



Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004, in which the Council requested me to provide a report prior to the expiration of the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 30 November 2004. The report describes the progress made in the deployment of MINUSTAH and the activities of its components. As requested by the Council, it also contains recommendations on whether to extend, restructure or reshape the Mission to ensure that the Mission and its mandate remain relevant to changes in Haiti's political, security and economic development situation.

2. MINUSTAH continues to be led by my Special Representative, Juan Gabriel Valdés. He is assisted in his task by two deputies, Hocine Medili and Adama Guindo, as well as the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (Brazil) and the Civilian Police Commissioner, David Charles Beer (Canada).

II. Deployment of the Mission

Military deployment

3. During the reporting period, the deployment of troops throughout the country remained a major priority for MINUSTAH in order to stabilize a precarious security situation and contribute to creating the necessary conditions for the implementation of other aspects of its mandate. On 8 November 2004, the Mission's troop strength in Haiti stood at 4,493 (see annex I). The arrival of additional troops from Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Peru, Spain and Sri Lanka enabled the Mission to deploy throughout the country and have a permanent presence in all important areas, except in Jérémie and Port-de-Paix.

4. The advance party from the Nepalese contingent deployed to Hinche, thereby relieving the Brazilian detachment that had been stationed there temporarily. Sri Lankan forces assumed responsibilities for the south-western sector of Port-au-Prince, extending up to Miragoâne. The Spanish-Moroccan composite battalion replaced the Chilean detachment in Fort-Liberté and monitored major crossing points along the border with the Dominican Republic. The Jordanian contingent

deployed to Port-au-Prince and areas to the north to strengthen security in the capital region. Troops from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay remained deployed to areas in Gonaïves, Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes, respectively, as indicated in my previous report (S/2004/698, paras. 5-7). The Uruguayan contingent was also given the task of covering the area of Jérémie. The Peruvian force reserve company deployed to Jacmel, where it maintained a state of readiness to move to any part of the country as required. The Guatemalan military police company assumed its support responsibilities mission-wide. The Chilean-Ecuadorian composite engineering company has commenced its deployment.

Civilian police deployment

5. As at 8 November 2004, the strength of the MINUSTAH civilian police component stood at 978 personnel, comprising 560 civilian police officers and 6 formed police units with a combined strength of 418 from China, Jordan, Nepal and Pakistan (see annex II). MINUSTAH civilian police officers have a permanent presence in all 10 administrative districts of Haiti, albeit in varying degrees. Three formed police units from China and Jordan were deployed to Port-au-Prince to help address the security situation. The advance parties of the Pakistani and Nepalese formed police units had arrived, and the full units are expected to be operational by the end of November and the end of December, respectively. The second Jordanian formed police unit will stay in Port-au-Prince until the security situation improves and will then move to Cap-Haïtien.

III. Main developments and operational activities

6. Since my interim report of 30 August 2004 (S/2004/698), the security situation in Haiti has deteriorated, particularly in Port-au-Prince, and the political climate has remained tense. The Transitional Government has come under growing pressure to increase security and enhance economic development. The main threat continued to emanate from various armed groups, some of which have displayed an increasing willingness to defy and confront the Transitional Government. In addition, following the floods caused by tropical storm Jeanne on 17 and 18 September, the security situation in Gonaïves temporarily worsened, in particular around food distribution points and access roads.

7. Late in August and early in September, members of the former military occupied three police stations in Petit-Goâve, Thomazeau and Terre-Rouge. Early in November, they took possession of an unoccupied police station in the vicinity of Saint-Marc. Meanwhile, they had been expelled from the police station of Thomazeau by the Haitian National Police (HNP), with the assistance of MINUSTAH, and prevented from occupying other public buildings. On 29 September, MINUSTAH forces denied them entry to Gonaïves, where they were planning to deliver humanitarian aid, as they refused to relinquish their arms.

