

Reducing Communication Overhead of the Subset Difference Scheme

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Abstract

In Broadcast Encryption (BE) systems like Pay-TV, AACs, online content sharing and broadcasting, reducing the header length (communication overhead per session) is of practical interest. The Subset Difference (SD) scheme due to Naor-Naor-Lotspiech (NNL) is the most popularly used BE scheme. It assumes an underlying full binary tree to assign keys to subsets of users. In this work, we associate short tree structures of height a to nodes in the binary tree to assign keys to more subsets. This ensures that for any set of revoked users, the header length is in general less and never more than the NNL-SD scheme. Experimental studies show that the average header length is always less than that of the NNL-SD scheme and decreases as a increases. User storage in the new scheme is more than that of the NNL-SD scheme but is not prohibitively expensive. By choosing a suitable value of a , it is possible to obtain substantial reduction in the communication overhead at the cost of a tolerable increase in the user storage.

Keywords: Broadcast encryption; subset difference; trees; augmented structure; general arity; probabilistic analysis; expectation; header length; transmission overhead.

1 Introduction

Content protection in systems like Pay-TV, online media broadcasting and digital rights management [DRM] in optical discs, are based on broadcast encryption (BE) schemes. A symmetric key BE scheme assumes a broadcasting center and a set \mathcal{N} of users who can receive the encrypted broadcast. At the outset, the users are provided long-lived keys which are stored on the user devices. Blocks of data are broadcast in sessions. For a given broadcast, a non-empty subset of users are identified as *privileged* and the other users are said to be *revoked*. Each session is encrypted with a fresh random session key. The session key in turn is encrypted a number of times using a subset of long-lived keys such that each privileged user has access to one of these keys and no revoked user can access any of these keys. These encryptions of the session key are sent with the encrypted data block as the *header*. The number of times the session key is encrypted is called the *header length*. The communication overhead due to the scheme is measured by the header length.

The Advanced Access Content System [AAC] standard for digital rights management [DRM] in optical discs suggest the use of the Subset Difference (SD) scheme proposed in 2001 by Naor, Naor and Lotspiech [NNL01]. The SD scheme has thus become the most popularly used BE scheme. In this scheme, long-lived keys are assigned to some subsets of \mathcal{N} . A user is provided some secret information from which it can derive the keys of only those subsets to which it belongs. At the time of the broadcast, the center computes the subset cover containing subsets of privileged users. Each privileged user for a session is in some subset of the cover for that session. In the header, the session key is encrypted using the long-lived keys of subsets in the cover. A privileged user can

decrypt the session key from the part of the header intended for the subset in the cover to which it belongs. It can thus decrypt the data block of the session.

For a system with n users, the NNL-SD scheme requires each user to store $O(\log^2 n)$ secret key material. Further, for a broadcast having r revoked users, the worst case header length is $2r - 1$.

1.1 Our Contributions

There are two main parameters of a BE scheme – the header length which determines the communication bandwidth requirement and the user storage. In applications like the Advanced Access Content System [AAC] for digital rights management [DRM] in optical discs, reducing the header length implies the system will be able to tolerate more number of revocations. There are applications like Pay-TV where the communication bandwidth is more important than the user storage. Our goal in this work is to explore methods to reduce the communication bandwidth in the NNL-SD scheme.

The starting point of our work is the NNL-SD scheme. For a system with $n = 2^{\ell_0}$ users, the NNL-SD scheme uses a full binary tree of height ℓ_0 . The scheme identifies certain subsets of users and employs a clever strategy for assigning keys to these subsets. In any broadcast, the set of privileged users are covered using these subsets. A basic combinatorial intuition is that if we can somehow manage to increase the number of allowed subsets, then it may become easier to cover the privileged users using a smaller number of subsets. We follow up on this intuition.

Reducing the communication bandwidth can trivially be done if there is no restriction on the user storage. This, however, is an unrealistic scenario. We consider the issue of reducing communication bandwidth while at the same time ensuring that the increase in the user storage is not prohibitively expensive. The new scheme that we introduce still uses \mathcal{T}^0 as the underlying framework and all the subsets considered in the NNL-SD scheme are also present in the new scheme. Additionally, we use small trees of height a rooted at internal nodes of \mathcal{T}^0 to identify additional subsets which are to be assigned keys. In the scheme, a is a parameter whose value is greater than or equal to 1. Accordingly, the new scheme is called as the a -augmented binary tree subset difference (a -ABTSD) scheme. For $a = 1$, the new scheme is the same as the NNL-SD scheme. For $a > 1$, the flexibility of having additional subsets arises. As a result, the new scheme is a proper generalization of the NNL-SD scheme.

For a scheme with n users, the user storage is still $O(\log^2 n)$. The difference with the NNL-SD scheme is that the constant in the big-oh notation is proportional to 2^{k-1} where $k = 2^a$. So, for a fixed n , the a -ABTSD scheme is meaningful only if a is small. Later we consider the values of a to be from 1 to 4. The worst case header length of the a -ABTSD scheme is $2r - 1$ (irrespective of the value of a) as in the case of the NNL-SD scheme. It can be shown though that for any particular set of revoked users, the header size of the new scheme is never more than that of the NNL-SD scheme. Further, compared to the NNL-SD scheme, in the a -ABTSD scheme, the maximum header size of $2r - 1$ is attained for a larger values of n .

The main gain in using the a -ABTSD scheme is the reduction in the average header length. We have carried out experiments to study this. It turns out that for all values of r , the average header length of the new scheme for $a > 1$ is lower than that of the NNL-SD scheme. The lowering effect of the header length becomes more pronounced as either r increases or as a increases. Our results show that in scenarios where reducing communication bandwidth is a major concern, the new scheme provides an attractive alternative to the NNL-SD scheme.

1.2 Previous And Related Works

Broadcast encryption was introduced in [Ber91] and the scheme was based on “ k out of n ” secret sharing. It was formally studied in [FN93] and several schemes were proposed that were based on one-way functions and computational number-theoretic assumptions. These schemes were not fully resilient against colluding users.

The subset cover framework for BE was proposed in [NNL01] that modelled almost all previously known BE schemes. The subset difference scheme, its formal security analysis and traitor tracing technique were all proposed in this same work. Halevy and Shamir introduced the concept of layering in the underlying tree of the NNL-SD scheme and reduced the user storage [HS02]. The number of users in these tree-based schemes NNL-SD [NNL01] and the HS-LSD [HS02] was assumed to be a power of two. The NNL-SD scheme was extended to accommodate arbitrary number of users in [BS13a]. Detailed combinatorial and probabilistic analysis of the scheme was also done. In [BS13b] the idea of layering was further generalized to obtain different optimizations of the user storage and the expected header length.

A ternary tree based subset difference technique was proposed in [FKTS08]. More recently, [BS13c] introduced a generalization of the NNL-SD scheme to work for k -ary trees for any $k \geq 2$ and studied its properties.

The trade-off between a given upper bound on the user storage and the consequent lower bound on the header length was given by [LS98]. BE schemes for low-memory stateless and low-state devices was considered in [LS98]. The header length was brought down below r for the first time in [JHC⁺05] with a one-way chain based scheme, where the user storage increased considerably.

The header length being the most important parameter affecting the cost of implementation of BE schemes, most of the analysis of these schemes are towards it. Analysis of the expected header length of tree-based schemes in [NNL01, HS02] was done in [PB06]. It was shown in [EOPR08] that the standard deviations of the header lengths for these schemes are small compared to the means as the number of users gets large. Hence, the expected header length is a good estimate of the overall communication overhead per session. Efficient algorithms to compute the expected header lengths for these schemes were proposed in [BS13a, BS13b]. Lower bounds on the header length for subset cover algorithms over different ranges of r were found in [AKI03]. Detailed worst case header length analysis for the tree-based schemes of [NNL01] have been done in [MMW09].

2 Subset Cover Framework

Most known symmetric key BE schemes fall under the subset cover framework [NNL01]. In this framework, the broadcast center defines a collection \mathcal{S} of subsets of the set of users \mathcal{N} and keys are assigned to each subset in \mathcal{S} . For a user u , let \mathcal{S}_u denote the subsets in \mathcal{S} which contain u , i.e., $\mathcal{S}_u = \{S : S \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } u \in S\}$. A user u gets secret information I_u from which it can derive the keys for all subsets in \mathcal{S}_u . This secret information I_u need not be the actual keys, instead it can consist of sufficient information which allows u to derive the key for any subset in \mathcal{S} to which it belongs.

The message to be broadcast by the center in each session is encrypted with a random *session key* K_s . For each session, the center knows the set of revoked users \mathcal{R} . It forms a *partition* \mathcal{S}_c of the set of privileged users $\mathcal{N} \setminus \mathcal{R}$ using subsets in \mathcal{S} , i.e., $\mathcal{S}_c \subseteq \mathcal{S}$; for $S_1, S_2 \in \mathcal{S}_c$, $S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset$; and $\cup_{S \in \mathcal{S}_c} S = \mathcal{N} \setminus \mathcal{R}$.

This set of subsets \mathcal{S}_c is called the *subset cover* and the algorithm to find \mathcal{S}_c is called the *cover generation or cover finding algorithm*. The session key is further encrypted for each subset $S \in \mathcal{S}_c$, using the key associated with S . These encryptions of the session key are sent as the header with the encrypted data. The number, h , of subsets in the cover \mathcal{S}_c , i.e., $h = |\mathcal{S}_c|$ is called the header length.

For decryption, a privileged user first determines the subset S in \mathcal{S}_c to which it belongs. Then it uses the key corresponding to S to decrypt the portion of the header intended for S to obtain the session key K_s . Finally, it uses K_s to decrypt the message.

2.1 The Naor-Naor-Lotspiech Subset Difference Scheme

The subset difference scheme introduced by Naor, Naor and Lotspiech (NNL-SD) [NNL01] falls under the subset cover framework. The number of users n ($n = |\mathcal{N}|$) is assumed to be a power of two, i.e., $n = 2^{\ell_0}$ for some $\ell_0 \geq 0$.

