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### FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

#### INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in compliance with resolution 832 (1993). It describes the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) for the period from 22 May to 20 November 1993.
2. Since my report of 21 May 1993 (S/25812 and Add.1-3) on the overall implementation of the Peace Accords signed between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), I have submitted a number of reports on specific aspects of the implementation process. These include my letter of 8 June (S/25901) and my reports of 29 June and 30 August (S/26005 and S/26371) on the discovery and destruction of illegal arms deposits belonging to FMLN, my report of 14 October 1993 regarding the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth (S/26581) and my report of 20 October (S/26606) on the activities of the Electoral Division of ONUSAL. In addition, the seventh and eighth reports of the ONUSAL Human Rights Division are contained in documents S/26033 and S/26416 and Add.1.
3. Mr. Augusto Ramirez-Ocampo has continued to serve as my Special Representative and Chief of Mission. The ONUSAL Electoral Division began operating in September 1993.
4. The discovery in Nicaragua on 23 May 1993 of an illegal arms cache belonging to FMLN and the latter's subsequent admission that it had maintained large quantities of weapons both within and outside El Salvador marked a serious violation of the Peace Accords. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), in collaboration with the Governments concerned and with the full cooperation of FMLN, undertook the complicated task of verifying and destroying the undeclared arms. On 30 August, I confirmed to the Council (S/26371) that the military structure of FMLN had been effectively dismantled and that its former combatants had been demobilized and reintegrated into the civil, institutional and political life of the country.
5. At the end of July, after a delay of several months, I was in a position to report to the Council (S/26052) that the Government had taken the necessary

steps to comply with the provisions of the Peace Accords relating to the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces of El Salvador.

6. Several other key aspects of the Peace Accords continued to suffer serious delays. The programme for the transfer of lands fell further behind the targets agreed in October 1992. Delays also affected the reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and war-disabled. Serious difficulties affected the operations of the National Public Security Academy and the deployment of the National Civil Police. Additional problems arose over the lack of a plan for phasing-out the National Police and the establishment of the functional divisions of the National Civil Police, including the transfer to them of members of the Criminal Investigation Commission and the Special Antinarcotics Unit. The collection of weapons previously issued for the exclusive use of personnel of the Armed Forces of El Salvador remained far from incomplete.

7. In late August, ONUSAL held a series of meetings with each of the parties in an effort to find ways of tackling these delays. There followed, on 8 September 1993, a meeting at the highest level between the two parties and ONUSAL, at which it was agreed to "sweep the table clean" with respect to outstanding agreements before the start of the electoral campaign on 20 November 1993. Commitments were undertaken on the adoption of draft laws on the possession of weapons and the regulation of private security services; the submission of a plan for the phasing-out of the National Police; measures to ensure the civilian character of the National Civil Police and its autonomy from the Armed Forces of El Salvador; deployment of the National Civil Police; the admission of former FMLN combatants at the executive and senior levels of the National Public Security Academy; and plans to accelerate the transfer of land and the reintegration programmes. Agreement was reached on measures aimed at strengthening the climate of reconciliation, including cooperation in eradicating armed illegal groups and a pledge to refrain from mutual accusations in cases of serious incidents. A timetable was devised by ONUSAL for implementation of these commitments and joint government-FMLN-ONUSAL working groups were created or reinforced to deal with various of them.

8. The National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), with its subcommissions, has continued to exercise its function of supervising implementation of the Peace Accords, with ONUSAL present as an observer. Despite the slowness of its decision-making process, which requires consensus, COPAZ has continued to play a useful role.

9. In August, the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation reached agreement on an agenda for its discussion of reforms of El Salvador's labour legislation. This came after several weeks of stalemate caused by disagreements among government, business and labour representatives on International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions relating to collective labour rights. The creation of a Labour Council within the Ministry of Labour, which institutionalizes consultations among the three parties, is a positive development. However, ILO conventions on collective rights have yet to be ratified.

10. In response to increasing crime and growing public concern about security, the Government has deployed the Armed Forces in several parts of the country in

a deterrent role. A key provision of the Peace Accords is that the Armed Forces should be used for public security functions only in exceptional circumstances, which should be reported to the Legislative Assembly. ONUSAL has pressed the Government, so far without success, to make such a report in order to respect this constitutional provision.

11. In recent weeks, a number of murders and assaults have raised fears about the possible resurgence of illegal armed groups with political objectives, including the so-called death squads. In October, the Division of Human Rights of ONUSAL alerted the Government to this danger and stressed the usefulness of establishing an autonomous mechanism for the investigation of these incidents. The subsequent killings of two senior FMLN leaders, a member of the governing party (ARENA) and two former municipal officials belonging to that party, brought this issue into sharper focus. In view of these killings and the ONUSAL position as expressed by its Human Rights Division, the Government created an Interinstitutional Commission to investigate this type of crimes. At a meeting between the President and the FMLN leadership (with ONUSAL present), it was decided to invite foreign experts to cooperate in the investigation of the cases of the two senior FMLN leaders. This led to the creation of a subgroup of the Commission, the Interinstitutional Investigation Group for that purpose. On 29 October, ONUSAL informed the Government that the Interinstitutional Commission did not meet United Nations criteria for the investigation of summary executions. Nevertheless, in compliance with its observation function, ONUSAL has been following closely the work of the subgroup. On 3 November 1993 I conveyed my concerns in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/26689), to which the Council responded with the President's statement of 5 November 1993 (S/26695).

## I. MILITARY ASPECTS

### A. Matters relating to the end of the armed confrontation

12. As at 1 November 1993, ONUSAL had a strength of 31 military observers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Spain, India, Ireland, Sweden and Venezuela and 7 medical officers from Argentina, deployed in two regional offices in the western and eastern parts of the country, from which they patrol, in particular, the former zones of conflict. During the period under review they were concerned mainly with the aftermath of the explosion in Managua on 23 May 1993 of an arsenal belonging to the FMLN faction "Fuerzas Populares de Liberación". The incident was covered in my reports to the Council dated 8 June, 29 June and 30 August 1993 (S/25901, S/26005 and S/26371) and by the Council itself in its statement of 11 June 1993 (S/25929). It required ONUSAL to verify and destroy the 128 widely dispersed caches declared by FMLN in El Salvador (109), Nicaragua (14) and Honduras (5), containing 38 missiles and approximately 3,000 individual and collective weapons.