8. The Transitional Government has taken concrete steps to start addressing the grievances of the former military. It created three commissions, one of which agreed on 18 September on a set of conclusions and recommendations, which included the creation of a Demobilized Soldiers Management Bureau (*Bureau de gestion des militaires démobilisés*) by the Transitional Government. On 6 October, the Bureau was set up and on 21 October a three-member board of the Bureau was installed

under the authority of the *Conseil supérieur de la police nationale*. It will seek to reintegrate the demobilized soldiers into the economic and social life of the country. In order to enhance their public image, the former military offered assistance in restoring public order and were seen, in some places, cooperating with the National Police and being accepted by the local population and administration. However, the HNP spokesperson recently stated that the National Police recognized only the demobilized soldiers who had been integrated into its structures.

9. On 30 September, violence broke out during demonstrations organized by supporters of former President Aristide to commemorate the thirteenth anniversary of the 1991 military coup. Demonstrations continued for three days, during which barricades were erected and sporadic gunfire was heard in parts of the city, including in the shanty towns of Bel-Air and Cité Soleil, which are considered to be strongholds of former President Aristide.

10. Demonstrations and violent incidents continued after the arrest on 2 October of two Senators, Yvon Feuillé and Gérald Gilles, and a former Member of Parliament, Rudy Hérivaux, of Fanmi Lavalas, as well as one of their lawyers, accused of masterminding the violence. Two of them were subsequently released but Senator Feuillé and the former MP remain in detention on the basis of the following three charges: murder with premeditation; illegal possession of firearms; and plotting against the security of the State. Father Gérard Jean-Juste, a priest and vocal supporter of former President Aristide, who was arrested on 13 October, also remains in custody at the National Penitentiary on charges of plotting against the security of the State.

11. The surge in violence has been unanimously condemned. On 4 October, my Special Representative issued a statement in which he voiced regret that a peaceful demonstration had served as an excuse for a series of brutal and violent actions. He appealed to all Haitians not to let themselves be drawn into a vicious cycle of revenge and violence and to embark on the path of dialogue, reconciliation and peace.

12. On 21 October, the Prime Minister, Gérard Latortue announced a limited cabinet reshuffle, the first since the Transitional Government took office on 17 March 2004. Among other changes, a former military officer was appointed Secretary of State in charge of public security, reporting to the Minister of Justice.

13. On 26 October, in the Fort-National district of Port-au-Prince, at least seven young people were executed, according to media reports and eyewitnesses, by people dressed in black. At the urging of my Special Representative, the Transitional Government ordered an investigation into the reported deaths. The National Police denied any involvement in the event. Two days later four other youths were killed in similar circumstances in Carrefour-Péan.

14. During the demonstrations, and violent incidents in October, more than 60 people were killed, including 13 HNP officers, three of whom were beheaded. The unrest disrupted the daily life of city residents. Schools and businesses had to close down at times. Fear kept workers away from the workplace, which brought port activities in Port-au-Prince to a standstill. Vessels carrying food supplies, destined primarily for victims of the humanitarian crisis in Gonaïves, could not be unloaded or cleared by customs.

15. To counter the spread of violence, on 4 October, a Joint MINUSTAH/HNP Operations Centre was established in Port-au-Prince to enhance coordination between the Mission's civilian police and military components and the National Police in undertaking joint actions and, ultimately, to restore the confidence of the population in the capacity of the police, with the assistance of MINUSTAH, to control the situation.

16. Since the establishment of the Centre, 10 joint operations have been conducted, including four operations in Bel-Air. The operations resulted in numerous arrests, but only an insignificant number of weapons were seized, highlighting the difficulty of planning and organizing such operations in total confidentiality. Following a clean-up operation on 24 October to remove over 100 burnt-out cars used as barricades, a joint HNP/MINUSTAH post was established in Bel-Air. The post functions 24 hours a day and is supported by joint patrols of the National Police and the MINUSTAH civilian police and military components. On 4 November, joint operations in Bel-Air resulted in the arrest of 13 so-called *chimères*, including three leaders. Regular joint patrols have also contributed to the normalization of public markets and the reopening of schools. On 25 October, my Special Representative visited the Port-au-Prince harbour, where activities had resumed after the Brazilian brigade had secured the facilities.

