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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
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Agenda item 28THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY AND PEACE INITIATIVESSECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth YearReport of the Secretary-General.

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 637 (1989) of 27 July 1989 and General Assembly resolution 44/10 of 24 October 1989.

2. In my last report, dated 21 December 1989 (A/44/886-8/21029), I described the activities of the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) carried out by myself and the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), the establishment of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and the progress made by the United Nations Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN). I also noted that in the extraordinary meeting held at San Isidro de Coronado, Costa Rica, on 12 December 1989, the Central American Presidents, in addition to requesting the full deployment of ONUCA and the expansion of its mandate to include verification of any cessation of hostilities and demobilization of irregular forces that might be agreed upon in the region, also requested me to take the necessary steps for the reinitiation of the dialogue between the Government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and to involve States with interests in the region more directly in the peace effort.

3. In the past 10 months, the pace of events in Central America and the United Nations involvement in the region have accelerated considerably.

4. At the time of the submission of my last report to the General Assembly, ONUVEN had issued two reports on the electoral process in Nicaragua (A/44/642 and A/44/834). The third report, issued on 31 January 1990 (A/44/917), covered the period from the beginning of the electoral campaign in early December to the end of January 1990. By the beginning of December, the core group of observers had been enlarged by 20 additional personnel and ONUVEN regional offices had been opened in

eight of the nine **regions** of Nicaragua. The report **described, inter alia, the administration of the electoral process**, the conduct of the electoral campaign, **including external and internal financing**, electoral strategies **of** the different **parties**, military actions *in* conflict areas and the role in the campaign **of** the mass media, including television, radio **stations** and the written press.

5. The fourth report of **ONUSUEN** (A/44/921) was timed to appear on the day following **the** closing of the electoral campaign on 21 February. It covered the events that occurred in the last three weeks of the campaign **and, more importantly**, gave an overall **assessment** of the electoral process since its inception **and up to the** close of the campaign. In the opinion of **ONUSUEN**, the people of Nicaragua were in a position to decide between alternatives which had been **given a** reasonable **chance** to be aired and would be free to determine their future government through the verdict of the ballot boxes on 25 February,

6. The final task of **ONUSUEN**, to verify the fairness of the polling and counting of votes, was carried out by **over** 240 observers representing **over** 50 different nationalities. To those drawn from the United Nations Secretariat as well as from organizations and **agencies of the** United Nations **system** based in the **region** were added poll-watchers from over 20 Member States. These included **Austria**, Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, **Czechoslovakia**, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain and Sweden,

7. In the early **morning** of 26 February 1990, my Personal Representative informed **me of** the preliminary assessment **of** **ONUSUEN** that the voting had been conducted under **normal** conditions without intimidation or violence and could be considered free and fair. The last **ONUSUEN** report (A/44/927) of 30 March 1990 confirmed the preliminary **assessment** by stating that the electoral process had been impartial and fair throughout.

8. On 26 February, the accurate projection of the voting results made the previous night by **ONUSUEN** had been confirmed **by** the results officially announced by the Supreme Electoral Council. President Daniel Ortega Saavedra publicly accepted the results and declared the readiness of the Sandinista Front of National Liberation to transfer power *on* 25 April 1990 to the new Government to be formed by the National Opposition Union through **a** peaceful and orderly transition process. Both the President and the President-elect, Mrs. **Violeta** Barrios de Chamorro, requested **me**, through my Personal Representative, to maintain a United Nations presence in Nicaragua to ensure a peaceful and orderly transition process leading to the transfer of power *on* 25 April 1990. I replied positively and assigned for this purpose a small team to remain *in* the country. The **team** was to assist both in the remaining electoral issues **as well as** in the political aspects of the transition.

9. In the post-electoral atmosphere, charged with uncertainty, the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance, **an essential** element in the Central American peace process, **became a high priority**. To that end, at the beginning of March, I reached agreement with the Secretary-General of **OAS** *on* the **modus operandi** of **CIAT** in relation to the two **organizations'** responsibilities in the demobilization and

voluntary repatriation of members of the Nicaraguan resistance and their families. Under that agreement, subsequently complemented by another one arrived at in June, the United Nations component of CIAV (CIAV/UN) was assigned responsibility for the assistance to and repatriation of demobilized members of the Nicaraguan resistance, their families and others related to the Nicaraguan resistance in Honduras and Costa Rica. The OAS component of CIAV (CIAV/OAS) was to provide assistance to those members of the Nicaraguan resistance who demobilized inside Nicaragua, as well as to the members of the Nicaraguan resistance and their families repatriated by CIAV/UN once they had reached Nicaraguan soil. In addition, CIAV/UN was to be responsible for the voluntary repatriation of Nicaraguan refugees, as well as for all follow-up activities and their assistance in Nicaragua. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) acted as the operational arm of CIAV/UN, conducting all support and repatriation activities.

