

SMT and Its Application in Software Verification

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Based on the slides of Barrett, Sanjit, Kroening , Rummert, Sinha,
Jhala, and Majumdar

Assertion in C

```
int main(){  
    int x;  
    scanf("%d", &x);  
    assert(x > 10); }
```

- Useful tool for debugging.
 - Can be used to describe pre- and post-conditions of a function.
 - A program terminates immediately, if it reaches a **violated** assertion.

```
[yfc@FM3 ~]$ gcc test.c  
[yfc@FM3 ~]$ ./a.out  
10  
a.out: test.c:9: main: Assertion `x > 10' failed.  
Aborted
```

Assertion in C

```
int main(){
    int x;
    scanf("%d", &x);
    while(x<10){
        x++;
    }
    assert(x > 0);
}
```

- Will this assertion be violated?

Assertion in C

```
int main(){
    int x;
    scanf("%d", &x);
    while(x<10){
        x--;
    }
    assert(x > 0);
}
```

- Will this assertion be violated?

Assertion in C

```
int main(){  
    int x;  
    scanf("%d", &x);  
    while(x<4324358){  
        x--;  
    }  
assert(x > 4324358); }
```

- Will this assertion be violated?

Assertion in C


- One more example:

```
void A(bool h, bool g) {  
    h := !g;  
    g=B(g,h);  
    g=B(g,h);  
    assert(g);  
}
```

```
void B(bool a1,bool a2) {  
    if (a1)  
        return B(a2,a1);  
    else  
        return a2;  
}
```

The Problem We are Going to Solve

- Given a program with assertion, we want to **automatically detect if the assertion may be violated.**



Part I: Logic and Program Verification

First-Order Logic: A Quick Review

– Logical Symbols

- Propositional connectives: $\vee, \wedge, \neg, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$
- Variables: v_1, v_2, \dots
- Quantifiers: \forall, \exists

– Non-logical Symbols

- Functions: $+, -, *, \text{suc}, \dots$
- Predicates: $\leq, =, \dots$
- Constant symbols: $0, 1, \text{null}, \dots$

– Example

- $3*v_2 + 5*v_1 \leq 54$

Why This is Relevant to Software Verification?

For example:

- Given an integer program without loop and function call.
- The **assertion checking** problem can be reduced to **satisfiability** problem of a trace formula*

```
int main(){  
    int x; scanf("%d", &x);  
    if(x<10) x= x -1;  
    assert(x != 9);  
}
```

$$\begin{aligned} & (x_0 < 10 \wedge x_1 = x_0 - 1 \wedge x_1 = 9) \\ & \quad \wedge \\ & (x_0 \geq 10 \wedge x_0 = 9) \end{aligned}$$

The assertion may be violated



The first order formula is satisfiable

Note *: a FOL formula under theory of linear integer arithmetic.

First order logic Theories

- A first order theory consists of
 - Variables
 - Logical symbols: $\wedge \vee \neg \forall \exists (' ')$
 - **Non-logical Symbols (signature) Σ : Constants, predicate and function symbols**
 - **The meanings of the non-logical symbols.**

Examples

- $\Sigma = \{0, 1, '+', '='\}$
 - ‘0’, ‘1’ are constant symbols
 - ‘+’ is a binary function symbol
 - ‘=’ is a binary predicate symbol
- An example of a Σ -formula:

$$\exists x. x + 0 = 1$$

Is ϕ valid?

Structures

- The most common way of specifying the meaning of symbols is to specify a **structure**
- Recall that $\phi = \exists x. x + 0 = 1$
- Consider the structure S:
 - Domain: \mathcal{N}_0
 - Interpretation of the non-logical symbols :
 - ‘0’ and ‘1’ are mapped to 0 and 1 in \mathcal{N}_0
 - ‘=’ $\mapsto =$ (equality)
 - ‘+’ $\mapsto *$ (multiplication)
- Now, is ϕ true in S ?

Short Summary

- A theory defines
 - the signature Σ (the set of non-logical symbols) and
 - the interpretations that we can give them.

