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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED
NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL)

1. The purpose of the present report is to update the Security Council on the recent discovery, at various locations inside and outside of El Salvador, of illegal arms deposits belonging to the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). Following my letter of 8 June 1993 to the President of the Security Council on this issue (S/25901), the Council issued a statement on 11 June (S/25929) in which it expressed serious concern at the maintenance of such clandestine arms deposits, which it considered the most serious violation to date of the commitments assumed under the Peace Accords. The Council also urged FMLN to comply with its obligation to provide a complete inventory of its arms and munitions, both inside and outside El Salvador and surrender them in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Accords, and to continue to cooperate in this regard with the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). Ever since the discovery of the first illegal arms cache in Managua on 23 May, I have made continuous efforts directly and through ONUSAL to establish the facts, to ensure that all remaining clandestine caches are declared to it and their contents destroyed and to limit the repercussions on the peace process of this very serious violation of the Peace Accords.

2. On 12 June 1993, I addressed a letter to the Coordinator-General of FMLN, Mr. Schafik Handal, in which, among other things, I expressed my distress at learning that, contrary to the assurances he had given me, the final inventory of weapons presented to ONUSAL by FMLN had been grossly inaccurate. I reminded Mr. Handal that it was on the basis of ONUSAL's confirmation that all the items in the inventory had been accounted for and were being destroyed that FMLN had been legalized as a political party by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral) of El Salvador. I emphasized that such a deliberate attempt to mislead me placed my credibility in doubt and raised very serious questions of confidence and trust. I accordingly urged FMLN to demonstrate in words and deeds that it remained committed to the peace process and also requested Mr. Handal to inform me, by 20 June 1993, of the action taken by FMLN to ensure that all arms caches in El Salvador and in neighbouring countries were located and their contents destroyed, and that any weapons still in possession of FMLN militants were similarly handed over to ONUSAL for destruction. The full text of my letter to Mr. Handal is annexed to this report (annex I).

3. On 17 June 1993, I received Mr. Handal's reply, dated 16 June, together with another letter, dated 11 June, addressed to me by Mr. Salvador Sánchez Cerén, Secretary-General of the FMLN constituent group which had acknowledged responsibility for the existence of the Managua arms cache, the Popular Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación) (FPL). Both letters are annexed to the present report as annexes II A and B. Mr. Handal stressed that, notwithstanding the existence of undeclared war-related matériel, whose purpose had been "to keep a last negotiating card in order to guarantee peace and the conclusion of the agreements", FMLN had at no time considered resuming the armed struggle in El Salvador and unreservedly reaffirmed its commitment to the peace process. He also stated categorically that FMLN had no armed groups under its command. Finally, he referred to FPL's readiness to "clean up its house", adding that the FMLN leadership was considering how best to carry out the collection of arms which might have been dispersed and concealed. He also promised to inform me as soon as possible of the conclusions reached in this regard (see para. 5 below).

4. For his part, Mr. Sánchez Cerén apologized for having misled me and the United Nations, stating that FPL had not inventoried nor destroyed all its arms owing to its profound mistrust of the Armed Forces. This mistrust had grown with the Government's delays and failure to meet its commitments. Although various reschedulings had prevented the collapse of the process, the balance reflected in the initial implementation timetable had been radically upset. He further stated that, as FMLN developed as a political party and its chances of expansion were increasing, the maintenance of those arms had become an onerous and unnecessary burden, incompatible with its new status. Consequently, FPL had already decided to hand over its caches to the Nicaraguan Government and to ONUSAL when the explosion occurred. He further stated that FPL had taken all the necessary steps to rid itself of all arms and that, once the total destruction of the weapons in Nicaragua was completed, it would inform ONUSAL about the location of the remaining caches in El Salvador. Shortly after this letter, FPL contacted ONUSAL with a view to setting up a schedule, not to exceed 45 days, for the location and destruction of the caches. This was followed, on 18 June, by a letter addressed to my Special Representative, in which Mr. Sánchez Cerén indicated FPL's willingness to begin working immediately with ONUSAL on this process. In his letter Mr. Sánchez Cerén also appointed an FPL liaison officer for the purpose of drawing up with ONUSAL the operational plan for the location and destruction, by 4 August 1993, of the above-mentioned weapons.

