

# Fear, Real Indeterminacy and Policy Responses

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# Motivation

- New Keynesian model is a leading framework in macroeconomics  
⇒ inflation, aggregate demand stimulus, monetary policy, among others
- This model is plagued by well-known equilibrium multiplicities  
⇒ equilibrium selection key for positive and normative predictions
- Monetary and fiscal policy central to equilibrium selection but no consensus on a single approach.  
⇒ Active monetary policy: interest rate rule that responds sufficiently aggressively to output and inflation (Taylor principle)  
⇒ Active fiscal policy: tax/spending policy that does not accommodate changes in public debt services

## New light on this controversy

- Study textbook New Keynesian model but **no linearization** around its steady state to study **local dynamics**.  
⇒ study its true **nonlinear, stochastic** form and **global dynamics**.
- New insights about multiplicity and policies that can eliminate/trim it.

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- **Active fiscal policy** can **kill self-fulfilling volatility**
  - ⇒ FTPL approach contributes to equilibrium selection beyond disciplining price level dynamics
- Favors equilibrium selection criteria linked to fiscal rather than monetary policy

# Related literature

## **New Keynesian indeterminacies:**

Sargent and Wallace [1975], Benhabib et al. [2001], Benigno and Fornaro [2018], among many others.

Lee and Dordal i Carreras [2023] also studies a nonlinear NK model with volatility driving the multiplicity, and argue that “active” Taylor rules do not restore determinacy.

⇒ Only entertain equilibria local to steady state

⇒ Do not explore a lower bound on interest rates or active fiscal policy.

## **Fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL):**

Leeper [1991], Sims [1994], Woodford [1994], Woodford [1995], Brunnermeier et al. [2020], Bassetto and Cui [2018], Cochrane [2023].

# Overview

- Canonical New Keynesian model (without fundamental shocks)
- Deterministic analysis
  - Conventional indeterminacy analysis
  - Aggressive Taylor rule restore uniqueness
- Stochastic analysis
  - A new class of equilibria
  - Aggressive Taylor rule cannot restore uniqueness
  - Risk targeting: can restore uniqueness (if no lower bound on  $i_t$ )
- Active fiscal (FTPL)
  - Simple example: primary surplus proportional to output
  - Beyond simple fiscal rule

# Model

# Canonical New Keynesian model

- Uncertainty. For simplicity, only an extrinsic Brownian motion  $Z_t$ .
- Household's preferences

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t}\left(\log(C_t) - \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi}\right)dt\right]$$

- Technology:  $Y_t = L_t$ .
  - Continuum of intermediate-goods firms with linear labor technology.
  - Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods is constant.
- Price setting
  - Monopolistic competition among intermediate good firms.
  - Sticky prices a la Rotemberg (quadratic adjustment costs).
  - Profits rebated lump-sum to household.
  - Competitive final-goods sector.

# Canonical New Keynesian model

- Inflation and output gap:  $\pi_t := \dot{P}_t/P_t$  and  $x_t := \log(Y_t/Y^*)$  where  $Y^*$  is flexible-price output and  $P_t$  the price level.

$$dx_t = \mu_{x,t}dt + \sigma_{x,t}dZ_t$$

$$d\pi_t = \mu_{\pi,t}dt + \sigma_{\pi,t}dZ_t$$

for some  $\mu_x, \sigma_x, \mu_\pi, \sigma_\pi$  to be determined in equilibrium.

- Monetary policy: Taylor rule

$$\iota_t = \bar{\iota} + \Phi(x_t, \pi_t) \quad (\text{MP})$$

for some target rate  $\bar{\iota}$  and some response function that satisfies  $\Phi(0, 0) = 0$

- Complete financial markets.
  - Real stochastic discount factor  $M_t$  induced by real interest rate  $r_t = \iota_t - \pi_t$  and price of risk  $h_t$  associated to risk  $Z_t$ .
  - Risk-free bond in zero net supply.

# Equilibrium

An *equilibrium* is processes  $(C_t, Y_t, L_t, B_t, M_t, W_t, P_t, \iota_t, r_t, \pi_t)_{t \geq 0}$ , such that

- (i) Taking  $(M_t, W_t, P_t)$  as given, consumers choose  $(C_t, L_t)_{t \geq 0}$  to maximize objective subject to their lifetime budget and No-Ponzi constraints

$$\Pi_0 + \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^\infty M_t \frac{W_t L_t}{P_t} dt \right] \geq \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^\infty M_t C_t dt \right]$$
$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} M_T \frac{B_T}{P_T} \geq 0,$$

where  $\Pi$  represents the real present-value of producer profits and  $B$  represents the bond-holdings of the consumer.

