MANCHESTER 1824

The University of Manchester

Compatibility and Isolation in Specialised Operating Systems

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my website in the cloud

Full-fledged Virtual Machine

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


Full-fledged Virtual Machine
Linux distribution
Application
Libraries
Linux Kernel
Hypervisor
Hardware


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
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Software bloat!


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Software bloat leads to:
→ Increased attack surface
→ Additional costs
→ Performance loss


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Unikernel: application + dependencies + thin OS compiled as a static binary running on top of a hypervisor [1]

[1] Madhavapeddy et al., “Unikernels: Library Operating Systems for the Cloud”, ASPLOS’13

[2] Zhang et al., “KylinX: A Dynamic Library Operating System for Simplified and Efficient Cloud Virtualization, ATC’18

Unikernel: application + dependencies + thin OS compiled as a static binary running on top of a hypervisor [1]

- **Single-purpose**: run 1 application
  - Want to run multiple applications? Run multiple unikernels
- **Single-process**
  - Want to run a multi-process application? Run multiple unikernels [2]
  - However, SMP (multicores) and multithreading are supported
- **Single-binary and single-address space** for application + kernel
  - No user/kernel protection needed

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- **Lightweight virtualisation**
  - Contain and run only what is absolutely necessary for the application
  - Security advantage: small attack surface
  - Cost advantage: memory/disk footprint reduction
  - As VMs, considered as a *secure alternative to containers*

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- **Per-application tailored kernel**
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  - The kernel itself contains only what is needed
- **Reduced OS noise, increased performance**
  - Low system call latency: app + kernel in ring 0, system calls are function calls
  - Sub-second boot time

Unikernels can be classified based on the language(s) in which the applications they support can be written in (non-exhaustive list):

- Pure **memory safe languages** (OCamL, Erlang, Haskell): MirageOS[1], LING[2], HalVM[3]
- **C/C++, semi-POSIX API**: HermitCore[4], OSv[5], Rumprun[6], Lupine[7], UKL[8]
- **Rust/Go**: RustyHermit[9], Clive[10]
- **Multi-languages**: HermiTux[11], Unikraft[12]

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[1] https://mirage.io/, [2] https://github.com/cloudozer/ling [3] https://github.com/GaloisInc/HaLVM [4] https://hermitcore.org/ [5] http://osv.io/ [6] https://github.com/rumpkernel/rumprun [7] https://github.com/hckuo/Lupine-Linux [8] https://github.com/unikernelLinux/ukl [9] https://github.com/hermitcore/libhermit-rs [10] http://lsub.org/ls/clive.html [11] https://ssrg-vt.github.io/hermitux/ [12] https://unikraft.org/

Benefits Summary

- Lower costs by being lightweight
- Increased security with low attack surface and high isolation
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Application domains

- Cloud applications: servers, micro-services, SaaS, FaaS/serverless
- Embedded virtualisation, Edge computing, IoT
- Network Function Virtualisation, HPC, VM introspection, malware analysis, secure Desktop applications
- etc.

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- Unikernels have plenty of benefits to bring
- Unikernels have plenty of application domains
- They are very popular in academia ...
  - Mirage (ASPLOS'13), LightVM (SOSP'17), and many others
- **...but why (nearly) nobody uses them in the industry?**

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Because it is hard to port existing applications!

Why Porting to Unikernels is Hard



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

- Proprietary software $\rightarrow$ source code not available



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

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

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

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- Complex build toolchains

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Our Solution: HermiTux

- **A unikernel *binary-compatible* with Linux applications**
  - I.e. a unikernel that can run application that have been compiled for Linux
  - For the x86-64 and aarch64 (ARM64) architectures

HermiTux's objective: running as unikernels executables that have been compiled for a popular OS: Linux

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- **Consider unmodified binaries** built with various compilers, from various source languages, potentially stripped/obfuscated
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- **Consider both static and dynamic binaries**
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- Binary compatibility is achieved by developing a unikernel **conforming to the Linux Application Binary Interface (ABI)**
  - Convention, sets of rules a program needs to follow to execute on top of the Linux kernel
  - We need to implement the OS side of these rules in our unikernel