10. In a report to the Security Council, dated 15 March (S/21194), I sought from the Council its urgent approval, on a contingency basis, of an enlargement of the mandate of ONUCA and the addition of armed personnel to its strength in order to enable it to play a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance. I recalled that, in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/20856) on 26 August 1989, I had pointed out that the task of collecting the weapons, matériel and military equipment of the Nicaraguan resistance would need to be entrusted to military units equipped with defensive weapons. The Council had welcomed my intention to seek its approval at the appropriate time (S/20857). My request of 15 March was based on consultations held earlier that month at Managua between the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs and the Chief Military Observer of ONUCA and the Nicaraguan authorities. An understanding had then been reached in principle according to which ONUCA would be responsible for implementing the military aspects of the Tela Accord (A/44/451-5/20778) and would receive the weapons, matériel and military equipment from members of the Nicaraguan resistance. Having done so, the individuals concerned would become the responsibility of CIAV, which would arrange for their repatriation or resettlement. ONUCA would also establish and ensure the security of temporary assembly points in Honduras and Nicaragua and in certain locations in Costa Rica. It would further be responsible for the custody of the weapons and other matériel handed over to it until their final disposal was decided upon by the five Central American Presidents.

11. The Security Council, in resolution 650 (1990) of 27 March 1990, authorized an enlargement of the mandate of ONUCA and the addition of armed personnel to its strength, as requested in my report.

12. On 27 March 1990, the two transition teams designated by the President and the President-elect of Nicaragua signed a Protocol of Procedure for the transfer of power which, inter alia, considered the demobilization of the resistance forces before 23 April 1990 as essential in creating the climate for a peaceful transfer (A/44/927, appendix VIII).

13. On 3 April 1990, the Central American Presidents signed a Declaration at their summit meeting at Montelimar, Nicaragua (A/44/936-S/21235), in which, inter alia, they agreed to emphasize the urgent need for the immediate demobilization of the

Nicaraguan resistance, pursuant to the Joint Plan signed at Tela on 7 August 1989 and to support the **Protocol** of Procedure for the Transfer of Presidential Authority of the Republic of Nicaragua. They also agreed to request **ONUCA** and **CIAV** to take the necessary steps to assist in the demobilization and disarmament of the members of the resistance inside or outside Nicaragua, a process to be initiated immediately and concluded no later than 25 April 1990. They also decided that the weapons to be received by **ONUCA** were to be destroyed in situ, as I had suggested.

14. The demobilization of the first group of the Nicaraguan resistance took place in Honduras on 16 April 1990, where a company of an armed Venezuelan infantry battalion temporarily added to **ONUCA** for that purpose began the process of receiving and destroying the weapons. However, by that date, most of the resistance forces had moved to Nicaragua where, on 18 April 1990, following intense negotiations, definitive cease-fire agreements were concluded in Managua between the Government of Nicaragua and the Northern, Central and Atlantic fronts of the Nicaraguan resistance. The talks, which were attended by the **ONUCA** Chief Military Observer and my Alternate Personal Representative, concluded with an agreement that the demobilization of the resistance forces in Nicaragua should start on 25 April 1990 and be completed no later than 10 June 1990 (A/44/941-S/21272).

15. On 19 April 1990, I informed the Security Council (S/21259) that the agreements arrived at by the Nicaraguan parties required a further broadening of the **ONUCA** mandate to include the tasks of monitoring a cease-fire and separation of forces; that the security zones envisaged in the agreements, where the resistance was to concentrate, were considerably larger than the temporary assembly points envisaged in my March report; and that **CIAV** would provide humanitarian assistance to members of the resistance as soon as they arrived in the zones, i.e., before demobilization was complete. By resolution 653 (1990) of 20 April, the Security Council approved my proposals concerning **ONUCA's** additional task of monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces resulting from the withdrawal of the Nicaraguan Government's forces from the established security zones and surrounding areas,

