

# On the Multi-output Filtering Model and Its Applications

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**Abstract.** In this paper, we propose a novel technique, called multi-output filtering model, to study the non-randomness property of a cryptographic algorithm such as message authentication codes and block ciphers. A multi-output filtering model consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a multi-output filtering function. Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we propose an attack technique under IND-CPA using the multi-output filtering model. By introducing a distinguishing function, we theoretically determine the success rate of this attack. In particular, we construct a distinguishing function based on the distribution of the linear complexity of component sequences, and apply it on studying TUAK's  $f_1$  algorithm, AES, KASUMI and PRESENT. We demonstrate that the success rate of the attack on KASUMI and PRESENT is non-negligible, but  $f_1$  and AES are resistant to this attack. Second, we study the distribution of the cryptographic properties of component functions of a random primitive in the multi-output filtering model. Our experiments show some non-randomness in the distribution of algebraic degree and nonlinearity for KASUMI.

## 1 Introduction

Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a cryptographic scheme (keyed or non-keyed) with  $n$ -bit input and  $m$ -bit output. Clearly it can be simply regarded as a vectorial Boolean function from  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$  to  $\mathbb{F}_2^m$ . When  $\mathcal{C}$  involves a key  $K$ , we should write  $\mathcal{C}_K$  for strictness, but we prefer to use  $\mathcal{C}$  for simplicity if the context is clear. In most circumstances, the cryptographic properties of  $\mathcal{C}$ , such as algebraic degree and nonlinearity, are difficult to be exploited due to the large values of  $n$  and  $m$ . A natural idea to overcome this difficulty is to restrict the inputs of  $\mathcal{C}$  on a subspace  $\mathcal{S}$  of  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ . For instance, the subspace  $\mathcal{S}$  can be generated by an  $\ell$ -stage linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Then we obtain a function  $\mathcal{C}'$  from  $\mathcal{S}$  to its image set  $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{S})$ . By adapting the size of  $\mathcal{S}$ , we can study the cryptographic properties of  $\mathcal{C}'$ . If  $\mathcal{C}$  has good randomness properties, it should be difficult to find a subspace  $\mathcal{S}$  such that  $\mathcal{C}'$  has bad randomness properties. We must mention that the above method for analyzing the cryptographic scheme  $\mathcal{C}$  lies in a more general notion called *subset cryptanalysis* [27], which tries to track the statistical evolution of a certain subset of values through various operations in the cryptographic schemes. One is referred to [17] for a successful application of the subset cryptanalysis to find a 5-round collision on Keccak [5].

We achieve the above idea by proposing a new technique, called a *multi-output filtering model*. This model aims to exploit the non-randomness property of a cryptographic algorithm  $\mathcal{C}$  such as message authentication codes and block ciphers. General speaking, a multi-output filtering model consists of a linear feedback shift register and a multi-output filtering function. The LFSR is used to generate an input subspace of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  is used as a multi-output filtering function. This multi-output model is a generalization of the classic filtering model in stream ciphers [37] as it outputs multiple bits, instead of only one bit, for the set of inputs to  $\mathcal{C}$  generated by an LFSR. Under this model, we can obtain a number of component sequences and component functions in the multi-output model. This paper is devoted to studying the randomness properties of  $\mathcal{C}$  through investigating its component sequences and component functions. The detail of the multi-output filtering model can be

found in Section 3. We should mention that in this paper we restrict  $\mathcal{C}$  to MACs and block ciphers, but this model can also be generalized to study other cryptographic primitives.

Thanks to the fruitful research outcome on the theory of sequences and Boolean functions, we can study the distribution of certain properties of the component sequences and functions. Such properties include linear complexity of the component sequences, algebraic degree and nonlinearity of the component functions, etc. Before describing our contribution in further, let us first briefly introduce the cryptographic primitives on which we apply the multi-output filtering model, especially on the recently proposed  $f_1$  algorithm of the TUAK algorithm set [41] for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project.

TUAK is proposed to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) for providing authenticity and key derivation functionalities in mobile communications. The design of TUAK is based on the Keccak permutation with 1600-bit internal state due to its good attack resistance property and its simple and efficient constructions of message authentication code and key derivation function. The TUAK algorithm set contains seven different algorithms, namely  $f_1$  to  $f_5$  and  $f_1^*$  and  $f_5^*$ . The  $f_1$  ( or  $f_1^*$  as re-synchronisation message authentication) algorithm ensures the authenticity of messages,  $f_2$  is used for generating responses and  $f_3$  to  $f_5$  and  $f_5^*$  are used as key derivation functions. Since TUAK's design is closely based on Keccak's design, one may expect that the security property of TUAK may inherit from that of Keccak. The security evaluation for TUAK is essential for guaranteeing the authenticity in mobile communications. The details of TUAK can be found in Appendix A. The analysis of the resistance of TUAK to many known attacks has been presented in [22]. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the MAC generation algorithm  $f_1$  in the multi-output filtering model. Our analysis also considers the block ciphers AES [11], KASUMI [40], and PRESENT [8].

In Section 5, we introduce a generic distinguishing attack framework on  $\mathcal{C}$  under the indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack model (IND-CPA for short), which is a variant of indistinguishability of encryptions proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [19] in public-key cryptography settings. This attack makes use of a special object, called a *distinguishing function*. We theoretically determine the success rate of the attack. In particular, we construct a new type of distinguishing function by relying on the distribution of the linear complexity of the component sequences. Applying this new distinguishing function on  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT, we can distinguish the output of both KASUMI and PRESENT with the output of a random primitive with non-negligible success rate. On the other hand, our study shows that  $f_1$  and AES is immune to this attack.

Furthermore, in Section 6, we study the distribution of the algebraic degree and nonlinearity of the component functions. We first determine the distribution of these two properties for the component functions of a random multi-output filtering function. By performing experiments on  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT, it can be seen that, for KASUMI, the density of its component functions with algebraic degree less than  $\ell - 2$  is greater than the random case, where  $\ell$  is the length of the LFSR. While the degree distributions of the other primitives are similar to that of the random case. This can be a potential risk of the security of KASUMI when an adversary uses the decoding method of Reed-Muller code.