Theories through axioms

- The number of sentences that are necessary for defining a theory may be large or **infinite**.
- Instead, it is common to define a theory through a set of **axioms**.
- The **theory is defined by these axioms** and everything that can be inferred from them by a sound inference system.

Example 1

- Let $\Sigma = \{ '=' \}$
 - An example Σ -formula is $((x = y) \wedge \neg(y = z)) \rightarrow \neg(x = z)$
- We would now like to define a Σ -theory T that will **limit the interpretation** of '=' to equality.
- We will do so with the equality axioms:
 - $\forall x. x = x$ (reflexivity)
 - $\forall x,y. x = y \rightarrow y = x$ (symmetry)
 - $\forall x,y,z. x = y \wedge y = z \rightarrow x = z$ (transitivity)
- Every assignment that satisfies these axioms also satisfies ϕ above.
- Hence ϕ is T -valid.

Example 2

- Let $\Sigma = \{‘<’\}$
- Consider the Σ -formula $\phi: \forall x \exists y. y < x$
- Consider the theory T:
 - $\forall x,y,z. x < y \wedge y < z \rightarrow x < z$ (transitivity)
 - $\forall x,y. x < y \rightarrow \neg(y < x)$ (anti-symmetry)

Quantifier-free Subset

- In **Software Verification**, we will largely restrict ourselves to formulas without quantifiers (\forall, \exists)—mainly for efficiency reason.
- This is called the quantifier-free fragment of first-order logic.

Some Useful Theories in Software Verification

- Equality (with uninterpreted functions)
- Linear arithmetic (over \mathbb{Q} or \mathbb{Z})
 - Peano Arithmetic, Presburgh Arithmetic
- Difference logic (over \mathbb{Q} or \mathbb{Z})
- Finite-precision bit-vectors
 - integer or floating-point
- Arrays
- Misc.: strings, lists, sets, ...

Theory of Equality and Uninterpreted Functions (EUF)

- Signature:
 - Constants and Function symbols: f , g , etc. In principle, all possible symbols but “ $=$ ” and those used for variables.
 - Predicates symbol: “ $=$ ”
- equality axioms:
 - $\forall x. x = x$ (reflexivity)
 - $\forall x,y. x = y \rightarrow y = x$ (symmetry)
 - $\forall x,y,z. x = y \wedge y = z \rightarrow x = z$ (transitivity)
- In addition, we need *congruence*: the function symbols map identical arguments to identical values, i.e., $x = y \Rightarrow f(x) = f(y)$

Example EUF Formula

$$(x = y) \wedge (y = z) \wedge (f(x) \neq f(z))$$

Transitivity:

$$(x = y) \wedge (y = z) \Rightarrow (x = z)$$

Congruence:

$$(x = z) \Rightarrow (f(x) = f(z))$$

Equivalence Checking of Program Fragments

```
int fun1(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    z = y;  
    y = x;  
    x = z;  
  
    return sq(x);  
}
```

```
int fun2(int y) {  
    return sq(y);  
}
```

formula ϕ is satisfiable iff
the programs are non-equivalent

$$\begin{aligned} & z_0 = y_0 \wedge y_1 = x_0 \wedge x_1 = z_0 \wedge \text{ret1} = \text{sq}(x_1) \\ & \wedge \\ & \text{ret2} = \text{sq}(y_0) \\ & \wedge \\ & \text{ret1} \neq \text{ret2} \end{aligned}$$

A Small Practice:

```
int f(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    x = myFunc(y);  
    x = myFunc(x);  
    z = myFunc(myFunc(y));  
  
    assert (x==z);  
}
```

Write a formula ϕ such that
formula ϕ is satisfiable \Leftrightarrow
the assertion can be violated

Solution:

First Order Peano Arithmetic

- constant function predicate
- $\Sigma = \{0, 1, '+', '*', '='\}$

- Domain: Natural numbers

Validity is

Undecidable!