16. On 27 April, I submitted a report to the Security Council recommending the extension of the **ONUCA** mandate for a further period of six months on the understanding that **ONUCA's** task of monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces in Nicaragua and the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance would lapse with the completion of the demobilization process no later than 10 June 1990. The Council approved my recommendation on 4 May 1990 by resolution 654 (1990). On the same day in Managua, the Nicaraguan resistance had stated its willingness to proceed to its voluntary demobilization to be completed by 10 June. On 22 May 1990, however, the slow pace of demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance prompted me to convey my concern to the Council, stressing that, unless there was a rapid increase in the rate of demobilization, the deadline for its completion would not be met. This would create for the Security Council, responsible for **ONUCA**, and the **OAS**, responsible for **CIAV** in Nicaragua, a difficult choice, since continuation of the current arrangement would have implied assistance to a group which stood in defiance of its commitments to the Nicaraguan Government, whereas a withdrawal could have precipitated a crisis in the country which, at worse, could have led to a resumption of civil conflict. The following day, the President of the Council made a statement (S/P 331) calling upon the resistance to meet fully and urgently

the commitments it had made in agreeing to demobilize. The Council supported the Government of Nicaragua in **its efforts** to facilitate timely **demobilization** and called upon all others with influence in this matter to take action to ensure that demobilization would proceed in accordance **with** the **agreements** and, in particular, that the 10 June deadline would be respected. This position was conveyed to the **five** Central American Presidents as well as to the Secretary-General of **OAS**.

17. In my report of 4 June 1990 (S/21341), I informed the Council about **a** set of complaints investigated by **ONUSA** referring to the situation surrounding the **security zones** and the demilitarized **zones** in Nicaragua. In general, it remained my **assessment** that there had not been serious violations of the cease-fire. Some breaches **of** the agreement on the separation **of** forces **in** certain areas **were** attributable to the lack of trust between the two sides following eight years of hostilities. **As** far as demobilization was concerned, I noted that, although **there** had recently been a welcome increase in its rate, the leaders of the Nicaraguan resistance had still not achieved the minimum target to which they had committed themselves. In a further report to the Security Council on 8 June (S/21349), I recommended that **ONUSA's** mandate of monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces in Nicaragua and demobilizing members of the Nicaraguan resistance be extended, on the understanding that these tasks would lapse with the completion of the demobilization process not later than 29 June 1990 (resolution 656 (1990)).

18. By the end of June 1990, I was in a position **to** inform the Security Council that demobilization **of** the Nicaraguan resistance had been essentially completed **on** 28 June (S/21379). In a letter addressed to the Chief Military **Observer**, the Nicaraguan Government had stated its full satisfaction with the process of demobilization that **ONUSA** had carried out in **fulfilment** of its mandate. The demobilization of over 22,400 members of the Nicaraguan resistance and the destruction of their weapons, including small arms, grenade launchers and missiles, appeared to close a chapter of a conflict with 30,000 **casualties** which had taken its toll on every Nicaraguan family. All the problems, however, were not solved by the demobilization itself. While a major international effort gave the people of Nicaragua the opportunity to vote freely and brought an end to the civil war, the country unfortunately still faces a daunting task of reconciliation and reconstruction. It deserves all possible assistance from the international community.

19. A wider task awaited the United Nations in the assistance and repatriation of members of families of former combatants, as well as thousands of Nicaraguan refugees and "indocumentados" living in Honduras and Costa Rica. On 18 April 1990, I addressed a letter to all Member States in which, after delineating the respective responsibilities **of** the United Nations and **OAS** within CIAV, I launched an appeal to Member Governments to support the task to be undertaken by **CIAV/UN**. **1/** A pledging conference to that effect **took** place on 25 April 1990.

20. **On** 1 May 1990, **CIAV/UN** initiated its activities in Honduras. So far **CIAV/UN**, with the operational support of UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has provided assistance to over 60,000 **people**. Assistance to former members of the Nicaraguan resistance and their families was taken **over** from the United States Agency for International Development (**USAID**) in co-ordination with Honduran

authorities **and** the Honduran Red **Cross**, In the absence of data, **CIAV/UN** conducted **a census**, in which 36,664 former combatants and their families, former beneficiaries of **USAID**, were registered in Honduras. Their voluntary repatriation to Nicaragua began on **5 July 1990** and is scheduled **to** conclude by the end of 1990. By mid-October, 15,124 persons had been repatriated and at the beginning Of November **there were about** 2,500 **CIAV/UN** beneficiaries pending for repatriation. The **majority** of remaining ones are believed to have *gone* back by their own means. In addition, **CIAV/UN** conducted a census of 23,463 Nicaraguan refugees, **20,385** Of whom have so far been repatriated. Their assistance and follow-up activities will continue to be provided in Nicaragua **by** UNHCR on behalf of **CIAV/UN**.