- (ii) Firms set prices optimally.
- (iii) Markets clear, namely  $C_t = Y_t = L_t$  and  $B_t = 0$ .
- (iv) The central bank follows the interest rate rule.

## Consumption-savings decision (Euler equation)

$$\mu_{x,t} = \iota_t - \pi_t - \rho + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{x,t}^2 \quad (\text{IS})$$

- The volatility term is associated to:
  - precautionary savings due to prudence  $u''' > 0$
  - the non-linear transformation:  $x_t = \log(C_t/C^*)$
- If  $u''' = 0$  and we study  $C_t$  dynamics directly  $\Rightarrow$  no volatility term
- Literature usually disregards  $\sigma_{x,t}^2$  by linearizing the IS equation

$$\mu_{x,t} = \iota_t - \pi_t - \rho \quad (\text{linear IS})$$



## Price setting behavior (Phillips curve)

$$\mu_{\pi,t} = \rho\pi_t - \kappa \left( \frac{e^{(1+\varphi)x_t} - 1}{1 + \varphi} \right) \quad (\text{PC})$$

- $\kappa$  associated to degree of price flexibility ( $\kappa \rightarrow 0$  fully sticky prices).
- Fully flexible prices ( $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$ ) implies  $x_t = 0 \ \forall t \geq 0$ .
- Linearized version

$$\mu_{\pi,t} = \rho\pi_t - \kappa x_t \quad (\text{linear PC})$$

# Equilibrium characterization

## Lemma

Suppose processes  $(x_t, \pi_t, \iota_t)_{t \geq 0}$  satisfy (IS) + (PC) + (MP).

- If  $|x_t| < \infty$  almost-surely for all finite horizon  $\Rightarrow$  an equilibrium
  - If  $|x_t| = \infty$  for some finite  $t$  with positive probability  $\Rightarrow$  not an equilibrium
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- $x_t = \infty$  for finite  $t$  not compatible with household maximization.

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- $x_t = \infty$  for finite  $t$  not compatible with household maximization.
  - Fully flexible prices ( $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$ ) benchmark
    - Unique outcomes for real variables.  $x_t = 0$  and  $r_t = \rho \forall t \geq 0$ .
    - Inflation adjusts to ensure the proper real rate holds  $\pi_t = i_t - \rho$ .

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    - Inflation adjusts to ensure the proper real rate holds  $\pi_t = i_t - \rho$ .
  - Sticky prices and equilibrium selection with monetary policy
    - Recall  $\iota_t = \bar{\iota} + \Phi(x_t, \pi_t)$  with  $\Phi(0, 0) = 0$ .
    - With target  $\bar{\iota} = \rho$  and any function  $\Phi$ ,  $x_t = \pi_t = 0$  is an equilibrium.
    - Can we find a function  $\Phi(x_t, \pi_t)$  such that this is the only equilibria?

# Deterministic Equilibria ( $\sigma_x \equiv 0$ )

Consider only equilibria without volatility  $\sigma_x \equiv 0$ .

## Review: conventional indeterminacy in NK model

- Consider the linear version of the Phillips curve and specialize to a linear MP rule

$$\iota_t = \rho + \phi_x x_t + \phi_\pi \pi_t. \quad (\text{linear MP})$$

- The system becomes

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{x}_t \\ \dot{\pi}_t \end{bmatrix} = \mathcal{A} \begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ \pi_t \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{where} \quad \mathcal{A} := \begin{bmatrix} \phi_x & \phi_\pi - 1 \\ -\kappa & \rho \end{bmatrix}.$$

- The eigenvalues of  $\mathcal{A}$  are both strictly positive, and the system unstable, if  $\phi_x > 0$  and  $\phi_\pi > 1$ . The continuous-time version of conditions in Blanchard and Kahn [1980].

## Deterministic Equilibria ( $\sigma_x \equiv 0$ )

- However, even when the Taylor rule is destabilizing, the outcome is still a valid equilibrium, as stressed by Cochrane [2011].
  - Nothing about the model rules out asymptotic explosions.
  - No matter how large the central bank picks  $\phi_x$  and  $\phi_\pi$ , the explosion will always only be at the infinite horizon.
  - Usually, explosive solutions are ruled out by an ad-hoc assumption. We do not do this. [But this is not paper about explosive solutions]

### Proposition (Linear deterministic analysis)

*Under (linear PC) and (linear MP), any  $(x_0, \pi_0)$  is consistent with a deterministic equilibrium.*

*If  $\phi_x > 0$  and  $\phi_\pi > 1$ , then all deterministic equilibria explode asymptotically, except for the one with  $(x_0, \pi_0) = (0, 0)$ .*

- We extend the analysis for the case of the non-linear Phillips curve. Results are the same.

