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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 743 (1992)

1. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 743 (1992) on the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was adopted on 21 February 1992, the Security Council requested

"the Secretary-General immediately to deploy those elements of the Force which can assist in developing an implementation plan for the earliest possible full deployment of the Force for approval by the Council and a budget which together will maximize the contribution of the Yugoslav parties to offsetting its costs and in all other ways secure the most efficient and cost-effective operation possible".

In paragraph 6, the Council invited the Secretary-General, inter alia, "to submit a first report on the establishment of the Force within two months of the adoption of this resolution". This report is submitted in accordance with these provisions of the above resolution.

2. The Force Commander, Lt. General Satish Nambiar, the Deputy Force Commander, Maj. General Philippe Morillon, the Director of Civil Affairs, Mr. Cedric Thornberry, the Chief of Staff, Brig.-Gen. Lewis Mackenzie, and the Chief Administrative Officer, Mr. Keith Walton, together with other senior members of UNPROFOR, arrived in Belgrade on 8 March 1992. After initial consultations there and in Zagreb, especially on the question of assistance that could be provided by the various Yugoslav parties, they proceeded to Sarajevo, and established UNPROFOR's headquarters there on 13 March. During this period, the Force Commander had dispatched reconnaissance teams, consisting of military sector commanders, senior police officers, and chief civil affairs coordinators, to the four sectors in the three United Nations protected areas (UNPAs). After presentation of their initial reports in Sarajevo on 14 March, and the arrival of advance teams of the military elements, a fuller reconnaissance began in all four sectors on 16 March, the teams returning to report on 25 March.

3. In the course of the Force Commander's discussions with the authorities in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, each emphasized their wholehearted support for UNPROFOR, and urged the maximum possible deployment as soon as possible,

in order to help stabilize a very delicate situation. Indeed, breaches of the cease-fire and continuing tension have been reported on a daily basis in a number of regions even after the arrival of UNPROFOR's advance elements, and the situation remains, at this time, far from stable. As regards the contributions which the Yugoslav parties might make, it was stated to General Nambiar that each, in its own way, was suffering severe economic consequences from the conflict and other recent events. Despite their full commitment to the implementation of resolution 743 (1992), and their desire to make substantial contributions to the support of UNPROFOR, they had only limited capabilities. The contributions offered by the Yugoslav parties are described in paragraphs 10 to 13 below.

4. As regards the operational plan for UNPROFOR, General Nambiar, after receiving reports from the senior military, police and civilian elements of his team, and after discussing all aspects of the matter with the parties, has confirmed the original concept submitted to the Security Council in annex III to my predecessor's report of 11 December 1991 ^{1/} and further described in my report of 15 February, ^{2/} both approved by the Security Council. However, he has reported that certain variations in deployment can be made without seriously prejudicing the implementation of the mandate.

5. As to the military component, detailed reconnaissance has confirmed the requirement for 12 battalions assigned as originally planned: 2 in Sector East, 4 in Sector West, 3 in Sector North and 3 in Sector South (see S/23592, para. 20). Logistic bases will be located in Banja Luka, Belgrade and Zagreb. The combat engineers will be based initially in Sector West and will address the serious mine-clearing tasks in Sectors West and East concurrently. After approximately two months, the unit will shift to Sectors North and South. The Construction Engineer Battalion will be based in Banja Luka and will support all four sectors. No change is foreseen in the numbers and tasks of the military observers assigned to UNPROFOR.

6. As to the police component, the Force Commander, after consultation with the Director of Civil Affairs and the Police Commissioner, has concluded that the original total of 530 police should be maintained. However, in order to reduce costs, it is proposed that only 320 will be deployed at the initial stage, in some 31 locations. As of 30 March, headquarters and three sector headquarters had been established, as well as one liaison office, and approximately 100 police had been deployed although, at this stage, with limited logistical support. Whenever possible, sector headquarters for the civil affairs staff and civilian police will be collocated with those of the military component. The number of police deployed will be kept under constant review.

7. In this context, and having regard to the tasks that will be assumed by the police component in conjunction, especially, with the civil affairs element and the humanitarian agencies in the protected areas, I have been deeply concerned by continuing reports of mass expulsions, and other coercion against certain communities on both sides. Both I and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have made strong representations to the respective authorities in this regard.