13. The Armed Forces of El Salvador, which, as I reported in May, had completed the reduction of its troops in March 1993, developed plans for the reduction of its officer strength. However, the reintegration programmes for demobilized soldiers have been seriously delayed. The payment of compensation (one year's wages) stipulated by the Peace Accords has not yet begun and the land transfer

and training programmes cover only a very small percentage of the potential beneficiaries.

14. In November 1992 (see S/24833, para. 28), ONUSAL verified, from documentation and various personal interviews, the disbanding of the former National Intelligence Department and the handover of all its premises to other units of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, in accordance with the Peace Accords. The Government stated that the Department's files would remain in the care of the Armed Forces of El Salvador Joint Chiefs of Staff but has not yet clarified how they will ultimately be disposed of. Department files that could allude to persons reintegrated into the civil, political and institutional life of the country are supposed to be destroyed or transferred to the State Intelligence Agency. ONUSAL also verified the creation of that Agency and the appointment of its Director, in keeping with the Peace Accords. The intelligence activities of the Armed Forces should now be carried out within the framework of the doctrinal principles that appear in chapter I.3 of the Peace Accords and derive from the reformed Constitution. It is not fully clear that the above provisions have been adequately complied with and ONUSAL is pursuing this matter with the Government.

B. Recovery of weapons of the Armed Forces held by private individuals

15. The recovery by the Government of Armed Forces of El Salvador weapons held by private individuals has been very seriously delayed and cannot be fully implemented until two laws regulating the use and possession of arms by individuals and by security institutions are enacted and in force. The first of these is before the Legislative Assembly and close to being approved. The second has not yet been submitted by COPAZ to the Legislative Assembly. At the high-level meeting on 8 September 1993, the Government undertook to collect these weapons and substitute others for them by 20 November 1993. This has not happened, although work is under way to verify the weapons concerned with a view to establishing a comprehensive inventory of them.

C. Clearing of minefields

16. After collaborating with the working group that prepared the demining programme for El Salvador (S/25812, para. 22), ONUSAL military observers helped to coordinate and control the clearing of 425 minefields. Contractual problems between the Government of El Salvador, which assumed financial responsibility for the project in the absence of a commitment by international aid organizations, and an international company have prevented the completion of the programme, although it is 80 per cent complete and is expected to be terminated before year's end.

D. Other matters

17. During the period under review, and in compliance with the Accords, the Armed Forces of El Salvador has disseminated its new doctrine. It has likewise initiated courses, seminars and conferences for its members and for other

sectors of Salvadorian society in accordance with this new doctrine. Worthy of note is the organization of the first advanced strategic studies course in which, for the first time, military officers and civilians from a broad range of institutions and political parties, including FMLN, study and analyse security and national defence problems and the new role of the Armed Forces of El Salvador in Salvadorian society.

18. Military observers have been monitoring the deployment of the Armed Forces of El Salvador for public security duties ("plan vigilante"). According to the Government, the plan is aimed at completing the training of the Armed Forces of El Salvador and deterring crime by deploying the Forces on roads in high-crime areas that are not in former conflict or urban zones. ONUSAL's reaction to this move is described in paragraph 10 above.

## II. PUBLIC SECURITY MATTERS

### A. Police Division

19. The Police Division, which has a current strength of 277 police observers contributed by Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Spain and Sweden, continues to perform its task of monitoring and assisting the National Police during the period of transition until its complete replacement by the National Civil Police, which should take place by 1 September 1994, as established in the Organic Law of the National Civil Police. Between October 1992 and July 1993, police observers also supervised and supported the Auxiliary Transitory Police, which was responsible for maintaining public order and security in the former zones of conflict during those months. In response to a government request that ONUSAL provide support to the National Civil Police for a six-month period and in close coordination with the international technical team that advises the Director General of the National Civil Police, the Division carried out, between 1 April and 30 September 1993, an evaluation of the performance of the new police force in the field and provided it with technical advice and logistical support. The Government did not request an extension of this support and the Division has had to limit its involvement with the National Civil Police to observation of its performance in order to verify compliance with the Peace Accords. ONUSAL remains ready to help the Government to complete the territorial and functional deployment of the National Civil Police on time.

20. The Division also supports the Human Rights Division, to which 19 police observers are seconded, and the Electoral Division. Police observers conduct special inquiries when required and verify that appropriate security measures are provided for FMLN leaders, as established by the Accords. The Division also provides observers for the admission examinations to the National Public Security Academy.

### B. National Public Security Academy

21. The Academy, which is responsible for the training of recruits to the National Civil Police, celebrated its first anniversary on 1 September 1993. In 14 months it has graduated eight basic-level classes with a total of about 2,306

students, of whom 44 are National Civil Police officers. It is now training an additional 2,200 basic-level students and nearly 200 executive and senior-level students and intends to graduate a total of 5,700 agents and 240 officers by end-July 1994, as envisaged in the Peace Accords and in the supplementary agreements of August 1992. In order to attain that target the Academy has increased its monthly recruitment from the 330 established in the Accords to more than 400. It may be advisable to maintain the monthly intake of 400 after July 1994 in order to reach the tentative goal of around 10,000 agents and 500 officers before the target date of mid-1999 set by the Peace Accords.

22. Perhaps the greatest challenge that the Academy faces in the coming months is that of simultaneously training by end-July 1994 both agents and officers required by the National Civil Police for its territorial deployment and specialists to staff its various functional divisions. It has already begun training the first members of the Transit and Finance Divisions, although the number planned for the latter Division would seem insufficient to replace the 1,200-strong Customs Police. The training of officers for the Division for the Protection of Eminent Persons and the Borders Division will take place between February and July 1994. During the second half of 1994, the Academy will train experts in arms and explosives and the environment. The plan envisages the training of a total of 810 specialists by November 1994. It does not, however, include the training of specialists in criminal and antinarcotics investigations, as those two divisions will initially be staffed with personnel transferred from the existing Criminal Investigation Commission and the Special Antinarcotics Unit.

