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BITCOIN GAMBLING USING DISTRIBUTED ORACLES IN THE BLOCKCHAIN

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Every time we place a bet, we implicitly trust the other participant to pay in the case we win. For this reason if we deal with people we do not know or trust, we do not bet directly with them, and instead we use a casino or other gambling sites. We expect the law or even casino reputation to help us to enforce good behavior.

Cryptocurrencies made possible to store and transfer value easily without using centralized control. Given its recent popularity, many decentralized applications have been proposed and implemented on top of them. Among them, gambling. It is currently possible to safely bet with a stranger on random events using cryptocurrencies. We can bet on the value of digital dice, cards or roulette. Neither trust nor centralized entities are required. In this work we propose a protocol on top of Bitcoin to place bets on real world events in a decentralized and trustless fashion. Our protocol uses a set of *oracles* to bring the outcome of the event on which the bet depends into the blockchain. When a certain threshold of the oracles have reported the same outcome for the event, we unlock the winner's prize. The protocol was designed to automatically move the money to one of the players in that case, so oracles do not take control of the prize, they only decide between two possible outcomes.

Economic incentives are placed to encourage good behavior on the participants. Oracles get paid if and only if they provide the right answer, where right is defined as the answer provided by the majority of them. Also, oracles are required to place a deposit to participate. This allows the protocol to establish economic penalties if the oracle fails to answer.

Once the bet is placed, the prize is locked waiting for the oracles' answer. Players relinquish their control over the money until the oracles decide the winner or a previously defined timeout expires. In case of timeout, each player gets half of the prize.

Using Bitcoin scripting language, the protocol guarantees fairness and execution correctness with both, a dishonest minority of oracles as well as a dishonest peer, at least once the bet is placed. Before that a dishonest peer can cause limited economic damage to an honest player. Yet the attack produces no net gain: it costs the attacker as much as the amount of the damage done to the victim. Dishonest oracles, before the bet is placed, can cause small economic damage to both players equally, although the cost for this attack is a parameter set by the players.

The protocol was implemented and run in the Bitcoin testnet using the official client to verify the transactions. Our implementation is currently available as an Open Source project. Discussion on the trade off between the protocol cost and economic incentives for the participants are included in this work. We also provide a detailed cost analysis of running the protocol.

We believe this work's contribution is a novel way of reasoning and deciding about "real world" events while integrating the outcome into the blockchain. The protocol can be easily extended to resolve contract disputes and similar situations where subjective but fair resolutions are needed, all in a decentralized environment.



*A mis padres, Lucy y Patricio.*  
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# Contents

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Gambling . . . . .	1
1.2. Cryptocurrency . . . . .	2
1.3. Gambling using cryptocurrencies . . . . .	3
1.4. Objectives . . . . .	3
1.4.1. Specific objectives . . . . .	4
1.5. Methodology . . . . .	4
1.6. The proposed protocol . . . . .	4
1.6.1. Oracle Selection . . . . .	5
1.6.2. Bet Resolution . . . . .	5
<b>2. Preliminaries</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1. Hash functions . . . . .	6
2.2. Cryptographic hash function . . . . .	6
2.3. Digital Signatures . . . . .	7
2.4. Ecash . . . . .	8
2.5. Bitcoin . . . . .	9
2.5.1. Transactions . . . . .	9
2.5.2. Blockchain . . . . .	10
2.5.3. Script . . . . .	13
2.6. Previous work . . . . .	15
2.6.1. Distributed oracles: Orisi . . . . .	16
2.6.2. Trustless distributed casino: Winsome.io . . . . .	16
2.6.3. Secure data feeds . . . . .	16
<b>3. The Protocol</b>	<b>18</b>
3.1. Overview . . . . .	18
3.1.1. First part: Oracle selection . . . . .	18
3.1.2. Second part: The Bet . . . . .	18
3.2. Oracles . . . . .	19
3.3. Players . . . . .	20
3.4. Protocol Description . . . . .	20
3.4.1. Notation . . . . .	20
3.4.2. First part: Oracle Selection . . . . .	21
3.4.3. Second part: The bet . . . . .	24
3.5. Cost analysis . . . . .	29

3.5.1. Concrete costs . . . . .	32
3.6. Communication . . . . .	33
3.6.1. Secure communication . . . . .	33
3.6.2. Channel . . . . .	34
3.7. Implementation . . . . .	34
<b>4. Discussion</b>	<b>36</b>
4.1. Incentives . . . . .	36
4.1.1. Players . . . . .	36
4.1.2. Oracles . . . . .	37
4.2. Costs . . . . .	37
4.2.1. Attacks . . . . .	38
4.3. Limitations . . . . .	40
4.3.1. Number of participants . . . . .	40
4.3.2. Bet prize . . . . .	40
4.4. Extensions . . . . .	40
4.5. Comparison with Existing Solutions . . . . .	41
4.6. Future work . . . . .	42
4.6.1. Protocol extension . . . . .	42
4.6.2. Oracle reutilization . . . . .	43
<b>5. Conclusion</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>6. Appendix</b>	<b>50</b>
6.1. Transactions . . . . .	50
6.1.1. Oracle registration . . . . .	50
6.1.2. Bet promise . . . . .	51
6.1.3. Oracle enrollment . . . . .	55
6.1.4. Bet . . . . .	58
6.1.5. Oracle answer . . . . .	66
6.1.6. Winner prize collect . . . . .	68
6.2. Bitcoin scripting . . . . .	77

# List of Tables

2.1.	Script evaluation to check a P2PKH transaction. . . . .	14
2.2.	Script evaluation of a P2SH transaction. . . . .	15
3.1.	Transaction notation example. . . . .	20
3.2.	Oracle Registration. . . . .	22
3.3.	Bet Promise . . . . .	24
3.4.	Oracle Enrollment . . . . .	25
3.5.	Bet . . . . .	27
3.6.	Timeouts . . . . .	28
3.7.	Transactions size and fee. . . . .	30
3.8.	Successful run, costs for the players . . . . .	31
3.9.	Successful run, oracle cost and earning . . . . .	31
4.1.	Oracle exits after Oracle Enrollment . . . . .	38

# List of Figures

2.1. Simplified Transaction . . . . .	10
2.2. Blocks linked to each other in the blockchain. . . . .	11
2.3. Block Structure . . . . .	12
2.4. A fork in the blockchain. . . . .	12
2.5. Wire format of an Input. . . . .	13
2.6. Wire format of an Output . . . . .	13

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1. Gambling

Gambling is the activity of predicting events and placing a wager on the uncertain outcome of those events, with the intent of winning money or valuable goods. A wager can be placed on many different events. In a casino we find randomizing devices as dice, roulette wheels, etc. which are used to get randomized events. In other establishments we can bet on sporting events, such as a horse racing, football games, or even the minimum temperature in Santiago during a particular night. Given the gambling popularity and the large amounts of money at stake inevitably entails a lot of interest in such activities. Sometimes gambling is heavily regulated and taxed, and lotteries are usually owned by the state.

Internet has made it cheaper to open and operate a casino, without the need of complying with laws of a particular country. This and the massive internet grow has moved a big percentage of the gambling industry online [33, 18]. The global Internet gambling market was estimated to be worth US\$28 billion in 2012 and forecasted to rise to US\$49 billion by 2017[17]. However, gambling not only takes place in casinos, lotteries or betting sites, it can also involve two or more individuals with no intermediaries. In Chile, friends usually bet on their favorite football teams.

Of all the different ways for placing a bet, the aforementioned share a common obstacle: participants are required to trust in the other parties to pay if they lose. Even if the bet takes place in a physical casino, where the law can enforce the bet, it is not certain the casino will be able to pay after the resolution. We might not be aware of the fact, but every time we place a bet we are implicitly trusting in a third party, either the other player or the bet site. For physical casinos this is usually not a problem, as they are regulated by the law, any misconduct can get the casino in legal problems resulting in a revoked license to operate. As there is a significant cost involved in starting a physical casino, maintaining a good reputation will attract customers.

Friends usually are trusted people, so trusting them when gambling might not be considered an issue, but the friendship could be put at risk if the bet is not paid. Another option

is to place the bet with the help of a third friend, who holds the money and pass it to the winner when the bet is resolved. Online casinos on the other hand are more problematic as there are many known scam schemes, as described by Griffiths [19]. And half of the players at these sites believe the providers are cheating on them [26]. However, some of them are subject to government regulation and many have been in the business for several years. This kind of characteristics can help to identify a trustworthy online site.

But, what if you would like to gamble in a event that no gambling site offers nor any friend is willing to do gamble in it? Likely the internet would be the place to look for somebody willing to gamble on this event. Yet, how could you trust the potential person in order to bet with him/her?

## 1.2. Cryptocurrency

Digital currency refers to any currency stored and transferred electronically. A subset of the digital currencies is called virtual currencies: they are usually defined [3] as a *«unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community»*.

Based on the interaction of the currency with currencies outside the community there are three types of virtual currencies: the ones with almost no interaction with the outside money, this is usually the case of video games, where its currency is only valuable within the game. A second type is where the currency can be purchased directly using other currency. Here, we observe an unidirectional flow. The third type is when the flow is bi-directional, the users can sell and buy the currency. A cryptocurrency is a bi-directional virtual currency that uses cryptography for security and anti-counterfeiting measures. Virtual currencies are being historically linked to cryptography. The first known investigations [8] to establish a virtual currency were lead by David Chaum, an American cryptographer. However, despite his and others' effort (e-gold<sup>1</sup>, Ecash [9], DigiCash, LibertyReserve, among others), virtual currencies never were massively adopted.

By late 2008, a short whitepaper [29] signed using a pseudonym, was released with yet another virtual currency protocol specification. Later in 2009 its implementation was made available as open source code. The main difference with previous implementations was its lack of a central organization. This new coin was completely decentralized. The software started to be run by some early enthusiasts and Bitcoin went from an idea to a usable coin. In the beginning the coins were exchanged for free among the community users. However, at some point the community was big enough and its members started to give value to the coin, then the first exchanges from and to other coins started to take place. Bitcoin transitioned into a bi-directional flow virtual coin.

Then the first online exchanges between bitcoin and other currencies started to appear, and the coin started to gain popularity as people outside the community were able to buy and sell coins. As the money became popular, the idea was taken and a whole generation of

---

<sup>1</sup><https://www.wired.com/2009/06/e-gold/>

cryptocurrencies was born. Today the market capitalization of Bitcoin (this is, the amount of money times its value in USD) is over 25,000,000,000 USD.

### 1.3. Gambling using cryptocurrencies

With cryptocurrencies getting more popular, it was only a matter of time until the first sites started to offer some games of chance, acting as online casinos. The only difference of these new sites with a traditional online casino was the currency on which the bet takes place. However, as any other currency online casino, any player who decided to play here is at the mercy of the casino. If the casino does not want or does not have the means to pay, there is nothing the participant can do, and his money is lost. The problems described for online casinos using traditional currencies apply in the same way to the new ones. (More on online casinos in Section 1.1.)

After some time, people started to see potential of cryptocurrencies at solving some of the trust issues related to gambling. In 2014 Andrychowicz et al. [2] proposed a two-party randomized gambling protocol. Players are not required to trust each other in order to gamble, so even if the loser does not behave correctly, the honest player receives the prize. The protocol is not a representation of a casino game, but effectively allows players to gamble on a random event. Also in 2014, a group of Bitcoin enthusiasts started Orisi<sup>2</sup>, a distributed oracles system for cryptocurrency contracts. Orisi allows users to access data from the outside world from the blockchain by using a distributed set of oracles. So instead of trusting in one instance to provide the data, the trust is placed in the majority of several different oracles. More recently, in early 2017, Winsome<sup>3</sup> was released. Advertised as a «*Provably Fair / Trustless Casino*», Winsome is an online casino where wagers are placed in a public smart contract posted in the Ethereum's blockchain. The contract defining the game is enforced by the Ethereum protocol. As of May 2017, they do offer two casino games, blackjack and **Rouleth**, which is an online roulette.

Motivated to provide an option to gamble over real world events with untrusted peers, this work proposes a protocol to define the destination of an initial wage between the two players. The decision is made by a set of oracles, which are being paid also within the protocol to behave correctly.

### 1.4. Objectives

Design and implement a distributed protocol where real world observations can be used as blockchain transaction inputs.

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<sup>2</sup><http://orisi.org>

<sup>3</sup><https://www.winsome.io>

### 1.4.1. Specific objectives

1. Provide a protocol to make it possible to gamble with untrusted peers about real world events.
2. Provide the correct economic incentives to the protocol participants to behave correctly.
3. Implement a proof of concept of the designed protocol.
4. Discuss implications and other applications of the protocol.

## 1.5. Methodology

The main phases of this work will be the following:

1. Extensive review of existing proposal and implementations to solve the proposed problem or similar ones. As cryptocurrencies are a recent research field, this review must cover literature as well as community gathering places, such as forums and specialized blogs, magazines, etc.
2. Analysis of current solutions to the problem and similar ones.
3. Design and implementation of a protocol to solve the problem. Implementation is considered very important as the current rate of change of cryptocurrencies is considerably fast, and validating the protocol within a real implementation is critical.
4. Analysis of the economic incentives of the protocol participants, to ensure protocol viability.

## 1.6. The proposed protocol

The main idea behind this work is to eliminate most single points of trust when performing bets. Traditional currencies are produced and controlled by governments, so the first decision was to use a currency without a single controller. We chose Bitcoin mainly for two reasons. It is the first and one of the most stable currencies out there. Changes are made much slower than other currencies, the market backs this claim by making bitcoin the Cryptocurrency with by far the biggest market capitalization. And second, the network supporting bitcoin is much bigger than the ones for other cryptocurrencies. This makes it much harder to attack and take control of the currency.

Our proposed protocol lets users bet against each other over the outcome of future events, without trusting each other nor any individual judge. It keeps the money under each player's control and relies on a distributed set of oracles to decide who wins the money.

There are two main phases in the protocol: oracle selection and bet resolution. They are explained as follows:



### 1.6.1. Oracle Selection

In this first step the players compile a list of oracles from a distributed and public source, and select randomly from there a subset of oracles to be used in their bet.

Bitcoin (like most of the cryptocurrencies) includes a scripting language (see Appendix 6.2) able to control money transferences, well defined and with its execution enforced by the complete bitcoin network. The challenge is to bring data from outside the bitcoin blockchain into it so scripts on it can run on that data. Our protocol relies on several paid *oracles* to bring this data. As the oracles' output will be used to decide who is the bet's winner, it is a crucial step. The chances of a player tampering the list with oracles controlled by him must be minimized. We say this phase is optional as it might be the case both players trust already in a set of oracles.

### 1.6.2. Bet Resolution

This phase starts after the players agree on the bet and the oracles to be used on it. Both players build and sign a transaction containing all the Bitcoins required for the bet, the bet description and the list of oracles chosen to participate. This transaction is sent to the blockchain to make it publicly visible. So oracles know they are asked to participate. Oracles express their desire to participate by submitting an enrollment transaction into the blockchain. If enough oracles enroll, the bet can take place.

Once the required number of oracles are enrolled to participate, the Bet transaction is placed in the blockchain, and signed by the oracles participating and both players. All the payments are also set in this transaction: the payments for the winner player; the payments for the oracles that answer properly; and the payments to the players from the oracles that do not behave properly.

Oracles get their payment by answering who the winner is, and as soon as enough oracles vote for one player as the winner<sup>4</sup>, the winning player can take its reward.

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<sup>4</sup>Enough is a threshold defined in the bet parameters, at least  $\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor + 1$  with  $n$  the number of oracles. This ensures there is only one winner, any number below this threshold can lead to two winners in a correct execution of the protocol.

# Chapter 2

## Preliminaries

*This chapter contains an introduction to topics this work is built on. It includes cryptographic functions and primitives referred in the next sections. A brief explanation on the history and internals of the bitcoin protocol, and previous related work.*

### 2.1. Hash functions

A hash function is a mapping from a set of arbitrary size to a set of a fixed size. The range has only elements of the same size. If we represent the data in binary, the range is bounded by  $2^n$  where  $n$  is the size in bits of the output. The domain of the function in principle can be unbounded, and by the *Pigeonhole Principle*:

$$\exists i, j \mid f(i) = f(j), i \neq j \quad (2.1)$$

When this happen, we say there is a collision, and for most uses of a Hash function are unwanted.

Hash functions are used for many things: File comparison, instead of comparing files bit to bit, the image of a Hash Function can be compared instead; Hash-Tables, this allows quick lookups for the elements; Finding similar records, by using a Hash Function that produces similar images for similar pre-images, etc..

If not stated otherwise we will use the word *hash* to denote the image of some data using a Hash Function.

### 2.2. Cryptographic hash function

This refers to a special class of Hash Functions the cryptography has defined to be suitable for its use on cryptographic applications. These functions are designed to be “one way”

functions, meaning it is unfeasible<sup>1</sup> to invert if the input to the function is chosen uniformly at random.

In an ideal cryptographic function, the most efficient way to find one of the preimages is by a brute-force search<sup>2</sup>. We call this property *preimage-resistance*. It is also important for this ideal function to be *collision resistant*, this means it is unfeasible to find a collision, that is: any two distinct inputs  $x, x'$  with the same image, i.e., such that  $h(x) = h(x')$ .

