\mathcal{S}}$. Moreover, we say that ℓ is the complexity of the LSSS. We note that $\text{Share}_{\mathcal{S}}$ runs in polynomial time in ℓ .² It is easy to see that we can define an algorithm $\text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}}$, based on solving systems of linear equations, that runs in polynomial time in ℓ .

It is a well known result from [ISN87] that every adversary structure is the adversary structure of a LSSS.

THEOREM 3.1. *For every finite field \mathbb{F} and integer $\ell_0 \geq 1$ and for every adversary structure \mathcal{A} there exists a perfect linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$ with secrets in \mathbb{F}^{ℓ_0} and adversary structure \mathcal{A} .*

In general the complexity of the LSSS $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$ in [ISN87] is exponential in n .

We say that a LSSS is ideal if $\ell_i = 1$ for all i .³ The complexity of an ideal LSSS is n , which is smallest possible. Given a field \mathbb{F} and an adversary structure \mathcal{A} , it is not necessarily true that there exists an ideal LSSS over \mathbb{F} with \mathcal{A} as its adversary structure. In fact, there are families of adversary structures \mathcal{A} such that for any finite field \mathbb{F} , the smallest complexity of an LSSS with \mathcal{A} as its adversary structure is superpolynomial in n . See [Beil1] for more information.

4 Security Model

Our model is the client-server model. We have two clients who wish to realize secure computation with the aid of n servers. Each client can corrupt a certain set of servers and its corruption capability is defined by an adversary structure. In this paper, we ignore the case where servers are corrupted by an entity which is not one of the players. In our protocol, we will first consider cases where only one player is malicious and corrupts servers while the other player is honest and does not corrupt servers. We will prove security of our protocol in

²Technically, we need e to be polynomial in ℓ . But this can be assumed without loss of generality: if e is not polynomial in ℓ we can find e' polynomial in ℓ and $M' \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell \times (\ell_0 + e')}$ that generate the same LSSS.

³We include the case in which some shares are dummy, i.e., always zero.

the *Universal Composability (UC)* framework, introduced by Canetti [Can01]. We will then also consider the case where they both are corrupted, one semi-honestly and the other either in a malicious or semi-honest fashion, and where in addition both may corrupt servers. We will use the *Universal Composability with Local Adversaries* framework (abbreviated by Local Universal Composability or LUC), introduced by Canetti and Vald, to prove security in those cases.

Universal Composability is based on the simulation paradigm. Roughly, the idea is to compare the execution of the actual protocol (the real world) with an idealized scenario (the ideal world) in which the computations are carried out by a trusted third party (the ideal functionality) which receives inputs from and hands in outputs to the players. The goal is to show that these two worlds are indistinguishable. In order to formalize this goal, we introduce a party called the environment \mathcal{Z} , whose task is to distinguish between both worlds. Furthermore, in the ideal world, we introduce a simulator S , its task being to simulate any action of the adversary in the real protocol and thereby to make the two views indistinguishable for any environment. More precisely, in the real world execution of protocol π , with the adversary \mathcal{A} and environment \mathcal{Z} , the environment provides input and receives output from both \mathcal{A} and π . Call $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{A},\pi,\mathcal{Z}}$ the view of \mathcal{Z} in this execution. In the ideal world \mathcal{Z} provides input and receives output from S and the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} . Call $\text{Ideal}_{S,\mathcal{F},\mathcal{Z}}$ the view of \mathcal{Z} in the ideal execution.

We can proceed to define what it means for a protocol to be secure.

DEFINITION 4.1. *A protocol π UC-implements a functionality \mathcal{F} if for every adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a simulator S such that for all environment \mathcal{Z} ,*

$$\text{Real}_{\mathcal{A},\pi,\mathcal{Z}} \approx \text{Ideal}_{S,\mathcal{F},\mathcal{Z}}.$$

The cornerstone of the universal composability framework is the composition theorem, which works as follows. Denote by $\pi \circ G$ a protocol π that during its execution makes calls to an ideal functionality G . The composition proof shows that if $\pi_f \circ G$ securely implements \mathcal{F} and if π_g securely implements G then $\pi_f \circ \pi_g$ securely implements \mathcal{F} . This provides modularity in construction of protocols and simplifies proofs dramatically. It is also shown that proving security against a dummy adversary, one who acts as a communication channel, is sufficient for proving general security.

Universal Composability as we have described it so far considers a single real-world adversary which corrupts parties and chooses their behaviour to attack the protocol and a single ideal-world simulator which generates a view consistent for the given real world adversary. However, this notion does not capture the case where there are more than one “local” adversaries which do not work together or more precisely do not share a view of the system. This means that Universal Composability does not allow us to deal with certain notions of security such as collusion freeness, anonymity, deniability, confinement or security in game-theoretic scenarios.

To capture such a notion, Canetti and Vald [CV12] defined the notion of Local Universal Composability. Roughly speaking, instead of having a single adversary which corrupts participants, there are multiple adversaries, each of whom can only corrupt a single participant. In the ideal world, each adversary will be replaced by a simulator. The simulators can only communicate with each other either through the environment or through the ideal functionality. Local universal composability also considers hybrid models.

Canetti and Vald describe the power of their notion as follows: “If π is a LUC-secure protocol that implements a trusted party \mathcal{F} then each individual entity participating in π affects each other entity in the system no more than it does so in the ideal execution with \mathcal{F} .” A general composition theorem is provided which allows the replacement of an ideal functionality with a protocol which implements it. In addition, it is also proven that security with respect

to dummy adversaries implies security against a general adversary. Let us denote the parties as $\{P_i : i \in I\}$. As mentioned above, to each party P_i corresponds an adversary \mathcal{A}_i and a simulator S_i .