5. On 19 June 1993, Mr. Handal, complying with his promise to me, informed me that FMLN would cooperate with ONUSAL in locating and destroying all of its remaining weapons within a period of 45 days beginning on 21 June 1993 (i.e. by 4 August). Any weapons confiscated after the expiry of that period would be accounted for solely by the persons in whose possession they were found and would not be FMLN's responsibility. Finally, expressing concern for delays and non-compliance by the Government with its obligations under the Peace Accords, Mr. Handal stressed the need for the establishment of specific time-limits to assure full implementation of pending commitments. The need for such a timetable has been repeatedly raised by FMLN, particularly last March when Mr. Handal visited United Nations Headquarters on the occasion of the presentation of the report of the Commission on the Truth. In this regard, he

emphasized the importance of renewed direct communication between the parties. The full text of Mr. Handal's letter is included in annex III.

6. On 17 June 1993, the ONUSAL technical team that had travelled to Managua on 29 May, at the invitation of the Government of Nicaragua, to work jointly with the Government's Special Disarmament Brigade (Brigada Especial de Desarme) on the establishment of the facts surrounding the 23 May explosion reported that the task of itemizing and destroying weapons and war-related matériel that were under the control of FPL had been completed. Based on the information provided by FPL, which cooperated fully in the investigation, ONUSAL and the Nicaraguan authorities verified 16 "safe houses" (casas de seguridad), including the automobile-repair shop that was the scene of the 23 May incident. Five of those houses contained armament which was mostly in good condition, and which included some 1,240 rifles, 2,025 kilogrammes of explosives, 1,406,300 rounds of ammunition, 1,300 mortar grenades, 3,970 assorted grenades, 350 rockets (LAW), 35,700 detonators, 42 machine-guns and 19 surface-to-air missiles. No weapons or war matériel were found in the other "safe houses". The Nicaraguan authorities are continuing their inquiries into the possible involvement of parties foreign to El Salvador.

7. Another constituent group of FMLN, the former People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo), now renamed Expresión Renovadora del Pueblo (ERP), separately handed over to ONUSAL in San Salvador, on 17 June 1993, some 2-3 tons of matériel consisting primarily of small-arms ammunition and explosives, some of them in poor condition. ERP has also informed ONUSAL about the existence of another clandestine deposit in the eastern part of the country, which it will soon transfer to ONUSAL for destruction. Furthermore, ONUSAL has been informed by a third FMLN group, the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional) (RN), that various caches of arms and ammunition located in the country would be transferred to it for destruction within the next few days. A fourth FMLN faction, the Liberation Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación) (FAL), has also informed ONUSAL that it will soon provide information on its own holdings of war matériel.

8. On 11 June 1993, I received a letter from President Cristiani in which, among other things, he stated that the conduct of FMLN, in addition to being in violation of the commitments it had assumed, violated the constitutional provision prohibiting the existence of armed groups and might therefore be a reason to disband FMLN as a political party. In this connection, the President requested that the 14 December 1992 ONUSAL certification of complete disarmament on the part of FMLN be left in abeyance until FMLN had handed over all its war-related matériel for destruction. In the same letter, President Cristiani also demanded that FMLN demobilize armed groups of its members or sympathizers, or declare that it had severed links with such groups. The President also expressed the view that the gravity of the breach by FMLN warranted that the Security Council pass a resolution on the matter. President Cristiani's letter appears in annex IV to this report.

9. The right of FMLN to maintain its status as a political party in the current circumstances has also been questioned in other quarters and the view expressed that this status should be cancelled or suspended. On 14 June 1993, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral), which, on the basis

of ONUSAL's certification, had granted to FMLN its present status, requested from ONUSAL a full report on the discovery of arms caches in Nicaragua.