The rest part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the preliminaries of this paper. In Section 3, we first describe the multi-output filtering model in which a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is used to generate the inputs of a multi-output function. In Section 4, we describe the attack model of our distinguishing attack. Section 5 presents the construction of a distinguishing function based on the linear complexity of component sequences. In Section 6, we present some non-randomness in the distribution of

the algebraic degree and the nonlinearity of component functions of  $f_1$  and other primitives. Section 7 concludes our work.

## 2 Preliminaries

In this section, we provide some definitions and results that will be used in this paper. We first give a list of notations that we use throughout the paper.

### Notations

- $\mathbb{F}_2$ : the Galois field with two elements  $\{0, 1\}$ ;
- $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ : a finite field with  $2^n$  elements that is defined by a primitive element  $\alpha$ ;
- $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ : a vector space with  $2^n$  elements and each element is a binary  $n$ -tuple;
- $d(f)$ : the algebraic degree of a Boolean function  $f$ ;
- $NL(f)$ : the nonlinearity of a Boolean function;
- $LC(\mathbf{s})$ : the linear complexity of a binary sequence  $\mathbf{s}$  with period  $N$ ;
- $\Pi$ : Keccak- $f[1600]$  permutation.
- $\mathcal{B}_n$ : the set of all Boolean functions with  $n$  variables.

### 2.1 Basic definitions on sequences

We present some definitions on sequences. For a well-rounded treatment of sequences and Boolean functions, the reader is referred to [10,21].

Let  $\mathbf{s} = \{s_i\}$  be a sequence generated by a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) whose recurrence relation is defined as

$$s_{\ell+i} = \sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} c_j s_{i+j}, s_i, c_i \in \mathbb{F}_2, i = 0, 1, \dots \quad (1)$$

where  $p(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} c_i x^i \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]$  is the characteristic polynomial of degree  $\ell$  of the LFSR. A binary sequence  $\mathbf{s}$  in Eq. (1) with period  $2^\ell - 1$  generated by an LFSR is called an *m-sequence*. Let  $\mathbf{s} = \{s_i\}$  be an *m-sequence* of period  $2^\ell - 1$  and  $f(x_0, \dots, x_{\ell-1})$  be a Boolean function in  $\ell$  variables. We define a sequence  $\mathbf{a} = \{a_i\}$  as

$$a_i = f(s_{r_1+i}, s_{r_2+i}, \dots, s_{r_t+i}), s_i, a_i \in \mathbb{F}_2, i \geq 0$$

where  $r_1 < r_2 < \dots < r_t < \ell$  are tap positions. Then the sequence  $\mathbf{a}$  is called a *filtering sequence* and the period of  $\mathbf{a}$  equals  $2^\ell - 1$ .

The *linear complexity* or *linear span* of a sequence is defined as the length of the shortest LFSR that generates the sequence. For an *m-sequence*, the linear complexity of an *m-sequence* is equal to the length of its LFSR [21]. On the other hand, the linear complexity of a nonlinear filtering sequence lies in the range of  $\ell$  and  $2^\ell - 1$  [24]. If a filtering sequence has linear complexity  $2^\ell - 1$ , then we call it has *optimal* linear complexity.

### 2.2 Basic definitions on Boolean functions

There is a one-to-one correspondence between a sequence and a Boolean function. The correspondence between a Boolean function and a sequence can be obtained by computing the trace representation of a given sequence using the Fourier transformations. For the details, see Chapter 6 of [21].

**Definition 1.** Let  $f$  be a Boolean function from  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$  to  $\mathbb{F}_2$ . Then  $f$  can be uniquely represented by its algebraic normal form (ANF) as

$$f(x) = \sum_{I \in \mathcal{P}(\{0, \dots, n-1\})} a_I x^I,$$

where  $a_I \in \mathbb{F}_2$ ,  $x^I = \prod_{i \in I} x_i$  and  $\mathcal{P}(\{0, \dots, n-1\})$  is the power set of  $\{0, \dots, n-1\}$ . The algebraic degree of  $f$ , denoted by  $d(f)$ , is the maximal size of  $I$  in the ANF of  $f$  such that  $a_I \neq 0$ .

One of the most important properties of Boolean functions is its nonlinearity, which was proposed to measure the distance of it to all affine functions. A cryptographic strong Boolean function is supposed to have high nonlinearity to resist linear attacks [29].

**Definition 2.** The Walsh spectrum of a Boolean function  $f$  to a point  $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ , denoted by  $W_f(a)$ , is defined by

$$W_f(a) = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} (-1)^{f(x) + a \cdot x}$$

where  $a \cdot x$  is the inner product of  $a$  and  $x$ .

The *nonlinearity* of  $f$  can be defined in terms of the Walsh spectrum as

$$\text{NL}(f) = 2^{n-1} - \max_{a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \frac{|W_f(a)|}{2}.$$

When  $n$  is an even positive integer, it is known that the maximum value of the nonlinearity of a Boolean function  $f$  is  $\text{NL}(f) \geq 2^{n-1} - 2^{n/2-1}$  [10]. A Boolean function achieving this bound is called a *bent function*.

Let  $m$  and  $n$  be two positive integers. A function  $F$ , from  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$  to  $\mathbb{F}_2^m$ , defined by  $F(x) = (f_1(x), f_2(x), \dots, f_m(x))$  is called a  $(n, m)$ -function, multi-output Boolean functions, or vectorial Boolean functions, where  $f_i$ 's are called coordinate functions [10].

### 3 Multi-Output Filtering Model

In this section, we provide a detailed description of the multi-output filtering model of a cryptographic primitive.

