

**Security Council**Distr.
GENERALS/23900
12 May 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 749 (1992)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to its resolution 749 (1992), in paragraph 6 of which the Council appealed "to all parties and others concerned in Bosnia-Herzegovina to cooperate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution". Following concerns expressed in informal consultations of the Security Council, I wrote to its President on 29 April 1992 informing him of my decision to despatch Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, to examine the evolving situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to look into the feasibility of a United Nations peace-keeping operation. 1/ Mr. Goulding was in Yugoslavia (a term which, for the purposes of the present report, is used to signify the republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) from 4 to 10 May. While there he took the opportunity to review progress in the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and to discuss problems relating to that operation with the Force Commander and certain of his Yugoslav interlocutors. The present report therefore covers two separate subjects: Bosnia-Herzegovina and the deployment of UNPROFOR.

2. On his way to Yugoslavia, Mr. Goulding stopped in Lisbon to meet with Ambassador José Cutileiro, the Plenipotentiary for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Chairman of the European Community (EC) Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, who briefed him on the latest session of the Conference held under his chairmanship on constitutional arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Belgrade Mr. Goulding met with President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Dr. Borisav Jovic, Chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations and Colonel-General Blagoje Adzic, Acting Federal Secretary for Defence and Army Chief of Staff, as well as Mr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Sarajevo, headquarters of UNPROFOR and the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he had discussions with President Alija Izetbegovic, leaders of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) and Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) parties in that Republic, General Milutin Kukanjac, Commander of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Sarajevo corps, Mr. Colm Doyle, Lord Carrington's representative,

and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR and his staff. In Zagreb, Mr. Goulding held meetings with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, Dr. Milan Ramljak, Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation with UNPROFOR, General Anton Tus, Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army, and Ambassador Joao Salgueiro, Head of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). He also visited UNPROFOR in Sector East (Eastern Slavonia) and met with local civic, military and militia leaders on both sides of the line. During his visits to Belgrade and Zagreb, Mr. Goulding received detailed briefings on the humanitarian situation, with particular emphasis on Bosnia-Herzegovina, from representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Mr. Goulding was accompanied throughout by the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar.

I. THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

3. Mr. Goulding has reported to me a grim state of affairs in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation in the capital, Sarajevo, which I had described briefly in my previous report, 2/ continues to deteriorate. The city suffers regular heavy shelling and sniper fire nightly, and intermittent shelling at other times, often on a random basis, from Serb irregulars in the surrounding hills, who use mortars and light artillery allegedly made available to them by JNA. Muslim forces have blockaded JNA locations in the city (including a military school with 1,300 teenage pupils and the military hospital) and regularly attack a Serb stronghold in the suburb of Ilidza as well as other locations in the city. Loss of life and much damage to property have resulted. Even on a day when shelling is light there is no public transport, few people go to work and the streets are largely deserted. The city's civilian airport is usually closed. Economic life is at a standstill and there are growing shortages of food and other essential supplies owing to the blockade imposed on the city by Serb forces.

4. Intense hostilities are taking place elsewhere in the Republic, notably in Mostar and the Neretva valley (JNA versus Croat forces; Belgrade's claim that these are units of the Croatian Army is contested by Zagreb and has not been confirmed by UNPROFOR, but it is not disputed that individual members of the Croatian Army, with their weapons, are extensively deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina); in Bosanski Krupa near the Bihac region in the north-west (Serbs versus Muslims); around Bosanski Brod in the north-east (Serbs versus Croats); and in eastern Bosnia (Serbs versus Muslims, although this area is now largely under Serb control).

5. All international observers agree that what is happening is a concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the acquiescence of, and at least some support from, JNA, to create "ethnically pure" regions in the context of negotiations on the "cantonization" of the Republic in the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, chaired by Ambassador Cutileiro. The techniques used are the seizure of territory by military force and

intimidation of the non-Serb population. The conclusion of a partial cease-fire agreement between Croat and Serb leaders on 6 May 1992 has revived suspicions of a Croat-Serb carve up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving minimal territory to the Muslim community, which accounts for a plurality (44 per cent) of the population. Further concern has been caused by the decision of the Belgrade authorities to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina by 18 May all JNA personnel who are not citizens of that Republic. This will leave in Bosnia-Herzegovina, without effective political control, as many as 50,000 mostly Serb troops and their weapons. They are likely to be taken over by the Serb party.