23. The complementary accords of June 1992 established that, during the transition period, 20 per cent of entrants to the Academy would be from FMLN and 20 per cent from the National Police and the remaining 60 per cent would be persons who had not participated in the armed conflict. The National Police has already filled its quota and FMLN has committed itself to doing so before the end of the transition period. More and more of the new recruits will thus have to be persons who did not participate directly in the armed conflict. The Academy will accordingly have to increase its recruitment campaign among the civilian population.

24. The Academy has discovered that some 40 candidates who requested admission as civilians had been former FMLN combatants. FMLN stated that that did not result from a deliberate policy on its part but from the decisions of individual candidates and requested that the persons concerned be counted as part of its 20 per cent quota.

25. In order to verify whether former members of the Treasury Police, National Guard and elite battalions (immediate reaction infantry battalions) have also been admitted to the Academy as civilians, ONUSAL asked the Government in October to provide the Academy with lists of the personnel of those bodies prior to their dissolution and demobilization. The Government has not yet responded to that request, thus preventing this verification from being carried out. I must also reiterate the concern expressed in my previous report (S/25812, para. 43), regarding some candidates submitted by the National Police to the National Civil Police. The problems referred to in my reports of November 1992 and May 1993 (S/24833, para. 37, and S/25812, para. 30) that resulted from the incorporation in the executive and senior levels of the Academy of 10 former

officers of the National Guard and the Treasury Police have finally been overcome.

26. The Academy has continued to receive the support of an international team of experts from Spain and the United States of America that provides the Director and the Academic Council with advice on aspects such as the recruitment and selection process, curricula, finances and discipline. Instructors from Chile, Norway, Spain and the United States play a full part in the training. Currently, the Academy has a total of 38 international experts and instructors, and three new instructors from Sweden are expected to join soon. It is essential that this international support be maintained. At the same time, the Academy should begin training Salvadorian instructors, chosen from among its own graduates.

27. ONUSAL continues to monitor the functioning of the Academy and is represented by an observer at its Academic Council. It also monitors the admissions examinations and recommends improvements when necessary. Its Human Rights Division is organizing, jointly with the Academy, seminars and workshops on human rights and provides literature on the subject. ONUSAL remains ready to provide personnel from its Police Division to support and complement the efforts of the international technical team.

28. In the Government's budget for 1994, recently presented to the Legislative Assembly, about US\$ 10 million has been assigned to the Academy, a slightly higher level than in the current year. This will need to be complemented by continuing support from the international community. In addition to the Governments of Spain, the United States and Norway, which have been involved in the project from the outset, Germany and Sweden have recently contributed to it. I appeal to other Member States to follow suit.

#### C. National Civil Police

29. The National Civil Police, which began operating in March 1993, is currently deployed in six departments. By year's end, it will have replaced the National Police in 9 of the 10 departments where its deployment was planned for 1993. During the first half of 1994, it will begin operations in all remaining parts of the country except the capital, San Salvador, where it will initiate its deployment in July 1994, where, it should be noted, a partial deployment took place in early October 1993 as part of a plan to combat the high level of delinquency.

30. As regards the National Civil Police's functional divisions, the deployment of its Territorial Traffic Division began in October and that of the Finance Division in November. The Protection of Eminent Persons Division will follow in February 1994, the Border Division in April, the Arms and Explosives Division in June and the Environmental Division in the second half of 1994. The Criminal Investigation and Antinarcotics Divisions should be constituted before the end of 1993 with the integration of personnel from the Criminal Investigation Commission and the Special Antinarcotics Unit, respectively.

31. However, as I informed the Council in May (S/25812, para. 35), the integration of former Criminal Investigation Commission and Special

Antinarcotics Unit personnel into the National Civil Police must be carried out in accordance with the complementary agreements of 22 December 1992, which establish that personnel of those bodies wishing to join the National Civil Police must first be evaluated by its Director-General, under ONUSAL verification and based on criteria of professional competence and suitability to join the new civilian police force. They must also pass a special course on the new National Civil Police doctrine at the National Public Security Academy. As indicated in my report to the Council on the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth (S/26581, annex, para. 30), ONUSAL is still not in receipt of all the information that it has requested on the candidates, nor have its recommendations for improving the procedures for transferring personnel from those units to the National Civil Police been given due consideration. These include psycho-technical tests and conceptual tests on the new National Civil Police doctrine. Moreover, under the complementary agreement of 22 December 1992, those members of the Special Antinarcotics Unit and the Criminal Investigation Commission who were at the same time members of the Armed Forces should have resigned from the Armed Forces of El Salvador before joining the National Civil Police. ONUSAL has not so far succeeded in obtaining the necessary documentation to verify that this provision was complied with.

32. A further cause for concern is that, although ONUSAL has not yet been able to verify the manner in which this transfer is being carried out, Special Antinarcotics Unit and Criminal Investigation Commission personnel have already joined the National Civil Police. Moreover, contrary to the complementary agreement of 22 December 1992, which provided that Special Antinarcotics Unit personnel would be incorporated only into the National Civil Police's Antinarcotics Division, Special Antinarcotics Unit personnel have already begun fulfilling other functions, for example, those of Chief of the National Civil Police detachment in San Miguel, which is the second most important detachment in the country.

33. It is also a matter of concern that the Government submitted the relevant legislation regarding Criminal Investigation Commission and Special Antinarcotics Unit transfers directly to the Legislative Assembly, bypassing COPAZ, and that some of the provisions in one of the new laws are not consistent with the Organic Law of the National Civil Police or some international instruments on human rights. It is essential that other laws and regulations relating to National Civil Police be discussed by COPAZ before being submitted to the Legislative Assembly.

34. Nor has the subcommission of COPAZ for the National Civil Police been permitted to function as a consultative body to the Director-General. Contrary to the Peace Accords and the renewed commitment made by the Government at the high-level meeting of 8 September 1993, the Director-General has not been requesting its opinion before adopting relevant decisions or measures regarding the organization and deployment of the National Civil Police.

35. It is also essential that the National Civil Police's organic structure be completed with the immediate appointment of its Inspector-General, whose responsibilities include monitoring and controlling the activities of the force's operational and management services, as well as its respect for human



rights. The units on control and disciplinary investigation should also be established without further delay.