When using this ideal function, on average, producing a (second) preimage requires  $2^n$  operations, and producing a collision requires at least  $2^{n/2}$  operations [32].

## 2.3. Digital Signatures

The idea of *digital signature* was introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman in *New Directions in Cryptography* [12]. This work introduced what they called *Public Key Cryptosystem*, where enciphering and deciphering operations use different keys,  $E$  and  $D$ , such that computing  $D$  from  $E$  is computationally infeasible. Today this pair is widely used and known as Public Key (PK) and Secret Key (SK).

The public key cryptosystem, or asymmetrical cryptography was created to solve one important problem of symmetrical systems<sup>3</sup>: It is impossible to start a secure communication in an insecure channel without previously exchange of a key using a secure channel. To establish secure communication within an insecure channel participants makes its PK publicly available to the others. Anyone willing to talk to another participant must cipher its message using the public key of the receiver, this way the only one able to decipher the message is the intended receiver.

A digital signature, as its name indicates, is a mechanism to provide protection against third party forgeries. It must be easy for anyone to recognize as authentic, but impossible for anyone but the signer to produce it. This is especially challenging since any digital signal can be easily copied.

The signer uses his SK to produce a signature over the message to sign, and anyone with the signer PK and the message can determine the validity of the signature.

The most important property of a digital signature is that it does not matter how many pairs  $\langle \text{message}, \text{signature} \rangle$  a third party has seen, it does not make it easier to generate a signature for a new message. This property is called existential unforgeability [13] and it is formally defined as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>We say something is computationally unfeasible when even it is computable, it will require far too many resources to do it.

<sup>2</sup>Also known as exhaustive search, consisting of enumerating all the potential solutions and checking which of them satisfies the predicate

<sup>3</sup>As opposed to asymmetrical systems, symmetrical systems use the same key to cipher and decipher the messages.

A signature scheme is existentially unforgeable if, given any polynomial (in the security parameter) number of pairs

$$(m_1, S(m_1)), (m_2, S(m_2)), \dots, (m_k, S(m_k))$$

where  $S(m)$  denotes the signature on the message  $m$ , it is computationally infeasible to generate a pair  $(m_{k+1}, S(m_{k+1}))$  for any message  $m_{k+1} \notin \{m_1, \dots, m_k\}$ .

Sometimes we require more than one signer to produce a signature, when this is the case we call it multisignature. In the general case a multisignature has two associated parameters: The number of signers able to sign; and the required numbers of signers to be a valid signature. A multisignature with 7 signers where at least 4 of them are required to produce a valid signature is called a 4 of 7 multisignature. So, a signature is valid with at least 4 out of the 7 valid signers.

## 2.4. Ecash

Digital currencies have been a research topic since at least 1983 when David Chaum [8] introduced Blind Signatures: A form of digital signature where the content of the signed message is blinded, so the entity signing the message does not get to see it. This technique was used to provide untraceable payments in a cash system where however anybody can check the signature is valid.

The field has been an active topic in the Academia and as business intent. Much research has been published proposing new schemes and cryptographic primitives [31, 7, 6, 1, 25].

In 1990 David Chaum founded DigiCash, which developed an early electronic payment based on blind signatures. Payments using the software were untraceable by the issuing bank or any third party, including the government. However, the company was not able to beat credit cards in the electronic commerce and files its bankruptcy in 1998.

In 1996 e-gold allowed its users to buy electronic money ("grams of gold"<sup>4</sup>) that were backed by precious metals held by the company [21]. The users can buy, sell and transfer the ownership of the metals over the Internet. In 1999 the *Financial Times* described e-gold as the only electronic currency that has achieved critical mass on the web. However, its success contributed to its demise. It was used for fraud, phishing, cyber crime gangs, etc.. Law enforcement agencies began to characterize e-gold as the favorite payment system for criminals and terrorists<sup>5</sup>. By 2007 the justice started to seize e-gold balances that ended up with the suspension of the service.

Other initiatives suffered the same fate. Closed by the governments or lack of interest are the reasons for the failure. New cryptocurrencies are virtually impossible to close by a government because their distributed design, and so far people have been very enthusiastic about them. This could mean they will prevail much longer than previous solutions.

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<sup>4</sup>Also of platinum, silver, etc..

<sup>5</sup>"Feds out to bust up 24-karat Web worry". NY Daily News. 2007-06-03. Retrieved 2017-07-27.

## 2.5. Bitcoin

Bitcoin is the first fully distributed cryptocurrency made publicly available, proposed in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto (a pseudonym) [29]. The same author shared as open source code implementation of the protocol in January 2009, and it has been running ever since.

Nevertheless as it was mentioned in the previous section, Bitcoin is not the first idea of electronic cash. The idea of electronic cash has been present within the cryptographic community since at least 1983 [8]. And there were attempts for another three decades, and hundreds of papers published with improvements of e-cash schemes[4]. So, why is Bitcoin so popular and why has it achieved the notoriety that three decades of academic research on the field could not achieve?

Barber et al. [4] suggest a few key points to explain why Bitcoin was the first electronic currency to take off.

1. No central point of trust. Bitcoin is a fully distributed system, there are no trusted entities in the system. The only assumption is that the majority of the network participants are honest. Every previous proposal had a central trusted entity for critical tasks, as preventing double spending and coin issuance.
2. Predictable money supply. The money supply is minted at a defined and transparent rate, defined from the beginning of the protocol.
3. Transaction irreversibility. Bitcoin transactions quickly become irreversible. This is a big difference with credit cards, where chargebacks have been used largely to commit fraud.

The main technical advance in Bitcoin is its database, the **blockchain** [15, 30]. The blockchain is a distributed database formed by an always growing list of blocks, where each block contains the data to be stored, a timestamp and a link to a previous block. Its fully distributed nature allows bitcoin to lack a central authority.

### 2.5.1. Transactions

Bitcoin works with accounts where coins are stored, these accounts are identified with an address<sup>6</sup>, for this reason sometimes account and address are used interchangeably. The address is not private, and people share their accounts when willing to receive money.

The address represents a hash of a public key. The owner of the account is whoever controls the private key associated to the address. Bitcoin uses Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)<sup>7</sup> to ensure the owner of an address is the only one able to spend its

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<sup>6</sup>In the implementation format, an address is a 25-byte value, yet for human consumption we usually see it in its encoded representation of base 58, resulting in a string of 25-33 characters.

<sup>7</sup>ECDSA is a digital signature algorithm using Elliptic Curve Cryptography. It is an asymmetric scheme, with a private and public key. Bitcoin transactions are secured with a private key signature and validated using the public one.

content. Getting a new address is free, it only requires one to generate a random byte string and get a ECDSA private key from it. ECDSA allows the public key derivation from the private key. By hashing the public key the address is then obtained. Many libraries and most of the bitcoin wallets implement the algorithms to generate new addresses.

A transaction is the only way to move bitcoins from one account to another, it is basically two lists: a list of accounts where the money is pulled from, called inputs; and a list of accounts where the bitcoins are going to, a simplified view is illustrated in the figure 2.1.

...	
Num Inputs	Num Outputs
Input <sub>0</sub>	Output <sub>0</sub>
Input...	Output...
Input <sub>n-1</sub>	Output...
	Output <sub>m-1</sub>

Figure 2.1: Simplified Transaction

There is only one exception to this rule; the miner that builds each block is allowed to create a transaction without inputs and send money to his account. The details of this special transaction, called generation transaction, are defined in the protocol. Any attempt to generate more than the defined coins from the miner will make this transaction invalid. The amount of coin generated by each block is set to decrease geometrically each 210 000 blocks by a 50%. Until it reaches the maximum supply of 21 Million bitcoins. Then, no more coins will be generated.

A transaction input points to a previous unspent output and proves it has the right to spend that output. An output contains the address of the account it is transferring the money to, so any input signed using the private key of that address has the right to spend the output<sup>8</sup>. This implies that the money from an account must be spent in the same amount the money was received. There is no way to spend just a fraction of the money received in a previous output. If an output of \$10BTC is received, when trying to spend it, the same amount must be spent. If willing to spend just a portion, a second output is created and sent to the same account.

## 2.5.2. Blockchain

It works as the bitcoin's ledger keeping record of all transactions and coin generation that had ever taken place in the protocol. It is completely distributed, public, and anybody can participate and get a copy of it. This makes it simple to prevent double spending while being sure the received coins are valid, as anybody can examine where each coin came from.

As any other distributed system, the blockchain must resolve the consensus problem [16]. Get all the participants to agree on the data. This is a fundamental problem to any distributed system. In the blockchain anybody with an internet connection can be part of the

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<sup>8</sup>This is a simplification, not every output works this way. Details are in Section 2.5.3.




Figure 2.2: Blocks linked to each other in the blockchain.

protocol, so solving this problem is quite challenging. Some authors argue that the blockchain is the first practical solution to the Byzantine Consensus problem [27, 34].

Proof of work is the algorithm used by the bitcoin blockchain to seek consensus. Each entity trying to add data to the database must prove it has done some required work. This algorithm was designed originally to fight email spam by requiring the sender of an email to prove that a small job was done in order to send the email [14]. It works by using a hard to calculate, but easy to check function. This way the receiver or the mail server can easily check if the sender did the required work. However the work of the sender was much harder. The difficulty of a particular work is defined by the amount of computational power required to get it done.

The atomical piece in the blockchain is the block. Each valid block carries transactions of the protocol and a proof of work. Therefore every entity trying to get a valid block into the database needs to collect transactions and solve the puzzle to get a valid proof of work for its block. This process is called mining, therefore the entities trying to get a valid block are called miners. A block is linked to the previous one, as show in the figure 2.2.

The mining process is like playing the lottery: tickets are distributed among every miner until someone gets the winning one. The number of tickets each miner gets is proportional to the work he/she is doing, so a miner doing more work will have a bigger chance at winning the lottery and mine a block. However, in principle any miner can win.

Of course, in the real implementation there are no tickets issued to the miners. Proof of work consists in building a block with a hash under a threshold value, so the miners should reorder and change the block until the hash fulfills the requirement. There is no known algorithm to do this in a better way than brute force, so the only method to get a hash that mets the criteria is to try with different block configurations. In the block there are also some bytes of nonce, a timestamp and transactions to be changed to get different hashes.

Once block is produced, all the other miners need to delete the transactions added by the block from the one they are building and update the link to the new last block. And they start to mine a new block. By design a block must be produced every 10 minutes, so the work required to mine a block is adjusted periodically to meet this goal.

The structure of a Bitcoin block is shown in figure 2.3, the fields with the gray background represents the block header, the data hashed to get the block's hash. The transactions are indirectly hashed in the Merkle Root<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>9</sup>A **Merkle Tree** is a tree in which each non leaf node is labeled with the hash of its children's labels. In

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0	Magic no				Blocksize			
8	Version Number				Hash Previous Block			
16	Hash Previous Block (cont)							
40	Hash Previous Block (cont)				Hash Merkle Root			
48	Hash Merkle Root (cont)							
72	Hash Merkle Root (cont)				Timestamp			
80	Target difficulty				Nonce			
88	Transaction counter and Transactions.							
—								

Figure 2.3: Block Structure




Figure 2.4: A fork in the blockchain.

As expected in a protocol with many participants, there are times where more than one block is generated with the same parent (figure 2.4). This is called *fork*.

In order to achieve consensus, the protocol determines that the chain with more work<sup>10</sup> on it is the active chain. So when a fork happens there are two active chains, while having a non unique active chain miners will try to mine in any of the candidates with the same work. A block mined on one of the branches will decide which is the active one because it adds more work to the chain. However the situation that originated the fork can repeat itself and prevent having one consensus branch, which is very unlikely [11] to happen during a long time.

The chain structure gives a chronological order to the transactions in the protocol, so it makes it easy to check if a transaction is valid. Any participant willing to probe the validity of a given transaction needs to evaluate the script (see Section 2.5.3), and check the block where the output being spent is stored up to the current block and see if the money was already spent in a different transaction.

the block each transaction is mapped into a tree leaf. So the root of this tree hashes all the transactions.

<sup>10</sup>The amount of work in a chain is the sum of the difficulty of every block on it.



### 2.5.3. Script

When sending money, there are more details than we have discussed at Section 2.5.1. In an input (figure 2.5) there is more than a signature, and at each output (figure 2.6) there are also more than one address.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0	Previous Tx Hash							
32	Previous Tx Output index				Script Length[1-9 bytes]			
	Script / scriptSig [<Script Length> bytes]							
	sequence_no							

Figure 2.5: Wire format of an Input. The first two fields specify the output to be spent. The first one is the hash of the transaction containing it, and the second its index on it. The next two fields define the input script, commonly known as scriptSig. To be a valid input the script in the output being spent must evaluate to true using this script as parameter. The last field, sequence\_no, is used to lock executions based on the age of the output being spent.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0	Value							
8	Script Length [1-9 bytes]							
	Script / scriptPubKey [<Script Length>bytes]							

Figure 2.6: Wire format of an Output. The first field is the amount of coins this output holds. The second field specifies the length of the script. And the third field is the script required to spend this output, it contains a sequence of operations in the bitcoin scriptin language. This output can be spent for anybody able to provide an input to this script such that after evaluating it, the stack finishes with a true value in the top.

An output does not send money to a given address, but defines how the money can be spent. Currently there are two formats in use. The most used is called *Pay To Public Key Hash* (P2PKH)<sup>11</sup>. The other is called *Pay To Script Hash* (P2SH).

As figure 2.6 shows, the output has a script on its wire representation. This script is written in a small stack based language. It is read from left to right and it is purposefully not Turing-complete. The script is evaluated using the scriptSig as input. If the transaction willing to spend this output provides a valid scriptSig<sup>12</sup>, the output is available to be spent. This is how a P2PKH script looks like:

| OP\_DUP OP\_HASH160 <pubKeyHash> OP\_EQUALVERIFY OP\_CHECKSIG |

<sup>11</sup>The key hash is the address of an account.

<sup>12</sup>A script is considered valid if after its execution the value in the top of the stack is True.

Stack	Script
<b>Step 1:</b> <i>Constants from scriptSig are copied to the stack.</i>	
<pubKey> <sig>	OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <pubKeyHash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
<b>Step 2:</b> <i>OP_DUP copies the top element from the stack.</i>	
<pubKey> <pubKey> <sig>	OP_HASH160 <pubKeyHash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
<b>Step 3:</b> <i>The hash of the top element is calculated.</i>	
H(<pubKey>) <pubKey> <sig>	<pubKeyHash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
<b>Step 4:</b> <i>The destination address is moved to the stack.</i>	
<pubKeyHash> H(<pubKey>) <pubKey> <sig>	OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
<b>Step 5:</b> <i>The destination address is compared with the Hash of the Public Key (PK) provided by the sig Script. This checks that the provided Public Key is the one from the intended receiver.</i>	
<pubKey> <sig>	OP_CHECKSIG
<b>Step 6:</b> <i>Using the already verified PK, the script checks that the transaction was signed using the corresponding Private Key. This step secures the transaction from tampering and proves it was sent by the private Key controller.</i>	
True	

Table 2.1: Script evaluation to check a P2PKH transaction.

It receives two values as input: <pubKey> and <sig>. It will first hash the public key and compare it with the expected address and then verify the provided signature. Detailed execution is provided in table 2.1.

The script in a pay to script hash (P2SH) transaction is even simpler:

| OP\_HASH160 <scriptHash> OP\_EQUAL |

This script is pretty simple, it takes the first element of the stack, calculates its hash and compares it with ‘<scriptHash>’. The first element in the stack is however a complete script, and after checking it hashes to the expected scriptHash, this element will be evaluated with its required input. This implies the scriptSig now holds the script and its signature:

| <sig> <script> |

Execution of a sample P2SH is shown in table 2.2.

Stack	Script
<b>Step 1:</b> <i>The serialized script and its input are copied to the stack.</i>	
{<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIG} <sig>	OP_HASH160 <scriptHash> OP_EQUAL
<b>Step 2:</b> <i>The serialized script hash is calculated.</i>	
H({<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIG}) <sig>	<pubkeyHash> OP_EQUAL
<b>Step 3:</b> <i>The expected hash is pushed to the stack.</i>	
<pubKeyHash> H({<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIG}) <sig>	OP_EQUAL
<b>Step 4:</b> <i>Hashes are compared, and if they match, the script is deserialized and evaluated.</i>	
<sig>	<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIG
<b>Step 5:</b> <i>The public key is pushed to the stack.</i>	
<pubkey> <sig>	OP_CHECKSIG
<b>Step 6:</b> <i>The provided signature is validated using the public key &lt;pubkey&gt;.</i>	
True	

Table 2.2: Script evaluation of a P2SH transaction.

A P2SH transaction allows different conditions to redeem its outputs. Even bitcoin script language is not Turing-complete, it implements around two hundred functions. It implements basic flow control, as IF, ELSE, etc.; stack operations to delete, swap, duplicate, etc. elements from the stack; arithmetic operations to operate 32-bit integers; cryptographic operations as hashing, and signature verification. We will add an explanation of operations used in this work as we mention them. An extensive list of the operations supported by the bitcoin scripting language can be found at the Bitcoin wiki: <https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script>.

## 2.6. Previous work

There are several attempts to provide information to the blockchain from the outside. One possibility is using *distributed oracles*, where the data is channeled through a group of third party participants. Another option is using the so called *data feeds*, where the data is provided by a centralized party, using some cryptographic techniques to authenticate the data.