8. As regards the **civil affairs** staff, reconnaissance has confirmed the need for them to travel extensively throughout the protected areas, in view of the fraught post-conflict situation and the many problems that are arising there. Moreover, the need for UNPROFOR to provide objective and impartial information in an inflammatory situation has been stressed by all sides and has underlined the importance of UNPROFOR's public information programme. This will be conducted in close collaboration with the High Commissioner, in view of the many hundreds of thousands of displaced persons hoping to return to their homes. It is possible that internal redeployment may become necessary in order to assign further resources to this particular function of civil affairs. Nevertheless, having regard to the imperative need for economies, I have concluded that a reduction of approximately 15 per cent in civil affairs staffing is possible, together with reductions in the level of certain posts, thus limiting the number of Professional staff to 33.

9. As regards the **civilian** members of the administration of UNPROFOR, 11 offices will be required, namely at the headquarters in Sarajevo, in Belgrade and Zagreb, in Banja Luka, in the 4 UNPAs and in Mostar, Bihac and Dubrovnik to support the military observers. The task of supporting such a huge mission deployed at so many locations will be very onerous. Despite this, and having reviewed the situation on the ground, the Force Commander has informed me that it will be possible to reduce administrative staffing by 5 per cent.

10. I turn now to the goods and services offered by the Yugoslav parties free of cost to the United Nations. They have offered significant accommodation at no cost except for maintenance. However, only 4,200 bedspaces are suitably located in the UNPAs in areas of operational deployment and the vast majority of these will require extensive renovation. To this should be added 1,550 bedspaces located in Logbase BRAVO (at Belgrade) and Logbase ZULU (at Zagreb); however, 400 of these are for transient accommodation and will not reduce the accommodation needs in the UNPAs. Since fewer suitable accommodations were identified than had been assumed in the preliminary cost estimates annexed to S/23592/Add.1, it has been found necessary to accept that troops will be accommodated in tents for longer periods than originally foreseen, before gradually moving into prefabricated buildings before the onset of the next winter. In these circumstances, and given the inadequate sanitary standards in the military accommodation offered, as well as the large number of isolated checkpoints and observation posts which UNPROFOR is having to establish, the need for prefabricated accommodation will be considerable, though savings of 7.7 per cent have been identified. It is estimated that prefabricated structures will in due course be required for the following:

(a) Accommodation for 2,100 personnel;

(b) Accommodation/ablution/kitchen facilities for up to 132 checkpoints and 100 observation posts;

(c) Ablution facilities for 4,000 personnel;

(d) Accommodation for 55 headquarters (sector, battalion and company), out of a total of 73;

(e) One United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL) sector headquarters.

11. In addition to the above, the federal authorities have made available to UNPROFOR an office building in central Belgrade, of which two floors have been utilized for the liaison and logistical support office required there. In Zagreb, the Croatian authorities have made available, also free of rental costs, office accommodation for the UNPROFOR liaison office. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a headquarters building has been made available in Sarajevo and provides 175 offices there, also free of rental. Logistic facilities have also been made available free of cost in Banja Luka, Belgrade and Zagreb.

12. Regarding transportation, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Belgrade authorities have provided 84 vehicles of various types for an initial period of two months to meet some of the requirements of the advance party. The Croatian Army has provided 14 vehicles for a similar period. To date, the authorities have expressed reluctance to extend the period of loan. The Belgrade authorities have also provided some buses for initial movement of advance parties and UNCIVPOL into the UNPAs. In this regard, it should also be mentioned that a number of company-sized units are arriving in theatre with no vehicles whatsoever, as will one infantry battalion. Efforts are under way to provide the latter with military lift from a number of possible sources. If these efforts are unsuccessful, civilian pattern vehicles of a wide range of types up to and including 5-ton trucks, will have to be purchased or leased. Overall, the Force Commander's current estimate identifies a requirement for 750 civilian pattern vehicles of various types to provide adequate support for all elements of the mission.

13. The Belgrade authorities have advised that UNPROFOR will have the use of 10 trains of 38 cars each, free of charge. Details are still under negotiation; however, this offer will greatly facilitate the deployment of heavy equipment and subsequent logistic in-theatre support. It is not anticipated that any food or fuel will be provided free of charge. There is, however, cause for optimism that it will be provided at cost. Fuel consumption will be high owing to the numerous patrol tasks and the relatively long distances involved in difficult terrain. All the parties have indicated that they are unable to provide free fuel because of their economic difficulties; in some instances there are also severe domestic shortages.

