



## Security Council

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### FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 743 (1992)

#### INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, the Security Council decided to establish, under its authority, for an initial period of 12 months, a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in accordance with the Secretary-General's report of 15 February 1992 (S/23592) and the United Nations peace-keeping plan (S/23280, annex III). The present report is intended to provide a basis for the Security Council to take appropriate action on the future of the Force before its mandate expires on 21 February 1993.

#### I. MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS OF UNPROFOR

2. In successive resolutions since the adoption of resolution 743 (1992), the Security Council has added to the responsibilities of UNPROFOR. The Force's operational mandate currently extends to five Republics of the former Yugoslavia - Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia - and it has a liaison presence in the sixth, Slovenia. Its functions in the three Republics where it is principally operational are summarized below. A table on the overall strength and the deployment of UNPROFOR is attached as annex I.

##### A. Croatia

3. Under the terms of the original United Nations peace-keeping plan, UNPROFOR was intended to "be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis" (S/23280, annex III, para. 1). To this end, it was deployed in three United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) in Croatia, corresponding largely to areas where intercommunal tensions had led to armed conflict. The plan accepted by the parties to the conflict rested on two central elements: on the one hand, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's

Army (JNA) from all of Croatia and the demilitarization of the UNPAs; on the other, the continued functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis under the auspices of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR was required to ensure that the UNPAs remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. In addition to military personnel, United Nations **civilian police** monitors were to ensure that the local police carried out their duties without discrimination against any nationality and with full respect for the human rights of all residents of the UNPAs. The Force was also to provide all appropriate support to facilitate the return to their homes of all persons displaced by the hostilities who wished to return (S/23280, annex III, paras. 7-20).

4. In its resolution 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992, the Council additionally authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring functions in the "pink zones" of Croatia, by which was meant Serb-controlled areas lying outside the UNPAs, where hostilities had continued (S/24188, para. 16). It also recommended the establishment of a Joint Commission chaired by UNPROFOR and consisting of representatives of the Government of Croatia and of the local authorities in the region, with the participation of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), to oversee and monitor the process of the restoration of authority by the Croatian Government in the "pink zones". The tasks assigned to UNPROFOR included verifying the immediate withdrawal of the Croatian Army, territorial defence forces and any irregular units from the "pink zones", particularly the Miljeveci Plateau, supervising the restoration of authority by the Croatian police and the re-establishment of the local police in proportion to the demographic structure of the areas prior to the conflict and monitoring the maintenance of law and order by the existing police forces, with particular regard to the well-being of minorities.

5. In resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992, the Council authorized UNPROFOR to carry out immigration and customs functions on the international borders of certain areas in Croatia where the boundaries of the UNPAs coincide with international frontiers. Finally, in resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, the Council authorized UNPROFOR to assume responsibility for monitoring the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from, and the demilitarization of, the Prevlaka Peninsula. UNPROFOR's current authorized military strength for the performance of all the above tasks in Croatia is just under 14,000 all ranks (see annex I).

#### B. Bosnia and Herzegovina

6. The peace-keeping plan approved by the Council in resolution 743 (1992) envisaged that the headquarters of UNPROFOR would be located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that UNPROFOR military observers would undertake patrolling functions in certain limited areas of that Republic following the demilitarization of the UNPAs in Croatia. Accordingly, in March 1992 UNPROFOR established its headquarters in Sarajevo, which was chosen as a neutral

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location unaffected by the conflict that had erupted in Croatia. It was also hoped that its presence might serve as a stabilizing factor amidst the increasing tensions that had arisen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This hope was rapidly belied by the outbreak of fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNPROFOR's senior command found itself severely handicapped in executing its primary mandate relating to the UNPAs. The bulk of UNPROFOR's headquarters staff was therefore relocated temporarily to Belgrade on 16 and 17 May 1992. UNPROFOR subsequently established its headquarters in Zagreb.

7. Despite the relocation of its headquarters, UNPROFOR left behind some 120 persons in Sarajevo under the command of the Chief Military Observer. This UNPROFOR group became the only international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina when ECMM and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) withdrew their personnel after violence had been directed against them, causing one fatality in each case. As a result, UNPROFOR found itself not only facilitating, but also leading, negotiations between the parties both on specific ad hoc problems and on arrangements for an overall cease-fire, as well as lending its good offices to promote humanitarian actions for which it did not, strictly speaking, have a mandate from the Security Council. Once UNPROFOR had concluded an agreement on 5 June 1992 permitting the reopening of Sarajevo airport under its auspices, its formal mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina followed, and was defined by, this agreement.

