Applying the Isabelle Insider Framework to Airplane Security

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Abstract

Avionics is one of the fields in which verification methods have been pioneered and brought a new level of reliability to systems used in safety critical environments. Tragedies, like the 2015 insider attack on a German airplane, in which all 150 people on board died, show that safety and security crucially depend not only on the well functioning of systems but also on the way how humans interact with the systems. Policies are a way to describe how humans should behave in their interactions with technical systems, formal reasoning about such policies requires integrating the human factor into the verification process.

We model insider attacks on airplanes using logical modelling and analysis of infrastructure models and policies with actors to scrutinize security policies in the presence of insiders [2]. The Isabelle Insider framework has been first presented in [4]. Triggered by case studies, like the present one of airplane security, it has been greatly extended now formalizing Kripke structures and the temporal logic CTL to enable reasoning on dynamic system states. Furthermore, we illustrate that Isabelle modelling and invariant reasoning reveal subtle security assumptions: the formal development uses locales to model the assumptions on insider and their access credentials. Technically interesting is how the locale is interpreted in the presence of an abstract type declaration for actor in the Insider framework redefining this type declaration at a later stage like a "post-hoc type definition" as proposed in [8]. The case study and the application of the methododology are described in more detail in the preprint [3].

Contents

1 Kripke structures and CTL

We apply Kripke structures and CTL to model state based systems and analyse properties under dynamic state changes. Snapshots of systems are the states on which we define a state transition. Temporal logic is then employed to express security and privacy properties.

theory *MC*
imports *Main*
begin

1.1 Lemmas to support least and greatest fixpoints

lemma *predtrans-empty*:
  assumes *mono* $(\tau :: {'}a\ set \Rightarrow {'}a\ set)$
  shows $\forall\ i.\ (\tau\ \hat{}\hat{}\ i)\ (\{\}) \subseteq (\tau\ \hat{}\hat{}(i + 1))(\{\})$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *ex-card*: *finite* $S \Longrightarrow \exists\ n::\ nat.\ card\ S = n$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *less-not-le*: $[\![(x::\ nat) < y;\ y \leq x]\!] \Longrightarrow False$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *infchain-outruns-all*:
  assumes *finite* $(UNIV :: {'}a\ set)$
    and $\forall i :: nat.\ ((\tau :: {'}a\ set \Rightarrow {'}a\ set)\hat{}\hat{}\ i)\ (\{\} :: {'}a\ set) \subset (\tau\ \hat{}\hat{}\ (i + (1 :: nat)))$
$\{\}$
  shows $\forall j :: nat.\ \exists i :: nat.\ j < card\ ((\tau\ \hat{}\hat{}\ i)\ \{\})$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *no-infinite-subset-chain*:
  assumes *finite* ($UNIV$ :: $'a$ *set*)
   and   *mono* (τ :: ($'a$ *set* $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *set*))
   and $\forall\, i$ :: *nat*. ((τ :: $'a$ *set* $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *set*) $\char`^\char`^$ i) $\{\}$ $\subset$ (τ $\char`^\char`^$ (i + (1 :: *nat*))) ($\{\}$ :: $'a$ *set*)
  shows   *False*

Proof idea: since $UNIV$ is finite, we have from *ex-card* that there is an n with *card UNIV* = *n*. Now, use *infchain-outruns-all* to show as contradiction point that $\exists\, i.\ card\ UNIV\ <\ card\ (\tau^i\ \{\})$. Since all sets are subsets of $UNIV$, we also have $card\ (\tau^i\ \{\}) \leq card\ UNIV$: Contradiction!, i.e. proof of False

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *finite-fixp*:
  assumes *finite*($UNIV$ :: $'a$ *set*)
    and *mono* (τ :: ($'a$ *set* $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *set*))
   shows $\exists\ i.\ (\tau\ \char`^\char`^\ i)\ (\{\}) = (\tau\ \char`^\char`^(i + 1))(\{\})$

Proof idea: with *predtrans-empty* we know
$\forall\, i.\ \tau^i\ \{\} \subseteq \tau^{i\,+\,1}\ \{\}$ (1).
If we can additionally show
$\exists\, i.\ \tau^{i\,+\,1}\ \{\} \subseteq \tau^i\ \{\}$ (2),
we can get the goal together with equalityI $\subseteq$ + $\supseteq$ $\longrightarrow$ =. To prove (1) we observe that $\tau^{i\,+\,1}\ \{\} \subseteq \tau^i\ \{\}$ can be inferred from $\neg\ \tau^i\ \{\} \subseteq \tau^{i\,+\,1}\ \{\}$ and (1). Finally, the latter is solved directly by *no-infinite-subset-chain*.

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *predtrans-UNIV*:
  assumes *mono* (τ :: ($'a$ *set* $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *set*))
  shows $\forall\ i.\ (\tau\ \char`^\char`^\ i)\ (UNIV) \supseteq (\tau\ \char`^\char`^(i + 1))(UNIV)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *Suc-less-le*: $x < (y - n) \Longrightarrow x \leq (y - (Suc\ n))$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *card-univ-subtract*:
  assumes *finite* ($UNIV$ :: $'a$ *set*) **and** *mono* (τ :: ($'a$ *set* $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *set*))
   and ($\forall\, i$ :: *nat*. ((τ :: $'a$ *set* $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *set*) $\char`^\char`^$ (i + (1 :: *nat*)))($UNIV$ :: $'a$ *set*) $\subset$ (τ $\char`^\char`^$ i) $UNIV$)
   shows ($\forall\ i$ :: *nat*. $card$((τ $\char`^\char`^$ i) ($UNIV$ ::$'a$ *set*)) $\leq$ ($card$ ($UNIV$ :: $'a$ *set*)) $-$ i)
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *card-UNIV-tau-i-below-zero*:
  assumes *finite* ($UNIV$ :: $'a$ *set*) **and** *mono* (τ :: ($'a$ *set* $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *set*))

and $(\forall\, i :: nat.\ ((\tau :: ('a\ set \Rightarrow 'a\ set))\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ (i + (1 :: nat)))(UNIV :: 'a\ set) \subset (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ i)\ UNIV)$
  shows $card((\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ (card\ (UNIV ::'a\ set)))\ (UNIV ::'a\ set)) \le 0$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *finite-card-zero-empty*: $\llbracket\ finite\ S;\ card\ S \le 0 \rrbracket \Longrightarrow S = \{\}$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *UNIV-tau-i-is-empty*:
  assumes *finite* $(UNIV :: \ 'a\ set)$ **and** *mono* $(\tau :: ('a\ set \Rightarrow 'a\ set))$
    and $(\forall\, i :: nat.\ ((\tau :: 'a\ set \Rightarrow 'a\ set)\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ (i + (1 :: nat)))(UNIV :: 'a\ set) \subset (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ i)\ UNIV)$
  shows $(\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ (card\ (UNIV ::'a\ set)))\ (UNIV ::'a\ set) = \{\}$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *down-chain-reaches-empty*:
  assumes *finite* $(UNIV :: \ 'a\ set)$ **and** *mono* $(\tau :: \ 'a\ set \Rightarrow 'a\ set)$
    and $(\forall\, i :: nat.\ ((\tau :: \ 'a\ set \Rightarrow 'a\ set)\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ (i + (1 :: nat)))\ UNIV \subset (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ i)\ UNIV)$
  shows $\exists\ (j :: nat).\ (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ j)\ UNIV = \{\}$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *no-infinite-subset-chain2*:
  assumes *finite* $(UNIV :: \ 'a\ set)$ **and** *mono* $(\tau :: ('a\ set \Rightarrow 'a\ set))$
    and $\forall\, i :: nat.\ (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ i)\ UNIV \supset (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ (i + (1 :: nat)))\ UNIV$
  shows *False*
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *finite-fixp2*:
  assumes *finite*$(UNIV :: \ 'a\ set)$ **and** *mono* $(\tau :: ('a\ set \Rightarrow 'a\ set))$
  shows $\exists\ i.\ (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ i)\ UNIV = (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}(i + 1))\ UNIV$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *lfp-loop*:
  assumes *finite* $(UNIV :: \ 'b\ set)$ **and** *mono* $(\tau :: ('b\ set \Rightarrow 'b\ set))$
  shows $\exists\ n\ .\ lfp\ \tau\ = (\tau\ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ n)\ \{\}$
$\langle proof \rangle$

These next two are repeated from the corresponding theorems in HOL/ZF/Nat.thy for the sake of self-containedness of the exposition.

lemma *Kleene-iter-gpfp*:
  assumes *mono* f **and** $p \le f\ p$ **shows** $p \le (f\hat{}\,\hat{}k)\ (top::'a::order\text{-}top)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *gfp-Kleene-iter*: **assumes** *mono* f **and** $(f\hat{}\,\hat{}Suc\ k)\ top = (f\hat{}\,\hat{}k)\ top$
shows $gfp\ f = (f\hat{}\,\hat{}k)\ top$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *gfp-Kleene-iter-set*:
  assumes *mono* $(f :: ('a \ set \Rightarrow 'a \ set))$
      and $(f \ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ Suc(n)) \ UNIV = (f \ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ n) \ UNIV$
    shows *gfp* $f = (f \ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ n) \ UNIV$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *gfp-loop*:
  assumes *finite* $(UNIV :: 'b \ set)$
  and *mono* $(\tau :: ('b \ set \Rightarrow 'b \ set))$
    shows $\exists \ n \ . \ gfp \ \tau = (\tau \ \hat{}\ \hat{}\ n)(UNIV :: 'b \ set)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

1.2 Generic type of state with state transition and CTL operators

The system states and their transition relation are defined as a class called *state* containing an abstract constant *state-transition*. It introduces the syntactic infix notation $I \rightarrow_i I'$ to denote that system state I and I' are in this relation over an arbitrary (polymorphic) type $'a$.

class *state* =
  fixes *state-transition* $:: ['a :: type, 'a] \Rightarrow bool$ (**infixr** $\rightarrow_i 50$)

The above class definition lifts Kripke structures and CTL to a general level. The definition of the inductive relation is given by a set of specific rules which are, however, part of an application like infrastructures. Branching time temporal logic CTL is defined in general over Kripke structures with arbitrary state transitions and can later be applied to suitable theories, like infrastructures. Based on the generic state transition $\rightarrow$ of the type class state, the CTL-operators EX and AX express that property f holds in some or all next states, respectively.

definition AX **where** $AX \ f \equiv \{s. \ \{f0. \ s \rightarrow_i f0\} \subseteq f\}$
definition EX' **where** $EX' \ f \equiv \{s \ . \ \exists \ f0 \in f. \ s \rightarrow_i f0 \ \}$