10. As indicated above (see para. 3), FMLN has categorically denied that it is supporting any armed groups or that it has any such groups under its command. However, it has not discarded the possibility that some of its former combatants belong to groups of delinquents and has requested that a professional investigation be conducted with the support of ONUSAL. It has also offered its full cooperation in dealing with this problem. ONUSAL has been investigating the issue for some time and has found no evidence of armed groups under the command of FMLN. It has, however, confirmed the existence of a number of armed criminal bands varying in size from 20 to 50 members and composed not only of ex-combatants of FMLN, but also of former members of the Armed Forces and civilians equipped with military weapons. ONUSAL has for its part ascertained that these bands are fully autonomous and that their behaviour is of a criminal and non-political nature. It has been able to identify members of one of those groups and has turned this information over to the Government. ONUSAL will continue to gather information on the activities of these criminal groups and to cooperate with the authorities on this matter. No direct relationship has been established between these groups and the arms caches recently discovered.

11. The seriousness of the situation which was revealed by the explosion of 23 May 1993 in Managua cannot be overemphasized. It has raised questions of confidence and trust and could have seriously undermined the peace process. However, the cancellation or suspension of FMLN's status as a political party could in my view place in jeopardy the progress which has so far been achieved and could itself deal a severe blow to the peace process. The transformation of FMLN into a political party and the full reintegration of its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country, are at the very core of the Peace Accords. Indeed, this process constitutes the ultimate goal of the entire process as envisaged in the Geneva Agreement of 4 April 1990. It is likewise imperative to avoid a disruption of the electoral process, in which it is essential that FMLN have every opportunity to participate. Fortunately, FMLN's prompt and complete acceptance of its responsibility for the events and its full cooperation in the ensuing investigation have paved the way for a restoration of the confidence that should accompany the peace process. It is clear however that FMLN now has to demonstrate anew its commitment to that process and that confidence will only be fully restored upon the complete disclosure, as promised, by FMLN of all its holdings in arms and munitions and their subsequent destruction by the date indicated. I shall keep the Security Council informed of further developments.

12. It is an indication of the strength and irreversibility of the peace process and a credit to both parties that a serious incident of this nature has not been allowed to derail the implementation of the Peace Accords. In this regard, I wish to commend President Cristiani for the statesmanship he has demonstrated and to exhort the Government and FMLN to make every effort in the months ahead to restore confidence in the peace process and to ensure its successful completion. I also wish to record my gratitude to the Government of Nicaragua for the cooperation and support it has given ONUSAL in this matter.

Annex I

Letter dated 12 June 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the Coordinator-General of the Frente Farabundo Martí para
la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)

I write with reference to the recent discovery in Nicaragua of important quantities of military weapons and related items belonging to one of the constituent groups of the FMLN. You will already have seen the statement made on this matter by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Council.

As you are well aware, it is on the basis of (a) repeated assurances by the FMLN that the inventory it had presented to ONUSAL was a full statement of its holdings of military matériel and (b) confirmation by ONUSAL that all the items in that inventory had been accounted for and were being destroyed, that the FMLN became a political party on 14 December 1992 and the armed conflict in El Salvador was brought formally to an end on the following day. It is because I was convinced that such indeed was the case that I stated then that El Salvador had crossed the line from armed peace into a new era. With this in mind, I am distressed to learn that, contrary to your assurances which I had accepted in good faith, the inventory presented to ONUSAL by the FMLN was grossly inaccurate and failed to include large quantities of warlike matériel. Such a deliberate attempt to mislead me places my credibility in doubt and raises in my mind very serious questions of confidence and trust which, in the absence of any communication from you, I am unable to answer at this time.

Recent pronouncements in El Salvador clearly show the damaging effects of the recent incident in Nicaragua and the very serious consequences that it could have for the peace process itself. I would urge you to take the necessary steps to demonstrate, in words and in deeds, that the FMLN, notwithstanding the damage done, continues to be committed to the Peace Accords and to the process of national reconciliation.

Given the United Nations responsibility for verifying the implementation of the Peace Accords, it will be necessary for me to keep the Security Council informed about developments in regard to this issue. I should accordingly be grateful if you would inform me by 20 June 1993 of the action which has been taken by the FMLN to ensure that all arms caches in El Salvador and neighbouring countries are located and their contents destroyed and that any weapons remaining in the hands of FMLN militants are similarly handed over to ONUSAL for destruction.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex II (A)

[Original: Spanish]

Letter dated 16 June 1993 from the Coordinator-General of
the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
(FMLN) addressed to the Secretary-General

In reply to your letter of 12 June 1993, I should like first of all to state that the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) has at no time considered resuming the armed conflict. On behalf of all the comrades of the former General Command, I can assure you that we all remain committed to continuing to develop and consolidate the peace process. No one is supporting or is in command of armed groups.