#### 3.1 Description of the multi-output filtering model

Let  $\mathbf{a} = \{a_i\}_{i \geq 0}$  be a binary sequence generated by an  $\ell$ -stage linear feedback shift register (LFSR) whose recurrence relation is

$$a_{\ell+i} = \sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} c_j a_{i+j}, \quad c_j \in \mathbb{F}_2, \quad i \geq 0, \quad (2)$$

where  $p(x) = x^\ell + \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} c_i x^i$  is a primitive polynomial of degree  $\ell$  over  $\mathbb{F}_2$  and  $\text{STATE}_j = (a_j, a_{j+1}, \dots, a_{j+\ell-1})$  is called the  $j$ -th state of the LFSR. Using this LFSR, from the above sequence  $\mathbf{a}$ , we generate a set of messages of  $n$  bits as follows  $\mathcal{R} = \{R_j : 0 \leq j \leq 2^\ell - 2\}$  where

$$R_j = (a_j, a_{j+1}, \dots, a_{j+n-1}), \quad j = 0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 2, \quad (3)$$

where modulo  $2^\ell - 1$  is taken over the indices of  $a_i$ 's. Note that the elements in  $\mathcal{R}$  are in the sequential order. We now define the multi-output filtering model on  $F : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ . For a fixed key  $K$  and for each  $R_j$  with  $0 \leq j \leq 2^\ell - 2$ , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} C_j &= F(K, R_j) \\ &= (g_0(K, R_j), \dots, g_{m-1}(K, R_j)) \\ &\triangleq (y_{j,0}, y_{j,1}, \dots, y_{j,m-1}). \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Using a matrix, we can represent the above  $C_j$  as

$$\begin{pmatrix} C_0 \\ C_1 \\ \vdots \\ C_{2^\ell-2} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y_{0,0} & y_{0,1} & \cdots & y_{0,m-1} \\ y_{1,0} & y_{1,1} & \cdots & y_{1,m-1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ y_{2^\ell-2,0} & y_{2^\ell-2,1} & \cdots & y_{2^\ell-2,m-1} \end{pmatrix}. \quad (5)$$

The matrix (5) provides us two methods to study cryptographic properties of  $F$  as described below.

- I. **Sequence point of view:** Each column in the above can be considered as a sequence of period  $2^\ell - 1$  for a nonzero initial state of the LFSR. Each sequence of period  $2^\ell - 1$  is called a *component sequence*. We denote the  $i$ -th component sequence by  $\mathbf{s}_i$  and  $\mathbf{s}_i = \{y_{0,i}, y_{1,i}, \dots, y_{2^\ell-2,i}\}$ .  $\mathbf{s}_i$  can also be considered as a filtering sequence with filter function  $g_i$ ,  $0 \leq i \leq m - 1$ .
- II. **Boolean function point of view:** From (4) and (5), we see the following process

$$g_i : \{\text{STATE}_j \in \mathbb{F}_2^\ell \text{ of the LFSR}\} \rightarrow \{R_j \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\} \rightarrow i\text{-th component sequence}.$$

Therefore, each component sequence can also be regarded as a Boolean function on  $\mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ . Note that, for a nonzero initial state, the LFSR cannot generate all-zero state, we need to query  $F$  to get the output value  $F(K, 0^n)$  for all-zero input for all component Boolean functions. With a fixed  $K$  in  $F$ , using an  $\ell$ -stage LFSR, we obtain  $m$  Boolean functions on  $\mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ . Mathematically,  $m$  Boolean functions  $g_i : \mathbb{F}_2^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$  ( $0 \leq i \leq m - 1$ ) are defined as

$$g_i(K, \text{STATE}_j) = y_{j,i}, \quad (0 \leq j \leq 2^\ell - 2). \quad (6)$$

We call each Boolean function  $g_i$  a *component* or *coordinate function* of  $F$ .

### 3.2 Application to TUAK's $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT

For the sake of clarity on the input assignment, we briefly explain how we apply the multi-output filtering model on TUAK's  $f_1$ , and block ciphers AES, PRESENT and KASUMI.

**TUAK's  $f_1$ :** Recall that  $f_1$  takes  $K$ ,  $\text{RAND}$ , and  $\text{SQN}$  as inputs. Now we fix a key  $K$  and a sequence number  $\text{SQN}$ . We use an  $\ell$ -stage LFSR to generate random numbers  $\text{RAND}_j$  in  $f_1$ . Denoting by the  $i$ -th state of the  $\ell$ -stage LFSR by  $\text{STATE}_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ . We obtain  $2^\ell - 1$  different  $n$ -bit  $\text{RAND}$  numbers  $\mathcal{R} = \{R_j : 0 \leq j \leq 2^\ell - 2\}$  by Eq. (3) and the component sequences and component functions are obtained using Eq. (4) with  $C_j = f_1(K, R_j, \text{SQN})$ .

*Remark 1.* For TUAK's  $f_1$  function, in Eq. (5), recovering the last bit  $y_{2^\ell-2,i}$  for each component sequence  $\mathbf{s}_i$  from the previous  $2^\ell - 2$  bits is equivalent to recovering  $C_{2^\ell-2}$  from  $\{C_0, \dots, C_{2^\ell-3}\}$ . This leads to a MAC forgery attack on  $f_1$ .

**AES, PRESENT and KASUMI:** Recall that AES\_128 accepts a 128-bit key and a 128-bit input and produces an output of 128 bits, and AES\_256 accepts a 256-bit key and a 128-bit input and produces an output of 128 bits [11]. KASUMI has a 64-bit input, a 128-bit key, and a 64-bit output. For AES\_128 and AES\_256, the inputs messages of 128 bits are generated using an LFSR of length  $\ell$  and by Eq. (3), and the component sequences and functions are obtained using Eq. (4) with  $C_j = \text{AES\_128}(K, R_j)$  and  $C_j = \text{AES\_256}(K, R_j)$ . PRESENT [8] is a 64-bit block cipher with a 80-bit key. The component sequences and functions of PRESENT are obtained using Eq. (4) with  $C_j = \text{PRESENT}(K, R_j)$ . KASUMI [40] is a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit key. The 64-bit inputs messages are generated by Eq. (3) with  $n = 64$  and the component sequences and functions are obtained using Eq. (4) with  $C_j = \text{KASUMI}(K, R_j)$ .