The CTL formula $AG \ f$ means that on all paths branching from a state s the formula f is always true (G stands for 'globally'). It can be defined using the Tarski fixpoint theory by applying the greatest fixpoint operator. In a similar way, the other CTL operators are defined.

definition AF **where** $AF \ f \equiv lfp \ (\lambda \ Z. \ f \cup AX \ Z)$
definition EF **where** $EF \ f \equiv lfp \ (\lambda \ Z. \ f \cup EX' \ Z)$
definition AG **where** $AG \ f \equiv gfp \ (\lambda \ Z. \ f \cap AX \ Z)$
definition EG **where** $EG \ f \equiv gfp \ (\lambda \ Z. \ f \cap EX' \ Z)$
definition AU **where** $AU \ f1 \ f2 \equiv lfp(\lambda \ Z. \ f2 \cup (f1 \cap AX \ Z))$
definition EU **where** $EU \ f1 \ f2 \equiv lfp(\lambda \ Z. \ f2 \cup (f1 \cap EX' \ Z))$
definition AR **where** $AR \ f1 \ f2 \equiv gfp(\lambda \ Z. \ f2 \cap (f1 \cup AX \ Z))$
definition ER **where** $ER \ f1 \ f2 \equiv gfp(\lambda \ Z. \ f2 \cap (f1 \cup EX' \ Z))$

1.3 Kripke structures and Modelchecking

datatype $'a$ *kripke* =
  Kripke $'a$ *set* $'a$ *set*

primrec *states* **where** *states* (*Kripke S I*) = *S*
primrec *init* **where** *init* (*Kripke S I*) = *I*

The formal Isabelle definition of what it means that formula f holds in a Kripke structure M can be stated as: the initial states of the Kripke structure init M need to be contained in the set of all states states M that imply f.

definition *check* ($- \vdash - 50$)
 where $M \vdash f \equiv (init\ M) \subseteq \{s \in (states\ M).\ s \in f\ \}$

definition *state-transition-refl* (**infixr** $\rightarrow_i* 50$)
where $s \rightarrow_i* s' \equiv ((s,s') \in \{(x,y).\ state\text{-}transition\ x\ y\}^*)$

1.4 Lemmas for CTL operators

1.4.1 EF lemmas

lemma *EF-lem0*: $(x \in EF\ f) = (x \in f \cup EX'\ (lfp\ (\lambda Z :: ('a :: state)\ set.\ f \cup EX'\ Z)))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem00*: $(EF\ f) = (f \cup EX'\ (lfp\ (\lambda\ Z :: ('a :: state)\ set.\ f \cup EX'\ Z)))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem000*: $(EF\ f) = (f \cup EX'\ (EF\ f))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem1*: $x \in f \lor x \in (EX'\ (EF\ f)) \Longrightarrow x \in EF\ f$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem2b*:
  assumes $x \in (EX'\ (EF\ f))$
 shows $x \in EF\ f$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem2a*: **assumes** $x \in f$ **shows** $x \in EF\ f$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem2c*: **assumes** $x \notin f$ **shows** $x \in EF\ (-\ f)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem2d*: **assumes** $x \notin EF\ f$ **shows** $x \notin f$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EF-lem3b*: **assumes** $x \in EX'\ (f \cup EX'\ (EF\ f))$ **shows** $x \in (EF\ f)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *EX-lem0l*: $x \in (EX' f) \Longrightarrow x \in (EX' (f \cup g))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EX-lem0r*: $x \in (EX' g) \Longrightarrow x \in (EX' (f \cup g))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EX-step*: **assumes** $x \rightarrow_i y$ **and** $y \in f$ **shows** $x \in EX' f$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-E*[*rule-format*]: $\forall f.\ x \in (EF\ (f :: ('a :: state)\ set)) \longrightarrow x \in (f \cup EX'$
$(EF\ f))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-step*: **assumes** $x \rightarrow_i y$ **and** $y \in f$ **shows** $x \in EF\ f$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-step-step*: **assumes** $x \rightarrow_i y$ **and** $y \in EF\ f$ **shows** $x \in EF\ f$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-step-star*: $[\![\ x \rightarrow_i* y;\ y \in f\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow x \in EF\ f$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-induct-prep*:
  assumes $(a::'a::state) \in lfp\ (\lambda\ Z.\ (f::'a::state\ set) \cup EX'\ Z)$
  and $mono\ (\lambda\ Z.\ (f::'a::state\ set) \cup EX'\ Z)$
  shows $(\bigwedge x::'a::state.$
    $x \in ((\lambda\ Z.\ (f::'a::state\ set) \cup EX'\ Z)(lfp\ (\lambda\ Z.\ (f::'a::state\ set) \cup EX'\ Z) \cap$
$\{x::'a::state.\ (P::'a::state \Rightarrow bool)\ x\})) \Longrightarrow P\ x) \Longrightarrow$
    $P\ a$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-induct*: $(a::'a::state) \in EF\ (f :: 'a :: state\ set) \Longrightarrow$
  $mono\ (\lambda\ Z.\ (f::'a::state\ set) \cup EX'\ Z) \Longrightarrow$
  $(\bigwedge x::'a::state.$
    $x \in ((\lambda\ Z.\ (f::'a::state\ set) \cup EX'\ Z)(EF\ f \cap \{x::'a::state.\ (P::'a::state \Rightarrow$
$bool)\ x\})) \Longrightarrow P\ x) \Longrightarrow$
  $P\ a$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *valEF-E*: $M \vdash EF\ f \Longrightarrow x \in init\ M \Longrightarrow x \in EF\ f$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-step-star-rev*[*rule-format*]: $x \in EF\ s \Longrightarrow (\exists\ y \in s.\ x \rightarrow_i* y)$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *EF-step-inv*: $(I \subseteq \{sa::'s :: state.\ (\exists i::'s \in I.\ i \rightarrow_i* sa) \wedge sa \in EF\ s\})$
        $\Longrightarrow \forall\ x \in I.\ \exists\ y \in s.\ x \rightarrow_i* y$
⟨*proof*⟩

1.4.2 AG lemmas

lemma *AG-in-lem*: $x \in AG\ s \implies x \in s$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AG-lem1*: $x \in s \wedge x \in (AX\ (AG\ s)) \implies x \in AG\ s$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AG-lem2*: $x \in AG\ s \implies x \in (s \cap (AX\ (AG\ s)))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AG-lem3*: $AG\ s = (s \cap (AX\ (AG\ s)))$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AG-step*: $y \to_i z \implies y \in AG\ s \implies z \in AG\ s$
   ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AG-all-s*: $x \to_{i*} y \implies x \in AG\ s \implies y \in AG\ s$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *AG-imp-notnotEF*:
$I \neq \{\} \implies ((Kripke\ \{s :: ('s :: state).\ \exists\ i \in I.\ (i \to_{i*} s)\}\ (I :: ('s :: state)set)$
$\vdash AG\ s)) \implies$
$(\neg(Kripke\ \{s :: ('s :: state).\ \exists\ i \in I.\ (i \to_{i*} s)\}\ (I :: ('s :: state)set)\ \vdash EF\ (-$
$s)))$
⟨*proof*⟩

A simplified way of Modelchecking is given by the following lemma.

lemma *check2-def*: $(Kripke\ S\ I \vdash f) = (I \subseteq S \cap f)$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

2 Insider Framework

In the Isabelle/HOL theory for Insiders, one expresses policies over actions *get*, *move*, *eval*, and *put*.

2.1 Actors and actions

The theory Airinsider is an instance of the Insider framework for the case study of airplane insiders. Although the Isabelle Insider framework is a generic framework the actual semantics of the actions is specific to applications. Therefore we use here an "instance" of the framework in the form of a theory "Airinsider" but the main part of definitions and declarations is the same.

theory *AirInsider*

imports *MC*
begin

An actor may be enabled to

- *get* data or physical items, like keys,

- *move* to a location,

- *eval* a program,

- *put* data at locations or physical items – like airplanes – "to the ground".

The precise semantics of these actions is refined in the state transition rules for the concrete infrastructure. The framework abstracts from concrete data – actions have no parameters:

datatype *action = get | move | eval | put*

The human component is the *Actor* which is represented by an abstract type *actor* and a function *Actor* that creates elements of that type from identities (of type *string*):

We use an abstract type declaration actor that can later be instantiated by a more concrete type.

typedecl *actor*
type-synonym *identity = string*
consts *Actor :: identity ⇒ actor*

Note that it would seem more natural and simpler to just define *actor* as a datatype over identities with a constructor *Actor* instead of a simple constant together with a type declaration like, for example, in the Isabelle inductive approach to security protocol verification [6, 7]. This would, however, make the constructor *Actor* an injective function by the underlying foundation of datatypes therefore excluding the fine grained modelling that is at the core of the insider definition: In fact, it defines the function *Actor* to be injective for all except insiders and explicitly enables insiders to have different roles by identifying *Actor* images.

Alternatives to the type declaration do not work.

context fixes Abs Rep actor assumes td: *type-definition Abs Rep actor begin definition Actor where Actor = Abs* ...doesn't work as an alternative to the actor *typedecl* because in *type-definition* above the *actor* is a set not a type! So can't be used for our purposes.