# Deterministic Equilibria ( $\sigma_x \equiv 0$ )

## Trimming equilibria: a very active Taylor rule

- A linear Taylor rule does not ensure a unique equilibrium.
- Uniqueness requires an additional policy that pledges to “blow up the world” if proposed equilibrium is not followed (Cochrane [2011]).
- Such nuclear option can be a very aggressive Taylor rule, e.g.,

$$i_t = \rho + \frac{\phi_x}{2}(e^{x_t} - e^{-x_t}) + \pi$$

which log-linearized form coincides with the linear Taylor rule studied.

- In this case,

$$x_t = \log \left( \frac{1 - Ke^{\phi_x t}}{1 + Ke^{\phi_x t}} \right)$$

where  $K = \frac{1-e^{x_0}}{1+e^{x_0}}$ . This process diverges in *finite time* for any  $x_0 \neq 0$ : it explodes at time  $T = -\phi_x^{-1} \log(|K|)$ .

# Stochastic analysis

## Deterministic analysis

- Linear Taylor rule  $\Rightarrow$  deterministic multiplicity
- Aggressive Taylor rule (or no explosion clause)  $\Rightarrow$  eliminates equilibrium multiplicity



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- An extended Taylor rule that includes risk targeting can  
... but not feasible with a lower bound on the interest rate.

# A New Class of Sunspot Equilibria

- Assume prices are permanently rigid  $\kappa \rightarrow 0$ .
  - Focus on real indeterminacy rather than inflation indeterminacy.
  - Simple analytic analysis
- Consider the aggressive policy rule that restore uniqueness in the deterministic analysis
- An equilibrium is a process for  $x_t$  that satisfies (optimal consumption saving decision)

$$\mu_{x,t} = \phi_x(e^{x_t} - e^{-x_t}) + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{x,t}^2$$

and remains finite for all  $t \geq 0$ .

- Key: agents can have arbitrary beliefs about risk  $\sigma_x^2$  and those influence optimal behavior (precautionary savings)
  - Beliefs about risk can bring "stability" to the system, e.g., large volatility when  $x_t$  large and negative

# A New Class of Sunspot Equilibria

## Simple example with transitory volatility

- Recall  $y_t = e^{x_t} y^*$ , so  $x_t \rightarrow -\infty \iff y_t \rightarrow 0$
- Let agents believe / coordinate the following process for volatility

$$\sigma_x^2 = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{\nu}{y}\right)^2 + \phi_x \frac{1-y^2}{y}, & \text{if } y < 1; \\ 0, & \text{if } y \geq 1. \end{cases}$$

- Then

$$dy_t = \begin{cases} \frac{\nu^2}{y_t} dt + \sqrt{\nu^2 + \phi_x y_t (1 - y_t^2)} dZ_t, & \text{if } y_t < 1; \\ \phi_x (y_t^2 - 1) dt & \text{if } y_t \geq 1. \end{cases}$$

$\Rightarrow y_t > 0$  always (behaves as a Bessel(3) process as  $y_t \rightarrow 0$ )

- Family of equilibria indexed by  $y_0 \in (0, 1)$  and  $\nu > 0$ 
  - $y_t$  bounces around the region  $(0, 1)$  and eventually reaches  $y_t = 1$  where it remains forever  $\Rightarrow$  **transitory** sunspot volatility



# A New Class of Sunspot Equilibria

## Simple example with permanent volatility

- Slight modification to agents beliefs / coordination

$$\sigma_x^2 = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{\nu}{y}\right)^2 + \phi_x \frac{1-y^2}{y}, & \text{if } y < 1 - \delta; \\ 0, & \text{if } y \geq 1 - \delta. \end{cases}$$

- Then

$$dy_t = \begin{cases} \frac{\nu^2}{y_t} dt + \sqrt{\nu^2 + \phi_x y_t (1 - y_t^2)} dZ_t, & \text{if } y_t < 1 - \delta \\ \phi_x (y_t^2 - 1) dt & \text{if } y_t \geq 1 - \delta. \end{cases}$$


$\Rightarrow y_t > 0$  always still

- Family of equilibria indexed by  $y_0 \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\nu > 0$ ,  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ 
  - $y_0 \in (0, 1 - \delta]$  bounces around this volatile region forever (visits  $y_t = 1 - \delta$  frequently)
  - $y_0 \in (1 - \delta, 1)$  exits this deterministic region in finite time  
 $\Rightarrow$  **permanent** sunspot volatility

# A New Class of Sunspot Equilibria

## Simple example with permanent volatility

- Stationary, non-explosive equilibria



**Figure:** The resulting stationary CDF features a mass point at  $y = 1 - \delta$ . Parameters:  $\rho = 0.02$ ,  $\nu = 0.02$ ,  $\delta = 0.05$ ,  $\phi_x = 0.1$ .