## 4 Distinguishing Attack Model

In this section, we describe the attack model of our distinguishing attack on a message authentication code and a block cipher. In this paper we restrict ourselves to message authentication codes and block ciphers. The attack model is based on indistinguishability (IND) of encryptions under chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) (IND-CPA), which was first developed due to Goldwasser and Micali [19] in public-key settings. In [3], Bellare *et al.* studied the indistinguishability of encryptions under chosen-plaintext attack in the symmetric key setting. Here, we use the same attack model to distinguish MACs (or ciphertexts) in the symmetric-key setting. However, we develop a new distinguishing technique based on linear complexity of component sequences in the multi-output filtering model for deciding the MAC (or ciphertext). For the message authentication code, the aim of an adversary is to distinguish two MACs for two messages  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  with a high probability where messages  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  were chosen by the adversary. On the other hand, for an encryption, the adversary aims at distinguishing two ciphertexts for two chosen messages  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  with a high probability.

Let  $F : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  be a cryptographic algorithm which accepts two inputs, a key of length  $k$  and a message of length  $n$  and produces an output of length  $m$ . Assume that  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  are two messages of length  $n$  chosen by the adversary, the length of the key  $K$  is  $k$  and  $c_i = F(K, P_i)$ ,  $i = 0, 1$ . The aim of the distinguishing attack is to distinguish  $c_0$  and  $c_1$  for the messages  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  with high probability. We denote the random oracle by  $\mathcal{O}$  and the adversary by  $\mathcal{A}$ . The indistinguishability game [2,19] between the random oracle and the adversary is played as follows.

- (1) Fixing a key  $K$  and generating the set of messages  $\mathcal{R} = \{R_0, R_1, \dots, R_{N-1}\}$  using an LFSR with a primitive polynomial of degree  $\ell$ ,  $N = 2^\ell - 1$ ;
- (2) The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  randomly picks up  $P_0 \in \mathcal{R}$  and  $P_1 \notin \mathcal{R}$  and sends both  $\{P_0, P_1\}$  to  $\mathcal{O}$ .
- (3) The random oracle picks up  $P_b \xleftarrow{\$} \{P_0, P_1\}$ ,  $b = 0$  or  $1$  and computes  $c = F(K, P_b)$ .  $\mathcal{O}$  sends  $c$  to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- (4) Once  $\mathcal{A}$  receives  $c$  as a challenge, the adversary performs a technique and decides  $b'$  and returns  $b'$  to  $\mathcal{O}$  where  $b' = 0$  or  $1$ ;
- (5) If  $b = b'$ , then adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds; otherwise she fails.

We also summarize the game in Figure 1.

It is easy to see that, for a random cipher  $\mathcal{B}$ , the success rate of winning the game for an adversary is  $1/2$ . In the following section, we present a new method to distinguish the




Fig. 1: Indistinguishability game

MACs produced by  $f_1$  for  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  with probability greater than  $1/2$ . Therefore, the new method provides a construction of a distinguisher on  $f_1$ .

## 5 Distinguishing Attack Based on Linear Complexity

In this section, we first present a general technique to build a distinguisher of a cryptographic primitive, followed by the theoretical determination of the success probability of the distinguishing attack. In particular, we make use of the distribution of the linear complexity of component sequences of a primitive to develop a new distinguisher. Finally we apply this technique on  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI, and PRESENT.

### 5.1 A generic framework to build a distinguisher

We start this section by the following definition.

**Definition 3.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$  be two subsets of  $U$ , where  $\mathcal{S} = U \setminus \mathcal{R}$ . Let  $\Omega$  be a subset of  $\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{S}$ . Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a cryptographic scheme from  $U$  to some set  $V$ . For any  $P_0 \in \mathcal{R}$  and  $P_1 \in \mathcal{S}$ , define a distinguishing function  $h : \{\mathcal{C}(P_0), \mathcal{C}(P_1)\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ . We say that  $\mathcal{C}$  is distinguishable with respect to  $\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{S}, h, \Omega$  if the average probability

$$\sum_{i \in \{0, 1\}} \Pr(h(c) = i \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_i))$$

is non-negligible compared with  $1/2$ , when  $(P_0, P_1)$  is randomly chosen from  $\Omega$ .

Now we state the main theorem below and provide the proof of it in Appendix B due to the page limit.

**Theorem 1.** Let the notations be the same as above. Now we define a subset  $\mathcal{CS}$  of  $U$ , which is called the condition set. Let  $\mathcal{S}' \subset \mathcal{S}$  and  $\Omega = \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{S}'$ . For any  $P_0 \in \mathcal{R}, P_1 \in \mathcal{S}'$ , let us define the distinguishing function  $h : \{\mathcal{C}(P_0), \mathcal{C}(P_1)\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  as

$$h(y) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y = \mathcal{C}(x) \text{ and } x \in \mathcal{CS}, \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

Define the following two probabilities

$$\begin{aligned} q_0 &= \Pr(x_0 \in \mathcal{R} \wedge x_0 \in \mathcal{CS}), \\ q_1 &= \Pr(x_1 \in \mathcal{S}' \wedge x_1 \in \mathcal{CS}). \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where  $(x_0, x_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \Omega$ . Then the average probability is

$$\sum_{i \in \{0,1\}} \Pr(h(c) = i \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_i)) = \frac{1 + (q_0 - q_1)}{2}. \quad (9)$$

Several remarks on Theorem 1 are as follows:

- (i) An attacker will expect the probability value in (9) to be as large as possible so that she can distinguish the cryptographic scheme  $\mathcal{C}$  with a high probability.
- (ii) The difficulty of finding the distinguishing attack described in Theorem 1 is to find a proper condition set  $\mathcal{CS}$  such that  $q_0 - q_1$  is large.
- (iii) The value of  $q_0 - q_1$  could be negative. If the attacker uses  $\overline{\mathcal{CS}}$  to replace  $\mathcal{CS}$ ,  $q_0 - q_1$  will be positive, and the probability will be greater than 0.5. Thus, the problem of finding a condition set such that  $q_0 - q_1$  is large becomes the problem of finding the condition set such that  $|q_0 - q_1|$  is large.
- (iv) In the rest of this section, we will show how to construct such set  $\mathcal{CS}$ , which leads to distinguishing attack on KASUMI and PRESENT with non-negligible success rate.