We also add *trustless distributed casino* as they provide a solution to a similar problem. They perform trustless bets, but not on real world events. The service is limited to bets on random events.

### 2.6.1. Distributed oracles: Orisi

Orisi [24] is a distributed system for bitcoin smart contracts that relies on multiple oracles to bring information from outside of the blockchain. It allows users to transfer money from one address to another when a condition is met.

The way the system works is as follows: In the first step both players choose 7 oracles who will decide the winner of the bet. These oracles are chosen from *the oracle list*, a curated list with oracles. A multisignature address is then generated to store the money while the bet takes place. A multisignature address is defined by  $n > 1$  different addresses and a required number  $m$  ( $m < n$ ) of them are required to sign. A valid signature for a multisignature address is generated by using at least  $m$  out of these  $n$  addresses.

The multisignature address generated will store the money until the oracles decide the winner. To avoid the oracles stealing the money the multisignature transaction includes the address of the receiver. Therefore we want a  $1 + (m \text{ of } n)$ , where the extra signature is from the receiver. As this kind of transaction is not considered standard<sup>13</sup>. With this configuration the oracles are not able to move the money by themselves, and at least one signature from the receiver is required.

### 2.6.2. Trustless distributed casino: Winsome.io

In may 2016 Rouleth [22] was launched as a distributed application on the ethereum network. It offered players a *provably-fair*, real money roulette. Soon after *BlockJack*, another game, was launched using the Ethereum network. It is the first playable blackjack game on the Ethereum mainnet.

Winsome.io is the instance where these games are enclosed and offers unique advantages over traditional casinos (physical and virtual), like no need to trust on it, and complete control over the funds the entire time while playing. It does work in a distributed fashion using smart contracts, publicly available for everyone's scrutiny.

Winsome.io provides its users trustless gambling over random events. By using the ethereum network as backend. It has been quite successful and one of the most popular decentralized applications on the Ethereum Network.

### 2.6.3. Secure data feeds

A secure data feed is a centralized stream of data, where a trusted entity ensures the correctness of the data provided by it. It is usually protected from tampering by cryptographic algorithms. Although this is a centralized data source, using many techniques or providers

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<sup>13</sup>Non standard transactions are recognized as valid by everybody at the bitcoin network, but only a small fraction of miners will mine them.

might be combined to get a decentralized source. Several services provide this feeds as a service to use on smart contracts in the blockchain.

## Oraclize

Oraclize [23] provides an interface for using data fetched from a web site in the ethereum blockchain, working with arbitrary URLs or queries in certain web services, as *Wolfram Alpha*<sup>14</sup>. It provides an Authenticity Proof of the data gathered, so the user can check that the data provided by the interface was generated by the source and had not been tampered.

The most common authenticity proof is the *TLSnotary proof*, which leverages in a feature from the TLS protocol. Oraclize provides a signed attestation that a proper TLSnotary proof did occur, on its server. This implementation is implicitly trusting in Oraclize and the web page to provide the right data.

## Town Crier

Town Crier [36] is an authenticated data feed system for the ethereum blockchain. As oraclize it works as a bridge between web feeds, and the blockchain. It uses an Intel technology called *Software Guard Extensions* [10], than provides some execution guarantees of the software executed by hardware protected areas. This protects the execution of the data feed even with the host OS, BIOS or any other software in the machine compromised. As Oraclize, it relies on centralized trust sources to provide an answer.

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<sup>14</sup>Wolfram Alpha is a knowledge engine able to answer queries rather than provide links to data sources, as a search engine does.

# Chapter 3

## The Protocol

*This chapter presents the proposed protocol, beginning with a quick overview of it. Then, introducing the notation to present it formally, including analysis of its cost, communication assumptions and thoughts on its implementation.*

### 3.1. Overview

We split the protocol to make clear the optional parts. In this subsection we present an overview before the full explanation of the protocol.

#### 3.1.1. First part: Oracle selection

1. The first step is to compile a list of available oracles, we use the blockchain as a decentralized database. Everyone willing to be an oracle can send a transaction to register into the blockchain. Players can compile the list from all registered oracles or may apply some filter; e.g. time of registration or if the oracle already participate in a previous bet.
2. Players negotiate the bet parameters required for this step, as the number of oracles to use.
3. In order to decide which oracles to use, the players need to pick a subset of the list compiled, they can do this by running a distributed coin tossing protocol. With this, they can be sure the list generated is a random subset of the full list. If the list is big enough, the chance of one user controlling the oracles gets smaller, as it would be too expensive to control almost all the oracles in the list.

#### 3.1.2. Second part: The Bet

1. Players negotiate bet parameters as the fees to the oracles, the bet resolution timeout, the amount of money to gamble, the winner on each outcome of the event, the oracles

penalties on misbehavior, etc..

2. Players build, sign and send a transaction to the blockchain with the bet description, including the IDs of the oracles they want to decide the winner. We call this transaction *Bet Promise*, as the players commit to the bet by placing it. The wage is also on it. Another purpose of this transaction is to invite the oracles to participate in the bet. This transaction makes public the ID of each oracle who was been invited to participate on the bet.
3. The oracles will see the transaction asking them to participate in the bet, they will evaluate it and, if they are interested they will join the bet. To enroll in the bet they will reply with a transaction containing a reference to the *Bet promise* transaction and a deposit as commitment that they will participate in the process.
4. When the players see a positive answer from the number of oracles specified in the bet, they submit the *Bet* transaction with funds of the bet and the oracles' reward. If not enough oracles reply to the call, a second invitation can be send to a different set of oracles to fill the available spots.
5. As soon as the event that defines the bet takes place, oracles are able to collect its payment from the *Bet* transaction. To collect, each oracle must make public its vote. After the threshold number of oracles collect its payment, the winner player is able to collect its prize, its private key and the oracle votes are required to get it.
6. After a second timeout, players can take the deposit from the oracles that did not participate in the bet resolution.

## 3.2. Oracles

The first issue to solve when making decisions over events in the world is how to choose who tracks and defines the outcome of a given event. Usually we get information about events from a variety of sources. From television, an internet portal, or our eyes among many others. Any protocol willing to make decisions over events needs a source for those events.

In order to keep the protocol decentralized we define the source of truth to be a majority from a set of entities, called oracles. The answer for questions asked within the protocol is decided by the oracles voting. Using this scheme the decision does not rely on a centralized entity, but in a group of them.

Oracles are rewarded when provide the correct answer to resolve the bet. We define the correct answer as the one given by at least  $m$  of the  $n$  oracles where  $\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor < m$ . When providing the incorrect answer oracles do not get paid, and when giving both answers they get penalized because its misbehavior. This gives strong economic incentives to the oracles to answer as they expect the other ones are going to answer. A discussion on how this incentives influence oracles behavior is available in Section 4.1.2.

### 3.3. Players

Players are the ones providing the money. In this work we only consider two party bets, the idea behind this work can be extended to more than two players. The code in the transactions, however, gets more complicated, so transactions increase on size, which makes the protocol more expensive.

Players participate in the protocol with the expectation to predict the outcome of the event and to win some money, they might not trust each other but they collaborate to build the transaction of this protocol, expecting to win. The protocol locks the players' money before the event and let the oracles decide where the money goes. This prevent the losing player from not paying the bet. Players pay for the oracles' services as well as the costs of all transactions required in the protocol.

### 3.4. Protocol Description

#### 3.4.1. Notation

Before explaining the protocol we introduce the following notation, based on the work of Andrychowicz et al. [2], to describe the transactions.

Table 3.1 represents a transaction that spends two outputs from two different previous transactions and creates three outputs:

$T_x$ ( <b>in:</b> $T_{y1}, T_{y2}$ )	
<i>Inputs:</i>	
$T_{y1}[\alpha]$	$\sigma_1$
$T_{y2}[\beta]$	$\sigma_2$
<i>Outputs:</i>	
$(\nu_1)$	$\gamma_1$
$(\nu_2)$	$\gamma_2$
$(\nu_3)$	$\gamma_3$

Table 3.1: Transaction notation example.

- $T_x$ : Transaction's name/id.
- $T_{y1}, T_{y2}$ : Transactions being spent.
- $\alpha, \beta$ : Indexes of the output being spent, this is the position the outputs appear in its transaction, starting from 0.
- $\sigma_1, \sigma_2$ : Input script, values required to satisfy the output script being spent.
- $\nu_1, \nu_2, \nu_3$ : Value of the output.



- $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3$ : Output scripts, need to be satisfied in order to spend its corresponding output.

For the scripts we use the logical conjunction ( $\wedge$ ) when both propositions must be satisfied. Logical disjunction ( $\vee$ ) when we need to satisfy only one of the propositions. Signatures always sign the transaction they are included on, this makes the signature valid only for the transaction it was created. When a signature from the participant  $A$  is provided, we denote:  $\mathcal{S}_A$ . Sometimes a literal is required, usually a preimage of a known hash ( $H(l)$ ). In that case, we just use  $l$ . Some branches of the transaction's script are locked before a defined time, we use  $\tau_k$  to disable the branch this expressions is in before the time  $k$ .

As an example, let's say Alice wants to give money to Bob if he solves a problem before a time  $k$ . We would like the money to be unspendable from Alice (to ensure Bob he gets the money even she changes her mind) until the time  $k$ . During this time, if Bobs provide the answer he can claim the money by himself. After the time  $k$ , if Bob does not provide an answer, Alice gets her money back.

The script at 3.1 describes this set of constraints. It basically has two branches, the first which requires Bob's signature ( $\mathcal{S}_B$ ) and the solution to the problem ( $l$ ); and the second gives the money back to Alice after the time  $k$  requiring its signature ( $\mathcal{S}_A$ ).

$$(\mathcal{S}_B \wedge l) \vee (\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \tau_k) \quad (3.1)$$

### 3.4.2. First part: Oracle Selection

The oracles are a key piece in the protocol, as they get to decide who gets the prize money. The first part of the protocol defines a way to select them in a trustless way. The idea is quite simple, players selects a subset of oracles from a list to participate on its bet. If the list is big enough, selecting elements randomly from it reduces the chances that any participants may influence the selection.

#### Oracle List Generation

In order to get a trustworthy list, we define a few key properties: The list must be decentralized; anybody willing to be an oracle can enroll itself; and it must be visible for both players.

As discussed in Section 2.5.2, we already have a public distributed database to store information. We use the blockchain to keep the list of oracles, this provides tampering protection, a public database, and a distributed source for the list. In order to let anybody enroll to be an oracle, the enrollment operation is a simple transaction generated by the oracle and sent to the blockchain. We defined our own string as protocol identification ("I'm an oracle! Ready to provide data"), but different protocols can use different strings to define other types of lists.

## The Oracle Registration Transaction

$T_{Registration}$ ( <b>in:</b> $T_{oracleprevious tx}$ )	
<i>Inputs:</i>	
$T_{Oracleprevious tx}[\alpha]$	$\sigma$
<i>Outputs:</i>	
$(\nu)$	$\gamma$
$(0)$	OP_RETURN {ENROLLMENT DATA}

Table 3.2: Oracle Registration.

In this registration transaction the oracle takes money from an unspent output of hers and simply sends all the money to the first output. The registration happens with the second output. OP\_RETURN makes this output invalid, so nobody can spend it. This doesn't matter that much, as the value is zero. But the operation allows us to insert arbitrary data into the blockchain, and it is here where we include our predefined string. This string includes the oracle's address and its will to participate as oracle in future bets.

Note that there is no required deposit for registration. There is a transaction fee, however, which must be paid when submitting the transaction. We may argue that a higher price to register an oracle will decrease the chances of single individual controlling the majority of the list. If that is the case, increasing the cost by adding a required a unspendable output does not require any change in the transaction 3.2, as the unspendable output already exists. Adding a deposit spendable by an address will require a new output, but the idea remains the same.

When this transaction is submitted to the blockchain, players can look into this transaction and recognize it as an oracle registration.

## Compiling the Oracle List

There are a few parameters the value of which players must agree in order to select oracles from the blockchain list. First they decide the period of time they will consider oracles from<sup>1</sup>. Some participants might want to avoid recently registered oracles, as they might have a higher chance to be controlled by the other player. Others might argue that those oracles associated to very old registrations are likely to be inactive. So players may be willing to avoid oracles registered long time ago.

Second, players decide the list to get the oracles from. In this process, they may want to filter out oracles, for example excluding oracles that paid less than  $b$  bitcoins on fees at registration time. Finally they decide the number of oracles to use, also they can decide to select a few more than the required oracles, anticipating one or more of the selected oracles will not reply to the invitation.

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<sup>1</sup>Time is measured as a range of blocks in the blockchain.

Once the players have agreed on the blocks from where the oracles will be selected (and whether some other condition/filter would be required on the oracles), both players can compile the same list of available oracles. Hashing the list and compare the hashes helps the users to be sure they had compiled the same list. This list is the source for selecting the oracles to use, players just need to decide which of them to use.

## Oracle Selection Protocol

If the oracle list is big and there is a cost to register into it, a random selection from it decreases the chance for any player to get a possible controlled oracle into the final list.

As trust in the other player is not required for this protocol, both players need to have the certainty the election from the list is random. In order to achieve this property we use a protocol originally proposed to flip coins over the phone [5]. Today this algorithm is mostly known as *coin tossing*, from a subfield of cryptography called Secure Multi Party Computation. Secure Multi Party Computation aims to provide protocols for computing public functions and gets its results while participants keep their inputs private.

Roughly speaking, the Coin Tossing protocol we use allow us to get a random bit. To understand the protocol, let's first consider a simpler protocol. As neither of the players trust the other to select the bit randomly, both players select a bit and they XOR those bits together. This way, it does not matter how bits were chosen, the result is random. Clearly, one player's bit must be chosen before knowing the value of the other, otherwise if one bit is known the second one can be selected in order to get the desired outcome. If the players were physically together we would write down the bit in a paper, wait for the other player to write his and then reveal both bits and perform the XOR. However we would like to run this algorithm through the phone or in this case the computer. The idea is the same, but instead of writing down into a paper, players *commit* to the value they just chose randomly by sending to the other player a *commitment*. This commitment binds the player to the value calculated, without revealing it. Once both players receive the other's commitment, they send the bit they chose. They check the received value against the previously received commitment, and if they match, the protocol outputs the XOR of both bits as the random bit. Otherwise, a player tried to cheat and the protocol aborts as there is no way to calculate a random bit.

If we have a list both players agree with, and we can also produce random bits, selecting a number of oracles from the list is a trivial exercise. After this step, players had decided the oracles to use. We represent the total number of oracles participating in the protocol by  $n$ , and the required number to decide the bet as  $m$ , where  $\frac{n}{2} < m$ .

### 3.4.3. Second part: The bet

#### Bet Promise

Once players decided the oracles to use, whether using the *Oracle Selection* protocol or by any other mean, they need to agree in the terms of the bet, the event and who is the winner on each outcome, the time available for the oracles to answer, the amount of money bet by each player, and the fees and deposit required to the oracles. Once all the bet parameters are set and serialized its hash is calculated. Players put the bet hash and all the money required to run the protocol, including fees and the prize into a transaction. The selected oracles, bet hash and a method<sup>2</sup> to get the transaction's full description are appended to this transaction in plain text, and the transaction is sent to the blockchain. We call this transaction “*Bet Promise*”, as it is a commitment from both players to the bet:

$T_{BetPromise}$ (in: $T_{Aprevious tx}, T_{Bprevious tx}$ )	
<i>Inputs:</i>	
$T_{Aprevious tx}[\alpha_A]$	$\sigma_A$
$T_{Bprevious tx}[\alpha_B]$	$\sigma_B$
<i>Outputs:</i>	
(0)	OP_RETURN {Bet Channel, Oracle List, Bet hash}
$(\mathcal{P} - \mathcal{F}_{BetPromise}/2)$	$(\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B)$ $\vee$ $(\tau_{Bet} \wedge \mathcal{S}_A)$
$(\mathcal{P} - \mathcal{F}_{BetPromise}/2)$	$(\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B)$ $\vee$ $(\tau_{Bet} \wedge \mathcal{S}_B)$
$(c/n)$	$(\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B)$
$(\dots)$	$\dots \langle n - 1 \rangle \dots$

Table 3.3: Bet Promise

The inputs for this transaction are not relevant to the protocol, they spend money from both players to pay for this bet. There can be more than one input by player, and change outputs if required, as it's unlikely the players have an unspent transaction for the exact amount required for the bet. To simplify the transaction, extra inputs and change outputs are not included.

The first output does not transfer any money but includes the following information: the oracles list invited to participate; the channel to use for retrieving the full bet and the hash to compare the retrieved bet against. When an oracle sees itself in the list of oracles, it goes to the channel and retrieves the bet, compares it against the expected hash, and reads the description; with that information the oracle decides or not to participate in the bet

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<sup>2</sup>For instance an URL to a website with the bet description. Oracles are responsible to check the description fetched with the hash provided in the transaction.

The second and third outputs of this transaction moves most of the money into a joined account. From now on it can only be moved by both players together. This represents the commitment to start the bet, as each one lock its own money under the other's will. In case one of the players disappear, there is a provision so, after a certain time ( $\tau_{Bet}$ ) money can be recovered by its owner.