8. In resolution 761 (1992) of 29 June 1992, the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to take over full operational responsibility for the functioning and security of Sarajevo airport. This included ensuring the immediate security of the airport and its installations, supervising its operations, controlling its facilities and organization, facilitating the unloading of humanitarian cargo and ensuring the safe movement of humanitarian aid and related personnel (S/24075, para. 4). In addition, UNPROFOR was to verify the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons systems from within range of the airport and its approaches and monitor the concentration of artillery, mortar, and ground-to-ground missile systems in specified areas which would be agreed by it. This task was performed initially by one large, and subsequently three smaller, infantry battalions, together with necessary support elements including military observers and civilian police (a total of some 1,900 all ranks).

9. Following widespread reports of attacks upon civilians, human rights abuses and shortages of food and medicine throughout the Republic, the Security Council, on 13 August 1992, adopted resolution 770 (1992), in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it called upon States to take all measures necessary to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance where necessary in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In further discussions, however, it was decided that that task should be entrusted to UNPROFOR. In resolution 776 (1992), which was adopted on 14 September 1992 and which made no reference to Chapter VII, the Council authorized UNPROFOR to support the efforts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such

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protection necessary (S/24540, para. 5). The resolution noted with appreciation the offers of a number of Member States to make available military personnel for this purpose without cost to the Organization. It also authorized UNPROFOR to protect convoys of released detainees if requested to do so by ICRC. A separate Bosnia and Herzegovina Command was established within UNPROFOR to implement resolution 776 (1992), with a total of some 7,800 all ranks in addition to Sector Sarajevo.

10. In resolution 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, the Security Council established a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and authorized UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with it, including by placing observers where necessary at airfields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It also instructed UNPROFOR to ensure, through an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection, that the purpose of flights to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina, other than those banned, was consistent with Security Council resolution 781 (1992). The ban and the above arrangements were reaffirmed in resolution 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992. A total of 75 additional United Nations military observers were authorized for this task.

#### C. Macedonia

11. In resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992, the Security Council authorized the establishment of a presence of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. This task would be performed by an infantry battalion and a group of 35 United Nations military observers who would be deployed on the Macedonian side of the Republic's border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (S/24923, para. 3). A small group of United Nations **civilian police** would also be deployed in the border areas, with the consent of the Government.

### II. FULFILMENT OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE

#### A. Croatia

12. UNPROFOR's experience during the first 11 months of its existence has been a mixed one. In Croatia, its principal success has been in ensuring the complete withdrawal of JNA from the territory of that Republic, including the Prevlaka Peninsula, in accordance with resolutions 743 (1992) and 779 (1992). Until the fourth week of January 1993 it could also be said that UNPROFOR's presence had helped to prevent a recurrence of hostilities in the UNPAs and "pink zones". However, as I have pointed out in several earlier reports to the Council (S/24848, paras. 10-20 and 44-45, S/24600, paras. 4-22, S/24353, paras. 2-10 and S/24188), non-cooperation by the local Serb authorities has prevented UNPROFOR from achieving the demilitarization of the UNPAs and the disarming of the Serb Territorial Defence and irregular forces in these areas

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and in the "pink zones". The Serb local authorities have taken the position that official and public threats by the Croatian authorities to resort to force, frequent cease-fire violations and repeated armed incursions have made it impossible for them to implement full demilitarization.

13. In consequence, UNPROFOR has not been able to establish the conditions of peace and security that would have permitted the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in these areas. Nor has it been able to establish the border controls called for in resolution 769 (1992), although negotiations on this issue were about to recommence when the events described in paragraph 14 below occurred. The civilian aspects of UNPROFOR's activities, notably the efforts of United Nations civilian police to prevent discrimination and abuse of the human rights of residents in the UNPAs, have not, despite UNPROFOR's best efforts, proved fully successful. As I have informed the Council on a number of occasions, an atmosphere of terror and intimidation existed in many parts of the four sectors through much of the first year of the mandate. However, from November 1992 onwards, the situation improved in all but a few areas. The maintenance of law and order was gradually enhanced through the reorganization and redeployment of the local police. The carrying of "long arms", in breach of the agreed plan, greatly diminished, and by January 1993 such arms were being carried only by the "border militia". The Serb authorities had informed UNPROFOR that these, too, would be withdrawn once they were sure that UNPROFOR could exercise full protection against Croatian incursions across the line of confrontation.