## 5.2 Distribution of the linear complexity of component sequences

We use  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT as multi-output filtering functions and study the distribution of the linear complexities of their component sequences. Meidl and Niederreiter studied the expectation of the linear complexity of random binary periodic sequences in [30]. Unfortunately, the average values of the linear complexities of the component sequences of AES,  $f_1$ , KASUMI, PRESENT are very close to the theoretical value determined in [30] according to our experiments. This motivates us to look at the whole distribution of the linear complexity of the component sequences instead of considering only the average value. We perform the following test for the linear complexity and have an interesting observation on the component sequences of KASUMI and PRESENT.

**Test of the distribution of linear complexity.** Usually, for a primitive  $\mathcal{C}$ , it is difficult to determine the distribution of linear complexity of its component sequences. Of course, one can choose a subset of inputs to the primitive to estimate the linear complexity distribution. However, since the input space is very large, it is hard to measure the accuracy of the estimated distribution. To avoid such problem, we propose a new method to test the distribution. This goal is achieved by choosing two (large) subsets of inputs and by comparing the distributions of the linear complexity of their component sequences. In particular, we choose one subset  $\mathcal{LI}$  of the inputs to be generated by an  $\ell$ -stage LFSR and the other subset  $\mathcal{RI} = (\mathcal{LI} \setminus \{P_0\}) \cup \{P_1\}$ , where  $P_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{LI}$  and  $P_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \overline{\mathcal{LI}}$ . Note that the elements in  $\mathcal{LI}$  are ordered according to Eq. (3). It is clear that if the  $\mathcal{C}$  has very good random property, it should not be easy to distinguish two distributions for  $\mathcal{LI}$  and  $\mathcal{RI}$ . Our method consists of the following three steps.

Now fixing a primitive  $\mathcal{C}$  and an  $\ell$ -stage LFSR:



**Step 1 (Generating component sequences).** We randomly choose  $N_{key}$  keys.

1. For all keys, using  $\mathcal{LI}$  as the set of inputs and  $\mathcal{C}$  as a multi-output filter, we obtain  $m \cdot N_{key}$  component sequences. This set of component sequences is denoted by  $Q_1$ .
2. Similarly, using  $\mathcal{RI}$  as the inputs, we generate another set of  $m \cdot N_{key}$  component sequences, which is denoted by  $Q_2$ .

**Step 2 (Computing linear complexity).** We compute the linear complexities of the sequences in  $Q_1$  and  $Q_2$  and count the number of component sequences in  $Q_i$  with the linear complexity  $2^\ell - 2$  and  $2^\ell - 1$ , denoted by  $N_{2^\ell-2}^i$  and  $N_{2^\ell-1}^i$ , where  $i = 1$  or  $2$ .

**Step 3 (Comparing the distributions).** Now we compare two distributions by computing the slopes  $sl_i$  of the line between two points  $(2^\ell - 2, N_{2^\ell-2}^i)$  and  $(2^\ell - 1, N_{2^\ell-1}^i)$ , where

$$sl_i = \frac{N_{2^\ell-1}^i - N_{2^\ell-2}^i}{(2^\ell - 1) - (2^\ell - 2)} = N_{2^\ell-1}^i - N_{2^\ell-2}^i.$$

If the difference between  $sl_1$  and  $sl_2$  is non-negligible, we can make use of it to build a distinguisher of  $\mathcal{C}$ , which is described in the next section. The worst case computational complexity for exhausting all  $\ell$ -stage LFSRs of the above three steps is

$$\frac{\phi(2^\ell - 1)}{\ell} \times N_{key} \times 2\ell \times (2^\ell - 1) \times m, \quad (10)$$

where  $\phi$  is the Euler phi function. We perform the experiment using these parameters on  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT in the next section.

**Distribution of  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT.** In our experiment, we choose  $\ell = 8$  and  $N_{key} = 10^8$ . By Eq. (10), the worst case complexity for the primitive  $f_1$  is  $2^{50.27}$  (some computation can be performed in a parallel way). We present the result in the following figures. In the figures, the red (resp. blue) line represents the distribution of sequences in  $Q_1$  (resp.  $Q_2$ ).




Fig. 2: KASUMI




Fig. 3: PRESENT





Fig. 4: AES

Fig. 5:  $f_1$ 

From Figs. 2 and 3, one can observe that, for KASUMI and PRESENT, the difference of the distribution of the linear complexity for sequences in  $Q_1$  and  $Q_2$  is non-negligible. While Figs. 4 and 5 show this is not the case for AES and  $f_1$ .

### 5.3 The new distinguishing attack

We now present the details of our distinguishing attack, which is achieved through constructing a distinguishing function  $h$ . The construction of the distinguishing function is based on the linear complexity distribution of the component sequences of a primitive in the multi-output filtering model.

**Constructing the distinguishing function.** Recall that the distinguishing function is defined in Definition 3. We use the notations in Theorem 1 and the attack model is depicted in Fig. 1.

1. Choosing an  $\ell$ -stage LFSR with a primitive polynomial to generate the inputs of length  $n$  in  $\mathcal{R}$  (see Eq. (3)). For  $f_1$  and AES,  $n = 128$ ; for KASUMI and PRESENT,  $n = 64$ .
2. Constructing  $\mathcal{S} = \mathbb{F}_2^n \setminus \mathcal{R}$ ;
3. Randomly choose a message  $P_0 \in \mathcal{R}$  and  $P_1 \in \mathcal{S}$ ;
4. Let  $N_{LC}$  be the number of component sequences with linear complexity  $LC$  where  $\ell \leq LC \leq 2^\ell - 1$ ;
5. Defining the condition set

$$\mathcal{CS} = \left\{ y \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{using } (\mathcal{R} \setminus \{P_0\}) \cup \{y\} \text{ as the inputs of a primitive in the} \\ \text{multi-output filtering model, the slope of the line between} \\ \text{the points } (2^\ell - 2, N_{2^\ell - 2}) \text{ and } (2^\ell - 1, N_{2^\ell - 1}) \text{ is less than } t. \end{array} \right. \right\};$$

6. The distinguishing function  $h$  is defined in Eq. (7) using the condition set  $\mathcal{CS}$ ;
7.  $q_0, q_1$  are the probability values defined in Definition 3.