While this does not rule out the possibility that there may be groups which include persons who at one point were FMLN combatants - just as it has been determined that there are armed groups made up of former members of the armed forces and security bodies, at the present time they have no connection with us. As you know, this is a frequent and almost inevitable phenomenon in post-war periods, but it, I repeat, does not mean that FMLN is supporting, organizing or concealing the existence of such groups.

Consequently, you may rest assured that the view which you expressed at the ceremony marking the cessation of the armed confrontation to the effect that "El Salvador has crossed the line from armed peace into a new era" is completely valid and objective as far as FMLN is concerned, today as it was on 15 December.

Comrade Salvador Sánchez Cerén, in his letter of 11 June, which I have attached, explains clearly the reason why a certain quantity of arms was withheld without informing ONUSAL about this fact. The purpose of this was to keep a last negotiating card in order to guarantee peace and the conclusion of the agreements. The need for this card derives from a profound mistrust of the armed forces. This mistrust is based on both the reluctance of the armed forces to adapt to change and accept the new doctrine, their new role in a democratic society, as well as the military capability which this armed institution still has and which is sufficient to reverse the process, in spite of the measures and commitment by the United Nations to prevent them from doing so.

I understand perfectly that since I have not communicated with you until now you feel unable to respond to the doubts and questions which the discovery of the arms stockpile in Santa Rosa has given rise to. I did not contact you earlier because I had assumed that the free-flowing communication and full collaboration which our comrades in the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) have had with ONUSAL were sufficient. In any event, I accept your views on the matter and apologize for this oversight. At the same time, I should like to reiterate that I feel personally committed to do everything incumbent upon me to move forward through this critical period.

With regard to the information which you have requested from me concerning the measures which FMLN is taking in order to ensure that any further arms stockpiles which might exist in El Salvador or a neighbouring country are

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located and destroyed, I should like to indicate the following: as comrade Salvador Sánchez Cerén informs you, FPL has already taken the necessary steps to "clean up its house". The rest of us in the former General Command are considering the way in which arms which may have been dispersed and concealed could be recollected. I plan to return from Mexico City to San Salvador next Friday, 18 June. I shall then contact the other comrades and inform you as speedily as possible of the conclusions which we have reached. In the meantime, I am sending you a copy of the FMLN communiqué on the subject, which we issued yesterday.

I learned through the press that President Cristiani has requested you to suspend ONUSAL certification of the complete disarmament and demobilization of FMLN. The President intends to use this action by the United Nations to justify suspending the legal status of FMLN as a political party.

I am concerned at the fact that President Cristiani is taking these positions now. At first, he assumed a moderate stance with regard to the discovery in Santa Rosa. He espoused a position rather in defense of the peace process. Last Friday, however, he used the incident as a pretext for cancelling a high-level meeting between the parties which had been agreed upon after the discovery for the purpose of promoting compliance with the agreements to be carried out in order to reduce the negative impact of the incident. This change is probably due to the fact that President Cristiani is being subjected to strong pressure by those who are opposed to the peace process. They know that the armed conflict came about because the political avenues were closed. They are aware that an attempt to close them again now, if only temporarily, may have serious implications for the process, which has not encountered any setback. Suspending the legal status of FMLN would be the first step backwards in the implementation of the agreements. Without any doubt, such a measure, instead of restoring trust between the parties, would enormously increase the feelings of mistrust.

Accordingly, I feel on the contrary that the United Nations should take extraordinary steps to re-establish communication between the parties and ensure that this stumbling block does not degenerate into an obstacle that paralyses and undermines the progress that has already been achieved or is close at hand. The Salvadorian people deserve the successful completion of this process, which began well and has proceeded well.

In view of the importance of the matter, you are at liberty to include a copy of this letter together with that of comrade Sánchez Cerén as an annex to your report to the Security Council.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the assurances of my highest consideration and once again reaffirm our commitment to proceeding forward in the peace process.