36. The Government's failure to provide the National Civil Police with adequate logistical and technical support is another factor that is compromising the new force's ability to perform its functions. In early November 1993, the 1,740 civilian policemen deployed in 5 departments and partially in another 3 had only 67 vehicles (one third of which were in the capital), 31 motorcycles (all in San Salvador) and 134 portable radios. This is blatantly insufficient. In addition, working conditions in National Civil Police stations are generally very poor. This lack of support imposes considerable strain on the civilian policemen, taxes their morale and hampers their performance, in spite of their best efforts. It is important that the Government immediately make available to the National Civil Police resources previously assigned to the National Police and other public security bodies.

37. It is also necessary for the Government to provide the National Civil Police with an adequate budget. It has asked the Legislative Assembly for an increase from \$12 million for 1993 to \$33 million for 1994. However, the Director-General of the National Civil Police has told ONUSAL that this is still \$20 million short of what is technically necessary and this shortfall could affect future National Civil Police deployment. While the primary responsibility must rest with the Government, I hope that the international community will support the Government's efforts, especially by providing the National Civil Police with some of the equipment it needs. The United States and Sweden have set an encouraging example in this regard.

#### D. National Police

38. In early October the Government presented its plan for the phasing out of the National Police, for which ONUSAL had been pressing since February. It consists of two phases: during the first phase (October 1993-May 1994) 2,400 policemen will be demobilized at a monthly rate of 300; during the second phase (May-October 1994), 6,850 will be demobilized at a monthly rate of 1,370. The plan also establishes that the Customs Police, comprising 1,211 policemen, will be demobilized when the National Civil Police Finance Division becomes operational. A total of 10,461 National Police will thus be demobilized. The National Police training school, which currently graduates between 60 and 100 agents per month, will be closed at the end of 1993.

39. The figures contained in the Government's plan confirm my statements in previous reports that the National Police was significantly strengthened after the signing of the Peace Accords. The insistence of the Government on this policy, and in particular on keeping the National Police training school in operation until the end of 1993, is difficult to reconcile with the Peace Accords. As the National Police's 20 per cent quota has already been filled, graduates from the National Police school will not be qualified to join the National Civil Police; this means that the effect of its continued operation has been to deprive the National Civil Police of potential recruits.

40. The Government's plan is at variance with the Organic Law of the National Civil Police, which provides that the National Police should disappear by

1 September 1994. Moreover the plan to maintain the bulk of the National Police after the deployment of the National Civil Police is virtually complete would be inconsistent with the principle contained in the Accords that the National Civil Police should progressively replace the National Police as it deploys throughout the country. ONUSAL is therefore pressing the Government to accelerate the reduction of the National Police and bring its phasing-out into line with the rate of deployment of the National Civil Police.

41. It will be evident from this section of the report that there are many causes for concern about the way in which the police and public security provisions of the Peace Accords are being implemented. I accordingly decided to send to El Salvador a small police mission to assess the current state of implementation and make recommendations on how the United Nations can further support this vital part of the Peace Accords. The mission arrived in San Salvador on 16 November 1993.

### III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

42. During the period under review, reports covering ONUSAL's work in the area of human rights were submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council under my notes of 2 July, 15 September and 27 October 1993 (S/26033, S/26416 and Add.1). The Human Rights Division continues its active verification and its programmes in support of the institutions responsible for the administration of justice and protection of human rights. Of special relevance are activities being carried out with the Supreme Court of Justice for the training of judges and magistrates and support to the Armed Forces of El Salvador in the development of a new democratic doctrine and the revision of curricula in the military academies relating to human rights and constitutional law. The Division cooperates with the Office of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, with which it signed an agreement aimed at the transfer to the Counsel's Office of experience and investigative technology when ONUSAL withdraws from El Salvador. A permanent consultative mechanism exists at the highest level between the Division and the Counsel's Office with a view to conducting joint verification activities in the near future.

43. During the period covered by the Division's most recent report (S/26416), the human rights situation has evolved in a somewhat ambivalent fashion, showing in some areas signs of improvement and in others an increase in serious violations. Problems relating to the right to life, individual liberty, personal integrity and due process have intensified. There has been a troubling 34 per cent rise in complaints of arbitrary executions: 43 in the current quarter, as compared with 32 in the preceding one.

44. Particularly worrying are the activities of the so-called "death squads". Taking on names used in the past, or using newly created ones, these illegal groups have been the authors of numerous death-threats with clearly political connotations. At the same time, groups who purport to take the law into their own hands against supposed common delinquents have also been making death-threats and carrying out murders. The emergence of criminal organizations of this type seriously affects the stability of the peace process by eroding confidence and security, which are its fundamental bases.

45. The assassination on 25 October 1993 of Francisco Velis, a member of the FMLN National Council and a candidate for the forthcoming elections, was a particularly grave occurrence that added force to fears about the resurgence of death squads. The murder, five days later, of Eleno Castro, another member of the FMLN National Council, and the subsequent discovery of the bodies of several FMLN supporters killed in a style reminiscent of the death squads that operated with impunity during the years of armed conflict raised political tension and led many to fear a new human rights crisis in El Salvador. At the same time at least three members of the governing party (ARENA) have also been murdered in recent weeks. All these murders have been very widely repudiated within El Salvador and the international community has expressed its concern over the possible consequences for implementation of the Peace Accords, respect for human rights being a sine qua non for the success of the peace process and for the consolidation of a democratic society. It is to be hoped that the investigation that is being carried out with international assistance can quickly lead to the identification and punishment of those responsible. It is particularly important that, as endorsed by the Security Council in its statement of 5 November 1993, arrangements should be agreed for the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL to work with the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights to help the Government to carry out the relevant recommendation of the Commission on the Truth. By 20 November, such arrangements had not yet been agreed, although considerable progress had been made towards an agreement.

#### IV. COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH

46. The progress report that I submitted on 14 October (S/26581) described the measures taken on some of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth and the action required on several outstanding points of great importance, namely the dismissal of officials mentioned in connection with the serious acts of violence investigated by the Commission; recommendations requiring constitutional amendments, particularly with regard to the decentralization of powers and competence of the Supreme Court; and recommendations on amparo and the recognition of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Progress on these issues depends not only on action by the Government and FMLN, but also by individuals and institutions, in particular, COPAZ and the Legislative Assembly.