A *full binary tree* \mathcal{T}^0 of height ℓ_0 forms the underlying structure for the scheme. Each user is associated with a unique leaf of \mathcal{T}^0 . The nodes in the tree are numbered as follows. The root node is numbered 0. The left (resp. right) child of an internal node i is numbered $2i + 1$ (resp. $2i + 2$). For any node i in \mathcal{T}^0 , the full binary tree rooted at i is denoted as \mathcal{T}^i .

There are a total of $\ell_0 + 1$ levels in the tree \mathcal{T}^0 . The leaf nodes are at level 0; any internal node is at level $\ell + 1$ if its children are at level ℓ . So, the root node is at level ℓ_0 . By $\text{level}(i)$ we denote the level number of the node i in the tree \mathcal{T}^0 . If J is a set of nodes all of which are at the same level, we will denote this common level by $\text{level}(J)$.

Let i be a non-leaf node in \mathcal{T}^0 and j be a non-root node in \mathcal{T}^i . By $\mathcal{T}^i \setminus \mathcal{T}^j$ we denote the subgraph obtained by taking away \mathcal{T}^j from \mathcal{T}^i . Let $S_{i,j}$ be the set of *leaf* nodes of $\mathcal{T}^i \setminus \mathcal{T}^j$.

The Collection NNL- \mathcal{S} . For the NNL-SD scheme, let us denote the collection of subsets which are assigned keys by NNL- \mathcal{S} . Then

$$\text{NNL-}\mathcal{S} = \{\mathcal{N}\} \cup \{S_{i,j} : i \text{ is a non-leaf node of } \mathcal{T}^0 \text{ and } j \text{ is a non-root node of } \mathcal{T}^i\}. \quad (1)$$

The size of the collection NNL- \mathcal{S} is $1 + \ell_0 2^{\ell_0+1} - 2^{\ell_0} + 1 = 2 + \ell_0 2^{\ell_0+1} - 2^{\ell_0}$.

Key Assignment To Subsets. A key K_0 is assigned to the subset \mathcal{N} . For key assignment to the other subsets in \mathcal{S} , a cryptographic hash function

$$G : \{0, 1, 2\} \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m \quad (2)$$

is chosen by the center and is made available to all users in the system. Here m is the key-size of the underlying symmetric cipher. For $t = 0, 1, 2$, let $G_t(\cdot) \triangleq G(t, \cdot)$. Each subset $S_{i,j} \in \mathcal{S}$ is assigned a key as follows.

- Every internal node i in \mathcal{T}^0 is assigned a uniform random m -bit seed L_i .
- All non-root nodes j in the subtree \mathcal{T}^i derive seeds from L_i in the following manner. Let $j = t_0, \dots, t_p = i$ be the sequence of nodes in the path from j to i . Then for $\iota = p - 1, \dots, 0$, $t_\iota = 2t_{\iota+1} + s_\iota$ where $s_\iota \in \{1, 2\}$. Define the label $L_{i,j}$ associated to $S_{i,j}$ to be $L_{i,j} \triangleq G_{s_0}(\dots G_{s_{p-2}}(G_{s_{p-1}}(L_i)) \dots)$.
- The key $K_{i,j}$ associated to the subset $S_{i,j}$ is defined to be $K_{i,j} \triangleq G_0(L_{i,j})$.

The Set I_u For A User u . For a user u consider the set NNL- \mathcal{S}_u of subsets in NNL- \mathcal{S} which contain u . If $S_{i,j}$ is such a subset, then i is an ancestor of the leaf node u and j is not an ancestor of u . The user u should be able to generate the keys of all such subsets and no more. User u is at level 0 and suppose i is at level ℓ . Further suppose $u = i_0, i_1, \dots, i_\ell = i$ be the path from u to i . Let j_1, \dots, j_ℓ be the siblings of i_1, \dots, i_ℓ respectively. Corresponding to the ancestor i at level ℓ , user u is given the ℓ seeds $L_{i,j_1}, \dots, L_{i,j_\ell}$. Since u has ℓ_0 ancestors, the total number of seeds given to u is $\ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2$ plus the key K_0 assigned to the set \mathcal{N} . Denote the set of all seeds given to u by NNL- I_u , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NNL-}I_u &= \{K_0\} \cup \{L_{i,j} : i \text{ is an ancestor of } u \text{ and } j \text{ is the sibling of some node in the path from } u \text{ to } i\}. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

It can be seen that from the seeds that u gets, it can derive the keys for all subsets to which it belongs and no more.

3 The a -Augmented Binary Tree Subset Difference Scheme

The a -Augmented Binary Tree Subset Difference (a -ABTSD) scheme is a generalization of the NNL-SD scheme. It assumes an underlying full binary tree \mathcal{T}^0 as in the case of the NNL-SD scheme and imposes additional structure on this tree. The size of the structure is determined by a parameter a . For $a = 1$, the scheme turns out to be the same as the NNL-SD scheme.

Underlying Structure. As in the case of the NNL-SD scheme, there are $n = 2^{\ell_0}$ users associated with the leaves of the underlying full binary tree \mathcal{T}^0 . The nodes and levels are also numbered as in the NNL-SD scheme.

For ease of later description, we introduce a few notions. Suppose J_1 and J_2 are two sets of nodes of \mathcal{T}^0 such that there is a node $j \in J_1$ and nodes $j_1, j_2 \in J_2$ such that $J_1 \setminus \{j\} = J_2 \setminus \{j_1, j_2\}$ and j_1, j_2 are the two children of j . Then the set J_2 can be thought of as being obtained from J_1 by replacing $\{j_1, j_2\}$ by j . Call the operation of replacing j_1, j_2 by their parent j to be a *moving-up* step.

Given a set J , it is possible to repeatedly apply the moving-up operation to get a set J' such that the moving-up operation can no longer be applied on J . We call J' to be a *reduced set*. Given a set J , there is a unique reduced set which can be obtained by repeatedly applying the moving-up step.

Let \mathcal{T} be a full binary tree and J be a non-empty subset of the leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} . If J is either singleton, or, J can be reduced to a singleton set using moving-up operation, then J is called a *simple* subset of \mathcal{T} ; otherwise, J is called a *non-simple* subset of \mathcal{T} . Figure 1 and Figure 2 show examples of simple and non-simple subsets respectively. By $\mathcal{J}_s(\mathcal{T})$ we denote the set of all simple subsets of \mathcal{T} . Similarly, $\mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T})$ denotes the set of all non-simple subsets of \mathcal{T} . Note that both $\mathcal{J}_s(\mathcal{T})$ and $\mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T})$ consist of subsets of the set of leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} .




Figure 1: A full binary tree \mathcal{T} with the set $J_1 = \{7, 8, 9, 10\}$ of leaf nodes that can be reduced to a singleton set $J'_1 = \{1\}$. Hence, J_1 is a simple subset of \mathcal{T} .




Figure 2: A full binary tree \mathcal{T} where the set $J_2 = \{7, 9, 10, 12\}$ of leaf nodes may be reduced to $J'_2 = \{7, 4, 12\}$ which is not singleton. Hence, J_2 is a non-simple subset of \mathcal{T} .

For the new scheme, additional structure is endowed to \mathcal{T}^0 in the following manner. Define an a -tree \mathcal{A}_a^j to be a subgraph of \mathcal{T}^0 which is the full binary tree rooted at node j and of height a . So, the number of nodes in an a -tree is $1 + 2 + \dots + 2^a = 2^{a+1} - 1$. The scheme is parameterized by the number a .

We provide an example to illustrate this notion. In Figure 3 where $a = 2$, the subtree rooted at node 4 is the a -tree \mathcal{A}_2^4 containing the nodes $\{4, 9, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22\}$. Another a -tree \mathcal{A}_2^1 is the subgraph containing the nodes $\{1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10\}$.

For a fixed value of a in \mathcal{T}^0 , each a -tree is uniquely identified by its root node. Alternatively, suppose J is a non-empty subset of leaf nodes of an a -tree \mathcal{A}_a^j such that the nodes in J are at level ℓ (of \mathcal{T}^0). Then the root j is the unique ancestor at level $\ell + a$ of the nodes in J . So, given J , the node j is uniquely determined and we will call j to be the a -pivot of J .

The level number of the root node of any a -tree in \mathcal{T}^0 is at least a . Hence, for a full binary tree with $n = 2^{\ell_0}$ leaves, the number of distinct a -trees is the number of internal nodes at levels between ℓ_0 and a . Since there are $2^{\ell_0-\ell}$ nodes at level ℓ in \mathcal{T}^0 , hence the number of a -trees is

$$1 + 2 + \dots + 2^{\ell_0-a} = 2^{\ell_0-a+1} - 1.$$

For any internal node i of \mathcal{T}^0 and any non-root node j in \mathcal{T}^i , $\mathcal{T}^i \setminus \mathcal{T}^j$ is the subgraph of \mathcal{T}^i obtained by taking away \mathcal{T}^j . We generalize this notion in the following manner. As before, let i be a non-leaf node in \mathcal{T}^0 and let $J = \{j_1, \dots, j_c\}$ be a non-empty subset of non-root nodes in \mathcal{T}^i . Define $\mathcal{T}_{i,J}$ to be the subgraph of \mathcal{T}^i formed by taking away all of $\mathcal{T}^{j_1}, \dots, \mathcal{T}^{j_c}$ from \mathcal{T}^i . In other words,

$$\mathcal{T}_{i,J} = \mathcal{T}^i \setminus (\mathcal{T}^{j_1} \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{T}^{j_c}).$$

Let $S_{i,J}$ denote the set of leaf nodes of the subgraph $\mathcal{T}_{i,J}$.

