

# Manifest Problems: Analyzing Code Transparency For Android Application Bundles

ACSAC 2024

Florian Draschbacher

Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria  
Secure Information Technology Austria, Vienna, Austria  
*florian.draschbacher@tugraz.at*


Lukas Maar

Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria  
*lukas.maar@tugraz.at*

December 13th, 2024


# Mobile App Security

- New mobile computing use cases



# Mobile App Security

- New mobile computing use cases
  - Sensitive user data



# Mobile App Security

- New mobile computing use cases
  - Sensitive user data
- Attractive for attackers




# Mobile App Security

- New mobile computing use cases
  - Sensitive user data
- Attractive for attackers
- Recent attack trend:
  - **Supply Chain attacks**







# <2018: Direct APK Distribution



# 2018: Android Application Bundle (AAB)



# 2021: Code Transparency for AAB





# Problem Statement & Approach

# Code Transparency for AAB

- Google heavily promotes AAB format
  - APK signing keys in hands of app store operator
  - Breaks integrity guarantees based on APK signature
- Optional Code Transparency
  - Provable integrity guarantee for key parts of the app
  - Ensure code executed matches code built by developer
- No **security analysis** of this scheme so far

# Approach

- **Manual analysis of CT design and implementation**
  - Multiple flaws
- **Attacks exploiting flaws**
  - Code execution while retaining valid CT
- **Large-scale survey of CT in practice**
  - Use of CT and AAB on Google Play and Huawei AppGallery
  - Susceptibility to vulnerabilities

# Attacker Models

- **Privileged App Store**
  - Preinstalled with privileged permissions
- **Unprivileged App Store**
  - Third-party store e.g. installed by user
- **Other Role in Supply Chain**
  - Can manipulate APK delivered to user

# Design and Implementation Flaws

# Design Flaws

- **Optionality**
  - Code Transparency is not required!
- **Scope**
  - Only covers DEX and SO files
- **Communication Channel**
  - How to find out legitimate public key?



# Implementation Flaws in bundletool

- **Certificate Reuse**
  - APK signing certificate != CT signing certificate
- **DEX or SO in Assets**
  - Even untampered files fail validation
- **App Archives**
  - Inject binary DEX file by design

# Evaluation

# Attacks

Attack	Attacker	Condition
Stripping CT	Any	None
Modifying Assets	Any	Relevant Assets
Inject Shared Library	Privileged / Unprivileged	None
Debuggable Flag	Privileged	None
Backup Opt-In	Privileged	< Android 14

**Goal: Code Execution** in Context of Target App OR **Data Extraction**

# Large-Scale Analyses


- **Apps that use AAB and Code Transparency**
  - Google Play: 46% (AAB), 0.0014% (CT) of 3.3m apps
  - Huawei AppGallery: 0.04% (AAB), 0% (CT) of 240k apps
- **Executable Assets in Popular Google Play Apps**
  - 22% of 6648 apps cannot use CT (DEX/SO in assets)
  - 52% susceptible to code execution through asset manipulation
    - If they used CT

# Case Study

- Microsoft Loop (uses CT)
- Inject **shared static library** into app manifest:

```
<uses-static-library  
  android:name="com.attack.library"  
  android:version="1"  
  android:certDigest="f7...9d">  
</uses-static-library>
```


- Bundletool still reports intact CT



# Case Study

```
$ bundletool check-transparency --mode=apk , --apk-  
zip=loop-patched-apks.zip  
APK signature is valid. SHA-256 , fingerprint of the apk  
signing key certificate (must be compared with the  
developer's public key manually): 94 ... 6B  
Code transparency signature is valid. SHA-256  
fingerprint of the code transparency key certificate  
(must be compared with the developer's public key  
manually): 52 ... 02  
Code transparency verified: code related file contents  
match the code transparency file.
```

- Bundletool still reports intact CT






# Case Study

- Microsoft Loop (uses CT)
- Inject **shared static library** into app manifest:

```
<uses-static-library  
  android:name="com.attack.library"  
  android:version="1"  
  android:certDigest="f7...9d">  
</uses-static-library>
```

- Bundletool still reports intact CT
- **Static library executes in context of MS Loop**



# Conclusion

# Manifest Problems

- First security analysis of Code Transparency for Android App Bundles
- Severe consequences of AAB
  - Yet CT is hardly used
  - Even apps that use CT are vulnerable
- Discussions with Google
  - Transparency Log, ...

Questions?