- Axioms (“semantics”):
 1. $\forall x : (0 \neq x + 1)$
 2. $\forall x : \forall y : (x \neq y) \rightarrow (x + 1 \neq y + 1)$
 - + { 3. Induction
4. $\forall x : x + 0 = x$ }
These axioms define the semantics of ‘+’
 - * { 5. $\forall x : \forall y : (x + y) + 1 = x + (y + 1)$
6. $\forall x : x * 0 = 0$
7. $\forall x \forall y : x * (y + 1) = x * y + x$

First Order Presburger Arithmetic

- constant function predicate
- $\Sigma = \{0, 1, '+', \cancel{'*'}, '='\}$

- Domain: Natural numbers

Validity is

decidable!

- Axioms (“semantics”):

$$1. \forall x : (0 \neq x + 1)$$

$$2. \forall x : \forall y : (x \neq y) \rightarrow (x + 1 \neq y + 1)$$

- + { 3. Induction }

$$4. \forall x : x + 0 = x$$

$$5. \forall x : \forall y : (x + y) + 1 = x + (y + 1)$$

- * { 6. $\forall x : x * 0 = 0$ }

$$7. \forall x \forall y : x * (y + 1) = x * y + x$$

These axioms define the semantics of ‘+’

Note that $3*v2 + 5*v1 \leq 54$ is a Presburger Formula

Examples in Software Verification

- Array Bound Checking:

```
void f() {                                i0=1 ∧ i1=2 ∧ i2=3 ∧ i3=4 ∧ ... ∧ i8=9 ∧  
    int x[10];                            0 < i0 < 10 ∧ 0 < i1 < 10 ∧ ... ∧ 0 < i8 < 10  
    x[0]=1;                                is satisfiable iff  
    for(int i=1; i<11; i++){            the assertion may be violated  
        assert(0 < i < 10);  
        x[i]=x[i-1]+5;  
        .....  
    }  
}
```

Theory of Arrays

- Two interpreted functions: select and store
 - $\text{select}(A,i)$ Read from array A at index i
 - $\text{store}(A,i,d)$ Write d to array A at index i
- Two main axioms:
 - $\text{select}(\text{store}(A,i,d), i) = d$
 - $\text{select}(\text{store}(A,i,d), j) = \text{select}(A,j)$ for $i \neq j$
- Extentionality axiom:
 - $\forall i. \text{select}(A,i) = \text{select}(B,i) \rightarrow (A = B)$

Combining Theories

- **Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problem** is a decision problem for logical formulae with respect to combinations of different first order theories.
- For example: Uninterpreted Function + Linear Integer Arithmetic

$$1 \leq x \wedge x \leq 2 \wedge f(x) \neq f(1) \wedge f(x) \neq f(2)$$

Linear Integer Arithmetic (LIA)

Uninterpreted Functions(UF)

- How to Combine Theory Solvers?

A Classical Algorithm: The Nelson-Oppen Method . Google “Nelson-Oppen” and you can get tons of slides explaining it.

Combining Theories

- **Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problem** is a decision problem for logical formulae with respect to combinations of different first order theories.
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Linear Integer Arithmetic (LIA)

Uninterpreted Functions(UF)

- How to Combine Theory Solvers?

In this lecture, we will not talk about the algorithm for solving SMT problem. Instead ,we will show you tools (SMT solvers) that does the job.

What you have learned so far?

- Assertions in C
- First Order Theories related to Verification
 - Equality and Uninterpreted Functions
$$f(a,b)=a \Rightarrow f(f(a, b), b)=a$$
 - Linear Integer Arithmetic
$$x+5>y-7 \wedge 3y < x \wedge y>0$$
 - Arrays
$$i>j \rightarrow \text{select}(A, i) > \text{select}(A, j) \quad [\text{array } A \text{ is sorted}]$$
- The SMT Problem


Tools: Theorem Provers of FOL



- An example: Princess (by Philipp Rummer):
 - <http://www.philipp.ruemmer.org/princess.shtml> (JRE is required)
- Automatically check validity of a FOL formula modulo linear integer arithmetic.

