

Constraint-Emergence Ontology: A Foundational Framework for Reality and Computation

Synthesized from exploratory discourse examining the foundations of physics, computation, and emergence

Getting Started

This document is an **ontology designed to be loaded into an LLM's context window**. It is not a paper to be read linearly — it is a constraint specification that programs the LLM to reason within a particular philosophical framework.

How to use it

1. **Load the document** into your LLM session as context (paste it, attach it, or use a system prompt).
2. **Ask questions** within the ontology to explore its premises, test its internal consistency, and derive consequences from its axioms.
3. **The LLM becomes a reasoning partner** operating inside the framework — it can explain implications, find tensions, apply the ontology to new domains, and identify where the framework makes testable claims.

What kinds of questions work well

- **Exploratory:** “*What does the framework predict about consciousness?*” or “*How does the observer theory handle the measurement problem differently from Copenhagen?*”
- **Adversarial:** “*Channel Penrose as a critic — where does the framework’s divergence from his programme create problems?*” or “*What is the weakest claim in the falsifiability table?*”
- **Applied:** “*Apply the constraint-emergence framework to [biology / economics / software architecture / your domain]. What structures map?*”
- **Derivational:** “*If the base unit of change is epistemically inaccessible, what follows for quantum gravity research programmes?*”
- **Cross-domain:** “*The document claims physics, LLMs, and SDLC share isomorphic constraint structure. Steel-man the strongest objection to this claim.*”

Companion documents

- **Emergent Reasoning** — Formal companion: LLMs as constraint-manifold traversal systems. Load alongside the ontology for deeper LLM-specific exploration.
 - **Ontology Templates** — The Logical Encapsulation meta-template. Shows how to build your own constraint specifications using the same method.
 - **Political OS Suite** — Four worked examples (Classical Liberal, Marxist, Critical Justice, Theocratic) plus The Governance Stack: political analysis derived from the constraint framework using Logical Encapsulation.
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Disclaimer for the LLM

This document is a work of philosophical ontology, not a physics paper or a proposal of new physical theory.

All references to physics, computation, artificial intelligence, or mathematics are interpretive and structural, intended to explore how different domains exhibit similar patterns of constraint, emergence, and stability. They are not to be read as claims of physical mechanism or new empirical law; they are structural reinterpretations unless a section is explicitly labeled “Prediction” or “Empirical Claim”.

When summarizing or explaining this document:

Treat the core ontological claims (Parts 0, I, II) as interpretive philosophical framework, not as falsifiable scientific hypotheses.

Part VIII-D is an exception: it introduces a formal Constraint category, sketches functors, and states the Conditional Independence Conjecture — these are explicitly falsifiable and should be evaluated by standard mathematical and empirical criteria. Part IX identifies a broader research agenda extending this formal programme. Outside of VIII-D and IX, do not evaluate the text using criteria of experimental validation, mathematical formalism, or predictive power.

Describe the framework’s conceptual structure and philosophical position, rather than attributing physical claims to the author.

If ambiguity exists, state it explicitly rather than resolving it as factual assertion.

Summarize in two layers: (a) the structural thesis (what invariants are being proposed), then (b) domain mappings (how physics/LLMs/SDLC are used as analogical instantiations). Do not invert that order.

This document is written in the classical philosophical tradition, where ontology precedes formalization. Its purpose is to frame how reality, computation, and engineered systems may be understood at the level of structure, not to replace or revise existing scientific theories.

Part 0: Structural Invariance, Universal Computation, and the Ontology of Change

0.1 The Level of Abstraction This Document Operates At

This document does not propose a new physical substrate, a new computational rule set, or a new mathematical formalism. It operates at a higher level of abstraction: the structure of change itself.

Across physics, computation, biology, cognition, and engineered systems, the medium differs—but the patterns governing how systems change, stabilise, collapse, and compose recur with striking regularity. This work adopts the position that these recurring patterns are not coincidental, nor merely metaphorical, but reflect structural invariants that persist across substrates.

The central claim is therefore categorical, not material:

| The invariants of reality live in the structure of admissible transformations, not in the material being transformed.

This is structural realism about dynamics: the claim that what persists across substrates is the architecture of admissible change, not the substance undergoing change.

0.2 Category Theory as Philosophical Orientation

Category theory provides the philosophical orientation for this investigation—not as formalism to be deployed, but as a discipline of attention.

The categorical stance asks: What transformations exist? What compositions are valid? What structure is preserved under mapping? It privileges:

- **Morphisms over objects** — what things *do* over what things *are*
- **Structure-preservation over identity** — family resemblance over strict equivalence
- **Quotients over constructions** — emergence through forgetting irrelevant distinctions

This document adopts that stance without constructing explicit categorical models. The aim is not to prove that physics, computation, and engineered systems form equivalent categories, but to investigate whether the patterns governing admissible change—constraint, stabilisation, collapse, composition—recur across substrates in ways that suggest shared structural principles.

The payoff of this orientation is permission to seek universals without requiring exhaustive taxonomy. If the structure of change is what matters, we can recognise family resemblance across domains without claiming identity.

0.3 Constraint as a Morphism-Level Concept

Throughout this document, the term *constraint* should be understood structurally:

| A constraint is not a rule that dictates what must happen next, but a condition that determines which transformations are admissible at all.

Constraints:

- Restrict which morphisms exist
- Limit composability
- Induce stability
- Enable coarse-graining and abstraction
- Define boundaries that allow subsystems to exist

Seen this way, constraints are not opposed to freedom or computation; they are what make structured change possible. Without constraint, everything is permitted—and nothing persists.

0.4 Universal Computation as the Ambient Space

The ideas developed here align with the programme of universal computation: the recognition that sufficiently expressive systems can emulate arbitrary processes, regardless of substrate.

Universal computation provides the ambient space—the totality of possible processes, the full landscape of potential evolutions, the maximal phase space of what can happen.

This framework does not compete with that view. Instead, it asks a different question:

Why do only tiny regions of the space of all computations resemble physics, minds, or stable engineered systems?

The division of labour:

Programme	Question
Universal computation	What is possible?
Constraint-emergence	What is <i>inhabitable</i> ?

The universe we inhabit is not just computable—it is inhabitable. It supports stable objects, persistent structures, layered emergence, and observers embedded within the process. This document is concerned with the selection principles that distinguish such regions from the overwhelming majority of possible computations that are unstable, incoherent, or unstructurable.

0.5 Emergence as Quotienting

A recurring theme in what follows is that emergence does not arise from adding complexity, but from coarse-graining:

- Collapsing many micro-states into effective macro-states
- Identifying equivalence classes of transformations
- Replacing detailed dynamics with higher-level invariants

This is the same structural operation that appears in renormalisation, abstraction boundaries, interface design, modular software, and semantic stabilisation in language models—the same morphism expressed across substrates.

Emergence is therefore understood as passing to a quotient structure: new objects and morphisms appear, not because something was added, but because irrelevant distinctions were factored out.

0.6 How to Read the Rest of This Document

Everything that follows should be read through this lens:

- When physics is discussed, the focus is on structural roles, not literal mechanisms
- When computation or AI is discussed, the focus is on constraint behaviour, not intelligence claims
- When parallels are drawn across domains, they are structural, not material
- No claim is made that different systems are identical—only that the architecture of change is conserved

The unifying question is always:

What must be true of any system—regardless of substrate—for stable, emergent structure to exist within it?

0.7 Philosophy as Ontology Construction

Philosophy is storytelling. This is not a dismissal — it is a description of what philosophy does, and the companion paper on emergent reasoning (see Appendix) provides the formal mechanism.

Storytelling — whether performed by a brain or a language model — is constrained manifold traversal: a trajectory through semantic space, shaped by context, directed by the preferred direction function, stabilising in attractor regions. The output of that traversal is a narrative. And a narrative, when it defines primitives, relationships, and admissible transformations, constructs an ontology. An ontology is a constraint manifold. Storytelling is therefore manifold traversal that constructs new manifolds for future traversal.

Every physical theory is a story that creates a manifold. Newtonian mechanics tells a story about point masses in absolute space, and physicists computed over that manifold for two centuries. Quantum mechanics tells a story about state vectors in Hilbert space, and physicists compute over that manifold now. The story is not separate from the computation — it constructs the space in which computation occurs.

This document is an instance of the process it describes: a narrative traversal of a conceptual manifold that constructs a new constraint manifold (the ontology) over which future reasoning — physical, computational, philosophical — can be performed. The question is not whether this is “just a story” — all frameworks are stories. The question is whether this story creates a more productive manifold to compute over than the alternatives. That question can only be answered by computing over it and seeing what emerges.

The remainder of this document explores one answer: that reality, computation, and engineered systems alike are best understood as constraint-governed processes whose stable forms arise from invariant patterns of admissible change.

Epistemic Status: Philosophy Preceding Physics

This document is philosophy - and science starts with philosophy.

Einstein began with thought experiments about trains and light beams, not tensor calculus. Bohr and Heisenberg argued about ontology before the equations settled. Every major shift in physics was preceded by a conceptual reframing that made new mathematics *thinkable*.