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- **Load-time conventions**
  - Application binary format supported: ELF
  - What part of the address space is accessible for the application (currently lower half of the 48 bits virtual address space)
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- **Runtime conventions**
  - How to request services from the OS: system calls
  - Additional communication channels with the kernel through virtual filesystems (`/sys`, `/proc`, etc.) and shared memory areas (vDSO/vsyscall)

Load-Time Convention: Stack at Entry Point



- Describes syscall invocation, parameters and return value passing.
- It is ISA-specific
- E.g. for x86-64:
  - Syscall identifier in `%rax`
  - Parameters are passed in orders in `%rdi`, `%rsi`, `%rdx`, `%r10`, `%r8`, `%r9`
  - Return value in `%rax`
  - Invocation with the `syscall` instruction

- Custom KVM-based hypervisor





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

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

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

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

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- VMM loads app and kernel ELF binaries
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- And runtime conventions for syscalls



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- VMM loads app and kernel ELF binaries
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- And runtime conventions for syscalls

HermiTux supports 97 syscalls, 81 developed on top of the original HermitCore kernel. They offer support for:

- Statically and dynamically compiled binaries
- Multithreading (TLS, clone, synchronisation with futex)
- Signals
- Scheduling priorities
- Highly randomised memory mappings (entropy: 34 bits)



Features: System Call Support (2)

Category	System calls supported by HermiTux
Filesystem	access, chdir, close, creat, faccessat, fcntl, fdatasync, fstat, fsync, getcwd, getdents, getdents64, lseek, lstat, mkdir, mkdirat, newfstatat, open, openat, pwrite64, read, readlinkat, readlink, readv, rmdir, stat, sync, syncfs, unlink, unlinkat, write, writev
Memory management	brk, sbrk, madvise, mincore, mmap, mprotect, mremap, munmap
Process management	clone*, exit, exit_group, getpid/ppid/gid/egid/euid/tid/uid, setsid, getrlimit, prlmit64, setrlimit, umask
Networking	accept, bind, connect, gethostname, getpeername, getsockname, getsockopt, listen, recvfrom, select, sendto, sendfile, sethostname, setsockopt, socket
Signals & Syncrhonization	futex, get_robust_list, kill, set_tid_address, rt_sigaction, sigaltstack, signal, tgkill, tkill
Scheduling	getprio, setprio, sched_getaffinity, sched_setaffinity, sched_yield
Time management	clock_getres, clock_gettime, gettimeofday, nanosleep, time
Miscellaneous	arch_prctl, ioctl, shutdown, sysinfo, uname

*threads only

- Until now we described a small operating system that can run applications and bring these unikernels benefits
  - Security and isolation
  - Low memory/disk footprint
  - Fast boot time

What about the other unikernel benefits?

- Fast system calls (function calls)
- Kernel modularity

- HermiTux's syscall handler is invoked by the `syscall` instruction
  - Reintroduce high latency for system calls due to the exception

```
40127e:   b8 07 00 00 00          mov    $0x7,%eax (poll)
401283:   4c 89 c7                mov    %r8,%rdi
401286:   48 89 ca                mov    %rcx,%rdx
401289:   0f 05                   syscall
```

- For **dynamically compiled programs:**
  - At runtime **load a unikernel-aware Libc**
  - Custom Libc has system calls implemented as (fast) function calls directly into the kernel
  - Fork of Musl Libc, automatically transformed using Coccinelle



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

- What about **static binaries?**
- (Statically) **binary-rewrite `syscall` instructions to direct jumps to the syscall implementation**
  - Problem: `syscall` is 2 bytes long and any `call`/`jmp` instruction will be larger



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

Different/smarter solutions appeared since then: X-Container (ASPLOS'19), NullPoline (ATC'23)


Lmbench3
Exection time (s)
0.030
0.025
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
null (getppid)
read
write
Linux (native)
Hermitux Handler
Hermitux Rewrite
Hermitux Lib. Substitution

- System-call based modularity
  - Compile a kernel with support for only the necessary system calls
  - How to identify syscall needed without access to the sources?
  - **Use binary analysis** to find out what is the value in `%rax` (x86-64) or `%x8` (aarch64) for each `syscall` invocation



Program	Number of system calls	x86-64 kernel `.text` size reduction	aarch64 kernel `.text` size reduction
Minimal	4	21.22 %	29.26 %
Hello world	9	19.91 %	27.42 %
PARSEC Blackscholes	15	17.68 %	24.50 %
Postmark	27	16.02 %	22.55%
Sqlite	33	11.34 %	16.44%
Full syscalls support	97	-	-



- Image 650x smaller, boot time 780x faster, RAM usage 9x lower than a Linux VM!