14. On 22 January 1993, however, the Croatian Army began a bombardment of Maslenica and other locations in the southern part of Sector South and the adjacent "pink zones", launching an offensive that resulted in the deaths of two UNPROFOR soldiers and injuries to four more. The Croatian Government stated that it took this action out of impatience with the slow progress of negotiations in respect of various economic facilities in and adjacent to the UNPAs and "pink zones". (This issue had in fact been raised since September 1992 by the Co-Chairmen, who requested President Cosic, Prime Minister Panic and President Milosevic in Belgrade to use their influence to resolve the deadlock on these economic problems. Nevertheless, progress had been difficult to achieve, but a meeting on this issue had in fact been arranged, after intensive consultations by UNPROFOR, for the very week of the offensive.) On 27 January 1993, the Croatian Army attacked and captured the Peruca dam. The Serbs responded to the Croatian offensive by breaking into a number of storage areas, which were under joint control under a double-lock system in the UNPAs, and by removing their weapons, including heavy weapons.

15. At this time, fighting is continuing at various points along the new confrontation line, with both sides bringing up reinforcements and strengthening their positions. Tension is also high throughout the other sectors. UNPROFOR has warned both the Croatian Government and the Serb authorities not to attempt further incursions into the UNPAs. The Force has also sought to limit the damage caused by the recent Croatian offensive, and has made repeated representations in Zagreb, Zadar, Knin and Belgrade with a view to preventing escalation and bringing about a cease-fire in accordance

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with Security Council resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993. As regards this resolution, the Croatian Government on 26 January informed the Force Commander that, upon compliance by the Serb side with its various provisions, they would remove their military, but not their police, from the areas taken by them. For their part, the Serb side stated that Croatia must return to its pre-22 January positions before the implementation of the remainder of the resolution could be considered.

16. As I informed the Council on 27 January, Serb hostility to UNPROFOR has been inflamed by the Croatian offensive, since the local Serb leadership feels "betrayed" by what they see as UNPROFOR's failure to protect them. In particular, they blame UNPROFOR for the Serb casualties incurred at the start of the offensive, since they had been deprived of their heavy weapons by UNPROFOR in accordance with the peace-keeping plan. These events have seriously undermined the degree of confidence which was slowly being built up, and the process of negotiation, painfully and frustratingly developed by UNPROFOR, has been disrupted.

17. These developments have increased the threat to the security of UNPROFOR personnel in the areas affected by the fighting and elsewhere in the UNPAs and "pink zones". The Force Commander continues to keep under constant review possible measures to enhance the protection of the members of the Force against this threat and others which may result from untoward developments in the mission area as a whole. Meanwhile a positive response has been given to those contributing Governments that wish to strengthen the equipment of their contingents in order to reinforce their self-defence capability.

#### B. Bosnia and Herzegovina

18. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where UNPROFOR has a more limited mandate, the Force has succeeded in keeping Sarajevo airport open, despite interruptions as a result of hostile military action against humanitarian aircraft. In the period from 3 July 1992 to 31 January 1993, the humanitarian airlift organized by UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines and other relief goods. The operation under resolution 776 (1992) to protect humanitarian convoys throughout the Republic has been persistently thwarted by obstruction, mines, hostile fire and the refusal of the parties on the ground, particularly (but not exclusively) the Bosnian Serb party, to cooperate with UNPROFOR. None the less, from the deployment of additional UNPROFOR battalions for this purpose in November 1992 until January 1993, a total of some 34,600 tons of relief supplies has been delivered to an estimated 800,000 beneficiaries in 110 locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19. UNPROFOR's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been characterized by a regrettable tendency on the part of the host Government to blame it for a variety of shortcomings, whether real or imagined. Criticism of UNPROFOR's performance in the Republic has largely been directed at its failure to fulfil tasks that the Force has not been mandated, authorized, equipped, staffed or

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financed to fulfil. There have been a number of attacks on the Force by the Government and by elements answerable to it, both in public statements and declarations and, more seriously, through violence. Deliberate attacks upon UNPROFOR personnel have led to the deaths of six soldiers and injuries to over 100 more in the performance of their duties in the Republic. Despite formal protests by UNPROFOR, no action has been undertaken by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to identify and punish those responsible for these outrages. (Information on the casualties UNPROFOR has suffered in its entire area of operation is provided in annex II to the present report.)