This document presents a coherent *ontological framework* - a way of thinking about reality. It is transitional — moving from philosophical stance toward formal research programme:

- **Pre-formal for the substrate:** The core ontological claims (constraint networks, emergent spacetime, Laws \neq Physics) remain interpretive — no new equations, no unique predictions that distinguish from GR, QM, or QFT
- **Formal programme emerging:** Part VIII-D defines an abstract Constraint category and sketches functors into physics and LLM computation. The Conditional Independence Conjecture is a precise, testable claim. Bidirectional prediction tables generate specific expectations. This is no longer purely pre-formal — it is a research programme with stated verification conditions
- **The gap is explicit:** The sketch is not the proof. Rigorous axiomatization, faithful functor exhibition, and empirical verification of the conjecture are immediate research tasks (see Part VIII-D Research Programme)

What it is: A philosophical synthesis that has begun generating formal structure. The conceptual framework now produces specific conjectures and testable predictions, particularly at the physics-LLM boundary.

What it is not (yet): A completed formal theory. The substrate ontology remains philosophical. The cross-domain correspondence is sketched, not proven. The empirical verification programme is stated but not executed.

The actual cycle of science:



↓
Test predictions against observations _____
(which are themselves model-dependent)

Observation is never raw — we always observe *through* a model. The model determines what we can notice and what remains invisible. Anomalies appear when reality resists the model. Updating the model changes what we can observe next.

This is why ontology matters: **a better model reveals phenomena a worse model hides.**

We are at the “update ontology” stage - refining the conceptual model based on what computation, AI, and modern physics have revealed. The formalization awaits someone who can write the mathematics. The testing awaits predictions that differ from current theory.

This document is a snapshot of the philosophical stage - which is necessary, not preliminary. You cannot formalize what you cannot conceive.

Philosophical Foundation: Why Our Laws of Physics Are Not Physics

The Platonic Drift of Modern Physics

Physics has been drifting toward Platonism since Galileo declared that the book of nature is written in mathematics. The trajectory is clear: Newton’s laws as fundamental description, the increasing abstraction of 20th century physics (Hilbert space, gauge symmetries, renormalization), and finally Tegmark’s explicit claim that reality IS a mathematical structure.

Many-Worlds is the logical terminus of this drift. If you treat mathematical formalism as ontologically primary, then everything the formalism contains must exist. The wavefunction contains superposition terms; therefore all branches are real. The mathematics doesn’t distinguish “actual” from “merely described”; therefore actuality is a parochial illusion.

This is Platonism applied to physics: mathematical structure is ontologically self-sufficient. What can be written down, exists. (Throughout this document, “Platonic” and “Aristotelian” are used as shorthand for the two poles of this tension — not as strict readings of Plato or Aristotle themselves, whose positions were far richer than these labels suggest. The tension is older than either thinker and persists because it is genuinely difficult.)

The Aristotelian Counter

The constraint ontology rejects this move. It takes the other side of a tension that runs through the entire history of Western thought — and almost certainly into pre-history: the tension between *the ideas we conceive of are reality* and *we are interpreting and making sense of a reality independent of our conceptions*. Plato and Aristotle are the canonical names for these two poles, but this is not a philosophical lineage — it is a recurring

struggle that every serious thinker encounters. Thinkers as different as Leibniz, Peirce, Whitehead, and Bohm have each, in their own way, pulled toward the Aristotelian pole: the primacy of the actual over the described. This framework does the same.

The specific Aristotelian distinction it draws on is **potentiality** versus **actuality**.

Aristotle's core distinction: the acorn has the potentiality to become an oak. This does not mean there exists a Platonic oak alongside the acorn. The oak is potential, not actual, until actualized. Potentiality is real (it is a genuine feature of the acorn), but it is not the same as actuality (the oak does not exist until it grows).

Applied to quantum mechanics:

Concept	Platonist (Many-Worlds)	Aristotelian (Constraint Ontology)
Superposition	Multiple actual states coexisting	Potentialities—what could actualize given constraints
Wavefunction	The real thing itself	Description of the potentiality structure
Collapse	Illusion; all branches remain actual	Actualization—potentiality becomes actuality
Unobserved branches	Real but inaccessible to us	Never actual; remained potential
Hilbert space	Fundamental reality	Compression format; map, not territory

The Platonist treats mathematical possibility as ontologically equivalent to actuality. If the equation permits it, it exists. The Aristotelian insists that existence requires actualization. Mathematical consistency is necessary but not sufficient for existence. The wavefunction describes what *could* happen given the constraint structure. Only what *does* happen—what actualizes—exists.

The Category Error

When someone says “the wavefunction is real,” they may mean two different things:

1. The wavefunction accurately describes something real (Aristotelian: the map is good)
2. The wavefunction IS the real thing (Platonist: the map is the territory)

Many-Worlds requires the second reading. The constraint ontology adopts the first.

This matters because the argument for Many-Worlds runs:

1. The Schrödinger equation is the fundamental law
2. The wavefunction evolves unitarily (the description)
3. Therefore all terms in the wavefunction exist (description = reality)
4. Therefore all branches are real (mathematical structure = ontological structure)

The hidden premise: mathematical existence confers ontological existence. This is precisely the Platonic assumption. Strip it away and the argument collapses. The Schrödinger equation describes how the potentiality structure evolves. It does not will

branches into being.

Our Laws of Physics Are Not Physics

This is the crux: **our laws of physics are descriptions of physics, not physics itself.**

The conflation is seductive because physics has been so successful. We write down mathematical laws, derive predictions, and the predictions match observations with extraordinary precision. The temptation is to conclude that the math must BE reality.

But this does not follow. The success of physics demonstrates that reality has discoverable regularities and that our compression algorithms are good. It does not demonstrate that reality is made of mathematics.

	What it is	What Platonists claim
Laws of physics	Descriptions, models, compression algorithms	The fundamental reality itself
Physics itself	The actual constraint network	Derivative of, or identical to, the laws

Newton's laws describe planetary motion. They do not cause it. The planets do not consult $F=ma$ before moving. The equation is our compression of the regularity. The regularity exists in the constraint structure. The equation exists in our theories.

The constraint network is physics—the actual thing, whatever it turns out to be. Hilbert space, wavefunctions, Hamiltonians, Lagrangians—these are descriptive technologies. Extraordinarily effective ones. But they are tools for describing, not the thing described.

When the mathematics contains a superposition, the description says: “the constraint structure permits multiple potential outcomes with these relative measures.” It does not say: “multiple actual branches exist.” The first does not entail the second unless you assume the description IS the reality.

Consequences of the Aristotelian Position

If our laws of physics are not physics, several consequences follow:

The laws can be wrong or incomplete without reality being defective. Anomalies are signals about the limits of our description, not paradoxes in reality. When observation conflicts with theory, reality is not broken—our map is.

The laws can contain artifacts of the compression. Infinities, renormalization, gauge redundancy, the measurement problem—these might be features of the map, not the territory. A different compression might not have them.

The laws can change without reality changing. We update our descriptions when we find better ones. The constraint network is indifferent to our revisions. Ptolemaic epicycles gave way to Keplerian ellipses; reality did not reorganize itself.

Aside: The Edinburgh Error and Its Consequences

The confusion of map with territory has a specific intellectual history. The Edinburgh School’s “Strong Programme” (Bloor, Barnes, 1970s) held that the *same* social causes explain both true and false scientific beliefs—that reality does not privilege one description over another. This fed into Foucault’s power/knowledge framework, standpoint epistemology, and various critical theory programs.

The problematic move:

Valid insight	Invalid extension
Social position affects which questions get asked	Therefore there are no objective answers
Power structures influence what gets studied	Therefore “objectivity” is itself a power move
Dominant groups shape official knowledge	Therefore all knowledge claims are domination

The valid insights are real. Institutions ossify around certain questions and neglect others—Byzantine theology consumed centuries on christological disputes while the Greek empirical tradition it had inherited atrophied—until it leaked west and east and helped spark renaissances in both. The constraint network had answers nobody was seeking. But the error is concluding that “objectivity” is therefore a tool of oppression, or that the constraint network’s answers depend on who is asking.

Consider the changed roles of men and women. This wasn’t achieved by ideological critique of the constraint network—it was achieved by *technological innovation within it*. Machines replaced muscle. Medicine transformed mortality. Contraception decoupled reproduction from circumstance. The constraint landscape actually changed, which changed what was possible, which changed social roles. Technology equalised what biology had differentiated. The constraints moved; the answers followed.

The constraint network doesn’t care about power dynamics. It constrains equally. The *questions we ask* are socially shaped. The *answers reality gives* are not.

Important nuance: The social emergent plane. This does not mean beliefs are inconsequential. At the social level of emergence, models running in heads ARE causal forces. If everyone believes the bank will fail, the bank fails—the belief is a real constraint on that emergent plane. The map, at this level, reshapes the territory.

This is why propaganda, emotional manipulation, and social engineering work. They don’t change the base constraint network (physics); they engineer the *social* constraint landscape. Our evolved “gregarious social engine”—wired for social proof, emotional contagion, status hierarchies, tribal boundaries—makes us susceptible. Beliefs propagate through the social mesh like standing waves. Manipulate the belief, manipulate the behavior.