17. In addition, MINUSTAH forces and civilian police have been patrolling extensively outside of the capital to provide a visible security presence and protect key installations. They also established checkpoints to control movement and search for illegal weapons. On a few occasions, MINUSTAH forces have been targeted by hostile fire. Three military and civilian police personnel from Argentina, Brazil and Jordan have sustained light injuries in separate incidents.

18. The Transitional Government blamed armed supporters of former President Aristide, as well as the former President himself, for the deliberate instigation of violence, which they perceived to be part of a larger strategy aimed at destabilizing the country, disrupting the transition process and undermining the Transitional Government. Several political leaders and representatives of civil society have urged the Transitional Government to take stronger action against these armed supporters. It was suggested, inter alia, that Fanmi Lavalas, considered a "terrorist" organization, should be outlawed and an international warrant issued for the arrest of former President Aristide. The Prime Minister has called upon the non-violent Lavalas elements to condemn the violence and join the political transition process.

19. Lavalas supporters continued to denounce the repression of their movement and the political persecution of which they claim they are victims. In addition to those arrested on 2 October, former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune, accused of having masterminded a massacre in Saint-Marc, remains in prison. His case is pending a decision of the Supreme Court to appoint a new judge to handle the case. The former Minister of the Interior, Jocelerme Privert, and the political activist Annette Auguste (So Ann), arrested on 6 April and 10 May 2004, respectively, also remain in detention. They have not been formally charged.

IV. Preparations for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

20. The Transitional Government has not yet established a national commission on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as urged in my previous report (S/2004/698, paras. 14 and 57), nor has it adopted the required legal framework.

21. MINUSTAH initiated consultations on a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme with all relevant partners. This resulted, among other things, in the establishment on 27 October of an ad hoc committee on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, comprising representatives of the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, MINUSTAH and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to prepare the draft decree that will enable the Prime Minister to create the National Commission.

22. MINUSTAH is integrating the present UNDP programme on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into its overall structure. It is also exploring the extension to other areas of the UNDP-run pilot project in the Carrefour-Feuilles district of Port-au-Prince, aimed at mobilizing and sensitizing communities for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It is envisaged that the lessons learned in the pilot project will facilitate early entry into other volatile quarters of the city.

V. Support for the rule of law

23. The MINUSTAH civilian police component established its operations in all 10 administrative districts of Haiti. Logistical and administrative shortfalls continue to hamper its effectiveness, however. Regional commands have established a combined MINUSTAH civilian police/HNP patrol system, with the exception of Gonaïves.

24. The increased security threats have made it necessary for the MINUSTAH civilian police component to focus mainly on providing operational support to the National Police. This has limited the capacity to address police development and training needs. However, since August 2004, MINUSTAH civilian police have been assisting in the six-month training programme for new HNP recruits at the National Police Academy. Meanwhile, 400 candidates have been selected to join the sixteenth class, which is expected to start in December 2004. In addition, since September, MINUSTAH civilian police have been involved in a "train-the-trainers" programme for HNP instructors. The programme was suspended temporarily because of the redeployment of personnel to Gonaïves to address the security situation following the floods, but it was scheduled to restart in the week of 15 November. MINUSTAH is coordinating closely with bilateral partners on all initiatives aimed at addressing the needs of HNP.

25. A national assessment of National Police needs in staffing, training and logistical equipment in the entire country is ongoing. A female international civilian police officer is conducting a needs assessment in the capital on the structures to deal with cases of sexual violence against women that are reported to the police. Awareness-raising and preventative campaigns on inter alia HIV/AIDS, child protection and victims of sexual crimes have been conducted in cooperation with the relevant MINUSTAH units.