# A New Class of Sunspot Equilibria

## General case for the rigid price limit

- Equilibrium dynamics

$$dx_t = (\iota(x_t) - \rho + \sigma_{x,t}^2)dt + \sigma_{x,t}dZ_t$$

- Independently of interest rate rule  $\iota(x_t)$ , beliefs about volatility  $\sigma_{x,t}$  can always stabilize the system for  $x_t < 0$   
 $\Rightarrow$  prevent  $x_t \rightarrow -\infty$  in finite time.

## Proposition (Multiplicity for any Taylor rule)

*Suppose prices are rigid ( $\kappa \rightarrow 0$ ).*

*For any Taylor rule  $\iota(x)$  that is increasing in  $x$ , there exist a continuum of sunspot equilibria indexed by  $x_0$  and the volatility function  $\sigma_x(x)$*

# A New Class of Sunspot Equilibria: key features

Key feature: impact of volatility over consumption-saving decision

- Channel: precautionary savings
- Linearized version of the IS = no precautionary savings

$$dx_t = (\iota(x_t) - \pi_t - \rho)dt + \sigma_{x,t}dZ_t$$

- analysis similar to the deterministic case (just adding some noise)
- a sufficiently aggressive Taylor rule  $\iota(x)$  restores equilibrium uniqueness!

⇒ it is not volatility per se but its role in consumption-saving decision

Key feature: demand determined output

- Phillips curve

$$\mu_{\pi,t} = \rho\pi_t - \kappa\left(\frac{e^{(1+\varphi)x_t} - 1}{1 + \varphi}\right)$$

- Flexible price benchmark ( $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$ ) implies  $x_t = 0$  always.
- No role for beliefs about volatility

# Risk targeting

- Extended monetary policy rule

$$\iota_t = \rho + \Phi(x_t, \pi_t) - \alpha(x)\sigma_{x,t}^2.$$

- Output dynamics

$$dy_t = y_t \left[ \Phi(x_t, \pi_t) - \pi_t + (1 - \alpha(x_t))\sigma_{x,t}^2 \right] dt + y_t \sigma_{x,t} dZ_t,$$

- $\alpha(x) = 1$  eliminates the role of volatility in consumption-saving decision  $\Rightarrow$  aggressive Taylor rule  $\Phi$  can restore uniqueness
- Consider  $\alpha(x) := \alpha_- \mathbf{1}_{\{x < 0\}} + \alpha_+ \mathbf{1}_{\{x > 0\}}$ .  
If  $\alpha_- > 1 > \alpha_+$ , volatility helps destabilize the system  
 $\Rightarrow$  aggressive Taylor rule  $\Phi$  can restore uniqueness

## Proposition (Uniqueness with risk targeting)

*Suppose prices are rigid ( $\kappa \rightarrow 0$ ). With sufficiently strong risk premium targeting and sufficiently aggressive responsiveness to the output gap, the modified Taylor rules ensures that the unique equilibrium is  $x_t = 0$ .*

# Feasibility of aggressive Taylor rules: credible threats?

Are the extreme rules proposed to trim equilibria credible?

- “blow up the world” nuclear threats are generically not credible.
- the central bank commits to blow up the economy (in finite time) if the desired equilibrium path is not followed
- discussed by Cochrane [2011]

## Feasibility of aggressive Taylor rules: Lower bound on $\iota_t$

- Aggressive monetary rules that restore equilibrium uniqueness imply that  $\iota_t \rightarrow -\infty$  as  $x_t \rightarrow -\infty$
- Consider the price-rigid case and impose a lower bound

$$dx_t = \left[ \underline{\iota} - \rho + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{x,t}^2 \right] dt + \sigma_{x,t} dZ_t, \quad \text{when } x_t < 0$$

- For deterministic equilibria ( $\sigma_x = 0$ )
  - clearly  $x_t$  cannot diverge to  $-\infty$  in finite time.
  - for  $\underline{\iota} < \rho$ , all equilibria with  $x_0 < 0$  are explosive  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_t = -\infty$
  - exogenous assumption ruling out explosive equilibria  $\Rightarrow$  uniqueness
- For stochastic equilibria ( $\sigma_x \neq 0$ )
  - Volatility helps to stabilize the system (increases the drift) but opens the door for a sequence of negative shocks.
  - Constant volatility  $\Rightarrow x_t$  cannot diverge in finite time.
  - There are volatility process that induce non-explosive dynamics.
  - Exogenous assumption ruling out explosive equilibria  $\nRightarrow$  uniqueness

# Fiscal policy

- Previously, we abstract from fiscal policy.
- Let  $S_t := \tau_t - \xi_t$  be the real primary deficit of the government and  $B_t$  the value of nominal government debt

$$\dot{B}_t = \iota_t B_t - P_t S_t$$

- Present value formula for government debt

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty \frac{M_u}{M_t} S_u du \right], \quad (\text{GD})$$

since TVC must hold for the representative agent.