Trying a locale instead for polymorphic type Actor is a suggested alternative [8].

locale ACT = fixes Actor :: string ⇒ ′actor begin ... That is a nice idea and works quite far but clashes with the generic *state-transition* later (it's not

possible to instantiate within a locale and outside of it we cannot instantiate
$'a$ *infrastructure* to state (clearly an abstract thing as an instance is strange).

definition *ID* :: [*actor*, *string*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where *ID* a s $\equiv$ (a = *Actor* s)

2.2   Infrastructure graphs and policies

Actors are contained in an infrastructure graph. An *igraph* contains a set
of location pairs representing the topology of the infrastructure as a graph
of nodes and a list of actor identities associated to each node (location)
in the graph. Also an *igraph* associates actors to a pair of string sets by
a pair-valued function whose first range component is a set describing the
credentials in the possession of an actor and the second component is a set
defining the roles the actor can take on. Finally, an *igraph* assigns locations
to a pair of a string that defines the state of the component. Corresponding
projection functions for each of these components of an *igraph* are provided;
they are named *gra* for the actual set of pairs of locations, *agra* for the actor
map, *cgra* for the credentials, and *lgra* for the state of a location and the
data at that location.

datatype *location* = *Location nat*
datatype *igraph* = *Lgraph* (*location* ∗ *location*)*set location* $\Rightarrow$ *identity list*
                          actor $\Rightarrow$ (*string list* ∗ *string list*) *location* $\Rightarrow$ *string list*

Atomic policies of type *apolicy* describe prerequisites for actions to be granted
to actors given by pairs of predicates (conditions) and sets of (enabled) actions:

type-synonym *apolicy* = ((*actor* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*) ∗ *action set*)

datatype *infrastructure* =
       Infrastructure igraph
                    [*igraph*, *location*] $\Rightarrow$ *apolicy set*

primrec *loc* :: *location* $\Rightarrow$ *nat*
where *loc*(*Location n*) = n
primrec *gra* :: *igraph* $\Rightarrow$ (*location* ∗ *location*)*set*
where *gra*(*Lgraph g a c l*) = g
primrec *agra* :: *igraph* $\Rightarrow$ (*location* $\Rightarrow$ *identity list*)
where *agra*(*Lgraph g a c l*) = a
primrec *cgra* :: *igraph* $\Rightarrow$ (*actor* $\Rightarrow$ *string list* ∗ *string list*)
where *cgra*(*Lgraph g a c l*) = c
primrec *lgra* :: *igraph* $\Rightarrow$ (*location* $\Rightarrow$ *string list*)
where *lgra*(*Lgraph g a c l*) = l

definition *nodes* :: *igraph* $\Rightarrow$ *location set*
where *nodes g* == { x. (*? y*. ((x,y): *gra g*) | ((y,x): *gra g*))}
definition *actors-graph* :: *igraph* $\Rightarrow$ *identity set*

where *actors-graph g == {x. ? y. y : nodes g ∧ x ∈ set(agra g y)}*
primrec *graphI :: infrastructure ⇒ igraph*
where *graphI (Infrastructure g d) = g*
primrec *delta :: [infrastructure, igraph, location] ⇒ apolicy set*
where *delta (Infrastructure g d) = d*
primrec *tspace :: [infrastructure, actor] ⇒ string list * string list*
  where *tspace (Infrastructure g d) = cgra g*
primrec *lspace :: [infrastructure, location] ⇒ string list*
where *lspace (Infrastructure g d) = lgra g*
definition *credentials :: string list * string list ⇒ string set*
  where *credentials lxl ≡ set (fst lxl)*
definition *has :: [igraph, actor * string] ⇒ bool*
  where *has G ac ≡ snd ac ∈ credentials(cgra G (fst ac))*
definition *roles :: string list * string list ⇒ string set*
  where *roles lxl ≡ set (snd lxl)*
definition *role :: [igraph, actor * string] ⇒ bool*
  where *role G ac ≡ snd ac ∈ roles(cgra G (fst ac))*
definition *isin :: [igraph,location, string] ⇒ bool*
  where *isin G l s ≡ s ∈ set(lgra G l)*

2.3   Insider predicate

The human actor's level is modelled in the Isabelle Insider framework by assigning the individual actor's psychological disposition[1] *actor-state* to each actor's identity.

datatype *psy-states = happy | depressed | disgruntled | angry | stressed*
datatype *motivations = financial | political | revenge | curious | competitive-advantage | power | peer-recognition*

The values used for the definition of the types *motivations* and *psy-state* are based on a taxonomy from psychological insider research [5]. The transition to become an insider is represented by a *Catalyst* that tips the insider over the edge so he acts as an insider formalized as a "tipping point" predicate.

datatype *actor-state = Actor-state psy-states motivations set*
primrec *motivation :: actor-state ⇒ motivations set*
where *motivation (Actor-state p m) =   m*
primrec *psy-state :: actor-state ⇒ psy-states*
where *psy-state (Actor-state p m) = p*

definition *tipping-point :: actor-state ⇒ bool* **where**
  tipping-point a ≡ ((motivation a ≠ {}) ∧ (happy ≠ psy-state a))

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[1]Note that the determination of the psychological state of an actor is not done using the formal system. It is up to a psychologist to determine this. However, if for instance, an actor is classified as *disgruntled* then this may have an influence on what they are allowed to do according to a company policy and this can be formally described and reasoned about in Isabelle.

To embed the fact that the attacker is an insider, the actor can then impersonate other actors. In the Isabelle Insider framework, the predicate *Insider* must be used as a *locale* assumption to enable impersonation for the insider: this assumption entails that an insider *Actor "Eve"* can act like their alter ego, say *Actor "Charly"* within the context of the locale. This is realized by the predicate *UasI*: *UasI* and *UasI'* are the central predicates allowing to specify Insiders. They define which identities can be mapped to the same role by the *Actor* function (an impersonation predicate "a can act as b"). For all other identities, *Actor* is defined as injective on those identities. The first one is stronger and allows substitution of the insider in any context; the second one is parameterized over a context predicate to describe this.

definition *UasI* :: [*identity*, *identity*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where *UasI a b* $\equiv$ (*Actor a* = *Actor b*) $\wedge$ ($\forall$ x y. $x \neq a \wedge y \neq a \wedge$ *Actor x* = *Actor y* $\longrightarrow$ $x = y$)
definition *UasI'* :: [*actor* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*, *identity*, *identity*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where *UasI' P a b* $\equiv$ *P* (*Actor b*) $\longrightarrow$ *P* (*Actor a*)

Two versions of Insider predicate corresponding to *UasI* and *UasI'* exist. Under the assumption that the tipping point has been reached for a person a then a can impersonate all b (take all of b's "roles") where the b's are specified by a given set of identities.

definition *Insider* :: [*identity*, *identity set*, *identity* $\Rightarrow$ *actor-state*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where *Insider a C as* $\equiv$ (*tipping-point* (*as a*) $\longrightarrow$ ($\forall$ $b \in C$. *UasI a b*))
definition *Insider'* :: [*actor* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*, *identity*, *identity set*, *identity* $\Rightarrow$ *actor-state*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where *Insider' P a C as* $\equiv$ (*tipping-point* (*as a*) $\longrightarrow$ ($\forall$ $b \in C$. *UasI' P a b* $\wedge$ *inj-on Actor C*))

The predicate *atI* – mixfix syntax $@_G$ – expresses that an actor (identity) is at a certain location in an igraph.

definition *atI* :: [*identity*, *igraph*, *location*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool* (- $@_{(-)}$ - 50)
where $a @_G l \equiv a \in set(agra\ G\ l)$

The enables predicate is the central definition of the behaviour as given by a policy that specifies what actions are allowed in a certain location for what actors. Policies specify the expected behaviour of actors of an infrastructure. They are defined by the *enables* predicate: an actor h is enabled to perform an action a in infrastructure I, at location l if there exists a pair (p,e) in the local policy of l (*delta I l* projects to the local policy) such that the action a is a member of the action set e and the policy predicate p holds for actor h.

definition *enables* :: [*infrastructure*, *location*, *actor*, *action*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
enables I l a a' $\equiv$ ($\exists$ $(p,e) \in$ *delta I* (*graphI I*) *l*. $a' \in e \wedge p\ a$)

For example, the *apolicy* pair (λ *x. True*, {*move*}) specifies that all actors are enabled to perform action *move*.

The behaviour is the good behaviour, i.e. everything allowed by the policy of Infrastructure *I*.

definition *behaviour* :: *infrastructure* $\Rightarrow$ (*location* * *actor* * *action*)*set*
where *behaviour I* $\equiv$ {(*t,a,a'*). *enables I t a a'*}

The misbehaviour is the complement of behaviour of an Infrastructure *I*.

definition *misbehaviour* :: *infrastructure* $\Rightarrow$ (*location* * *actor* * *action*)*set*
 where *misbehaviour I* $\equiv$ $-$(*behaviour I*)

We prove some basic lemmas for the predicate *enable*.

lemma *not-enableI*: ($\forall$ (*p,e*) $\in$ *delta I* (*graphI I*) *l*. ($\neg$(*h* : *e*) | ($\neg$(*p*(*a*)))))
         $\implies$ $\neg$(*enables I l a h*)
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *not-enableI2*: $[\![\bigwedge$ *p e.* (*p,e*) $\in$ *delta I* (*graphI I*) *l* $\implies$
         ($\neg$(*t* : *e*) | ($\neg$(*p*(*a*)))) $]\!]$ $\implies$ $\neg$(*enables I l a t*)
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *not-enableE*: $[\![$ $\neg$(*enables I l a t*); (*p,e*) $\in$ *delta I* (*graphI I*) *l* $]\!]$
         $\implies$ ($\neg$(*t* : *e*) | ($\neg$(*p*(*a*))))
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *not-enableE2*: $[\![$ $\neg$(*enables I l a t*); (*p,e*) $\in$ *delta I* (*graphI I*) *l*;
           t : *e* $]\!]$ $\implies$ ($\neg$(*p*(*a*)))
 $\langle proof \rangle$

2.4   State transition on infrastructures

The state transition defines how actors may act on infrastructures through actions within the boundaries of the policy. It is given as an inductive definition over the states which are infrastructures. This state transition relation is dependent on actions but also on enabledness and the current state of the infrastructure.