$(x_0 < 10 \wedge x_1 = x_0 - 1 \wedge x_1 = 9) \vee (x_0 \geq 10 \wedge x_0 = 9)$

Princess Input:



Note: f is unsatisfiable iff !f is valid

```
\functions {
int x0, x1;
}

\problem {
\forall int x0, x1;
!( (x0 < 10 & x1 = x0-1 & x1 = 9) | (x0 >= 10 & x0 = 9) )
}
```

Tools: Theorem Provers of FOL

- An example: Princess (by Philipp Rummel):
 - <http://www.philipp.ruemmer.org/princess.shtml> (JRE is required)

Download the binary tarball from the web-site

Installation of the binary distribution

We provide a binary distribution of the latest version of Princess. This distribution contains all required libraries, i.e., the Scala runtime environment (version 1.5 or newer) installed.

Install JRE 1.5 or above

Run Princess:

set BASE=.

set CLASSPATH=%CLASSPATH%;%BASE%\dist\princess-all.jar

java ap.DialogMain

About Princess

- Theorem prover (SMT solver) for
first-order logic + linear integer arithmetic
- Supported features:
 - Uninterpreted **predicates, functions, quantifiers**
 - Theory of **arrays** (using functions + axioms)
 - **Craig interpolation**

Declaration of functions/constants

```
\functions {
    /* Declare constants and functions occurring in the problem
     * The keyword "\partial" can be used to define functions without totality axiom,
     * "\relational" can be used to define "functions" w/o functionality axiom. */
```

```
int x, y, z, ar;
```

} Constant Variables

```
\partial int select(int, int);
```

} Partial functions

```
\partial int store(int, int, int);
```

} Total function

```
}
```

[...]

Declaration of predicates

[...]

```
\predicates {  
    /* Declare predicates occurring in the problem */
```

p; q;

}

Nullary predicates (propositional variables)

r(int, int);

}

Predicates/relations

[...]

Formulae/problems

[...]

```
\problem {  
  /* Problem to be proven. */
```

```
\forall int ar, ind, val;  
  select(store(ar, ind, val), ind) = val
```

->

```
\forall int ar, ind1, ind2, val;  
  (ind1 != ind2 ->  
   select(store(ar, ind1, val), ind2) = select(ar, ind2))
```

->

```
x + 1 = 5
```

->

```
select(store(ar, x, y), 4) = y
```

}



Array axioms



Implied formula

Syntax of formulae

Syntax	Meaning
$A \& B$	Conjunction
$A B$	Disjunction
$!A$	Negation
$A \rightarrow B$	Implication
$A \leftrightarrow B$	Equivalence
$\forall \text{int } x, y, z; A$ $\exists \text{int } x, y, z; A$	Quantifiers
$\text{\textbackslash part}[p0] A$	Labelled formula
$s = t, s != t$ $s <= t, s < t$	(Dis)equations, inequalities
$p(s, t, \dots)$	Application of predicates
$\dots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots$	Integer literals (constants)
$s + t, s * t$	Sums, products (only linear expressions are allowed)
x, y, z	Variables, constants
$f(s, t, \dots)$	Application of functions

Some Practice

```
int main(){  
    int x; scanf("%d", &x);  
    if(x<10) x= x -1;  
    assert(x != 9);  
}
```

$$\begin{aligned} & (x_0 < 10 \wedge x_1 = x_0 - 1 \wedge x_1 = 9) \\ & \vee \\ & (x_0 \geq 10 \wedge x_0 = 9) \end{aligned}$$

The assertion may be violated



The first order formula is satisfiable

Some Practice

```
int main(){  
    int x; scanf("%d", &x);  
    if(x<10) x= x -1;  
    assert(x != 9);  
}
```

$$\begin{aligned} & (x_0 < 10 \wedge x_1 = x_0 - 1 \wedge x_1 = 9) \\ \vee \\ & (x_0 \geq 10 \wedge x_0 = 9) \end{aligned}$$