The outputs with indexes 3 to  $3 + (n - 1)$  are a small portion of the money, used for the oracle enrollments. This money does not include a timeout because it is a small amount<sup>3</sup>. This money is spend at the oracle enrollment as commitment from the players to the oracles.

This transaction spends  $\mathcal{P} + \frac{c}{2}$  from each player:  $n \cdot \frac{c}{n}$  goes to pay for oracle enrollments;  $\mathcal{F}_{BetPromise}$  goes to pay this transaction's fees; and  $2 \cdot \mathcal{P} - \mathcal{F}_{BetPromise}$  to pay the bet and its associated costs, as transaction fees and oracle rewards<sup>4</sup>.

## Oracle Enrollment

Oracles invited to participate need to retrieve the Bet description as instructed in the *Bet Promise* transaction, and decide whether or not to participate. When one or more oracles do not participate, players must decide how to select new one(s). For example, using a "waiting list" computed in the first part of the protocol is an option. When an oracle decides to participate, it builds an *Oracle enrollment* transaction, and sends it to the players while spending money from the *Bet Promise* transaction. Table 3.4 includes the details.

$T_{OracleEnrollment}$ (in: $T_{Oracleprevious tx}, T_{BetPromise}$ )	
Inputs:	
$T_{Oracleprevious tx}[\alpha]$	$\sigma$
$T_{BetPromise}[3 + \text{Oracle Index}]$	$\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B$
Outputs:	
$([\text{Registration}] + c/n + [\text{Oracle Payment}] - \mathcal{F}_{OracleEnrollment})$	$(\mathcal{S}_{Oracle} \wedge \mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B)$ $\vee$ $(\mathcal{S}_{Oracle} \wedge \tau_{Bet})$
$([\text{Two Answers Penalty}])$	$((\mathcal{S}_A \vee \mathcal{S}_B) \wedge (A\text{Wins}_o \wedge B\text{Wins}_o))$ $\vee$ $(\mathcal{S}_{Oracle} \wedge \tau_{Two})$

Table 3.4: Oracle Enrollment

This transaction is the oracle's commitment with the bet and it conveys the players acceptance the oracle. The oracle sends  $[\text{Registration}] + [\text{Oracle Payment}]$  as initial payment (input 0), and players send  $c/n$  from the *Bet Promise* (input 1). The oracle index goes from 0 to  $n - 1$ .

The first output takes the money under the oracle and both players control, to be used in

<sup>3</sup>If players are willing to pay the extra fee required to add this timeout, it can be added.

<sup>4</sup> $\mathcal{P}$  is a constant to make easier to keep track of the money spent by the each player during the protocol

the *Bet* transaction. If the Bet Transaction (see Section 3.4.3) does not go into the blockchain, the oracle can claim this money after  $\tau_{Bet}$ .

The second one is a penalty to be charged if the oracle misbehaves. If the oracle reveals that player A and player B win, this money can be taken by any player. Otherwise the money can be claimed back by the oracle after  $\tau_{Two}$ . Two Answers Penalty is the charge for voting twice, this must not be a small amount, as voting twice is the oracle's full responsibility. At this output the hash of the answers is revealed ( $H(AWins_o)$ ,  $H(BWins_o)$ ), the oracle must keep  $AWins_o$  and  $BWins_o$  secret, revealing this value is equivalent to choose a winner.

## Bet Transaction

Once the required oracles are enrolled to participate, the “Bet” transaction is built by the players. The first two inputs contain what is remaining from the original players contributions to the prize, controlled by the players' joint account. Then, the next  $n$  inputs are the outputs in the *Oracle Enrollment*, containing the oracles registration. Each one of these outputs are controlled by one oracle and both players.

Because inputs come from outputs controlled by all the participants, the transaction must be signed by both players and all the oracles:

$T_{Bet}$ ( <b>in:</b> $T_{BetPromise}, T_{OraclesEnrollment}$ )	
<i>Inputs:</i>	
$T_{BetPromise}[0]$	$\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B$
$T_{BetPromise}[1]$	$\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B$
$T_{Oracle_1Enrollment}[0]$	$\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B \wedge \mathcal{S}_{o_1}$
$T_{\dots}[\dots]$	$\dots$
$T_{Oracle_nEnrollment}[0]$	$\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B \wedge \mathcal{S}_{o_n}$
<i>Outputs:</i>	
$(\mathcal{P} + n/2 \cdot ([\text{Registration}]$ - $[\text{Oracle Payment}]$ - $\mathcal{F}_{OracleEnrollment}$ ) - $1/2 (\mathcal{F}_{BetPromise} + \mathcal{F}_{Bet}))$	$(\mathcal{S}_A \wedge (A\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge A\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_m}))$ $\vee$ $(\mathcal{S}_B \wedge (B\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge B\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_m}))$ $\vee$ $(\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \tau_{Two})$
$(\mathcal{P} + n/2 \cdot ([\text{Registration}]$ - $[\text{Oracle Payment}]$ - $\mathcal{F}_{OracleEnrollment}$ ) - $1/2 (\mathcal{F}_{BetPromise} + \mathcal{F}_{Bet}))$	$(\mathcal{S}_A \wedge (A\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge A\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_m}))$ $\vee$ $(\mathcal{S}_B \wedge (B\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge B\text{Wins}_{\tilde{o}_m}))$ $\vee$ $(\mathcal{S}_B \wedge \tau_{Two})$
$([\text{Oracle}_1 \text{ Payment}])$	$(\mathcal{S}_{o_1} \wedge (A\text{Wins}_{o_1} \vee B\text{Wins}_{o_1}) \wedge \tau_{Bet})$ $\vee$ $\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B \wedge \tau_{Reply}$
$(\dots)$	$\dots$
$([\text{Oracle}_n \text{ Payment}])$	$(\mathcal{S}_{o_n} \wedge (A\text{Wins}_{o_n} \vee B\text{Wins}_{o_n}) \wedge \tau_{Bet})$ $\vee$ $\mathcal{S}_A \wedge \mathcal{S}_B \wedge \tau_{Reply}$
$([\text{Oracle}_1 \text{ Payment}])$	$(A\text{Wins}_{o_1} \wedge$ $(B\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge B\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_m}) \wedge \mathcal{S}_B)$ $\vee$ $(B\text{Wins}_{o_1} \wedge$ $(A\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge A\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_m}) \wedge \mathcal{S}_A)$ $\vee$ $\mathcal{S}_{o_1} \wedge \tau_{Undue}$
$(\dots)$	$\dots$
$([\text{Oracle}_n \text{ Payment}])$	$(A\text{Wins}_{o_n} \wedge$ $(B\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge B\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_m}) \wedge \mathcal{S}_B)$ $\vee$ $(B\text{Wins}_{o_n} \wedge$ $(A\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_1} \wedge \dots \wedge A\text{Wins}_{\hat{o}_m}) \wedge \mathcal{S}_A)$ $\vee$ $\mathcal{S}_{o_n} \wedge \tau_{Undue}$

$o_i, \tilde{o}_j, \hat{o}_k$   
 $\in \text{Oracles}$

Table 3.5: Bet

The first two outputs are the prize, it can be spend by any of the two players' signature plus at least  $m$  votes of the oracles for that player. When any of the players sees  $m$  votes from the oracles it can get its prize. If the threshold is not met, half of this money goes to each player and we say the bet is not resolved, as there is no winner.

The next  $n$  outputs are the oracles' payment for answering. They can not be spent before time  $\tau_{Bet}$ , the moment when the event happens. These outputs require the vote of the oracle ( $AWins_o$  or  $BWins_o$ ) plus the oracle's signature to be redeemed, this binds the vote with the oracle's payment, as they are required to make its vote public in order to get the payment. If the oracle does not answer after time  $\tau_{Reply}$ , players are allowed to take this money back and the oracle can not further claim its payment.

The last  $n$  outputs are a withholding for the same amount of the oracle payment, if the oracle gives a wrong answer for the outcome, this money goes to the real winner. This way we take the payment out from the oracle for failing to give the right answer. If it behaves as expected, the oracle can spend this money some time after ( $T_{Undue}$ ) the bet is resolved.

There are four timeouts expressed in the transaction which are described in table 3.6.

Symbol	Description
$\tau_{Bet}$	First timeout, this is the moment the event being used to decide the bet takes place. From this moment on oracles can vote for a winner and take its payment for it.
$\tau_{Reply}$	This timeout signals the time for the oracles to answer. After this timeout passes, players can take the oracle's payment if the oracle has not replied.
$\tau_{Undue}$	If an oracle gave the wrong answer, players have until this timeout to take its payment back. After this timeout the oracle that behaved correctly can take the payment deposit back.
$\tau_{Two}$	The last timeout, this could be the same as $\tau_{Undue}$ . Until this moment, players can take the two answers penalty for any oracle that made public the votes for both players. After this timeout, the oracle can take its deposit back.

Table 3.6: Timeouts

Timeouts are enforced using Relative Lock Time (RLT) as defined by the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 68 (BIP 68). Their granularity is 512 seconds, roughly the same time it takes to produce a new block. As it is a 16 bits number, it can be at most a year in the future, relative to the time its transaction was submitted to the blockchain.



### 3.5. Cost analysis

Most of the proposed bitcoin protocols in the literature make the simplified assumption that transaction fee is 0, as this was the cost of it for a long time. However as bitcoin use has increased, transactions are not free anymore<sup>5</sup>. That is why we decided to explicitly consider the fees in the protocol. So in what follows we do the analysis with all the costs, not only the oracle's payment.

In Bitcoin, fees are charged by byte, therefore bigger transactions will pay more money as fee, no matter how much money they spend.

At the moment we write this work, transactions paying 120 satoshi<sup>6</sup> usually get into the next mined block. That is not too bad for money transferences, but as we have some big transaction we will do calculations with a fee of 15 per byte. This usually will not get our transactions into the first block, but into the first 15, this means it can take up to 3 hours to get the transactions in the blockchain. This is enough for an average case with enough time between timeouts. Players in a tight schedule can expend more money in fees and submit transactions faster.

It is impossible to give an exact value for the size of each transaction, as addresses and signatures do not have a fixed size. For this analysis, we use average size values, which consider a fluctuation of under 5%. Table 3.7 has the size for the transactions used in the protocol. Sizes are in bytes and we consider 7 oracles.

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<sup>5</sup>We can still send transactions with no fees to the blockchain, but it might take forever for them to get into it. As miner will prioritize transactions with fee to collect.

<sup>6</sup>A satoshi is the smallest unit of bitcoin on the blockchain. It is a one hundred millionth of a single bitcoin ( $1 \cdot 10^{-8}$ ).

Transaction	Constant size	Per oracle size	Fee [satoshi]	Size example $n = 7$	Fee example $\mathcal{F} = 15$ $n = 7$
Oracle Registration	239	0	$(239 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	239	3585
Bet Promise	1267	65	$(1267 + n \cdot 65) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	1722	25,830
Oracle Enrollment	776	0	$(776 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	776	11,640
Bet	617	445	$(617 + n \cdot 445) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	3732	55,980
Player redeem prize	511	150	$(511 + n \cdot 150) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	1561	23,415
Oracle redeem payment	355	0	$(355 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	355	5325
Oracle redeem undue	283	62	$(283 + n \cdot 62) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	717	10,755
Oracle redeem two answers	323	0	$(323 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	323	4845
Player redeem wrong answer	338	70	$(338 + n \cdot 70) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	828	12,420
Player redeem two answers	373	0	$(373 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	373	5595
Player redeem oracle doesn't answer	439	0	$(439 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	439	6585

Table 3.7: Transactions size and fee.

The first four transactions are the ones detailed in the previous section. These transactions however are not enough to make the complete cost analysis of a protocol execution. Redeem transactions are required to put back the money into personal accounts, so we append them. They are explained next:

- Player redeems prize: takes the earnings of the winner into an address the player controls.
- Oracle redeems payment: this transaction includes the vote to select the winner and allows the oracle to retrieve him/her reward.
- Player redeems oracle doesn't answer: can be submitted by both players when an oracle doesn't answer. It charges the oracle with the associated penalty.
- Player redeems wrong answer: it is the transaction where the winning player can charge oracles that didn't answer correctly.
- Oracle redeems undue: it is submitted by each oracle that does provide a correct answer or fails to provide one at all.
- Player redeems two answers: it is a transaction that can be submitted by any player when a given oracle gave two answers to collect the penalty associated.
- Oracle redeems two answers: it can be submitted by any oracle that didn't give two answers; it recovers the penalty for this behavior back to the oracle.

Table 3.8 summarize the costs incurred by both players. For a successful run of the protocol, where there is a winner and every oracle behaves properly.

Item	Cost [satoshi]	Cost example $\mathcal{F} = 15, n = 7$
Bet Promise fees	$-(1267 + n \cdot 65) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	-25,830
Oracle Enrollments fee	$-(0 + n \cdot 776) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	-81,480
Bet transaction fee	$-(617 + n \cdot 445) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	-55,980
Oracles payment	$-n \cdot [\text{Oracle Payment}]$	$-7 \cdot [\text{Oracle Payment}]$
Oracle first transfer	-c	-c
Player redeem prize	$-2 \cdot (511 + n \cdot 150) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	-23,415
<b>Total</b>	$-\mathcal{F} \cdot (2906 + 1586 \cdot n)$ $-n \cdot [\text{Oracle Payment}] - c$	$-7 \cdot [\text{Oracle Payment}] - c - 210,120$

Table 3.8: Successful run, costs for the players

The number of oracles is 7, as set above. The value of  $c$  and  $[\text{Oracle Payment}]$  are parameters decided by the players, below we propose values for this constants and discuss about the tradeoff on setting this values.

In table 3.9 we summarize the cost and earnings for an oracle that behaves correctly in a protocol execution.

Item	Cost [satoshi]	Cost example [satoshi] $\mathcal{F} = 15, n = 7$
Initial deposit	$-\text{[Registration]} - \text{[Oracle Payment]}$ $- \text{[Two Answers Penalty]}$	$-\text{[Registration]} - \text{[Oracle Payment]}$ $- \text{[Two Answers Penalty]}$
Payment	$\text{[Oracle Payment]}$	$\text{[Oracle Payment]}$
Redeem payment fee	$-(355 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	-5325
Undue deposit	$\text{[Oracle Payment]}$	$\text{[Oracle Payment]}$
Undue redeem fee	$-(283 + n \cdot 62) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	-10,755
Two answers deposit	$\text{[Two Answers Penalty]}$	$\text{[Two Answers Penalty]}$
Two answers redeem fee	$-(373 + n \cdot 0) \cdot \mathcal{F}$	-5595
<b>Total</b>	$\text{[Oracle Payment]} - \text{[Registration]}$ $-\mathcal{F} \cdot (1011 + n \cdot 62)$	$\text{[Oracle Payment]} - \text{[Registration]} - 21,675$

Table 3.9: Successful run, oracle cost and earning

The constant  $c$  captures transfer made from the players to the *Oracle Enrollment* bet. Its objective is to mitigate the oracle risk of accepting to participate in the bet. Namely, if an oracle sends the *Oracle Enrollment* and the bet does not take place. In this case, the oracle will get back all its deposit plus  $c/n$  minus  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OracleEnrollment}}$ .

Players might decide, in order to incentive oracles to participate, to eliminate the risk of losing money in this situation for oracles. So the players can set  $c$  such that  $c/n > \mathcal{F}_{\text{OracleEnrollment}}$ . Nonetheless, players might decide to make  $c = 0$  because this simplifies the transaction and saves money in fees.

The [Registration] constant is an option to require the oracle to lock more money while participating in the bet. Making this constant big could help to have more committed oracles, as they have more at stake in the execution. Players have the option to set it at zero, but this will not save any fees. Probably the most important constant in this analysis is the [Oracle Payment], it's the most expensive cost for the players and the way oracles earn money by participating.

As the tables show there is no dependency between the protocol costs and the amount of the bet. The cost for paying oracles is directly proportional to the number of them, and how much is each one getting paid. And the transaction cost depends on the number of oracles, the size of the transactions, and a per byte fee.

### 3.5.1. Concrete costs

So, how much does it cost a run of the protocol? At the moment this work was written bitcoin was being exchange by USD 3800. If we replace this number in the first table we get the cost of the protocol for the players:

$$| 7 * [\text{Oracle Payment}] + c + \text{USD } 7.98 |$$

As the *Oracle Registration* transaction fees correspond to 3585 satoshis, we set the parameter  $c/n$  to 5000, a little bit more than the cost of the fees. This gives a value of  $c = 35\,000$ , so the cost of  $c$  is USD 1.33.

The discussion about the value for the oracle payment is less technical, and probably each person reading this work might have a different optimal value in mind. We have simplified this payment to be equal for every oracle, but players might decide some oracles are more expensive than others. Oracles with more history or reputation might be worthy of a bigger payment. The amount being wagered is also an important factor to determine this number, if there is a really big amount of money at stake we might be willing to spend more money on this item, as this can decrease the chance of the oracles taking a bribe.

For this calculation we have defined [Oracle Payment] to be 200,000 satoshis, or USD 7.60. Simplifying the [Registration] to 0, running the protocol cost the users USD 62.51. In order to participate in the bet, each oracle needs to put a deposit of USD 31.25, and if behaves properly at the end of the bet will earn USD 6.40

To summarize, if player are willing to bet USD 1000, they are required to start with USD 1031.25, the winner would have win USD 968.75 at the end, and the loser would have spent 1031.25.