DEFINITION 4.2. π LUC implements \mathcal{F} if for every PPT $\mathcal{A} = \cup_{i \in \bar{I}} \mathcal{A}_i$ where $\bar{I} \subseteq I$, there exists a PPT $S = \cup_{i \in \bar{I}} S_i$ such that for any PPT \mathcal{Z} , we have that $\text{Ideal}_{S, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{Z}} \approx \text{Real}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi, \mathcal{Z}}$.

In our case, since we consider the possibility where both players are semi-honest, it must be the case that the simulators are able to get shares to each other. Since the simulators can only communicate to each other via the ideal functionality or the environment and the environment is untrustworthy, it must be the case that these values can be extracted from the ideal functionality.

5 A protocol for semi-honest adversaries

As a warm-up, we sketch a simple protocol that allows secure computation for semi-honest adversaries, simultaneously corrupting adversary structures \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} , as long as $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is \mathcal{R}_2 .

We introduce the following notation: for two vectors $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n)$, $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n)$ of the same length, we define $\mathbf{a} * \mathbf{b} = (a_1 b_1, a_2 b_2, \dots, a_n b_n)$, their coordinatewise product, and $\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{b} = (a_1 b_1, a_1 b_2, \dots, a_1 b_n, \dots, a_n b_n)$, their Kronecker product.

Let $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$ be a perfect LSSS for adversary structure \mathcal{A} and with secrets in a finite field \mathbb{F} , according to Theorem 3.1. It follows from a construction in [CDM00] that from $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$ we can build an LSSS $\bar{\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{A}}$ for $\bar{\mathcal{A}}$, and that furthermore, for any secrets s, s' , we have that

$$[s, \mathbf{u}]_{\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}} * [s', \mathbf{v}]_{\bar{\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{A}}} = [ss', \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{v}]_{\hat{\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{A}}}, \quad (1)$$

where $\hat{\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is an LSSS determined by $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$, in which the set of all players is qualified. Indeed, for this scheme, the sum of all shares is the secret. Note that in [CDM00], it is assumed that the adversary structure is \mathcal{Q}_2 , but this assumption is only used there to guarantee that $\bar{\mathcal{A}}$ is contained in \mathcal{A} , which we do not need. Equation (1) holds even if \mathcal{A} is not \mathcal{Q}_2 . The idea of the protocol is now as follows: Bob believes that Alice may corrupt a set of servers that is in \mathcal{A} (but nothing more), so he is happy to share a secret among the servers using $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$. Alice, on the other hand, believes that Bob may corrupt a set in \mathcal{B} , but by the \mathcal{R}_2 condition and Lemma 2.6, we have that $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{A}}$, so Alice will be happy to share a secret among the servers using $\bar{\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{A}}$. This and equation (1) will imply that we can implement multiplication of a value from Alice and one from Bob.

We will represent a secret value $x \in \mathbb{F}$ in the computation in additively shared form: we will write $\langle x \rangle$ to denote a pair (x_A, x_B) with $x = x_A + x_B$ where Alice holds x_A and Bob holds x_B . Usually the pair will be randomly chosen such that the sum is x , but we suppress the randomness from the notation for simplicity. We define the sum $\langle x \rangle + \langle y \rangle$ via component wise addition to be the pair $(x_A + y_A, x_B + y_B)$ and multiplication by a public constant similarly. Then we trivially have $\langle x \rangle + \alpha \langle y \rangle = \langle x + \alpha y \rangle$.

We then define a protocol (see Figure 1) for computing securely an arithmetic circuit over \mathbb{F} ; the parties define representations of their inputs and then work their way through the circuit using the subprotocols for addition and multiplication, as appropriate. In the end the outputs are revealed.

It is trivial to see that this protocol computes correct results since both parties follow the protocol. Informally, privacy holds because one party always uses a secret sharing scheme for which the other party can only corrupt an unqualified set. Furthermore, the set of n values received by Bob in the Multiplication subprotocol is easily seen to be a set of uniformly random values that reveal no side information.

Semi-honest Secure Protocol.

Input If Alice holds input x , we define $\langle x \rangle = (x, 0)$, if Bob holds y , we define $\langle y \rangle = (0, y)$.

Addition Given $\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle$, Alice and Bob compute $\langle a \rangle + \langle b \rangle = \langle a + b \rangle$ by local computation.

Multiplication by constant Given α and $\langle a \rangle$, Alice and Bob compute $\alpha \langle a \rangle = \langle \alpha a \rangle$ by local computation.

Multiplication Subprotocol Assuming Alice holds a and Bob holds b , we want to compute a random representation $\langle ab \rangle$ without revealing any information on a or b . Alice creates a set of shares $[a, \mathbf{u}]_{\mathcal{S}_A}$ for random \mathbf{u} and sends the i -th share to S_i . Similarly Bob creates and distributes $[b, \mathbf{v}]_{\mathcal{S}_A}$. Finally Alice chooses a random $r \in \mathbb{F}$ and random r_1, \dots, r_n subject to $r = r_1 + \dots + r_n$, and sends r_i to S_i .

Let a_i, b_i be the shares of a, b received by S_i . He now computes $w_i = a_i b_i - r_i$ and sends it to Bob, who computes $\sum_i w_i$. The final representation is defined to be $\langle ab \rangle = (r, \sum_i w_i)$.

Multiplication Given $\langle x \rangle = (x_A, x_B), \langle y \rangle = (y_A, y_B)$, we want to compute a representation $\langle xy \rangle$. Execute the above Multiplication subprotocol twice. First, with $(a, b) = (x_A, y_B)$ to get $\langle x_A y_B \rangle = (a_1, b_1)$ and second, with $(a, b) = (y_A, x_B)$ to get $\langle y_A x_B \rangle = (a_2, b_2)$. Then we define the output to be

$$\langle xy \rangle = (x_A y_A + a_1 + a_2, x_B y_B + b_1 + b_2)$$

Figure 1: Semi-honest Secure Protocol

One might imagine that the semi-honest secure protocol could be made secure against malicious adversaries in the standard way, i.e., by using verifiable secret sharing to commit parties to the values they hold and in this way allow them to prove that the protocol was followed. However, verifiable secret sharing requires (at least) that the adversary structure used is \mathcal{Q}_2 , and as we have seen this may not be satisfied for any of the two adversary structures. Therefore, we follow a different approach in the following section.