21. According to the latest tentative figures available, the number of CIAV beneficiaries inside Nicaragua **for** 1991 would **be** approximately 90,000 people. I wish to express **my** sincere appreciation to the donor countries for their assistance to CIAV and to pay tribute to all those dedicated workers of the United Nations and other international agencies who have carried out their task so efficiently in **often** difficult circumstances,

22. During the period under review, I have actually pursued **my** efforts, with the full support of the Security Council in its resolutions 637 (1969) and 654 (1990), to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict in El Salvador. **In the** San Isidro de Coronado Declaration of December 1969, the five Central American Presidents requested **me** to do everything within **my power to ensure** the resumption of the dialogue between the Salvadorian Government **and FMLN**. **These** efforts intensified following a visit to Headquarters by President **Cristiani** *in* January 1990, and after receiving assurances **from** both the Salvadorian Government and FMLN that they were seriously intent **on** seeking an end to the armed conflict in that country through negotiations, A series of consultations were undertaken by **my** Personal Representative, Mr. **Alvaro de Soto**, with both parties in order to agree on the format, mechanism and pace of a process aimed **at** bringing about as speedily as possible, under **my** auspices, a definitive end to the armed conflict in that country.

23. **At** a joint meeting held in **my** presence at Geneva on 4 April 1990, the Government of El Salvador and FMLN signed an **agreement** in which they agreed to a process of negotiations under **my** auspices to end the armed conflict **by** political means as speedily as possible, promote democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect of human rights and reunify Salvadorian society (see annex I). The initial objective was to achieve political agreements for arranging a halt to the armed confrontation and any acts that infringe the rights of the civilian population which would **have** to be verified by the United Nations subject to the approval of the Security Council. Once that had been achieved, the process was to lead to the establishment of necessary guarantees and conditions for reintegrating the members of FMLN, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, institutional and political life of the country. The **parties** agreed to a method of negotiation **by** means of two complementary activities: direct dialogue between the negotiating commissions of the two parties with the **active** participation of the Secretary-General or his representative, and an intermediary **role** by the Secretary-General or his representative between the parties to ensure **that** both the Government and FMLN were committed at the highest level,

24. Following a **second round** of direct talks held at Caracas with the participation of my Personal Representative, **the Government and FMLN agreed to an agenda and a schedule for negotiations, in which mid-September was set as a target date for achieving the initial objective described above (see annex II). As had been agreed at Geneva, the initial objective for the process will be to achieve political agreements for a halt to the armed confrontation and any acts that infringe the rights of the civilian population, which will have to be verified by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the Security Council. The Issues on which political agreements, as described in the Caracas agenda, were to be reached relate to the following: armed forces, human rights, judicial system, electoral system, constitutional reform, economic and social issues and verification by the United Nations.**

25. Following the agreement on the **agenda**, two **substantive** rounds of negotiations were held in Mexico and Costa Rica in June and July, respectively. On 26 July 1990, the parties concluded an agreement **on human rights (A/44/971-S/21541)** which contains detailed commitments to guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights in El Salvador, and which provides for the establishment of a United Nations verification mission under a Director appointed by **the Secretary-General and with such verification personnel as may be necessary. The mission is to be given powers to take whatever legally permissible action it may deem appropriate for promoting and protecting human rights as part of the intention to promote respect for and guarantee of such rights in El Salvador and to contribute towards improving those situations in which such respect and guarantee are not duly observed. The agreement on human rights is the first substantive achievement of the negotiating process. The implementation of the verification mission, which is to last for one year, but which may be renewed, was conditioned in the agreement on a halt to the armed confrontation. The parties have since agreed that it need not await the fulfilment of that condition.**

26. As I informed the Security Council on 3 August 1990, it is **envisaged** that, in the context of the achievement of the "initial objective" established in the Geneva agreement, **the United Nations will be requested to carry out a certain number of tasks relating to the verification of a cease-fire, the monitoring of the electoral process and the human rights verification mentioned above. It is my view that these tasks are being cast as essential components of a peaceful solution to the Salvadorian conflict and that, in order to ensure proper co-ordination on the ground and the rational use of resources, an integrated operation should be established under the authority of the Security Council. In the mean time, having obtained the previous authorization of the Security Council (S/21717 and S/21718), I intend to establish shortly a small preparatory office for the United Nations verification mission, in order to enable the latter to undertake the monitoring task as soon as developments permit.**