### 5.4 An example of the attack

In this section, we apply the attack with our distinguishing function defined in Section 5.3 on  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI, and PRESENT. Theorem 1 and the observations in Figs. 2 and 3 enable us to gain a non-negligible success rate of the attack on KASUMI and PRESENT. For simplicity, we use an 8-stage LFSR to conduct our attack. However, one can use an arbitrary stage LFSR based on computation capability.

We first choose an 8-stage LFSR to construct the set  $\mathcal{R}$ . We then randomly choose  $2^{10}$  keys. For each key, a message  $P_0 \in \mathcal{R}$  and message  $P_1 \in \mathcal{S}$  are chosen randomly. In Fig. 1,

we use the distinguishing function  $h$  to execute the attack. It is worth to mention that, to test the average success rate is stable, we repeated the experiment 20 times by choosing different groups of  $2^{10}$  keys and found similar results for all experiments. Due to the page limit, we present the average success rate for an experiment in Table 1, where we use the upper bound of the slope  $t$  and the 8-stage LFSR the same as those in Table 5 in Appendix C.

Table 1: Average success rate of our attack on  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT

Primitive	$t$	$q_0$	$q_1$	Avg. Succ. Rate
$f_1$	2	0.20398	0.194458	50.476%
AES	2	0.193848	0.20044	50.329%
KASUMI	4	0.421875	0.454103	51.612%
PRESENT	5	0.5686	0.540285	51.416%

One can observe from the average success rate in Table 1 that the outputs of both KASUMI and PRESENT can be distinguished from a random primitive with a non-negligible probability. On the other hand, the performance of  $f_1$  and AES is very similar to the random one.

## 6 Distribution of the Algebraic Degree and Nonlinearity of the Component Functions

In this section, we investigate the distribution of the algebraic degree and the nonlinearity of the component functions of  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI, and PRESENT in the multi-output filtering model. To measure the randomness property, we first determine the distribution of the algebraic degree and the nonlinearity of component functions using a random primitive as the multi-output filter. Comparing this ideal distribution with those of  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT obtained by performing experiments, some non-randomness property of KASUMI is discovered. On the other hand, our experimental results show that  $f_1$ , AES and PRESENT perform very similar to the ideal case in the sense of the distributions of the algebraic degree and nonlinearity.

### 6.1 Algebraic degree distribution

Recall that the algebraic degree of a Boolean function is defined in Section 2. The following result states the number of Boolean functions with a given algebraic degree. The first part of the result can also be found in [10]. We provide a simple proof below for the completeness.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $f$  be a Boolean function on  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . Then the number of Boolean functions with algebraic degree at most  $d$  is  $2^{\sum_{i=0}^d \binom{n}{i}}$ , and the number of Boolean functions with algebraic degree exactly  $d$  is  $\left(2^{\binom{n}{d}} - 1\right) 2^{\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} \binom{n}{i}}$*

*Proof.* Denoting the set  $\Omega = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$ . Let the ANF of  $f$  be  $f(x) = \sum_{I \in \mathcal{P}(\Omega)} a_I x^I$ . If the degree of  $f$  is at most  $d$ , then all  $a_I = 0$  for  $|I| > d$ . Clearly there are  $\sum_{i=0}^d \binom{n}{i}$  terms in the ANF of  $f$  with  $|I| \leq d$ , and their coefficients can be either 0 or 1. Therefore there are  $2^{\sum_{i=0}^d \binom{n}{i}}$  Boolean functions with degree at most  $d$ . For simplicity, let us denote by  $A_d$  the number of Boolean functions with degree at most  $d$ . Then by noting the number of Boolean functions with degree exactly  $d$  is  $A_d - A_{d-1}$  we obtain the result.  $\square$

**Corollary 1.** *Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a random cryptographic primitive and  $\mathcal{L}$  be an  $n$ -stage LFSR whose characteristic polynomial is a primitive polynomial of degree  $n$ . We use  $\mathcal{C}$  as a multi-output filtering function and  $\mathcal{L}$  to generate the inputs of  $\mathcal{C}$ . Then the probability of the component functions having degree at most  $d$  is  $\frac{2^{\sum_{i=0}^d \binom{n}{i}}}{2^{2^n}}$ . In particular,  $\Pr(d \leq n-3) = \frac{1}{2^{n+1}}$ .*

Several remarks on the application of Theorem 2 are in the sequel:

- (1) Assume the primitive  $\mathcal{C}$  is used to generate MACs (for instance the function  $f_1$  in TUAK). If the percentage of component functions with degree less than  $n-2$  is large, then we may use the decoding method of the Reed-Muller code  $R(n, n-3)$  to forge the MACs. See [28] for the Reed-Muller decoding. Note that the code  $R(n, n-3)$  is the set of Boolean functions on  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  with algebraic degree at most  $n-3$ . Therefore, we need the probability  $\Pr(d \leq n-3)$  to be as small as possible.
- (2) On the other way, as shown in Corollary 1, for a random primitive, the probability  $\Pr(d \leq n-3) = \frac{1}{2^{n+1}}$ . So, for the primitive  $\mathcal{C}$ , if this probability is very different with  $\frac{1}{2^{n+1}}$ , some non-randomness properties may be exploited.
- (3) The probability  $\Pr(d \leq n-3)$  is actually affected by the diffusion property of the primitive  $\mathcal{C}$ . Assumed  $\mathcal{C}$  is a keyed primitive from  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  to  $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ . In the modern design of ciphers, by increasing the number of iteration rounds, normally  $\mathcal{C}$  could attain the maximal possible degree for any key  $K$ . For a keyed primitive  $\mathcal{C}_K$ , in the multi-output model, we restrict the inputs of  $\mathcal{C}_K$  to a subspace  $\mathcal{S}$  generated by an LFSR. For a fixed key  $K$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_K$  can be regarded as a vectorial function and the ANF of  $\mathcal{C}_K$  has the form  $\mathcal{C}_K(x) = \sum_{I \in \mathcal{P}(\Omega)} a_I(K)x^I$ , where  $\Omega = \{0, \dots, n-1\}$  and  $\mathcal{P}(\Omega)$  is the power set and  $a_I(K) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$  are the coefficients of  $x^I$  ( $a_I$  is a function with  $K$  as the variable) [10]. Then the restrictions of  $\mathcal{C}_K|_{\mathcal{S}} = \sum_{I \in \mathcal{P}(\Omega), I \subset \mathcal{S}} a_I(K)x^I$ . The degree  $d$  of the component functions is then determined by  $a_I$  with  $|I| = d$ . If the diffusion property of  $\mathcal{C}$  and the key generating algorithm are good, it should be very rare that all  $a_I = 0$  for  $|I| \geq \dim(\mathcal{S}) - 2$ .

