Automatic Exploit Generation

Given a program, find bugs and generate exploits

Thanassis Avgerinos, Brent Lim Tze Hao, David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University

Agenda

- WarmUp
- Demo
- Overview of AEG
- Challenges
- Formal Verification
- Design
- Evaluation
- Discussion
- Conclusion

```
1 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
     int skfd;
                           /* generic raw socket desc.
                                                             */
     if(argc == 2)
       print_info(skfd, argv[1], NULL, 0);
6 static int print_info(int skfd, char *ifname, char *args[], int count)
     struct wireless_info info;
     int
                            rc:
    rc = get_info(skfd, ifname, &info);
10 ...
11 static int get_info(int skfd, char *ifname, struct wireless_info * info
12
     struct iwreq
                           wrq;
     if(iw_get_ext(skfd, ifname, SIOCGIWNAME, &wrq) < 0) {</pre>
13
14
         struct ifreq ifr;
         strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname); /* buffer overflow */
15
16 ...
```

Stack

Return Address

Other local variables

ifr.ifr_name

Heap

```
# WarmUp
                                                                                        Stack
 1 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
                                                                                    Return Address
     int skfd;
                           /* generic raw socket desc.
                                                              */
     if(argc == 2)
       print_info(skfd, argv[1], NULL, 0);
                                                                                      Other local
                                                                                       variables
                                       Can you spot a bug?
     int
                            rc:
                                                                                      ifr.ifr name
     rc = get_info(skfd, ifname, &info);
10
11 static int get_info(int skfd, char *ifname, struct wireless_info * info
12
     struct iwreq
                            wrq;
     if(iw_get_ext(skfd, ifname, SIOCGIWNAME, &wrq) < 0) {</pre>
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                                                                                        Heap
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         struct ifreq ifr;
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strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname); /* buffer overflow */

Memory

Code snippet from iwconfig

15

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Stack Return Address Other local variables ifr.ifr name Heap

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Stack Return Address Other local variables ifr.ifr name Heap

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# WarmUp
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                                                                                     Return Address
     int skfd;
                           /* generic raw socket desc.
     if(argc == 2)
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                                                                                       Other local
                                                                                        variables
                             Note that this ifr.ifr name is a 32 bytes array
     int
                            rc:
                                                                                       ifr.ifr name
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Stack

Memory

Code snippet from iwconfig

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                                                                                       Other local
                                                                                        variables
                       What if we put a significant a long input to this program?
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                                                                                       ifr.ifr name
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Code snippet from iwconfig

Stack

Trigger buffer overflow!

How would you exploit it?

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Stack Return Address Other local variables User Input Heap

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Stack Return Address **User Input** Heap

Memory

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```

Stack **User Input** Heap

Execve bin/sh!

Demo!