20. The interdiction of military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been violated, apparently by all three parties, on nearly 400 occasions since its imposition. However, the frequency of violations has dropped recently and in the four weeks to 8 February 1993 averaged only around two violations a day. It is clear that the ban has achieved its principal purpose of preventing the use of air power in military combat in the Republic. UNPROFOR observers on the ground and monitors using AWACS information made available by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have found no evidence to suggest that any party has flown combat air missions, or conducted hostilities from the air, since the interdiction regime was established by the Council.

#### C. Macedonia

21. In Macedonia, UNPROFOR's experience has been too limited to permit any conclusions to be drawn about the practicability of its mandate and the effectiveness of the Force in the first preventive deployment operation in the history of United Nations peace-keeping.

### III. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS

22. In reviewing the mandate of UNPROFOR, which expires on 21 February 1993, the Security Council will wish to take into account the fact that the Force has grown considerably, in numbers and in the range and variety of the tasks it is expected to perform, since it was established by the Council in resolution 743 (1992). As pointed out in paragraph 2 above, UNPROFOR has operational responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and (in relation to resolution 781 (1992)) in Serbia and Montenegro which could be continued irrespective of any decision the Council may make relating to the original mandate in Croatia. The decisions required of the Council now are thus (a) whether to extend the existence of the Force and, if so, (b) whether to alter any of the specific tasks which it has authorized UNPROFOR to perform in the various Republics.

23. UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, currently deriving from resolutions 761 (1992), 776 (1992) and 781 (1992), could need to be altered significantly when the outcome is known of the current talks led by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the

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Former Yugoslavia. Specific recommendations in this regard must therefore await that outcome and will be contained in a separate report. UNPROFOR's mandate in Macedonia has just begun to be implemented and a review would therefore be premature. The present report thus focuses primarily on the options available to the Council in relation to UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia.

24. While the non-cooperation of the local Serb authorities had seriously retarded implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan approved by the Security Council, the Croatian offensive on and after 22 January 1993 has significantly altered the realities on the ground. In a series of public pronouncements before the offensive, most notably in a letter dated 9 December 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24934), the President of Croatia, Mr Franjo Tudjman, had declared that the willingness of his Government to agree to an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate was dependent on progress in a number of areas. Listing various demands relating to issues on which the Serb side had refused to cooperate, or on which there was no agreement with the Serbs, he urged the Council to grant UNPROFOR an enforcement mandate "resembling [that] in the case of aggression against Kuwait and with regard to the present-day situation in Somalia". Following the offensive, President Tudjman has indicated publicly that his Government was also prepared to invade the UNPAs if UNPROFOR was unable to fulfil its mandate there. For its part, the Serb leadership in the UNPAs has re-armed and remobilized its forces in response to the Croatian offensive and has received substantial reinforcements of Serb fighters from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Serb militias have broken into storage depots holding heavy weapons placed there under the peace-keeping plan. The Serb side has also refused to enter into negotiations with the Croats, or to return the heavy weapons taken from storage, unless the Croatian armed forces withdraw to the positions they occupied before the offensive, in accordance with Security Council resolution 802 (1993). Such a withdrawal, in turn, is categorically rejected by the Croatian authorities.

25. In addition, the circumstances in which the peace-keeping plan was drafted and agreed in late 1991 and early 1992 have themselves changed. The plan was envisaged as an interim arrangement pending an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The Government of Croatia, as a sovereign State Member of the United Nations whose independence and territorial integrity are recognized by the international community, claims there is no longer any "overall political solution" to negotiate. The only issue, in Zagreb's view, is the return of the UNPAs and the "pink zones" to Croatian control, with the Serb minority enjoying the rights granted to it by the Croatian Constitution, the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Rights of Ethnic Communities and other relevant domestic legislation. The Serb leadership in the UNPAs, however, refuses to consider these territories to be a part of Croatia and rejects talks on this basis, recalling that the plan was explicitly not intended to prejudge a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. It further argues that two parties to the original plan, the President of Serbia and the Federal Yugoslav military authorities in Belgrade, no longer have any locus standi in the areas where UNPROFOR is deployed. The mandate and deployment of UNPROFOR, they insist, must now be discussed anew

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with them as the sovereign "Republic of Serb Krajina". These positions appear to be irreconcilable and to have become even more so in the atmosphere of intense distrust and hostility which has been created by the recent Croatian offensive.