The assertion may be violated



The first order formula is satisfiable

```
ex1.pri  
\functions {  
    int x0, x1;  
}  
\problem {  
    \forall int x0, x1;  
    !((x0<10 & x1=x0-1 & x1=9) & (x0>=10 & x0=9))  
}
```

Some Practice

```
int fun1(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    z = y;  
    y = x;  
    x = z;  
  
    return sq(x);  
}  
  
int fun2(int y) {  
    return sq(y);  
}
```

Some Practice

```
int fun1(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    z = y;  
    y = x;  
    x = z;  
  
    return sq(x);  
}  
  
int fun2(int y) {  
    return sq(y);  
}
```

formula ϕ is satisfiable iff
the programs are non-equivalent

Some Practice

```
int fun1(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    z = y;  
    y = x;  
    x = z;  
  
    return sq(x);  
}
```

```
int fun2(int y) {  
    return sq(y);  
}
```

formula ϕ is satisfiable iff
the programs are non-equivalent

$$\begin{aligned} & z_0 = y_0 \wedge y_1 = x_0 \wedge x_1 = z_0 \wedge \text{ret1} = \text{sq}(x_1) \\ & \wedge \\ & \text{ret2} = \text{sq}(y_0) \\ & \wedge \\ & \text{ret1} \neq \text{ret2} \end{aligned}$$

Some Practice

```
int fun1(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    z = y;  
    y = x;  
    x = z;  
  
    return sq(x);  
}  
  
int fun2(int y) {  
    return sq(y);  
}
```

formula ϕ is satisfiable iff
the programs are non-equivalent

$$\begin{aligned} & z_0 = y_0 \wedge y_1 = x_0 \wedge x_1 = z_0 \wedge \text{ret1} = \text{sq}(x_1) \\ & \wedge \\ & \text{ret2} = \text{sq}(y_0) \quad \text{ex2.pri} \\ & \wedge \\ & \text{ret1} \neq \text{ret2} \end{aligned}$$

```
\functions {  
    int z0, y0, y1, x0, x1, ret1, ret2;  
    int sq(int);  
}  
  
\problem {  
    \forall int z0, y0, y1, x0, x1, ret1, ret2; !(  
        z0 = y0 \& y1 = x0 \& x1 = z0 \& ret1 = \text{sq}(x1)  
        \& ret2 = \text{sq}(y0) \& ret1 != ret2  
    )} 
```

Some Practice

```
int f(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    x = myFunc(y);  
    x = myFunc(x);  
    z = myFunc(myFunc(y));  
    assert (x==z);  
}
```

Some Practice

```
int f(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    x = myFunc(y);  
    x = myFunc(x);  
    z = myFunc(myFunc(y));  
    assert (x==z);  
}
```

Write a formula ϕ such that
formula ϕ is satisfiable \leftrightarrow
the assertion can be violated

Some Practice

```
int f(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    x = myFunc(y);  
    x = myFunc(x);  
    z = myFunc(myFunc(y));  
    assert (x==z);  
}
```

Write a formula ϕ such that

formula ϕ is satisfiable \Leftrightarrow
the assertion can be violated

$x_0 = \text{myFunc}(y_0) \wedge x_1 = \text{myFunc}(x_0) \wedge$
 $z_0 = \text{myFunc}(\text{myFunc}(y_0)) \wedge x_1 \neq z_0$

Some Practice

```
int f(int y) {  
    int x, z;  
    x = myFunc(y);  
    x = myFunc(x);  
    z = myFunc(myFunc(y));  
    assert (x==z);  
}
```

ex3.pri

```
\functions {  
    int z0, y0, x0, x1;  
    int myFunc(int);  
}  
\problem {  
    \forall int z0, y0, x0, x1; !(  
        x0=myFunc(y0) & x1=myFunc(x0) & z0 =myFunc(myFunc(y0)) & x1 != z0 )}
```

Write a formula ϕ such that

formula ϕ is satisfiable \Leftrightarrow
the assertion can be violated

$x0=\text{myFunc}(y0) \wedge x1=\text{myFunc}(x0) \wedge$
 $z0 = \text{myFunc}(\text{myFunc}(y0)) \wedge x1 \neq z0$

Homework

1. Define a small program verification problem.
2. Reduce the problem to a satisfiability problem of FOL
3. Solve it using Princess (send me your pri file via email:
yfc@iis.sinica.edu.tw)

Samples can be found the previous 3 pages.