(Signed) Schafik Jorge HANDAL

Annex II (B)

[Original: Spanish]

Letter dated 11 June 1993 from the Secretary-General of
the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL) addressed
to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you in my capacity as Secretary-General of the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí (FPL), and as a member of the Political Committee and of the former General Command of FMLN, with reference to the stockpiles of arms which we did not destroy earlier.

I believe that we owe you, your closest colleagues, the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and members of the Security Council an explanation because of the very significant contribution which you have made, and can continue to make, to the process of implementation of the agreements and consolidation of peace in El Salvador. Please forward a copy of this letter to them all.

In explaining the viewpoint of FPL, I am not seeking to be exhaustive, to evade responsibilities or to deny the seriousness of this. I am trying to place it in proper perspective, to maintain your confidence and that of the others for whom this letter is intended and, above all, to ensure that those who have always opposed the peace process do not seize this opportunity to reduce substantially the achievements of the Salvadorian people.

First of all I should like to assure you that the reason we did not take an inventory of or destroy these arms was at no time because we were thinking of using them to conduct a further military offensive. As you yourself can confirm, ever since we opted to seek a political solution to the Salvadorian conflict, FPL - as part of FMLN - has been working hard in the negotiations, contributing to the search for formulas that have helped us to untie the "Gordian knots". After the signing of the peace agreements, we have been endeavouring to move ahead constructively with their implementation while, at the same time, devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to transforming our secret political-military structure into an open political organization with an expanding popular base.

The results of these efforts became clear at the close of the first FPL Congress, which was an expression of the vitality and political strength which we have built up and the occasion for the highest governing body of FPL to ratify, by unanimously approving the strategy for this new period, the historic decision which our Central Committee had taken, namely, to replace the political and military struggle by an exclusively political struggle. Our current strategy is aimed entirely at achieving the implementation of the agreements, electoral victory, promotion of overall development and the growth and consolidation of our political party.

The real reason we did not make an inventory of or destroy all our arms was simply that we had profound mistrust of the armed forces. This forced us to keep one last negotiating card up our sleeve in order to guarantee the full execution of all agreements. As you know, even though the process was put back

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on track by means of various reschedulings which averted a major crisis in the peace process, the Government's delays and failure to meet commitments considerably increased our mistrust and definitively upset the balance achieved in the initial schedule. As a result, destruction of FMLN's military apparatus was carried out under circumstances substantially different from those which were initially agreed on. It was done before the arms for the exclusive use of the armed forces had been collected, before land ownership in the conflict areas had been legalized, before the functional structure of PNC had been created, before the purification of the armed forces had been completed, and so forth.

For this reason, although we were fully confident that after 15 December you and your colleagues would continue to press for full implementation of the agreements, we had serious grounds for believing that after that date the resistance of certain sectors of the armed forces would increase, which might reduce the latitude for United Nations mediation. As you are well aware, the effectiveness of the United Nations observer missions does not depend only on the sincerity, dedication and commitment of the Secretary-General and his colleagues. If that were so, all the peace processes which are currently being verified by the United Nations would be as successful as that of El Salvador.

After 15 December, we were able to confirm, on the one hand, that the resistance of those sectors of the armed forces which opposed the peace agreement did increase and, at the same time, our own capacity to press for compliance with the agreements was substantially weakened. This contributed, inter alia, to a significant slowing down of the pace of execution of agreements that were incomplete or outstanding.

As you know, most of the agreements which were rescheduled on 22 December and 4 February 1993 were not implemented on the agreed new dates. Up to now they have not been implemented. This non-fulfilment is correctly reflected in the report you presented, on 21 May, to the Security Council, in which it is stated that some 30 government commitments have not been fully met. This is without listing all the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth and the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL which the Government has not acted on.

Moreover, we were also able to confirm that, after 15 December, you, your colleagues and the Security Council continued to press insistently for full implementation of the recommendations of the ad hoc Commission, the Commission on the Truth and all other agreements.

Inasmuch as we were continuing to develop as a legal political party and as our prospects of continuing to do so were expanding apace, it became incompatible, burdensome and unnecessary for us to have these stockpiles of arms. For that reason, those in charge of maintaining the stockpiles had already decided to hand them over privately to the Government of Nicaragua and to ONUSAL, as had been done with the stockpiles we had in Honduras. Unfortunately this new decision was not carried out because all the active members of FPL were engrossed in preparing for Congress and the Congress itself, and in the immediate tasks following therefrom.