47. Since the above-mentioned progress report, there has been one important development that merits the attention of the Council. In October, the Ministry of Justice submitted six draft laws to the Legislative Assembly. These were aimed at perfecting the guarantees for due process through reforms to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure and the invalidation of extrajudicial confessions. The package also contained the proposed repeal of the law of dangerous condition (estado peligroso), which violates some of the fundamental rights enshrined in international instruments. To this is annexed a proposal for modification of article 13.4 of the Constitution, which represents an important precedent. This is a very positive step in the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth and, at the same time, of those of the ONUSAL Human Rights Division, which were endorsed by the Commission.

## V. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS

### A. Transfer of land programme

48. In my last report I was able to point to progress, albeit slow, in the implementation of the land transfer programme of 13 October 1992. Six months later I regret to report that, in spite of commitments by the two parties to accelerate the process, very little progress was made until very recently. A year after agreement was reached on the land programme, land titles had been issued to less than 10 per cent of the potential beneficiaries. This was discouraging land owners from selling since they could not receive payment until the legal transfer was finalized. The difficulties encountered and the slow rate of progress were also discouraging potential donors from making new commitments to the programme. This was particularly true of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and European Community (EC) donors, who noted that funds previously committed by them were still partially unused. It was also worrying that both parties had entered into new agreements to accelerate the programme but had had difficulty in putting them into practice.

49. The main problem still related to determining who should be entitled to land. The agreement stipulated that ex-combatants of both sides and landholders who had occupied land during the conflict and had been "verified" by the Special Agrarian Commission of COPAZ would be entitled to land. However, FMLN had questioned the way the verification was made. For example, the verification as reflected in the Commission's records often included the names of those on the board of a cooperative but not all of its members, although they had filled out forms for verification purposes (boletas). Thus the Commission's verification underestimated the total number of potential beneficiaries. In the Follow-up and Supervision Committee, a tripartite (Government/FMLN/ONUSAL) mechanism to accelerate the land programme, it was agreed that those who had filled out boletas would also be included. These, however, had not been accepted at the 42 government offices that were established in October 1993 to undertake the reverification nor had they been included in the Government's total of persons to whom it contemplated transferring land.

50. The FMLN, for its part, had also failed to comply with certain commitments. At the high-level tripartite meeting of 8 September 1993, the Government proposed and FMLN accepted that land would be transferred first to those who had been reverified. Those who had not been verified, as well as minors, would receive land at the end of the programme, if additional financing was available. The total number of beneficiaries, however, could not exceed the total contemplated in the 13 October 1992 land programme. For this sequence to begin, FMLN would have had to "clean up" the lists of beneficiaries it had submitted to the Government so as to eliminate those who had not been verified. Although the difficulties of doing this should not be underestimated, FMLN's failure to comply with the 8 September Agreement was being interpreted by the Government and by some donors as reflecting a desire to exploit the non-implementation of this programme for political purposes.

51. The land programme needed to be reactivated as soon as possible and in a dynamic way, and I appealed to the two parties to exercise flexibility in the belief that the remaining technical, financial and legal difficulties could be solved if the political will to do so existed. There was an urgent need to

reduce tension among those ex-combatants whose justified expectations of getting land, credit and housing had been largely unfulfilled. Credit for agricultural production and for housing could not be obtained unless borrowers held title to, or a promise of, land. Thus, problems in land transfer had seriously delayed the reintegration of former combatants and landholders into productive activity.

52. To get the programme moving and facilitate the search for new financing, the Government had offered to issue certificates (Certificados de asignación) by 31 December for all verified people in FMLN lists for 50 State properties and also to transfer 120 negotiated private properties, provided that FMLN agreed to include only verified beneficiaries. For FMLN to clean up these lists would have been very difficult. For this reason I requested the Government to show flexibility by accepting as many non-verified people on these properties as possible.

53. I am pleased to report that on 17 November the Government agreed to accept the lists presented by the FMLN for the 120 private properties and for the 50 State properties already negotiated, so that they could be transferred before 15 December. I now urge FMLN to honour its commitment to prepare lists for the remaining properties with ex-combatants and landholders who have been verified. This would be on the understanding that a solution will be found for the unverified ones after the verified persons have received land and as resources become available, as had been agreed at the 8 September meeting.

54. The Government's willingness to accept the lists that FMLN had presented for those 170 properties will make it possible for 12,000 beneficiaries to gain access to credit for production by the end of the year. The Agricultural Development Bank, which needs to be strengthened for this purpose, would have time to establish its eligibility criteria, specify the different types of credit for different types of crops, train people, establish the necessary documentation, etc. The Bank needs to be ready to advertise its credit line by January and February so that borrowers can start getting credit in March, in time for the planting season.

55. A solution also needs to be found to the problem of human settlements (referred to in the agreements as predios e inmuebles). Although at the 8 September meeting it was agreed that those in rural areas would be included in the land programme, no transfers have yet taken place. FMLN wants them transferred as they exist, with all the infrastructure and en bloc. Since approximately 750 beneficiaries of FMLN live in these settlements, breaking them up would have complex political and social consequences. The Government will also need to show flexibility and political will to solve this problem.

56. The follow-up to land transfers is extremely important. Although some beneficiaries have received training before obtaining land, it is important that specific training relating to different crops be provided when the transfer takes place so that they can put the credit to use as productively as possible. Technical expertise to help beneficiaries to diversify production will also be needed. This is an area in which the international community could make a significant impact.

B. Forum for Economic and Social Consultation

57. In May 1993, I reported that, although the representatives of Government, business and labour had agreed, in February 1993, on the principle of the right of labour to associate, there had been, in April, a set-back in the work of the Forum with regard to the adoption of the ILO conventions relating to these rights (see S/25812, para. 70). This stalemate was compounded by a month-long health-care workers' strike, which generated tension, as workers from other sectors stopped work or threatened to do so to show solidarity.

58. On 25 August 1993, the Forum emerged from this impasse and approved a new agenda, which included the reform of primary national laws on labour issues, without eliminating the issue of the ILO conventions. The agenda included the Labour Code, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and the Social Security Law.