26. UNDP has resumed providing technical assistance to tribunals in Port-au-Prince and in some regions and continued to support the civil society organizations in their efforts to build a consensus on a programme for justice reform.

VI. National dialogue and reconciliation

27. My Special Representative has held exploratory meetings with political leaders and civil society representatives, at which broad support has been shown for a national dialogue, the timing, objectives and format of which are being discussed. UNDP offered its assistance to MINUSTAH in this area, and international experts on dialogue issues visited Haiti to assess the situation and advise on steps to promote a national dialogue process, building on existing capacities and ensuring coordination among various initiatives. The MINUSTAH public information office will support these efforts through public information and outreach activities directed towards civil groups.

VII. Preparations for elections

28. The Transitional Government reiterated its commitment to organize free, fair and credible elections in 2005 and to transfer power to an elected President on 7 February 2006. It allocated funds and materiel to the Provisional Electoral Council to enable it to launch its preparatory activities. MINUSTAH participated in discussions and consultations among the Council, political parties and civil society representatives to form a general consensus on the elections.

29. As a result of the consultations, and in spite of differences among its members which eventually led to the resignation of its President on 8 November, the Provisional Electoral Council adopted a number of decisions. On 5 October, it decided that Haitians will vote in local elections on 6 November 2005. On 27 November 2005, the first round of national elections (presidential and legislative) will be held, with the option of a second round of voting on 18 December 2005. Fifty per cent of the vote is needed to be elected President, Senator or Member of Parliament. The Provisional Electoral Council also agreed on a budget of \$43.9 million for the organization of the elections. The Transitional Government is funding the elections with \$2.9 million while the international community is expected to contribute \$41 million.

30. The Haitian women's organization Fanm Yo La has taken the lead among organizations of civil society for the promotion of women in the electoral process, both as voters and as candidates. Discussions with the Provisional Electoral Council on the introduction of a quota to promote women's participation will be continued.

31. The memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) concerning electoral assistance to Haiti was signed on 2 and 3 November 2004. The agreement delineates respective responsibilities and sets up an electoral cooperation committee to ensure that the assistance provided is effective and coherent. Among other key tasks, the United Nations assumes the supervision of all aspects of the electoral process and the quality control of technical assistance projects; OAS will be conducting the voter registration exercise. In addition to OAS, MINUSTAH is collaborating closely with

the International Organization of la Francophonie, as well as other international organizations, agencies and donors involved in supporting the electoral process.

VIII. Civil affairs

32. As of November 2004, the Transitional Government has appointed new municipal commissions in 131 out of 139 municipalities. Each commission consists of one Mayor and two deputies. Only one of the appointed commissions is contested by the local population. However, many local and central administrations continue to lack qualified staff, institutional memory, and the minimum equipment necessary to function.

33. In close consultation with the Haitian authorities, MINUSTAH, together with UNDP, initiated the assessment of applicable local law, the needs in capacity and management training for municipal employees, and the degree of representation of local government structures, so as to establish integrated governance and institutional programmes. MINUSTAH also assisted ministries and non-governmental organizations in their efforts to restructure, reorganize, decentralize and train networks of civil society groups.

IX. Humanitarian situation and development

34. Almost four months after the floods of 24 May 2004 in the southern part of Haiti, which killed more than 2,000 people and affected more than 30,000 people in the regions of Belle-Anse and Fonds-Verrettes, Haiti was again faced with a natural disaster of significant magnitude. Heavy rains, brought by the passage of tropical storm Jeanne on 17 and 18 September, caused flash floods in the north-west of Haiti. According to official figures, 1,870 persons died, 884 are missing and 2,620 were injured. Some 4,628 houses were destroyed. In all, nearly 300,000 people were affected.