- For now, let taxes  $\tau_t$  and transfers  $\xi_t$  be lump-sum.  
 $\Rightarrow$  equilibrium: same equations as before (IS, PC, MP) plus (GD)
- **Passive fiscal:** gov't chooses  $\{S_t\}_{t \geq 0}$  taking (GD) as a constraint.  
 $\Rightarrow$  all previous results hold (gov't debt has no role in eq. selection)



# Fiscal policy: active fiscal

**Active fiscal (FTPL):** gov't chooses  $\{S_t\}_{t \geq 0}$  independently of (GD)  
 $\Rightarrow$  Price level  $P_t$  must adjust to ensure gov't debt valuation holds.

## Active fiscal equilibrium selection: a first example

- Consider  $S_t = \bar{s}Y_t$  for some  $\bar{s} > 0$
- Gov't debt valuation

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} = \bar{s} \mathbb{E}_t \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(u-t)} \frac{Y_t}{Y_u} Y_u du = \rho^{-1} \bar{s} e^{x_t} Y^*.$$

- Since  $B_t/P_t$  evolves locally deterministically,  $x_t$  also evolves locally deterministically, i.e.,  $\sigma_{x,t} = 0$ .
  - $\sigma_\pi \neq 0$  possible but without real effects
  - holds for any monetary policy rule and even in the rigid-price limit!

# Fiscal policy: active fiscal

## Active fiscal equilibrium selection: a first example

- How active fiscal policy trims equilibria?
  - Disciplines beliefs about  $\sigma_{x,t}$ : must be consistent w/ debt valuation.
  - Aggregate demand adjusts such that (GD) holds.
- Role of monetary policy
  - Equilibrium will be deterministic but also depends on monetary policy.
  - Active monetary (e.g., linear Taylor rule with  $\phi_x > 0$  and  $\phi_\pi > 0$ ): equilibrium explodes asymptotically.
  - Passive monetary: equilibrium stable and non-explosive.

## Beyond the simple fiscal rule.

Does active fiscal prevents sunspot vol. only with  $S_t = \bar{s}Y_t$ ? No!

Result extends to ..

- Surplus-to-GDP ratio time-varying but exogenous
- Surplus-to-GDP ratio that depends on output gap (fully rigid prices)
- Long-term debt

# Fiscal policy: active fiscal

## Surplus to GDP time-varying but exogenous

- Let  $S_t = s_t Y_t$  where

$$ds_t = \lambda(\bar{s} - s_t)dt + \sigma_{s,t}dZ_t^s,$$

where  $Z^s$  is independent of the sunspot shock  $Z$ , and  $\sigma_{s,t}$  is an arbitrary potentially stochastic volatility. Then,

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} = \rho^{-1} e^{x_t} Y^* \left[ \frac{\rho}{\rho + \lambda} s_t + \frac{\lambda}{\rho + \lambda} \right]$$

- Since  $B_t/P_t$  has no loading on the sunspot shock  $Z_t$ , and neither does  $s_t$ , we have that  $x_t$  is independent of  $Z_t$ .

# Fiscal policy: active fiscal

## Surplus to GDP that depends on output gap (fully rigid prices)

- Let  $S_t = \zeta(x_t)Y_t$  with  $\zeta(\cdot) > 0$ . Then,

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} = \rho^{-1} e^{x_t} Y^* \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty \rho e^{-\rho(u-t)} \zeta(x_u) du \right]$$

- With fully rigid prices, the expectation is a function of only  $x_t$

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} = \rho^{-1} e^{x_t} Y^* f(x_t)$$

- Again, we have that  $x_t$  is independent of  $Z_t$  (except for knife-edge cases).

## Final thoughts

- We uncover a new type of fear-driven equilibria in NK models (i.e., self-fulfilled volatility)
- Benefit to working in continuous time and analyzing “globally”
- Monetary policy struggle as a equilibrium selection mechanism
- Using various examples, we have shown that active fiscal policy can kills real sunspot volatility
- Can unconventional monetary policy help? Maybe helps coordinating beliefs.