First we introduce some auxiliary functions dealing with repetitions in lists and actors moving in an *igraph* and some constructions to deal with lists of actors in locations for the semantics of action *move*.

primrec *del* :: [$'a$, $'a$ *list*] $\Rightarrow$ $'a$ *list*
where
del-nil: *del a* [] = [] |
del-cons: *del a* (*x*#*ls*) = (*if x* = *a then ls else x* # (*del a ls*))

primrec *jonce* :: [$'a$, $'a$ *list*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
jonce-nil: *jonce a* [] = *False* |

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jonce-cons: *jonce a* $(x\#ls) = ($ *if* $x = a$ *then* $(a \notin ($ *set ls* $))$ *else jonce a ls* $)$

primrec *nodup* :: $['a,\ 'a\ list] \Rightarrow bool$
  where
    nodup-nil: *nodup a* $[] =$ *True* |
    nodup-step: *nodup a* $(x \# ls) = ($ *if* $x = a$ *then* $(a \notin ($ *set ls* $))$ *else nodup a ls* $)$

definition *move-graph-a* :: $[identity,\ location,\ location,\ igraph] \Rightarrow igraph$
where *move-graph-a n l l' g* $\equiv$ *Lgraph* $(gra\ g)$
                    $(if\ n \in set\ ((agra\ g)\ l)\ \&\ \ n \notin set\ ((agra\ g)\ l')\ then$
                    $((agra\ g)(l := del\ n\ (agra\ g\ l)))(l' := (n\ \#\ (agra\ g\ l')))$
                    $else\ (agra\ g))(cgra\ g)(lgra\ g)$

State transition relation over infrastructures (the states) defining the semantics of actions in systems with humans and potentially insiders.

inductive *state-transition-in* :: $[infrastructure,\ infrastructure] \Rightarrow bool$ $((\text{-} \rightarrow_n \text{-})$ $50)$
where
  move: $[\![\ G = graphI\ I;\ a\ @_G\ l;\ l \in nodes\ G;\ l' \in nodes\ G;$
        $(a) \in actors\text{-}graph(graphI\ I);\ enables\ I\ l'\ (Actor\ a)\ move;$
        $I' = Infrastructure\ (move\text{-}graph\text{-}a\ a\ l\ l'\ (graphI\ I))(delta\ I)\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow I \rightarrow_n I'$
$|\ get : [\![\ G = graphI\ I;\ a\ @_G\ l;\ a'\ @_G\ l;\ has\ G\ (Actor\ a,\ z);$
        $enables\ I\ l\ (Actor\ a)\ get;$
        $I' = Infrastructure$
                $(Lgraph\ (gra\ G)(agra\ G)$
                    $((cgra\ G)(Actor\ a' :=$
                        $(z\ \#\ (fst(cgra\ G\ (Actor\ a'))),\ snd(cgra\ G\ (Actor\ a')))))$
                    $(lgra\ G))$
                $(delta\ I)$
        $]\!] \Longrightarrow I \rightarrow_n I'$
$|\ put : [\![\ G = graphI\ I;\ a\ @_G\ l;\ enables\ I\ l\ (Actor\ a)\ put;$
        $I' = Infrastructure$
                $(Lgraph\ (gra\ G)(agra\ G)(cgra\ G)$
                    $((lgra\ G)(l := [z])))$
                $(delta\ I)\ ]\!]$
        $\Longrightarrow I \rightarrow_n I'$
$|\ put\text{-}remote : [\![\ G = graphI\ I;\ enables\ I\ l\ (Actor\ a)\ put;$
        $I' = Infrastructure$
                $(Lgraph\ (gra\ G)(agra\ G)(cgra\ G)$
                    $((lgra\ G)(l := [z])))$
                $(delta\ I)\ ]\!]$
        $\Longrightarrow I \rightarrow_n I'$

Note that the type infrastructure can now be instantiated to the axiomatic type class *state* which enables the use of the underlying Kripke structures and CTL. We need to show that this infrastructure is a state as given in MC.thy

instantiation *infrastructure* :: *state*
begin

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definition
  state-transition-infra-def: $(i \rightarrow_i i') = (i \rightarrow_n (i' :: infrastructure))$

instance
  $\langle proof \rangle$

definition *state-transition-in-refl* $((- \rightarrow_n* -) 50)$
where $s \rightarrow_n* s' \equiv ((s,s') \in \{(x,y).\ state\text{-}transition\text{-}in\ x\ y\}^*)$

Lemmas about the auxiliary functions *del*, *jonce*, *nodup* are provided.

lemma *del-del*[*rule-format*]: $n \in set\ (del\ a\ S) \longrightarrow n \in set\ S$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *del-dec*[*rule-format*]: $a \in set\ S \longrightarrow length\ (del\ a\ S) < length\ S$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *del-sort*[*rule-format*]: $\forall\ n.\ (Suc\ n\ ::nat) \leq length\ (l) \longrightarrow n \leq length\ (del$
$a\ (l))$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *del-jonce*: $jonce\ a\ l \longrightarrow a \notin set\ (del\ a\ l)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *del-nodup*[*rule-format*]: $nodup\ a\ l \longrightarrow a \notin set(del\ a\ l)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *nodup-up*[*rule-format*]: $a \in set\ (del\ a\ l) \longrightarrow a \in set\ l$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *del-up* [*rule-format*]: $a \in set\ (del\ aa\ l) \longrightarrow a \in set\ l$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *nodup-notin*[*rule-format*]: $a \notin set\ list \longrightarrow nodup\ a\ list$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *nodup-down*[*rule-format*]: $nodup\ a\ l \longrightarrow nodup\ a\ (del\ a\ l)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *del-notin-down*[*rule-format*]: $a \notin set\ list \longrightarrow a \notin set\ (del\ aa\ list)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *del-not-a*[*rule-format*]: $x \neq a \longrightarrow x \in set\ l \longrightarrow x \in set\ (del\ a\ l)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *nodup-down-notin*[*rule-format*]: $nodup\ a\ l \longrightarrow nodup\ a\ (del\ aa\ l)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *move-graph-eq*: $move\text{-}graph\text{-}a\ a\ l\ l\ g = g$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

Some useful properties about the invariance of the nodes, the actors, and the policy with respect to the state transition are provided.

lemma *delta-invariant*: $\forall\ z\ z'.\ z \rightarrow_n z' \longrightarrow\ delta(z) = delta(z')$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *init-state-policy0*:
  assumes $\forall\ z\ z'.\ z \rightarrow_n z' \longrightarrow\ delta(z) = delta(z')$
    and $(x,y) \in \{(x\text{::}infrastructure,\ y\text{::}infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
  shows $delta(x) = delta(y)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *init-state-policy*: $[\![\ (x,y) \in \{(x\text{::}infrastructure,\ y\text{::}infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
$]\!] \Longrightarrow$

$$delta(x) = delta(y)$$

  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *same-nodes0*[*rule-format*]: $\forall\ z\ z'.\ z \rightarrow_n z' \longrightarrow nodes(graphI\ z) = nodes(graphI\ z')$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *same-nodes*: $(I,\ y) \in \{(x\text{::}infrastructure,\ y\text{::}infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
          $\Longrightarrow nodes(graphI\ y) = nodes(graphI\ I)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *same-actors0*[*rule-format*]: $\forall\ z\ z'.\ z \rightarrow_n z' \longrightarrow actors\text{-}graph(graphI\ z) = actors\text{-}graph(graphI\ z')$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *same-actors*: $(I,\ y) \in \{(x\text{::}infrastructure,\ y\text{::}infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
          $\Longrightarrow actors\text{-}graph(graphI\ I) = actors\text{-}graph(graphI\ y)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

end
end

3   Airplane case study

In this section we first provide the necessary infrastructure, then specify global and local policies, and finally formalize insider attacks and safety and security.

theory *Airplane*
imports *AirInsider*
begin

3.1 Formalization of Airplane Infrastructure and Properties

We restrict the Airplane scenario to four identities: Bob, Charly, Alice, and Eve. Bob acts as the pilot, Charly as the copilot, and Alice as the flight attendant. Eve is an identity representing the malicious agent that can act as the copilot although not officially acting as an airplane actor. The identities that act legally inside the airplane infrastructure are listed in the set of airplane actors.

To represent the layout of the airplane, a simple architecture is best suited for the purpose of security policy verification. The locations we consider for the graph are *cockpit*, *door*, and *cabin*. They are defined as locale definitions and assembled in a set *airplane-locations*.

The actual layout and the initial distribution of the actors in the airplane infrastructure is defined by the graph *ex-graph* in which the actors Bob and Charly are in the cockpit and Alice is in the cabin.

The two additional inputs *ex-creds* and *ex-locs* for the constructor *Lgraph* are the credential and role assignment to actors and the state function for locations introduced in Section **??**, respectively. For the airplane scenario, we use the function *ex-creds* to assign the roles and credentials to actors. For example, for *Actor "Bob"* this function returns the pair of lists ($[''PIN'']$, $[''pilot'']$) assigning the credential *PIN* to this actor and designating the role *pilot* to him. Similar to the previous function *ex-creds*, the function *ex-locs* assigns values to the locations of the infrastructure graph. These values are simply of type string allowing to store arbitrary state information about the locations, for example, the door is "locked" or the airplane is on the "ground".

In the Isabelle Insider framework, we define a global policy reflecting the global safety and security goal and then break that down into local policies on the infrastructure. The verification will then analyze whether the infrastructure's local policies yield the global policy.

subsection *Initial Global and Local Policies* Globally, we want to exclude attackers to ground the plane. In the formal model, landing the airplane results from an actor performing a *put* action in the cockpit and thereby changing the state from *air* to *ground*.

Therefore, we specify the global policy as "no one except airplane actors can perform *put* actions at location cockpit" by the following predicate over infrastructures I and actor identities a.

We next attempt to define the *local-policies* for each location as a function mapping locations to sets of pairs: the first element of each pair for a location l is a predicate over actors specifying the conditions necessary for an actor to be able to perform the actions specified in the set of actions which is the second element of that pair. Local policy functions are additionally parameterized over an infrastructure graph G since this may dynamically

change through the state transition. The policy *local-policies* expresses that any actor can move to door and cabin but places the following restrictions on cockpit.

put: to perform a *put* action, that is, put the plane into a new position or put the lock, an actor must be at position cockpit, i.e., in the cockpit;

move: to perform a move action at location cockpit, that is, move into it, an actor must be at the position cabin, must be in possession of PIN, and door must be in state norm.

Although this policy abstracts from the buzzer, the 30 sec delay, and a few other technical details, it captures the essential features of the cockpit door.

