

Notes

Introduction

1. On linguistic engineering in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, see Young 1991. There is also relevant information in works such as Zeman 1964 (on Nazi Germany) and Benn 1989 (on the Soviet Union). Whyte (1974, chap. 3) shows that in the Soviet Union, small group rituals (a crucial agent of effective linguistic engineering) were not extended to the general population.
2. It is possible, of course, that there have been even more rigorous experiments in linguistic engineering, but they have not been sufficiently documented. Two cases that deserve investigation are the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Pol Pot's Cambodia, although the existence of the latter was very brief (1975–1979). Other possibilities, on a much smaller scale, include some religious sects and enclosed religious communities.
3. I have borrowed the terms “logocide” and “semanticide” from Young 1991, chap. 4.
4. The field is well surveyed by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and van Dijk (2001).

Chapter 1: Linguistic Engineering

1. Reference groups model attitudes, so there is a degree of overlap between reference group effects and modeling. However, modeling is not confined to reference groups, and reference group theory goes beyond modeling theory when it explains why we adopt attitudes modeled by some groups (our reference groups), but reject attitudes modeled by others. That is why the two theories require separate mention.

Chapter 2: Linguistic Engineering before the Cultural Revolution

1. See, for example, K. D. Yang 1998, 236: “Language is the direct reality of thought. One cannot think without language.” Similar views

are expressed by D. F. Yang 1999, 100: “As everyone knows, language is a tool of thinking. Humans can only think through language.” See also the discussion in Chen 2001, 745–754.

2. I use the term “dialect” in its Chinese sense. The Chinese word is *fangyan*, which means, literally, “region speech” or “place speech.” It refers to all regional or local varieties of speech used by the Han people, as distinct from the common language (*putonghua*). Western scholars, of course, use the term “dialect” in a variety of other senses, none of them suited to a discussion of the rise of *putonghua*.
3. See also the useful discussion in Unger 1982, 12–14, 254 n. 1. Unger, however, uses the term “*jieji chengfen*” where I use the term “*chushen*” (“class origin” or “family background”), which I discuss later. The Chinese themselves are often confused and inconsistent in their use of class terminology, and this confusion has caused problems in academic discussions of the class system.
4. I take the figure from Spence 1991, 517. Estimates by other reputable scholars of the numbers executed range up to five million (cf. Margolin 1999, 479, 790 n. 81; Domes 1973, 38, 45 n. 14; Rummel 1991, 220–223, 274–276). However, Shalom (1984, 37–43, 142–147) has strongly criticized the higher estimates. He suggests that the total deaths resulting from all campaigns in the early 1950s, including land reform, may have been only a million, while allowing that “it is possible that twice this number is closer to the mark.” The latter total is compatible with estimates of a million or more deaths linked to land reform.
5. The number of deaths is difficult to determine. Estimates generally range from seven hundred thousand to more than three million (cf. Strauss 2002, 87–89, 102 n. 26; Dittmer 1987, 47; Margolin 1999, 483; Domes 1973, 51–52; Rummel 1991, 223–226, 276–277). However, Shalom (1984, 17–43, 124–149) has cogently criticized the evidence upon which the higher estimates are based and suggests that even the figure of seven hundred thousand may be substantially inflated.
6. Some reports indicate that political prisoners subjected to thought reform in the early 1950s appeared to be more sincere in their self-criticisms than their counterparts in later years. This was no doubt partly because political prisoners in the early years were not given fixed sentences, but released when they showed evidence of reform. Moreover, in the early 1950s many still naïvely believed that if they convinced the Party that they really had reformed, they would have

a promising future in the new China. What we lack is any convincing evidence that their self-criticisms were sincere. See the discussion in Whyte 1974, 193–194, 208–209.

7. In Communist Party terminology, they were a “national bourgeoisie,” sharply distinguished from the “comprador capitalists” and “bureaucratic capitalists” who took the side of the imperialists and the Guomindang. Most of the latter had fled as Communist forces advanced between 1945 and 1949.

Chapter 3: Mao’s Revolutionary Strategy, 1966–1968

1. The term “Maoist conspiracy” is appropriate, but should not be misunderstood as implying that all the conspirators fully appreciated what was going on. Those whom Mao briefed most extensively were Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Lin Biao, but he seems to have told them only what they needed to know if they were to assist his plans and avoid mistakes (cf. Wang 1988, 26). Lin Biao confirmed the existence of a Mao-centered conspiracy when he met foreign visitors with Mao in May 1967: “Now, among the central leaders, those who are highly regarded [still in authority] are invariably those whom Mao had briefed in advance about the Cultural Revolution. That is the reason they did not make mistakes” (Wang 1988, 26 n. 2). His statement also implies that Party leaders whom Mao chose not to brief would make mistakes and fall from grace—an oblique reference to one of Mao’s techniques of framing.
2. Mao himself recognized that his strategy increased the risk of a coup. In May 1966, as he purged Luo Ruiqing, the Beijing Party hierarchy, and the propaganda-media-culture apparatus, he ordered Zhou Enlai to increase security in Beijing—especially in Zhongnanhai, the leaders’ compound (MacFarquhar 1997, 459).

Chapter 5: Dichotomies, Demons, and Violence

1. The role of dissonance in leading people to despise or hate their victims emerges in other Cultural Revolution memoirs. See, for example, Yang 1997, 139:

What a pity this man died! But really he was so stupid! If he had said no to all our questions, I’m sure he would have been alive. . . . So in the final analysis everything he said and did was wrong! It was his own fault he was beaten to death. He

was so sordid! So disgusting! A real rapist and counterrevolutionary, he deserved what he got, every bit of it!

So after we killed this man in the evening, I killed him once more at night, in my mind. I killed him because I had to, or else I would not be able to sleep.

Chapter 8: Educating Revolutionaries

1. During the institutional phase of the Cultural Revolution between late 1968 and 1976, centralized, authoritarian control of discourse produced remarkable uniformity within literary genres at any given point in time. So assertions that a book is typical are not problematic, as they would be if we were examining textbooks published in a pluralist society. This uniformity enhances the value of data contained in the tables in this chapter, even though they are based on very small numbers of textbooks.