Suppose J_1 and J_2 are two sets of nodes in \mathcal{T}^i such that J_2 is obtained from J_1 by a moving-up step. Then it is easy to see that the set of leaf nodes of \mathcal{T}_{i,J_1} is the same as the set of leaf nodes of \mathcal{T}_{i,J_2} and so $S_{i,J_1} = S_{i,J_2}$. We say (i, J_1) and (i, J_2) are two representations of the set $S_{i,J_1} = S_{i,J_2}$. If J' is a reduced set obtained by successively applying the moving-up operation to a set J , then $S_{i,J} = S_{i,J'}$. By an extension of terminology, we will call the representation (i, J') to be the reduced form representation of the set $S_{i,J}$.

The Collection \mathcal{S} . Let i be an internal node of \mathcal{T}^0 and J be a non-simple subset of \mathcal{A}_a^j where j is a node of \mathcal{T}^i . We call such a pair (i, J) to be *allowed*.

Suppose (i, J) is an allowed pair where the nodes in J are at level ℓ . Then the level of the a -pivot j of J is $\ell + a$ and so the level of i is at least $\ell + a$. This shows that there cannot be an allowed pair (i, J) where the level of i is less than a .

The collection \mathcal{S} consists of the following subsets:

- all NNL-SD subsets $S_{i,j}$; and
- $S_{i,J}$ for all allowed pairs (i, J) .

In other words,

$$\mathcal{S} = \text{NNL-}\mathcal{S} \cup \mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S} \tag{4}$$

where $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S} \triangleq \{S_{i,J} : (i, J) \text{ is allowed}\}$.

For $S_{i,J} \in \mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S}$, J is non-simple and so J cannot be reduced to a singleton set using moving-up operations. As a result, $S_{i,J}$ is not equal to any NNL-SD subset. So, the collections $\text{NNL-}\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S}$ are disjoint.

If $a = 1$, then any J which is a non-empty subset of the leaf nodes of an a -tree is necessarily simple. So, there are no allowed pairs (i, J) showing that $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S} = \emptyset$. As a consequence, in this case, the a -ABTSD scheme collapses to the NNL-SD scheme.

As an example, let us consider the tree \mathcal{T}^0 in Figure 3 with 16 users. It shows the subset that has been formed by excluding the users in \mathcal{T}^7 , \mathcal{T}^9 and \mathcal{T}^{10} from the users in \mathcal{T}^0 . The subset is denoted as $S_{0,\{7,9,10\}}$. Nodes $\{7, 9, 10\}$ are leaves of the a -tree \mathcal{A}_2^1 . Note that the set $\{7, 4\}$ can be obtained from the set $\{7, 9, 10\}$ by a moving-up operation. So, $S_{0,\{7,9,10\}} = S_{0,\{7,4\}}$.

Key Assignment To Subsets In \mathcal{S} . The key assignment strategy is an extension of the strategy for the NNL-SD scheme. The collection \mathcal{S} consists of two sub-collections $\text{NNL-}\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S}$. We assume as in the case of the NNL-SD scheme that each internal node i of \mathcal{T}^0 is assigned an independent and uniform random m -bit seed L_i . Further, for any non-root j in \mathcal{T}^i , the seed $L_{i,j}$ is also defined using G_t as in the NNL-SD scheme and the




Figure 3: The binary tree \mathcal{T}^0 that is the underlying structure of the a -ABTSD scheme for $n = 16$ users is shown here. The red leaf nodes denote revoked users while the black ones denote privileged users. Here we assume $a = 2$. The subset $S_{0,\{7,9,10\}} = \{17, 18, 23, 24, \dots, 30\}$ from the collection \mathcal{S} ($\mathcal{A}\text{-}\mathcal{S}$ in particular) is also shown. It has all users in the subtree \mathcal{T}^0 but not in $\mathcal{T}^7 \cup \mathcal{T}^9 \cup \mathcal{T}^{10}$. Since $J = \{7, 9, 10\}$ is a non-simple subset of the a -tree \mathcal{A}_2^1 , $(1, J)$ is an allowed pair. Using the moving up operation, the subset J may also be represented as $S_{0,\{7,4\}}$.

key for the NNL-SD subset $S_{i,j}$ is $K_{i,j} = G_0(L_{i,j})$. In other words, keys to the subsets in NNL- \mathcal{S} are assigned as in the NNL-SD scheme. For convenience of notation, we define $L_{i,i} \triangleq L_i$.

Let \mathcal{T} be a full binary tree of height a and as defined earlier $\mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T})$ is the set of all non-simple subsets of \mathcal{T} . We define a cryptographic hash function

$$H[\mathcal{T}] : \mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T}) \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m. \quad (5)$$

Keys to the subsets in $\mathcal{A}\text{-}\mathcal{S}$ are defined using the hash function H . Note that H is defined with respect to the tree \mathcal{T} . This is because the domain of H depends on \mathcal{T} . On the other hand, we expect H to act on any full binary tree of height a in the same manner. So, when \mathcal{T} is clear from the context, we will write H instead of $H[\mathcal{T}]$.

Let $k = 2^a$ which is the number of leaf nodes in any a -tree. Suppose $S_{i,J}$ is in the collection $\mathcal{A}\text{-}\mathcal{S}$. Then (i, J) is an allowed pair and suppose the a -pivot of J is j . Then J is necessarily a non-simple subset of \mathcal{A}_a^j , i.e., $J \in \mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{A}_a^j)$. The key $K_{i,J}$ assigned to $S_{i,J}$ is

$$K_{i,J} \triangleq H[\mathcal{A}_a^j](J, L_{i,j}). \quad (6)$$

Note that j can be equal to i and in that case $L_{i,i}$ is simply L_i .

Number Of Subsets In The Collection. As mentioned earlier, the count of the number of NNL-SD subsets is $2 + \ell_0 2^{\ell_0+1} - 2^{\ell_0}$. We now consider the number of subsets in $\mathcal{A}\text{-}\mathcal{S}$. The following result gives the number of simple and non-simple subsets of a full binary tree of height a .

Lemma 1. *Let \mathcal{T} be a full binary tree of height a and $k = 2^a$. Then the number of simple subsets of \mathcal{T} , i.e. $|\mathcal{J}_s(\mathcal{T})|$ equals $2k - 1$. Consequently, the number of non-simple subsets of \mathcal{T} , i.e. $|\mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T})|$, equals $2^k - 2k$.*

Proof. \mathcal{T} has $k = 2^a$ leaf nodes and a total of $2k - 1$ nodes. If J is a simple subset of \mathcal{T} , then J is either a singleton subset of the set of leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} or, can be reduced to one of the internal nodes of \mathcal{T} . So, the number of simple nodes of \mathcal{T} is $2k - 1$. The total number of non-empty subsets of the leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} is $2^k - 1$. Out of these $2k - 1$ are simple subsets. As a result, there are $2^k - 2k$ non-simple subsets of \mathcal{T} . \square

Fix a node i of \mathcal{T}^0 with $\text{level}(i) = \ell$. Out of the $2^{\ell+1} - 1$ nodes in \mathcal{T}^i , $2^{\ell-a+1} + \dots + 2^\ell$ nodes are at the bottom-most a levels. These nodes cannot be the a -pivot for any set J such that the pair (i, J) is allowed. Each of the remaining $2^{\ell-a+1} - 1$ nodes in \mathcal{T}^i will be the root of an a -tree that generate subsets. For a node i , each such a -tree will generate $2^k - 2k$ subsets of the form $S_{i,J}$ where J is non-simple. Thus, the total number of subsets of the form $S_{i,J}$ in $\mathcal{A-S}$ is

$$\sum_{\ell=a}^{\ell_0} 2^{\ell_0-\ell} (2^{\ell-a+1} - 1) (2^k - 2k - 2) = (2^k - 2k) ((\ell_0 - a) 2^{\ell_0-a+1} - 2^{\ell_0-a+1} + 1).$$

Hence, the total number of subsets in the collection \mathcal{S} is

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{S}| &= |\text{NNL-}\mathcal{S}| + |\mathcal{A-S}| \\ &= 2 + \ell_0 2^{\ell_0+1} - 2^{\ell_0} + (2^k - 2k) ((\ell_0 - a) 2^{\ell_0-a+1} - 2^{\ell_0-a+1} + 1). \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

I_u Per User u . Let u be a user, i.e. a leaf node of \mathcal{T}^0 . The information provided to u consists of two disjoint subsets which we call $I_u^{(1)}$ and $I_u^{(2)}$.

The Subset $I_u^{(1)}$. The first part is the same as that in the NNL-SD scheme, i.e., $I_u^{(1)} = \text{NNL-}I_u$. Recall that $\text{NNL-}I_u$ consists of seeds $L_{i,j}$ where i is an ancestor of u and j is the sibling of some node in the path from u to i . As mentioned earlier, the number of m -bit seeds in $I_u^{(1)}$ is $|I_u^{(1)}| = 1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2$. From the seeds in $I_u^{(1)}$, u can derive keys of the following type:

- key $K_{i,j}$ corresponding to any NNL-SD subset $S_{i,j}$ containing u ;
- key $K_{i,J}$ corresponding to any subset $S_{i,J}$ containing u such that the a -pivot of J is in the subtree rooted at the sibling of some node in the path from u to i .

The seeds in $I_u^{(1)}$ are not actual keys for subsets. These actual keys have to be derived from the seeds by one or more applications of the hash functions G and/or H .

The Subset $I_u^{(2)}$. Let \mathcal{T} be a full binary tree of height a and v be a leaf node of \mathcal{T} . Let $\mathcal{J}_{ns,v}(\mathcal{T})$ denote the set of all non-simple sets of \mathcal{T} not containing v . In other words, J is in $\mathcal{J}_{ns,v}(\mathcal{T})$ if J is a non-empty subset of the leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} , J cannot be reduced to singleton subset and $v \notin J$.

Lemma 2. Let \mathcal{T} be a full binary tree of height a and v be a leaf node of \mathcal{T} . Then $|\mathcal{J}_{ns,v}(\mathcal{T})| = 2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1$.