```
root
Is
Makefile
access.log
aeg.sh
aeg.fi-data
aeg.fi-data
aeg.stdin
aeg_stdin
aeg_stdin-stat
error.log
filesize
klee-last
klee-out-fi
portno
recvinfo
recvinfo
server.conf
```

serverd.bc stype tmpfile

AEG automatically got a root shell exploit in under a second!

What is an Exploit?


Hacking Community

Control Flow Hijack


Overview



Overview



Overview



- State Space Explosion
- Path Selection
- Environment Modelling
- Mixed Analysis challenge
- Exploit Verification

- State Space Explosion
 - Challenge: There are possible infinite paths that AEG needs to explore
 - Solution: Preconditioned symbolic execution
- Path Selection
- Environment Modelling
- Mixed Analysis challenge
- Exploit Verification

- State Space Explosion
- Path Selection
 - Challenge: AEG must select the path which should be explore firstly
 - Solution: Path prioritization technique
- Environment Modelling
- Mixed Analysis challenge
- Exploit Verification

- State Space Explosion
- Path Selection
- Environment Modelling
 - o Challenge: Make accurate analysis
 - Solution: Model environment IO behavior
- Mixed Analysis challenge
- Exploit Verification

- State Space Explosion
- Path Selection
- Environment Modelling
- Mixed Analysis challenge
 - Challenge: Perform a mix of binary and source level analysis to scale large program
 - Solution: Combine DBA and SRC analysis
- Exploit Verification

- State Space Explosion
- Path Selection
- Environment Modelling
- Mixed Analysis challenge
- Exploit Verification
 - o Challenge: Is it success?
 - Solution: Execute '/bin/sh'

How can we describe problems?

Treat it as a formal verification

problem!

Formal Verification

Formal verification is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics. - Wikipedia

Typically, in security field, we would use it prove the system whether it is safe.


Verify the program whether it is exploitable

Formal Verification


Predicates

- Unsafe Path Predicate (Πbug)
 - Represents a path predicate of an execution that violates safe property φ
- Exploit Predicate (Πexploit)
 - Represents attacker's logic
- Preconditioned symbolic parameter (Πprec)
 - Represents the narrow state

Formal Verification



Design



- Pre-Process: $src \rightarrow (Bgcc, Bllvm)$
- Src-Analysis: Bllvm → max
- Bug-Find: (Bllvm, φ , max) \rightarrow (Π bug,V)
- DBA: (Bgcc, (Πbug,V)) → R
- Exploit-Gen: (Πbug_{R}) $\rightarrow \Pi bug \land \Pi exploit$
- Verify: (Bgcc, \sqcap bug $\land \sqcap$ exploit) $\rightarrow \{\epsilon, \perp\}$

- Pre-Process: $src \rightarrow (Bgcc, Bllvm)$
 - A compiled binary Bgcc give it to AEG to generate exploits
 - A LLVM bytecode Bllvm will be used in bug finding infrastructure
- Src-Analysis: Bllvm → max
- Bug-Find: (Bllvm, φ , max) \rightarrow (Π bug,V)
- DBA: (Bgcc, (Πbug,V)) → R
- Exploit-Gen: (Πbug,R) → Πbug ∧ Πexploit
- Verify: (Bgcc, \sqcap bug $\land \sqcap$ exploit) $\rightarrow \{\epsilon, \perp\}$

- Pre-Process: $src \rightarrow (Bgcc, Bllvm)$
- Src-Analysis: Bllvm → max
 - Analyze source code to generate max size of input length
- Bug-Find: (Bllvm, φ , max) \rightarrow (Π bug,V)
- DBA: (Bgcc, (Πbug,V)) → R
- Exploit-Gen: (Пbug,R) → Пbug ∧ Пexploit
- Verify: (Bgcc, \sqcap bug $\land \sqcap$ exploit) $\rightarrow \{\epsilon, \perp\}$


- Pre-Process: $src \rightarrow (Bgcc, Bllvm)$
- Src-Analysis: Bllvm → max
- Bug-Find: (Bllvm, φ , max) \rightarrow (Π bug,V)
 - Пbug contains path predicates
 - V contains source-level information about detected vulnerabilities
- DBA: (Bgcc, (Π bug,V)) $\rightarrow R$
- Exploit-Gen: (Πbug,R) → Πbug ∧ Πexploit
- Verify: (Bgcc, \sqcap bug $\land \sqcap$ exploit) $\rightarrow \{\epsilon, \perp\}$

- Pre-Process: $src \rightarrow (Bgcc, Bllvm)$
- Src-Analysis: Bllvm → max
- Bug-Find: (Bllvm, φ , max) \rightarrow (Π bug,V)
- DBA: (Bgcc, (Πbug,V)) → R
 - Analyze Bgcc with a concrete buggy input and output runtime Information
- Exploit-Gen: (Πbug,R) → Πbug ∧ Πexploit
- Verify: (Bgcc, \sqcap bug $\land \sqcap$ exploit) $\rightarrow \{\epsilon, \perp\}$


- Pre-Process: $src \rightarrow (Bgcc, Bllvm)$
- Src-Analysis: Bllvm → max
- Bug-Find: (Bllvm, φ , max) \rightarrow (Π bug,V)
- DBA: (Bgcc, (Π bug,V)) $\rightarrow R$
- Exploit-Gen: (Пbug,R) → Пbug ∧ Пexploit
 - Constructs a formula for a exploit
- Verify: (Bgcc, \sqcap bug $\land \sqcap$ exploit) $\rightarrow \{\epsilon, \perp\}$

- Pre-Process: $src \rightarrow (Bgcc, Bllvm)$
- Src-Analysis: Bllvm → max
- Bug-Find: (Bllvm, φ , max) \rightarrow (Π bug,V)
- DBA: (Bgcc, (Πbug,V)) → R
- Exploit-Gen: (Пbug,R) → Пbug ∧ Пexploit
- Verify: (Bgcc, \sqcap bug $\land \sqcap$ exploit) $\rightarrow \{\epsilon, \perp\}$
 - \circ If there is a solution then outputs ϵ

