

# 1 7 January 2014

## 1.1 Stable Marriage Problem

Gale-Shapley, 1962

Residents list hospital preferences, hospitals list resident preferences.

Try to find a stable arrangement. That is, there does not exist a resident  $R$  or hospital  $H$  such that  $R$  and  $H$  are not currently assigned to each other, but would prefer to be assigned to each other over their current assignments.

	1	2	3
A	Y	X	Z
B	X	Y	Z
C	Z	X	Y

(a) Amy, Bertha, Clare

	1	2	3
X	A	B	C
Y	B	C	A
Z	B	A	C

(b) Xavier, Yancey, Zeus

Do stable matchings exist? If so, how do we find them?

(X, A) (Y, B): stable

(X, A) (Z, C): stable

(Y, B) (Z, C): stable

(X, C), (Y, B), and (Z, C) is unstable: B prefers X over Y, X prefers B over C.

### Possible approaches

**Approach 1** Assign a value to each pair and pick match with largest value

**Approach 2** If a man and woman prefer each other, match them and repeat

**Approach 3** If exists unique top choice, match them. If two or more have same top choice, go through the others and identify stable pairs.

### Gale-Shapley Method

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while there exists unmatched man  $m$  who has not proposed to all women do  
   $m$  proposes to next woman  $w$  on his list  
  if  $w$  is unmatched or  $w$  is engaged to  $m'$  but prefers  $m$  to  $m'$  then  
     $w$  gets matched to  $m$  (dumping  $m'$  if necessary)  
  else  $w$  rejects  $m$   
  end if  
end while
```

### Example

X proposes to A	(X, A)
Z proposes to B	(X, A), (Z, B)
Y proposes to B	(X, A), <del>(Z, B)</del> (Y, B)
Z proposes to A, A rejects Z	(X, A), (Y, B)
Z proposes to C	(X, A), (Y, B), (Z, C)

**Lemma 1** : G-S always terminates.

**Lemma 2** : At termination, the matching is stable.

### Stable roommates

	1	2	3
A	B	C	D
B	C	A	D
C	A	B	D
D	A	B	C

Never stable, because no one wants to live with D.

Observation 1: Once a woman is proposed to, she is always matched.

Proof: First time a woman is proposed to (line 2) she gets engaged (line 4). Thereafter she breaks off the engagement only to get engaged to someone else.

Observation 2: At termination, every man is either matched or has proposed to every woman.

Proof of Lemma 1:

- In each iteration of the while loop, some man  $m$  proposes to some woman  $w$ .
- No man proposes to the same woman twice.
- No more than  $n^2$  proposals.
- No more than  $n^2$  iterations.
- G-S terminates in  $\leq n^2$  iterations.

## 2 9 January 2014

Lemma 2: G-S returns a stable matching

**a** Every man is matched to a woman

**b** There does not exist an unstable pair, i.e. pairs  $(m, 2)$  and  $(m', w')$  such that  $m$  prefers  $w'$  over  $w$  and  $w'$  prefers  $m$  over  $m'$ .

(a): By contradiction

Suppose there exists a man  $m$  who is not matched to any woman. There must exist an unmatched woman.

- $m$  must have gone through his list
- at some point proposed to  $w$
- certainly from that point on,  $w$  is matched

Contradicts the fact that  $w$  is unmatched at the end. Therefore (a) holds.

(b): By contradiction

Suppose two pairs exist  $(m, w)$  and  $(m', w')$ . Their preferences are:

$m : w' \dots w$

$w' : m \dots m'$

We know that at step 1,  $m$  proposed to  $w'$  at some instant  $t$ . After the proposal,  $w'$  is matched to some man whom she likes at least as much as  $m$ . At termination,  $w'$  is engaged to a man she likes at least as much as  $m$ . Contradicting matching  $(m', w')$ .

Total number of steps  $\leq 10n^2$

List for woman  $w$ , where the  $i$ th value is her  $i$ th preferred man:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
5	3	1	9	10	8	6	7	2	4

Invert, so the  $i$ th value is the rank of man  $i$ :

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
3	9	2	10	1	7	8	6	4	5

Suppose woman is engaged to man #5 and man #3 proposes. She'll look up 5 and 3 in the inverted list. If we didn't reverse the list, the total number of steps would be  $n^3$ .

### 2.1 Array of numbers

$A[1, \dots, n]$

3	4	13	28	30
0	1	10	25	27
0	0	9	24	26
0	0	0	15	17
0	0	0	0	2

For rows  $i$  and columns  $j$ :

$$B[i/j] = \begin{cases} \text{sum of } A[i \dots j] & : i \leq j \\ 0 & : i > j \end{cases}$$

Where the sum of  $A[i \dots j]$  is  $A[i] + A[i+1] + \dots + A[j]$

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1: Zero the array by setting  $B[i/j]$  to 0 for all  $i, j$ 
2: for  $i$  from 1 to  $n$  do
3:   for  $j$  from  $i$  to  $n$  do
4:     set  $B[i/j]$  to the sum of  $A[i], A[i+1], \dots, A[j]$ 
5:      $\text{sum} \leftarrow 0$ 
6:     for  $k \leftarrow i$  to  $j$  do
7:        $\text{sum} \leftarrow \text{sum} + A[k]$ 
8:     end for
9:      $B[i, j] \leftarrow \text{sum}$ 
10:   end for
11: end for

```

**1**  $n^2$

**2**  $n$

**3** For iteration  $i$ :  $n - i + 1$  times =  $\frac{n(n+1)}{2}$

**5** For fixed  $i, j$ :  $1 \leftarrow \frac{n(n+1)}{2}$

**6** For fixed  $i, j$ :  $j - i + 1$

**7** For fixed  $i, j$ :  $j - i + 1$

**9** For fixed  $i, j$ : 1

Running time:  $n^2 + n + \frac{n(n+1)}{2} + \frac{n(n+1)}{2} + \frac{n(n+1)}{2} + n^3 + n^3 \leq 2n^3 + \frac{5n^2}{2} + \frac{5n}{2}$