6 The protocol

In this section we present our main oblivious transfer protocol. We assume again that the adversary structures \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} satisfy that $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is \mathcal{R}_2 .

To simplify the exposition, we first assume that \mathcal{A} is the adversary structure of a perfect *ideal* linear secret sharing scheme \mathcal{S} over the field of two elements $\mathbb{F}_2 = \{0, 1\}$, and later we give a more general version of our protocol that does not impose this “ideality” requirement on \mathcal{A} .

Let \mathcal{M} be the space of messages. Without loss of generality assume $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{F}_2^m$ for some positive integer m . We fix a default message $\mathbf{0} \in \mathcal{M}$ (for example if we see the elements of \mathcal{M} as bit strings of certain length, we can take $\mathbf{0}$ to be the all-zero string).

Given \mathcal{S} , we construct two more perfect ideal LSSS that we call \mathcal{S}_0 and \mathcal{S}_1 , whose space of secrets is \mathcal{M} and which are defined on a set of $2n$ players indexed by the set $\mathcal{P}_{n,2} := \{(i, j) : i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, j \in \{0, 1\}\}$. These schemes are defined as follows. Let $V_0 = \{[0, \mathbf{u}]_{\mathcal{S}} : \mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$ be the set of all possible sharings of 0 with the scheme \mathcal{S} . That is, $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$ belongs to V_0 if there exists a sharing of 0 with \mathcal{S} , where each player i receives v_i . Similarly let $V_1 = \{[1, \mathbf{u}]_{\mathcal{S}} : \mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$ be the set of all possible sharings of 1 with \mathcal{S} . Now, we take \mathcal{S}_0 to be a secret sharing scheme whose minimally qualified sets are exactly the sets $\{(1, v_1), \dots, (n, v_n)\} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{n,2}$ with $(v_1, \dots, v_n) \in V_0$. Obviously this means that every set $\{(1, w_1), \dots, (n, w_n)\}$ with $(w_1, \dots, w_n) \notin V_0$ is unqualified. Similarly, the minimally qualified

sets of \mathcal{S}_1 are the sets $\{(1, v_1), \dots, (n, v_n)\} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{n,2}$ with $(v_1, \dots, v_n) \in V_1$. Note that $\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1$ are guaranteed to exist by Theorem 3.1 and that they do not need to be ideal.

Then we construct the protocol π_{OT} as described in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Protocol π_{OT}

In the following we will prove the next theorem.

THEOREM 6.1 (informal). *If $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is an \mathcal{R}_2 pair of structures, the protocol π_{OT} is an unconditionally secure protocol that implements OT between Alice and Bob in the setting above.*

Note, first of all, that if Alice and Bob follow the protocol honestly, at the end of the protocol Bob will have received all values $m_b^{(i,b_i)}, i = 1, \dots, n$, for some sharing $[b]_{\mathcal{S}} = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$. Since $\{(1, b_1), \dots, (n, b_n)\} \in V_b$, by definition it is a qualified set for \mathcal{S}_b and hence Bob has enough information to reconstruct m_b .

We will first show that this protocol implements securely the functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT} described in Figure 3 in the Universal Composability framework. This will serve both as a warm up and a reference when we prove security in the Local Universal Composability framework.




Figure 3: Functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT}

THEOREM 6.2. *The protocol π_{OT} UC-implements the functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT} .*

PROOF.

Alice honest, Bob malicious:

The idea of this simulation is to have the simulator extract the environment's input by applying the reconstruction procedure of \mathcal{S} to the shares b_i received from the environment. By the \mathcal{R}_2 property, these shares can be consistent with at most one b . If in fact Bob is bound to a bit b , this is sent to the functionality and the value m_b is received and the simulator generates random values for the shares associated to a random m_{1-b} . Otherwise m_b , generates shares for random m_0, m_1 .

We need two lemmas. The first uses the \mathcal{R}_2 property to argue that the set of servers uncorrupted by Bob is qualified in the scheme \mathcal{S} and therefore no matter what he sends to the uncorrupted servers, this can be consistent with at most one possible input.

LEMMA 6.3. *If $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is an \mathcal{R}_2 pair of structures, and \mathcal{S} is a perfect secret sharing scheme with \mathcal{A} as its adversary structure, then for every $B \in \mathcal{B}$, its complement \overline{B} is qualified in \mathcal{S} .*

This is obvious since by definition of \mathcal{R}_2 pair, $\overline{B} \notin \mathcal{A}$. Our second lemma will be used to guarantee the privacy of Alice's input.

LEMMA 6.4. *Let m_0, m_1 be shared independently with $\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1$ respectively. For $c = 0, 1$, let $m_c^{(i,j)}$ be the sharing of m_c with \mathcal{S}_c . Let $B \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ and $(b'_1, \dots, b'_n) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, and define $\mathcal{I}' = \{(i, b'_i) : i \in \overline{B}\} \cup \{(i, j) : i \in B, j \in \{0, 1\}\}$.*

If the set $\{b'_i : i \in \overline{B}\}$ is not part of any sharing $[c]_{\mathcal{S}}$ then the values $m_0^{(i,j)}, m_1^{(i,j)}, (i, j) \in \mathcal{I}'$ give no information about m_c . I.e., for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, the values $m_c^{(i,j)}, (i, j) \in \mathcal{I}'$ have the same distribution as the values $m^{(i,j)}, (i, j) \in \mathcal{I}'$ in a random sharing of m according to \mathcal{S}_c .