- Traditional symbolic execution
 - Try to cover all paths
 - Slow to find exploitable bugs



- Preconditioned Symbolic Execution
 - Decrease the state space
 - Find bugs efficiently



- Preconditions
 - None
 - No precondition
 - Known Length
 - Max length of input
 - Known Prefix
 - Constrains the input
 - Ex. PNG utility
 - Concolic Execution
 - Specify all inputs have a specific value

Not all paths are likely to be exploitable

- Path Prioritization
 - Which paths should explore first?
- Buggy-Path-First
 - Paths contain bugs are more likely to be exploitable
 - Prioritize buggy paths higher
- Loop Exhaustion
 - Run a high priority interpreter as many times as possible

Design (DBA)

- Dynamic Binary Analysis
 - Test exploitability of buggy path
- Inputs
 - Bgcc
 - Path constraints
 - Names of vuln functions and buffers
- Output
 - Address to overwrite
 - Starting address AEG write to
 - Additional constraints that describe stack memory

Design (Exploit-Gen)

- Generate an exploit
 - Determines which class of attacks
 - Return-to-stack Exploit
 - Return-to-libc Exploit
 - Shellcode
 - Size
 - Position of shellcode

Design (Verify)

- Checks the shell whether is has been spawned
 - Success: A shell
 - Failure: Nothing

- Take popular advisories
 - o CVE
 - o OSVDB
 - o EDB

	Program	Ver.	Exploit Type	Vulnerable Input src	Gen. Time (sec.)	Executable Lines of Code	Advisory ID.
None	aeon	0.2a	Local Stack	Env. Var.	3.8	3392	CVE-2005-1019
	iwconfig	V.26	Local Stack	Arguments	1.5	11314	CVE-2003-0947
	glftpd	1.24	Local Stack	Arguments	2.3	6893	OSVDB-ID#16373
	ncompress	4.2.4	Local Stack	Arguments	12.3	3198	CVE-2001-1413
	htget (processURL)	0.93	Local Stack	Arguments	57.2	3832	CVE-2004-0852
	htget (HOME)	0.93	Local Stack	Env. Var	1.2	3832	Zero-day
Length	expect (DOTDIR)	5.43	Local Stack	Env. Var	187.6	458404	Zero-day
	expect (HOME)	5.43	Local Stack	Env. Var	186.7	458404	OSVDB-ID#60979
	socat	1.4	Local Format	Arguments	3.2	35799	CVE-2004-1484
	tipxd	1.1.1	Local Format	Arguments	1.5	7244	OSVDB-ID#12346
	aspell	0.50.5	Local Stack	Local File	15.2	550	CVE-2004-0548
D. C	exim	4.41	Local Stack	Arguments	33.8	241856	EDB-ID#796
Prefix	xserver	0.1a	Remote Stack	Sockets	31.9	1077	CVE-2007-3957
	rsync	2.5.7	Local Stack	Env. Var	19.7	67744	CVE-2004-2093
	xmail	1.21	Local Stack	Local File	1276.0	1766	CVE-2005-2943
Concolic	corehttp	0.5.3	Remote Stack	Sockets	83.6	4873	CVE-2007-4060
Avo	erage Generation Time	e & Exec	114.6	56784			

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Format String

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Buffer overflow


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
Remote Attack


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	exim	4.41	Local Stack	Arguments	33.8	241856	EDB-ID#796
	· 						
	rsync	2.5.7	Local Stack	Env. Var	19.7	67744	CVE-2004-2093
	xmail	1.21	Local Stack	Local File	1276.0	1766	CVE-2005-2943
Ave	erage Generation Tim	e & Exec	114.6	56784			


Local Attack

	Program	Ver.	Exploit Type	Vulnerable Input src	Gen. Time (sec.)	Executable Lines of Code	Advisory ID.
	aeon	0.2a	Local Stack	Env. Var.	3.8	3392	CVE-2005-1019
None	iwconfig	V.26	Local Stack	Arguments	1.5	11314	CVE-2003-0947
	glftpd	1.24	Local Stack	Arguments	2.3	6893	OSVDB-ID#16373
	ncompress	4.2.4	Local Stack	Arguments	12.3	3198	CVE-2001-1413
	htget (processURL)	0.93	Local Stack	Arguments	57.2	3832	CVE-2004-0852
	htget (HOME)	0.93	Local Stack	Env. Var	1.2	3832	Zero-day
Length	expect (DOTDIR)	5.43	Local Stack	Env. Var	187.6	458404	Zero-day
	expect (HOME)	5.43	Local Stack	Env. Var	186.7	458404	OSVDB-ID#60979
	socat	1.4	Local Format	Arguments	3.2	35799	CVE-2004-1484
	tipxd	1.1.1	Local Format	Arguments	1.5	7244	OSVDB-ID#12346
	aspell	0.50.5	Local Stack	Local File	15.2	550	CVE-2004-0548
D 0	exim	4.41	Local Stack	Arguments	33.8	241856	EDB-ID#796
Prefix	xserver	0.1a	Remote Stack	Sockets	31.9	1077	CVE-2007-3957
	rsync	2.5.7	Local Stack	Env. Var	19.7	67744	CVE-2004-2093
	xmail	1.21	Local Stack	Local File	1276.0	1766	CVE-2005-2943
Concolic	corehttp	0.5.3	Remote Stack	Sockets	83.6	4873	CVE-2007-4060
Ave	erage Generation Time	e & Exec	114.6	56784			










AEG in smpCTF Solved one of problems less 10 mins

Discussion

What do you think about the causes make this happen?



Futurework

- Heap Exploitation
- Portable Exploits
 - AEG only generates an exploit for a GNU compiled binary

Conclusion

- First fully automatic end-to-end approach for exploit generation
- Implementation of AEG
- Analyzed 14 open source projects
- Generated 16 control flow hijack exploits (2 zero day)
- Find and identify exploitable bugs
 - Developed Preconditioned symbolic execution
 - Developed Path prioritization algorithms

End!