To better understand Theorem 2 and the above comments, for  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT, we perform the following test on the distribution of the algebraic degree of their component functions.

**Statistical Test 1** *By Corollary 1, using an LFSR with a primitive polynomial of degree 8, the probability that the degree of the component functions is smaller than 7 is  $\frac{1}{2^9} = 19.53125 \times 10^{-4}$ . For  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT, we apply the multi-output filtering model as in Section 3.1. We choose 50,000 keys for these primitives and compute the degree of the component functions. The probability of the degree is smaller than 7 is listed in the following table.*

Table 2: Distribution of the degree smaller than 7

Cryptographic primitive	$\Pr(d \leq 6)$
Random function	$19.53125 \times 10^{-4}$
$f_1$	$19.87 \times 10^{-4}$
AES	$19.77 \times 10^{-4}$
KASUMI	$20.16 \times 10^{-4}$
PRESENT	$19.58 \times 10^{-4}$

From Table 2, we can see that for KASUMI, the probability  $\Pr(d \leq 6)$  is much higher than the one for other ciphers. To confirm this, we test another 50000 keys and found the

probability is very close to it. This points out a distinguisher of *KASUMI* and other ciphers in Table 2.

## 6.2 Nonlinearity distribution

The nonlinearity of a Boolean function is one of the most important cryptographic properties. A highly nonlinear function is used to avoid the linear attack and its variants. Let  $f$  be a Boolean function on  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ . The *nonlinearity* of  $f$  is defined in Section 2. One can see easily from its definition that, in other words,

$$NL(f) = \max_{g \in RM(1,n)} d(f, g),$$

where  $RM(1, n)$  denotes all Boolean functions with degree at most 1, and  $d(f, g)$  is the weight of the sequence  $(f(x) + g(x) : x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n)$ . It is well known that when  $n$  is even the best nonlinearity a Boolean function may achieve is  $2^{n-1} - 2^{n/2-1}$  and such functions are called bent functions (see [10] for more details). However, such functions are very rare. For a random Boolean function, we have the following result on the distribution of its nonlinearity.

**Theorem 3 ([36,10]).** *Let  $c$  be any strictly positive real number. The density of the set*

$$\left\{ f \in \mathcal{B}_n, NL(f) \geq 2^{n-1} - c\sqrt{n}2^{\frac{n-1}{2}} \right\}$$

*is greater than  $1 - 2^{n+1-c^2n \log_2 e}$ . If  $c^2 \log_2 e > 1$ , then this density tends to 1 when  $n$  tends to infinity.*

Applying the above theorem on Boolean functions with 8 variables, we have the following table. Note that the best nonlinearity we expect for Boolean functions with 8 variables is  $2^7 - 2^3 = 120$ .

Table 3: Lower bound of the density of Boolean functions in  $\mathcal{B}_8$  with nonlinearity greater than  $W$

Lower Bound $W$ of NL	Lower bound of the density of Boolean functions with $NL(f) \geq W$
98	0.547478790614789878029979196008
97	0.719023101510754029847811117031
96	0.828242210249647874600628825765
95	0.896634306072499532736808245299
94	0.938757831567911386351203605713
93	0.964277746514500200807343273821
92	0.979486428025371618477752447455
91	0.988402673490240554092683405343
90	0.993545113167509528277258485524

From the above table, one can see that if the component functions of  $f_1$  are random, the probability that the component Boolean functions have nonlinearity smaller than 90 is very small, which is  $1 - 0.993545113167509528277258485524 \approx 0.00645$ . In view of this, we perform the following statistical test for  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT.

**Statistical Test 2** *Let the LFSR and the other settings be the same as in Statistical Test 1. We list the distribution of the nonlinearity of the component functions of  $f_1$  and AES in the following table. Since only the component functions with smallest nonlinearity are important to us (as an attacker), we only list the probability that a Boolean function has nonlinearity smaller than 90 or 91. The notation  $\Pr_{<W}$  denotes the probability that the nonlinearity is smaller than  $W$ .*

Table 4: The distribution of the nonlinearity of component sequences of  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT

Cryptographic primitive	$\Pr_{<90}$	$\Pr_{<91}$
Random Function	0.006455	0.011597
$f_1$	0.000299	0.000690
AES	0.000306	0.000592
KASUMI	0.000299	0.000565
PRESENT	0.000308	0.000589

Unlike the distribution of the algebraic degree, from the above table we can not see obvious difference among these four ciphers. However, one can still see that the probability values  $\Pr_{<90}$  and  $\Pr_{<91}$  is still very different with the random case (although they are only the **upper bounds** of the probability).

Although now we cannot derive attacks from Statistical Test 1 and Statistical Test 2, it is interesting to observe some non-randomness in the aspect of the distribution of cryptographic properties.

## 7 Concluding Remarks and Future Work

In this paper, we introduced the multi-output filtering model for analyzing the security of a cryptographic primitive. In this model, a cryptographic primitive is used as a multi-output filtering function and a number of component sequences and component functions of the primitive are obtained. We aimed at exploiting the security properties of the primitive through studying its component sequences and functions.