The graph, credentials, and features are plugged together with the policy into the infrastructure *Airplane-scenario*.

locale *airplane* =

fixes *airplane-actors* :: *identity set*
defines *airplane-actors-def*: *airplane-actors* ≡ {″*Bob*″, ″*Charly*″, ″*Alice*″}

fixes *airplane-locations* :: *location set*
defines *airplane-locations-def*:
airplane-locations ≡ {*Location 0*, *Location 1*, *Location 2*}

fixes *cockpit* :: *location*
defines *cockpit-def*: *cockpit* ≡ *Location 2*
fixes *door* :: *location*
defines *door-def*: *door* ≡ *Location 1*
fixes *cabin* :: *location*
defines *cabin-def*: *cabin* ≡ *Location 0*

fixes *global-policy* :: [*infrastructure*, *identity*] ⇒ *bool*
defines *global-policy-def*: *global-policy I a* ≡ *a* ∉ *airplane-actors*
⟶ ¬(*enables I cockpit* (*Actor a*) *put*)

fixes *ex-creds* :: *actor* ⇒ (*string list* * *string list*)
defines *ex-creds-def*: *ex-creds* ≡
(λ *x*.(*if x* = *Actor* ″*Bob*″
then ([″*PIN*″], [″*pilot*″])
else (*if x* = *Actor* ″*Charly*″
then ([″*PIN*″],[″*copilot*″])
else (*if x* = *Actor* ″*Alice*″
then ([″*PIN*″],[″*flightattendant*″])
else ([],[]))))))

fixes *ex-locs* :: *location* ⇒ *string list*
defines *ex-locs-def*: *ex-locs* ≡ (λ *x*. *if x* = *door then* [″*norm*″] *else*
(*if x* = *cockpit then* [″*air*″] *else* []))

fixes *ex-locs′* :: *location ⇒ string list*
defines *ex-locs′-def* : *ex-locs′ ≡* (λ *x. if x = door then* [″*locked*″] *else*
(*if x = cockpit then* [″*air*″] *else* []))
fixes *ex-graph* :: *igraph*
defines *ex-graph-def* : *ex-graph ≡ Lgraph*
{(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
(λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Bob*″, ″*Charly*″]
else (*if x = door then* []
else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
ex-creds ex-locs

fixes *aid-graph* :: *igraph*
defines *aid-graph-def* : *aid-graph ≡ Lgraph*
{(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
(λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Charly*″]
else (*if x = door then* []
else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Bob*″, ″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
ex-creds ex-locs′

fixes *aid-graph0* :: *igraph*
defines *aid-graph0-def* : *aid-graph0 ≡ Lgraph*
{(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
(λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Charly*″]
else (*if x = door then* [″*Bob*″]
else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
ex-creds ex-locs

fixes *agid-graph* :: *igraph*
defines *agid-graph-def* : *agid-graph ≡ Lgraph*
{(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
(λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Charly*″]
else (*if x = door then* []
else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Bob*″, ″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
ex-creds ex-locs

fixes *local-policies* :: [*igraph, location*] ⇒ *apolicy set*
defines *local-policies-def* : *local-policies G ≡*
(λ *y. if y = cockpit then*
{(λ *x.* (? *n.* (*n* @$_G$ *cockpit*) ∧ *Actor n = x*), {*put*}),
(λ *x.* (? *n.* (*n* @$_G$ *cabin*) ∧ *Actor n = x* ∧ *has G* (*x,* ″*PIN*″)
∧ *isin G door* ″*norm*″),{*move*})
}
else (*if y = door then* {(λ *x. True,* {*move*}),
(λ *x.* (? *n.* (*n* @$_G$ *cockpit*) ∧ *Actor n = x*), {*put*})}
else (*if y = cabin then* {(λ *x. True,* {*move*})}
else {})))

fixes *local-policies-four-eyes* :: *[igraph, location]* $\Rightarrow$ *apolicy set*
defines *local-policies-four-eyes-def*: *local-policies-four-eyes G* $\equiv$
   (λ *y. if y = cockpit then*
        $\{(\lambda\ x.\ (?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cockpit) \wedge Actor\ n = x) \wedge$
            $2 \leq length(agra\ G\ y) \wedge (\forall\ h \in set(agra\ G\ y).\ h \in airplane\text{-}actors),$
$\{put\}),$
         $(\lambda\ x.\ (?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cabin) \wedge Actor\ n = x \wedge has\ G\ (x,\ ''PIN'') \wedge$
            isin G door $''norm''$),$\{move\})$
        $\}$
     else (*if y = door then*
        $\{(\lambda\ x.\ ((?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cockpit) \wedge Actor\ n = x) \wedge 3 \leq length(agra\ G$
cockpit)), $\{move\})\}$
        else (*if y = cabin then*
          $\{(\lambda\ x.\ ((?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ door) \wedge Actor\ n = x)),\ \{move\})\}$
           else $\{\})))$

fixes *Airplane-scenario* :: *infrastructure* (**structure**)
defines *Airplane-scenario-def*:
Airplane-scenario $\equiv$ *Infrastructure ex-graph local-policies*

fixes *Airplane-in-danger* :: *infrastructure*
defines *Airplane-in-danger-def*:
Airplane-in-danger $\equiv$ *Infrastructure aid-graph local-policies*

fixes *Airplane-getting-in-danger0* :: *infrastructure*
defines *Airplane-getting-in-danger0-def*:
Airplane-getting-in-danger0 $\equiv$ *Infrastructure aid-graph0 local-policies*

fixes *Airplane-getting-in-danger* :: *infrastructure*
defines *Airplane-getting-in-danger-def*:
Airplane-getting-in-danger $\equiv$ *Infrastructure agid-graph local-policies*

fixes *Air-states*
defines *Air-states-def*: *Air-states* $\equiv$ { *I. Airplane-scenario* $\rightarrow_n*$ *I* }

fixes *Air-Kripke*
defines *Air-Kripke* $\equiv$ *Kripke Air-states* {*Airplane-scenario*}

fixes *Airplane-not-in-danger* :: *infrastructure*
defines *Airplane-not-in-danger-def*:
Airplane-not-in-danger $\equiv$ *Infrastructure aid-graph local-policies-four-eyes*

fixes *Airplane-not-in-danger-init* :: *infrastructure*
defines *Airplane-not-in-danger-init-def*:
Airplane-not-in-danger-init $\equiv$ *Infrastructure ex-graph local-policies-four-eyes*

fixes *Air-tp-states*
defines *Air-tp-states-def*: *Air-tp-states* $\equiv$ { *I. Airplane-not-in-danger-init* $\rightarrow_n* I$
}

fixes *Air-tp-Kripke*
defines *Air-tp-Kripke* $\equiv$ *Kripke Air-tp-states* {*Airplane-not-in-danger-init*}

fixes *Safety* :: [*infrastructure*, *identity*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
defines *Safety-def*: *Safety I a* $\equiv$ *a* $\in$ *airplane-actors*
$\longrightarrow$ (*enables I cockpit* (*Actor a*) *move*)

fixes *Security* :: [*infrastructure*, *identity*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
defines *Security-def*: *Security I a* $\equiv$ (*isin* (*graphI I*) *door* ''*locked*'')
$\longrightarrow$ ¬(*enables I cockpit* (*Actor a*) *move*)

fixes *foe-control* :: [*location*, *action*] $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
defines *foe-control-def*: *foe-control l c* $\equiv$
(! *I*:: *infrastructure*. (? *x* :: *identity*.
x @$_{graphI\ I}$ *l* $\land$ *Actor x* $\neq$ *Actor* ''*Eve*'')
$\longrightarrow$ ¬(*enables I l* (*Actor* ''*Eve*'') *c*))

fixes *astate*:: *identity* $\Rightarrow$ *actor-state*
defines *astate-def*: *astate x* $\equiv$ (*case x of*
''*Eve*'' $\Rightarrow$ *Actor-state depressed* {*revenge*, *peer-recognition*}
| - $\Rightarrow$ *Actor-state happy* {})

assumes *Eve-precipitating-event*: *tipping-point* (*astate* ''*Eve*'')
assumes *Insider-Eve*: *Insider* ''*Eve*'' {''*Charly*''} *astate*
assumes *cockpit-foe-control*: *foe-control cockpit put*

begin

3.2 Insider Attack, Safety, and Security

Above, we first stage the insider attack and introduce basic definitions of
safety and security for the airplane scenario. To invoke the insider within
an application of the Isabelle Insider framework, we assume in the locale
airplane as a locale assumption with *assumes* that the tipping point has
been reached for *Eve* which manifests itself in her *actor-state* assigned by
the locale function *astate*.

In addition, we state that she is an insider being able to impersonate *Charly*
by locally assuming the *Insider* predicate. This predicate allows an insider
to impersonate a set of other actor identities; in this case the set is singleton.

Next, the process of analysis uses this assumption as well as the definitions
of the previous section to prove security properties interactively as theorems

in Isabelle. We use the strong insider assumption here up front to provide a first sanity check on the model by validating the infrastructure for the "normal" case. We prove that the global policy holds for the pilot Bob.

lemma *ex-inv*: *global-policy Airplane-scenario ''Bob''*
⟨*proof*⟩

We can prove the same theorem for *Charly* who is the copilot in the scenario (omitting the proof and accompanying Isabelle commands).

lemma *ex-inv2*: *global-policy Airplane-scenario ''Charly''*
⟨*proof*⟩

But *Eve* is an insider and is able to impersonate *Charly*. She will ignore the global policy. This insider threat can now be formalized as an invalidation of the global company policy for *''Eve''* in the following "attack" theorem named *ex-inv3*:

lemma *ex-inv3*: ¬*global-policy Airplane-scenario ''Eve''*
⟨*proof*⟩

Safety and security are sometimes introduced in textbooks as complementary properties, see, e.g., [1]. Safety expresses that humans and goods should be protected from negative effects caused by machines while security is the inverse direction: machines (computers) should be protected from malicious humans. Similarly, the following descriptions of safety and security in the airplane scenario also illustrate this complementarity: one says that the door must stay closed to the outside; the other that there must be a possibility to open it from the outside.

Safety: if the actors in the cockpit are out of action, there must be a possibility to get into the cockpit from the cabin, and

Security: if the actors in the cockpit fear an attack from the cabin, they can lock the door.

In the formal translation of these properties into HOL, this complementarity manifests itself even more clearly: the conclusions of the two formalizations of the properties are negations of each other. Safety is quite concisely described by stating that airplane actors can move into the cockpit.
We show Safety for *Airplane-scenario.*

lemma *Safety*: *Safety Airplane-scenario (''Alice'')*
⟨*proof*⟩

Security can also be defined in a simple manner as the property that no actor can move into the cockpit if the door is on lock.
We show Security for *Airplane-scenario.* We need some lemmas first that use the injectivity of the *is-in* predicate to infer that the lock and the norm states of the door must be actually different.

lemma *inj-lem*: ⟦ *inj f*; *x ≠ y* ⟧ ⟹ *f x ≠ f y*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inj-on-lem*: ⟦ *inj-on f A*; *x ≠ y*; *x∈ A*; *y ∈ A* ⟧ ⟹ *f x ≠ f y*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inj-lemma'*: *inj-on* (*isin ex-graph door*) {*"locked"*,*"norm"*}
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *inj-lemma''*: *inj-on* (*isin aid-graph door*) {*"locked"*,*"norm"*}
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *locl-lemma2*: *isin ex-graph door "norm" ≠ isin ex-graph door "locked"*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *locl-lemma3*: *isin ex-graph door "norm" =* (¬ *isin ex-graph door "locked"*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *locl-lemma2a*: *isin aid-graph door "norm" ≠ isin aid-graph door "locked"*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *locl-lemma3a*: *isin aid-graph door "norm" =* (¬ *isin aid-graph door "locked"*)
⟨*proof*⟩

In general, we could prove safety for any airplane actor who is in the cabin for this state of the infrastructure.