27. The human rights agreement arrived at in San José was followed by two direct meetings held also at San José in August and September 1990 between the representatives of the Government and the FMLN with the **participation of my Representative. My Personal Representative has also undertaken frequent trips to meet with President Cristiani and senior commanders of the FMLN. He has also been in frequent contact with leaders and representatives of a wide array of political**

parties, social **organizations** and church leaders **in** El Salvador. I myself met with President **Cristiani** during his recent visit to the United Nations. I also met with a high-level delegation of the **FMLN**. The question **of** El Salvador has come **up** frequently in my meetings with leaders of Member States who are in a **position to** assist **in** my efforts, as envisaged in the **Geneva Agreement**,

26. While significant progress has been recorded to date, it is fair to say that considerable problems have been encountered in negotiations, particularly on the most difficult, **sensitive** and complex issue on the agenda, the armed forces. On which, despite continuous efforts, it has not yet been possible to reach an agreement. In an effort to reinvigorate the negotiating process, at a direct meeting held in Mexico City from 29 to 31 October 1990, the two parties, with the participation of my Representative, reached consensus on the need to make adjustments in the mechanics followed so far. To this end, they decided to place greater emphasis on the active role of the **Secretary-General's Representative** and his role as intermediary and on the confidential character of future **direct** meetings. Procedural improvements will not by themselves solve the remaining problems. However, I remain persuaded that, given the necessary will, coupled with perseverance and flexibility on the substance **of** the issues on both sides, and with the support from outside Powers in a position to support these efforts, the goal of peace in El Salvador can be achieved in the not-too-distant future.

29. On 30 March 1990, a delegation of the National Reconciliation Commission of **Guatemala**, acting with the full support **of** the Government of the Republic, and a delegation **of** the Unidad Revolucionaria **Nacional** Guatemalteca (**URNG**), with the full support of its General **Command**, signed in Oslo a "Basic Agreement for the Search for Peace by Political Means", with a view to initiating a serious process which, by seeking ways to bring about a peaceful solution of the nation's problems, would culminate **in** the attainment **of** peace and the enhancement of functional and participatory democracy in Guatemala (see annex III). To that end, the National Reconciliation Commission and URNG agreed **to carry out** a series of activities and, by mutual agreement, appointed as Conciliator Monsignor Rodolfo **Quezada Toruño** in his capacity as Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, a body established by the Government of Guatemala in accordance **with** the Esquipulas II Agreements. The two parties agreed to request that I should observe the activities to be carried out and I, with the express support of the President of the Republic, accepted that request on 21 May 1990, bearing in mind that the Agreement fell within the framework of the **Esquipulas II Agreements**, as endorsed by **Security Council** resolution 637 (1989).

30. Pursuant to the Oslo Agreement, five meetings have been held, under the auspices of the National Reconciliation Commission and in the presence of the Conciliator and my appointed Observer, between representatives of URNG and representatives of political parties, private enterprises, religious and popular groups and a mixed sector representing academics, **professionals** and small- and medium-sized businesses. These meetings were held at El Escorial, Spain, from 27 May to 1 June (**A/44/959**); at **Ottawa**, from 31 August to 1 September; at Quito, from 24 to 26 September; and at Metepec (**Puebla**), Mexico, from 23 to 25 October and from 27 to 28 October, respectively. The next phase envisaged under the Oslo

Agreement would be the holding of talks between representatives of the Government of the Republic, the Guatemalan Army and the General Command of URNG with a view to achieving a political solution of the internal armed confrontation. I cherish the hope that the process initiated by the **signature** of the Oslo Agreement will continue and pave the way **for** a process **of** *reconciliation* and peace in Guatemala.

31. The Central American Presidents, and the President of Panama as an observer, attended a summit meeting at Antigua, Guatemala, in June 1990. In the Antigua Declaration of 17 June 1990 (A/44/958), they agreed, *inter alia*, to pursue negotiations on security, *verification* and **control and limitation** of weapons, in accordance with the Esquipulas II Agreement, and to seek technical advice from the Secretariats of the United Nations and OAS. In **order** to provide such advice, officials from the United Nations Secretariat participated as **observers** in the **meetings** of the Security **Commission**, established under Esquipulas II, held at San José, on 31 July and at San Salvador on 12 and 13 September 1990, respectively.