Proof. Consider a non-empty subset of the leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} not containing v . Since \mathcal{T} has k leaf nodes, there are a total of $2^{k-1} - 1$ possibilities for J . Further J cannot be reduced to any of the ancestors of v in \mathcal{T} . \square

Define $\mathcal{S}_u^{(2)}$ to be collection of subsets $S_{i,J}$ in $\mathcal{A-S}$ satisfying the following conditions:

- i is an ancestor of u and the a -pivot j of J is also an ancestor of u ;
- the ancestor v of u at $\text{level}(J)$ is not in J .

Define

$$I_u^{(2)} = \{K_{i,J} : S_{i,J} \text{ is in } \mathcal{S}_u^{(2)}\}. \quad (8)$$

The size of $I_u^{(2)}$ is calculated as follows. If i is at level ℓ , then the possible levels for the a -pivot j of J are $a, a+1, \dots, \ell$. Fix a level ℓ' of j . We now need to find the number of non-simple subsets J satisfying the above

conditions. There are $k = 2^a$ leaf nodes of \mathcal{A}_a^j . The ancestor v of u at level ℓ' is a leaf node of \mathcal{A}_a^j . By the above condition, v should not be in J and so there are $k - 1$ leaf nodes of \mathcal{A}_a^j which can be in J . Any subset J' of the leaf nodes of \mathcal{A}_a^j which does not contain v cannot be reduced to any of the singleton nodes in the path from v to j (both inclusive). There are a total of $(2k - 1) - (a + 1)$ nodes in \mathcal{A}_a^j to which it may be possible to reduce J' by applying moving-up operations. So, the number of J satisfying the required conditions is $2^{k-1} - 1 - (2k - a - 2)$. For a node i at level ℓ , there are $(\ell - a + 1)$ possible choices for j and for each j there are $2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1$ choices for J . So, the number of keys in $I_u^{(2)}$ is

$$|I_u^{(2)}| = \sum_{\ell=a}^{\ell_0} (\ell - a + 1)(2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1) = \frac{1}{2} \times (2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1)(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1). \quad (9)$$

Recall that for a user u , \mathcal{S}_u denotes the collection of subsets in \mathcal{S} which contain u . Also, $\text{NNL-}\mathcal{S}_u$ denotes the collection of all NNL-SD subsets which contain u . Define $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S}_u$ to be the collection of all subsets from $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S}$ which contain u . Then \mathcal{S}_u is the disjoint union of $\text{NNL-}\mathcal{S}_u$ and $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S}_u$. The set $I_u^{(1)}$ provides u with information to generate keys for any subset in $\text{NNL-}\mathcal{S}_u$. Similarly, the set $I_u^{(2)}$ provides u with information to generate keys for any subset in $\mathcal{A-}\mathcal{S}_u$. Further, the two sets $I_u^{(1)}$ and $I_u^{(2)}$ are disjoint and their union is the set I_u which provides u with information to generate keys for any subset in \mathcal{S}_u . The total number of m -bit seeds that u needs to store is the cardinality of I_u and is given by the following.

$$|I_u| = |I_u^{(1)}| + |I_u^{(2)}| = 1 + \frac{\ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)}{2} + \frac{(2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1)(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)}{2}. \quad (10)$$

For a fixed k and as n grows, the expression in (10) is $O(\log^2 n)$ which is the same as that of the NNL-SD scheme. This is much better than the number of keys being proportional to n . On the other hand, for a fixed n as k increases, the number of keys also increases. The set $I_u^{(2)}$ consists of actual keys for the subsets in $\mathcal{S}_u^{(2)}$. Later we show how to define the hash function H such that the definition of $I_u^{(2)}$ can be altered to provide information using which seeds in $\mathcal{S}_u^{(2)}$ can be derived. This results in decreasing the factor $(2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1)$ in the above expression.

4 Cover Finding Algorithm

The algorithm takes as input the set \mathcal{R} of revoked users and outputs the subset cover \mathcal{S}_c . If $\mathcal{R} = \emptyset$ then the only set in the subset cover is the set \mathcal{N} of all users. If $\mathcal{R} \neq \emptyset$, then the subset cover consists of NNL-SD subsets $S_{i,j}$ or $S_{i,J}$ for allowed pairs (i, J) . The subset cover algorithm that we describe below identifies NNL-SD subsets $S_{i,j}$ with $S_{i,\{j\}}$. For any allowed pair (i, J) , the algorithm obtains $S_{i,J'}$ where J' is the reduced form of J .

The algorithm runs iteratively and maintains a list \mathcal{L} of nodes on the paths joining revoked leaf nodes with the root. The list \mathcal{L} is initially populated with the revoked leaf nodes, all marked as **covered**. The algorithm runs from left to right on this list and keeps adding the parent nodes of each node in the list until the root. Each node j in the list has an associated list $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ of its descendant nodes. For a node j at level $\text{level}(j) \geq a$, the nodes in $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ are in an a -tree rooted at j or at some descendant of j . For a node j at level $\text{level}(j) < a$, the list $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ will have nodes from the subtree \mathcal{T}^j . While investigating the child nodes of i in the list, $\text{SDnodes}[i]$ and the status of i are updated. The algorithm works as follows.

Algorithm C. Takes as input the set $\mathcal{R} \neq \emptyset$ of revoked users and outputs the subset cover \mathcal{S}_c . Each subset in \mathcal{S}_c is in reduced form.

1. Form the initial list \mathcal{L} with all revoked leaf nodes of \mathcal{T}^0 . Mark each node j as **covered** and set $\text{SDnodes}[j] = \{j\}$. Set \mathcal{S}_c to be the empty set.

2. Process nodes in \mathcal{L} from left to right. Let $\mathcal{L}[t]$ be the node that is processed at the t^{th} iteration. If $\mathcal{L}[t]$ is the root node, go to step 3. Let i be the parent of $\mathcal{L}[t]$. At the t^{th} iteration:
 - (a) If $\mathcal{L}[t]$ and $\mathcal{L}[t+1]$ have the same parent, proceed to the next iteration for $\mathcal{L}[t+1]$.
 - (b) Else, append i to \mathcal{L} . Node i can have at most two children in \mathcal{L} . Let the children of i in \mathcal{L} be $\{j_1, j_c\}$ where $(1 \leq c \leq 2)$. The following mutually exclusive cases occur:
 - i. Case when all c children of i are covered:
 - A. If $c = 1$, mark i as *intermediate* and set $\text{SDnodes}[i] = \{j_1\}$.
 - B. For $c = 2$, mark i as *covered* and set $\text{SDnodes}[i] = \{i\}$.
 - ii. Case when $c = 1$ and j_1 is *intermediate*:
Mark i as *intermediate* and copy $\text{SDnodes}[j_1]$ to $\text{SDnodes}[i]$.
 - iii. Case when $c = 2$ and at least one node in $\{j_1, j_2\}$ is *intermediate*:
 - A. If for some $j \in \{j_1, j_2\}$, there is a $j' \in \text{SDnodes}[j]$ such that $\text{level}(j) - \text{level}(j') \geq a$, then for each $j \in \{j_1, j_2\}$ that is marked as *intermediate*, add $S_{j, \text{SDnodes}[j]}$ to \mathcal{S}_c . Subsequently, mark i as *covered* and set $\text{SDnodes}[i] = \{i\}$.
 - B. Otherwise, mark i as *intermediate* and set $\text{SDnodes}[i]$ to $\text{SDnodes}[j_1] \cup \text{SDnodes}[j_2]$.
3. If the root node is marked as *intermediate*, add $S_{0, \text{SDnodes}[0]}$ to the cover \mathcal{S}_c .

The subset cover \mathcal{S}_c output by the algorithm is a collection of subsets of the form $S_{i, \text{SDnodes}[i]}$.




Figure 4: Example of a subset cover for $\mathcal{R} = \{31, 33, 39, 43\}$ in the a -ABTSD scheme with $a = 2$ and $n = 32$ users. The subsets in the cover are $S_{3, \{31, 33\}}$, $S_{9, \{39\}}$, $S_{10, \{43\}}$ and $S_{0, \{1\}}$.

Figure 4 shows an example where $a = 2$, $n = 32$ and $\mathcal{R} = \{31, 33, 39, 43\}$. Hence, the list \mathcal{L} eventually gets populated with the nodes $\{31, 33, 39, 43, 15, 16, 19, 21, 7, 9, 10, 3, 4, 1, 0\}$ that lie on the paths joining the revoked leaves with the root node. The subsets generated by the algorithm working on the above list are $S_{9, \{39\}}$, $S_{10, \{43\}}$, $S_{3, \{31, 33\}}$ and $S_{0, \{1\}}$.

The cover generation algorithm outputs sets of the type $S_{j, \text{SDnodes}[j]}$. To show the correctness of the algorithm we need to argue two things.

1. Each subset produced by Algorithm \mathcal{C} is in \mathcal{S} .
2. The subsets that are produced form a partition of the set of privileged users.

Lemma 3. *If Algorithm \mathcal{C} produces a subset $S_{i, J}$, then every element of J has been marked covered.*

Proof. J is of the form $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ for some node j . Further, all nodes in $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ are marked **covered**. This can be seen from the manner in which the $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ is built up. Nodes enter $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ either in Step 1 or in Step 2(b)(i) and in both cases they are marked **covered**; the set $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ grows in Step 2(b)(iii)(B) through the union of two other sets of the same type and hence the property of having only **covered** nodes is preserved. \square

Lemma 4. *If a subset $S_{i,J}$ is produced by Algorithm \mathcal{C} , then J is a reduced set.*

Proof. All nodes in J are marked **covered**. Let if possible j_1 and j_2 be siblings in J and i is their parent. Then both j_1 and j_2 are marked **covered**. When the node i is considered in Step 2(b), then c is 2 and Step 2(b)(i)(B) is executed which results in $\text{SDnodes}[i]$ being set to $\{i\}$ and j_1, j_2 do not enter any $\text{SDnode}[i]$. So, they cannot be members of any J such that $S_{i,J}$ is produced by Algorithm \mathcal{C} at a later point of time. \square

Lemma 5. *For any set $\text{SDnodes}[j]$, if $i_1, i_2 \in \text{SDnodes}[j]$, then $\text{level}(i_1) - \text{level}(i_2) < a$. Further, all nodes of $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ belong to some a -tree.*

Proof. Let $J = \text{SDnodes}[j]$. If J is a singleton set, then this is clearly true; if J contains more than one element, then J must have been formed by the merger of two SDnodes set in Step 2(b)(iii)(B). Such merger can take place only if the maximum of the differences in the levels of the nodes in the resulting set is less than a .