Thanks to the fruitful research outcome in the theory of sequences and Boolean functions, we propose a general distinguish attack technique under IND-CPA. We developed a new object, called a distinguishing function, to characterize the success rate of our new attack method. Interestingly enough, for a primitive  $\mathcal{C}$ , by comparing the distribution of the linear complexity of the component sequences generated by two sets of inputs, we can construct a new distinguishing function. The importance of this new distinguishing function is demonstrated by launching an attack on KASUMI and PRESENT with non-negligible success rates.

Furthermore, we studied the cryptographic properties of the component functions. By comparing the distribution of the algebraic degree and nonlinearity properties with that of a random one, we discovered that, for KASUMI, its distribution of the algebraic degree is very different, while the distribution of  $f_1$ , AES and PRESENT is not. We cannot propose any immediate attack based on this observation, but it is interesting to point it out for future research.

Regarding to the future work, we believe it is important to study which inner structure of a primitive affects the distribution of the linear complexity, algebraic degree, nonlinearity,

and other properties of component sequences and functions. This study may lead to a new attacking method, and present new criteria on designing a cryptographic primitive.

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## Appendix

Here we present a description of TUAk's  $f_1$  algorithm, the proofs of Theorem 1, and the slope of the linear complexity distribution of  $f_1$  and AES, KASUMI and PRESENT.


### A: Overview of TUAk algorithm set

The TUAk algorithm set is designed to generate message authentication codes (MAC) and various keys such as cipher keys and integrity keys in mobile communications. The TUAk algorithm set consists of seven algorithms, namely  $f_1, f_1^*, f_2, f_3, f_4, f_5, f_5^*$ , which are built upon the Keccak permutation Keccak- $f$ [1600] [41]. Each algorithm in TUAk is used to perform some specific task, for instance  $f_1$  and  $f_1^*$  are used to generate MACs,  $f_2$  to  $f_5$  are used to output signed response (RES), confidentiality key (CK), integrity key (IK), anonymity key (AK), respectively. The MAC and various keys are expected to guarantee the security in mobile communications.

### Description of $f_1$

Generally speaking, all the algorithms in TUAk are built by assigning some specific inputs at some predefined input positions of the Keccak permutation, and then by extracting  $M$  bits from predefined output positions of the Keccak permutation. For a detailed description of all TUAk algorithms, the reader is referred to [41]. In particular, we introduce the algorithm  $f_1$  as it plays the role of generating MACs. We provide an overview of the  $f_1$  algorithm in Fig. 6.



Fig. 6: The  $f_1$  function

Mathematically, we can write  $f_1$  in the form:

$$f_1 \triangleq \Pi (\text{INPUT}) = (y_0, y_1 \cdots, y_{M-1}), \quad (11)$$

where  $M$  is the length of the MAC and INPUT is defined as

$$\text{INPUT} = \text{TOP}_c || \text{INSTANCE} || \text{ALGORITHM} || \text{K} || \text{RAND} || \text{AMF} || \text{SQN} || \text{PADDING} || 0^{512}. \quad (12)$$

Note that, in the INPUT, except K, RAND, SQN, the other parameters are all prescribed constants. For details, see [41]. For the convenience, in the rest of the paper, we write  $f_1$  as

$$f_1(\text{K}, \text{RAND}, \text{SQN}) = (y_0, y_1 \cdots, y_{M-1}).$$

The algorithm  $f_1$  is flexible with the length of the parameters. The key length is 128 or 256 bits, the length of RAND is 128 bits, the length of SQN is 48 bits, and the possible output lengths are 64, 128, and 256.

## B: Proof of Theorem 1

We present the proof of Theorem 1 below.

*Proof.* It is not difficult to see that there are four independent cases of the event  $h(c) = i \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_i)$  when  $i \in \{0, 1\}$ , therefore we may compute its probability one by one and sum them together:

(1).  $h(c) = 0 \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_0) \wedge P_0 \in \mathcal{CS}$ . The probability of this case equals

$$\Pr(h(c) = 0 \mid c = \mathcal{C}(P_0) \wedge P_0 \in \mathcal{CS}) \Pr(c = \mathcal{C}(P_0) \mid P_0 \in P) \Pr(P_0 \in \mathcal{CS}) = \frac{1}{2}q_0;$$

(2).  $h(c) = 0 \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_0) \wedge P_0 \notin \mathcal{CS}$ . The probability of this case is clear 0.

(3).  $h(c) = 1 \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_1) \wedge P_0 \in \mathcal{CS}$ . The probability of this case equals

$$\Pr(h(c) = 1 \mid c = \mathcal{C}(P_1) \wedge P_0 \in \mathcal{CS}) \Pr(c = \mathcal{C}(P_1) \mid P_0 \in P) \Pr(P_0 \in \mathcal{CS}) = \frac{1}{2}q_0(1-q_1).$$

(4).  $h(c) = 1 \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_1) \wedge P_0 \notin \mathcal{CS}$ . The probability of this case equals

$$\Pr(h(c) = 1 \mid c = \mathcal{C}(P_1) \wedge P_0 \notin \mathcal{CS}) \Pr(c = \mathcal{C}(P_1) \mid P_0 \notin P) \Pr(P_0 \notin \mathcal{CS}) = \frac{1}{2}(1-q_0)(1-q_1).$$

Summing the above probability we have the desired result

$$\sum_{i \in \{0,1\}} \Pr(h(c) = i \wedge c = \mathcal{C}(P_i)) = \frac{1 + (q_0 - q_1)}{2}.$$

The proof is completed. □

**C: Slope of the linear complexity distribution**

Here we present the results of the test in Section 5.2 in Table 5. The slope in Table 5 is the average slope over  $10^8$  samples. The column “Slope (L)” contains the slopes computed from the LFSR input, and the column “Slope (R)” contains the slopes computed from the random input. The last column shows the absolute value of the difference between “Slope(L)” and “Slope(R)”. We can see the “Difference” of KASUMI and PRESENT are much greater than  $f_1$  and AES.

Table 5: The slope of  $f_1$ , AES, KASUMI and PRESENT on average