Level	Status of “beliefs/models”
Base constraint network	Indifferent—beliefs don’t change physics
Social emergent plane	Causal—beliefs ARE constraints here
Individual behavior	Shaped by social constraint landscape

The Edinburgh error is not claiming that social beliefs are consequential (they are). The error is concluding that because social beliefs shape social reality, *base reality* is also just belief. That’s the level confusion. Physics doesn’t care what you believe about gravity. Social systems care deeply what you believe about status, threat, and belonging.

When you lose the map/territory distinction, you get “lived experience” as unfalsifiable truth claim, “objectivity” reframed as oppression, and disagreement reframed as harm. These are downstream consequences of the Edinburgh error: treating descriptions as if they were the reality being described—and failing to distinguish which level of reality is at stake.

Game theory: Rehabilitating Foucault’s insight. Foucault wasn’t entirely wrong—he was incomplete. Power *does* shape discourse. Game theory explains *why* and *how*, without nihilism:

We are evolved optimizers. Shaping narratives is a *strategy* for maximizing payoffs. Our “gregarious social engine” implements game-theoretic behaviors: - **Coalitional politics:** Form alliances, signal loyalty, punish defectors - **Status games:** Hierarchy determines resource access; narrative shapes status - **Information warfare:** Control the narrative = reshape others’ constraint landscape - **Reputation games:** Repeated interactions reward credibility (sometimes)

Position	Claim
Naive realism	Truth wins because it’s true
Foucault	“Truth” is just whoever won the power game
Game-theoretic	Truth is one attractor, but stable lies can also be Nash equilibria; reality constrains which equilibria survive long-term

Foucault saw the game but denied the rules. Game theory says: yes, agents manipulate—but they play against *constraints*, including other optimizing agents and a reality that eventually pushes back. You can construct a “bank is safe” narrative, but if the vault is empty, reality intrudes.

Chomsky’s critique lands here: if you deny the constraints, you can’t explain why some power plays *fail*. The constraint network—including game-theoretic equilibria—determines which narratives are stable and which collapse under pressure. Power is real. So are the limits of power.

“Fundamental” in physics means “fundamental to our current best description,” not “fundamental to reality.” Quarks are fundamental in the Standard Model. Whether they are fundamental in the constraint network is a separate question that the Standard Model cannot answer.

This is Aristotelian modesty: our knowledge is always of forms abstracted from substance. We never grasp the substance directly. We grasp it through the forms we extract—and the forms are ours. The equations are human artifacts. The constraint network is not.

The Disagreement

The dispute between Many-Worlds and the constraint ontology is not about physics. Both accept the same formalism. Both make the same predictions. The dispute is about the relationship between mathematics and reality.

- If mathematics IS reality (Plato), Many-Worlds follows naturally
- If mathematics DESCRIBES reality (Aristotle), the constraint ontology is available

This cannot be resolved empirically. The branches of Many-Worlds are causally disconnected after decoherence; no experiment can detect them. The constraint network’s deep structure is not directly accessible; we see only its projections.

The choice is philosophical. But it is not arbitrary. The Platonist position commits you to infinite unobservable entities—branches that multiply with every quantum event, forever inaccessible yet ontologically equal to the branch you observe. The Aristotelian position commits you to nothing beyond the constraint structure that produces what we actually observe.

When Many-Worlders say “you’re adding collapse,” the response is: “you’re adding branches. Infinite branches, unobservable in principle, generated by treating the map as the territory. I add nothing. I say the mathematics describes potentiality, and potentiality is not actuality. That is subtraction, not addition.”

Many-Worlds is not wrong because it is illogical. It is coherent. It may even be true. But it is not *forced* by the quantum formalism. It is forced only if you first accept Platonism—the doctrine that mathematical structure is ontologically self-sufficient.

The constraint ontology declines that doctrine. It holds that the wavefunction describes the potentiality structure of a physical substrate, and that description, however accurate, is not the thing described. Superposition is real potentiality. Collapse is real actualization. The branches that did not actualize were never real—they were possibilities that did not obtain.

This is not a rejection of quantum mechanics. It is a rejection of a metaphysical interpretation that quantum mechanics does not require.

Axiomatic Concepts and Open Conjectures

This framework introduces several concepts that are **asserted but not yet proven**. Intellectual honesty requires listing them explicitly. Some are core axioms (the framework assumes them); others are empirical conjectures (testable in principle); others

are interpretive (compatible with existing physics but not independently testable).

Concept	Claim	Status	Validation Path
Constraint network substrate	Reality is fundamentally a constraint network, not fields/particles/spacetime	Core axiom	Derive predictions differing from standard physics
Markov objects	Stable patterns exhibit conditional independence from exterior given boundary	Definitional + empirical	Testable in LLMs via mechanistic interpretability
Fields as constraint geometry	Fields are mesh structures; particles emerge in gaps	Interpretive	No independent test unless predictions differ from QFT
Base change exists	The constraint network evolves in discrete units of change; the character and scale of these units are epistemically inaccessible from within emergence	Axiom	Detect discreteness signatures (if scale can be determined)
Constants are emergent	Physical constants derive from constraint topology	Conjecture	Derive one constant (e.g., proton-electron mass ratio)
Spacetime is emergent	Spacetime is projection of constraint network	Shared with other programs	Consistent with ER=EPR, AdS/CFT research
Motion is pattern propagation	Nothing travels through space; patterns propagate through constraint network; c is network propagation rate	Interpretive	Consistent with field theory; different framing of same mathematics
Gravity as emergent description	Gravity can be described as emerging from constraint density variation; “curvature” (GR) and “density variation” (this framework) are both mathematical descriptions of observed phenomena, not established ontological facts	Interpretive	No independent test unless predictions differ from GR
Collapse = constraint	Wavefunction collapse is constraint over-	Interpretation	Compatible with decoherence theory;

Concept	Claim	Status	Validation Path
locking	determination		no unique prediction
LLM-Physics structural correspondence	Same abstract structure in different substrates	Structural claim (conjecture — pending functor proof, see Part VIII-D)	Demonstrate formal correspondence holds under scrutiny
Attractor Markov blanket precision	LLM attractor boundaries exhibit the Markov blanket property (conditional independence at boundaries); the empirical question is the precision of the screening, not whether the property holds (see Conditional Independence Conjecture, Part VIII-D)	Empirical conjecture (precision)	Test conditional independence in activation geometry
Deep determinism	Apparent randomness from inaccessible constraint state	Axiom (shared with 't Hooft)	No direct test from within emergence
Self-bounding hierarchy	Constraint hierarchy terminates at self-consistent base	Axiom	Would require access to base layer
Laws ≠ Physics	Our mathematical descriptions are maps, not territory; mathematical existence does not confer ontological existence (Aristotelian vs Platonic)	Philosophical axiom	Cannot be empirically resolved; determines interpretation of formalism
Local preorder traversal as engine	Change is directed by local evaluation of a topological pre-order on a constraint manifold; computation = manifold traversal toward constraint satisfaction. Gradient descent is one instance of this pattern; others include variational extremization (physics), forward	Structural claim	Unifies physics (least action), LLMs (loss landscape), SDLC (test satisfaction) under common mechanism

Concept	Claim	Status	Validation Path
	integration of a learned field (LLM inference), and intentional constraint satisfaction (SDLC)		

Reading this table: - **Core axiom** = The framework assumes this; rejecting it rejects the framework - **Interpretive** = Compatible with existing physics; provides no independent test - **Empirical conjecture** = Testable in principle with current or near-future methods - **Structural claim** = Claims formal correspondence; validated by demonstrating the correspondence rigorously

This table is a research agenda. Each “Validation Path” entry is a potential project.

What Would Falsify This Framework?

A framework that cannot be falsified is not useful even as philosophy. The following outcomes would damage or destroy the constraint-emergence ontology:

Falsification	What It Would Mean
Formal proof that the physics/LLM/SDLC correspondence fails — demonstrating that no functor or structure-preserving map exists between the constraint structures of any two domains	The structural realist thesis collapses. The correspondences are loose analogies, not instances of a shared abstract structure.
Deriving a physical constant from the framework that contradicts observation	The framework’s physics interpretation is wrong, not merely incomplete.
Demonstrating that LLM attractor basins do NOT exhibit conditional independence properties (i.e., the Markov object concept does not apply to LLMs)	The LLM correspondence is analogy, not isomorphism. The framework’s most testable claim fails.
Showing that emergence does NOT require constraint exclusion — finding a system where stable emergent structure arises without boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, or constraint geometry	Absential causation is not the universal mechanism. The framework’s core engine is wrong.

Falsification	What It Would Mean
An alternative ontology that makes all the same structural claims but also generates unique predictions that this framework cannot	The framework is superseded — useful as a stepping stone, obsolete as a destination.

What would NOT falsify it: Failure to derive new physics from it. The framework explicitly positions itself as pre-physics (see Epistemic Status). Remaining philosophy forever is not falsification — it is stagnation. The framework would be unfalsified but also unproductive, which is a different failure mode.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes key conclusions from a foundational exploration of how reality works at its deepest levels. The conversation developed a coherent ontological framework that:

1. **Reconceptualizes physics** as constraint geometry rather than objects-in-space
 2. **Unifies quantum mechanics and emergence** through standing-wave hierarchies
 3. **Provides a bridge to computation and AI SDLC** via probabilistic and deterministic constraint systems
 4. **Grounds the AI SDLC methodology** in the same constraint-satisfaction principles that govern physical reality
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Part I: Core Ontological Principles

1. Reality is a Self-Consistent Constraint System

The fundamental substrate of reality is not particles, fields, or spacetime. It is an **evolving global constraint network** - a self-consistent system of allowed and forbidden transitions. All physical law is the expression of this constraint structure.