32. At the San José meeting, the **members** of the Security Commission agreed that its objectives were to ensure the **defensive** nature of armed **forces** of the countries of the region, establish a reasonable balance **among** them, **define** a new model for security relations and secure commitments with respect to the foreign military presence in the region (A/44/970). At its second meeting (A/45/642), the Security Commission established a technical sub-commission **for the purpose of** drawing up a draft format **or** model for conducting inventories of the military installations, personnel and weapons of the military **and security forces** of the Central American countries. The sub-commission, at a meeting held at Guatemala City in mid-October, prepared, with the assistance of Secretariat representatives, such a model, which will be considered by the Security Commission at its next meeting to be held in Honduras in November.

Notes

1/ SG/CONF.5/1.

ANNEX I

Press communique issued following the Geneva meeting presided over by the Secretary-General between representatives of the Government of El Salvador and of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional

At the request of the Central American Presidents and within the framework of the mandate of good offices conferred on me by the Security Council under resolution 637 of 27 July 1989, I have held consultations with the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in order to agree on the format, mechanism and pace of a process aimed at bringing about as speedily as possible, under my auspices, a definitive end to the armed conflict in that country. I have agreed to carry out this effort at the request of the Government and FMLN and because I have received assurances from both parties that there is a serious intention and good faith to bring about such an end through negotiations. As a result of my consultations, the Government and FMLN have agreed on the points set forth below, which are designed to ensure that the process proceeds in an efficient and serious manner and promotes mutual trust through appropriate guarantees.

I believe that the scrupulous maintenance of these guarantees, over and above their intrinsic importance, will demonstrate the desire and ability of the parties to carry out the commitment that they undertake during the negotiations. On this understanding, the Government and FMLN have pledged not to renounce the negotiation process.

1. The purpose of the process shall be to end the armed conflict through political means as speedily as possible, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadorian society.

The initial objective shall be to achieve political agreements for arranging a halt to the armed confrontation and any acts that infringe the rights of the civilian population, which will have to be verified by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the Security Council. Once that has been achieved, the process shall lead to the establishment of the necessary guarantees and conditions for reintegrating the members of FMLN, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, institutional and political life of the country,

2. The process shall be carried out under the auspices of the Secretary-General and in a continuing and ongoing manner.

3. In order to ensure the success of the negotiation process, the Government and FMLN agree to a method which will be elaborated by means of two types of complementary activities: direct dialogue between the negotiation commissions with the active participation of the Secretary-General or his Representative, and an intermediary role by the Secretary-General or his Representative between the parties to ensure that both the Government and FMLN are committed at the highest

level. The Secretary-General **shall** see to it that these activities **are** conducted in a manner that truly contributes to the success **of** the process. The Government and FMLN shall ensure **that their negotiation** commissions are fully authorized to discuss and conclude agreements,

4. The Government and FMLN **agree** that the process shall be conducted in the strictest confidence. The only public information on the development of this **process** shall be that which is provided by the Secretary-General or his **authorized** Representative.

5. The Secretary-General, at his discretion, may maintain confidential contacts with **Governments of** States Members **of the** United Nations or groups of such Governments which **may** contribute to the success of the process through their advice **and** support .

6. The Government of El Salvador and FMLN **agree** that the political parties and other existing representative social organizations in El **Salvador have** an important role to play in achieving peace. In the same way, they recognize the need **for** both the *Government* and FMLN to maintain adequate and standing information and consultation mechanisms with these parties and social **organizations** in the **country** and that the latter **must** undertake to ensure the necessary confidentiality for the success of the dialogue process. When it is deemed appropriate and on the basis of **mutual agreement**, the commissions may call upon the representatives of these parties and **organizations in order to receive** their contributions.

7. The Government and FMLN likewise **recognize** that it is useful for the Secretary-General to maintain contacts with Salvadorian **persons** and groups whose contribution **may** be of use *in* **his efforts**.

Representing the **Government**
of El Salvador:

Dr. Oscar SANTAMARIA
Ambassador Guillermo PAZ LARIN
Ambassador **Ana** Cristina SOL
Ambassador Carlos **Ernesto** MENDOZA

Representing the Frente Farabundo
Martí **para** la **Liberación Nacional**:

Cornandante Shafik **HANDAL**
Licenciado Salvador **SAMAYOA**
Comandante **Ana** Guadalupe MARTINEZ
Comandante Roberto **CAÑAS**

In the capacity assigned to **me** by the
United Nations Security Council in resolution 637 (1989)

Javier PEREZ DE CUELLAR
Secretary-General of the United Nations

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ANNEX II

General agenda and schedule for the comprehensive negotiation process, issued at Caracas on 21 May 1990

A. GENERAL AGENDA

- I. ~~The~~ initial objective shall be ~~to~~ achieve political agreements ~~for a~~ halt to the armed confrontation and any acts ~~that~~ infringe the rights of the civilian population, which will have to be **verified** by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the Security Council.