26. In these circumstances, there seem to be three options with regard to UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia:

(a) To renew the mandate entrusted to UNPROFOR by resolution 743 (1992), with no change;

(b) To modify that mandate;

(c) To give UNPROFOR no mandate in Croatia and confine its operations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Each option is briefly analysed below.

27. As regards option (a), in a call upon the Secretariat on 19 January 1993, the Permanent Representative of Croatia, speaking on instructions, made it clear that his Government could agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR's present mandate only if specific objectives were achieved beforehand, as stated in President Tudjman's letter of 9 December 1992 (S/24934). The Permanent Representative underlined the need for UNPROFOR to achieve progress in certain specific areas - the restoration of Croatian control over the Maslenica bridge and highway, Zemunik airport and the Peruca dam - which three days later turned out to be amongst the objectives of the Croatian military offensive. The Government's position in effect requires UNPROFOR either to negotiate results which - as a peace-keeping force relying on the cooperation of the parties - it has no power to compel the other side to accept, or to risk unilateral military action by the Government. Such action, as recent events demonstrate, may or may not succeed, but will certainly not enhance UNPROFOR's ability to achieve by negotiation the results desired by the Government. Even if the latter had some reason to be impatient with the local Serb leadership's obstruction of the original peace-keeping plan, its offensive has had a devastating effect on cooperation between UNPROFOR and the local Serb authorities at all levels and has put in doubt the feasibility of a return to the original plan.

28. Option (b) raises the question of what kind of modifications would make the Force more effective. Enforcement would involve the danger of placing UNPROFOR in direct conflict with the Serbs, who have, as noted above, now been reinforced by armed elements belonging to a variety of extremist groups. Enforcement would also require additional military forces and equipment which are not at present available to UNPROFOR and could not be deployed immediately upon the passage of an enforcement resolution by the Security Council. The mere passage of an enforcement resolution risks threatening the safety and security of United Nations peace-keeping personnel currently deployed in the UNPAs and some, perhaps most, troop-contributing countries might in these circumstances review their participation in UNPROFOR. Nor is it clear that

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enough Member States would be willing to provide the additional troops and equipment required for enforcement. Indeed, it can be argued that enforcement would be a fundamental contradiction of the nature and purpose of UNPROFOR's deployment in Croatia, as a peace-keeping force entrusted with the implementation of a plan agreed by all parties.

29. An alternative modification of the mandate would be, as the Serb leadership in the UNPAs suggest, to convert UNPROFOR into a buffer force deployed along the present front lines in order to prevent a recurrence of hostilities. This option was considered and rejected at the time that the original peace-keeping plan was drawn up, on the grounds that it would simply freeze in place a military situation that the Croatian authorities found unacceptable and would make it impossible for several hundred thousand displaced persons to return to their homes. It is not, therefore, likely to receive the consent of the Government of Croatia.

30. If neither option (a) nor option (b) is viable, option (c) may seem to be the only one left. However, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the UNPAs would almost certainly result in the resumption of large-scale hostilities in the areas of its deployment and would thus bring to nought the political effort and the material resources invested by the international community in ending the conflict that had raged for nearly a year before the deployment of UNPROFOR.

#### IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

31. It will be recalled that, in my report of 10 September 1992 (S/24540) I recommended that the Security Council accept the offer of certain Member States to provide, at no cost to the United Nations, the additional personnel needed to enable UNPROFOR to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This seemed to me at the time an innovative arrangement which would facilitate the early deployment of the additional troops required at a time when Member States were finding it increasingly difficult to accept the financial implications of the very rapid expansion of the Organization's peace-keeping activities that had already taken place in 1992. The Security Council accepted my recommendation, although a number of Member States, troop-contributing countries and others, expressed reservations of principle. It was, and still is, argued that this arrangement compromised the principle, established with such difficulty in earlier decades, that peace-keeping operations are collective activities of the United Nations and that their costs are expenses of the Organization in the terms of Article 17 (2) of the Charter and thus borne by the membership as a whole. Concern was also expressed that this arrangement, if more widely applied, would carry the connotation that peace-keeping operations might be established only in regions that could afford to finance them and be staffed only by personnel from countries that could afford to meet the costs of participation. After six months' experience, it has also become clear that this arrangement gives rise to a number of operational and administrative difficulties. I have accordingly come, with some reluctance, to the conclusion that it may no longer be appropriate.