## 3.6. Communication

When the protocol is explained, we have left many things on the intuitive level: we just said oracles and players exchange data between them with not further discussion. When implementing this protocol the communication between participants can not be ignored. In this section, we discuss a proposed model of communication for the protocol.

In Bitcoin, all protocol communication is not encrypted neither authenticated. The Bitcoin's protocol has incentives and cryptographic protection that make this possible. The protocol relies heavily on the blockchain, so we take advantage of all these features and we add no encryption nor authentication to the protocol communication.

In order to start the protocol, players are required to know two things about each other: Each other player's Bitcoin address and a specific communication method. A communication method besides the blockchain is required in order to discuss and agree on the bet parameters. This communication must be bidirectional.

The first step is to chat and decide the bet, if this communication is not secure, the *Bet Promise* transaction works as authentication method. This is because, at signing it, each player proves it control the private key corresponding to its address. This way, each player commits to the data the transaction holds.

When an oracle sees its id in the blockchain it needs to get the full bet description to decide whether to participate or not, as the full description hash is in the *Bet Promise* transaction. This description can be retrieved using an insecure channel. If the oracle decides to participate it needs to send the *Oracle Enrollment* transaction to the players, which is signed with the oracle's private key. Then, players must check it matches the address they selected. Oracle also sends the transaction script, as a P2SH only contains the hash of it, players must check that the transaction is consistent with what the protocol requires.

After all the oracles sent their transactions, players have all they need to create, sign, and send the Bet transaction to the blockchain. No further communication off the blockchain is required from now on if every oracle behaves correctly.

### 3.6.1. Secure communication

As stated above, there is no need for secure communication in the protocol, however if required for some participants, we now propose a mechanism to start a secure communication with no extra previous knowledge, simply using a peer to peer channel.

Both players know each other's Bitcoin address, so the first step is to reveal to the other the address' public key using an insecure channel. This is verifiable by the receiver, as the address is the hash of the public key. Then they generate and send a random string in the insecure channel. After this, using the public key of the other player, the following information is encrypted and signed: a secure channel id, credentials to establish the secure channel, and the received random string. This encrypted values are sent using the insecure

channel. This message is decrypted and equality check is done, the random string received must match the one sent at the beginning, to prevent replay attacks.

At this point both players know the secure channel and have the credentials to connect to it, secure communication can be started between them. This step is also reproducible with the oracles, nothing changes as the oracle's address is also known.

### 3.6.2. Channel

For test purposes we used a plain TCP connection between peers. A secure channel was implemented using CurveZMQ<sup>7</sup>, an authentication and encryption protocol implemented on top of TCP that uses elliptic curves cryptography to protect the communication.

Establishing a permanent peer to peer connection (a channel) might reveal more information than participants might want. A communication channel via a trusted third party can be used to obscure our id from the other players, but this opens the door to abuse by the (trusted) third party controlling the channel. Several options can be used to obscure real id when communicating. Using private navigation as the one provided by the Thor network<sup>8</sup> can help when using a third party channel. Another approach is to use other anonymous communication protocols, as the one Orisi uses, BitMessage [35]. Which solution to use will vary from case to case and the degree of anonymity the participants desire.

## 3.7. Implementation

Bitcoin is widely used as value storage, most of the applications and library supporting it provide just a wallet and blockchain inspection functionality. Creating custom transactions is not a common functionality in bitcoin clients, and by the time this work started there was no library available to generate custom transactions.

In order to prove the viability of the proposed protocol and generate the transactions an implementation was written (see Appendix 6.1).

We used Java to implement all the protocol functionality. We divide our implementation in three logical modules to explain the work done:

1. **Bitcoin communication:** The official Bitcoin client exposes a RPC server to interact with the blockchain. This module provides an interface to the Bitcoin client, it allows our implementation to get information from the Blockchain and verify the validity of the transactions we generate.
2. **Bitcoin core:** This module exposes Bitcoin objects with our required functionality. It is capable to generate custom transaction and sign them, it also provides transaction

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<sup>7</sup><http://curvezmq.org/>

<sup>8</sup><https://www.torproject.org/>

parsers and human readable views of them. Likely all this functionality would be in a Bitcoin library if bitcoin were usually used to do smart contracts.

3. **Protocol implementation:** In this module we included the protocol specific functionality, it is able to generate and understand the Bets and the protocol transactions. It also exposes a distributed coin tossing implementation to select oracles randomly from a list.

Our implementation has a little bit more than 10 thousand lines of code. It includes:

- An encrypted and authenticated communication channel, which can start from an insecure channel only knowing the Bitcoin address of the other participant.
- A blockchain scan to compile a list of oracles from its Registration transactions.
- A distributed coin tossing implementation to select the oracles to use from the compiled list.
- A direct method to generate each of the required transactions in the protocol, including all the redeem transactions required to spend them.
- A check to verify the transactions received from the other player are valid and include the expected inputs and outputs.

We used this implementation and the official bitcoin client to prove the validity of the transactions generated. We want to be sure the transactions generated are valid Bitcoin transactions, so testing them using the official client is a crucial step. We created bitcoin accounts for all the participants and simulated a protocol run by generating all of its transactions, using each participant's accounts. After the transactions are generated and signed with all the required keys, they are sent to the official bitcoin client for verification. This is the most important step, as this verification is exactly the same one used to verify transactions in the real blockchain.

Due to lack of libraries doing custom transactions, this implementation is a contribution not only for this protocol, but potentially for other applications using custom transactions.

The implementation [28] is available at [https://github.com/fmontoto/thesis\\_oracle](https://github.com/fmontoto/thesis_oracle) under the MIT license.

# Chapter 4

## Discussion

*This chapter includes discussions on the participants economic incentives, as well as the costs of running the protocol. It also goes through the limitations in the protocol, such as the maximum number of participants. It ends with a comparison with existent solutions and possible extensions of this work.*

### 4.1. Incentives

The ulterior motive for participating in a betting protocol is to make money, so we assume each player is driven by this logic. All of their actions are consistent with this goal, earn money. The protocol is designed with this assumption in mind and, in the following paragraphs, we discuss how the monetary incentives encourage participants to behave properly.

#### 4.1.1. Players

The first thing to considerate is that the protocol runs on top of bitcoin transactions, which have a cost (fee). Once the first transaction is placed, at least one player will not recover its money: if the protocol does not finishes with a resolution, both will lose some money; if there is a winner, such entity will get earnings and the other will lose the money involved.

One strategy to maximize the option to win is to control the oracles. The first phase of the protocol and the second's player enforcement prevent this. However there is another way to control the oracles, payments can be made to influence into the oracle's answer. Bribing the oracles is discussed into the Section 4.1.2.

Simply causing the other player to lose money could be a motivation to some players, even if such action does not mean an earning for themselves. As payments on timeouts and fees are equally distributed in the transactions, aborting the protocol at some point will mean an equal lose of funds for both players. If a player is willing to make the other one lose an



amount of money, it will cost him the same amount. Other possible motivation could be to deprive the other player of its funds. But again for the same reason mentioned above, this will mean the player performing the attack should lock the same amount of money for the same period of time.

A malicious player can impair monetarily the other player, but it will not be for free, as it will cost the same amount of money for the malicious player. Finally, one player can make the other player lose money, but only the small amounts to be used as fees. When it comes to funds withholding, the amount may end up being all the money involved, but it will certainly not be lost, just locked during the timeout associated to the bet.

### 4.1.2. Oracles

As the players, oracles also seek to maximize their earnings. In principle, for the protocol that means the oracle must give the correct answer to collect its payment. But, there is an option to increase the earnings outside the protocol. Receiving money from a player to change their vote can give the oracle more money than answering correctly, as the incentive to change its vote can be bigger than the payment. A modified version of the bet transaction can be used to do these payment, the player willing to pay the bribe can set the output to be spent with the answer he expects. So, in order to get the bribe, the oracle must reveal the answer the player is paying for. This makes the problem even bigger, as no trust is required between a player and the oracle in order to cheat and change the answer.

This problem comes from the fact there is not source of truth accessible in the blockchain. In fact this is the main problem the protocol tries to solve. The payment for answering correctly goes for the oracles that answer as the majority of them, not the ones that answer the truth, simply because that is the protocol truth. Bribing a majority of the oracles gives the oracles the bribe and also the payment. And this is the only useful bribe for the player, to change a minority of the answers does not give him any benefit.

A way to mitigate this problem is to give the oracles certain reputation based on past behavior. This gives the oracles the incentive of behaving properly in order to get long term earnings, as accepting bribes will erode their chances to be selected as oracles again. Players must consider this incentive when choosing oracles, for example, selecting some kind of reputation in the hope this approach decreases the chance of selecting malicious oracles.

## 4.2. Costs

In Section 3.5 we discussed the cost of a successful transaction, which summed up to over USD 60. A smaller number of oracles or less payment could bring down this number, however even after this the number will not be negligible. This has some important consequences for this protocol: it is expensive to run, and that makes it unsuitable for small amount bets.

### 4.2.1. Attacks

#### Oracle

Within the protocol, oracles maximize their earnings by participating and selecting “the real winner”. However, if oracles stop participating after they send the *Oracle Enrollment* and  $c/n > \mathcal{F}_{OracleEnrollment}$  they can also win money:

Item	Cost [USD]
Initial deposit	-[Oracle Payment] - [Two Answers Penalty]
Redeem initial deposit	[Oracle Payment] + $c/n$ - $\mathcal{F}_{OracleEnrollment}$
Redeem initial deposit fee	- $\mathcal{F}_{RedeemInitialDeposit}$
Redeem two answers penalty	[Two Answers Penalty]
Redeem two answers penalty fee	- $\mathcal{F}_{RedeemTwoAnswersPenalty}$
<b>Total</b>	$c/n$ - $\mathcal{F}_{OracleEnrollment}$ - $\mathcal{F}_{RedeemTwoAnswersPenalty}$

Table 4.1: Oracle exits after Oracle Enrollment

If  $c/n$  is bigger than the fees required to redeem the *Oracle Enrollment* transaction, oracle wins money by aborting after submitting this transaction.

For the players, this brings some additional costs beside  $c/n$ . If the players need to get a replacement for some oracle, a new smaller *Bet Promise* transaction can be sent. This new transaction has an added cost, as it has to pay fees.

A malicious oracle can try to attack the players by aborting after the *Oracle Enrollment* transaction, resulting in an extra cost to the players. Decreasing the value of  $c$  makes this attack unlikely, as oracles will require to spend money in order to perform it. However decreasing this value might discourage oracles to participate in the bet. A second *Bet Promise* transaction to ask for another oracle is much cheaper than the original one, as it can link the bet data from the first one, and only requires to list one oracle. So players can spend some extra money trying to get a new oracle, run the bet with less oracles or abort it. Running the bet with fewer oracles does is the only option that does not cost extra money.

This attack is nonetheless limited. A malicious oracle can trigger the attack only once, as it will be replaced or ignored after doing it. But if the same bet gets multiple malicious oracles they can delay the bet long enough to force player to abort it. This is extremely unlikely if oracles are being selected randomly from a big pool.

#### Players

If the bet faces a malicious player, it can abort the execution at any point before submitting the *Bet* transaction. As during the protocol both players contribute in the same way to pay it, if the bet gets canceled at any moment, both players get to lose the same amount of money. So it is feasible for a malicious player to attack the other one, but the cost of the attack is the same of the harm done. Other important measure the protocol has to limit the

extent of this attack is to keep the bet money separated from the fees and oracle payments. A malicious player can not make the other one to lose more than the bet associated costs.

## Colluded attacks

For every collusion involving the player and any number of oracles less than the majority threshold, the damage is limited to losing an amount equal to the associated costs, discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.1. The cost of any of this attacks is of the same than the damage done, so we claim they are impractical.

When one player and at least the majority threshold of the oracles are colluded, this player can take all the money to distribute it with the colluded oracles. This cost to the honest player all of the bet money plus the associated costs.

From table 3.9 we know the expected earning for one oracle behaving properly is  $[\text{Oracle Payment}] - [\text{Registration}] - \mathcal{F} \cdot (1011 + n \cdot 62)$ , lets call this value  $\mathcal{E}$ .

When an oracle takes a bribe there are two possible outcomes for him in the protocol: enough oracles also take the bribe and it earns the payment for a correct protocol execution  $\mathcal{E}$ ; or not enough players take the bribe and the oracle is penalized in the protocol for providing a wrong answer, the oracle receives  $\mathcal{E} - [\text{Oracle Payment}] = - [\text{Registration}] - \mathcal{F} \cdot (1011 + n \cdot 62)$ .

A honest oracle which behaves correctly earns  $\mathcal{E}$  for a protocol run, any bribe  $\mathcal{B}$  should at least ensure that amount to the oracle in order to provide strong economic incentives for lying:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{B} - [\text{Registration}] - \mathcal{F} \cdot (1011 + n \cdot 62) &\geq \mathcal{E} \\ \mathcal{B} &\geq [\text{OraclePayment}] \end{aligned} \tag{4.1}$$

Anyone willing to bribe the oracle should at least offer  $[\text{Oracle Payment}]$  as bribe. This give us a lower bound for the cost of bribing enough oracles to change the outcome of a bet:

$$(\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor + 1) \cdot [\text{OraclePayment}] \tag{4.2}$$

If oracles were chosen randomly, it's unlikely that the dishonest player and the oracles trust each other, so the cost of bribing is incemented by the transactions required to enforce the bribe.

## 4.3. Limitations

### 4.3.1. Number of participants

Due the way the protocol is encoded into the transaction, the number of players must be equal to the number of possible outcomes on the bet's event. During all this work we implicitly set this number to two, because usually bets are between two players, and events with binary outcomes are more simple. However nothing prevents the protocol to be used with a larger number of players.

Because bitcoin limitation on the maximum size of each individual element of a script, the proposed protocol can not use more than 7 oracles when the number of players is two.

Bitcoin bounds the size of individual elements on the stack to 520-bytes. As we use hash of 20-bytes as answer validation, and 33-bytes for the address to verify signatures, a lower bound of the size required for our redeem prize transaction is  $n \cdot (c \cdot 20) + c \cdot 33 = c \cdot (n \cdot 20 + 33)$ . With two players ( $c = 2$ ) and seven oracles ( $n = 7$ ) it gives us a lower bound of 346-bytes. The other almost 200-bytes are spent on the transaction logic, this is a large number mostly due the fact that there are no loops. The code looks like an unrolled loop.

This equation also give us other important result, increasing the number of players decreases substantially the space available for oracles.

### 4.3.2. Bet prize

The cost of a protocol run is given by the bitcoin fees, and the number of oracles to use, as they define the transactions size and the payments to be made. The cost does not depend at all on the amount of the prize for the winner, which makes relatively much more expensive bets of small prizes. It will not make any sense to do a bet with a prize smaller than the cost of running the protocol.

## 4.4. Extensions

If we step out a little bit, the proposed protocol uses paid oracles to get a binary answer about an event outside the blockchain. This is useful not only for betting on some outcome. The oracles are oblivious to the protocol in which their answer is used; they get paid anyway. Further applications of the protocol can be generalized from our proposal. Resolution of contractual disputes is an interesting topic where parties agree to use arbitrator(s) to decide two conflicting interpretations of a contract, for example. In this example, oracles take part in the protocol in a role that is more similar to a judge than to an oracle. One major difference is that one should not care whether a given judge's opinion matches the others' opinion, but instead that the judge provides his/her independent opinion. So, it would make sense to paid

the oracle for providing an answer instead of providing the same that of the majority. To implement the proposed protocol from our protocol we can simply remove the output with the penalty on a wrong answer.

Other possible extension would be to move beyond untrusted and randomly selected oracles to decide the bet. It may be interesting to consider semi-trusted oracles, as “oracles as a service” could be a realistic business option. This might require different types of payments to the oracles; semi-trusted oracles may charge more for participate than random ones from the list. Our protocol was proposed with the assumption all oracles are equivalent, therefore they get paid equally, but it also may be extended to support different rewards and penalties per oracle.

## 4.5. Comparison with Existing Solutions

This protocol is not the first attempt to perform trustless gambling using crypto currencies. Is not even the first one to do it using Bitcoin in particular. In this section, we try to differentiate this proposal from the existent solutions by highlighting their differences.

In Section 2.6 we presented a short introduction to the existent solutions. Oraclize and Town Crier provide a secure interface to web sites. Making information of these websites available in the blockchain. A web site is a centralized data source, however combining multiple sites as data sources and considering a majority instead one of them give us a decentralized source. This could be a really good approach to do bets on popular events, as many websites already publish results for this events (football results, presidential election results, etc..). If the outcome is used from a massive number of bets, the cost of the oracles could be amortized among all the players.

There are two main problems with this approach: none of the discussed website interfaces provide a strong cryptographic proof binding the results and the website; and is difficult for this approach to work with non popular events, as web sites does not provide results for them. An important difference with the proposed protocol is the platform they work on, Ethereum. In the next paragraphs we discuss how this might be an important difference.

Winsome is another implementation on top of Ethereum that allows people to gamble against each other, but on random events. It emulates casino games as blackjack and roulette. As its target are random games, it's not suitable for real world event bets.