6. The fighting and intimidation have led to massive displacement of civilians. On 8 May 1992, it was estimated that at least 520,000 persons (over 12 per cent of the Republic's population) had been displaced, some 360,000 of whom have taken refuge in neighbouring republics. The international community's efforts to bring succour to these suffering people are greatly obstructed by the warring parties whose demographic objectives they may frustrate. Freedom of movement is virtually non-existent: a recent UNHCR convoy had to negotiate its way through 90 roadblocks between Zagreb and Sarajevo, many of them manned by undisciplined and drunken soldiers of undetermined political affiliation and not responsible to any identifiable central authority. Relief supplies are stolen, vehicles hijacked and international aid workers threatened and abused.

7. In spite of energetic efforts by Mr. Colm Doyle, Lord Carrington's representative, it has proved impossible to implement the cease-fire agreement signed in Sarajevo on 12 April 1992 under EC auspices and reaffirmed on 23 April 1992 during the visit to Sarajevo of the Portuguese Foreign Minister and Lord Carrington. Following the killing of one of its members near Mostar on 1 May, ECMM initially reduced its presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and has now completely withdrawn its monitors from the Republic. All international observers and workers in Bosnia-Herzegovina are pessimistic about the prospects for a durable peace and many expect that they too will soon have to withdraw.

8. Meanwhile Ambassador Cutileiro continues his efforts to induce the leaders of the Croat, Muslim and Serb communities to agree on future constitutional arrangements for the Republic. He suspended the most recent session of his Conference on 1 May because of the parties' failure to honour the cease-fire, but he was encouraged by the acceptance, by all sides, of the principle of "cantonization", whereby each "national" group would be responsible for its own region or regions within a confederal, independent and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. He told Mr. Goulding on 9 May 1992 that he hoped to be able to reconvene the Conference on 13 May 1992 in order to start discussion of draft maps of the cantonal boundaries. In his view it was important for the talks, once restarted, to work through to a successful conclusion, without further suspensions. However, on 11 May, Ambassador Cutileiro informed the parties that, because of the deterioration in the security situation in Sarajevo on 10 May, and in particular the theft

of 12 tons of ICRC relief supplies from the airport, he had decided to postpone the reconvening of his Conference.

9. As for the United Nations, I had already decided 3/ to advance the deployment of UNPROFOR military observers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 41 of them have, since 1 May 1992, been conducting patrols from 4 locations - Medjugorje, Mostar, Stolac and Trebinje. On 10 May the military observers were able to establish a temporary cease-fire in Mostar to evacuate civilians and wounded from the front lines but, this success excepted, they have found it impossible to reduce the intensity of the conflict. On 6 May a military observer in Mostar was wounded by shrapnel. Conditions remain extremely difficult for his colleagues and it cannot be excluded that concern for their security will soon make it necessary to withdraw them. On 12 May, a military observer vehicle was struck by a rocket or other missile, its two occupants being fortunate to escape injury. Operations of UNPROFOR military observers have been suspended as a result.

10. In addition, UNPROFOR's presence in Sarajevo has inevitably led to its being asked to help, in various ways, those who are trying to control the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict and mitigate its worst consequences. While such help does not fall within UNPROFOR's mandate, the Force has, with my authority, responded to those requests in so far as its resources and the security of its personnel permit. Its headquarters building has become the only meeting place accepted by all the parties in the EC-led efforts to implement the cease-fire. It has responded to humanitarian emergencies arising from the shelling of the city, has provided some support to international humanitarian agencies and has made its good offices available, with the EC representatives, in crisis situations, including those directly arising from military conflict between two of the parties in Sarajevo.

II. FEASIBILITY OF A UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

11. Mr. Goulding's discussions with his interlocutors on the feasibility of a peace-keeping role for the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina envisaged two possible time-frames: (a) an immediate operation to help to end the current fighting; and (b) an operation to help to implement the agreement or agreements which it is hoped will be reached in the talks chaired by Ambassador Cutileiro. The views of his interlocutors on each of these possibilities are described below.