59. The presentation and discussion of proposals by ILO experts to reform the labour code have contributed greatly to a new dynamism in the Forum. Most of the changes concerning the individual rights of workers were adopted and, since 25 October, the parties have been discussing collective rights and freedom to form and join unions.

60. I am glad to be able to report that, as a result of the discussions, restrictions on the unionization of rural workers have been removed and the three parties have agreed on the creation of a Labour Council within the Ministry of Labour, which will institutionalize consultation between all three parties on labour issues. Unfortunately the business sector decided to suspend its participation in the Forum as of 20 November 1993, the date of initiation of the electoral campaign.

C. Reintegration programmes

61. ONUSAL has continued to work with the parties and with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with a view to stimulating the implementation of various programmes designed to facilitate the economic and social reintegration into civilian life of former FMLN and Armed Forces of El Salvador combatants.

FMLN ex-combatants

62. As reported in May, all the short-term programmes (agricultural training, distribution of agricultural tools, basic household goods and academic instruction) have been completed, with the exception of the industrial training programme, which is now scheduled to end in April 1994.

63. Among the many problems the following are worth mentioning. First, a global strategy is lacking in the formulation of the programmes, and this has affected their design and planning. Second, short-term training programmes did not start at the same time and were not synchronized with the dates of demobilization, with the result that some beneficiaries registered in programmes because of economic need rather than preference or vocation to learn. Third, there was no overall planning and the same mistakes were repeated in the different programmes.

64. In spite of the many problems, short-term programmes served an important purpose. They reduced the risk that demobilized people would resort to crime as a means of survival. They also helped to ensure respect for the cease-fire and thus played a crucial role in the peace process.

65. There is now a need to focus and expand on medium- and longer-term programmes, including credit for micro-enterprises, agriculture and housing, technical assistance and scholarships. As with the short-term programmes, there has not been a clear overall strategy to ensure that ex-combatants can be reintegrated into the productive life of the country. The programmes for micro-enterprises, technical assistance and scholarships have suffered serious delays, partly as a result of administrative problems but also for lack of immediate financing and political will. Those for agricultural credit and housing have been delayed by the lack of progress in the transfer of land. These delays have disrupted the continuum between short- and medium-term programmes and generated scepticism and tension among the beneficiaries, who have had to find other ways to meet their socio-economic needs.

66. At the end of October, a German-financed project for the construction of 2,000 houses for FMLN ex-combatants was inaugurated in eight departments. This represents an important start, though the number of houses to be provided meets only one third of the total demand.

67. The non-governmental organization (NGO) Fundación 16 de enero needs to be strengthened in order to enable it to comply with its given role in the agreed programmes of representing, organizing and informing potential beneficiaries among ex-combatants of the five FMLN groups. The fact that it has not had the necessary support or the funding to do this has weakened FMLN's capacity to participate successfully in these programmes and has added to the administrative difficulties of implementing them.

#### Armed Forces of El Salvador ex-combatants

68. These programmes are similar to those envisaged for FMLN. While short-term reintegration programmes for the demobilized members of the Armed Forces of El Salvador have started, they cover only part of the target group. In addition, most of the medium-term programmes are still in the preparatory phase. ONUSAL continues to offer its help in overcoming the existing problems so that all these programmes can be implemented. A German-financed housing project similar to that inaugurated for FMLN ex-combatants is being prepared for demobilized members of the Armed Forces of El Salvador.

69. The Peace Accords stipulate that those members of the Armed Forces of El Salvador who are demobilized as a result of the Accords are entitled to an indemnity of one year's salary (chap. I.13.B). ONUSAL is still unable to obtain from the Government the information it needs on reintegration programmes (including land transfer) for ex-combatants of the Armed Forces of El Salvador (see S/25812, para. 74).

#### War-disabled

70. The Fund for the Protection of Wounded and War-disabled as a Consequence of the Armed Conflict was created by Decree No. 416 of 13 December 1992 in

compliance with the New York Agreement, which stipulated that the Government would provide the resources to enable its Board of Directors to function. The swearing in of the Fund's Board of Directors was postponed several times, but finally took place at the end of June after a demonstration in San Salvador in which at least one life was lost. However, the emergency budget presented by the Board to permit the disbursement of funds established by the Law, which should have started in June, still awaits the approval of the Ministry of Finance. Nor has the Government yet fulfilled its obligation to make an initial contribution to the Fund, which is an important condition for the start of contributions from donors.

#### VI. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY FMLN

71. As I informed the Council on 29 June (S/26005), the discovery of undeclared FMLN arms caches raised questions in certain quarters about the legality of FMLN as a political party. After I had reported to the Council on 30 August (S/26371) that the residual arms deposits declared by FMLN had been verified and destroyed by ONUSAL, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of El Salvador was duly informed, in accordance with its request. This enabled FMLN to continue as a legally recognized political party. On 5 September 1993, FMLN held its national convention at which it decided to participate in the elections and chose its candidates.

72. At the high-level meeting of 8 September 1993 between the Government, FMLN and ONUSAL, the Government undertook to assign two television frequencies and one short-wave frequency to the institution or persons designated by FMLN. This, added to the AM and FM frequencies previously assigned, fulfils the commitment entered into by the Government in the complementary agreements of 22 December 1992. The Government also agreed to grant tax exemptions for the vehicles imported by FMLN for use by its leaders; these are still being processed.

73. Likewise, the approval by the Legislative Assembly on 17 June 1993 of the Law for the Protection of Individuals Subject to Special Security now permits its application to FMLN, whose bodyguards are being incorporated into the National Civil Police as supernumeraries, although not in the numbers originally envisaged. FMLN leaders have hitherto been protected by ex-combatants chosen by them and armed with their own weapons verified by ONUSAL and authorized by the Government. The recent murders of two FMLN leaders highlight the need for the provision of adequate security to the FMLN leadership which, under the Peace Accords, is the responsibility of the Government.

#### VII. RESTORATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE FORMER ZONES OF CONFLICT

74. As I reported to the Council in May, all mayors and judges returned to their jurisdictions at the beginning of the year. However, some of them are still not living in their municipalities, which limits to some extent the services they can provide to their communities. Neither mayors nor judges have faced political obstacles in the exercise of their functions and relations between them and local communities have on the whole been positive. The



re-establishment of public services has, however, been slow and the disbursement of funds for the reconstruction of the areas most devastated by the conflict has still not been made in the amount and with the urgency that the situation demands. I again urge the Government to accord higher priority to the reconstruction of the former zones of conflict.