PROOF.

Since the sharings of m_0 and m_1 are independent, this amounts to proving that the set \mathcal{I}' is unqualified for \mathcal{S}_c . But if \mathcal{I}' was qualified for \mathcal{S}_c it would contain a set $\{(1, v_1), \dots, (n, v_n)\} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{n,2}$ with $(v_1, \dots, v_n) \in V_c$. However then necessarily $v_i = b'_i$ for all $i \in \overline{B}$ and that would mean $\{b'_i : i \in B\}$ belongs to a sharing $[c]_{\mathcal{S}}$ which is a contradiction. \triangle

We now describe the simulator Sim. We will suppose without loss of generality that corrupted servers act as a dummy adversary. Let B denote the set of corrupted servers.

First, Sim awaits **(ready, i)** for $i \in B$ and that the environment has sent b_i for each $i \in \overline{B}$. Then Sim executes **Reconstruct $_{\mathcal{S}}$** ($\{(i, b_i) : i \in \overline{B}\}$). If the reconstruction fails then Sim chooses random messages \tilde{m}_0, \tilde{m}_1 . If the reconstruction succeeds, let b be its output; then Sim sends the command **(transfer, b)** to \mathcal{F}_{OT} , receives message **(sent, m_b)** and sets $\tilde{m}_b := m_b$; it selects a random message $\tilde{m}_{1-b} \in \mathcal{M}$.

In any case, Sim generates shares for \tilde{m}_0 using \mathcal{S}_0 and shares for \tilde{m}_1 using \mathcal{S}_1 . It creates the values $u_i^0 := \tilde{m}_0^{(i,0)} || \tilde{m}_1^{(i,0)}$ and $u_i^1 = \tilde{m}_0^{(i,1)} || \tilde{m}_1^{(i,1)}$. Finally, in parallel Sim sends the following to the environment: for each $i \in \overline{B}$, he sends **(output, $i, u_i^{b_i}$)** and for each $i \in B$, he sends **(Alice-share, i, u_0^i, u_1^i)**.

In order to prove indistinguishability, we should first note that, by Lemma 6.3, the set \overline{B} is qualified for \mathcal{S} and hence, the values $\{b_i : i \in \overline{B}\}$ cannot be part of both a sharing $[0]_{\mathcal{S}}$ and a sharing $[1]_{\mathcal{S}}$. It is now easy to see, by Lemma 6.4, that the distribution of shares received by \mathcal{Z} in the simulation is indistinguishable from the distribution of shares received in the real world.

Alice corrupt, Bob honest:

The simulation in this case is slightly tricky, since a potential problem of the protocol is that Alice can generate inconsistent shares which make Bob's output dependent on his selections (that is, on the random sharing of his input). We show, perhaps surprisingly, that this does not affect the security of the protocol. Essentially, the simulator will generate one sharing for $b = 0$ and one for $b = 1$ such that the shares corresponding to the corrupted servers coincide. The simulator will then construct the value that a receiver would construct for each of these two sharings and will send these values to the functionality. This results in a view in the ideal world which is perfectly indistinguishable from the real world, due to the privacy for the set of corrupted servers.

We will suppose without loss of generality that corrupted servers act as dummy adversary. We denote by A the set of uncorrupted servers and note that $A \in \mathcal{A}$. The simulator works as follows.

Upon receiving (**ready**) from the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT} , Sim generates uniformly random sharings of $b = 0$ and $b' = 1$ in \mathcal{S} subject to the only condition that if $i \in A$, then $b_i = b'_i$. Note that this is possible since for any A , it is unqualified for \mathcal{S} . Then, in parallel Sim sends to the environment the message (**ready**, i) for each i and the message (**Bob-share**, i, b_i) for each $i \in A$. Sim now awaits that for each $i \in \bar{A}$, the environment sends u_i^0 and u_i^1 and that for each $i \in A$ the environment sends $u_i^{b_i}$.

If any u_i^j is not an element of \mathcal{M}^2 , then, Sim does the following: if $b_i = j$, set $m_0 = \mathbf{0}$, and if $b'_i = j$, set $m_1 = \mathbf{0}$. For the rest of the u_i^j , Sim does the following: Sim parses, for $i \in \bar{A}$, u_i^0 as $m_0^{(i,0)} || m_1^{(i,0)}$ and u_i^1 as $m_0^{(i,1)} || m_1^{(i,1)}$. Sim also parses, for $i \in A$, $u_i^{b_i}$ as $m_0^{(i,b_i)} || m_1^{(i,b'_i)}$ (again, note $b_i = b'_i$ for $i \in A$).

If m_0 is not already set to $\mathbf{0}$ then Sim computes $m_0 = \text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}_0}(\{(i, b_i), m_0^{(i,b_i)} : i \in \mathcal{P}_n\})$ and if m_1 is not already set to $\mathbf{0}$, Sim computes $m_1 = \text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}_1}(\{(i, b'_i), m_1^{(i,b'_i)} : i \in \mathcal{P}_n\})$. If the reconstruction of m_0 (respectively m_1) fails, Sim sets $m_0 = \mathbf{0}$ (resp. $m_1 = \mathbf{0}$). Finally, it sends the command (**send**, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{F}_{OT} .

By construction, the shares b_i corresponding to the set A of corrupt servers that the environment receives are indistinguishable from the A -shares in a uniformly random sharing of b , regardless of whether $b = 0$ or $b = 1$. Hence these b_i do not allow the receiver to distinguish the real and ideal world. Now, since after that step there is no further interaction, it suffices to show that the messages sent to the simulator are indistinguishable from the real world.