A. An immediate United Nations operation

12. President Izetbegovic, his fellow-SDA member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, Mr. F. Abdic, and the representative of the Croat HDZ party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. M. Ljubic, were the only advocates of immediate United Nations intervention in the current situation. President Izetbegovic advocated a peace-enforcement operation of 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers,

supported by air forces, to "restore order" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Upon being advised by Mr. Goulding that enforcement action would require a much larger operation than President Izetbegovic contemplated and would be unlikely to be approved by the Security Council, the President suggested the deployment of a 6,000 to 7,000-man United Nations infantry force to ensure the unblocking of road, rail and air transport in the Republic, to protect and keep open Sarajevo Airport and certain essential bridges and to keep the peace at "neuralgic spots" where conflict was currently raging (including the towns, listed in paragraph 9 above, where UNPROFOR military observers have already been deployed). Mr. Goulding pointed out that such a role, while consistent with customary United Nations peace-keeping practice, would require the existence of a prior agreement among the principal parties to the conflict. President Izetbegovic accepted that no such agreement was in sight.

13. Mr. Mariofil Ljubic, on behalf of the Croat HDZ party, also advocated a peace-enforcement operation, not necessarily under United Nations auspices, to be followed by a United Nations peace-keeping force to maintain the peace that had been enforced and thereby create conditions for political negotiations and new elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14. Mr. Goulding's interlocutors in Belgrade, including Mr. Karadzic, saw no role for a United Nations peace-keeping force in the present circumstances and considered the current deployment of UNPROFOR military observers in the Mostar region to be of limited utility. They were doubtful about the prospects of negotiating any interim agreements that could form an acceptable basis for the mandate of a United Nations operation, in advance of agreement on new constitutional arrangements in Ambassador Cutileiro's Conference. The same views were expressed by General Kukanjac in Sarajevo and by Ambassador Salgueiro in Zagreb.

15. Mr. Goulding explored the possibility of a United Nations role in resolving specific problems, such as those relating to the closure of Sarajevo Airport, on the basis of local or ad hoc agreements among the warring parties. Once again this idea was found acceptable only by President Izetbegovic; in the view of Mr. Goulding's other interlocutors, no such agreements were currently achievable. Mr. Doyle expressed the view that, should he succeed in his attempts to obtain adherence to the EC-brokered cease-fire agreed on 12 April, the cease-fire should continued to be monitored by EC, within its existing mandate and using its existing Monitoring Mission.

16. Mr. Goulding also discussed with some of his interlocutors, and with the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, the feasibility of a United Nations peace-keeping role in support of the humanitarian activities of the international community, and especially of UNHCR, to which I have entrusted the lead role within the United Nations system. The UNHCR representatives, who described in detail the difficulties encountered by their relief convoys in the present security situation, including the hijacking of several of their trucks (with their contents), were keen that UNPROFOR should escort their convoys. The Force Commander and Mr. Goulding noted that no agreements had been negotiated for the unhindered distribution of humanitarian aid. In these circumstances, and

given the parties' uncooperative attitude to the movement of relief convoys, they judged that unarmed United Nations peace-keepers would not be able to prevent trucks from being blocked and stolen and armed troops would be required to implement such a mandate.

B. An operation to help to implement a political settlement

17. There emerged, however, some measure of agreement on a possible role for United Nations peace-keepers in helping to implement the constitutional agreement which is expected to emerge from the Conference chaired by Ambassador Cutileiro. President Izetbegovic, who stated that he had reluctantly accepted the cantonization principle as preferable to war, said that a United Nations peace-keeping force would be welcome in his Republic to separate the warring forces, to monitor such internal borders as might be agreed and to verify that no military personnel and equipment crossed those borders. The Belgrade authorities and the JNA leadership in both Belgrade and Sarajevo expressed agreement with that concept. Dr. Karadzic, leader of the Serb party, stated that UNPROFOR military observers could conceivably perform those functions, although if the borders were drawn well enough no international monitoring might be necessary. President Tudjman of Croatia expressed similar views.

III. DEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR

18. During his visit to Sarajevo and in his discussions with the Force Commander, Mr. Goulding was struck by the problems caused for the Force by the situation in that city. The Force Commander estimated that they currently consumed 75 per cent of his time. Movement in and out of the city is impossible on days of heavy shelling and General Nambiar has on occasions found himself stranded for up to 24 hours at intermediate points waiting for a lull in the fighting. The security of UNPROFOR personnel is a constant worry, and both the headquarters and residential quarters have experienced a number of near-misses. Nights of anxiety spent in shelters have an inevitable effect on the headquarters' effectiveness and could, ultimately, affect morale, although it remains excellent at this time. The blockade and the suspension of economic activity in Sarajevo have already obliged the Force Commander to move most of the civilian administrative staff to Belgrade and Zagreb.

19. General Nambiar recommended that, for pressing operational and security reasons, he and other significant elements of his headquarters staff should now be similarly relocated on a temporary basis pending an improvement in the situation. Sarajevo would remain the official site of UNPROFOR headquarters and sufficient staff would stay there to undertake the activities described in paragraphs 9 and 10 above and to provide a launching pad for any additional activities that the Security Council might in due course authorize. A detachment of armed troops would be retained to ensure security and United Nations humanitarian agencies could, if they wished, move temporarily to UNPROFOR's location.

20. All Mr. Goulding's interlocutors, and especially those in Croatia, pressed that UNPROFOR should assume its full responsibilities in all the United Nations Protected Areas as soon as possible. Unfortunately the timetable envisaged in annex I to document S/23777 has slipped by about a week. This is due to the above-mentioned difficulties in Sarajevo, to the complexities of transporting infantry battalions and their equipment from distant countries and to insurmountable difficulties in assigning civilian staff and procuring the equipment that they and United Nations police monitors require to carry out their functions. However, the Force Commander has notified the two sides that he will assume his full responsibilities in Sector East with effect from 0800 hours on 15 May 1992. This will bring to an end the nightly cease-fire violations in that sector, in particular the shelling of the city of Osijek, which continues to suffer serious casualties and damage at the hands of JNA. It will also bring to an end the continuing expulsions of non-Serb persons from those parts of Eastern Slavonia that are controlled by JNA. UNPROFOR has obtained some evidence of the complicity of JNA and local police personnel in these expulsions, although this was denied by both Belgrade and local authorities when Mr. Goulding raised the matter with them.

21. A major focus of Mr. Goulding's discussions in Belgrade and Zagreb was related to the problem alluded to in my previous report. 4/ Certain areas of Croatia which are at present controlled by JNA and populated largely by Serbs are outside the agreed boundaries of the United Nations Protected Areas. These for the most part follow the administrative lines of the opstine listed in paragraph 9 of annex III to document S/23280 as they existed before the conflict. In earlier discussions in Belgrade and New York, the Belgrade authorities had pressed strongly for these areas to be included in the Protected Areas. Otherwise, they said, the Serbs resident in them would resist by force the restoration of Croatian authority after the withdrawal of JNA. In that event the territorial defence units in the neighbouring Protected Areas would refuse to abandon their fellow-Serbs to "genocide" and widespread fighting would resume. The Croatian authorities had equally strongly resisted any changes in the boundaries of the United Nations Protected Areas. Attempts by the United Nations to reconcile these conflicting positions had failed.

22. The Force Commander reported that his Sector Commanders, especially those in Sectors North and South, had encountered serious difficulties in some areas where Serb territorial defence units were obstructing UNPROFOR's establishment of checkpoints and observation posts and saying that they would not demobilize unless the additional areas concerned were brought into the United Nations Protected Areas. General Nambiar expressed concern about the viability of his mandate unless that problem was resolved. It was accordingly decided to make a further effort to find a solution either by persuading the Belgrade authorities to make a serious effort to convince the Serb populations in the areas outside the Protected Areas that they would be safe when Croatian authority was restored or by persuading the Croatian authorities to accept some modification of the boundaries of the Protected Areas (including the removal from them of some wholly Croat areas) or by a combination of the two.