#### VIII. ELECTORAL PROCESS

75. The Council has recently received a detailed report (S/26606) on the activities of the ONUSAL Electoral Division. The Division's mandate is being carried out in five stages: during the first stage, from 1 to 30 June 1993, offices at the central and regional levels were established; the second stage, from 1 July to 18 December 1993, entails, inter alia, the verification of the registration of voters and subsequent political activities; the third stage, from 19 December to 14 March 1994, will be devoted to the observation of the electoral campaign; and the fourth stage, from 15 to 31 March 1994, will cover observation of the elections, the counting of votes and the announcement of results. The fifth and final stage will run from 1 to 30 April 1994, if a second round of voting is required for the election of the President.

76. The Division is now concentrating on verifying that steps are taken to permit the inclusion of all qualified citizens in the electoral register. Major progress had been made in mobilizing citizens to apply to register. By 19 November the Supreme Electoral Tribunal had received over 785,000 registration forms. There nevertheless remains a problem of transforming these applications into voter registration and electoral cards and serious technical difficulties have not yet been fully overcome.

77. One problem is that many municipalities are failing to send applicants' birth certificates to the Tribunal, a legal requirement for the transformation of application forms into electoral cards. A second problem is the limited capacity of the Tribunal for the timely computerization of voters' application forms and the birth certificates needed for their validation. A third problem relates to the transmission of information between the Tribunal on the one hand, and the political parties and Board of Vigilance on the other. At the time of writing, the Tribunal had not yet complied with its legal obligation to provide the parties with computer terminals connected to the centre that produces the voters' register or with lists of electoral cards available for delivery to applicants. The availability of this information would be useful in helping the parties to check how many prospective voters are still not registered. ONUSAL continues to support the Tribunal in its efforts to resolve these problems.

#### IX. THE FINANCIAL NEEDS OF POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

78. As I pointed out in my last report, the international community responded generously during the last Consultative Group meeting in Paris in April 1993 to the Government's request for financing for the national reconstruction plan during the period 1993-1996. However, donors showed a clear preference for financing specific projects, mostly in infrastructure and the environment. As a result, commitments for peace-related programmes for the reintegration of ex-combatants into productive activities (purchase of land, agricultural credit,

housing, credit for small enterprises, pensions for disabled, etc.) and for the promotion of democratic institutions (National Civil Police, National Public Security Academy, human-rights-related activities, the Judiciary and activities related to the coming elections) fell short of expectations.

79. In my efforts to promote financing for peace-related programmes in El Salvador, I have found that many donors condition their assistance on the Government's compliance with the Peace Accords and on stronger commitments to implement the specific programmes quickly and to give them priority in the government budget. It is thus with satisfaction that I am now able to report that the Government has begun to allocate some funds that could have been used for other purposes to some of the peace-related projects. For example, of the approximately \$71 million committed to the land programme from its inception, the Government has committed about 35 per cent of the total (\$25 million), with the remainder being provided by USAID (\$34 million) and EC (\$12 million). At the same time, its 1994 general budget allocates \$10 million to the Academy and \$33 million to the National Civil Police. The Government continues to mobilize external financing, especially in the form of grants and/or highly concessional loans, and has indicated its willingness to use some of the quick-disbursement funds that it obtains for these programmes.

80. Additional resources are required rather urgently for the strengthening of the Judiciary and other democratic institutions, including the National Civil Police, and for crucial programmes for the reintegration of ex-combatants and for continuing support in the area of human rights, including the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights. Financing is also critical for key programmes for the reintegration of ex-combatants and their supporters into the civilian and productive life of the country.

#### X. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

81. By its resolution 47/234 of 14 September 1993, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the operation of ONUSAL at a rate not to exceed \$3 million gross (\$2,720,000 net) per month for the four-month period from 1 December 1993 to 31 March 1994, should the Council decide to continue the Mission beyond 30 November 1993. This authorization is subject to the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Should the Security Council continue the mandate of ONUSAL beyond 30 November 1993, the monthly cost of maintaining the Mission through 31 March 1994 will be limited to the commitment authority contained in General Assembly resolution 47/234. I shall report to the Advisory Committee and to the General Assembly on the additional requirements needed for the maintenance of the Mission beyond 31 March 1994.

82. As of 15 November 1993, unpaid assessed contributions to the ONUSAL special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 30 November 1993 amount to some \$25.5 million.

## XI. OBSERVATIONS

83. The Peace Accords signed at Chapultepec on 16 January 1992 were a historic achievement of the Salvadorian people. President Cristiani and his Government and the leaders of FMLN and their supporters responded to the historic need to bring to an end a long period of civil strife, which had culminated in 11 years of bloody armed conflict. The settlement which they negotiated with the help of the United Nations was not just a cease-fire. It was a comprehensive package of interrelated agreements designed to address and resolve the many issues that had created economic, social and political tensions and finally erupted into armed conflict. It is important to remember that every element in the interrelated agreements was negotiated with the two sides and freely accepted by each of them.

84. Implementation of the Peace Accords has on the whole progressed well. Enormous advances have been achieved, advances that it would have been difficult to imagine when the United Nations first became involved in the effort to make peace in El Salvador four years ago. The elections that are to take place in March 1994 should represent the culminating point in the whole process. It had been envisaged that the vast majority of the provisions of the Peace Accords would have been implemented well before the elections. The timetable that forms part of the Accords was drafted on this basis. It was thought important that implementation of the Accords should not be caught up in the electoral campaign and that the electorate should be able to make its democratic choice at a time when the full dimensions of the new El Salvador created by the Accords were already apparent to it.

85. The electoral campaign officially began a few days ago, on 20 November 1993, preceded, during recent weeks, by a distinct polarization of political positions. The present state of implementation is described in some detail in the previous sections of this report. Much has been achieved. But it is a matter of considerable concern to me that the electoral campaign should have begun when some very important elements in the Accords remain only partially implemented and when there are disturbing signs of the reappearance of some ugly features of El Salvador's past.