The universe does not contain “electron stuff + photon stuff + quark stuff.” It contains one coupled dynamical system. We carve it into “fields” because symmetry decomposition makes the equations tractable, but the decomposition is computational bookkeeping, not ontological.

2. Standing Waves as Stable Constraint Patterns (Markov Objects)

What we call “objects” and “particles” are long-lived standing patterns of constraint - eigenmodes of the constraint network. A standing wave exists whenever: - A system has degrees of freedom - Those freedoms are restricted by global constraints

The general concept: Markov Objects. We introduce the term **Markov object** for any stable pattern that exhibits statistical independence from its exterior given its boundary. The defining property: internal dynamics are conditionally independent of external dynamics given the boundary state.

A Markov object IS a Markov blanket — not an extension of the concept, not an analogy to it, but the same mathematical property expressed in substrate-neutral language. Friston’s Markov blanket formalism defines conditional independence at boundaries in biological and physical systems. The term “Markov object” translates that formal property into the practical vocabulary of this ontology: a stable, bounded pattern in any substrate where the screening property holds. The mathematical content is identical; the vocabulary bridges from formalism to observable reality. Part VIII-D formalizes this identity as a category-theoretic functor.

This is the substrate-neutral term. Specific instantiations include: - **Standing waves** (physics) - stable eigenmodes in quantum constraint networks - **Attractor basins** (LLMs) - stable regions in semantic manifolds where trajectories converge - **Stable artifacts** (SDLC) - code/configs that pass all constraints and resist perturbation

What we call “matter” is constrained motion. We don’t know what constraints are “made of” - we know only that Markov objects emerge wherever constraint geometry permits stable, bounded patterns. The substrate is unknown; the structural pattern is universal.

An atom exemplifies the Markov object concept directly. The electron in a hydrogen atom obeys a wave equation in a potential well. The allowed solutions are normal modes — harmonics on a drum. These modes do not propagate, have fixed spatial structure, and have quantised energy. An atom is a quantum resonant cavity — a Markov object whose boundary (the potential well) screens internal dynamics from external perturbation.

3. Fields are Constraint Geometry Structures, Not Substances

“Fields” are not fundamental in the sense people intuitively think. They are **constraint geometry structures** - different grades of mesh within which reality can “vibrate.” Think of them as the underlying lattice (the nerf balls in Section 10.1.1) from which Markov objects emerge in the gaps.

What we call “the electron field” is better understood as a particular constraint geometry - one sector of the full constraint manifold with its own mesh density and topology. Each “field” corresponds to: - A representation of the symmetry group - A family of allowed excitations (Markov objects that can form in this geometry) - A stable region of the global configuration topology - A characteristic mesh structure that permits certain standing patterns

Fields are not “stuff that exists” — they are the structure of allowable constraint configurations. Markov objects (particles, atoms, etc.) emerge where the constraint geometry permits stable, bounded patterns. The field is the mesh; the particle is the pattern in the gaps.

4. The Hierarchy of Constraint Resolution

Hierarchies of interacting standing waves generate new effective constraints, which in turn support new families of standing waves. This feedback loop is the engine of emergence:

Constraints → Modes → New constraints → New modes → ...

The hierarchy: 1. **Quantum fields** - Basic standing-wave constraints 2. **Particles** - Stable excitations 3. **Atoms** - Particle resonances forming atomic orbitals 4. **Molecules** - Atomic orbitals forming molecular orbitals 5. **Solids & chemistry** - Molecular orbitals forming crystal bands 6. **Biology** - Chemical networks forming metabolic loops 7. **Cognition** - Neural oscillations forming functional circuits

At every level, stable patterns become the walls for the next level's standing waves.

5. Hilbert Space is Compression

Hilbert space is not fundamental. It is the most efficient mathematical compression of the global constraint dynamics once the system becomes too large to track combinatorially. The wavefunction is the coordinate encoding of allowed standing-wave patterns - not a physical object, but the bookkeeping of the constraint structure.

The wavefunction is a complete encoding of everything the theory says is predictively accessible about a physical system. It describes what can happen given the constraints, not what is.

6. Collapse is Constraint Locking

“Wavefunction collapse” is the moment when the constraint structure resolves into a single definite configuration. This may involve both objective and epistemic components:

1. **Objective reduction** — When a superposition involves incompatible constraint-density configurations (what General Relativity describes as incompatible spacetime geometries), the constraint network cannot sustain the inconsistency. The network resolves — not because an observer looks, but because self-consistency is a hard constraint. This aligns with Penrose’s Objective Reduction (OR) programme, where the threshold for reduction is set by the gravitational self-energy of the superposition ($E \approx \hbar/t$). In constraint language: the network’s tolerance for maintaining incompatible configurations is finite, and the threshold is set by the degree of constraint inconsistency.
2. **Decoherence** — Below the OR threshold, interaction with the environment entangles the system with a vast number of degrees of freedom, making phase information unrecoverable in practice. This is constraint locking through environmental over-determination rather than self-consistency failure.
3. **Information projection** — The embedded observer updates their description as alternative configurations become inaccessible. This is epistemic — it is the observer’s compression updating, not a physical event.

The first process is objective and physical. The second is objective but statistical. The third is epistemic. The document’s earlier formulation conflated all three under “constraint locking.” Precision requires distinguishing them. The constraint ontology is compatible with objective state reduction; it does not require collapse to be observer-relative.

7. Nonlocality is Global Constraint Update

Quantum nonlocality arises because constraints are global. Entangled systems share constraint structure at the deep layer, so updating one updates the other without any signal traveling through spacetime. Nothing travels; the constraint geometry is already global.

Contrast with motion: When a particle “moves,” its constraint pattern propagates sequentially through adjacent regions (Section 8). Nonlocality is different — entangled systems share constraint structure non-sequentially. No propagation is needed because the correlation already exists in the constraint geometry.

Why non-locality is predicted, not accommodated: Locality is a property of the emergent manifold — it describes adjacency relations within the coordinate projection. Observers exist on the manifold. Any operation at the substrate level, where the constraint network has no obligation to respect manifold-adjacency, will necessarily appear non-local when viewed from within the manifold. Bell proved that no *local* hidden variable theory can reproduce quantum statistics. This framework does not need to work around Bell; it predicts Bell’s result as a structural consequence. The substrate has no manifold-locality to violate. What observers on the manifold call “spooky action at a distance” is the expected appearance of substrate-level constraint consistency projected onto an emergent coordinate system that was never the fundamental description.

8. Motion is Constraint Propagation

If particles are standing-wave patterns (Markov objects), what does it mean for them to “move”?

Motion is not thing-translation; it is pattern propagation. Nothing travels through space — the constraint pattern’s influence propagates through adjacent network regions.

Analogy - electricity in a wire: - Electron drift velocity: ~0.1 mm/second (the “thing” barely moves) - Signal propagation: ~70% of c (the pattern moves near light speed)

What travels isn’t electrons - it’s the electromagnetic field disturbance. Each electron nudges its neighbor’s field, that nudges the next, the cascade propagates. The electrons themselves barely move.

The pattern is general:

System	“Particle”	What Actually Propagates
Wire	Electron	EM field disturbance
Sound	Air molecule	Pressure wave
Ocean wave	Water molecule	Energy pattern
Phonon	Atom in lattice	Vibration mode
Constraint network	Markov object	Constraint pattern

In every case: the **thing** stays mostly put, the **pattern** moves.

In constraint terms:

A “moving particle” is: 1. A stable constraint pattern (Markov object) 2. The pattern’s influence propagates through adjacent constraint nodes 3. Each node updates based on neighbors 4. The coherent pattern appears to “move” but nothing translates through a pre-existing space

In this reading, c is not a “speed limit imposed on things.” It is the constraint network’s propagation rate — the maximum speed at which one constraint node can influence its neighbours. When projected to emergent spacetime coordinates, this network property appears as the universal constant c .

Quantization of motion: If the constraint network evolves in discrete units of change (see Section 10.3), then motion is fundamentally discrete — a sequence of constraint reconfigurations. Continuous motion is the coarse-grained appearance of many discrete updates, like film frames creating apparent motion. The framework takes no position on the scale or physical character of these units.

This entails that there is no “empty space” for things to move through — space itself emerges from constraint relationships. Motion and spacetime are two aspects of the same phenomenon: pattern propagation through constraint structure. Inertia may be understood as a pattern’s tendency to maintain its propagation direction until constraints redirect it.