For the last statement, again it is easy to see this if J is a singleton set. On the other hand, if J has been formed by merger (one or more times), then each such merger is a union of the SDnodes of two siblings. Consequently, this corresponds to a moving-up operation within the same a -tree. \square

Lemma 6. *Any subset produced by Algorithm \mathcal{C} is in the collection \mathcal{S} .*

Proof. Suppose $S_{j, \text{SDnodes}[j]}$ is produced. Then all the nodes in $J = \text{SDnodes}[j]$ are in the subtree rooted at j . By Lemma 5, the nodes in J are in some a -tree and by the previous statement, the root of this a -tree is also in \mathcal{T}^j . So, $S_{j,J}$ is in \mathcal{S} . \square

Lemma 7. *If u is a leaf node corresponding to a revoked user, then Algorithm \mathcal{C} visits all ancestors of u .*

Proof. Whenever a node i is processed by Algorithm \mathcal{C} , its parent is added to \mathcal{L} . Further, every node in \mathcal{L} is processed before the algorithm terminates. Since the initial list \mathcal{L} contains the node u , every ancestor of u is processed by Algorithm \mathcal{C} . \square

Lemma 8. *Any privileged (i.e., non-revoked) user is in one of the subsets produced by Algorithm \mathcal{C} .*

Proof. Let v be a privileged user. Since there is at least one revoked user, there is a minimal subtree \mathcal{T}^i of \mathcal{T}^0 which contains both v and some revoked user u . Let j_1 and j_2 be the two children of i and suppose v is a leaf node of \mathcal{T}^{j_2} . By the minimality of \mathcal{T}^i , it follows that u is necessarily in \mathcal{T}^{j_1} and further all leaf nodes of \mathcal{T}^{j_2} are privileged.

Since i is an ancestor of the revoked node u , by the previous lemma, Algorithm \mathcal{C} will process both nodes i_1 and i . The node i is added to \mathcal{L} when node i_1 is processed. Since all nodes in \mathcal{T}^{i_2} are privileged, node i_2 does not enter \mathcal{L} . So, i has exactly one child in \mathcal{L} and either by Step 2(b)(i)(A) or by Step 2(b)(ii), i is marked **intermediate** and $\text{SDnodes}[i]$ is set to either $\{j_1\}$ or to $\text{SDnodes}[j_1]$. In both cases, v is in $S_{i, \text{SDnodes}[i]}$. From this point onwards, Algorithm \mathcal{C} ensures the following. If i' is an ancestor of i , then either the set $S_{i', \text{SDnodes}[i']}$ is produced, or, $S_{i', \text{SDnodes}[i']}$ contains v . Since, the second case cannot continue indefinitely, at some point of time, Algorithm \mathcal{C} will produce a set $S_{i', \text{SDnodes}[i']}$ for some ancestor i' of i and so v will be in this subset. \square

From Lemmas 7 and 8, we get the following result on the correctness of Algorithm \mathcal{C} .

Theorem 9. *Algorithm \mathcal{C} produces a sub-collection of subsets of \mathcal{S} which form a partition of the set of privileged users.*

The complexity of Algorithm \mathcal{C} is given by the following result.

Theorem 10. *Algorithm \mathcal{C} requires $O(r \log n)$ time where r is the number of revoked nodes.*

Proof. As proved in Lemma 7, the algorithm processes every ancestor of any revoked node. There are $O(\log n)$ such ancestors and so the total time taken by the algorithm is proportional to $r \log n$. \square

It has already been remarked that for $a = 1$, the a -ABTSD scheme collapses to the NNL-SD scheme. The following result shows that for $a > 1$ and any revocation pattern, the header length of the a -ABTSD scheme is never more than that of the NNL-SD scheme.

Theorem 11. *For a given \mathcal{R} (revocation pattern) the header length due to the NNL-SD scheme is at least as large as that of the a -ABTSD scheme.*

Proof. For a given value of a , let \mathcal{J}_a be the collection of all nodes j in \mathcal{T}^0 such that $S_{j, \text{SDnodes}[j]} \in \mathcal{S}_c$. Let us consider a node i in \mathcal{T}^0 that have both children $\{j_1, j_2\}$ in \mathcal{L} and at least one of them is marked as *intermediate*. When $a = 1$, for every *intermediate* child j of i , there is a $j' \in \text{SDnodes}[j]$ such that $\ell_j - \ell_{j'} \geq 1$. Hence, $S_{j, \text{SDnodes}[j]} \in \mathcal{S}_c$ and hence $j \in \mathcal{J}_{a=1}$. For $a > 1$, if for some $j \in \{j_1, j_2\}$, there is a $j' \in \text{SDnodes}[j]$ such that $\ell_j - \ell_{j'} \geq a$, only then all *intermediate* children of i generate SD subsets. Otherwise, i is marked as *intermediate* and $\text{SDnodes}[j]$ is included in $\text{SDnodes}[i]$ and is carried upwards. Hence, $\mathcal{J}_{a=1} \subseteq \mathcal{J}_{a>1}$. Thus, the header length due to a revocation pattern for the a -ABTSD scheme will be at most that of the NNL-SD scheme. \square

It follows from Theorem 11 above that the worst case header length for the a -ABTSD scheme will be less than or equal to that of the NNL-SD scheme. From [NNL01] we know that for a given r , the worst case header length of the NNL-SD scheme is $2r - 1$. Hence we get the following theorem.

Theorem 12. *For a given r in the a -ABTSD scheme, the maximum header length that can be achieved for any n , is $2r - 1$.*

To show that this upper bound is tight, we consider the a -ABTSD scheme with $a = 2$ for $n = 32$ users in Figure 5 where $\mathcal{R} = \{31, 39\}$. The subset cover for this revocation pattern is $\mathcal{S}_c = \{S_{3, \{31\}}, S_{4, \{39\}}, S_{0, \{1\}}\}$. Hence, the header length is $2|\mathcal{R}| - 1 = 3$. A similar example can be constructed to show the tightness of this upper bound for any general value of a with larger values of n . The subtrees rooted at nodes 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Figure 5 where $a = 2$, are of height $a + 1 = 3$ each. For any general a , these subtrees should be full subtrees of height $a + 1$ each. It is to be noted that the tree \mathcal{T}^0 in such a case will be of height $a + 3$ and the total number of users will be 2^{a+3} . There will be two revoked users, one in each of the subtrees rooted at nodes 3 and 4. The subset cover will have three subsets. Two of these subsets will be rooted at nodes 3 and 4. The third subset will be $S_{0, \{3,4\}} = S_{0, \{1\}}$. Hence, the upper bound given by Theorem 12 is tight for any $a \geq 1$.

5 Other Issues

In this section, we consider two issues. The first one is the ability to extend the scheme to handle arbitrary number of users and the second one is the issue of traitor tracing.

5.1 Accommodating Arbitrary Number Of Users

The NNL-SD [NNL01] scheme assumes the number of users n to be a power of two. The a -ABTSD scheme retains this assumption and hence assumes an underlying full binary tree. In practice this may be restrictive. We extend the a -ABTSD scheme for arbitrary number of users by assuming a *complete* binary tree instead of full. A complete binary tree with $2^{\ell_0-1} < n \leq 2^{\ell_0}$ leaves is formed by adding child nodes to the leaf nodes of a full tree with 2^{ℓ_0-1} leaf nodes, starting from the left. These newly added leaves are said to be at level 0. The old




Figure 5: Example to show that the upper bound $2r - 1$ of the header length in the a -ABTSD scheme with $a = 2$ is tight. The subset cover for $\mathcal{R} = \{31, 39\}$ in the binary tree \mathcal{T}^0 with $n = 32$ users contains the subsets $S_{3,\{31\}}$, $S_{4,\{39\}}$ and $S_{0,\{1\}}$.

leaves are at level 1. The newly constructed complete tree has n leaves, some of which are filled from the left of level 0 and the others (if $2^{\ell_0-1} < n < 2^{\ell_0}$) are on the right at level 1.

Since the underlying tree \mathcal{T}^0 is a complete tree (that may not be full) and hence an a -tree may also be a non-full complete binary tree. Thus, an a -tree \mathcal{A}_a^i is a complete tree rooted at node i in \mathcal{T}^0 and is of height a . Let us call the path joining the root node and the right-most internal node at level 1 to be the *dividing path*. Any subtree of \mathcal{T}^0 rooted at a node other than the dividing path, is full. Hence, only the a -tree rooted at the node on the dividing path at level a may be non-full. The subsets that are included in the collection \mathcal{S} are formed as before. A subset $S_{i,J} \in \mathcal{S}$ is such that all nodes in J are within a single (possibly non-full but complete) a -tree.

The user storage requirement of the a -ABTSD scheme assuming $n = 2^{\ell_0}$ is given by (10) where ℓ_0 is the height of the underlying tree. Let us denote this storage requirement as $us_a(2^{\ell_0})$. Then the user storage of the scheme assuming the complete tree structure will be at least $us_a(2^{\ell_0-1})$ and at most $us_a(2^{\ell_0})$, depending on where a user is placed in the tree with respect to the dividing path. All users are attached to some node on the dividing path. Users that are to the left (respectively right) of the dividing path and are attached to it at nodes on or above level a , receive $us_a(2^{\ell_0})$ seeds (respectively $us_a(2^{\ell_0-1})$ seeds). For the users that are attached to the dividing path at a level less than a , the number of seeds can be easily calculated from the number of users attached to the dividing path at those levels.