This is the case since the shares have been chosen with the same distribution as Bob would have and since the simulator reconstructs the messages m_0 and m_1 in exactly the same way as Bob would reconstruct m_b in the real protocol, if b is his input. Therefore the real and ideal world are indistinguishable. \triangle

We note that the simulators given in the proof above run in polynomial time in the maximum of the complexities of \mathcal{S}_0 and \mathcal{S}_1 .

Finally, we remark that the Oblivious Transfer protocol we have presented can easily be extended to the case where there does not exist an ideal secret sharing scheme for Alice's adversary structure.

THEOREM 6.5. *If $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ is an \mathcal{R}_2 pair of structures, there exists an unconditionally secure protocol that implements OT between Alice and Bob in the setting above.*

PROOF.

We give a complete description of the protocol in Appendix A. The basic idea is that instead of using each server as a faulty OT box for a single transfer, Alice and Bob will use each server multiple times. The number of faulty calls to a server will depend on the size of the share associated to that server.

More precisely, let $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$ be a secret sharing scheme with adversary structure \mathcal{A} . Bob will randomly secret share his input with $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$. Note that instead of having a single bit associated to each share, Bob now has a ℓ_i -bit string for each server. The i -th server will be used to execute ℓ_i OTs.

We then construct in the same fashion as before two secret-sharing scheme $\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1$ based on $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{A}}$ so that Alice can share her input in such a way that Bob, by requesting an OT value for each bit of the share associated to an honest server, can only reconstruct one of the two secrets.

In this case, we can see that correctness holds. By virtue of the privacy of \mathcal{S} , Bob's value is private and by virtue of the construction of \mathcal{S}_0 and \mathcal{S}_1 Alice's input is private. \triangle

7 Local Universal Composability

In this section, we will prove the security of our protocol in the Local Universal Composability model.

7.1 Oblivious Transfer Functionality

We will denote $C = \{\text{Malicious, Semi-honest, Honest}\}$. The functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT}^L will be the composition of three ideal functionalities: one center box, denoted by \mathcal{F}_{CIOT} , and two outer-boxes, denoted by \mathcal{I}_{HHA} and \mathcal{I}_{HHB} respectively. The local simulator Sim_A for \mathbb{A} (respectively Sim_B for \mathbb{B}) will communicate with \mathcal{I}_{HHA} (respectively \mathcal{I}_{HHB}) only.

Each of the outer boxes will know the level of corruption of both players. \mathcal{I}_{HHA} will learn the level of corruption of Alice directly from the local simulator Sim_A , while it will learn the level of corruption of Bob via the functionality \mathcal{F}_{CIOT} . The same (but with the roles swapped) will hold for \mathcal{I}_{HHB} .

The goal of the outer boxes is to hide from the local simulators whether the other party is honest, semi-honest or malicious (we use the acronym HH to denote honesty-hiding). This is done because having a functionality which would reveal the corruption level of the simulator would be useless for constructing protocols. This means that the outer boxes must simulate the case of a semi-honest party when the party in question is honest. A case-by-case (according to the corruption levels c_A and c_B) description of \mathcal{F}_{OT}^L can be found in Appendix B.

We will now argue that this ideal functionality is indeed one that we want to implement securely. Consider first the usual scenario where one of the players is honest. If both are honest then the functionality just implements OT as usual. If one of the players is honest and the other is not, the non-honest side obtains certain shares belonging to a sharing of some random element (which is therefore not related to the inputs) plus, in the case where Alice is honest and Bob is semi-honest, part of a sharing of the output, but this is already known.

Now we consider the case where none of the players are honest. In this case, our model forces us to communicate to the local simulators part of a "real" sharing of the actual inputs of the other player. This is because the information that the environment will receive from both Sim_A and Sim_B has to be consistent (as it happens to be in the real world). Note that, however, the sets of received shares give information about at most one of the inputs of Alice, and are information theoretically independent of the rest of inputs. Also note that, in the

Functionality \mathcal{I}_{HHA}

- It awaits $(\text{corrupt}, c_A, A)$ from Sim_A , where $c_A \in C$, and forwards it to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$. It then awaits $(\text{corrupt}, c_B)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$.
- If $c_B \neq \text{Honest}$ or $c_A = c_B = \text{Honest}$, then act as a communication channel between Sim_A and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$.
- Otherwise (if $c_A \neq \text{Honest}$ and $c_B = \text{Honest}$), on input (ready) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$:
 - It selects $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random and generates a sharing $[b']_{\mathcal{S}} = (b'_i)_{i \in \mathcal{P}_n}$.
 - For each $i \in A$ it sends $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b'_i)$ to Sim_A . For each $i \notin A$, it sends (ready, i) to Sim_A .
 - On receipt of (send, m_0, m_1) from Sim_A , it forwards it to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$.

Figure 4: Functionality \mathcal{I}_{HHA}

Functionality \mathcal{I}_{HHB}

- On input $(\text{corrupt}, c_B, B)$ from Sim_B where $c_B \in C$, and forwards it to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$. It then awaits $(\text{corrupt}, c_A)$.
- If $c_A \neq \text{Honest}$ or $c_A = c_B = \text{Honest}$, act as a communication channel between $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$ and Sim_B .
- Otherwise (if $c_A = \text{Honest}$ and $c_B \neq \text{Honest}$):
 - It awaits $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b_i)$ for all i from Sim_B .
 - On receipt of $(\text{transfer}, b)$ from Sim_B , it forwards it to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$.
 - On receipt of (sent, m_b) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$, it selects a random $m'_{1-b} \in \mathcal{M}$ and generates random sharings $[m_b]_{\mathcal{S}_b} = (m_b^{(i,j)})_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{P}_{n,2}}$ and $[m'_{1-b}]_{\mathcal{S}_{1-b}} = (m'^{(i,j)}_{1-b})_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{P}_{n,2}}$. It creates the concatenations u_i^j , $(i, j) \in \mathcal{P}_{n,2}$ as it would happen in the protocol, i.e., $u_i^j = m_b^{(i,j)} || m'^{(i,j)}_{1-b}$ if $b = 0$ and $u_i^j = m'^{(i,j)}_{1-b} || m_b^{(i,j)}$ if $b = 1$. For each $i \in B$, it sends $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$ to Sim_B and for each $i \notin B$, it sends $(\text{output}, i, u_i^{b_i})$ to Sim_B .