35. The need for an immediate response to the disaster posed a particular challenge to MINUSTAH. The Mission temporarily redeployed military and police personnel to Gonaïves to support the Argentinean troops in providing security at distribution points and warehouses, and for humanitarian convoys, as well as logistical support to relief activities; they also participated in clean-up operations. The Argentinean forces also established and ran a medical clinic. The Brazilian brigade provided daily escorts to humanitarian relief convoys, while the Chilean helicopters provided aviation support for the humanitarian operations.

36. MINUSTAH worked closely with the United Nations coordination structure, which is facilitated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in particular the disaster assessment and coordination team, with the support of the UNDP natural disaster mitigation team, and is composed of the United Nations country team agencies and other international humanitarian organizations. It also participated in the joint national committee, established by the Haitian authorities, to coordinate humanitarian assistance.

37. On 1 October, a Haiti Floods Flash Appeal was issued in the amount of \$32 million to respond to emergency relief and early recovery needs in Haiti from October 2004 to March 2005. As at 8 November, \$10.6 million in cash and in-kind

contributions had been received, which represents only 27 per cent of the total requirements.

38. The ravaging floods in May and September 2004 underlined the need for urgent and effective mitigation policies and programmes, particularly in the area of the environment. As a consequence, the United Nations system and the Transitional Government, with the support of some donor countries, have launched a countrywide study on risk and vulnerabilities, the results of which will help to design future mitigation policies and programmes. Meanwhile, the Transitional Government has taken some measures to stop the uncontrolled exploitation of quarries in the vicinity of Port-au-Prince.

39. Despite the humanitarian emergency and the tense security situation, significant steps have been taken towards the implementation of the interim cooperation framework, the Transitional Government's assessment of short- and medium-term needs in Haiti, which was made in collaboration with the international community. On 23 September, the Transitional Government, in close consultation with MINUSTAH, major donors and intergovernmental organizations, put in place a follow-up mechanism to coordinate the assistance to Haiti, particularly the pledges of \$1,085 million made at the July donors conference for the interim cooperation framework. The mechanism includes, at the strategic level, a joint implementation and monitoring committee chaired by the Prime Minister and including representatives of civil society and donors. An inter-ministerial committee, chaired by the Minister of Planning, will ensure the coordination of activities and the tracking of resources. At the implementation level, the principal ministries and national institutions responsible for each subsector of the interim cooperation framework will establish sectoral working groups — each led by the relevant national institution — to which the donor community has appointed focal points. The working groups will ensure coordination in the execution phase and will report on results achieved. MINUSTAH has been designated as the focal point of the international community for three sectoral working groups: police, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security; justice and human rights; and elections. The capacity of the United Nations on the ground to assist with the implementation of the interim cooperation framework has improved, notably through the opening of field offices by United Nations agencies that were not present before. Some donors, such as Canada, the United States of America, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, have started to disburse funds.

40. MINUSTAH continued to receive, review and approve proposals for quick-impact projects throughout Haiti. As at 8 November, 497 applications had been received, 173 reviewed and 35 approved for a total amount of \$462,096. The selected projects support civil society and public institutions initiatives. To assist the victims of tropical storm Jeanne in Gonaïves, the committee on quick-impact projects exceptionally approved four emergency projects for the city, for a total amount of \$60,000.

X. Human rights, children's rights, gender issues and HIV/AIDS

41. During the reporting period, the human rights situation remained a cause of great concern. The proliferation of weapons and armed groups and the climate of

impunity which continued to prevail have impeded the respect for human rights. Armed groups have made arbitrary arrests and run illegal detention centres in some localities. The justice system remained dysfunctional and the National Police continued to operate outside the purview of the rule of law. Cases of intimidation, unlawful and arbitrary detentions, ill-treatment and assassinations, as well as threats and intimidation against human rights activists, continued to be reported to MINUSTAH. In this context, the continued detention of members of Fanmi Lavalas or supporters of the movement, some of whom have not been formally charged, as well as the recent summary executions (see para. 13 above) are particularly worrisome. There has also been a recent increase in the number of reported cases of sexual violence against women.