In a slightly more complex proof, we can prove security for any other identity which can be simply instantiated to *"Bob"*, for example.

lemma *Security*: *Security Airplane-scenario s*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Security-problem*: *Security Airplane-scenario "Bob"*
⟨*proof*⟩

We show that pilot can get out of cockpit

lemma *pilot-can-leave-cockpit*: (*enables Airplane-scenario cabin* (*Actor "Bob"*) *move*)
  ⟨*proof*⟩

We show that in *Airplane-in-danger*, the copilot can still do *put* and therefore can *put* position to ground.

lemma *ex-inv4*: ¬*global-policy Airplane-in-danger* (*"Eve"*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Safety-in-danger*:
  fixes *s*
  assumes *s ∈ airplane-actors*
  shows ¬(*Safety Airplane-in-danger s*)

⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Security-problem′*: ¬(*enables Airplane-in-danger cockpit* (*Actor ″Bob″*) *move*)
⟨*proof*⟩

We show that with the four eyes rule in *Airplane-not-in-danger* Eve cannot crash the plane, i.e. cannot put position to ground.

lemma *ex-inv5*: *a* ∈ *airplane-actors* ⟶ *global-policy Airplane-not-in-danger a*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *ex-inv6*: *global-policy Airplane-not-in-danger a*
⟨*proof*⟩

The simple formalizations of safety and security enable proofs only over a particular state of the airplane infrastructure at a time but this is not enough since the general airplane structure is subject to state changes. For a general verification, we need to prove that the properties of interest are preserved under potential changes. Since the airplane infrastructure permits, for example, that actors move about inside the airplane, we need to verify safety and security properties in a dynamic setting. After all, the insider attack on Germanwings Flight 9525 appeared when the pilot had moved out of the cockpit. Furthermore, we want to redefine the policy into the two-person policy and examine whether safety and security are improved. For these reasons, we next apply the general Kripke structure mechanism introduced initially to the airplane scenario.

4 Analysis of Safety and Security Properties

For the analysis of security, we need to ask whether the infrastructure state *Airplane-in-danger* is reachable via the state transition relation from the initial state. It is. We can prove the theorem *step-all-r* in the locale *airplane*.

As the name of this theorem suggests it is the result of lining up a sequence of steps that lead from the initial *Airplane-scenario* to that *Airplane-in-danger* state (for the state definitions see the above defintion section of the locale). In fact there are three steps via two intermediary infrastructure states *Airplane-getting-in-danger0* and *Airplane-getting-in-danger*. The former encodes the state where *Bob* has moved to the cabin and the latter encodes the successor state in which additionally the lock state has changed to *locked*.

lemma *step0*: *Airplane-scenario* →$_n$ *Airplane-getting-in-danger0*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *step1*: *Airplane-getting-in-danger0* →$_n$ *Airplane-getting-in-danger*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *step2*: *Airplane-getting-in-danger* $\rightarrow_n$ *Airplane-in-danger*
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *step0r*: *Airplane-scenario* $\rightarrow_n*$ *Airplane-getting-in-danger0*
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *step1r*: *Airplane-getting-in-danger0* $\rightarrow_n*$ *Airplane-getting-in-danger*
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *step2r*: *Airplane-getting-in-danger* $\rightarrow_n*$ *Airplane-in-danger*
  $\langle proof \rangle$

theorem *step-allr*: *Airplane-scenario* $\rightarrow_n*$ *Airplane-in-danger*
  $\langle proof \rangle$

Using the formalization of CTL over Kripke structures introduced initiall, we can now transform the attack sequence represented implicitly by the above theorem *step-allr* into a temporal logic statement. This attack theorem states that there is a path from the initial state of the Kripke structure *Air-Kripke* on which eventually the global policy is violated by the attacker.

theorem *aid-attack*: *Air-Kripke* $\vdash EF$ ($\{x. \neg$ *global-policy x* $''Eve''\}$)
$\langle proof \rangle$

The proof uses the underlying formalization of CTL and the lemmas that are provided to evaluate the *EF* statement on the Kripke structure. However, the attack sequence is already provided by the previous theorem. So the proof just consists in supplying the step lemmas for each step and finally proving that for the state at the end of the attack path, i.e., for *Airplane-in-danger*, the global policy is violated. This proof corresponds precisely to the proof of the attack theorem *ex-inv3*. It is not surprising that the security attack is possible in the reachable state *Airplane-in-danger* when it was already possible in the initial state. However, this statement is not satisfactory since the model does not take into account whether the copilot is on his own when he launches the attack. This is the purpose of the two-person rule which we want to investigate in more detail in this paper. Therefore, we next address how to add the two-person role to the model.

4.1   Introduce Two-Person Rule

To express the rule that two authorized personnel must be present at all times in the cockpit, we have define a second set of local policies *local-policies-four-eyes* (see above). It realizes the two-person constraint requesting that the number of actors at the location *cockpit* in the graph *G* given as input must be at least two to enable actors at the location to perform the action *put*. Formally, we can express this here as $2 \leq$ *length*(*agra G cockpit*) since we

have all of arithmetic available (remember *agra G y* is the list of actors at location *y* in *G*.

Note that the two-person rule requires three people to be at the cockpit before one of them can leave. This is formalized as a condition on the *move* action of location *door*. A move of an actor *x* in the cockpit to *door* is only allowed if three people are in the cockpit. Practically, it enforces a person, say Alice to first enter the cockpit before the pilot Bob can leave. However, this condition is necessary to guarantee that the two-person requirement for *cockpit* is sustained by the dynamic changes to the infrastructure state caused by actors' moves. A move to location *cabin* is only allowed from *door* so no additional condition is necessary here.

What is stated informally above seems intuitive and quite easy to believe. However, comparing to the earlier formalization of this two-person rule [2], it appears that the earlier version did not have the additional condition on the action *move* to *door*. One may argue that in the earlier version the authors did not consider this because they had neither state transitions, Kripke structures, nor CTL to consider dynamic changes. However, in the current paper this additional side condition only occurred to us when we tried to prove the invariant *two-person-invariant1* which is needed in the subsequent security proof.

The proof of *two-person-invariant1* requires an induction over the state transition relation starting in the infrastructure state *Airplane-not-in-danger-init* (see above) with Charly and Bob in the cockpit and the two-person policy in place.

The corresponding Kripke structure of all states originating in this infrastructure state is defined as *Air-tp-Kripke*. Within the induction for the proof of the above *two-person-inv1*, a preservation lemma is required that proves that if the condition

$2 \leq length\ (agra\ (graphI\ I)\ cockpit)$

holds for *I* and $I \to I'$ then it also holds for *I'*. The preservation lemma is actually trickier to prove. It uses a case analysis over all the transition rules for each action. The rules for *put* and *get* are easy to prove for the user as they are solved by the simplification tactic automatically. The case for action *move* is the difficult case. Here we actually need to use the precondition of the policy for location *door* in order to prove that the two-person invariant is preserved by an actor moving out of the cockpit. In this case, we need for example, invariants like the following lemma *actors-unique-loc-aid-step* that shows that in any infrastructure state originating from *Airplane-not-in-danger-init* actors only ever appear in one location and they do not appear more than once in a location – which is expressed in the predicate *nodup* (see above).

Invariant: actors cannot be at two places at the same time

lemma *actors-unique-loc-base*:
  assumes $I \rightarrow_n I'$
    and $(\forall\ l\ l'.\ a\ @_{graphI\ I}\ l \wedge a\ @_{graphI\ I}\ l' \longrightarrow l = l') \wedge$
      $(\forall\ l.\ nodup\ a\ (agra\ (graphI\ I)\ l))$
    shows $(\forall\ l\ l'.\ a\ @_{graphI\ I'}\ l \wedge a\ @_{graphI\ I'}\ l' \longrightarrow l = l') \wedge$
      $(\forall\ l.\ nodup\ a\ (agra\ (graphI\ I')\ l))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *actors-unique-loc-step*:
  assumes $(I,\ I') \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
    and $\forall\ a.\ (\forall\ l\ l'.\ a\ @_{graphI\ I}\ l \wedge a\ @_{graphI\ I}\ l' \longrightarrow l = l') \wedge$
      $(\forall\ l.\ nodup\ a\ (agra\ (graphI\ I)\ l))$
    shows $\forall\ a.\ (\forall\ l\ l'.\ a\ @_{graphI\ I'}\ l \wedge a\ @_{graphI\ I'}\ l' \longrightarrow l = l') \wedge$
      $(\forall\ l.\ nodup\ a\ (agra\ (graphI\ I')\ l))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *actors-unique-loc-aid-base*:
$\forall\ a.\ (\forall\ l\ l'.\ a\ @_{graphI\ Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init}\ l \wedge$
      $a\ @_{graphI\ Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init}\ l' \longrightarrow l = l') \wedge$
    $(\forall\ l.\ nodup\ a\ (agra\ (graphI\ Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init)\ l))$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *actors-unique-loc-aid-step*:
$(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init,\ I) \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
$\implies \forall\ a.\ (\forall\ l\ l'.\ a\ @_{graphI\ I}\ l \wedge a\ @_{graphI\ I}\ l' \longrightarrow l = l') \wedge$
    $(\forall\ l.\ nodup\ a\ (agra\ (graphI\ I)\ l))$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

Using the state transition, Kripke structure and CTL, we can now also express (and prove!) unreachability properties which enable to formally verify security properties for specific policies, like the two-person rule.

lemma *Anid-airplane-actors*: $actors\text{-}graph\ (graphI\ Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init) = airplane\text{-}actors$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *all-airplane-actors*: $(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init,\ y) \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
    $\implies actors\text{-}graph(graphI\ y) = airplane\text{-}actors$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *actors-at-loc-in-graph*: $[\![\ l \in nodes(graphI\ I);\ a\ @_{graphI\ I}\ l\ ]\!]$
      $\implies a \in actors\text{-}graph\ (graphI\ I)$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *not-en-get-Apnid*:
  assumes $(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init, y) \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
  shows $\sim(enables\ y\ l\ (Actor\ a)\ get)$

⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Apnid-tsp-test*: ~(*enables Airplane-not-in-danger-init cockpit* (*Actor ''Alice''*) *get*)
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Apnid-tsp-test-gen*: ~(*enables Airplane-not-in-danger-init l* (*Actor a*) *get*)

  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *test-graph-atI*: *''Bob''* @$_{graphI\ Airplane-not-in-danger-init}$ *cockpit*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

The following invariant shows that the number of staff in the cockpit is never below 2.

lemma *two-person-inv*:
  fixes *z z′*
  assumes (2::*nat*) $\leq$ *length* (*agra* (*graphI z*) *cockpit*)
    and *nodes*(*graphI z*) = *nodes*(*graphI Airplane-not-in-danger-init*)
    and *delta*(*z*) = *delta*(*Airplane-not-in-danger-init*)
    and (*Airplane-not-in-danger-init,z*) $\in$ {(*x*::*infrastructure*, *y*::*infrastructure*). $x \rightarrow_n y$}*
    and $z \rightarrow_n z′$
  shows (2::*nat*) $\leq$ *length* (*agra* (*graphI z′*) *cockpit*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *two-person-inv1*:
  assumes (*Airplane-not-in-danger-init,z*) $\in$ {(*x*::*infrastructure*, *y*::*infrastructure*). $x \rightarrow_n y$}*
  shows (2::*nat*) $\leq$ *length* (*agra* (*graphI z*) *cockpit*)
⟨*proof*⟩

The version of *two-person-inv* above, that we need, uses cardinality of lists of actors rather than length of lists. Therefore, we first need some equivalences to then prove a restatement of *two-person-inv* in terms of sets.