23. Unfortunately Mr. Goulding was not successful in this effort. Both sides insisted on their previous positions, except that President Tudjman agreed that United Nations military observers and police monitors could be deployed in the areas in question, possibly alongside EC monitors, in order to help to reassure the Serb population that their individual and collective rights would be fully respected. When asked how they would react if UNPROFOR deployed in accordance with the existing boundaries of the United Nations Protected Areas, none of the Belgrade authorities said that they would withdraw their cooperation but all expressed grave concern about the impact of such a decision on the affected populations and stated that the consequences for the implementation of the plan could not be predicted. On 11 May, the Force Commander conveyed the outcome of Mr. Goulding's efforts to the Belgrade authorities, who repeated their conviction that renewed violence was likely in the affected areas adjoining Sectors North and South.

24. Mr. Goulding was also informed by the JNA leadership that, following the declaration on 27 April 1992 of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Belgrade authorities' policy was to withdraw from republics other than Serbia and Montenegro all JNA personnel who were citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, leaving behind the others to be demobilized or join the armed forces of the new republics. This policy was already being applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it was estimated that 80 per cent of JNA's strength were citizens of that Republic. It would similarly be applied in UNPROFOR's Sectors North and South. Mr. Goulding pointed out that that would greatly increase the number of troops who would have to be demobilized in order to demilitarize the United Nations Protected Areas. UNPROFOR would continue to plan on the basis that, in that difficult task, it would have the full support and assistance of JNA, with which, among others, the plan had been negotiated.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

25. As will be evident from section I of the present report, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is tragic, dangerous, violent and confused. I do not believe that in its present phase this conflict is susceptible to the United Nations peace-keeping treatment. Any successful peace-keeping operation has to be based on some agreement between the hostile parties. Such an agreement can range from a simple cease-fire to a comprehensive settlement of their dispute. Without an agreement of some sort, a workable mandate cannot be defined and peace-keeping is impossible. The European Community has been making efforts, both on the ground in Sarajevo and in the constitutional talks in Lisbon, to reach agreements. If, as all must hope, they succeed, opportunities for United Nations peace-keeping may emerge, though it may in this case turn out to be more appropriate for EC, rather than the United Nations, to undertake the peace-keeping as well as the peacemaking.

26. It also has to be observed that a successful peace-keeping operation requires the parties to respect the United Nations, its personnel and its mandate. One of the more distressing features of the current situation in

Bosnia-Herzegovina is that, for all their fair words, none of the parties there can claim to satisfy this condition. The establishment of UNPROFOR's headquarters in Sarajevo has not prevented a savage conflict from breaking out there. General Nambiar's repeated appeals for restraint have been ignored. He and Mr. Goulding were unjustifiably delayed, and mortar rounds fired close to them, by Serb irregulars on 5 May 1992. On 3 May, Muslim militiamen, reneging on an agreement for the safe passage of JNA personnel leaving the JNA headquarters in Sarajevo, killed a number of them in cold blood in the presence of senior UNPROFOR officers who were powerless to stop the slaughter (and were subsequently abused, detained and disarmed by Serb militiamen because of their alleged complicity in the plot). United Nations personnel are routinely harassed, the Organization's property stolen and its emblems and uniforms misappropriated by various of the parties. These are not the conditions which permit a United Nations peace-keeping operation to make an effective contribution.

27. It could be argued that in these circumstances the United Nations should consider the possibility of deploying an "intervention force" which would be sent in, without the consent of all the parties, to enforce an end to the fighting. Indeed President Izetbegovic made such a request (see para. 12 above). Given the intensity and scale of the fighting, such a concept would require many tens of thousands of troops equipped for potential combat with heavily armed and determined adversaries. I do not believe that an enforcement action of this kind is a practicable proposition.

28. On 8 May, President Izetbegovic wrote to me, following Mr. Goulding's visit, to request the deployment of United Nations peace-keeping forces with "specific goals and a limited workable mandate" to control Sarajevo Airport, protect humanitarian aid deliveries and keep open roads, bridges and border crossings. If, contrary to the general expectation (see para. 7 above), it proved possible to obtain the other parties' agreement to interim arrangements of this kind, there might be a role for UNPROFOR military observers in monitoring their implementation. However, the chaotic military situation and the apparent inability of the protagonists to get their forces to respect cease-fire agreements would probably make it necessary to deploy armed troops. The protecting force might also find that it had to take control of extensive territory. Protection of Sarajevo Airport, for instance, could be not assured simply by a presence at the Airport itself; it would be necessary also to control the surrounding hills from which the Airport can be shelled and to ensure that access roads to it were not blockaded, as they are at present. Such a task could require several infantry battalions, and if the factions controlling the roadblocks objected, an enforcement function might become necessary, with all the implications that that would entail.