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32. There is always a danger in peace-keeping operations that troop-contributing Governments may find it difficult to respect fully the principle that the troops provided by them operate under the command and control of the United Nations. This danger is more likely when the Governments concerned perceive the conflict in question to be one which affects their national interests. As I have already advised the Council (S/24848, paras. 36 and 50), the special financial arrangements for UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command have created a number of problems of this nature. Governments contributing contingents to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command have not always recognized that the new units are an integral part of UNPROFOR, under the overall command of the Force Commander and that newly arrived troops wearing United Nations insignia must pass under United Nations command as soon as they reach the mission area. It has also proved difficult to ensure that such units comply fully with UNPROFOR policy, as laid down by the Force Commander, in all operational, legal, information and administrative matters. Member States making such contributions have also been unwilling to accept some of the common costs of UNPROFOR, particularly those relating to military observers and civilian affairs personnel. I have therefore already been obliged to seek the General Assembly's agreement to the collective financing of the costs relating to civilian administrators, military observers and civil affairs personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/24848 and A/47/741, para. 56).

33. I therefore now recommend that, with effect from the renewal of its mandate, all activities of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia be financed in the normal manner, i.e. by assessments on the peace-keeping scale levied on all Member States. By its resolution 47/210 of 22 December 1992, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the operation of UNPROFOR, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond 20 February 1993, at a rate not to exceed \$47,064,525 gross (\$46,492,334 net) per month for the seven-month period from 21 February 1993 to 20 September 1993. This authorization is subject to the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. In the event that the costs to the United Nations for maintaining UNPROFOR during the extension period exceed the level of commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 47/210, the Secretary-General will report to the Advisory Committee and the General Assembly on the additional requirements needed for the maintenance of the Force.

34. As at 8 February 1993, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNPROFOR special account for the period up to 20 February 1993 amounted to \$242.3 million.

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## V. OBSERVATIONS

35. The analysis of options in section III above does not indicate any clear way forward in a difficult situation that was not foreseen when the Security Council decided a year ago to establish UNPROFOR. It will be recalled that the concept of UNPROFOR was at that time set in the wider context of the peacemaking efforts that were being undertaken by the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. For instance, in paragraph 13 of my report of 15 February 1992 (S/23592) I referred to:

"the peace-keeping role of the United Nations, whose primary purpose is to create the conditions in which a political settlement can be negotiated, and the peace-making role of the European Community, which is to conduct and mediate the necessary negotiations."

Earlier in that report (para. 8), I had referred to the importance of the concerns and interests of the Serb communities in Croatia being given full consideration in the Conference on Yugoslavia. Also relevant is the following passage in paragraph 29 of the same report:

"In reaching this conclusion I have made the assumption, which I recognize could also be questioned, that the Yugoslav parties are ready to engage seriously in the difficult task of negotiating an overall settlement in the Conference on Yugoslavia established by the European Community. It is stated in paragraph 5 of the plan that, subject to the Council's agreement, the United Nations Force would remain in Yugoslavia until a renegotiated settlement was achieved. The Force will succeed only if there is confidence that this will indeed be the case. Fears that it might be precipitately withdrawn before the underlying problems had been peacefully resolved would have a most unsettling effect in the United Nations protected areas."

Finally, I recommended in paragraph 30 of that report that there should be provision for a renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate if a negotiated settlement had not been achieved during the initial mandate period.

36. The difficulties which UNPROFOR and the Security Council currently face with regard to UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia can be attributed to two principal factors. The first is the failure to implement the peace-keeping plan described in annex III to document S/23280. It will be apparent from paragraph 15 above that the two sides are a long way from meeting the demands of the Security Council contained in resolution 802 (1993), let alone agreeing on full implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan.