86. I should like in particular to draw the Security Council's attention to three aspects: human rights, police matters and the economic and social programmes for the reintegration of both sides' ex-combatants into civil society.

87. The Human Rights Division of ONUSAL had expressed concern, in its last two reports, about a possible re-emergence of "death squads", whose contribution to the horrors of the Salvadorian civil war, and prior to it, have been amply described by the Commission on the Truth. While it would be wrong to prejudge the outcome of investigations that are under way, the recent series of murders must at least create a strong supposition that the Human Rights Division's fears were well founded. Be that as it may, those murders have had a nefarious impact on the political climate and have undermined confidence in the peace process. It is therefore essential that there should be, as soon as possible, an impartial, independent and credible investigation into illegal armed groups, as recommended by the Commission on the Truth. On 5 November 1993, the Council approved my ideas about how the United Nations should help in such an

investigation. I regret that, in spite of the dispatch to El Salvador of a mission led by Under-Secretary-General Goulding from 8 to 15 November, it has not yet proved possible to reach agreement on the establishment of the investigation. Consultations, however, continue with all concerned and I hope soon to be able to report a favourable outcome.

88. Meanwhile the human rights components of the Peace Accords have been implemented in varying degrees. Important legal reforms, such as those to the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the elimination of extrajudicial confessions and the modification of regulations with respect to habeas corpus, are in progress, although many of them are only in the proposal stage and deficiencies in judicial practice persist. Within the Armed Forces, the development of human rights components both in the new military structure and in the new doctrine have been conducted consistently in cooperation with the ONUSAL Human Rights Division. The consolidation and extension of this progress will depend on the country's capacity to reverse the regressive trends that have been detected in recent months, on the effective operation of the institutions created by the Peace Accords, especially the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, and on the effective deployment of the National Civil Police. Progress will also depend on the implementation of the pending recommendations of the Commission on the Truth concerning the judiciary.

89. The section on public security matters in this report (paras. 19-41) paints a somewhat disturbing picture. The civilianization of the police function was a central principle of the whole settlement. Only thus could the Armed Forces be reduced, remodelled and given the role normally performed by the military in democratic societies. I acknowledge the complexity of establishing a completely new police force and transferring responsibility for public order to it in the aftermath of a long civil war and in the middle of a crime wave. But ONUSAL's reports create the impression that at some levels in the Government there may be a lack of commitment to the objective enshrined in the Peace Accords. This is reflected in the denial to the National Civil Police of the necessary logistical and technical resources, the introduction into that force of military personnel, the prolongation of the existence of the National Police and the denial to ONUSAL of the information it requires for verification purposes. Concerns also persist that the military intelligence establishment may still be involving itself with internal security matters.

90. The severe delays in fulfilling the promises of land and other benefits that were made to ex-combatants of both sides has given rise to tension which, as the situation in a neighbouring country has shown, can become a dangerous source of instability. As regards land, both the Government and FMLN should respect their agreements and resolve to accelerate their implementation. The Government should also show flexibility in solving the human settlements problem and avoid threatening to evict landholders before the programme has been finalized and a solution is found to the problem of non-verified landholders. The medium-term programmes of reintegration also need to be accelerated through more financing, more technical assistance and, most importantly, more political will.

91. Full compliance with the Peace Accords will strengthen my efforts to obtain external financial assistance in support of peace-related programmes. The parties must show a continued commitment to the rapid implementation of these

programmes in order to sustain the interest and support of the international community. A third factor that could stimulate external support would be a clear demonstration of the Government's political will by giving these programmes the high priority they deserve and require in its budget.

92. For my part, I have asked my Special Representative to obtain the Government's and the FMLN's agreement to a new timetable that will set the firmest possible dates for completing the implementation of the most important outstanding points in the Peace Accords. Even so, it is clear that it will not be possible to complete implementation of all such points before the elections. It is important therefore that the new Government should maintain its predecessor's commitment to implement the Accords in their entirety. In this context, an important step was taken on 5 November 1993 when, in response to an initiative by my Special Representative, six of the seven presidential candidates signed a statement, entitled "Commitment of the presidential candidates to peace and stability in El Salvador", in which they inter alia solemnly committed themselves to maintain the constructive evolution of the peace process and to implement all the commitments contained in the Peace Accords and rejected any politically motivated violence or intimidation. I subsequently received a letter from the candidate who declined to sign the statement, in which he explained that, although he agreed with its objectives, he had not signed it because he believed that it should have contained more detailed commitments to specific measures. It is important that all those taking part in the election campaign should demonstrate their commitment to the peace process and, in particular, their commitment to the implementation of the Accords in full.

93. Until a short while ago, impressive progress had been made in implementing the Accords despite a number of obstacles, which could usually be overcome through supplementary negotiations and agreements. But recent developments described in this report have caused serious worry as to whether previous achievements are now threatened, especially as the electoral campaign gets under way. Both President Cristiani and the leadership of FMLN have been commended in the past for their determination to ensure that peace is consolidated. I exhort them to overcome these new challenges and make sure that the peace process continues on its course.

94. The elections and the transition to the administration of the newly elected President, who will be inaugurated on 1 June 1994, will be a critically important period and it is clearly necessary for ONUSAL to continue to carry out its verification and good offices functions throughout it. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council extend ONUSAL's mandate for a further period of six months, that is until 31 May 1994.

95. I have just received a recommendation from my Special Representative for some additional police observers to be assigned to ONUSAL and for a modest increase in the Mission's economic and political staff. This recommendation is currently under study and I shall revert to the Council, as necessary.

96. As regards the future of ONUSAL beyond 31 May 1994, my present thinking is that it will probably be desirable to keep the Mission in existence, at reduced strength, for a further period of a few months to verify the full deployment of the National Civil Police and the phasing-out of the National Police, together

with implementation of any other major points in the Peace Accords, such as those relating to land and other reintegration programmes, which remain outstanding at that time. I shall revert to the Council with a considered recommendation on this matter well before the expiry of the mandate extension recommended in the present report.

97. In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Augusto Ramirez-Ocampo, and to all the personnel of ONUSAL, for the exemplary manner in which they are assisting the Government and people of El Salvador to consolidate peace in their country through full implementation of the Peace Accords.

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