The proof idea is to show, since there are no duplicates in the list, *agra* (*graphI z*) *cockpit* therefore then *card*(*set*(*agra* (*graphI z*))) = *length*(*agra* (*graphI z*)).

lemma *nodup-card-insert*:
    a $\notin$ *set l* $\longrightarrow$ *card* (*insert a* (*set l*)) = *Suc* (*card* (*set l*))
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *no-dup-set-list-num-eq*[*rule-format*]:
  ($\forall$ *a. nodup a l*) $\longrightarrow$ *card* (*set l*) = *length l*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *two-person-set-inv*:

assumes $(\mathit{Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init}, z) \in \{(x::\mathit{infrastructure},\ y::\mathit{infrastructure}).$
$x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
   shows $(2::\mathit{nat}) \leq \mathit{card}\ (\mathit{set}\ (\mathit{agra}\ (\mathit{graphI}\ z)\ \mathit{cockpit}))$
⟨*proof*⟩

4.2   Revealing Necessary Assumption by Proof Failure

We would expect – and this has in fact been presented in [2] – that the two-person rule guarantees the absence of the insider attack.

This is indeed a provable fact in the following state *Airplane-not-in-danger* defined similar to *Airplane-in-danger* from Section **??** but using the two-person policy.

Airplane-not-in-danger ≡ *Infrastructure aid-graph local-policies-four-eyes*

For this state, it can be proved [2] that for any actor identity a the global policy holds.

global-policy Airplane-not-in-danger a

So, in the state *Airplane-not-in-danger* with the two-person rule, there seems to be no danger. But this is precisely the scenario of the suicide attack! Charly is on his own in the cockpit – why then does the two-person rule imply he cannot act?

The state *Airplane-not-in-danger* defined in the earlier formalization is mis-named: it uses the graph *aid-graph* to define a state in which Bob has left the cockpit and the door is locked. Since there is only one actor present, the precondition of the local policy for *cockpit* is not met and hence the action *put* is not enabled for actor Charly. Thus, the policy rule for cockpit is true because the precondition of this implication – two people in the cockpit – is false, and false implies anything: seemingly a disastrous failure of logic.

Fortunately, the above theorem has been derived in a preliminary model only [2] in which state changes were not integrated yet and which has been precisely for this reason recognized as inadequate. Now, with state changes in the improved model, we have proved the two-person invariant *two-person-inv1*. Thus, we can see that the system – if started in *Airplane-not-in-danger-init* – cannot reach the mis-named state *Airplane-not-in-danger* in which Charly is on his own in the cockpit.

However, so far, no such general theorem has been proved yet. We only used CTL to discover attacks using *EF* formulas. What we need for general security and what we consider next is to prove a global property with the temporal operator *AG* that proves that from a given initial state the global policy holds in all (A) states globally (G).

As we have seen in the previous section when looking at the proof of *two-person-inv1*, it is not evident and trivial to prove that all state changes preserve security properties. However, even this invariant does not suffice.

Even if the two-person rule is successfully enforced in a state, it is on its own still not sufficient. When we try to prove

Air-tp-Kripke ⊢ *AG* \\{*x. global-policy x* ″*Eve*″\\}

for the Kripke structure *Air-tp-Kripke* of all states originating in *Airplane-not-in-danger-init*, we cannot succeed. In fact, in that Kripke structure there are infrastructure states where the insider attack is possible. Despite the fact that we have stipulated the two-person rule as part of the new policy and despite the fact that we can prove that this policy is preserved by all state changes, the rule has no consequence on the insider. Since Eve can impersonate the copilot Charly, whether two people are in the cockpit or not, the attack can happen.

What we realize through this failed attempt to prove a global property is that the policy formulation does not entail that the presence of two people in itself actually disables an attacker.

This insight reveals a hidden assumption. Formal reasoning systems have the advantage that hidden assumptions must be made explicit. In human reasoning they occur when people assume a common understanding, which may or may not be actually the case. In the case of the rule above, its purpose may lead to an assumption that humans accept but which is not warranted.

We have used above a locale definition to encode this intentional understanding of the two-person rule. The formula *foe-control* encodes for any action *c* at a location *l* that if there is an *Actor x* that is not an insider, that is, is not impersonated by Eve, then the insider is disabled for that action *c*.

4.3   Proving Security in Refined Model

Having identified the missing formulation of the intentional effects of the two-person rule, we can now finally prove the general security property using the above locale definition. We assume in the locale *airplane* an instance of *foe-control* for the cockpit and the action *put*.

assumes cockpit-foe-control: *foe-control cockpit put*

With this assumption, we are now able to prove

theorem Four-eyes-no-danger: *Air-tp-Kripke* ⊢ *AG* {*x. global-policy x* ″*Eve*″}

that is, for all infrastructure states of the system *airplane* originating in state *Airplane-not-in-danger-init* Eve cannot put the airplane to the ground.

The proof uses as the key lemma *tp-imp-control* that within Kripke structure *Air-tp-Kripke* there is always someone in the cockpit who is not the insider. For this lemma, we first need some preparation.

lemma *Pred-all-unique*: ⟦ *? x. P x*; (*! x. P x* ⟶ *x = c*)⟧ ⟹ *P c*
  ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Set-all-unique*: $[\![\ S \neq \{\};\ (\forall\ x \in S.\ x = c)\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow c \in S$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *airplane-actors-inv0*[*rule-format*]:
   $\forall\ z\ z'.\ (\forall h::char\ list \in set\ (agra\ (graphI\ z)\ cockpit).\ h \in airplane\text{-}actors) \wedge$
       $(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init,z) \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).\ x$
$\rightarrow_n y\}^* \wedge$
               $z \rightarrow_n z' \longrightarrow\ (\forall h::char\ list \in set\ (agra\ (graphI\ z')\ cockpit).\ h \in$
airplane-actors)
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *airplane-actors-inv*:
  assumes $(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init,z) \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).$
$x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
    shows $\forall h::char\ list \in set\ (agra\ (graphI\ z)\ cockpit).\ h \in airplane\text{-}actors$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *Eve-not-in-cockpit*: $(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init,\ I)$
     $\in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).\ x \rightarrow_n y\}^* \Longrightarrow$
     $x \in set\ (agra\ (graphI\ I)\ cockpit) \Longrightarrow x \neq {''}Eve{''}$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

The 2 person invariant implies that there is always some x in cockpit where
x not equal *Eve*.

lemma *tp-imp-control*:
  assumes $(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init,I) \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).$
$x \rightarrow_n y\}^*$
  shows $(?\ x :: identity.\ x\ @_{graphI\ I}\ cockpit \wedge Actor\ x \neq Actor\ {''}Eve{''})$
$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *Fend-2*: $(Airplane\text{-}not\text{-}in\text{-}danger\text{-}init,I) \in \{(x::infrastructure,\ y::infrastructure).$
$x \rightarrow_n y\}^* \Longrightarrow$
       $\neg\ enables\ I\ cockpit\ (Actor\ {''}Eve{''})\ put$
  $\langle proof \rangle$

theorem *Four-eyes-no-danger*: $Air\text{-}tp\text{-}Kripke \vdash AG\ (\{x.\ global\text{-}policy\ x\ {''}Eve{''}\})$
$\langle proof \rangle$

end

4.4 Locale interpretation

In the following we construct an instance of the locale airplane and proof
that it is an interpretation. This serves the validation.

definition *airplane-actors-def'*: $airplane\text{-}actors \equiv \{{''}Bob{''},\ {''}Charly{''},\ {''}Alice{''}\}$
definition *airplane-locations-def'*:
$airplane\text{-}locations \equiv \{Location\ 0,\ Location\ 1,\ Location\ 2\}$
definition *cockpit-def'*: $cockpit \equiv Location\ 2$

definition *door-def'*: *door* ≡ *Location 1*
definition *cabin-def'*: *cabin* ≡ *Location 0*
definition *global-policy-def'*: *global-policy I a* ≡ *a* ∉ *airplane-actors*
        ⟶ ¬(*enables I cockpit* (*Actor a*) *put*)
definition *ex-creds-def'*: *ex-creds* ≡
    (λ *x*.(*if x = Actor* ″*Bob*″
      then ([″*PIN*″], [″*pilot*″])
      else (*if x = Actor* ″*Charly*″
        then ([″*PIN*″],[″*copilot*″])
        else (*if x = Actor* ″*Alice*″
          then ([″*PIN*″],[″*flightattendant*″])
           else ([],[]))))))

definition *ex-locs-def'*: *ex-locs* ≡ (λ *x. if x = door then* [″*norm*″] *else*
                 (*if x = cockpit then* [″*air*″] *else* []))

definition *ex-locs'-def'*: *ex-locs'* ≡ (λ *x. if x = door then* [″*locked*″] *else*
                 (*if x = cockpit then* [″*air*″] *else* []))

definition *ex-graph-def'*: *ex-graph* ≡ *Lgraph*
    {(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
    (λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Bob*″, ″*Charly*″]
      else (*if x = door then* []
        else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
    ex-creds ex-locs

definition *aid-graph-def'*: *aid-graph* ≡ *Lgraph*
    {(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
    (λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Charly*″]
      else (*if x = door then* []
        else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Bob*″, ″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
    ex-creds ex-locs'