Ethereum unlike Bitcoin was not designed with the goal of being a currency, but a platform to write and enforce code execution in a distributed way. It's primary objective is to become a *blockchain app platform* as they state in their website<sup>1</sup>. Because of this, their scripting language is Turing complete and provides much more flexibility. This makes Ethereum the home for most of the blockchain applications. Recently, one of the Ethereum biggest app, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), was subjected to an attack were attackers gained control of one third of the money it had. About 50 USD Million at the time of the

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<sup>1</sup><https://ethereum.org/>

attack. Most of the Ethereum community decided to “rollback” the history and give the DAO its money back. Immutability of the coin was therefore, broken.

On the contrary, bitcoin does not aim to be an app platform. People try to overcome its scripting limitations and write applications for it. Orisi is one of this applications that aims to solve the same problem we do. It works on top of bitcoin, one key difference is it’s centralized oracle database. Other important difference is its secrecy, it uses BitMessage to keep the location and identity of the participants secret. Although we could use BitMessage, our implementation uses direct TCP communication among the participants.

Probably the biggest difference between our proposal and Orisi are the type of transactions used by each one. Orisi uses multisignature address to move the bet money into the control of the oracles and the players. This means, in order to redeem the prize, the winner needs to make a transaction and get it signed by a majority of the oracles. So oracles need to agree in the destination of the prize, otherwise they will not sign the transaction. Our proposal gets the oracles out from this decision and requires only the winner signature to spend the money. In order to claim its payment, oracles are required to reveal one of the two secrets they kept. When a majority of the oracles have revealed the secrets corresponding to the winner, players and oracles collect them all and claim its prize.

This has two main advantages: the first one, already mentioned, keeps the oracles out from deciding where does the prize go. Oracles are not involved in the transactions spending the prize; The second one is how it bounds the action of emitting the vote for the winner with getting paid. There is no pressure for the oracle in responding before the other do it, there is a fixed timeout defined from the beginning to vote. Oracles can be sure if they behave properly and vote on time they will be remunerated, even if they vote after a majority already did. In the multisignature address, the player could decide to wait only to the minimum required number of oracles and send the transaction to redeem the prize. Then the prize gets splitted in exactly the required majority. Oracles that answer on time after this are not guaranteed to get paid.

## 4.6. Future work

### 4.6.1. Protocol extension

In our proposed protocol there is nothing that binds the oracle answer with an event’s outcome. We could ask the oracles an opinion, to take a position in a dispute, or anything we want without changing the protocol. In a more general view, our protocol allows a pair of peers to move money between two options outsourcing the decision. A bet is a particular case.

Even though our protocol is inspired by gambling, we strongly believe there is room to solve many other scenarios. Lawsuits seeking compensations is another example of deciding between two destinations. Accused must pay or keep its money, and the decision is made by third parties. Disputes on agreements and products warranties are other similar schemes.

In general we think, oracles can be re purposed as *judges* and let them decide on other scenarios. An arbiter or court might have problems to enforce its orders, using our protocol the money's recipient can get it as soon as the judges agree.

#### 4.6.2. Oracle reutilization

Utilizing oracles for more than one bet could be another interesting addition to the proposed protocol. First, because it would help to bring the cost of the protocol down. If the oracles payments can be shared among many bets, each bet pays an smaller amount. And second, if an oracle participates in many bets, it would receive a bigger payment than when participating on a single one. This makes more expensive to bribe an oracle by a single player. However it also adds a new attack possibility, multiple players betting on the same output could share the bribe cost. Which is more complicated than the single player case, because requires coordination and new transactions among the players.

Utilizing the same answers for many bets requires changes on how the oracle get paid and communication between players at different bets. It would require important changes in the current transactions.

# Chapter 5

## Conclusion

Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2008, more than a thousands of different cryptocurrencies have been proposed, most of them following Bitcoin's main design features. Bitcoin is known and often criticized due to its slow evolution and resistance to changes. This is further stressed by the overwhelming number of different and fast evolving currencies created.

A currency where rules does not change too much over time makes it a good store for value, and likely this Bitcoin's property contributes to make it the most valuable cryptocurrency today, as measured by market capitalization. This is a desirable feature for our algorithm. We do not want the value of the money when the bet is placed to be too different to the one when the bet is resolved.

However, using Bitcoin in our protocol does not come for free. This slow change rate keeps bitcoin script language very limited. When people talk about smart contract or scripting, Bitcoin is never the first currency coming to people's mind. The limited scripting, slow change rate and the biggest network made Bitcoin our choice: The script limitation poses a real challenge in the protocol presented, making this an open problem. As we discussed at Section 4.5, the problem has many implemented solutions for currencies with more expressive scripting languages. Bitcoin's slow change rate helps to keep the same rules from the start to the end of a bet, thus making the platform suitable for long term bets. Finally, having the largest network enforcing the protocol rules makes more difficult some known attacks (as *Majority and Eclipse* [20]) where attackers can overtake the control of the network or part of it. Another cost of using a limited scripting language is the amount of instructions and transactions required to express the protocol, which translates into somewhat higher costs.

The cost of running our proposed algorithm may be prohibitively expensive for some cases. Nonetheless we believe there are people willing to afford it when doing betting on large sums of money, as the cost of the protocol would represent a small fraction of the bet. Notice that the cost does not increase with the amount of money involved.

Most of the transactions required by the protocol are called *non standard* in Bitcoin. Non standard transactions are valid and everyone recognizes them as such. Yet, most of the miners will not mine them, so submitting the transactions will take more time than a standard one.



We hope new proposals that makes use of this available features, like this one, can move the Bitcoin community to embrace this non standard transactions.

One of the most challenging problems we had to address for this protocol was to translate the protocol restrictions to Bitcoin transactions. Studied existing solutions are composed just by one or two different transactions. In Ethereum one smart contract is enough for the applications we discussed at Section 2.6. For Orisi, only one transaction is post in the blockchain with the bet, all the other communication and required set up happens outside the blockchain. Our protocol uses the blockchain widely, not only for money transfers, but also for oracle discovery and initial communication. This seeks to avoid extra dependencies and keep most of the protocol expressed in the same framework. This come to a cost, more and larger transactions. They are not free anymore: we are charged by the miner for each byte we post in the blockchain in a transaction. This cost is discussed at Section 3.5.

A good example of this complexity is the transaction shown in Section 6.1.6. Bitcoin provides a multi-sig check function, which verifies if a certain number of signatures under the provided public keys are present. In the Bet transaction we need to implement our own version of this cryptographic primitive, in order to get a multi-hash check function, which checks that at least a threshold number of pre images are provided for the written hash. This transaction is hard to write as it can not be written using loops (because the language does not support them), and even not used branches need to be included in the transaction to match the original hash in the output of the Bet transaction.

Our initial decision of actually implementing the protocol proved to be very helpful when evaluating limitations of the protocol. It allowed us to calculate the size of the required transactions, which were then used to get a very accurate cost of the fees per transaction. Another limitation found thanks to the developing of an implementation was the existence of a maximum size of an element on the Bitcoin stack: 520 bytes. Due this limitation our original implementation was able to use up to 6 oracles, after some script optimizations our implementation supported up to 7 oracles. With other optimizations we might be able to support one or two more oracles. However, without a change in the way Pay To Script Hash transactions work, or the hard limit of 520 bytes per element in the stack, it is impossible for our protocol to support a larger number of oracles.

Much of the work in the implementation involved basic tools to manipulate and generate custom transactions. This code is a contribution not only for our protocol, but also for people willing to use the bitcoin with custom transactions, as we do.

Gambling is a really big and heavily regulated industry, initiatives like Winsomeio, oracizeit, or this protocol are tools to hopefully make this industry more flexible. They aim to allow people to fully control its money while gambling, contrarily from standard casinos and betting sites. As cryptocurrencies allows people to stay away from a centralized government issue currencies, this kind of tools also allows people to move away from centralized gambling sites. There is yet another big difference. People running protocols on top of blockchains can see every line of code executed and how decisions are taken, making gambling a transparent process, opposed as it is today, where people uses only the public interface of a web site or brick and mortar casino and what it is “behind the scenes” remains opaque. Never seeing what is really going on “behind the scenes”.

We believe this work is a contribution for both worlds: It introduces new options in the gambling industry. And it also adds a new application on top of Bitcoin, using it as more than a value store currency. Bitcoin introduces a method to store and transfer value without relying in a central authority. The presented protocol uses this property and introduces an option to do these transfers subject to real world events, without sacrificing the lack of central control. Therefore we see the objective for this work as accomplished.

While working on this project we realized bets are only one example of external events that may decide the destination of somebody else's money. We could also see our oracles as *judges* in a dispute. And instead of providing an event outcome into the blockchain, they can decide on any subject, acting as arbitrator on a controversy. Small adjustments would be required for the protocol. For example, if we remove the random selection of oracles, probably judges need to be agreed beforehand by the players. Other required change is to remove the penalization by answering different from the majority. It is perfectly fine and even desirable to have different opinions among the judges, and the ones with the minority should not be punished.

It might be also desirable to have a larger number of oracles participating in a bet. However, this requires a change in the Bitcoin implementation, which is beyond under our control.

Future work might also include sharing oracles among different bets. This could help making the protocol cheaper but adds new issues, such as paying the oracle. Our proposal pays the oracles in the same Bet transaction, get all the users to finance the oracles would require a new approach.

Other interesting change would be to decrease the number of transactions or even the transactions' size to decrease the fees. There are new features being introduced in Bitcoin which may help on this regard. For example, one of the last additions to Bitcoin was *Segregated Witness* (to solve transaction malleability), which opens the door to efficient and practical off the blockchain transactions. This is an option to decrease the number of required transactions posted in the blockchain, and therefore decrease the amount of fees paid.

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# Chapter 6

## Appendix

### 6.1. Transactions

Examples of each one of the most important transactions in the protocol, parsed and explained. Transactions are represented using a json-like format with the field name and its value. In the blockchain, the transaction is a concatenation of all the values exposed here, the field names are added to make the transaction human readable. These transactions are generated for the testnet of Bitcoin, this blockchain works as test for changes to be introduced in Bitcoin. It uses the same bitcoin client and rules, the main difference is their value, “bitcoins” in the testnet do not have a monetary value, so they are easier to access to.

#### 6.1.1. Oracle registration

```
{
  version: 1
  inputs counter: 1
  inputs: {
    {
      prev_tx_hash: 25FCA8C2AA9EC0FBFE418EF18EFF7E683B13EA344F77B5
                      ↪ 3AF48C9D50F980BD45
      prev_idx: 0
      script_length: 107
      script: 483045022100C2CDC0F9C2297D0359F41E6D878AF962966B7DA2
              ↪ 1126BA530C4117B47786165902201F1A667A2433F3336CD8
              ↪ DB220D954585EE3DEECB333DBAABA1E438BD344857D10121
              ↪ 0293CE4CCDC6B49EE87DF835EC2AD77D92822A52444C425D
              ↪ 03C7EDFAD09FCC2E52
      sequence_no: 4294967295
    }
  }
}
```

```

outputs_counter: 2
outputs: {
  {
    value: 0
    script_length: 38
    script: [OP_RETURN, OP_PUSH_36_bytes,
              49276D20616E206F7261636C652120526561647920746F2070
              ↪ 726F766964652064617461]
  }
  {
    value: 20968080
    script_length: 25
    script: [OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
              360973EAE34A60DD1EAB3D18705B9EF1C531B57F,
              OP_EQUALVERIFY, OP_CHECKSIG]
  }
}
lock_time: 0
}

```

The input spends money under the oracle’s control. This is outside the scope of the protocol, so we do not parse it.

The first output is a protocol dependent constant. It uses the OP\_RETURN opcode to push the data mark the output as unspendable. In this example the constant is the string “I’m an oracle! Ready to provide data”. This constant is used to identify an oracle enrollment in the blockchain, so players can find and invoke the oracles.

The second output is the change. In this case the protocol does not require to spend any money in this transaction, so the oracle takes all the money back to an address it controls.

### 6.1.2. Bet promise

```

{
  version: 1
  inputs counter: 7
  inputs: {
    {
      prev_tx_hash: 294B8B68DEC454C90A25C8CCA68EEBCF2280205AC17781
                  ↪ 39527DD64317E6CE14
      prev_idx: 0
      script_length: 106
      script: 47304402204C295245BD9389FC6DD7405F12DC04F6E8FB0E999A
              ↪ 08ABE8C14CCEFF7D6414E002207B6F5C77210B0CF2DC67DD
              ↪ 7E90A8526CC130DA28A87323B612FB030C417447C9012102
              ↪ A52B895664A1D2738B3C1FDEDC112F9B2F1FEF0800150E46
              ↪ 83CF3344AEEE149E
    }
  }
}

```

```

sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: A5C7E5CB12835D4B4CC8CBBEF7F6C1D6761F1C779DE396
           ↪ 179CFAF85A8B966434
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 106
script: 4730440220441665482EFADF4FE4BA306888233D2D9825722A1A
       ↪ 3FBF192D8BA84A5771C86B02201EB740CEF6ABB362DB9AA5
       ↪ ADB6E57E5248B220B0558165D1B371411B651F4666012102
       ↪ 23522078AF81C1A6D028F37B3446ABD29412EFBDF08EAFB1
       ↪ 122B223340E32D1E
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: F66078FCFED4721EB83D7E329E443CA647F78C9FFF6A77
           ↪ C0DD9362932A4BB1D8
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 107
script: 483045022100997F4732B6AFFC2BD95342DCE884ACA906A4A48B
       ↪ 1A841A2CDE07C8C2CD87ADCB0220356B28388D35826AA010
       ↪ 18C154DBA2F1E916F786C3F3E6BD68DB339AEDCDAFAA0121
       ↪ 036E623812F3F4042FA0B981483CB1562E2FE3654E90CB52
       ↪ DF5938932E3B616DEC
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: 322881B20E1C25A7BC7A4FF0947128F05353BDC1186016
           ↪ 907F70316A117B9F34
prev_idx: 1
script_length: 106
script: 47304402205AFE3147A8CCE8A7950BE4B3CE0D65C0EBFA1D39FF1
       ↪ 354CD28C7243F7B0CFE5B022072F165E7DE88CD8A7D8C3B4E
       ↪ B8899900CCB9AEE7CC4E4D3FC0D206EC0094252E012102E99
       ↪ 3E533772F9851A962C59D1819D5641D48B45DC7F6B2D2E2CF
       ↪ 3C34369F7DB5
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: FBC0BA746FECF73D12DEC825BC92630C1C014551F3818D
           ↪ 0CEAE06B71999A644E
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 106
script: 473044022036DE6627456A7DE119093F1E949705D090F00F521E
       ↪ 169C023E8BA9325B44175D022002A2A66272116DDAA378FE
       ↪ 89A0C0E0D6F202CCA9B7CF3CC75E2C01EC19ADE4D9012102
       ↪ E993E533772F9851A962C59D1819D5641D48B45DC7F6B2D2

```



```

        ↪ E2CF3C34369F7DB5
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: 741ADE91531D0537B94BBAB93E438D487E2EB4AF070DA2
        ↪ 10888527D4710FA780
prev_idx: 1
script_length: 106
script: 473044022070E8DAFBC001E12A6D2477391D493B0E22A7C1F044
        ↪ 23E47CC517E9FDA83CE0E802207F6A16960C13FAEA4386BB
        ↪ 2405478B4D82B39911CB64DEDD5C36F363A10434A5012103
        ↪ 4D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF95181DB3
        ↪ E209CD5B14332568
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: 4004CC1568D1041710924139C1206A89CCCA5C8D2D072C
        ↪ 426E9E75C94B31F7EF
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 107
script: 483045022100FCED70DE0C66BC3E3B10F6F1A3AC6849BE625AA6
        ↪ 0D28E1F5A7E36E0FFCB372C6022054CC3D92DD4914FEFA9F
        ↪ 2BC8DA77182C4691E754794741C5DD7A1C44080ED29F0121
        ↪ 02E993E533772F9851A962C59D1819D5641D48B45DC7F6B2
        ↪ D2E2CF3C34369F7DB5
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
}
outputs_counter: 10
outputs: {
{
value: 0
script_length: 257
script: [OP_RETURN, OP_PUSH_254_bytes,
17426574206C6F6F6B696E6720666F72206F7261636C657305
        ↪ 226D6B536737437248366E7A584145753753454E6F6B7
        ↪ 371636E425262566347783868226D6E41764644697434
        ↪ 50745A5338507334474D73456F7167436E3543624E473
        ↪ 36B4B226D69687976764D756A47317A57416946515239
        ↪ 3850336A67614C4A4C557A504E6172226D6D334551536
        ↪ E74344A506659505063586A64616F61666A5062445235
        ↪ 6231444C57226D7265675042747333756D6B4B386F7A4
        ↪ 55764486E35324E516D34384D51566D597394AC3992DD
        ↪ 3B975DCA40927169D471EBE00F19E601206C6F63616C6
        ↪ 86F73743A343332342C203137322E31392E322E35343A
        ↪ 38383736]
}
}

```

```

{
  value: 99892970
  script_length: 23
  script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           029EF2FC0D7C46BDCC4F07E517F6CC99F3711A66, OP_EQUAL]
}
{
  value: 99892970
  script_length: 23
  script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           003F90F5C12455CABD2F31685048ED4EDB3457AA, OP_EQUAL]
}
{
  value: 60000
  script_length: 23
  script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           B0A5676BE17E30499FFF05011D1D404770C48A40, OP_EQUAL]
}
{
  value: 60000
  script_length: 23
  script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           B0A5676BE17E30499FFF05011D1D404770C48A40, OP_EQUAL]
}
{
  value: 60000
  script_length: 23
  script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           B0A5676BE17E30499FFF05011D1D404770C48A40, OP_EQUAL]
}
{
  value: 60000
  script_length: 23
  script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           B0A5676BE17E30499FFF05011D1D404770C48A40, OP_EQUAL]
}
{
  value: 60000
  script_length: 23
  script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           B0A5676BE17E30499FFF05011D1D404770C48A40, OP_EQUAL]
}
{
  value: 220550000
  script_length: 25
  script: [OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
           66E2E39AB1C5E98A8180DE876CC4743D3292E14A, OP_EQUALVERIFY,

```

```

                OP_CHECKSIG]
    }
    {
        value: 531650000
        script_length: 25
        script: [OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
                73F245C95CAF31F4449B8259D6CEB248A57262F8, OP_EQUALVERIFY,
                OP_CHECKSIG]
    }
}
lock_time: 0
}

```

The inputs is all the money required to run this bet, it comes from both players' previously owned addresses.