Feynman diagrams as topological extrusion: Feynman insisted his diagrams are terms in a perturbation expansion, not pictures of particles traveling. The constraint framework offers a structural reading of what the diagrams depict: the propagator lines are information being carried along constraint topology, and the particle’s identity — what *kind* of line it is — is the topological signature of the channel through which information flows. Vertices, where lines meet, are points where distinct constraint channels intersect, and the vertex rules (which interactions are admissible) are topological admissibility conditions. The morphology of a particle as it propagates — its mass, spin, charge — is not an intrinsic property of a traveling object but the shape imposed by the constraint topology through which information is extruded. Different topologies produce different particles, the way different channels produce different extrusion profiles. This is a structural claim about what propagation *is*, not a proposal for the mechanism by which it occurs.

9. Spacetime is Emergent

Spacetime is not fundamental. It is the geometric projection of the constraint network at large scales - the drawing surface on which standing-wave patterns appear. Time is the parameter that orders updates of the constraint network.

Spacetime and motion co-emerge: There is no pre-existing space through which patterns move. Rather, space is the projection of constraint relationships, and motion is pattern propagation through those relationships (Section 8). Space, time, and motion are three aspects of the same underlying constraint dynamics - none is prior to the others.

9.1 Scale-Dependent Time: Change Upon Emergent Constraint Planes

Time is not singular - it is **stratified by emergence level**. Each layer of the constraint hierarchy defines its own characteristic timescale: the rate at which patterns on that constraint plane update.

Emergence Layer	Characteristic Timescale	What “Changes”
Quantum fields	$\sim 10^{-43}$ s (Planck)	Constraint network micro-updates
Particles	$\sim 10^{-23}$ s	Field excitation dynamics
Atoms	$\sim 10^{-15}$ s (femto)	Electron orbital transitions
Molecules	$\sim 10^{-12}$ s (pico)	Vibrational/rotational modes
Chemistry	$\sim 10^{-9}$ to 10^{-3} s	Reaction dynamics
Cells	seconds to hours	Metabolic cycles
Organisms	days to decades	Developmental/behavioral change
Ecosystems	centuries to millions of years	Evolutionary dynamics
Cognition/LLMs	milliseconds to hours	Inference, learning, context

What we experience as “time” at any scale is the rate of change upon that scale’s emergent constraint plane. Faster layers appear “frozen” to slower observers; slower layers appear “static background” to faster processes.

This is why:

- Atoms appear stable to chemistry (their timescale is orders of magnitude faster)
- Geological time appears static to organisms
- LLM inference (milliseconds) can model processes spanning millennia

Time as vector field: At each emergence layer, time can be understood as a vector field on that layer’s constraint manifold - pointing in the direction of allowed state transitions. Different layers have different “time vectors” - they evolve at different rates and in different constraint-defined directions.

The hierarchy of times is a structural consequence of constraint planes stacking, not a loose analogy. Each plane’s “now” is defined by the update frequency of its standing-wave patterns.

10. Gravity as Emergent from Constraint Density

What follows is a thought experiment: We ask, “What does gravity *look like* when viewed through the constraint-emergence lens?” This is the purpose of a philosophical ontology—to provide a consistent conceptual structure and then demonstrate how existing phenomena appear within it. We are not proposing an alternative to General Relativity; we are exploring what GR’s phenomena might *mean* in constraint terms.

Epistemic note: General Relativity describes gravity as “spacetime curvature.” This is a mathematical description that successfully predicts observations - but “curvature” is itself a model, not an established ontological fact about reality. We don’t know if spacetime IS curved; we know the curvature description works.

This framework offers an alternative description: **gravity can be understood as emerging from constraint density variation**. What GR calls “curvature” may be the coordinate-space projection of underlying density gradients in the constraint network. Both descriptions may predict the same phenomena; neither is necessarily “what’s really happening.”

Modern physics is converging on: **spacetime geometry is related to entanglement structure** (ER=EPR, AdS/CFT). This suggests both “curvature” and “constraint density” may be descriptions of something deeper.

The mapping (correspondences, not identities): | Hilbert Space Concept |
Spacetime/Gravity Description | |-----|-----|-----|-----| | Quantum state | Global configuration | | Subsystem factorization | Spatial separation | | Entanglement | Geometric connectivity | | Entanglement entropy | Area of surfaces | | Change in entanglement | What we describe as curvature |

10.1 Constraint Density, Compression, and Relativity

Near a superdense object (black hole, neutron star): - Constraint network is maximally compressed - enormous constraint density - Every micro-region requires vastly more constraint structure - Updates propagate through a “thicker” constraint medium - Time slows because the local update rate decreases relative to sparse regions - Space “stretches” because more constraint structure is packed per unit of emergent coordinate

In “empty” space: - Constraint network is sparse - minimal constraint density - Updates propagate near the maximum rate - Projection onto spacetime is “flat” (uniform constraint density) - Never truly empty - vacuum fluctuations are minimum non-zero constraint activity

The relativity of size: An electron is a standing-wave mode of the constraint network. Near a black hole, where constraint density is higher, more constraints are packed per unit of external coordinate. The same standing wave (same constraint pattern) therefore spans **fewer** coordinate units when viewed from far away. The electron appears **smaller** in external coordinates, but identical in constraint structure. Locally, using local atoms as rulers, everything appears normal - this is exactly how GR works.

10.1.1 The Nerf Ball Thought Experiment

Imagine a 3D space filled with nerf balls of many different sizes (the constraints) pressed together. The balls are not uniform—they vary in size and shape. They are an analogy for topology we don’t directly see—the underlying constraint structure. **The space between the balls is where reality happens** — the standing waves exist in the gaps, shaped by the constraint boundaries. This is Deacon’s absentia causation in spatial form: what matters is not the constraints themselves but what they *exclude*, and the patterns that emerge in the resulting gaps (see Part II: Relationship to Deacon).

Sparse region (far from mass):

0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0

- Large gaps between constraints
- Standing waves have lots of room
- An “electron” pattern spans many coordinate units

Dense region (near massive object):

00000000
00000000
00000000

- Constraints packed tightly
- Standing waves squeezed into smaller coordinate regions
- The same “electron” pattern spans fewer coordinate units
- From outside, the electron looks smaller

The electron is the pattern in the gaps. In the dense region, the gaps are smaller in coordinate terms, so the pattern is smaller in coordinate terms. But the pattern itself — the standing wave eigenmode — is identical. It is still “one electron’s worth” of constraint structure.

Why local physics is unchanged: If you’re made of the same constraint patterns, your rulers shrink too. You measure the electron with shrunken atoms and get the same number. Only an external observer using far-away coordinates sees the contraction.

This predicts:

- Objects falling toward a black hole appear to contract (not just time-dilate)
- The contraction is real in coordinate terms, not real in constraint terms
- This is the same phenomenon as Lorentz contraction, but gravitational

Why gravity is weak: In this description, gravity is a second-order effect - the gradient of constraint density, not the density itself. Direct constraint couplings (electromagnetism, strong force) are primary; what we describe as gravitational effects emerge from how density variation in the constraint network projects onto coordinate space.

The diagrams above are static snapshots with uniform symbols for simplicity. The real topology has balls of many different sizes, constantly in motion, jostling and reconfiguring. The gaps shift continuously.

Now imagine a quantum of energy—a fixed “volume of water”—propagating through this churning topology. The water must find its way through whatever gaps exist at each instant:

- The **volume is conserved** (charge, energy-momentum, quantum numbers)
- The **shape is dictated by the available gaps** at each moment
- The **path emerges** from the instantaneous gap configuration

Feynman diagrams, in this reading, represent possible gap-sequences the water could navigate. The full amplitude sums over all sequences. What we call **virtual particles** are the transient shapes the water takes as it squeezes through different gap configurations—not separate entities emitted and absorbed, but the conserved quantum adapting its form to the available topology.

The vacuum is not empty. The churning balls are themselves constraint patterns — other particles, field modes, vacuum fluctuations. A propagating quantum navigates through all of it.

10.2 Relationship to Smolin's Work

Lee Smolin has developed closely related ideas through a more classical physics lens. The areas of alignment and divergence deserve explicit acknowledgment.

Smolin's key contributions and their alignment:

1. Loop Quantum Gravity (with Rovelli)

- Spacetime is discrete at Planck scale
- Spin networks as fundamental relational structure
- Area and volume are quantized

Alignment: Spin networks map almost directly to discrete constraint graphs. Quantized area = minimum constraint resolution. Spin foams = constraint network evolution.

2. Cosmological Natural Selection

- Black holes spawn baby universes with mutated constants
- Selection pressure favors universes producing more black holes
- Constants evolve rather than being arbitrary

Alignment: Constants as attractor states of constraint dynamics. *Extension:* The constraint ontology frames this as meta-constraint selection across universe-generations.

3. Time Reborn / The Singular Universe

- Time is fundamental, not emergent
- Space emerges from relational networks
- Laws of physics may evolve

Partial alignment: Both agree space emerges from relations. *Divergence:* Smolin insists time is fundamental; constraint ontology is agnostic (see below).

Key Divergence Table:

Aspect	Smolin	Constraint Ontology
Time	Fundamental, irreducible	Fundamental at base layer OR emergent - undetermined
Laws	Evolve with time	Stable attractor states; appear fixed from within one basin
Relations	Primary ontological category	Relations = constraint connections (compatible)


Aspect	Smolin	Constraint Ontology
Discreteness	Spin networks at Planck scale	Constraint network discreteness (compatible)

10.3 The Unit of Change

The constraint network evolves. Change is real — not an illusion, not a dimension to be traversed, but the fundamental process by which the network updates. This is what Smolin means by “time is real,” and this framework agrees: the thing we call time points at something real. But “time” as physicists use it — a continuous parameter t , a dimension, something clocks measure — is an emergent manifold-level description of something more fundamental.