29. As regards the protection of international humanitarian programmes, experience has again shown that a mere United Nations presence is not sufficient to deter hostile action against them. The Force Commander's view, which I share, is that the best form of protection is respect for agreements,

binding on all the armed parties, to allow humanitarian supplies to be delivered without hindrance or abuse. Implementation of such agreements could be monitored by United Nations military observers.

30. To ensure effective protection in the absence of agreements between the parties, however, it would be necessary to provide convoys of relief supplies with armed escorts whose rules of engagement would permit them to open fire if a convoy was attacked. A protection operation would thus need to be on the lines of that proposed for Mogadishu in my report of 21 April to the Security Council. 5/ The Force Commander of UNPROFOR has advised me that such an operation would be technically feasible but that it would require adequately armed troops, who would have to be additional to UNPROFOR's existing strength. General Nambiar has also expressed the concern that the addition of this task to UNPROFOR's mandate would risk involving the Force in hostile encounters with those whose cooperation will be necessary if UNPROFOR is to succeed in fulfilling its existing mandate in the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia. Such hostilities would also have far-reaching implications for the security of UNPROFOR personnel generally. I fully share General Nambiar's concerns and do not therefore recommend that the Security Council pursue this option at the present time.

31. As regards the deployment of UNPROFOR, I am convinced by the operational and security arguments in favour of the temporary relocation of the bulk of the Force's headquarters staff from Sarajevo. I am therefore instructing General Nambiar to proceed accordingly, while making it clear to the parties that this is only a temporary relocation, pending the restoration of calm in the city.

32. The question of the boundaries of the United Nations Protected Areas is a difficult one. The Croatian authorities are correct in their interpretation of the plan. It would have been helpful if they could have agreed to some adjustment of the agreed boundaries, but they were under no obligation to do so. I now see no alternative but to instruct General Nambiar to deploy and assume his responsibilities in the existing Protected Areas in accordance with the Plan, while appealing to JNA and the Serbian authorities to use their influence to calm the fears of the Serb communities who will find themselves outside the Protected Areas and to ensure that the demilitarization of the Protected Areas goes according to Plan.

33. I must also draw the Security Council's attention to the implications of the decision of the Belgrade authorities in respect of JNA, described in paragraph 24 above. In effect this removes from the area of operations a party to the United Nations peace-keeping Plan whose cooperation is essential to its success, while substituting for it a new element or elements which are not formally bound by the Belgrade authorities' acceptance of the Plan. Refusal by the much-enlarged local forces to demobilize would undermine the very basis of the Plan which UNPROFOR has been mandated to implement. As stated in my report of 4 February 1992, 6/ the Plan contains two central elements: withdrawal of JNA from Croatia and demilitarization of the United

Nations Protected Areas, and the continuing functioning of the existing local authorities and police, pending the negotiation of an overall political solution to the crisis in EC's Conference on Yugoslavia. Failure to demobilize would thus make UNPROFOR's mandate unimplementable. Renewed hostilities would almost certainly result, especially in and around Sectors North and South, and the Force's future would have to be reconsidered.

34. There are thus two main conclusions to be drawn from the present report. The first is that in Bosnia-Herzegovina it is not at present feasible to undertake peace-keeping activities beyond the existing limited involvement of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and the Mostar region, in both of which places the security of United Nations personnel is already precarious. The second conclusion is that developments since the Security Council approved the Plan for the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Croatia have raised new doubts about the practicability of that operation.

35. In these circumstances, I believe that the Security Council must continue to lend its full support to the peace-making activities of the European Community. Political solutions to these tragic and complex conflicts can, in my view, be achieved only through a continuous and uninterrupted process of patient negotiation led by the European Community, which has already established agreed mechanisms for this purpose. The possibilities for an effective United Nations role will depend on its negotiators' success.

Notes

- 1/ S/23860.
- 2/ S/23844, paras. 18 and 19.
- 3/ Ibid., para. 7.
- 4/ Ibid., para. 22.
- 5/ S/23829.
- 6/ S/23513, para. 8.