Score of your homework


(60%) correctness

(40%) creativity


Part II: Software Model Checking

Model Checking

- Given a:
 - Finite state transition system M
 - A property p
 - Reachability (Simplest form)
 - CTL, LTL, CTL* (Prof. Farn Wang)
 - Automata (Prof. Yih-Kuen Tsay)
- The model checking problem:
 - Does M satisfy p ?




Model Checking (safety)



= bad state

Assertion Checking as Reachability

```
int main(){  
    int x;  
    scanf("%d", &x);  
    while(x<10){  
        x++;  
    }  
    assert(x > 0);  
}
```




```
int main(){  
    int x;  
    scanf("%d", &x);  
    while(x<10){  
        x++;  
    }  
    if(! (x > 0 )){  
        printf("ERROR");  
    }  
}
```

We will show you how to translate a program
to a state transition system later

Example

```
Example ( ) {  
1: do {  
    assert(!lock)  
    lock=true;  
    old = new;  
    q = q->next;  
2: if (q != NULL) {  
3:     q->data = new;  
    assert(lock)  
    lock=false;  
    new ++;  
}  
4: } while(new != old);  
5: assert(lock)  
lock=false;  
return;  
}
```




Fill up a linked list with increasing values

What a program *really* is...

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
    assert(!lock)
    lock=true;
    old = new;
    q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL) {
3:     q->data = new;
      assert(lock)
      lock=false;
      new++;
    }
4: } while(new != old);
5: assert(lock);
  lock=false;
  return; }
```

What a program *really* is...


State



pc \mapsto 3
lock \mapsto ●
old \mapsto 5
new \mapsto 5
q \mapsto 0x133a

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
    assert(!lock)
    lock=true;
    old = new;
    q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL) {
3:     q->data = new;
      assert(lock)
      lock=false;
      new++;
    }
4: } while(new != old);
5: assert(lock);
  lock=false;
  return; }
```

What a program *really* is...



State

Transition




<i>pc</i>	$\mapsto 3$
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Example () {

```
1: do{
    assert(!lock)
    lock=true;
    old = new;
    q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL) {
3:     q->data = new;
      assert(lock)
      lock=false;
      new++;
    }
4: } while(new != old);
5: assert(lock);
  lock=false;
  return;
```

What a program *really* is...



State

Transition




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What a program *really* is...



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
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
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The Safety Verification Problem




The Safety Verification Problem




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The Safety Verification Problem



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
The Safety Verification Problem



Is there a **path** from an **initial** to an **error** state ?

Problem: Infinite state graph

The Safety Verification Problem



Is there a **path** from an **initial** to an **error** state ?

Problem: Infinite state graph

Solution : Set of states \simeq logical **formula**

Representing States as *Formulas*



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$[F]$

states satisfying F $\{s \mid s \models F\}$

F

FO fmla over prog. vars

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$F_1 \wedge F_2$

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
$F_1 \vee F_2$

$\neg F$


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Idea 1: Predicate Abstraction




Idea 1: Predicate Abstraction




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old = new

Idea 1: Predicate Abstraction




- **Predicates** on program state:
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- States satisfying **same** predicates
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 - Merged into one **abstract state**

Idea 1: Predicate Abstraction



- **Predicates** on program state:
lock
old = new
- States satisfying **same** predicates
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 - Merged into one **abstract state**
- #abstract states is **finite**

Abstract States and Transitions



State




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Abstract States and Transitions



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


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
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
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lock

old=new

Abstract States and Transitions




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
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Abstract States and Transitions




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
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Theorem Prover




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Abstraction



Existential Lifting



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
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Abstraction





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
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
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
Analyze Abstraction



Analyze Abstraction




Analyze Abstraction



Analyze finite graph

Analyze Abstraction




Analyze finite graph

Over Approximate:

Safe \Rightarrow System Safe

No **false negatives**

Analyze Abstraction



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
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Problem

Spurious **counterexamples**

Analyze Abstraction



Analyze finite graph

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
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
Idea 2: Counterex.-Guided Refinement



Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction !


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
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
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


Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

Imprecision due to **merge**

Idea 2: Counterex.-Guided Refinement




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Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

1. **Add predicates** to distinguish states across **cut**

Idea 2: Counterex.-Guided Refinement




Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

1. **Add predicates** to distinguish states across **cut**
2. Build **refined** abstraction

Iterative Abstraction-Refinement



Solution


Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

1. Add predicates to distinguish states across **cut**
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-eliminates counterexample

[Kurshan et al 93] [Clarke et al 00]

[Ball-Rajamani 01]

Iterative Abstraction-Refinement



Solution


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
Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

1. Add predicates to distinguish states across **cut**
2. Build **refined** abstraction
-eliminates counterexample
3. **Repeat** search
Till real counterexample or system proved safe

Problem: Abstraction is Expensive

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



Problem

#abstract states = $2^{\text{#predicates}}$

Exponential Thm. Prover queries

Problem: Abstraction is Expensive





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Problem: Abstraction is Expensive



Problem

#abstract states = $2^{\text{#predicates}}$
Exponential Thm. Prover queries

Observe

Fraction of state space reachable
#Preds ~ 100's, #States ~ 2^{100} ,


A Concrete Example

Control Flow Automata

Program


```
void main() {  
    int i = 0;  
    while (i < 2) {  
        i++; }  
    assert (i >= 2);  
}
```

Control Flow Automata




Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata




ART




Assume that each node is associated with predicate ($i < 2$).

How to compute “successors” ?

```
Example ( ) {  
1: do{  
    lock();  
    old = new;  
    q = q->next;  
2: if (q != NULL) {  
3:     q->data = new;  
    unlock();  
    new ++;  
}  
4: }while(new != old);  
5: unlock ();  
}
```



Predicates: $\text{LOCK}, \text{new} == \text{old}$



$\text{Post}(\phi, \text{op})$


- Let ϕ be a formula describes a set of current states.
- $\text{Post}(\phi, \text{op})$ is a formula that describes the set of next states via operation **op**.
- Recall that two types of op are considered:
 - Assignment $x := e$, e.g., $x := x + 1$
 - Proposition $e_1 < e_2$ or $e_1 == e_2$, e.g., $x < y$

$\text{Post}(\phi, \text{op})$


- Recall that two types of op are considered:
 - Assignment $x := e$, e.g., $x := x + 1$
 - Proposition p , e.g., $x < y$
- $\text{Post}(\phi, x := e) = \phi[x/x'] \wedge x = e[x/x']$
- $\text{Post}(\phi, p) = \phi \wedge p$
- Try $\text{Post}(x > 3, x := x + 3)$

Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata



ART




$$\text{Post}(\text{True}, i := 0) = \text{True}[i/i'] \wedge i = 0[i/i']$$


Assume that each node is associated with predicate ($i < 2$).

Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata



ART




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
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Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata



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


$$\text{Post}(i < 2, i < 2) = i < 2 \wedge i < 2$$


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Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata



ART




$$\begin{aligned}\text{Post}(i < 2, i := i + 1) &= i < 2[i/i'] \wedge i = i + 1[i/i'] \\ &= i' < 2 \wedge i = i' + 1\end{aligned}$$


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Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata




ART




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Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata



ART




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Cover




iff (1) $n=n'$ (2) $\phi \rightarrow \phi'$


Then we can stop the search from



all bad states can be reached from




can also be reached from




Abstract Reachability Tree (ART)

Control Flow Automata



QUESTION: how to find useful predicates?