The discovery of the stockpile at Santa Rosa in Nicaragua and all the implications of that event convinced us that the decision to rid ourselves of

all arms was the correct one. Unfortunately, we had to do it after the events of 23 May.

I should like to take this opportunity to apologize for concealing the existence of these stockpiles from you and your colleagues. For the reasons set out above, we were convinced of the need to keep them, but decided to do so without informing you of the fact, since we were aware of the impartiality with which you and your colleagues had acted in the Salvadorian peace process.

The above explanations relate to the past. As to the present and the future, we have already publicly acknowledged responsibility for the arms found at Santa Rosa and are handing over to the Nicaraguan Government and ONUSAL other stockpiles we had kept in that country. Once they have been destroyed, we shall inform ONUSAL of the whereabouts of the stockpiles we have maintained in El Salvador so that they can be immediately destroyed. In short, we have already undertaken the necessary measures to "clean up our house", in other words to comply with the undertakings we gave in the peace agreements. We are also cooperating with the Nicaraguan Government to settle the legal proceedings currently in progress.

However, we are concerned that all these actions have served to fan, rather than extinguish, the flames. Because of the domestic political situation in Nicaragua and the forthcoming elections in El Salvador, these actions are continually being distorted in an attempt to further damage FPL, reduce the prospects of an electoral victory by the Salvadorian left, create a climate in which attacks on the opposition can be stepped up and, above all, diminish past prospective gains under the peace agreements, which are the heritage not of FMLN, but of the Salvadorian people.

For almost a month the local press has focused attention on the arms hidden by FPL. Scant mention has been made of the arms for the exclusive use of the armed forces which are still in the hands of civilians. It has overlooked the fact that many of the commitments given by the Government have not been met, including the land transfer programme, the agreement to deploy the National Civil Police, the gradual disbanding of the national police, implementation of the medium-term programme for the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life, compliance with the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, and so on.

Even your letter to the Security Council and the latter's subsequent declaration have been manipulated by certain sectors. Instead of serving to accelerate confidence-building and relaunch the process by urging full and immediate compliance with all the agreements, they are being used to promote mistrust and justify the failure to comply with the remaining agreements.

The fact that attention has been focused solely on the arms in the possession of FPL has today been used by the Government as a pretext for cancelling a high-level meeting at the eleventh hour. The meeting had been called by ONUSAL in the wake of the events in Nicaragua. It would have been very useful in seeking ways of rebuilding confidence, reopening communications, curbing the current increase in the dirty war, and speeding up implementation of the agreements.

It is clear that the extreme right is aggressively attacking the FPL leaders and prospective candidates not only from a desire to halt the implementation of the agreements once and for all, but also because they want to distort and reverse them. They know that FPL is the majority component of FMLN and one of its most dynamic forces. They know that by weakening FPL they can damage the prospects of the Salvadorian left winning the elections. They want to prevent the new Government from continuing to extend and consolidate the gains achieved by the negotiations. They want to ensure victory for ARENA in order to reverse the process of demilitarization and democratization carried out under the agreements.

In conclusion, I am convinced of the urgent need to put the transgression by FPL in a proper perspective, recognize that it has already been rectified and give rapid impetus to the process of implementing the agreements. It would be very useful if the chief of ONUSAL could call, privately as well as publicly, for efforts to overcome the crisis and the swift resumption of the process of complying fully with the agreements. Otherwise, that process will be seriously and irreparably damaged, with the main loser being not FPL but the Salvadorian people.

Without wishing to exonerate FPL, FMLN or the Government, we hope that in the interest of the Salvadorian people you will again be able to foster the resumption and consolidation of the peace process and prevent the current crisis from escalating and resulting in deadlock. There is an urgent need to refocus attention and efforts on meeting the outstanding commitments. Time is running out.

I take this opportunity to convey the assurances of my highest consideration, and to reaffirm our complete readiness to continue promoting the consolidation of peace through full compliance with all the agreements.