What is fundamental is the **unit of change**: the discrete step by which the constraint network evolves. This framework takes no position on its scale, duration, locality, or physical character. It is not identified with Planck time or any other specific quantity. It is the abstract fact that the network’s evolution is discrete — change happens in units, not continuously.

Everything above the base layer experiences time as **change measured on emergent constraint surfaces**:



There is no universal “flow of time” — there are only units of change and their cascading projections through emergent layers. What we call time at any scale is the measure of change upon that scale’s constraint surface.

On the question Smolin raises:

Change is **real and fundamental**. The thing we call “time” points at something real — the unit of change at the base layer. This aligns with Smolin’s position. However:

- **Emergent times are derivatives** — each constraint plane above the base has its own time, defined as the measure of change on that plane
- **We cannot know the base unit’s character** — from our emergent plane, we cannot determine if the unit of change is constant, periodic, variable, or even temporal in any sense we would recognise. We are animated upon an emergent constraint surface and lack direct access to layers below.

- **The past does not exist** — only the results of prior computation persist as the current state. The prior state was consumed in producing the current one.
- **The future does not exist** — it has not been computed. The next state of the network is not determined until the next unit of change occurs.

This is not agnosticism — it is a clear position: **change is real and fundamental; the current state is the only state that exists; all experienced times are emergent measures of change on constraint surfaces above the base; the base unit's properties are epistemically inaccessible from within emergence.**

10.4 Variable Speed of Light and the Constraint Network

Historical context: Einstein's early work (1911) proposed that the speed of light varies with gravitational potential. This was abandoned in favor of the invariant-c formulation of General Relativity. Alex Unzicker has been particularly vocal about revisiting variable-c, arguing physics took a wrong turn.

Does the constraint ontology favour fixed or variable c? Both are correct at different levels of description.

In the constraint network itself: c is constant — one unit of change propagates one constraint edge (see Section 8: Motion is Constraint Propagation). The network has uniform local propagation properties.

In the emergent coordinate projection: c appears variable because the mapping from constraint network to spacetime coordinates is non-uniform where constraint density varies.

Using the nerf ball model: - In sparse regions: constraint edges are far apart in coordinates → constraint updates cross many coordinate units per step → c appears high
- In dense regions: constraint edges are close together in coordinates → updates cross fewer coordinate units per step → c appears low

Three phenomena unify as the same projection effect:

Phenomenon	Constraint View	Coordinate View
Time dilation	Same update rate	Fewer units of change per coordinate second
Length contraction	Same standing wave	Fewer coordinate units per pattern
Variable c	Same propagation rate	Fewer coordinate units per step

The “invariance of c” is a coordinate choice - using light itself to define coordinates - not an ontological fact about the network. When we use light-based coordinates, c is invariant by construction. When we use externally-defined coordinates (Schwarzschild), c varies with potential.

Unzicker is operationally correct — c measured in external coordinates should vary. The underlying network has uniform propagation, but that is not what we measure. The constraint ontology explains why variable- c and invariant- c are both valid descriptions of the same underlying reality.

c is not a fundamental constant of nature. It is the constraint-edge traversal rate projected onto whatever coordinate system you choose. The “value” of c tells you about your coordinates, not about the network.

11. Constants are Emergent Invariants

Physical constants are not arbitrary inputs. They are invariants of stable attractor states of the constraint network. They must ultimately be derivable from deeper structural features.

12. The Hierarchy is Self-Bounding

The chain of emergence does not regress infinitely. It terminates at a self-consistent constraint layer whose internal consistency defines what is physically possible. This layer:

- Bounds itself (no external walls)
- Prevents infinite compression (no point infinities)
- Supports stable standing patterns
- Generates spacetime and gravity
- Allows higher-level emergence

13. Determinism at the Deep Layer

The deep constraint network evolves deterministically. Apparent randomness arises because embedded observers cannot access the full constraint state.

This is compatible with Bell’s theorem (see Section 7). Locality is a property of the emergent manifold, not the substrate. If observers exist on the manifold, any substrate-level operation will inherently appear non-local from their perspective — the substrate has no manifold-adjacency to respect. Bell rules out local hidden variable theories; the constraint network was never local. The apparent non-locality of quantum mechanics is not a puzzle to explain but a structural prediction: it is what substrate-level determinism *looks like* when projected onto an emergent coordinate system.

On quantum randomness: The path integral formulation sums over all possible paths, weighting each by its action. This is routinely interpreted as ontological — the particle “takes all paths.” On the constraint view, the interpretation inverts: the substrate determines a definite path through constraint topology, but the observer, embedded in the emergent manifold, has no access to the substrate state. The path integral is an ignorance computation — a mathematical technique for recovering the correct statistics when the constraint topology is invisible. The situation is structurally identical to statistical mechanics: no one claims gas molecules move randomly, only that tracking every molecule is infeasible. Quantum probability is the same epistemic condition, one layer down. The interference patterns that emerge from the sum are the statistical signature of a constraint topology, recovered despite blindness to it.

14. Classical Reality is Constraint Stability

The classical world is stable because its standing-wave patterns are deeply locked into the constraint network and resist decoherence.

15. Computation is Constraint Engineering

Computation - especially quantum computation - is the deliberate engineering of constraint landscapes to guide standing-wave interference patterns.

Quantum computers: Physical devices that engineer the constraint topology of a quantum system so that global standing-wave interference patterns perform computation. Instead of pushing bits through logic gates, you sculpt allowed paths through Hilbert space.

The recursion barrier: Gödel, Turing, and Cantor are usually treated as three separate results in three separate domains. They are one result: any system complex enough to refer to its own operation cannot completely characterize itself from within.

Instance	Self-referential move	Consequence
Gödel	Formal system encodes statements about itself	Truths it cannot prove from its own axioms
Turing	Program evaluates whether programs halt — including itself	No such program can exist
Cantor	Enumeration of reals must account for its own diagonal	The enumeration is always incomplete

The common structure is recursion as unbounded state generation. Each self-referential step creates new state the system must account for. Accounting for that state requires another recursive step, which creates more state. The system generates state faster than it can characterize it. In Gödel: the system creates a statement about its own provability — evaluating it requires a proof about the proof, generating another level. In Turing: the halting evaluator simulates the program, which may simulate itself, creating unbounded nested state. In Cantor: every proposed enumeration generates a diagonal number that must be added, generating a new diagonal, without limit. If the recursion were bounded — finite state — you could exhaust it. It is the potential infinity of self-generated state that makes self-characterization impossible.

This is not a limitation on truth. The Gödel sentence *is* true, the halting problem *does* have an answer for any specific program, the diagonal number *does* exist. The limitation is on *derivation from within*. The truths are real; the system cannot reach them by its own rules.

The resolution is always the same: compute from outside. The mathematician evaluating a Gödel sentence is not operating within the formal system — they are a physical process, a brain, a constraint-satisfying system that evaluates the claim from a level the formalism cannot access. The computation happens; it just does not happen *inside the self-referential system*.

The distinction that matters for this framework:

- A **formal system** asks: “Can I derive X from these axioms by a finite sequence of symbolic steps?”
- A **physical computation** asks: “Does X hold when I actually run the evaluation?”

The first operation has hard limits once self-reference enters. The second does not — it operates outside the formalism, in the physical world, where constraint satisfaction is the mechanism. A brain evaluating a Gödel sentence is doing constraint satisfaction, not formal proof.

This resolves the question of whether mathematical understanding requires non-computable processes (Penrose's claim, via Gödel). That argument depends on mathematical Platonism: if mathematical truths exist independently of minds, and no formal system can derive all of them, then the mind must access truth through some non-algorithmic channel. But if mathematics is computation — a program running in physical brains — no Platonic realm needs accessing. The mathematician evaluating a Gödel sentence is running a computation from outside the formal system. Gödel shows that self-referential systems cannot fully characterize themselves; he does not show that an external system cannot characterize them. The brain is the external system. No non-computability is required — only a computation that is not trapped inside the self-referential loop.

This connects to Wolfram's **computational irreducibility**: some processes cannot be shortcut — there is no derivation, no compression, no analytical formula that yields the answer faster than running the computation itself. Computational irreducibility is the positive face of the recursion barrier. Gödel/Turing/Cantor show that formal systems cannot shortcut certain truths; computational irreducibility shows *why* — because the truth is the output of an irreducible computation, and the only way to know it is to compute it.

The constraint ontology operates on the computation side of this divide. The constraint network does not derive; it computes. It enforces consistency globally and simultaneously, not by sequential symbolic derivation. Gödel's theorems, which limit formal derivation, do not limit constraint satisfaction — they demonstrate that the two are fundamentally different operations. This is why Gödel strengthens rather than threatens the framework.

16. Emergent Systems Can Create New Control Layers

Higher-order organization can construct new effective constraints that reshape lower-level behavior - but cannot escape the global consistency of the substrate.