ART




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Lazy Abstraction (1)

Control Flow Automata




ART



Initially, we do not have any predicates


Lazy Abstraction (2)

False Counterexample




We want to find a predicate that will remove this false counterexample


A More Detailed Illustration



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


A More Detailed Illustration




Lazy Abstraction

Control Flow Automata



ART




Weakest Preconditions

$WP(P, OP)$

Weakest formula P' s.t.

if P' is true before OP

then P is true after OP



Assign

$x = e$


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
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

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

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

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

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
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


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


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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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


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

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$x > 5$




Weakest Preconditions

$WP(P, OP)$


Weakest formula P' s.t.

if P' is true before OP


then P is true after OP



Another Example




Another Example



(Craig,57)

Craig Interpolant




Reachable states

States that can reach Error

Let R and E be FOL formulae, if $R \wedge E$ is UNSAT., then there exists a first order formula I (interpolant) such that .


- (a) $R \Rightarrow I$
- (b) $E \wedge I$ is UNSAT
- (c) $\text{Var}(I) = \text{Var}(R) \cap \text{Var}(E)$

Compute Interpolant using Princess



- $(i=0) \wedge (i>2)$ is UNSAT

Compute Interpolant using Princess




- $(i=0) \wedge (i>2)$ is UNSAT

```
\functions {
    int i;
}

\problem {
    \part[p0] (i=0)
    &
    \part[p1] (i>2)
    -> false
}
\interpolant {p0; p1}
```

Compute Interpolant using Princess



- $(i=0) \wedge (i>2)$ is UNSAT


```
\functions {
    int i;
}
```

```
\problem {
    \part[p0] (i=0)
    &
    \part[p1] (i>2)
    -> false
}
\interpolant {p0; p1}
```

No countermodel exists, formula is valid

Interpolants:
 $(-1*i \geq 0)$

A More Detailed Illustration



RHS Algorithm (Modified)

```
void A() {  
    h := !g;  
    g=B(g,h);  
    g=B(g,h);  
    assert(g);  
}
```

```
void B(a1,a2) {  
    if (a1)  
        return B(a2,a1);  
    else  
        return a2;  
}
```

```

void A() {
    h := !g;
    g=B(g,h);
    g=B(g,h);
    assert(g);
}


```

```

void B(a1,a2) {
    if (a1)
        return B(a2,a1);
    else
        return a2;
}

```

RHS Algorithm



Establish summary edge $(0,1) \rightarrow 1$
 Add it to node 2 @ ART (1)

```

void A() {
    h := !g;
    g=B(g,h);
    g=B(g,h);
    assert(g);
}


```

```

void B(a1,a2) {
    if (a1)
        return B(a2,a1);
    else
        return a2;
}

```

RHS Algorithm



Summary edges
(a) $(0,1) \rightarrow 1$

```

void A() {
    h := !g;
    g=B(g,h);
    g=B(g,h);
    assert(g);
}


```

```

void B(a1,a2) {
    if (a1)
        return B(a2,a1);
    else
        return a2;
}

```

RHS Algorithm



Summary edges
(a) $(0,1) \rightarrow 1$

Establish summary edge $(1,0) \rightarrow 1$
Add it to node 2 @ ART (1)

```

void A() {
    h := !g;
    g=B(g,h);
    g=B(g,h);
    assert(g);
}


```

```

void B(a1,a2) {
    if (a1)
        return B(a2,a1);
    else
        return a2;
}

```

RHS Algorithm



Summary edges

- (a) $(0,1) \rightarrow 1$
- (b) $(1,0) \rightarrow 1$

```

void A() {
    h := !g;
    g=B(g,h);
    g=B(g,h);
    assert(g);
}


```

```

void B(a1,a2) {
    if (a1)
        return B(a2,a1);
    else
        return a2;
}

```

RHS Algorithm



```

void A() {
    h := !g;
    g=B(g,h);
    g=B(g,h);
    assert(g);
}


```

```

void B(a1,a2) {
    if (a1)
        return B(a2,a1);
    else
        return a2;
}

```

RHS Algorithm



Lazy abstraction + RHS alg. ?

- Major problems
 - For each function call, we enumerate all combinations of predicates.
 - When generate predicates, we hope it only contains **local** variables of a function.