The cover generation algorithm for the complete tree version of the scheme would have an additional pre-processing step for the leaf nodes at level 0. First, all the revoked leaf nodes at level 0 are inserted into the list \mathcal{L} in left-to-right order. These nodes are processed one after another as in the cover generation algorithm. The parent of each leaf in \mathcal{L} gets appended to it and their respective data structures are appropriately updated. Once all revoked leaves at level 0 have been processed, all their parents at level 1 are in the list. The remaining revoked leaf nodes that are at level 1 in \mathcal{T}^0 , are then appended to \mathcal{L} . Then onwards, the cover generation algorithm proceeds exactly as it did for full trees. The worst-case header length remains $2r - 1$ for the complete tree version of the scheme. We have implemented this algorithm and results are reported later.

5.2 Traitor Tracing

Traitor tracing is an important feature of BE schemes. It is the mechanism to identify leaked user keys from a pirate decoder by treating it as a “black-box”. Traitor tracing for the>NNL-SD scheme was discussed in details in [>NNL01]. They showed that traitor tracing can be done on any scheme that assigns keys to subsets which satisfy the *bifurcation property*. The bifurcation property states that *given any subset that is in the collection \mathcal{S} and hence has been assigned a key, it is possible to partition the set into two (or a constant number of) almost equal subsets from \mathcal{S}* . The *bifurcation value* is defined to be the ratio of the size of the largest subset to that

of the set itself. For the BE schemes of [HS02, BS13a, BS13b], the subsets used in these schemes all belong to the collection \mathcal{S} for the NNL-SD scheme with the same number of users. Hence, their respective traitor tracing mechanisms are almost the same as the NNL-SD scheme.

For the a -ABTSD scheme that we have proposed in this work, keys are assigned to subsets that are in general different from those in the NNL-SD scheme. Hence, the traitor tracing for these schemes do not directly follow from the NNL-SD traitor tracing algorithm. However, the subsets of this scheme do follow the bifurcation property. Here we state very briefly how these subsets can be split into roughly equal sized subsets from their respective collection \mathcal{S} .

In the a -ABTSD scheme, the subsets in the collection \mathcal{S} are of the forms $S_{i,j}$ or $S_{i,J}$. Any subset of the form $S_{i,j}$ can also be written as $S_{i,J}$ where J is a simple subset of \mathcal{A}_a^j . Assume that all subsets in \mathcal{S} are of the form $S_{i,J}$ where J is a non-empty subset of the leaf nodes of \mathcal{A}_a^j for some j in the subtree rooted at i . Subsets where $J = \{j\}$ is a singleton set are split into two as was done in [NNL01]. The node j will be in either of the two subtrees rooted at $2i+1$ or $2i+2$. If j is in \mathcal{T}^{2i+1} , the subsets after split will be $S_{2i+1,j}$ and $S_{i,2i+1}$. If j is in \mathcal{T}^{2i+2} , the subsets after split will be $S_{2i+2,j}$ and $S_{i,2i+2}$. Hence, the maximum bifurcation value in this case is $2/3$.

For the subsets $S_{i,J}$ where $|J| > 1$, let us consider the a -tree \mathcal{A}_a^i rooted at node i . The a -tree \mathcal{A}_a^j containing the nodes in J is either this same a -tree (when $i = j$) or it is rooted at a descendant j of i . In any case, the subsets formed by the split are as follows. The subtrees rooted at leaves of \mathcal{A}_a^i form a subset each in the split. From each of these 2^a subtrees, all users under nodes in J are excluded. As a result, some of these 2^a subtrees may be completely excluded. When $i = j$, the maximum bifurcation value is $1/(2^a - |J|)$ which in the worst case would be $1/2$. In case j is in the subtree of i , the nodes in J will be contained in at least one (but not all) of the 2^a subtrees under the a -tree \mathcal{A}_a^i . The users in the subtrees of J are excluded from the respective subtrees at the leaves of \mathcal{A}_a^i . Since j is in the subtree of i , one of the child subtrees of i would not have any node in J . There will be at least 2^{a-1} subtrees at the leaves of \mathcal{A}_a^i that will not have any node in J . As a result, the bifurcation value in this case will be between $1/2^{a-1}$ and $1/2^a$. This goes to show that the bifurcation property also holds for subsets in the a -ABTSD scheme. Hence, traitor tracing mechanisms can be devised for the scheme introduced in this work in a manner similar to the one described in [NNL01].

The number of queries required by the traitor tracing algorithm depends on the bifurcation value. At every step of the traitor tracing algorithm, a subset S of users that contains a traitor is divided into subsets S_1, \dots, S_t using the bifurcation property as mentioned above. Each subset S_t is tested for containment of a traitor. The ratio $|S_t|/|S|$ is at most the bifurcation value. Lesser the bifurcation value, lesser is the size of the remaining subset from which the traitors have to be traced. The bifurcation value of the NNL-SD scheme is $2/3$. The bifurcation value of the a -ABTSD scheme is at most $2/3$ for $a \geq 2$. Hence, traitor tracing in the a -ABTSD scheme will be at least as efficient as the NNL-SD scheme, if not better on an average.

6 Reducing User Storage

A user u is provided with the set I_u as secret information. This set is the union of two disjoint sets $I_u^{(1)}$ and $I_u^{(2)}$ where $|I_u^{(1)}| = 1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2$ and $|I_u^{(2)}| = (2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1)(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)/2$. So the user storage is $|I_u| = 1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2 + (2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1)(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)/2$ where $k = 2^a$ (see (10)). For a given ℓ_0 , the quantity $|I_u^{(1)}| = 1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2$ is fixed and does not change with the value of a . As the value of a increases, the component $|I_u^{(2)}| = (2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1)(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)/2$ increases. The main increase is due to the exponential factor 2^{k-1} which is actually doubly exponential in a . Here we describe a technique to somewhat mitigate this increase. For small concrete values of a , the decrease in user storage is quite significant.

Recall that the information provided in $I_u^{(2)}$ is used by u to generate keys for the subsets in $\mathcal{A}\text{-}\mathcal{S}_u$. For a specified value of a , the new key generation method will provide a user u with a different set, to be denoted

$\Pi_u^{(2)}(a)$, which will enable u to generate keys for the subsets in $\mathcal{A}\mathcal{S}_u$.

It is to be noted that the technique for decreasing user storage described in this section does not change the definition of the collection \mathcal{S} of subsets to which keys are assigned in the a -ABTSD scheme. Hence, the cover generation algorithm remains the same. Only the method of assigning seeds to nodes and keys to SD subsets is altered.

Suppose the number of users is n . Then as discussed earlier, the user storage is not the same for all users. Denote by $\text{us}_a(n)$ the maximum user storage with n users, i.e., $\text{us}_a(n) = \max_u |I_u|$. For $2^{\ell_0-1} < n \leq 2^{\ell_0}$, $\text{us}_a(n) = \text{us}_a(2^{\ell_0})$.

6.1 The Basic Idea

Consider a subset $S_{i,J}$ for an allowed pair (i, J) . Let j be the a -pivot of J . Then J is a non-simple subset of the set of leaf nodes of \mathcal{A}_a^j , i.e., $J \in \mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{A}_a^j)$. The key $K_{i,J}$ is assigned to $S_{i,J}$ using the hash function H as $K_{i,J} = H[\mathcal{A}_a^j](J, L)$ where j is the a -pivot of J and $L = L_{i,j}$ (6). Let u be a user and consider the set $I_u^{(2)}$. The key $K_{i,J}$ is in $I_u^{(2)}$ if the following condition holds: the a -pivot j of J is an ancestor of u and the ancestor v of u at level(J) is not in J .

Let \mathcal{T} be a full binary tree of height a having $k = 2^a$ leaf nodes. Any subset J of the leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} can be encoded by a k -bit string $\text{str}(J)$ where the i -th bit from the left of $\text{str}(J)$ is 1 if and only if the i -th leaf node of \mathcal{T} is in J . By extension of this notation, $\text{str}(\mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T}))$ denotes the set of k -bit strings encoding the non-simple subsets of \mathcal{T} . Define

$$H : \text{str}(\mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T})) \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m. \quad (11)$$

For $\sigma \in \text{str}(\mathcal{J}_{ns}(\mathcal{T}))$ and $L \in \{0, 1\}^m$ define $L_\sigma = H(\sigma, L)$. If w is a leaf node of \mathcal{T} , define $\text{keys}[L, \mathcal{T}](w)$ to be the set of all L_σ such that the w -th bit of σ is 0.

Let i be an internal node of \mathcal{T}^0 and j be a node of \mathcal{T}^i . Let v be a leaf node of the a -tree \mathcal{A}_a^j . The seed $L_{i,j}$ is the derived seed from L_i which is assigned to the node j . Let w a leaf node of \mathcal{A}_a^j . The keys in $\text{keys}[L_{i,j}, \mathcal{A}_a^j](w)$ are to be made available to users in \mathcal{T}^w . This is captured by the following definition.

Using the definition of H in (11), the key $K_{i,J}$ for the subset $S_{i,J}$ is defined to be

$$K_{i,J} = H(\text{str}(J), L_{i,j}) \quad (12)$$

where as before, j is the a -pivot of J . Suppose u is a user. Then the set $I_u^{(2)}$ is the following.

$$I_u^{(2)} = \bigcup_i \bigcup_j \text{keys}[L_{i,j}, \mathcal{A}_a^j](v) \quad (13)$$

where i is an ancestor of u ; j is node on the path from u to i and $\text{level}(j) \geq a$; v is the ancestor of u at level $\text{level}(j) - a$.

Our basic idea of reducing key storage is that instead of directly providing $\text{keys}[L_{i,j}, \mathcal{A}_a^j](v)$ we provide sufficient information for the keys in this set to be computed. This is achieved by defining the function H in a different manner. Note that the function H can itself be defined with respect to a full binary tree \mathcal{T} of height a and without reference to the tree \mathcal{T}^0 . Once H is defined, the definition of $K_{i,J}$ follows and the set $\text{keys}[L_{i,j}, \mathcal{A}_a^j](v)$ is also obtained from the definition of $\text{keys}[L, \mathcal{T}](w)$.

