



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/21349
8 June 1990

ORIGINAL; ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in accordance with the request contained in paragraph 4 of Council resolution 654 (1990) of 4 May 1990 on the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). It updates the information regarding **the** demobilization of members of the Nicaraguan resistance which was contained in my report of 4 June 1990 (S/21341).

2. As indicated in paragraph 9 of that report, the members of the Nicaraguan resistance fall into three groups,

3. The first and largest group consists of the combatants of the "Northern Front" and "Central Front" who have concentrated in security zones 1 to 5 (see S/21274/Add.1, para. 2) and whose demobilization has **been** the subject of several agreements with the Nicaraguan Government, culminating in the Managua Protocol of 30 May (see S/21341, annex). Since my report of 4 June, there has been a further marked increase in the rate at which this group is being demobilized. In the four days from 4 to 7 June inclusive, the daily rate of demobilization has averaged 703. The Chief Military Observer of ONUCA has reported that the **average age of** demobilized personnel is around 25, with most of them very close to that age. He has also reported that the weapons handed in can be described, with **few** exceptions, as being in generally serviceable condition. As of 7 June, 6,536 members of this group had been demobilized since the process began in Nicaragua on 8 May. ON-WA's estimate is that approximately 6,700 remain to be demobilized including several thousand unarmed support personnel. It has been informed by the leadership of the Nicaraguan resistance **in the area that a major ceremony will take place on 9 June** in security zone 5 at which 2,000 or more combatants will hand over their weapons etc. to ONUCA.

4. The second group are the members of the Nicaraguan resistance belonging to the "Atlantic Front" (Yatama) who are present in security zones 6 and 7 (see S/21274/Add.1, para. 7) and whose demobilization started on 21 May. Their demobilization has proceeded at a less satisfactory pace than that of the main group, largely because of logistic difficulties in concentrating them at demobilization **areas** in the large security zones concerned. As of 7 June, 305 members of this group had been demobilized. ONUCA estimates that at least another 1,000 are yet to be demobilized.

5. Thirdly, there is the "Southern Front", which was due to resume its talks with the Government on 7 June at El Almendro, in **zone** 5, with a view to reaching an agreement with the Government on demobilization. However, these talks were postponed until the morning of 8 June.

Observations

6. Although it is doubtful whether it will be possible to complete the process of demobilization by 10 June, it will be clear from the figures in paragraph 3 above that, as far **as** the "Northern Front" and "Central Front" are concerned, rapid progress has been **made** during the week that is now ending. The leaders of this group have stated, both in their continuing conversations with the Nicaraguan Government and in public, that **demobilization** is an irreversible process and that they will honour the commitments which they have entered into. In these circumstances, the Nicaraguan Government has indicated its wish that I should recommend to the Security Council that that part of **ONUSA's** mandate which is related to **monitoring** the cease-fire and separation of forces and demobilizing the **members** of the Nicaraguan **resistance** should not be allowed to lapse on 10 June but should be extended for a sufficient period to permit demobilization to be completed (a period which the Nicaraguan Government estimates at between two and three weeks).

7. The situation regarding the "Atlantic Front" and "Southern Front" is less clear and less satisfactory. In the former case, demobilization has proceeded slowly and in the latter it **has** not yet **begun**. However, the combatants in these two groups are much fewer than those in the main group and if their demobilization can now proceed rapidly, it should be possible to complete it not later than the demobilization of the main group.

8. I believe that, in these circumstances, it would be appropriate for the Security Council to authorize an extension of the relevant part of **ONUSA's** mandate for a brief and clearly defined period. This will be in **accordance** with the wish of the **Nicaraguan Government**. It will also correspond with my own conviction that it would be a mistake for **ONUSA**, which has played such a central part in making demobilization possible, to be withdrawn when the work is now on the whole proceeding rapidly and its completion is within reach.

9. As reported above, the Nicaraguan Government believes that a further two to three weeks will be needed to complete demobilization. The **time** required **for** this is, of course, the critical factor determining the period **for** which the mandate should be extended. It will depend to an important extent on how many combatants remain to be demobilized after the ceremony planned for 9 June. It will also depend on how those combatants are distributed between the five security zones,

10. If the major demobilization in security zone 5 on 9 June takes place on the scale expected, the numbers remaining to be demobilized should be such as to permit completion of the process within 10 days or so. **But**, given the inevitable uncertainties, the Security Council may think it right to allow **some** flexibility and to authorize the extension of the relevant parts of **ONUSA's** mandate for a period of up to 19 days, that is until 29 June 1990. On this basis, I would instruct the Chief Military Observer to deploy the military personnel available to

him in a flexible manner in order to ensure the earliest possible completion of demobilization. He would also be instructed to repatriate the Venezuelan battalion, company by company, at the earliest dates permitted by the evolution of the task entrusted to it. I would also, on the Security Council's behalf, draw the Nicaraguan Government's attention to the fact that this part of ONUCA's mandate will terminate not later than 29 June and urge it to ensure that demobilization of the combatants of the "Atlantic Front" and "Southern Front" is completed before that date.

11. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council decide to extend that part of ONUCA's mandate which is related to monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces and demobilizing the members of the Nicaraguan resistance for a period not exceeding 19 days from 10 June 1990, that is until 29 June 1990 at the latest.