42. The human rights adviser to the United Nations country team and the MINUSTAH civilian police and military components paid joint inspection visits to prisons and police stations to follow up on arrests made by the National Police.

43. There has been little discernible progress in the realization of children's rights in Haiti. In Gonaïves, their situation has worsened as a result of the floods which killed more than 1,000 children and affected more than 155,000 children under 18. The Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Carol Bellamy, visited UNICEF relief efforts in Gonaïves on 29 September, emphasizing the need for children to regain a sense of normalcy.

44. The MINUSTAH gender unit worked with the Ministry for the Status of Women and women's organizations in assessing the impact of the floods on women and girls, as a number of women were reportedly attacked and robbed of food on their way home from the distribution spots secured by MINUSTAH. More efforts should be made to involve women in the reconstruction of the city.

45. Consultations continued between the MINUSTAH gender and HIV/AIDS units and the civilian police component, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, the United Nations Population Fund and Haitian physicians to prepare an integrated training package for the National Police. The main objective is to enhance the capacity of the police to develop prevention of, and response to, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS with consideration for a gender perspective.

XI. Coordination and cooperation with the Organization of American States and the Caribbean Community

46. MINUSTAH continued to work closely with OAS on police training and elections. The cooperation on the latter has now been formalized with the signing of the memorandum of understanding (see para. 31 above). The agreement provides a good basis for enhanced regional and international collaboration in supporting the electoral process. Contacts with representatives of CARICOM were held to discuss the electoral assistance that Member States would provide in keeping with the CARICOM decision to support all Haitian reconciliation and recovery efforts.

47. On 9 September, my Special Representative formally established the Core Group on Haiti (see S/2004/300, para. 81) in Port-au-Prince. Comprising representatives of the diplomatic corps, international financial institutions, and regional and subregional organizations, the Core Group meets twice a month to

exchange information and discuss issues of common interest. The Core Group in New York is expected to be launched at the end of November 2004.

XII. Mission support

48. MINUSTAH continued to share common premises and services with several United Nations agencies in the UNDP compound, where temporary offices have been established. Several other premises have been acquired to meet the Mission's expanded needs. In the absence of an acceptable integrated headquarters facility, MINUSTAH will continue operating from several locations as an interim measure.

XIII. Financial aspects

49. By its resolution 59/17 of 29 October 2004, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of \$49,259,800 for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004 previously authorized by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the establishment of the Mission under the terms of section IV of Assembly resolution 49/233 A, and appropriated the amount of \$379,046,800 for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, inclusive of the amount of \$172,480,500 previously authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 58/311 for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2004. The assessment of the amount of \$206,566,300, equivalent to \$25,820,787 per month, for the period from 1 November 2004 to 30 June 2005 is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission.

50. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINUSTAH beyond 30 November 2004, the cost of operating the Mission until 30 June 2005 would be limited to the monthly amounts approved by the General Assembly.

51. As at 30 September 2004, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to \$144.4 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$2,654 million.

XIV. Structure of the Mission

52. My Special Representative and the leadership of MINUSTAH have kept the structure and concept of operations of the Mission under constant review, keeping in mind the changing situation in Haiti. They have found that the time is not right for a major review of the general structure of MINUSTAH as the Mission has not yet fully deployed, the political processes are still in their early stages and the situation in Haiti remains fluid. Within the present general structure of MINUSTAH, a number of modifications could however be made to increase the Mission's capacity to implement its mandate at this stage.

53. The change in the security challenges confronting Haiti at this time has made it advisable to add, for an interim period, an additional formed police unit of 125 officers, to be stationed in Port-au-Prince, to provide enhanced operational support to the Haitian National Police and to strengthen security arrangements in the capital. The additional unit can be accommodated within the present authorized strength of

1,622 officers by postponing the deployment of a commensurate number of individual civilian police officers until such time as the situation on the ground warrants.