Figure 5: Functionality \mathcal{I}_{HHB}

malicious case, more shares are leaked to the non-malicious side, but this is ok because we cannot guarantee privacy for the malicious player.

THEOREM 7.1. π_{OT} *LUC-implements* \mathcal{F}_{OT}^L .

We now describe how each of the local simulators works. Later on, we will show the indistinguishability between the real world and the ideal world with these simulators.

7.2 Simulator

7.2.1 Description of Sim_A

- First, the simulator awaits $(\text{corrupt}, c_A, A)$ and forwards it to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} . It also takes note of this tuple.
- If $c_A = \text{Honest}$, it awaits (ready) from the functionality and forwards it to the environment. It then awaits (send, m_0, m_1) from the environment and sends it to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} and ignores any other message.

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{CIOT}

- On input $(\text{corrupt}, c_A, A)$ from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} , where $c_A \in C$:
The ideal functionality checks that $A \in \mathcal{A}$. If $c_A = \text{Honest}$, it also checks that $A = \emptyset$. If some of these checks fails, then it ignores further commands.
Otherwise, it stores (c_A, A) .
- On input $(\text{corrupt}, c_B, B)$ from \mathcal{I}_{HBB} , where $c_B \in C$:
The ideal functionality checks that $B \in \mathcal{B}$. If $c_B = \text{Honest}$, it also checks that $B = \emptyset$. If some of these checks fails, then it ignores further commands.
Otherwise, it stores (c_B, B) .
- The ideal functionality sends $(\text{corrupt}, c_A)$ to \mathcal{I}_{HBB} and $(\text{corrupt}, c_B)$ to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} .
- On input $(\text{transfer}, b)$ from \mathcal{I}_{HBB} , send (ready) to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} .
On input (send, m_0, m_1) from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} , if $(\text{transfer}, b)$ has been received previously from \mathcal{I}_{HBB} , send (sent, m_b) to \mathcal{I}_{HBB} .
- If $c_A = \text{Semi-honest}$:
On command $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b_i)$ from \mathcal{I}_{HBB} : if $i \in A$ it sends $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b_i)$ to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} ; otherwise, it sends (ready, i) to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} .
- If $c_B = \text{Semi-honest}$:
On command $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$ from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} : if $i \in B$, it sends $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$ to \mathcal{I}_{HBB} ; otherwise, it sends $(\text{output}, i, u_i^{b_i})$ to \mathcal{I}_{HBB} .
- If $c_A = \text{Malicious}$:
Any command from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} is directly forwarded to \mathcal{I}_{HBB} .
- If $c_B = \text{Malicious}$:
Any command from \mathcal{I}_{HBB} is directly forwarded to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} .

Figure 6: Functionality \mathcal{F}_{CIOT}

- If $c_A = \text{Semi-honest}$, on receiving a share b_i or a message (ready, i) from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} , it forwards them to the environment. It also forwards any other message from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} that contains and index i with $i \in A$ to the environment⁴. It then awaits the message (send, m_0, m_1) from the environment. It sends the message (send, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} . It then generates the values $\{u_i^0, u_i^1\}$ from (m_0, m_1) as in the protocol. It sends these values to the environment and it sends the messages $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$ to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} for all i .
- If $c_A = \text{Malicious}$, during its whole interaction with the environment, on reception of messages from the environment it checks that they contain a unique index i corresponding to a server. For each message, if this does not happen or if $i \notin A$ (unless for messages of the form $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$), the message is ignored. Otherwise, it is forwarded to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} ⁵. On reception of messages from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} , it forwards them to the environment. On reception of the shares of b_i for $i \in A$ from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} , it also constructs sharings $[0]_{\mathcal{S}} := (c_1, \dots, c_n)$, $[1]_{\mathcal{S}} := (d_1, \dots, d_n)$ consistent with the received b_i 's (i.e., $c_i = d_i = b_i$ for $i \in A$).
On reception of the values $\{u_i^j : (i, j) \in \mathcal{P}_{n,2}\}$ from the environment, it also constructs $m_0 = \text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}_0}(\{((i, c_i), m_0^{(i, c_i)}) : i \in \mathcal{P}_n\})$ and $m_1 = \text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}_1}(\{((i, d_i), m_1^{(i, d_i)}) : i \in \mathcal{P}_n\})$.

⁴Note this captures the situation where a malicious \mathbb{B} sends arbitrary messages to servers with $i \in A \cap B$, since \mathbb{A} will see those messages in the real protocol.

⁵This captures the fact that in the real protocol, a malicious \mathbb{A} can only deviate from the protocol by interacting with a server S_i either arbitrarily, in the case $i \in A$, or by sending messages to them, in the case $i \notin A$; however, in the latter case all messages which are not of the form $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$ will be ignored.

$i \in \mathcal{P}_n\}$). If the reconstruction of m_0 (respectively m_1) fails, Sim sets $m_0 = \mathbf{0}$ (resp. $m_1 = \mathbf{0}$). Now it sends the command (**send**, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{I}_{HHA} .

Note that in the case that Bob is honest, the local simulator Sim_B for Bob will output the value that was generated by Sim_A , otherwise Sim_B will reconstruct a message based on the shares received via \mathcal{F}_{OT}^L .