NPB IS Class A
execution time (s)
100
50
0
Linux
HermiTux
GCC/
Musl
GCC/Musl
stripped
GCC/
GlibC
Clang
Clang
obfuscated
Gfortran

Evaluation (3)



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

Evaluation (3)





HermiTux: a Unikernel Binary-Compatible with Linux

Evaluation (3)





Demo

Table of contents

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

- **OS security/isolation strategies are fixed at design time**
  - Isolation granularity, mechanisms used, data sharing strategies, etc.
- Not really suitable in modern scenarios
  - Applications have heterogeneous needs in terms of security/performance
  - Application made of multiple components with various levels of trust
  - Machines support various isolation mechanisms, with new technologies underway
  - Hardware protection breaks (e.g. Meltdown)



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

FlexOS

- LibOS that can specialise for **security**
- Security/isolation strategy can be instantiated at build time

- Flexos decouple from the OS design important security/isolation decisions and allow selecting at build time:

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

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

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

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

How to enable flexible builds?

- LibOS **compartmentalised to the finest level**: components
- Compartmentalisation API: annotations in the code marking **components interfaces** and **shared data**

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- **Code transformations** at build time merging/separating components into compartments and instantiating gates



```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512];
/* … */
rc = recv(connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```

Enabling Flexible Builds: Porting API

```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512];
/* … */
rc = recv(connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```

Porting

```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512] __attribute__((flexos_share));
/* … */
rc = flexos_gate(liblwip, recv, connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```

Enabling Flexible Builds: Porting API

```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512];
/* … */
rc = recv(connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```

Porting

```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512] __attribute__((flexos_share));
/* … */
rc = flexos_gate(liblwip, recv, connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```

Automatic gate instantiation at build time

```
int rc, connfd;
char *buf[512] = shared_malloc(512);
/* … */
rc = mpk_gate(0, 1, recv, connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```

lwip 1

app 0

Coccinelle

Replace with shared heap allocation

Replace with MPK gate

Enabling Flexible Builds: Porting API

```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512];
/* … */
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Porting

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int rc, connfd;
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```

Automatic gate instantiation at build time

lwip + app

```
int rc, connfd;
char buf[512];
/* … */
rc = recv(connfd, buf, 512, 0);
```

Coccinelle

Replace with standard stack allocation and function call

Redis throughput on a total of 80 configuration, isolation with MPK, varying

- Number of compartments (1, 2, 3)
- The distribution of software components in compartments
- Software hardening (per compartment, on/off)

A Few Numbers

Redis throughput on a total of 80 configuration, isolation with MPK, varying

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

- How to explore the wide design space FlexOS gives access to?
- Security is hard to quantify
- Propose a **semi-automated exploration strategy** based on partially ordered sets

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Example with 2 compartments and 2 software hardening techniques:
safe stack (S) and ASan (A):



Poset design space exploration for Redis:



Conclusion

Availability and Publications

Everything is open source!

- **HermiTux**
  - `https://ssrg-vt.github.io/hermitux/`
  - P. Olivier, D. Chiba, S. Lankes, C. Min and B. Ravindran, **A Binary-Compatible Unikernel**, *VEE'19*
  - P. Olivier, H. Lefeuvre, D. Chiba, S. Lankes, C. Min and B. Ravindran, **A Syscall-Level Binary-Compatible Unikernel**, *IEEE TC*, 2021
- **FlexOS**
  - `https://project-flexos.github.io/`
  - H. Lefeuvre, V. Badoiu, A. Jung, S Teodorescu, S. Rauch, F. Huici, C. Raiciu, and P. Olivier, **FlexOS: Towards Flexible OS Isolation**, *ASPLOS'22*
  - H. Lefeuvre, V. Badoiu, S Teodorescu, P. Olivier, T. Mosnoi, R. Deaconescu, F. Huici, and C. Raiciu, **FlexOS: Making OS Isolation Flexible**, *HotOS'21*
  - **FlexOS is part of Hugo Lefeuvre's PhD work**: `https://www.owl.eu.com/research.html`

Please do not hesitate to get in touch :) pierre.olivier@manchester.ac.uk