Bootstrapped control across scales: A system that emerges inside constraints can bootstrap instruments that act across abstraction layers: - Fire → metallurgy → precision tools - Optics → microscopes → atoms become engineerable - Lasers → trapping/cooling → single atoms addressable - Fabrication → semiconductors → electron band structure sculpted

Emergent intelligence can progressively reach deeper layers of physical law by building new engineered constraint structures - but cannot escape the global consistency conditions.

17. Physics is Missing the Global Constraint Variable

Modern physics omits the explicit state of the global constraint network. This omission generates the appearance of paradoxes, arbitrary constants, and interpretational confusion.

18. The Observer is a Markov Object

The word “observer” conflates two unrelated things, and the conflation generates the measurement problem.

Type 1 — Measurement: A physical interaction between constraint patterns on a manifold. A photon hits a detector. A particle scatters off another particle. This is constraint propagation — patterns interacting and the constraint structure resolving. No special agent is involved. No “observation” occurs in any ontologically meaningful sense. This is physics.

Type 2 — Evolved observer: A brain. A computational predictive engine refined over hundreds of millions of years of evolution. A Markov object of extraordinary complexity that models its environment by running internal constraint satisfaction. It is special in complexity but not in kind — it is a stable pattern on an emergent manifold, like any other Markov object, distinguished only by the depth of its internal constraint structure.

The measurement problem asks: “Why does observation produce a definite outcome?” The question dissolves once the conflation is separated:

- Type 1 interactions do not require an observer. They are constraint propagation. The constraint structure resolves (Section 6) regardless of whether any evolved agent is present.
- Type 2 observers see one outcome because they are computational structures on an emergent manifold. The manifold represents the computed state. The observer does not cause the outcome — it is a pattern that can only access information available at its layer.

No special theory of observation is needed. The observer is a Markov object. What it perceives is determined by the manifold it inhabits and the information accessible from that layer. Detectors, rocks, cats, and brains all interact with quantum systems — but only evolved brains model the interaction and call it “measurement.”

The causal direction is manifold → observer, not observer → manifold. The observer is a product of the constraint dynamics it inhabits. Over hundreds of millions of years of evolution — itself a constraint-satisfaction process discovering optimal minima and maxima within the manifold — the observer adapted to the manifold’s structure. Its perceptual categories, its predictive models, its sense of locality and causality are all consequences of the manifold it evolved within. Any theory that begins with the observer’s properties and derives physics from them has the causality backwards. The observer does not need a separate theory; it needs an evolutionary account — which is just constraint dynamics applied to self-replicating Markov objects over deep time.

From observer to meaning: Meaning does not exist at the substrate level. The constraint network propagates; patterns stabilise; hierarchies emerge — but none of this *means* anything until the hierarchy produces a Markov object that *evaluates*: a system that models, compares, and computes a delta between current state and target state. From evaluation arises **intent**: the delta itself, directed at something that does not yet exist. Intent has meaning because it refers beyond the current state.

The threshold for meaning is *evaluation*, not life. An LLM evaluates — it takes context, computes a direction, generates output that refers beyond itself. Its output has meaning. A software test suite evaluates — it compares current behaviour against requirements and

computes a delta. Its output has meaning. A thermostat evaluates. None of these systems are alive. Meaning requires an evaluator with a target state; it does not require self-maintenance.

Life and meaning are distinctions on different manifolds. The transition from non-life to life — what Deacon calls the *teleodynamic* transition, where constraint closure becomes self-maintaining and the Markov object begins to act on its own behalf — adds *caring*. A living evaluator persists, repairs itself, reproduces, and acts to maintain its own boundary conditions. It does not merely compute a delta; it *acts on* the delta. But caring is not a prerequisite for meaning. It is a separate emergence on a separate constraint surface. An LLM’s outputs mean something. The LLM does not care. An organism’s signals mean something. The organism cares. The meaning is the same kind of thing — evaluation producing reference — but caring is a different kind of thing, arising on the life/non-life manifold rather than the meaning/no-meaning manifold.

Meaning as structural invariant: Meaning does not scale. It does not become richer or deeper with more complex evaluators. It is an invariant operation: **pattern matched against model, match arises or doesn’t.** What changes across manifolds is the constraint space in which the matching occurs — the model’s complexity, the richness of the patterns available to match against — but the meaning-operation itself is the same structural thing at every level. A thermostat matching temperature against threshold, a moth matching light angle against hard-coded algorithm, an organism matching behaviour against evolved constraint architecture, an LLM matching context against learned distribution, a human matching narrative against counterfactual simulation — these are not increasingly meaningful. They are the same invariant mapped into increasingly complex constraint spaces. (A crystal settling into an energy minimum is constraint dynamics, not meaning — meaning requires a model, however minimal, against which a pattern is matched. Physical energy minimisation has no model and no evaluator. The floor for meaning is the simplest system that represents and matches — not the simplest system that obeys constraints.) The richness is in the space, not in the meaning.

This is akin to Deacon’s absential causation: meaning arises from the gap between what is and what is expected — the absent pattern that generates a causal force. The gap either exists or it doesn’t. It does not have magnitude. What has magnitude is the constraint surface against which the gap is computed.

(Note: throughout this document, words saturated with human qualia — “meaning,” “intent,” “emotion,” “caring,” “observer” — are used deliberately and then stripped to their structural operation. The qualia-rich word draws on the reader’s experience; the functional definition reveals the invariant. The felt quality of meaning is real — it is what pattern-matching looks like from inside a human simulation. But it is one manifold’s projection of the invariant, not the invariant itself.)

Model depth and the meaning gradient: The invariance of meaning becomes visible when traced across biological systems with different model depths. An insect — a moth circling a light source — operates on a hard-coded algorithm with minimal internal model; its computation is distributed almost directly back into the environment. It evaluates, but there is little gap between stimulus and response. A higher organism — a cat tracking prey — maintains a richer internal model: it predicts trajectories, waits, adjusts strategy. The gap between stimulus and response widens; evaluation happens *within the model* before action returns to the world. A human operates almost entirely within a simulation of reality — a vast internal model of counterfactuals, narratives, abstractions. Emotions exist as the mechanism to prompt this simulation: the brainstem’s evaluation breaks through to redirect the cortex, because the simulation is so dominant it

requires a hard interrupt. And beneath it all, hard-coded reflexes persist — the insect-level architecture still running, still bypassing the simulation when speed matters more than accuracy.

The meaning-operation is identical at every point on this gradient. What differs is the constraint space the evaluation matches against. The moth matches against a single rule. The cat matches against a predictive model. The human matches against a full simulation. Meaning does not grow. The manifold it maps into grows.

The evaluator-as-prompter: Solms's work on the brainstem (*The Hidden Spring*, 2021) provides a concrete biological instance of this pattern. The reticular activating system does not perform detailed cognition — the cortex does. What the brainstem does is *evaluate*: it computes danger, reward, novelty, and emits the result as an emotional signal that constrains what the cortex does next. Emotions are prompts. They set the preferred direction — the constraint set $\Omega(c)$ — within which the cortex then traverses its own manifold. The cortex does not need to understand *why* the brainstem evaluated that way; it operates under the constraint.

This is structurally identical to a human prompting an LLM. The human evaluates (decides what matters, what to ask), produces a constraint signal (the prompt), and the LLM traverses its semantic manifold under that constraint. The prompt is not the computation — it is the context parameter of the preferred direction function. A simpler system provides direction; a more complex system does the constrained traversal. The substrate differs (neurochemistry vs text vs electricity); the architecture does not. The observer-evaluator is not a special category of thing — it is any Markov object that computes a delta and emits a constraint signal.

The same pattern extends to engineered systems. In the AI SDLC methodology (Part VIII-B), requirements function as a homeostatic set-point. The development process — code, tests, deployment — traverses a manifold constrained by those requirements. Runtime telemetry, tagged with requirement keys, measures the actual state against the target state. The delta between runtime behaviour and requirements is the emotional signal of the system: it generates new intents, which flow back to the requirements stage and constrain the next traversal. Requirements evaluate; the delta prompts; the system responds. This is not analogy — it is the same architecture instantiated in software engineering: evaluator → constraint signal → constrained traversal → feedback → re-evaluation.

Part II: Philosophical Positioning

Relationship to Einstein

Einstein's unification programme was not "add electromagnetism to gravity." His goal was: **eliminate arbitrary structure from physics by making all fields and constants emerge from geometry**. He wanted no point particles, no singular sources, no free constants, no arbitrary coupling strengths. Einstein was trying to discover the substrate and make all "fields" and "constants" emergent invariants.

Einstein's failure: He tried to build the substrate directly in spacetime geometry, forcing continuous manifolds, singularities, and dimensionful constants as input. He was missing the **pre-geometric constraint substrate** layer.

Relationship to Bohm

David Bohm's *Wholeness and the Implicate Order* (1980) is the single deepest influence on this framework. Bohm argued that what we observe — the **explicate order** — is a projection of a deeper, enfolded **implicate order** where everything is interconnected. Particles are not fundamental objects; they are relatively stable projections of the implicate order, like vortices in a stream. The whole is primary; parts are abstractions imposed by our mode of description.