(Signed) Salvador SANCHEZ CEREN

Annex III

[Original: Spanish]

Letter dated 19 June 1993 from the Coordinator-General of
the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
(FMLN) addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letter of 16 June 1993, I am writing to inform you that, after my return from Mexico yesterday I met with my comrades of the former General Command and we adopted decisions and measures concerning the arms of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) that remain to be collected and destroyed. The decisions and measures are the following:

1. Collect and destroy, in close cooperation with the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), arms still held by FMLN, within a period of 45 days beginning on 21 June. We believe that this is sufficient time for us and we hope that it will also be sufficient for ONUSAL with its reduced military staff.
2. We cannot specify in advance the number and type of these arms, since there may be scattered and concealed weapons stockpiles over which we have no firm control. We have taken the necessary measures to determine the existence and whereabouts of such weapons stockpiles. We believe that, at the end of the aforementioned period, we will be in a position to specify the number and type of weapons that were collected.
3. The Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL) has informed us of its decision to reveal the location of and destroy the weapons stockpiles that it still maintains in El Salvador, once it has finished destroying, with the cooperation and supervision of ONUSAL, its stockpiles of weapons in Nicaragua. FPL has already submitted the plan for its operation in El Salvador to ONUSAL.

The Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) has also informed us that last week it provided ONUSAL with information about arms still in its possession with a view to their destruction.

We believe that all these arms should be accounted for at the end of the 45 days.

4. The collection of FMLN arms during this time period should proceed without publicity, in private, in accordance with a plan that each member organization of FMLN will submit to ONUSAL. This operation can begin immediately, with the plan already submitted by FPL. ONUSAL would publicize the final results. The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) and the National Police should not participate in this operation in any way. Since the operation involves former areas of conflict that are subject to a special security regime, the participation of the National Civil Police would be acceptable only when ONUSAL considers it necessary.

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5. The arms confiscated after the expiry of the 45-day period shall be accounted for solely by the persons in whose possession they are found. FMLN disclaims all responsibility. We have expressly agreed to this arrangement.
6. We have carefully examined the case of the arms that disappeared, after having been inspected and itemized by ONUSAL, at the 15 points at which our forces were concentrated during the period of the "armed peace", and we have concluded that:
 - (a) These arms were taken from under our control; to put it bluntly, they were stolen;
 - (b) It is clear that, since the arms formed part of the inventories that we turned over to ONUSAL and were inspected by its Military Division, there is no reason to suppose that we removed them ourselves for the purpose of concealing them;
 - (c) We are unable to recover these arms and, if they are confiscated in the future by the competent authorities, those persons in whose possession the arms are found shall be held accountable.

The developments that have prompted me to write this letter are, as you well understand, typical of a post-war situation and the complex process of dealing with the consequences of a long war that has had political, economic, moral, material and psychological repercussions and has left mistrust and anxiety in its wake. We cannot allow any of these difficulties and, at times, complications affect the peace or hinder the process of democratization. This is our firm conviction and resolve.

The peace process in El Salvador, despite these incidents, is a tangible fact, and it must be continued and encouraged. The strength of that process derives from each party's compliance with the agreements and commitments it has undertaken. This is also the source of its credibility.

FMLN has paid a high political price for not having complied fully with its obligation to submit accurate inventories of its arms. However, by taking the measures set out in this letter, it is making an extraordinary effort to normalize its situation within a short period of time - by 4 August 1993 - and thereby give new impetus to the Chapultepec process.

In your report of 21 May 1993, you informed the Security Council of a considerable and disturbing number of cases of non-compliance or distortions of its obligations on the part of the Government of President Cristiani, which form a truly dramatic panorama. We see no reason for considering such cases of non-compliance as any less serious than ours, which we are currently rectifying. This situation continues to give rise to mistrust among our member organizations and also among broad sectors of the population. Mistrust is increasing as the date of the elections - which will be held in March 1994 - approaches and the time remaining in the term of President Alfredo Cristiani is growing shorter; at the same time, the many cases of non-compliance that you referred to in your report have not been substantially redressed.

We are convinced of the need for extraordinary measures and efforts to ensure that the Government fulfils all its obligations in what remains of the current year, in any case before the March 1994 elections, except in those cases in which it was agreed that full compliance would take place at a later date.