The first output pushes the following: A constant to identify the data, in this case the string "Bet looking for oracles"; The bet description's hash; The channel to type and address to establish communication with the players. In this case an IP address and a port.

The second and third outputs move most of the money to a joint account, later used in the Bet transaction.

The fourth to the eighth outputs set apart the money to be used in the oracle enrollment.

Output number nine and ten are the change for both players, the difference from what they got from their inputs and what it is the required to run the bet.

Second to eighth outputs use Pay To Script Hash. This means we do not get to see the real script required to spend them, just the hash of it. The script (and the data required to evaluate it) must be provided when spending this outputs.

### 6.1.3. Oracle enrollment

```

{
    version: 1
    inputs counter: 4
    inputs: {
        {
            prev_tx_hash: 25FCA8C2AA9EC0FBFE418EF18EFF7E683B13EA344F77B5
                        ↪ 3AF48C9D50F980BD45
            prev_idx: 0
            script_length: 107
            script: [OP_PUSH_72_bytes
                    3045022100D0F089625E7E1198D48D6DF2AACF0A5AAB42853C
                    ↪ A48EE0B458DCC91D7438FB0502200DFA820300B8389C6
                    ↪ ED256387F78A3C2B30453B504520DB96F47DA57349883
                    ↪ [ALL]

```

```

        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        0293CE4CCDC6B49EE87DF835EC2AD77D92822A52444C425D03
        ↪ C7EDFAD09FCC2E52]
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: F3378F87464223D458156E561D147B1E8C50DD55860A69
        ↪ 065F7B3BD1D96F8EAB
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 106
script: [OP_PUSH_71_bytes
        304402206F48E436F5DDC97A74D7CF96BBD3BEF6252964F90B1
        ↪ 6F0F22E67CB93FD7D18610220441F11AB77AC454258808
        ↪ BD641183ADD71D6B8EB7DD455A9F400D2315958DF [ALL]
        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        0293CE4CCDC6B49EE87DF835EC2AD77D92822A52444C425D03C
        ↪ 7EDFAD09FCC2E52]
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: F65ED60FAF8C89F16E89939B1EBD5AC91FCCDA1EE4EBE1
        ↪ 1BD4DA203469C714CA
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 107
script: [OP_PUSH_72_bytes
        3045022100D32C220D13956398B7C1EBB7858FD4272F40ACD5
        ↪ BDB76E1D2FAF3A2E709047C8022065CC1C9AD993483B78
        ↪ C8394DBAB2CDEC1C67B49576BF0CCEB8B1DEFAB52254
        ↪ [ALL]
        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        0293CE4CCDC6B49EE87DF835EC2AD77D92822A52444C425D03
        ↪ C7EDFAD09FCC2E52]
sequence_no: 4294967295
}
{
prev_tx_hash: B7C9A9B3870295EF98367502E599210E1046410C9FA154
        ↪ 7321E8E026CAEB5590
prev_idx: 3
script_length: 218
script: [OP_0 OP_PUSH_72_bytes
        3045022100E3D14D93F42FB897D3DAB079122843CAC1DBE72A
        ↪ 22132689001FB452BCA144330220573015E3783DD47A42
        ↪ F49CB5A77E85CCA87049AEF4775B942DD740AF09962F
        ↪ [ALL]
        OP_PUSH_71_bytes
        304402203DE0D1CD2DE543795F79933DACCADFAAFF8D5D631E
        ↪ FF039EAC25CC8D759E696902207F48C2244049A8BF8764

```

```

    ↪ B74C7659C704E48E89E095968DBE4F76D17F23E1EA
    ↪ [ALL]
    OP_PUSH_71_bytes
    {
        [OP_2 OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2C
        ↪ D156B997F865034C257D1
        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF9518
        ↪ 1DB3E209CD5B14332568
        OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG]
    }
    ]
    sequence_no: 4294967295
}
}
outputs_counter: 3
outputs: {
    {
        value: 3001780
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
        1DBB37095E8EC83A0C37D4AF62778AA3035C8B7E, OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 10000000
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
        A17855C80692945036967371A75ACD35003DEDDC, OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 232075000
        script_length: 25
        script: [OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, OP_PUSH_20_bytes,
        360973EAE34A60DD1EAB3D18705B9EF1C531B57F,
        OP_EQUALVERIFY, OP_CHECKSIG]
    }
}
lock_time: 0
}

```

First three inputs belong to the oracle, this money come from transactions outside the protocol. And we can see the input of this transactions is the required data for a Pay to Public Key Hash, the public key and its corresponding signature.

The fourth input is spending the fourth (index 3) output from the Bet Promise transaction. It contains the output script requesting both players signatures using the OP\_CHECKMULTISIG

opcode. It also contains the two required signatures.

The first output moves the money to a joint account controlled by both players and the oracle.

The second output is the two answers penalty deposit.

The third output is the oracle's change, it gives the non used money back to the oracle.

#### 6.1.4. Bet

```
{
  version: 2
  inputs counter: 7
  inputs: {
    {
      prev_tx_hash: 2138072E6593FFBFECAB73D9F2B819E84274DAA78811DD
                      ↪ 54D994DF0972EBB657
      prev_idx: 1
      script_length: 227
      script: [OP_PUSH_71_bytes
                3044022069A810EBE1EEF38E7D4EC7606A5B98A2FAC417B3A1
                ↪ 7C012EA3249316AF5A6FD4022067F532EAE45500B6B0FA
                ↪ C8C42FE53E312406706FA2CEF47F11DD4567D0A517
                ↪ [ALL]
                OP_1 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
                30440220160EC827ECE0FD655F17D3C157C9BFAFF36ADF1CEB
                ↪ 23640E47B67D02E0B26A7802205ADE0BE3833FBD6E2B8A
                ↪ C37A4991A7F6954F1962E2CEDA86A824B9C65025BB
                ↪ [ALL]
                OP_PUSH_80_bytes
                {
                  [OP_PUSH_33_bytes
                    02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2CD1
                    ↪ 56B997F865034C257D1
                    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
                    OP_IF
                    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
                    034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF95
                    ↪ 181DB3E209CD5B14332568
                    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
                    OP_ELSE
                    OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
                    OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP
                    OP_ENDIF
                    OP_1]
                  }
                }
    }
  }
}
```

```

    ]
    sequence_no: 18446744073709551615
}
{
    prev_tx_hash: 2138072E6593FFBFECAB73D9F2B819E84274DAA78811DD
        ↪ 54D994DF0972EBB657
    prev_idx: 2
    script_length: 227
    script: [OP_PUSH_71_bytes
        304402202C6CFD8F24F24C093F37A7C00C983E0530F44F038B
        ↪ CC0D88DCF8F1906681A2B8022065C689F5AF3C0B81F719
        ↪ 816A19228217E592588EFC0EA9B900BF57C8FA6FCF
        ↪ [ALL]
    OP_1 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
    304402202B23B5CF5B175225BCD571CB5384C1E0AE8D991771
    ↪ DFF56B3C65825C840D19DF02204677B925F2F0DC8AD860
    ↪ 22867A005FF2F61F4DB642D7A12FA3815FF5EAE701
    ↪ [ALL]
    OP_PUSH_80_bytes
    {
        [OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF95181
        ↪ DB3E209CD5B14332568
        OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
        OP_IF
        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2C
        ↪ D156B997F865034C257D1
        OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
        OP_ELSE
        OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
        OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
        OP_DROP
        OP_ENDIF
        OP_1]
    }
    ]
    sequence_no: 18446744073709551615
}
{
    prev_tx_hash: 9EF6EFAD5B2C9EF387D19D878DA83E9743FAAE0A235BF4
        ↪ 8B049D9C86CB84F84A
    prev_idx: 0
    script_length: 337
    script: [OP_0 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
        3044022025E3CB3C98561F4E96E63A992895015531CE029B64
        ↪ 2D4E64F3D0A6D606E4302502200A9A9CDC8C7B9D19C81D

```

```

    ↪ 8AEB51DEDE329FE710C5877E3B923BF8B58C2ED678
    ↪ [ALL]
OP_PUSH_71_bytes
304402203B778E24A9E64161925AC8C6D47937250E47AE251C
    ↪ B3D47FFB4EE01F0D6DC96202205DB43C82081391471D28
    ↪ 20B530D51CB27B90B187B22FC8F775F5E5CEAD7307
    ↪ [ALL]
OP_1 OP_PUSH_72_bytes
3045022100C8CD147FC265CF5A1A7AE63EE89070C308D1A54A
    ↪ 0885F6048556B76F1CFA0D95022039141CBDA7D289A467
    ↪ 8F296C4687AA46CAA9B1887CC9BF31FCB6705052F37E
    ↪ [ALL]
OP_PUSH_116_bytes
{
    [OP_PUSH_33_bytes
    03E4BAB917EA0BD852820237A59595CB3B06F9492EF6EC5
    ↪ BEC16F5A89B5717E1F2
    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_IF
    OP_2
    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
    02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2C
    ↪ D156B997F865034C257D1
    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
    034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF951
    ↪ 81DB3E209CD5B14332568
    OP_2
    OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
    OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
    OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
    OP_DROP
    OP_ENDIF
    OP_1]
    }
}
sequence_no: 18446744073709551615
}
{
prev_tx_hash: FBBEC4193E0B7BB96208BB7CC5EA3834D324E422CDA367
    ↪ E57C65511E9696D810
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 336
script: [OP_0 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
30440220266A8174C9A75DA1C8FC7A43276B8FF2FEA79F87A9
    ↪ B9D10141729E0FA685A4CD0220316F6FBE91934C236BD4
    ↪ 608BB80C67AEFADCFD67F5C177039A70BF5A292380

```



```

    ↪ [ALL]
    OP_PUSH_71_bytes
    304402204C6A3C1E25615C2BF7B33F5637C78C24A1E1E33880
    ↪ 6675DC2B1905AFBCC2A0630220092950399A27279FA952
    ↪ 71ABE31C3F4D370853649665C69093016EDE6E9054
    ↪ [ALL]
    OP_1 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
    304402201501B998021EF8B77884EF66931B9B3B024021CAB0
    ↪ EE7FA98A0085D79EEF0180022016BBA25B58C5D66AECC0
    ↪ 431144B722528A587C1005EA4EBD83EA866DA95576
    ↪ [ALL]
    OP_PUSH_116_bytes
    {
        [OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        03C26AADD6B66332134182E8FCA8C238A7C24448D43C368
        ↪ 860BF1C7488F3CDC171
        OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
        OP_IF
        OP_2
        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2C
        ↪ D156B997F865034C257D1
        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF951
        ↪ 81DB3E209CD5B14332568
        OP_2
        OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY
        OP_ELSE
        OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
        OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
        OP_DROP
        OP_ENDIF
        OP_1]
    }
    ]
    sequence_no: 18446744073709551615
}
{
    prev_tx_hash: 3F32A95A1F811F2DF13192B1EB09C48C2C53491ADF7E9C
    ↪ 9D5152FB64ECCE4758
    prev_idx: 0
    script_length: 336
    script: [OP_0 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
    3044022069269B2D9053B13EDEA05F8A2726ADDE9DB8EE36DC
    ↪ E20BE9F80A3C4FF02C3EC702202018BA6BACF254AF9183
    ↪ 426C668C2EE5FCBAF17A062EAF3EAFE7D529697FA8
    ↪ [ALL]

```

```

OP_PUSH_71_bytes
304402202B43221C29EF9A32048BC883BC91E8BEEBF03EB300
  ↳ BEDA73B2790364C496A06E02204321EAED90C7A06518C6
  ↳ E6FE497786A6ED4B07EA7D9EB22E5745B137E98C2C
[ALL]
OP_1 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
30440220554BF72107A0F64007E0C36D38FBDE9C82FE6E4B70
  ↳ 56482FE7B23009A14AFC76022001BC85C822F49EBAC44E
  ↳ 37DF62414AD0A36D1DDAAE22B5911302BFD735FD49
[ALL]
OP_PUSH_116_bytes
{
  [OP_PUSH_33_bytes
    034D3259B9F364B8642A7E5937BD1C678E73C8353B0D525
      ↳ FF4C3181ADDE1CCA95B
    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_IF
      OP_2
      OP_PUSH_33_bytes
      02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2C
        ↳ D156B997F865034C257D1
      OP_PUSH_33_bytes
      034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF951
        ↳ 81DB3E209CD5B14332568
      OP_2
      OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
      OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
      OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
      OP_DROP
    OP_ENDIF
  OP_1]
}
]
sequence_no: 18446744073709551615
}
{
prev_tx_hash: 9DBCE4D777148100FA1D7E11B0F6FA568413601B24948F
  ↳ 598D67036BF9BADB3B
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 337
script: [OP_0 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
  3044022000DBD27D25C4BF0E1E1E2493DB3309AEC5F181288D
    ↳ 1B6925463C93B7A06E1F730220293A8F9652A374E59E9D
    ↳ 09CC129DD5753D83F811FE42E6B4096F4E6FCA1DDC
    ↳ [ALL]
  OP_PUSH_71_bytes

```

```

3044022016BA7E45A2D6A8174DE2A0476FA7A0E40C853CE793
  ↳ F71BDB5839FA824C253E1902206AEF00B3DD3EA8DCEBB1
  ↳ BF4B6741D28254A9384F11F72560BB63EC4E80570E
  ↳ [ALL]
OP_1 OP_PUSH_72_bytes
30450221009BD014D23E09693DE13CBE20CABCE8D341D22792
  ↳ 0D2884AC43584CC4770CBE3A022008A4D78E48620B56B5
  ↳ 148AC4CC214D962127DE10DD4977F447698D0FEE8C1C
  ↳ [ALL]
OP_PUSH_116_bytes
{
  [OP_PUSH_33_bytesi
    03840940CAB26409E8239C463655A4668108FA7C3B5F2A4
    ↳ F7FAFFD2C4D00047247
    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_IF
    OP_2
    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
    02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2C
    ↳ D156B997F865034C257D1
    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
    034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF951
    ↳ 81DB3E209CD5B14332568
    OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
    OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
    OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
    OP_DROP
    OP_ENDIF
    OP_1]
  }
]
sequence_no: 18446744073709551615
}
{
prev_tx_hash: 66AFA218E07ABE0D8242666FF170522F1CCED81006A1A3
  ↳ F9CF0E10808749F89E
prev_idx: 0
script_length: 338
script: [OP_0 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
  304402204CE28022808810B4DF1FEC09F5D14CB7369BCAB67D
  ↳ 320C23F5CEE468484B1CF102202C2D4CBCB7E917D49160
  ↳ 57DAA5B19F807C28FDBA7BD487FC9E87C2894F4EB2
  ↳ [ALL]
  OP_PUSH_72_bytes
  3045022100D624642E9EE4FD9E30ACA11579BD86B4646E846E
  ↳ 2E7619E82C24D2E602A2F82F0220054972431AB9F49FA7

```

```

    ↪ 1D345DD2C638ED49CCBE540A4F42F5E354293DDF5E4F
    ↪ [ALL]
  OP_1 OP_PUSH_72_bytes
  3045022100CE64EBBCC4D1125A59A5A989C69777051E840685
    ↪ A4094D03411867192E072B1C02200D1E53F93EA142968C
    ↪ ABDE879C599F465EBA818094FF4D867A7BEC6C13B048
    ↪ [ALL]
  OP_PUSH_116_bytes
  {
    [OP_PUSH_33_bytes
    0320E9F9ED3209E2A2552354FDD632245B13A0019B067EE
    ↪ 4537ECFD9C6CCC17582
    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
    OP_IF
      OP_2
      OP_PUSH_33_bytes
      02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2C
      ↪ D156B997F865034C257D1
      OP_PUSH_33_bytes
      034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF95181DB3E209CD5B14332568
      OP_2
      OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY
    OP_ELSE
      OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
      OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
      OP_DROP
    OP_ENDIF
    OP_1]
  }
]
sequence_no: 18446744073709551615
}
}
outputs_counter: 12
outputs: {
  {
    value: 92281150
    script_length: 23
    script: [OP_HASH160
      OP_PUSH_20_bytes E5A86D80F148897C3813C3981E9940CF328AAC49
      OP_EQUAL]
  }
  {
    value: 92281150
    script_length: 23
    script: [OP_HASH160
      OP_PUSH_20_bytes 2DCCF04275EB961DD4ED9E87EBC9B948C88E70E1

```

```

                OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 3000000
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes B8ED98E1F64E5A6278093054F201B1704B5D4519
                OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 3000000
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes D48B76D17895B4B8D6364F60FE3E0D734F3D8958
                OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 3000000
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes E84ABC5DAEBF11FFEC60E479ED8C17651837008D
                OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 3000000
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes 56D2E9575A80B96BFA3B9B1435A91DEFCBE77781
                OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 3000000
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes 7C4DCB244DA6DF5D472A7F88BA2C4D21867E99F7
                OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 3000000
        script_length: 23
        script: [OP_HASH160
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes CD5FA2DEF69CA02FB959FA79663C7D9366B1BAE1
                OP_EQUAL]
    }
    {
        value: 3000000
        script_length: 23

```

```

    script: [OP_HASH160
              OP_PUSH_20_bytes 632C59C13A5D3CE501CD772242D1E1278B0CE456
              OP_EQUAL]
  }
  {
    value: 3000000
    script_length: 23
    script: [OP_HASH160
              OP_PUSH_20_bytes 9D2E8D88757AA4227B72EA2111201909305B9DFA
              OP_EQUAL]
  }
  {
    value: 3000000
    script_length: 23
    script: [OP_HASH160
              OP_PUSH_20_bytes 639C1223300F80B287AF33819512EF861D7027E5
              OP_EQUAL]
  }
  {
    value: 3000000
    script_length: 23
    script: [OP_HASH160
              OP_PUSH_20_bytes 8EA5E31EF1F503BAFB9CEF5B3C02F03C0DD945A9
              OP_EQUAL]
  }
}
lock_time: 0
}

```

First two inputs spend the second and third output at the Bet Promise transaction. They include each player's signature and the output script. If we look closely, the output script is symmetric, as seen in table 3.3. We can see the main difference is the position of each player's public key. Other interesting data to notice is the "FA0140" constant that appears, it is the  $\tau_{Bet}$ <sup>1</sup>.