54. In addition, it is important for MINUSTAH to have the ability to rapidly undertake short-term projects that can make an immediate tangible difference in the lives of the people. Failure to do so would not only have dire humanitarian consequences, but it could also result in a general perception among the poorer sectors of society that MINUSTAH does little to contribute to positive and visible changes in Haiti. This may in turn create additional security risks for the Mission. My Special Representative has therefore concluded that the need for quick-impact projects of a humanitarian nature to be implemented by MINUSTAH will continue beyond the first year of the Mission. These projects will be fully in line with the objectives of the interim cooperation framework and could also provide an impetus for other partners to move rapidly on their commitment to Haiti.

55. In the light of the lack of capacity of the Transitional Government, there is a need to augment the capacity of MINUSTAH to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration projects in the community. Specifically, MINUSTAH would need to undertake operational activities, such as training, pre-positioning of equipment, establishment of registration centres, surveys and assessments and community-based projects. MINUSTAH would also require strengthening of its capacity to monitor and evaluate the community-based projects and to support the Transitional Government in developing the legal and institutional framework for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including small arms control and other security sector-related legislation.

56. MINUSTAH has furthermore recommended that, at this stage of deployment, one engineering company be added to its military component. The engineering company would have the task of repairing, in particular, roads and bridges which are used by MINUSTAH personnel during the implementation of their mandate. At the same time, the population at large would benefit from improved infrastructure in the country. This request could also be accommodated within the authorized strength of the MINUSTAH military component by postponing the deployment of a commensurate number of infantry soldiers or by replacing them with the engineering company on a longer-term basis, if it is deemed to be an operational requirement.

57. The humanitarian crisis ensuing from tropical storm Jeanne has demonstrated that the vulnerability of Haiti to natural disasters is greater than anticipated at the establishment of the Mission, as is the need for international assistance and capacity-building. In view of this, my Special Representative has recommended a modest strengthening of the humanitarian and development coordination pillar of MINUSTAH.

XV. Observations

58. Since my interim report of 30 August, the security situation in Haiti has deteriorated with a surge in violence, in particular in the capital in October, and I appeal to all armed groups to break this cycle of violence in order not to endanger further the transition process under way. As MINUSTAH troops and police personnel continue to build up their strength, the Mission's capacity to ensure a

secure and stable environment will increase. I urge countries contributing troops and personnel to abide by the deployment schedules that have been agreed. I would also like to reiterate my plea to Member States to make a further effort to provide French-speaking police officers.

59. I support the Transitional Government's efforts to put an end to the violence perpetrated by armed groups which have a common interest in destabilizing the country. I also welcome the establishment of an office which will seek to reintegrate into society the demobilized military, whose actions constitute a challenge to the authority of the State.

60. The restoration of law and order throughout the country needs to be achieved with due regard for basic human rights and the rule of law. The Transitional Government, in particular its law enforcement structures, needs to demonstrate a genuine and consistent adherence to human rights and legal principles as it deals with those responsible for the recent violence. I should like to remind the Transitional Government that the arbitrary detention of people solely for their political affiliation is in contravention of fundamental human rights principles. I therefore encourage the Transitional Government to release those against whom no charges have been brought and bring the others to justice in a fair and transparent process. I welcome the Transitional Government's decision on 7 October 2004 to lift the travel restrictions that had been imposed on certain former civil servants and politicians.

61. The recent violence has again underlined the need to remove all illegal weapons from the streets effectively, including through a comprehensive and community-based disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. I welcome the establishment of an ad hoc committee on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration which will help to prepare for the creation of the National Commission, which I hope will be established as a matter of priority. I also encourage the Transitional Government to include all segments of Haitian society in the development of that institution to ensure a truly national ownership of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

62. While security is a necessary condition for the success of the transitional process, it is not sufficient. Without a parallel political process which involves all segments of society, no sustainable peace and security will be achieved. I encourage the Transitional Government to continue to explore all possible ways to include in the democratic and electoral process those who currently remain outside the transition process but have rejected violence.