We believe that the Government must agree on specific time-limits that will enable it to end its dilatory behaviour and comply fully with its obligations that it has undertaken. We hope that you obtain specific commitments and measures from the Government of El Salvador so that the peace and democratization process can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. It is particularly important, as I mentioned in my previous letter, to re-establish direct communication between the parties.

I should like to reiterate, on behalf of all the members of FMLN, our strong desire to continue and promote the Chapultepec process, our firm resolve not to resume the armed struggle, and our assurances that we wish to cooperate in overcoming current difficulties without jeopardizing the peace process in any way.

Finally, I should like to draw your attention to the efforts being made to ban or suspend the legality of FMLN as a political party:

On 14 June, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal decided to request ONUSAL to provide information relating to the discovery of a FPL weapons cache in Managua, "since, in order to register the Partido Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional on 14 December 1992, it was required that the aforementioned party should be a 'truly disarmed organization', as the aforementioned Mission certified on that same day".

The reply of ONUSAL will undoubtedly be of legal significance, since it can be used as evidence against the legality of FMLN, with consequences that could greatly damage the peace process, to which I referred in my previous letter. The manner and terms in which ONUSAL replies to the request of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal will therefore be of the utmost importance. We believe that this situation should be dealt with very carefully.

(Signed) Schafik Jorge HANDAL

Annex IV

[Original: Spanish]

Letter dated 11 June 1993 from the President of the Republic
of El Salvador addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to convey to you the deep concern of the Government of the Republic of El Salvador at the large quantities of arms, ammunition and explosives belonging to FMLN recently discovered in Nicaragua, and at the other large quantities which might be present in Nicaragua and about which there is hard information. This should be investigated and verified in the next few days.

The aforementioned discoveries are in addition to the discoveries in El Salvador that we reported earlier to ONUSAL, and demonstrate unequivocally that FMLN has consciously violated its fundamental commitment to hand over all weapons, munitions, mines, other explosives and military equipment of its forces, including those located in other countries. Moreover, it has called into question your statement in the report to the Security Council dated 21 May 1993 (S/25812) that "by 11 February, all the arms stored in the FMLN concentration areas had been destroyed and on 1 April the destruction of arms in deposits outside El Salvador was completed".

The aforementioned violation becomes even more serious if one considers all the efforts you made before 15 December 1992 to ensure that FMLN included in the inventory submitted to ONUSAL large quantities of weapons in its possession that had not been included in the inventory submitted at the beginning of the cease-fire - conduct that was also in violation of the commitments assumed. Furthermore, it confirms the opinion of the Government of El Salvador, which is shared by other Governments, that the weapons and war matériel declared by FMLN differed substantially from what was actually its arsenal, a fact which was reported to ONUSAL on many occasions before 15 December 1992, the date on which you certified as satisfactory the inventory of arms and war matériel submitted by FMLN.

The conduct of FMLN is extremely serious and could affect the credibility of the entire peace process, but it is also a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the existence of armed groups, and it might be a reason to disband FMLN as a political party. In addition, that breach has been described as a serious development by the national supervisory body - COPAZ - as witness the accompanying document.

Our commitment is to consolidate peace in El Salvador; accordingly, the word pledged before you in the Geneva agreement must be honoured. We therefore respectfully request that you give a clear indication that there has been a serious breach of the commitment undertaken by FMLN as described above, and that the ONUSAL certification of complete disarmament on the part of FMLN be left in abeyance, until FMLN has handed over - and made available to ONUSAL for complete destruction - all war matériel in its possession either in El Salvador or in other countries. We believe that the gravity of the breach warrants a resolution by the United Nations Security Council; we are calling for a

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resolution because we think it is necessary in order to safeguard the prestige of a process which, as you stated in the report, constitutes a notable example for the world.

We also believe that the time is ripe for FMLN to be required to disarm the armed groups of members or sympathizers (we have reported them to ONUSAL and it has verified the reports in some cases), or declare that it has severed links with such groups, so that the means afforded by legislation might come into play, with a view to safeguarding the lives and property of the peaceful inhabitants of El Salvador.

Please find attached a copy of all the reports sent to ONUSAL on the question that has prompted this letter, as well as the aforementioned COPAZ statement and documents confirming what we are now reporting.*

(Signed) Alfredo CRISTIANI

* These attachments are not included in this report.