7.2.2 Description of Sim_B

- First, the simulator awaits (**corrupt**, c_B, B), notes that value and forwards it to \mathcal{I}_{HHB} .
- If $c_B = \text{Honest}$, it sends (**transfer**, b) to \mathcal{I}_{HHB} and forwards the response (**sent**, m_b) to the environment.
- If $c_B = \text{Semi-honest}$, it awaits input (**transfer**, b). It forwards it to \mathcal{I}_{HHB} . It then selects a random sharing $[b]_{\mathcal{S}} = (b_i)_{i \in \mathcal{P}_n}$. It sends the b_i to the environment. It sends messages (**Bob-share**, i, b_i) to \mathcal{I}_{HHB} for every i . On receiving (**Alice-share**, i, u_i^0, u_i^1) for $i \in B$ and (**output**, $i, u_i^{b_i}$) for $i \notin B$ from \mathcal{I}_{HHB} it forwards these to the environment. It reconstructs a message m_b from the received shares as in the protocol. Finally it forwards this message to the environment.
- If $c_B = \text{Malicious}$, during the whole interaction with the environment, on reception of messages from the environment it checks that they contain a unique index i corresponding to a server. For each message, if this does not happen or if $i \notin B$ (unless for messages of the form (**Bob-share**, i, b_i)), the message is ignored. Otherwise, it is forwarded to \mathcal{I}_{HHB} . On reception of messages from \mathcal{I}_{HHA} , it forwards them to the environment. The simulator awaits that the environment has sent (**Bob-share**, i, b_i) to each $i \in \bar{B}$. On receiving (**Alice-share**, i, u_i^0, u_i^1) for $i \in B$ and (**output**, $i, u_i^{b_i}$) for $i \notin B$ from \mathcal{I}_{HHB} it forwards these to the environment. It reconstructs a message m_b from the received shares as in the protocol. Finally it forwards this message to the environment.

7.3 Indistinguishability

First we argue that the case where one of the players is honest reduces to the universal composability proof. Say Alice is honest. Then, the idea is that the functionality \mathcal{F}_{CIOT} (the “inner” part of \mathcal{F}_{OT}^L) is basically the same as the functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT} in Section 6, except that it sends some extra messages to the honest side. However, these messages are ignored by \mathcal{I}_{HHA} . Moreover, the composition of Sim_B and \mathcal{I}_{HHB} acts as the simulator for the UC proof in the case of an honest Alice. If Bob is honest, the same holds by swapping A and B .

As for the cases where both Alice and Bob are corrupted (respectively by \mathbb{A} and \mathbb{B}), as we have said, we are assuming that \mathbb{A} and \mathbb{B} are not both malicious, and thus one of them is semi-honest. Say for the moment that \mathbb{A} is semi-honest. If we compare this with the situation where Alice is honest, and Bob has the same level of corruption, here we need to take into account that, in the real world, \mathcal{Z} will additionally receive from \mathbb{A} the information of the servers S_i with $i \in A$, and all information held by Alice, and all this information is consistent with what it receives from \mathbb{B} . We need to show that this needs to be the case also in the simulation. However, note that by design, the ideal functionality transfers the appropriate parts of the sharings created by Sim_B to Sim_A . Moreover, if \mathbb{B} is malicious it also sends any other potential information that goes through the servers corrupted by \mathbb{A} .

The environment then receives from each of the simulators the sharings created by themselves as well as the shares received from the other simulator via the functionality. This implies that the information received by \mathcal{Z} in both sides is also consistent in the ideal world. Moreover, it is indistinguishable from the view in the real world. This follows by the same arguments as above. Again, the case of a semi-honest Bob (and corrupted Alice) is the same.

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A Protocol for general \mathcal{A}

We show the general version of the protocol π_{OT} from Section 6, when the adversary structure \mathcal{A} corrupted by \mathbb{A} is not necessarily the adversary structure of an ideal LSSS.

Let \mathcal{S} be a perfect secret sharing scheme with adversary structure \mathcal{A} , whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 3.1 but which is not guaranteed to be ideal. For $i = 1, \dots, n$ the i -th share of \mathcal{S} belongs to the vector space $U_i = \{0, 1\}^{\ell_i}$ for some integer $\ell_i \geq 1$. Let $\ell = \sum_{i=1}^n \ell_i$ the complexity of \mathcal{S} . Let $V_0, V_1 \subseteq U_1 \times \dots \times U_n$ the sets of all possible sharings of 0 and 1 respectively. We can think of the elements of V_0 and V_1 as k -bit strings, and we index their coordinates by pairs (i, k) where the (i, k) -th coordinate of a sharing is the k -th bit of the i -th share.

As before we construct two perfect secret sharing schemes that we call \mathcal{S}_0 and \mathcal{S}_1 . These are now secret sharing schemes with 2ℓ shares each and the set of shares will be indexed by

$$\mathcal{P}_{n,2} := \{(i, k, j) : i = 1, \dots, n, k = 1, \dots, \ell_i, j = 0, 1\}.$$

We define the access structure Γ_0 of \mathcal{S}_0 as follows. The minimally qualified sets are exactly the sets $\{(1, 1, v_{(1,1)}), (1, 2, v_{(1,2)}) \dots, (n, k_n, v_{(n,k_n)})\} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{n,2}$ with $(v_{(1,1)}, v_{(1,2)}, \dots, v_{(n,k_n)}) \in V_0$. Similarly, the access structure Γ_1 of \mathcal{S}_1 has as minimally qualified sets those of the form $\{(1, 1, v_{(1,1)}), (1, 2, v_{(1,2)}) \dots, (n, k_n, v_{(n,k_n)})\} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{n,2}$ with $(v_{(1,1)}, v_{(1,2)}, \dots, v_{(n,k_n)}) \in V_1$.

Again $\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1$ are guaranteed to exist by Theorem 3.1. and these do not need to be ideal. In fact, shares may be exponentially large in k . Note that k itself may be exponential in n .