63. I welcome the Transitional Government's sustained commitment to holding local, legislative and presidential elections in 2005, for which dates have now been set. At the same time, I encourage the Provisional Electoral Council to remain focused on its tasks within the agreed timeframe. I welcome the signing of the memorandum of understanding with OAS and am confident that, together, our organizations will strive to accompany the Haitians towards elections in the most efficient way. I am also grateful for the assistance that the International Organization of la Francophonie and other international organizations, agencies and donors are providing. The support that members of CARICOM could provide to the electoral process in Haiti would add a significant dimension to regional cooperation efforts in Haiti.

64. A political process without job creation or longer-term development is not credible for a population which has been living in severe poverty for such a long time. MINUSTAH remains committed to mobilizing resources for projects which make an immediate difference in the lives of the people. I welcome the establishment of coordination mechanisms aimed at aiding the implementation of the interim cooperation framework, which received overwhelming support from international donors in July 2004.

65. While I regret that the disbursement of funds by the donors has been slow in coming, owing in part to the increased instability in Haiti, I note with satisfaction the establishment of a suitable framework to receive, manage and allocate the funds. The international community has insisted upon transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in this regard. I welcome the efforts of several donors who have already started disbursing funds and encourage others to follow suit swiftly. I also reiterate the readiness of MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team to support the full implementation of the interim cooperation framework.

66. In view of the time line for elections established by the Provisional Electoral Council, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINUSTAH for a further period of 18 months, until 31 May 2006. I support the suggestions outlined in this report for the modifications within the general structure of MINUSTAH (see paras. 52-57). My Special Representative and the leadership of MINUSTAH will continue to keep the structure of the Mission under constant review and I will revert to the Security Council with my recommendations when warranted.

67. In conclusion, I should like to commend my Special Representative, Juan Gabriel Valdés, and the civilian and military personnel of MINUSTAH, who continue to work tirelessly and with full dedication to restore peace and security and further the political process in Haiti, as mandated by the Security Council. I would also like once again to express my appreciation to the countries contributing troops and police personnel to MINUSTAH, as well as the United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations for their steadfast efforts in supporting the transition process in Haiti.

Annex I**United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti****Countries providing military staff and contingents (as at 8 November 2004)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>
Argentina	7	552	559
Benin	3		3
Bolivia	6		6
Brazil*	12	1 197	1 209
Canada	2		2
Chile	6	483	489
Croatia	1		1
Ecuador		12	12
France	2		2
Guatemala	1	70	71
Jordan		95	95
Morocco		163	163
Nepal	8	129	137
Paraguay	6		6
Peru	2	205	207
Spain		200	200
Sri Lanka	1	750	751
United States of America	4		4
Uruguay	4	572	576
Total	65	4 428	4 493


* Including the Force Commander.

Annex II

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Countries providing civilian police officers and formed police units
(as at 8 November 2004)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Civilian police officers</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Total</i>
Argentina	1	-	1
Benin	30	-	30
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	-	3
Brazil	3	-	3
Burkina Faso	39	-	39
Cameroon	43	-	43
Canada	101	-	101
Chad	19	-	19
Chile	38	-	38
China	1	125	126
El Salvador	2	-	2
France	79	-	79
Ghana	26	-	26
Jordan	1	250	251
Mali	8	-	8
Mauritius	2	-	2
Nepal	8	19	27
Niger	7	-	7
Nigeria	10		10
Pakistan		24	24
Philippines	10		10
Portugal	5	-	5
Romania	4	-	4
Senegal	51	-	51
Sierra Leone	5	-	5
Spain	30	-	30
Sri Lanka	3		3
Togo	4	-	4
Turkey	8	-	8
Uruguay	9	-	9
Zambia	10	-	10
Total	560	418	978



Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section