(a) First: POLITICAL AGREEMENTS

1. Armed forces
2. Human **rights**
3. Judicial system
4. Electoral **system**
5. Constitutional reform
6. Economic and social issues
7. Verification by the United Nations

(b) Second! AGREEMENT ON A HALT TO THE ARMED **CONFRONTATION** AND ANY ACTS THAT INFRINGE THE RIGHTS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

- II. Establishment of ~~the~~ **necessary guarantees** and conditions for reintegrating the members of FMLN, within ~~a~~ **framework** of full legality, into the civilian, institutional and political life of the country.

1. Armed forces
2. Human rights
3. Judicial **system**
4. Electoral **system**
5. Constitutional reform
6. Economic and social issues
7. Reintegration **of** FMLN members
8. Verification by the United Nations

- III. Final agreements for the consolidation of the objectives of the Geneva Agreement, and verification by the United Nations, as appropriate.

Note: The sequence **of** the items listed for the respective phases is not a strict order of consideration, and **may** be changed by common agreement.

The **agreements** should be precisely tailored to the nature of the phase involved. Political items **have** been **referred** to their respective phases; but since **some** of them are quite complex, certain aspects might **be** addressed in other phases. It all depends on the dynamics **of** the negotiations.

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B. SCHEDULE

In the light of the general agenda for the comprehensive negotiation process in the preceding section, the **Government** of El Salvador and FMLN agree that the initial objective set forth in paragraph 1 of the Geneva Agreement of 4 April 1990 should **be** achieved by the middle of September 1990, Provided that the parties reach synchronized agreements which have schedules for implementation and are **subject** to verification as appropriate, **so as** to **ensure** that all the components of the initial objective are duly co-ordinated.

The additional advantage **of** that deadline is that it would help to ensure that an electoral process is conducted at the legislative and municipal levels in an atmosphere of tranquillity, broad participation and freedom from intimidation.

It is difficult to set a strict time-limit **for** the conclusion of the comprehensive process. That would depend on factors that cannot yet be considered, such as the range and scope of the political agreements referred to in section I, which are to be negotiated, and the relationship between the negotiations and the electoral process. **On** the other hand, there is also a possibility that the initial objective might be achieved before the deadline. For these reasons, formulations regarding the conclusion of the process should **not be in terms** of dates, but in terms of a certain **number of** months from the achievement of the initial **objective**: tentatively, two to six months.

On the basis of the above understandings, the Government and FMLN shall **concentrate** on the negotiation **of** the political agreements envisaged under the initial objective.

Caracas, 21 May 1990

Representing the **Government**
of El **Salvador**:

Colonel Juan **A.** MARTINEZ VARELA

Dr. Oscar Alfredo SANTAMARIA

Colonel Mauricio Ernesto VARGAS

Dr. Abelardo TORRES

Dr. David ESCOBAR GALINDO

Dr. Rafael **HERNAN** CONTRERAS

Representing the **Frente** Farabundo Martí
para la **Liberación Nacional** :

Comandante Schafik **HANDAL**

Comandante Eduardo SANCHO

Ana Guadalupe MARTINEZ

Salvador SAMAYOA

Dagoberto GUTIERREZ

Marta VALLADARES

Roberto **CAÑAS**

Alvaro de SOTO
Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

ANNEX III
OSLO AGREEMENT

The delegation of the Reconciliation Commission of Guatemala, acting with the full support of the Government of the Republic and in the conciliatory role attributed to it under the Esquipulas II Agreement, and the delegation of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), acting with the full support of its General Command, express their profound satisfaction upon the signature of the

BASIC AGREEMENT FOR THE SEARCH FOR PEACE BY POLITICAL MEANS

following the serious, wide-ranging and frank discussions held from 26 to 30 March 1990 in the welcoming city of Oslo, with the kind hospitality of the Government of Norway and under the auspices of the Lutheran World Federation.

In conclusion, the two delegations attending the Oslo meeting wish to record their deep gratitude to the exemplary people and Government of Norway for having made it possible to hold this extremely important meeting in their territory. We are most particularly grateful for the presence of Mr. Kjell Magne Bondevik, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway.

