# 1 7 January 2014

# 1.1 Stable Marriage Problem

Gale-Shapley, 1962

Residents list hospital preferences, hospitals list resident preferences.

Try to find a stable arrangement. That is, there does not exist a resident R or hospital H such that R and H are not currently assigned to each other, but would prefer to be assigned to each other over their current assignments.

	1	2	3
A	Y	X	$\overline{z}$
В	X	Y	$\mathbf{Z}$
$\mathbf{C}$	$\mathbf{Z}$	X	Y

X A B C Y B C A Z B A C

(a) Amy, Bertha, Clare

(b) Xavier, Yancey, Zeus

Do stable matchings exist? If so, how do we find them?

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(X, A) (Y, B): stable
(X, A) (Z, C): stable
(Y, B) (Z, C): stable
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(X, C), (Y, B), and (Z, C) is unstable: B prefers X over Y, X prefers B over C.

#### Possible approaches

Approach 1 Assign a value to each pair and pick match with largest value

Approach 2 If a man and woman prefer each other, match them and repeat

**Approach 3** If exists unique top choice, match them. If two or more have same top choice, go through the others and identify stable pairs.

### Gale-Shapley Method

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while there exists unmatched man m who has not proposed to all women \operatorname{\mathbf{do}} m proposes to next woman w on his list \operatorname{\mathbf{if}} w is unmatched or w is engaged to m' but prefers m to m' then w gets matched to m (dumping m' if necessary) \operatorname{\mathbf{else}} w rejects m \operatorname{\mathbf{end}} \operatorname{\mathbf{if}} \operatorname{\mathbf{end}} \operatorname{\mathbf{if}} \operatorname{\mathbf{end}} \operatorname{\mathbf{if}} \operatorname{\mathbf{end}} \operatorname{\mathbf{if}} \operatorname{\mathbf{end}} \operatorname{\mathbf{in}} \operatorname{\mathbf
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#### Example

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\begin{array}{lll} X \text{ proposes to A} & & & (X, A) \\ Z \text{ proposes to B} & & (X, A), (Z, B) \\ Y \text{ proposes to B} & & (X, A), \frac{(Z, B)}{(Z, B)} (Y, B) \\ Z \text{ proposes to C} & & (X, A), (Y, B) \\ Z \text{ proposes to C} & & (X, A), (Y, B), (Z, C) \end{array}
```

Lemma 1 : G–S always terminates.

**Lemma 2**: At termination, the matching is stable.

#### Stable roommates

	1	2	3
A	В	С	D
В	С	Α	D
$\mathbf{C}$	A	В	D
D	A	В	$\mathbf{C}$

Never stable, because no one wants to live with D.

Observation 1: Once a woman is proposed to, she is always matched.

Proof: First time a woman is proposed to (line 2) she gets engaged (line 4).

Thereafter she breaks off the engagement only to get engaged to someone else.

 $\underline{\text{Observation 2:}}$  At termination, every man is either matched or has proposed to every woman.

## Proof of Lemma 1:

- In each iteration of the while loop, some man m proposes to some woman w.
- No man proposes to the same woman twice.
- No more than  $n^2$  proposals.
- No more than  $n^2$  iterations.
- G–S terminates in  $\leq n^2$  iterations.