Next five inputs are the money coming from each oracle's enrollment. At this inputs we can see three signatures are used, both players and the corresponding oracle. We can see two of the public keys are repeated in the previous inputs, however the signature provided for them are not equal. This is because the way Bitcoin specify transactions are signed: When signing a Pay To Script Hash all others input's scripts are set emptied. And the one being sign is set to the output's script the input spends. This is how Bitcoin ensures signatures are tied to its input.

### 6.1.5. Oracle answer

---

<sup>1</sup>The interpretation of this bytes can be found at Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 0112. <https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0112.mediawiki>

```

{
  version: 2
  inputs counter: 1
  inputs: {
    {
      prev_tx_hash: 9CAA0B7F15D18DAC9034DB114452ACD405C53B4BB1C20C
                      ↪ CCE0A7C6ADC0CF226A
      prev_idx: 2
      script_length: 269
      script: [OP_PUSH_22_bytes
                1AE3DB90D7B53CB9C1173900C356AE2D27CFB11B68EB
                OP_1 OP_PUSH_71_bytes
                30440220737C8D9FBEC9E236CC29A4A39D8C9AE157B4EC591E
                ↪ 09B92A1093CD0C5D495E4E02201FF11CB6D5EFDFE9CA9D
                ↪ 16BA4FD35623C634F0E7942D97B5D9EDB411B3B0E4
                ↪ [ALL]
                OP_1
                OP_PUSH_170_bytes
                {
                  [OP_IF
                    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
                    03E4BAB917EA0BD852820237A59595CB3B06F9492EF
                    ↪ 6EC5BEC16F5A89B5717E1F2
                    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
                    OP_PUSH_3_bytes FA0140
                    OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
                    OP_DROP
                    OP_IF
                      OP_HASH160
                      OP_PUSH_20_bytes
                      50918176ACCC76AFA983FBC196F72A13169E3706
                      OP_EQUALVERIFY
                    OP_ELSE
                      OP_HASH160
                      OP_PUSH_20_bytes
                      CB2349648A50A14AF307D60946B36299D323C58B
                      OP_EQUALVERIFY
                    OP_ENDIF
                  OP_ELSE
                    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
                    02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2
                    ↪ CD156B997F865034C257D1
                    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
                    OP_PUSH_33_bytes
                    034D00A2B430B6999974A29A168B56A12C0065A6CF95
                    ↪ 181DB3E209CD5B14332568
                    OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY

```

```

        OP_PUSH_3_bytes 320240
        OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
        OP_DROP
    OP_ENDIF
    OP_1]
}
]
sequence_no: 4194810
}
}
outputs_counter: 1
outputs: {
{
value: 2950160
script_length: 25
script: [OP_DUP, OP_HASH160
        OP_PUSH_20_bytes
        360973EAE34A60DD1EAB3D18705B9EF1C531B57F
        OP_EQUALVERIFY
        OP_CHECKSIG]
}
}
lock_time: 0
}

```

The first input of this transaction is giving a vote for winner to the first player. The value pushed is the 22-byte secret which hash is expected by the output script at the nested if-else block. We can see there are two options in this block, they only differ in the hash expected. They represent the vote for each player, and both have the same validity for this script. The second branch for the output script (not used by this transaction) requires both players' signatures and to be submitted after the timeout "320240", corresponding to  $\tau_{Reply}$ . At posting this transaction the oracle makes public its vote, after the required number of oracles does this, the winner can take these hash and redeem its prize.

The output of this transaction is a simple Pay To Public Key Hash, where the oracles has decided to move its payment.

#### 6.1.6. Winner prize collect

```

{
version: 2
inputs counter: 2
inputs: {
{
prev_tx_hash: 17640D0C824C575BE3F393491B32D1B585E5CA28F36BDB
               ↗ 2D2F98EFB3006B4535
prev_idx: 0

```



```

script_length: 567
script: [OP_PUSH_71_bytes
        304402207DC931CE42CCBD552FFCD75D57AF6A5E49B204ACAA
        ↪ 55AAB145C9181E44BA6B4D02207A031F9AF4EF605163A6
        ↪ C364660E6F7F06E49968823FF76679AF46CB1CFA5D
        ↪ [ALL]
        OP_PUSH_33_bytes
        02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2CD156B
        ↪ 997F865034C257D1
        OP_PUSH_1_bytes 51
        OP_PUSH_19_bytes
        3AFFA9D769B5807CE4F9764771A0F966CE02A6
        OP_PUSH_23_bytes
        5FDDD56DB498CFB29C514B3A27A6F685FF40449E9974CA
        OP_PUSH_21_bytes
        5A0A3C2DB3CB1DE19C0896FED80B4335FB6C503194
        OP_1
        OP_1
        OP_PUSH_388_bytes
        {
            [OP_IF
                OP_IF
                OP_0
                OP_TOALTSTACK
                OP_HASH160
                OP_DUP
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes
                010E7DAFABDD0E8EED77B2C1F715F3071F710D3E
                OP_EQUAL
                OP_IF
                OP_DROP
                OP_HASH160
                OP_ELSE
                OP_FROMALTSTACK
                OP_1ADD
                OP_TOALTSTACK
                OP_ENDIF
                OP_DUP
                OP_PUSH_20_bytes
                4D2021B46ED7B29EFC20AFB4C771AAE341AEBE5D
                OP_EQUAL
                OP_IF
                OP_DROP
                OP_HASH160
                OP_ELSE
                OP_FROMALTSTACK
                OP_1ADD
            ]
        }
    ]

```

```

    OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
774594000150D5935E3B1F63187EFCEB1E36CB83
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
590F74932E25BE9A958FD19D39BE52E2A4CB9D3F
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
276C972344745AADA362D4CECA7A25301EE47D86
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DROP
OP_FROMALTSTACK
OP_2
OP_LESSTHANOREQUAL
OP_VERIFY
OP_ELSE
    OP_PUSH_3_bytes
6A0240
OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY

```

```

    OP_DROP
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP
OP_HASH160
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
66E2E39AB1C5E98A8180DE876CC4743D3292E14A
OP_EQUALVERIFY
OP_CHECKSIG
OP_ELSE
    OP_0
    OP_TOALTSTACK
    OP_HASH160
    OP_DUP
    OP_PUSH_20_bytes
    99B6793C6944C55AB1195957545746055FEA0593
    OP_EQUAL
    OP_IF
        OP_DROP
        OP_HASH160
    OP_ELSE
        OP_FROMALTSTACK
        OP_1ADD
        OP_TOALTSTACK
    OP_ENDIF
    OP_DUP
    OP_PUSH_20_bytes
    2A3FB2A0E3DF3219579F5AF968A7AE118C7287FE
    OP_EQUAL
    OP_IF
        OP_DROP
        OP_HASH160
    OP_ELSE
        OP_FROMALTSTACK
        OP_1ADD
        OP_TOALTSTACK
    OP_ENDIF
    OP_DUP
    OP_PUSH_20_bytes
    2C1771354527252791F83A78AC5CEBD7427ACB59
    OP_EQUAL
    OP_IF
        OP_DROP
        OP_HASH160
    OP_ELSE
        OP_FROMALTSTACK
        OP_1ADD
        OP_TOALTSTACK

```

```

        OP_ENDIF
        OP_DUP
        OP_PUSH_20_bytes
        A843DBB79C247128B7BD223A80CA3551201515A3
        OP_EQUAL
        OP_IF
            OP_DROP
            OP_HASH160
        OP_ELSE
            OP_FROMALTSTACK
            OP_1ADD
            OP_TOALTSTACK
        OP_ENDIF
        OP_DUP
        OP_PUSH_20_bytes
        32FB95E3F35819519703A58B016F02C9C4943BFC
        OP_EQUAL
        OP_IF
            OP_DROP
            OP_HASH160
        OP_ELSE
            OP_FROMALTSTACK
            OP_1ADD
            OP_TOALTSTACK
        OP_ENDIF
        OP_DROP
        OP_FROMALTSTACK
        OP_2
        OP_LESSTHANOREQUAL
        OP_VERIFY
        OP_DUP
        OP_HASH160
        OP_PUSH_20_bytes
        4C48CA1BE269DF0539BFD40D27AC797101B7FFC9
        OP_EQUALVERIFY
        OP_CHECKSIG
    OP_ENDIF]
    }
]
sequence_no: 4194810
}
{
    prev_tx_hash: 17640DOC824C575BE3F393491B32D1B585E5CA28F36BDB
    ↪ 2D2F98EFB3006B4535
    prev_idx: 1
    script_length: 567
    script: [OP_PUSH_72_bytes

```

```

3045022100DDC7EE0D84A2B67A8EE5CF6328DE45776F518705
  ↪ 617C3E817FD368A74C6FC00E0220013496B5C3E7925887
  ↪ E32FB1253E2E1ECFC4A8D17AA6586BF84AF3F8A7EE97
  ↪ [ALL]
OP_PUSH_33_bytes
02EF5471E4BB8B2B6709C700057DBA30F2F9D418ACD2CD156B
  ↪ 997F865034C257D1
OP_PUSH_1_bytes 51
OP_PUSH_19_bytes
3AFFA9D769B5807CE4F9764771A0F966CE02A6
OP_PUSH_23_bytes
5FDDD56DB498CFB29C514B3A27A6F685FF40449E9974CA
OP_PUSH_21_bytes
5A0A3C2DB3CB1DE19C0896FED80B4335FB6C503194
OP_0
OP_PUSH_388_bytes
{
  [OP_IF
    OP_IF
      OP_0
      OP_TOALTSTACK
      OP_HASH160
      OP_DUP
      OP_PUSH_20_bytes
      99B6793C6944C55AB1195957545746055FEA0593
      OP_EQUAL
      OP_IF
        OP_DROP
        OP_HASH160
      OP_ELSE
        OP_FROMALTSTACK
        OP_1ADD
        OP_TOALTSTACK
      OP_ENDIF
      OP_DUP
      OP_PUSH_20_bytes
      2A3FB2A0E3DF3219579F5AF968A7AE118C7287FE
      OP_EQUAL
      OP_IF
        OP_DROP
        OP_HASH160
      OP_ELSE
        OP_FROMALTSTACK
        OP_1ADD
        OP_TOALTSTACK
      OP_ENDIF
      OP_DUP

```

```

OP_PUSH_20_bytes
2C1771354527252791F83A78AC5CEBD7427ACB59
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
A843DBB79C247128B7BD223A80CA3551201515A3
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
32FB95E3F35819519703A58B016F02C9C4943BFC
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DROP
OP_FROMALTSTACK
OP_2
OP_LESSTHANOREQUAL
OP_VERIFY
OP_ELSE
    OP_PUSH_3_bytes
    6A0240
    OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
    OP_DROP
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP

```

```

OP_HASH160
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
4C48CA1BE269DF0539BFD40D27AC797101B7FFC9
OP_EQUALVERIFY
OP_CHECKSIG
OP_ELSE
  OP_0
  OP_TOALTSTACK
  OP_HASH160
  OP_DUP
  OP_PUSH_20_bytes
  010E7DAFABDD0E8EED77B2C1F715F3071F710D3E
  OP_EQUAL
  OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
  OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
  OP_ENDIF
  OP_DUP
  OP_PUSH_20_bytes
  4D2021B46ED7B29EFC20AFB4C771AAE341AEBE5D
  OP_EQUAL
  OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
  OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
  OP_ENDIF
  OP_DUP
  OP_PUSH_20_bytes
  774594000150D5935E3B1F63187EFCEB1E36CB83
  OP_EQUAL
  OP_IF
    OP_DROP
    OP_HASH160
  OP_ELSE
    OP_FROMALTSTACK
    OP_1ADD
    OP_TOALTSTACK
  OP_ENDIF
  OP_DUP
  OP_PUSH_20_bytes

```

```

590F74932E25BE9A958FD19D39BE52E2A4CB9D3F
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
  OP_DROP
  OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
  OP_FROMALTSTACK
  OP_1ADD
  OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DUP
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
276C972344745AADA362D4CECA7A25301EE47D86
OP_EQUAL
OP_IF
  OP_DROP
  OP_HASH160
OP_ELSE
  OP_FROMALTSTACK
  OP_1ADD
  OP_TOALTSTACK
OP_ENDIF
OP_DROP
OP_FROMALTSTACK
OP_2
OP_LESSTHANOREQUAL
OP_VERIFY
OP_DUP
OP_HASH160
OP_PUSH_20_bytes
66E2E39AB1C5E98A8180DE876CC4743D3292E14A
OP_EQUALVERIFY
OP_CHECKSIG
OP_ENDIF]
}
]
  sequence_no: 4194810
}
}
outputs_counter: 1
outputs: {
  {
    value: 184385480
    script_length: 25
    script: [OP_DUP OP_HASH160 OP_PUSH_20_bytes
      66E2E39AB1C5E98A8180DE876CC4743D3292E14A
      OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG]
  }
}

```



```

    }
  }
  lock_time: 0
}

```

Inputs spend the first two outputs of the bet transaction. They contain the public key and the signature of the winner, and a majority of the votes for this player. In this case we have 5 oracles, and the threshold is set to 3, so inputs include three votes on its script, we can see these votes at the beginning of the script. The large and repetitive script is one of the costs of using a non Turing complete language. Because there are no loops available, we need to write everything explicitly, like an unrolled loop. This script contains three main branches, one for the timeout case, where a new constant is visible: "6A0240", which is the  $\tau_{Two}$ . And one for each winner, we can see at both of them the 20-byte hash of the expected votes. Most of the size in this output are these hash, in this case 10 of them, 2 per each oracle participating. An interesting property of this transaction is all the signatures required are generated by the winner, third parties are not required directly to redeem the bet prize.

The script implements an operation similar to a multi-sig check, but instead of signatures it checks multiple hash. It works by testing the provided pre image candidates against the expected hash, by hashing and then testing equality. Each time a pre image does not match a hash, we increase a counter stored in the alt stack, at the end of the script we check this counter to be less than 2. The difference between the total number of oracles and the threshold. It requires ordering in the provided candidates, respecting the order hash are written.

The output is a Pay To Public Key Hash which moves the money to an account controlled by the player.

## 6.2. Bitcoin scripting

Bitcoin transactions are encoded using a Forth-like scripting system<sup>2</sup>. A script is a sequence of instructions that describes how an output can be spent. The language does not have any jump or loop instructions, as it is purposefully not Turing-complete, in order to keep the execution of a script bounded.

A transaction is valid (can be redeemed) if its script evaluation does not trigger a failure and the top stack element is non false. Using a script in the transaction provides flexibility to change the parameters required to redeem a transaction.

The script contains commands or functions (also known as opcodes) and raw data, as keys and addresses. Commands available in the language can be grouped into a few groups: stack operations, as dup, push and drop; arithmetic operations on 32-bit signed integers, such as addition, subtraction and comparison; cryptographic operations like hash calculations and signature check; flow control as if and elf.

---

<sup>2</sup>Forth is an imperative stack based programming language developed in the late '60s.

There are some commands to mark the transaction invalid and make the output impossible to redeem on certain conditions, for instance before a certain time has elapsed since the transaction was included in the blockchain.

More information on the google scripting language can be found on the project wiki at <https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script> and in the official client implementation at <https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/script/script.h>.