definition *aid-graph0-def'*: *aid-graph0* ≡ *Lgraph*
    {(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
    (λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Charly*″]
      else (*if x = door then* [″*Bob*″]
        else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
    ex-creds ex-locs

definition *agid-graph-def'*: *agid-graph* ≡ *Lgraph*
    {(*cockpit, door*),(*door,cabin*)}
    (λ *x. if x = cockpit then* [″*Charly*″]
      else (*if x = door then* []
        else (*if x = cabin then* [″*Bob*″, ″*Alice*″] *else* [])))
    ex-creds ex-locs

definition *local-policies-def'*: *local-policies G* ≡
  (λ *y. if y = cockpit then*

$$\{(\lambda\ x.\ (?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cockpit)\ \wedge\ Actor\ n\ =\ x),\ \{put\}),$$
$$(\lambda\ x.\ (?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cabin)\ \wedge\ Actor\ n\ =\ x\ \wedge\ has\ G\ (x,\ ''PIN'')$$
$$\wedge\ isin\ G\ door\ ''norm''),\{move\})$$
$$\}$$
$$else\ (if\ y\ =\ door\ then\ \{(\lambda\ x.\ True,\ \{move\}),$$
$$(\lambda\ x.\ (?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cockpit)\ \wedge\ Actor\ n\ =\ x),\ \{put\})\}$$
$$else\ (if\ y\ =\ cabin\ then\ \{(\lambda\ x.\ True,\ \{move\})\}$$
$$else\ \{\})))$$

definition *local-policies-four-eyes-def ′*: *local-policies-four-eyes G ≡*
  $(\lambda\ y.\ if\ y\ =\ cockpit\ then$
      $\{(\lambda\ x.\ (?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cockpit)\ \wedge\ Actor\ n\ =\ x)\ \wedge$
          $2\ \leq\ length(agra\ G\ y)\ \wedge\ (\forall\ h\ \in\ set(agra\ G\ y).\ h\ \in\ airplane\text{-}actors),$
$\{put\}),$
          $(\lambda\ x.\ (?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cabin)\ \wedge\ Actor\ n\ =\ x\ \wedge\ has\ G\ (x,\ ''PIN'')\ \wedge$
              $isin\ G\ door\ ''norm''\ ),\{move\})$
      $\}$
    $else\ (if\ y\ =\ door\ then$
        $\{(\lambda\ x.\ ((?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ cockpit)\ \wedge\ Actor\ n\ =\ x)\ \wedge\ 3\ \leq\ length(agra\ G$
$cockpit)),\ \{move\})\}$
          $else\ (if\ y\ =\ cabin\ then$
              $\{(\lambda\ x.\ ((?\ n.\ (n\ @_G\ door)\ \wedge\ Actor\ n\ =\ x)),\ \{move\})\}$
                $else\ \{\})))$

definition *Airplane-scenario-def ′*:
Airplane-scenario ≡ Infrastructure ex-graph local-policies

definition *Airplane-in-danger-def ′*:
Airplane-in-danger ≡ Infrastructure aid-graph local-policies

This is the intermediate step where pilot left the cockpit but the door is still in norm position.

definition *Airplane-getting-in-danger0-def ′*:
Airplane-getting-in-danger0 ≡ Infrastructure aid-graph0 local-policies

definition *Airplane-getting-in-danger-def ′*:
Airplane-getting-in-danger ≡ Infrastructure agid-graph local-policies

definition *Air-states-def ′*: *Air-states ≡ { I. Airplane-scenario →$_n$∗ I }*

definition *Air-Kripke-def ′*: *Air-Kripke ≡ Kripke Air-states {Airplane-scenario}*

definition *Airplane-not-in-danger-def ′*:
Airplane-not-in-danger ≡ Infrastructure aid-graph local-policies-four-eyes

definition *Airplane-not-in-danger-init-def ′*:
Airplane-not-in-danger-init ≡ Infrastructure ex-graph local-policies-four-eyes

definition *Air-tp-states-def ′*: *Air-tp-states ≡ { I. Airplane-not-in-danger-init →$_n$∗ I }*

definition *Air-tp-Kripke-def′*:
Air-tp-Kripke ≡ Kripke Air-tp-states {*Airplane-not-in-danger-init*}

definition *Safety-def′*: *Safety I a ≡ a ∈ airplane-actors*
$\longrightarrow$ (*enables I cockpit* (*Actor a*) *move*)

definition *Security-def′*: *Security I a ≡* (*isin* (*graphI I*) *door* ″*locked*″)
$\longrightarrow$ ¬(*enables I cockpit* (*Actor a*) *move*)

definition *foe-control-def′*: *foe-control l c ≡*
   (! *I*:: *infrastructure*. (? *x* :: *identity*.
      x @$_{graphI\ I}$ *l* ∧ *Actor x* ≠ *Actor* ″*Eve*″)
         $\longrightarrow$ ¬(*enables I l* (*Actor* ″*Eve*″) *c*))

definition *astate-def′*: *astate x ≡*
      (*case x of*
      ″*Eve*″ ⇒ *Actor-state depressed* {*revenge, peer-recognition*}
      | *-* ⇒ *Actor-state happy* {})

print-interps *airplane*

The additional assumption identified in the case study needs to be given as
an axiom

axiomatization where
cockpit-foe-control′: *foe-control cockpit put*

The following addresses the issue of redefining an abstract type. We exper-
imented with suggestion given in [8]. Following this, we need axiomatiza-
tion to add the missing semantics to the abstractly declared type actor and
thereby be able to redefine *consts Actor*. Since the function Actor has also
been defined as a *consts :: identity ⇒ actor* as an abstract function without
a definition, we now also now add its semantics mimicking some of the con-
cepts of the conservative type definition of HOL. The alternative method of
using a locale to replace the abstract *type-decl actor* in the theory *AirInsider*
is a more elegant method for representing an abstract type *actor* but it is
not working properly for our framework since it necessitates introducing a
type parameter ′*actor* into infrastructures which then makes it impossible to
instantiate them to the *typeclass* state in order to use CTL and Kripke and
the generic state transition. Therefore, we go the former way of a post-hoc
axiomatic redefinition of the abstract type actor by using axiomatization of
the existing locale *type-definition*. This is done in the following. It allows
to abstractedly assume as an axiom that there is a type definition for the
abstract type actor. Adding a suitable definition of a representation for
this type then additionally enables to introduce a definition for the function
Actor (again using axiomatization to enforce the new definition).

definition *Actor-Abs* :: *identity ⇒ identity option*

where
Actor-Abs x ≡ (if x ∈ {″Eve″, ″Charly″} then None else Some x)

lemma *UasI-ActorAbs*: *Actor-Abs ″Eve″ = Actor-Abs ″Charly″ ∧*
  (∀ (x::char list) y::char list. x ≠ ″Eve″ ∧ y ≠ ″Eve″ ∧ Actor-Abs x = Actor-Abs
y ⟶ x = y)
  ⟨proof⟩

lemma *Actor-Abs-ran*: *Actor-Abs x ∈ {y :: identity option. y ∈ Some ' {x ::*
identity. x ∉ {″Eve″, ″Charly″}}| y = None}
  ⟨proof⟩

With the following axiomatization, we can simulate the abstract type actor and postulate some unspecified *Abs* and *Rep* functions between it and the simulated identity option subtype.

axiomatization where *Actor-type-def*:
type-definition (Rep :: actor ⇒ identity option)(Abs :: identity option ⇒ actor)
{y :: identity option. y ∈ Some ' {x :: identity. x ∉ {″Eve″, ″Charly″}}| y =
None}

lemma *Abs-inj-on*: ⋀ *Abs Rep:: actor ⇒ char list option. x ∈ {y :: identity option.*
y ∈ Some ' {x :: identity. x ∉ {″Eve″, ″Charly″}}| y = None}
      ⟹ y ∈ {y :: identity option. y ∈ Some ' {x :: identity. x ∉ {″Eve″,
″Charly″}}| y = None}
      ⟹ (Abs :: char list option ⇒ actor) x = Abs y ⟹ x = y
⟨proof⟩

lemma *Actor-td-Abs-inverse*:
(y∈ {y :: identity option. y ∈ Some ' {x :: identity. x ∉ {″Eve″, ″Charly″}}| y
= None}) ⟹
(Rep :: actor ⇒ identity option)((Abs :: identity option ⇒ actor) y) = y
⟨proof⟩

Now, we can redefine the function *Actor* using a second axiomatization

axiomatization where *Actor-redef*: *Actor = (Abs :: identity option ⇒ actor)o*
Actor-Abs

We need to show that

Abs (Actor-Abs x) = Abs (Actor-Abs y) ⟶ Actor-Abs x = Actor-Abs y,
i.e. *injective Abs*.

Generally, *Abs* is not injective but *injective-on* the type predicate. So, we need to show that for any x, *Actor-Abs x* is in the type predicate, then it would follow. This is the type predicate:

{y. y ∈ Some ' {x. x ∉ {″Eve″, ″Charly″}} ∨ y = None}.

lemma *UasI-Actor-redef*:
⋀ *Abs Rep:: actor ⇒ char list option.*
((Abs :: identity option ⇒ actor)o Actor-Abs) ″Eve″ = ((Abs :: identity option ⇒
actor)o Actor-Abs) ″Charly″ ∧

$(\forall\,(x::char\ list)\ y::char\ list.\ x \neq \mathit{''Eve''} \wedge y \neq \mathit{''Eve''} \wedge$
$((Abs :: identity\ option \Rightarrow actor)o\ Actor\text{-}Abs)\ x = ((Abs :: identity\ option \Rightarrow actor)o\ Actor\text{-}Abs)\ y$
$\longrightarrow x = y)$
$\langle proof \rangle$

Finally all of this allows us to show the last assumption contained in the Insider Locale assumption needed for the interpretation of airplane.

lemma *UasI-Actor*: *UasI ''Eve'' ''Charly''*
$\langle proof \rangle$

interpretation *airplane airplane-actors airplane-locations cockpit door cabin global-policy*

        ex-creds ex-locs ex-locs' ex-graph aid-graph aid-graph0 agid-graph
       local-policies local-policies-four-eyes Airplane-scenario Airplane-in-danger
         Airplane-getting-in-danger0 Airplane-getting-in-danger Air-states
Air-Kripke
       Airplane-not-in-danger Airplane-not-in-danger-init Air-tp-states
       Air-tp-Kripke Safety Security foe-control astate

$\langle proof \rangle$

end

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