In the rest of this section, we show how to define suitable H . In the next subsection, we describe this method for the special case of $a = 2$ and in the subsequent subsection we consider the case of general a .

6.2 The Case $a = 2$

For $a = 2$, $k = 2^a = 4$. For $a = 2$, the factor $2^{k-1} - 2k + a + 1 = 3$ and so from (10) the maximum number of seeds to be stored by a user is

$$1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2 + 3\ell_0(\ell_0 - 1)/2. \quad (14)$$

We show how to reduce the factor 3 to 2 by suitably defining the function H .

Let \mathcal{T} be a full binary tree of height a . Then the simple subsets of \mathcal{T} are encoded by the 6 strings 0001, 0010, 0100, 1000, 0011, 1100 and the non-simple subsets of \mathcal{T} are encoded by the 8 strings

$$0101, 0110, 0111, 1001, 1010, 1011, 0101, 1001, 1101, 0110, 1010, 1110.$$

So, given an m -bit string L and a string σ encoding a non-simple subset of \mathcal{T} , we have to define $L_\sigma = H(\sigma, L)$. Let the leaf nodes of \mathcal{T} from the left be $\theta_0, \dots, \theta_3$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{keys}[L, \mathcal{T}](\theta_0) &= \{L_{0101}, L_{0110}, L_{0111}\}; & \text{keys}[L, \mathcal{T}](\theta_1) &= \{L_{1001}, L_{1010}, L_{1011}\}; \\ \text{keys}[L, \mathcal{T}](\theta_2) &= \{L_{0101}, L_{1001}, L_{1101}\}; & \text{keys}[L, \mathcal{T}](\theta_3) &= \{L_{0110}, L_{1010}, L_{1110}\}; \end{aligned}$$

Each of these sets contains 3 m -bit strings which gives the factor 3 in (14). Since L and \mathcal{T} will be clear from the context we will drop them from the notation. We show how to define H such that any of the sets $\text{keys}(\theta_0), \dots, \text{keys}(\theta_3)$ can be obtained from 2 m -bit strings.

We define a new tree T_4 . This tree has no relation to the tree \mathcal{T}^0 . It is solely used to define the function H . The tree T_4 is defined as follows. The root node has four children nodes numbered 0, 1, 2, 3. The child node numbered i has two children numbered $(i, 0)$ and $(i, 1)$. The structure is shown in Figure 6.

Define, two hash functions $F_1 : \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ and $F_2 : \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$. These hash functions are chosen by the broadcast center and made available to the users in the system.

Given an m -bit seed L , define

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \widehat{L}_i &= F_1(i, L) & \text{for } i = 0, 1, 2, 3; \\ \widehat{L}_{i,b} &= F_2(b, \widehat{L}_i) = F_2(b, F_1(i, L)) & \text{for } i = 0, 1, 2, 3 \text{ and } b = 0, 1. \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (15)$$




Figure 6: The structure of T_4 for $a = 2$.

Define

$$\begin{aligned} L_{1110} &= \widehat{L}_{1,0}, L_{1010} = \widehat{L}_{1,1}, L_{1101} = \widehat{L}_{2,0}, L_{0101} = \widehat{L}_{2,1}, \\ L_{1011} &= \widehat{L}_{3,0}, L_{1001} = \widehat{L}_{3,1}, L_{0111} = \widehat{L}_{4,0}, L_{0110} = \widehat{L}_{4,1}. \end{aligned}$$

Then each of the sets $\text{keys}(\theta_0), \dots, \text{keys}(\theta_3)$ can be obtained from 2 m -bit seeds as indicated below.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{keys}(\theta_0) &: \hat{L}_3 \text{ and } \hat{L}_{1,1}; \\
\text{keys}(\theta_1) &: \hat{L}_2 \text{ and } \hat{L}_{0,1}; \\
\text{keys}(\theta_2) &: \hat{L}_1 \text{ and } \hat{L}_{2,1}; \\
\text{keys}(\theta_3) &: \hat{L}_0 \text{ and } \hat{L}_{3,1}.
\end{aligned}$$

It is easy to verify that the above information is sufficient to obtain any set $\text{keys}(\theta_i)$. For example, the users under the node $4j + 3$ in \mathcal{T}^0 will be able to get the seeds $\{L_{0101}, L_{0110}, L_{0111}\}$.

Fix a user u and an ancestor i of u at level ℓ . For every node j which is an ancestor of u at levels between 2 and ℓ , the set $\Pi_u^{(2)}(2)$ contains two m -bit seeds. Since ℓ can vary from 2 to ℓ_0 , we have

$$|\Pi_u^{(2)}(2)| = 2 \times \frac{\ell_0(\ell_0 - 1)}{2} = \ell_0(\ell_0 - 1). \quad (16)$$

Based on this we obtain the following improvement to (14).

$$\text{us}_2(2^{\ell_0}) = 1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2 + \ell_0(\ell_0 - 1). \quad (17)$$

6.3 General Case

The technique for $a = 2$ is somewhat specific since in this case the number of non-simple subsets of an a -tree turns out to be 8 which is a power of 2. More generally, Lemma 1 shows that the number of non-simple subsets of an a -tree is $2^k - 2k$ where $k = 2^a$. The expression $2^k - 2k$ will not be a power of 2 for $a > 2$. For this case, we directly use the technique from [BS13c] which dealt with the same problem in a different context. We explain this below.

The k -ary Tree Subset Difference Scheme. The underlying structure of the NNL-SD scheme is the binary tree \mathcal{T}^0 . The work [BS13c] generalizes the idea to work with k -ary trees for any $k \geq 2$. So, suppose that \mathcal{T}^0 is a k -ary tree. Then each internal node has k children. Let i be an internal node of \mathcal{T}^0 and J be a non-empty subset of nodes having a common parent j . Let $S_{i,J}$ denote the leaf nodes of the graph formed by taking away from \mathcal{T}^0 the subtrees whose root nodes are in J . The collection \mathcal{S} for the k -ary tree scheme consists of all such subsets $S_{i,J}$.

Key assignment in the k -ary tree scheme is done as follows. Each node is assigned a seed L_i and a hash function is iteratively used to define the seed $L_{i,j}$ for any node j in the subtree rooted at i . Given $L_{i,j}$ and the subset J of children nodes of j , a key $L_{i,J}$ is defined. In [BS13c] this is first defined directly and then later it is shown how to define this in a different manner so that the user storage reduces.

Coming back to the a -ABTSD scheme, we note the similarity between the subsets and the key assignment procedure of the two schemes. The relevant difference is that in the k -ary tree scheme the subset J is a non-empty subset of the children nodes of j , whereas in the a -ABTSD scheme, the subset J is a non-simple subset of the leaf nodes of the a -tree rooted at j . For both cases, the key to $S_{i,J}$ is assigned from the seed $L_{i,j}$. So, in both cases the problem is given an m -bit seed L and the subset J , how to define the key based on L and J ?

A solution to this problem has been given in [BS13c] which uses the notion of cyclotomic cosets. We do not provide the solution here and instead refer the reader to [BS13c] for details. Our main observation is that the solution provided in [BS13c] also works in the present case. The difference is that the method of [BS13c] assigns keys to all non-empty subsets of the children nodes of j , whereas in the present case, we only need to assign keys to all non-simple subsets of the leaf nodes of the a -tree rooted at j . This difference, however, is not significant. We simply ignore the keys that are assigned to the simple subsets.

On the other hand, it is also possible to actually modify the key assignment procedure in [BS13c] so that keys are only assigned to non-simple subsets. We have carried this out for $a = 3$ and $k = 2^a = 8$. The work required us to examine the $2^k - 1 = 256$ non-empty subsets and eliminate the keys assigned to $2k - 1 = 15$ simple subsets.

Table 1: Effect of reduction of user storage. In the second row the entry for $a = 2$ is from (16) and the entries for $a = 3$ and $a = 4$ are from (18).

storage	$a = 2$	$a = 3$	$a = 4$
$2 I_u^{(2)} /(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)$ from (9)	3	116	32741
$2 \Pi_u^{(2)}(a) /(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)$	1	36	4116

These details are quite tedious and so we do not report them. Directly using the key assignment procedure from [BS13c] in the present context shows that $\Pi_u^{(2)}(a)$ for a user u consists of $(\chi_k - 2)(\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)/2$ m -bit keys where χ_k is the number of cyclotomic cosets of k -bit strings, i.e., for $a > 2$,

$$\Pi_u^{(2)}(a) = \frac{(\chi_{2^a} - 2) \times (\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)}{2}. \quad (18)$$

So, for $a > 2$,

$$\text{us}_a(2^{\ell_0}) = 1 + \frac{\ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)}{2} + \frac{(\chi_{2^a} - 2) \times (\ell_0 - a + 2)(\ell_0 - a + 1)}{2} \quad (19)$$

For the case of $a = 2$ and $k = 4$, $\chi_4 = 6$. Hence, from (19) $\text{us}_2(2^{\ell_0})$ would be $1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2 + 2\ell_0(\ell_0 - 1)$. Previously, however, we have seen that $\text{us}_2(2^{\ell_0}) = 1 + \ell_0(\ell_0 + 1)/2 + \ell_0(\ell_0 - 1)$. So, for the case of $a = 2$, directly using the solution from [BS13c] is sub-optimal. This is one of the reasons why we considered the case of $a = 2$ as a special case.

For small value of a the reduction that is achieved is shown in Table 1. It is clear that the reduction achieved is significant in practical terms.