Thanks are also due to the Lutheran World Federation, which sponsored and made this meeting possible by virtue of its persistent efforts. We mention especially its Secretary-General, Dr. Gunnar Stålsett, the Under-Secretary-General for International Affairs and Human Rights, Dr. Paul Wee, and Dr. Leopoldo J. Nilus, Special Adviser on International Affairs to the Lutheran World Federation.

We are grateful too for the support and solidarity of the Norwegian Church and its Council for External Relations. Our thanks also go to the Reverend Andreas Aarflot, Bishop of Oslo.

DONE in the city of Oslo, Norway, this 29th day of March, 1990.

**Delegation of the National Reconciliation Commission of Guatemala,
representing the Guatemalan Government:**

(Signed) Jorge SERRANO ELIAS

(Signed) Mario PERMUTH

(Signed) Eduardo P. VILLATORO

**Delegation of the General Command of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca:**

(Signed) Luis BECKER GUZMAN

(Signed) Isidro VILLAGRAN

(Signed) Jorge E. ROSAL

BASIC AGREEMENT FOR **THE** SEARCH FOR PEACE BY POLITICAL MEANS

In the city of Oslo, Norway, the delegation of the National **Reconciliation** Commission (**CNR**) of Guatemala, acting with the full support of the **Government** of the Republic of Guatemala and in the conciliatory role attributed to it under the Esquipulas II **Agreement**, and the delegation of the Unidad Revolucionaria **Nacional** Guatemalteca (**URNG**), with the full support of its General Command, **having met** from 26 to 30 March 1990 expressly for the purpose of finding ways to bring about a peaceful solution of the nation's **problems** by political means, and **recognizing** that this objective is fundamental to **the** achievement of reconciliation **between** **Guatemalans** and to the solution of the nation's problems, do agree to initiate a serious process which will culminate in the attainment of peace and the enhancement of functional and participatory democracy in Guatemala.

The two delegations shall, by mutual agreement, **proceed** to exercise their

GOOD OFFICES

In accordance with the spirit of **the** Esquipulas II Agreement, the National Reconciliation Commission shall take steps to facilitate and sustain the peace-seeking activities to which this **Agreement** refers, through its good **offices** and the appointment as Conciliator, by agreement with URNG, of Monsignor Rodolfo **Quezada Toruño** in his capacity as Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission.

It shall be **the** function of the Conciliator to propose initiatives to all the parties, to facilitate and sustain dialogue and negotiation and to impart momentum to that process, and to **analyse whatever** Similarities or **differences there** may be between the positions of the parties. He shall be entitled to **propose initiatives** and solutions for discussion and agreement and shall perform all other functions required for the proper fulfilment of his commitment,

The National Reconciliation Commission and the Unidad Revolucionaria **Nacional** Guatemalteca agree to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Javier Perez de **Cuéllar**, to observe the activities to be carried out and to act as **guarantor** of compliance with the **agreements** and commitments entered into upon signature of this document.

ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT

The two delegations agree to launch activities which will generate conditions permitting the definitive attainment of peace and the enhancement of democracy.

(a) A meeting shall be held between representatives of the political parties of the Republic of **Guatemala** and representatives of the Unidad Revolucionaria **Nacional** Guatemalteca. The National Reconciliation Commission and the Unidad Revolucionaria **Nacional** Guatemalteca shall, by mutual **agreement**, decide the conditions under which this **meeting** will take place. The parties shall make the efforts required for the meeting to be held in the second fortnight of May 1990.

(b) The National Reconciliation Commission shall, by mutual agreement with URNG, create the mechanisms required for the convening, preferably in June 1990, of the necessary meetings between the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca and representatives of the country's popular, religious and business sectors, as well as other politically representative entities, with a view to finding ways of solving the nation's problems.

(c) Talks with a view to achieving a political solution of the internal armed confrontation shall be held, on a date to be established by mutual agreement between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, between representatives - with decision-making powers - of the Government of the Republic, the Guatemalan Army and the General Command of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. The National Reconciliation Commission shall take part in these meetings for purposes of confirmation and verification, in accordance with the functions attributed to it under the Esquipulas II Agreement.

SIGNED in the city of Oslo this 30th day of March 1990.

For the delegation of the National Reconciliation Commission:

(Signed) Jorge SERRANO ELIAS

(Signed) Mario PERMUTH

(Signed) Eduardo P. VILLATORO
Executive Secretary of CNR

For the delegation of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guetemaltecar

(Signed) Luis BECKER GUZMAN

(Signed) Isco VILLAGRAN M.

(Signed) Jorge E. ROSAL