37. The second factor is that it has not been possible to negotiate an agreed settlement to the conflict between the Republic of Croatia and the Serb populations living in the UNPAs and the pink zones. Again, paragraph 25 above shows how wide the gap is between the two sides on this question also. Neither the Croatian Government's position that an overall political solution already exists nor the local Serb authorities' demand that they be recognized

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as an independent republic provides a solution to the conflict; instead, these positions, if maintained, could lead to large-scale hostilities.

38. I have come to the conclusion that unless these two factors are addressed, a sound basis will not exist for renewing UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia. It follows that an urgent effort needs to be made, at a very senior level, to resolve the problems arising from the recent Croatian offensive (which means implementing resolution 802 (1993)), to establish a basis for completing implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan contained in document S/23280 and to agree on a framework for negotiating, within the principles of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, a settlement of the underlying dispute. I have accordingly asked the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to address these questions urgently with a view to establishing as soon as possible a basis on which I could make a substantive recommendation for an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate.

39. As it is unlikely that these results could be achieved by 21 February 1993, when the current mandate expires, I recommend that the Security Council decide to extend UNPROFOR's existing mandate for an interim period up to 31 March 1993, in order to give the Co-Chairmen the necessary time. I shall report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the progress of their efforts.

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Annex I

UNPROFOR military and civilian police personnel strength  
as of 4 February 1993

		<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Force Commander and aide-de-camp		2	2
Sector East	Belgium/Luxembourg	688	
	Russian Federation	878	1 566
Sector West	Argentina	895	
	Canada (1)	1 090*	
	Jordan	882	
	Nepal	901	3 768
Sector North	Denmark	866	
	Nigeria	886	
	Poland	868	2 620
Sector South	France (1)	922	
	Czech Republic/ Slovak Republic	490	
	Kenya	901	2 313
<u>Support units:</u>			
	British Medical Battalion	242	
	Canadian Engineer Battalion	177	
	Finnish Construction Battalion	302	
	French Logistics Battalion	1 215	
	Netherlands Signals Battalion	404	
	Norwegian Movement Control Unit	76	
	Swedish Headquarters Company	104	<u>2 520</u>
	Subtotal		12 789

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Note: Personnel in UNPROFOR headquarters and Liaison Office Belgrade are included in battalion figures.

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	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
<u>Bosnia and Herzegovina command</u>		
Sector Sarajevo		
Egypt	416	
France (2)	667**	
Ukraine	398	<u>1 481</u>
Bosnia and Herzegovina Command		
Total		9 076
Bosnia and Herzegovina Command		
Headquarters	193	
Belgian Transport Company	129	
British Battalion Group	2 626***	
Canadian Battalion Group (2)	829	
Danish Headquarters Company	214	
French Battalion Group (3)	1 842	
Netherlands Transport Battalion	515	
Netherlands Signals Unit	100	
Norwegian Engineer Platoon	36	
Spanish Battalion Group	758	
United States Hospital	353	
Subtotal		7 595
<u>Macedonia command</u>		
Nordic Battalion	68	
Canadian Company	147****	
Macedonia Command Total		215
<u>Military observers</u>		390
<u>Civilian police monitors</u>		<u>623</u>
UNPROFOR total		<u>23 093</u>

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- \* Including 256 Canadian Support Element.
  - \*\* Including 251 French Support Unit.
  - \*\*\* Including National Support Element.
  - \*\*\*\* Detached temporarily from Canbatt 2.

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Annex II

UNPROFOR casualties as of 2 February 1993

<u>Cause of casualty</u>		<u>UNPAs</u>	<u>Sector Sarajevo</u>	<u>Other places a/</u>	<u>Bosnia and Herzegovina Command b/</u>	<u>Total</u>
Firing	Injured	11	19	2	0	32
	Killed	0	3	0	1	4
Mines	Injured	37	15	2	1	55
	Killed	5	1	0	0	6
Shelling	Injured	17	64	3	5	89
	Killed	2	1	0	0	3
Subtotal	Injured	65	98	7	6	176
	Killed	7	5	0	1	13
Traffic	Injured	61	7	7	2	77
	Killed	6	0	0	0	6
Other	Injured	40	4	39	1	84
	Killed	6	0	1	0	7
Subtotal	Injured	101	11	46	3	161
	Killed	12	0	1	0	13
Total	Injured	166	109	53	9	337
	Killed	19	5	1	1	26

a/ Former Yugoslavia except UNPAs and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

b/ Other than Sector Sarajevo; figures in second column should be added to obtain overall totals for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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