6.4 Full Resilience

A user obtains secret information I_u which allows it to obtain a set of keys. Let us denote this set as \mathcal{K}_u . It is to be noted that under certain reasonable cryptographic assumptions on the hash functions G , F_1 and F_2 , user u does not obtain any information about keys that are not in \mathcal{K}_u . Further, if \mathcal{K} is a set of keys and $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}$ is the set of all users such that $\mathcal{K} \cap \mathcal{K}_u = \emptyset$, then $\cup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{K}}} \mathcal{K}_u$ does not provide any information about \mathcal{K} (again under reasonable cryptographic assumptions on G , F_1 and F_2). This can be argued formally along the lines of the argument provided in [NNL01]. We skip the details and only remark that this can be intuitively seen by considering the hash functions to be one-way and the outputs of the hash functions to be independent.

7 Experimental Studies

The main point of this work is to reduce the header length. As we have already seen, the header length is never more than that of the NNL-SD scheme. This result, however, does not indicate what will happen on average. In this section, we report on this aspect and also compare the average header length and user storage as a varies.

In order to compute the expected header length, one may consider a situation where r users out of n are randomly revoked without replacement. Then for every non-leaf node i in \mathcal{T}^0 , one can associate a binary valued random variable X_i which takes the value 1 if a subset of the form $S_{i,j}$ or $S_{i,J}$ is generated and takes the value 0 otherwise. The header length is then $\sum X_i$ and by linearity of expectation, the expected header length is $\sum \Pr[X_i = 1]$.

In order to find $\Pr[X_i = 1]$ one has to consider the situations for which the event $X_i = 1$ can occur. Let us consider two sibling nodes i_1 and i_2 in \mathcal{T}^0 . A subset S_{i_1, J_1} is generated from i_1 if sibling subtrees in J_1 are the

only subtrees within the subtree \mathcal{T}^{i_1} that have at least one revoked node each. Moreover, the level of the nodes in J_1 should be at least a levels below that of i_1 . If such a subset is generated from i_1 , then there has to be at least one revoked leaf in the subtree \mathcal{T}^{i_2} and a subset S_{i_2, J_2} will be generated. Similarly, if the subset S_{i_2, J_2} generated from i_2 is such that the sibling subtrees in J_2 are the only subtrees in \mathcal{T}^{i_2} with revoked users and the level of nodes in J_2 is at least a levels below i_2 , then \mathcal{T}^{i_1} will have at least one revoked leaf and a subset S_{i_1, J_1} will be generated from i_1 . This gives rise to a large number of cases in the computation of $\Pr[X_{n,r}^i = 1]$. While in principle it is possible to exhaust all the cases, the resulting algorithm will be quite complicated. It did not seem useful to us to obtain such an algorithm.

Instead, we chose a simulation based approach to get a fair idea of the expected header length. First, we fix the parameter a for the scheme. For given values of n and r , we generate random revocation patterns using Floyd's Algorithm [BF87]. For each such revocation pattern, the cover generation algorithm finds the exact cover and hence we get the header length. The number of iterations is chosen so that the average value of the header length stabilizes. It turns out that 100 iterations are sufficient.

Table 2 shows that for different values of r , the expected header length of the 1-ABTSD scheme (the complete tree version of the NNL-SD scheme) is always more than that of the a -ABTSD scheme with $a > 1$. In fact, as a increases, there is a steep fall in the expected header length for fixed n and r . As an example, we see that for $n = 2^{24}$ and $r = 0.4n = 6710886$, the expected header length due to the NNL-SD scheme is 2.29 times that of the a -ABTSD scheme with $a = 3$.

We compare the performance of the a -ABTSD scheme by varying the parameter a . Table 2 shows how the mean header length for a given value of a (MHL_a) varies with n and r . We observe the following:

1. For a fixed n , as the parameter a is increased, the user storage increases.
2. For fixed n and a , the ratio MHL_a/r decreases steadily as r increases. This behavior is true for all $a \geq 1$ (including the NNL-SD scheme).
3. For fixed n and r , as a increases, the ratio MHL_a/r decreases steadily. This holds for any value of r .
4. For fixed a and r/n , the value of MHL_a/r is approximately the same for all values of n . Hence, these properties hold good for the full-tree versions (with $n = 2^{\ell_0}$) of the scheme too.

For certain values of r/n , the ratio MHL_a/r is shown in Table 3. This behavior is further depicted by plotting the values of Table 3 in Figure 7.

Practical Impact. Broadcast encryption is used in paid services like cable TV, online broadcasting services (audio, video, gaming and document sharing), content protection in optical discs, etc. for implementing digital rights management [DRM]. Our scheme with $a > 1$ would reduce the communication overhead of a system that uses the NNL-SD scheme. For any value of r/n , the mean header length for $a > 1$ will be lesser than $a = 1$ (NNL-SD scheme).

In real-time systems like Pay-TV and online media broadcasting, the communication overhead is the costliest parameter. Reducing the communication overhead shall have significant impact on the economy of the system. Let us take an example scenario to explain this reduction. From Table 2, we see that for a system with $n = 10^6$ user of which $r = 0.4n = 4 \times 10^5$ users are revoked, the expected header length of the 2-ABTSD scheme is $0.96r$ whereas that of the 1-ABTSD scheme is $1.11r$. This means that a system using the NNL-SD scheme will on an average require the header to be smaller by $0.05r$ per session as compared to the 1-ABTSD scheme. In concrete terms, assuming that keys in these systems are 128-bit long, for $r = 4 \times 10^5$, on an average, the header length will be lesser by 312.5KB per session. Thus, each session will save around 0.31MB of additional bandwidth per channel. Depending upon the length of each session, this can be significant savings per channel. This practical

Table 2: User storage and mean header lengths in the complete a -ABTSD scheme for values of a between 1 and 4. For a fixed n , we report MHL_a/r for three different choices of r namely, $r = (0.1n, 0.2n, 0.4n)$.

n	a	$\text{us}_a(n)$	MHL_a/r	n	a	$\text{us}_a(n)$	MHL_a/r
10^3	1	55	(1.11, 0.97, 0.71)	10^4	1	105	(1.11, 0.97, 0.71)
	2	145	(0.96, 0.78, 0.53)		2	287	(0.96, 0.78, 0.53)
	3	1279	(0.75, 0.53, 0.31)		3	2757	(0.75, 0.53, 0.31)
	4	115247	(0.52, 0.31, 0.16)		4	271629	(0.52, 0.30, 0.16)
10^5	1	153	(1.11, 0.97, 0.71)	10^6	1	210	(1.11, 0.97, 0.71)
	2	425	(0.96, 0.78, 0.53)		2	590	(0.96, 0.78, 0.53)
	3	4233	(0.75, 0.53, 0.31)		3	6024	(0.75, 0.53, 0.31)
	4	432123	(0.52, 0.30, 0.16)		4	629652	(0.52, 0.30, 0.16)
10^7	1	300	(1.11, 0.97, 0.71)	10^8	1	378	(1.11, 0.97, 0.71)
	2	852	(0.96, 0.78, 0.53)		2	1080	(0.96, 0.78, 0.53)
	3	8902	(0.75, 0.53, 0.31)		3	11428	(0.75, 0.53, 0.31)
	4	950634	(0.52, 0.30, 0.16)		4	1234578	(0.52, 0.30, 0.16)

Table 3: List of values of the ratio MHL_a/r (for any n) corresponding to the varying ratio r/n for each a . Note that as the value of a increases, the scheme performs better in terms of communication overhead as compared to a lesser value of a .

$a \backslash r/n$	(0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, 0.90, 1.00)
1	(1.23, 1.18, 1.11, 0.97, 0.84, 0.71, 0.58, 0.46, 0.33, 0.22, 0.11, 0.00)
2	(1.20, 1.08, 0.96, 0.78, 0.64, 0.53, 0.44, 0.35, 0.27, 0.18, 0.10, 0.00)
3	(1.15, 0.93, 0.75, 0.53, 0.39, 0.31, 0.25, 0.20, 0.17, 0.13, 0.08, 0.00)
4	(1.07, 0.73, 0.52, 0.30, 0.21, 0.16, 0.13, 0.10, 0.09, 0.08, 0.06, 0.00)




Figure 7: Plot showing how MHL_a/r varies with r/n .

saving of communication bandwidth, however, comes at a cost. Assuming 128-bit key size, the storage for $a = 1$ is 26.25KB, whereas that of the 2-ABTSD scheme is around 73.75KB. Due to steadily falling memory prices, the benefit of savings in communication bandwidth will outweigh the cost of extra memory.

In applications like the standard for DRM in optical discs [AAC], the header is stored in a fixed portion of the optical disc. There is an allotted amount of space for the header. This amount of storage allotted for the header may be fixed and hence there would be a limit on the number of revoked users that the system will be able to tolerate. For a given value of r , the average header length due to $a > 1$ will always be less compared to the NNL-SD scheme ($a = 1$). In other words, for an instantiation of the scheme with $a > 1$, a particular value of the expected header length will occur for larger values of r . Given n and r , the maximum header length for $a > 1$ will be at most as much as the NNL-SD scheme and in general less. As a result of the reductions in the average as well as worst-case header lengths, the system with $a > 1$ will be able to tolerate more number of revoked users compared to the NNL-SD scheme.

8 Conclusion

User storage and communication overhead are two very important efficiency parameters for any BE scheme. The NNL-SD scheme of [NNL01] is the most popular BE scheme and is applied in a lot of practical scenarios. Several such scenarios require improving the communication efficiency and can tolerate an increase in the user storage. Our goal is to bring down the communication cost. It can be intuitively said that increasing the number of subsets to which keys are assigned, should improve the communication overhead. Based on this intuition, we have proposed the a -augmented binary tree subset difference scheme (a -ABTSD) scheme. This scheme is a generalization of the NNL-SD scheme. It is parameterized by a (height of the augmenting structure), offering varying efficiencies of the user storage and communication overhead. We prove that the header length for any given set of revoked users in this scheme is at most as much as the NNL-SD scheme. The expected header length however, is experimentally seen to be always less than the NNL-SD scheme for any value of r . Although the

storage requirement for both these schemes are asymptotically the same as the NNL-SD scheme, in concrete terms they are more than the NNL-SD scheme. This is the trade-off for the decreased average communication overhead.

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