Oblivious transfer protocol π_{OT} (non-ideal \mathcal{S} case)

1. Alice independently creates sharings $[m_0]_{\mathcal{S}_0} = (m_0^{(i,k_i,j)})_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, k_i \in \{1, \dots, \ell_i\}, j \in \{0,1\}}$ and $[m_1]_{\mathcal{S}_1} = (m_1^{(i,k_i,j)})_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, k_i \in \{1, \dots, \ell_i\}, j \in \{0,1\}}$ for her inputs.
Bob creates a sharing $[b]_{\mathcal{S}} = (b_{(i,k_i)})_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, k_i \in \{1, \dots, \ell_i\}}$ of his input, where each $b_{(i,k_i)} \in \{0, 1\}$.
2. Bob sends (**Bob-share**, i, b_i) to server S_i , where $b_i = (b_{(i,1)}, \dots, b_{(i,\ell_i)})$.
3. S_i sends (**ready**, i) to Alice.
4. After Alice has received (**ready**, i) from every server S_i , she sends the messages (**Alice-share**, $i, (u_i^{k_i,j})_{k_i \in \{1, \dots, \ell_i\}, j \in \{0,1\}}$) to each server S_i where $u_i^{k_i,j} := m_0^{(i,k_i,j)} \parallel m_1^{(i,k_i,j)}$.
5. Server S_i sends (**output**, $i, (u_i^{k_i,b_{(i,k_i)}})_{k_i \in \{1, \dots, \ell_i\}}$) to Bob.
6. If for any i , $u_i^{k_i,b_{(i,k_i)}} \notin \mathcal{M}^2$, then Bob outputs **0**. Otherwise, Bob parses each $u_i^{k_i,b_{(i,k_i)}}$ as $m_0^{(i,k_i,b_{(i,k_i)})} \parallel m_1^{(i,k_i,b_{(i,k_i)})}$.
If $b = 0$, Bob constructs m_0 by applying $\text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}_0}(\{(i, k_i, b_{(i,k_i)}), m_0^{(i,k_i,b_{(i,k_i)})} : i \in \mathcal{P}_n, k_i \in \{1, \dots, \ell_i\}\})$.
If $b = 1$, Bob constructs m_1 by applying $\text{Reconstruct}_{\mathcal{S}_1}(\{(i, k_i, b_{(i,k_i)}), m_1^{(i,k_i,b_{(i,k_i)})} : i \in \mathcal{P}_n, k_i \in \{1, \dots, \ell_i\}\})$.
In any of the cases, if the reconstruction fails, output **0**. Otherwise output the reconstructed m_b .

Figure 7: Protocol π_{OT}

B Description of \mathcal{F}_{OT}^L by cases

We describe the functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT}^L (the composition of \mathcal{I}_{HHA} , $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CIOT}}$ and \mathcal{I}_{HHB}) case-by-case, according to the level of corruption of Alice and Bob.

In every case, the functionality receives $(\text{corrupt}, c_A, A)$ and $(\text{corrupt}, c_B, B)$ from the local simulators.

1. **Case HH** ($c_A = c_B = \text{Honest}$).
It works exactly as \mathcal{F}_{OT} .
2. **Case HS** ($c_A = \text{Honest}, c_B = \text{Semi-honest}$).
It awaits $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b_i)$ for all $i \in \mathcal{P}_n$.
On input $(\text{transfer}, b)$ from Sim_B , it sends (ready) to Sim_A .
On input (send, m_0, m_1) from Sim_A the functionality generates a random message $m'_{1-b} \in \mathcal{M}$ and random sharings $[m_b]_{\mathcal{S}_b}$ and $[m'_{1-b}]_{\mathcal{S}_{1-b}}$. It creates values $u_i^j = m_0^{(i,j)} || m'_1^{(i,j)}$ (if $b = 0$) or $u_i^j = m'_0^{(i,j)} || m_1^{(i,j)}$ (if $b = 1$).
It sends, to Sim_B , the messages $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$ for $i \in B$ and $(\text{output}, i, u_i^{b_i})$ for $i \notin B$.
3. **Case SH** ($c_A = \text{Semi-honest}, c_B = \text{Honest}$).
On input $(\text{transfer}, b)$ from Sim_B , it generates shares b'_i for a random bit b' and sends to Sim_A the messages $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b'_i)$ for all $i \in A$ and (ready, i) for all $i \notin A$.
On input (send, m_0, m_1) from Sim_A , it sends (sent, m_b) to Sim_B .
4. **Case SS** ($c_A = \text{Semi-honest}, c_B = \text{Semi-honest}$).
The functionality awaits, for all $i \in \mathcal{P}_n$, the messages $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b_i)$ from Sim_B .
It sends to Sim_A the messages $(\text{Bob-share}, i, b_i)$ for all $i \in A$ and (ready, i) for all $i \notin A$.
The functionality awaits, for all $i \in \mathcal{P}_n$, the messages $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$.
It sends, to Sim_B , the messages $(\text{Alice-share}, i, u_i^0, u_i^1)$ for $i \in B$ and $(\text{output}, i, u_i^{b_i})$ for $i \notin B$.
5. **Case HM** ($c_A = \text{Honest}, c_B = \text{Malicious}$).
The functionality acts exactly the same as in the HS case.
6. **Case MH** ($c_A = \text{Malicious}, c_B = \text{Honest}$).
The functionality acts exactly the same as in the SH case.
7. **Case SM** ($c_A = \text{Semi-honest}, c_B = \text{Malicious}$).
The functionality acts the same as in the SS case except that *all* messages received from Sim_B are sent to Sim_A .
8. **Case MS** ($c_A = \text{Malicious}, c_B = \text{Semi-honest}$).
The functionality acts the same as in the SS case except that *all* messages received from Sim_A are sent to Sim_B .