14. As regards air transport, UNPROFOR's needs will also be high. First, the decision to locate UNPROFOR headquarters at Sarajevo has considerable operational and cost implications because of its distance from Belgrade and Zagreb and from the principal area of operations. Secondly, UNPROFOR's dependence upon fixed-wing and helicopter aviation, for operational, communication and logistical purposes, will be heavy. Two Lear-type fixed-wing executive jets are required for command group travel. Five Hercules medium transport aircraft are necessary for inter-theatre logistic

resupply, movement of reserves and sector and headquarters evacuation plans. Five medium Huey-type helicopters are essential for movement of reserves, casualty evacuation and logistics resupply, particularly in winter. The cost increase resulting from these is offset by reducing the requirement of 22 light B0105-type helicopters to 16. They are required for liaison, reconnaissance and casualty evacuation. Their reconnaissance role will be particularly important in winter in view of the difficult terrain and the plethora of small tracks and trails in the UNPAs. Thirdly, major limitations at present imposed upon UNPROFOR's freedom of aerial navigation would, if they continue, have damaging effects on its operational capability, as well as its cost-efficiency. UNPROFOR has been seeking to resolve these problems in cooperation with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

15. Several rounds of negotiations have taken place with the federal authorities, as well as with those of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, in regard to the conclusion of status-of-forces arrangements, the drafts of which closely follow the provisions of the model agreement. 3/ Agreement has been reached with the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, and it is hoped that agreement can be arrived at without further delay in the other two negotiations.

Observations

16. All the Force Commander's interlocutors have emphasized the need for the earliest possible deployment of UNPROFOR, as called for in paragraph 2 of resolution 743 (1992). I share their sense of urgency. The cease-fire remains fragile; alleged violations average about 100 per day and have occasionally exceeded 200. Some of them have been on a scale that could have led to serious outbreaks of fighting. Tensions have been aggravated by reports, not all of them substantiated, that persons of various nationalities have been expelled from their homes. There would be serious dangers in any further delay of UNPROFOR's full deployment. As requested in paragraph 4 of resolution 743 (1992), I attach as annex I an implementation plan for full deployment. The plan reflects difficulties which have arisen, largely for budgetary reasons, in making arrangements for transporting some of the more distant battalions and their equipment to Yugoslavia. As a result, UNPROFOR will not be fully deployed until the middle of May 1992, assuming that the Security Council takes a very early decision to authorize full deployment.

17. As further required by paragraph 4 of resolution 743 (1992), I also attach as annex II a revised statement of financial implications. These are now some 4.1 per cent lower than the preliminary estimate of \$633.6 million (gross) contained in S/23592/Add.1 of 19 February 1992. It is to be stressed that these figures remain preliminary and indicative. They have been prepared on the basis of advance reconnaissance by a limited number of military and civilian personnel with only minimal administrative and logistics support. Once full deployment is complete, specialists from the Secretariat will be tasked to work out in considerably greater detail how much implementation of the operational plan will cost. As already reported, negotiations continue

Annex II

UNPROFOR revised cost estimates

1. Based on information provided by the UNPROFOR advance party ground reconnaissance, several changes in the plans for the deployment and operation of the force can now be foreseen. Some of them affect the budget and some do not. A net reduction in estimated expenses in the amount of \$26 million is at present forecast against the cost estimates submitted in document S/23592/Add.1.

2. It is now clear that the original costing assumptions reflected in that document can be changed in respect of the number of civilian personnel, the speed of deployment of police monitors and the amount of subsistence allowance payments. Savings on subsistence allowance payments are currently estimated at \$11.2 million (military observers, civilian police and international staff). This includes savings due to a deliberate delay in civilian police deployment and savings due to reductions in the number of civilian personnel. A breakdown of the revised cost estimates by main objects of expenditure is provided below.

United Nations Protection Force

Cost estimate by objects of expenditure

<u>Objects of expenditure</u>	<u>Thousands of United States dollars</u>
1. Military component	
(a) Military observers	5 024
(b) Liaison officers	1 452
(c) Contingent personnel, pay and allowances	173 621
(d) Other costs pertaining to contingents	90 111
2. Civilian police monitors	23 870
3. Civilian personnel	33 991
4. Premises	122 054
5. Vehicle operations	26 836
6. Aircraft operations	70 317

Objects of expenditure

Thousands of United States dollars

7. Communications	5 394
8. Miscellaneous equipment	5 221
9. Supplies and services	11 946
10. Freight	30 043
11. Integrated Management Information System	300
12. Support account for peace-keeping operations	2 937
13. Staff assessment	<u>4 396</u>
Total estimate (gross)	<u><u>607 513</u></u>