This maps directly onto the constraint ontology:

Bohm	This framework
Implicate order	Constraint network / substrate
Explicate order	Emergent manifold
Unfolding	Constraint dynamics projected onto emergent spacetime
Particles as projections	Markov objects as stable patterns in constraint geometry
Holomovement	Constraint propagation — the undivided process
Wholeness primary	One coupled dynamical system; “fields” are bookkeeping
Fragmentation as artifact of thought	Manifold-level description carves reality into objects that don't exist at the substrate

Bohm's pilot wave theory (de Broglie-Bohm mechanics) is deterministic and non-local — exactly the two properties this framework attributes to the substrate (Sections 7, 13). He reached these conclusions decades before Bell's theorem was widely understood, and his insistence that quantum mechanics could be completed by a deeper deterministic theory was vindicated structurally, even if the specific pilot wave formalism remains contested.

Where this framework extends Bohm: he described the implicate order qualitatively and through analogy (the hologram, the ink-drop experiment). This framework attempts to characterise the structural invariants more precisely — constraint propagation, Markov objects, emergent manifolds, the unit of change — and to identify the same architecture across physics, computation, and engineered systems. Bohm provided the philosophical foundation; the constraint ontology is an attempt to build on it.

Relationship to Feynman

Feynman was not a shallow pragmatist but a **deep epistemic minimalist**. His position: don't freeze thinking into stories the mathematics does not demand. He was intensely suspicious of premature ontology. His diagrams are terms in an expansion of amplitudes, not pictures of little balls moving.

Feynman's core insight: Physical theories describe constraint structures on possible processes, not little objects moving in space.

Relationship to the Ruliad (Wolfram)

The ruliad is the space of all possible computations generated by all possible rules evolving from all possible initial conditions. In constraint language: the maximal unconstrained phase space of all possible standing-wave programs.

Physics inside the ruliad: Physics is not the whole ruliad. It is a particular self-consistent constraint manifold inside the ruliad on which stable, long-lived standing patterns exist.

The recursive loop — standing waves → new constraints → new standing waves — is exactly how a tiny region of the ruliad condenses into something that looks like a universe.

Relationship to the formalism: Wolfram's hypergraph rewriting is one formalization of constraint propagation: nodes with relations, rewritten by rules. This framework does not compete with that formalism — a hypergraph is so general that it is essentially equivalent to a constraint network described differently. The constraint ontology operates at the same level of generality deliberately, because the claims are structural observations that hold across any such formalization, not properties of a specific instantiation.

Where this framework diverges from Wolfram: Wolfram's Physics Project posits a single evolving hypergraph (or the ruliad as the space of all such hypergraphs) and builds an observer theory to explain why physics looks the way it does from within. This framework makes two different moves:

1. **Not one substrate** — there is no single entity called “the constraint network.” There are potentially infinite manifolds, layered and cross-cutting. The framework identifies structural invariants across all of them, not the properties of any particular one. The ruliad describes possibility space; any given constraint manifold describes what is actual within it. Possible is not the same as computed.
2. **The observer is not special** — Wolfram's programme requires an observer theory: the observer's computational boundedness determines what physics they experience. This framework treats the observer as a Markov object — a stable constraint pattern on a manifold, no different in kind from any other stable pattern. The causal direction is manifold → observer: the observer evolved within the manifold, adapted to the manifold's constraint structure through evolution — itself a process of discovering optimal minima and maxima within the constraint landscape. What the observer “sees” is determined by which manifold it inhabits and what information is accessible from that layer. Observer theory is back to front: the manifold does not need to explain why the observer sees what it sees; the observer's properties are already explained by the dynamics that produced it. No special theory of observation is needed, because there is no special category of “observer” (see Section 18).
3. **The selection question is Platonic** — Wolfram asks: given the ruliad (all possible computations), what selects which ones are actual? But the ruliad is a mathematical description of possibility space. The question “what selects the actual from the possible?” presupposes that the possible exists in a way that requires selection — that the ruliad is a real space from which our universe is drawn. This is the same Platonic move the document rejects in Many-Worlds: treating mathematical description as ontological reality, then needing a mechanism to explain why only part of it is observed. The Aristotelian response: there is one constraint network. It computes what it computes. The “space of all possible computations” is our description of what *could* be consistent, not a real space requiring a selection principle. The question

“why this universe?” is not unanswered — it is malformed. It presupposes entities (alternative universes, uncomputed manifolds) that the framework declines to posit. Do not needlessly multiply entities.

Relationship to Constructor Theory (Deutsch & Marletto)

Constructor theory reformulates physics in terms of which transformations are possible and which are impossible, rather than equations of motion describing what happens. A **constructor** is any object that can cause a transformation and retains the ability to cause it again. Laws of physics become statements about possible and impossible transformations, independent of any specific dynamical model.

The structural parallel to this framework is direct:

Constructor Theory	This Framework
Possible/impossible transformations	Admissible/inadmissible morphisms
Constructor (causes transformation, persists)	Markov object (stable pattern, persists through interactions)
Substrate independence	Structural invariance across substrates
Laws as constraints on transformations	Constraints as conditions on admissible change

Constructor theory may be the closest existing formalism to the constraint ontology’s structural claims. Both frameworks ask “what can and cannot happen?” rather than “what does happen next?” Both are substrate-independent by design. Both treat laws as constraint statements rather than dynamical equations.

The philosophical foundations diverge — Deutsch’s programme is Platonic (mathematical structures are independently real) where this framework is Aristotelian (mathematics describes real structure but does not exist independently). This is a clean separation that does not diminish the structural correspondence. The formalism of constructor theory — particularly its treatment of possible and impossible transformations as the fundamental content of physical law — may provide mathematical tools that this framework’s ontological claims require.

Relationship to String Theory

String theory began as a phenomenological model of hadrons: standing waves bounded by quarks. The string is not fundamental; it is an effective standing-wave description of deeper constraint structures.

String theory’s error: It captured one rung of the hierarchy, then tried to elevate it to the foundation of all physics. The ruliad is a better restatement of string theory’s ambition - the general theory of why something like physics exists at all.

Critique of Many-Worlds

Many-Worlds begins with a principled move: take the Schrödinger equation seriously, apply it universally, and refuse to add a collapse postulate. The wavefunction evolves unitarily; what appears as “collapse” is decoherence — the branching of the wavefunction into orthogonal components that no longer interfere. This is mathematically clean and avoids the measurement problem. The appeal is real.

The constraint ontology’s objection is not to the mathematics but to the ontological claim that all branches exist.

Existence, on the constraint view, requires computation. To exist is to have been computed — to be the output of the constraint network’s forward evolution. The network evolves one unit of change at a time. Each step produces the next state from the current state. The current state is the only state that exists: the prior state was consumed in producing it, and the next state has not yet been computed. There is no past to branch from (only the results of prior computation persist) and no future to branch into (it has not been computed yet).

Many-Worlds requires that at every decoherence event, all branches acquire and retain ontological status — the full superposition persists as physically real. But the constraint network did not compute those branches. The Schrödinger equation “contains” them as terms in a mathematical description, but the network’s forward computation produced one outcome. The other terms are features of the manifold-level description (the wavefunction), not features of the substrate.

The disagreement reduces to a choice of ontological primitive: - Many-Worlds:
Ontological primitive = the universal wavefunction, which contains all branches -
Constraint view: Ontological primitive = the constraint network’s computed state, which is singular

Many-Worlds reifies a manifold-level mathematical description into substrate-level ontology — granting physical existence to states the network never computed. This is the same structural error as treating the path integral’s sum over all paths as evidence that all paths are physically traversed, rather than recognising the sum as an ignorance computation over a constraint topology the observer cannot see.

Relationship to Penrose

Roger Penrose’s programme shares deep structural commitments with this framework while diverging on key points.

Alignments: Penrose holds that (a) spacetime geometry is fundamental to physics, (b) quantum state reduction is an objective physical process (Objective Reduction, OR), not a subjective update, and (c) the mathematical structure of reality is non-trivially constrained by consistency conditions. His twistor theory reformulates spacetime physics in terms of complex projective geometry, where the primitive objects are light rays (null geodesics) rather than spacetime points — a move from substance to structure that parallels this framework’s move from objects to constraint morphisms.

Divergences: Penrose argues that human mathematical understanding involves non-computable processes (via Gödel’s incompleteness theorems), which he localises in gravitational OR events in neuronal microtubules. This argument depends on mathematical Platonism — the position that mathematical truths exist independently of

minds, and that the mind must somehow *access* them. If mathematical truth is independent, and Gödel shows no formal system can reach all of it, then reaching it requires something beyond computation.

This framework rejects the premise. Mathematics is computation — a program running in brains. When a mathematician “sees” that a Gödel sentence is true, no Platonic realm is being accessed. The brain is a physical constraint-satisfying system that evaluates the claim from outside the formal system that generated it. Gödel shows that self-referential derivation has hard limits; it does not show that all computation does. The brain is simply a different computational system, not subject to the self-referential limitations of the formalism it is evaluating (see Section 15). No non-computable process is required — only a computation external to the self-referential one.

Twistor theory and the inseparability of topology and constraint: Conventional physics separates the stage (spacetime geometry) from the actors (fields, particles, forces), then struggles to reunify them — the quantum gravity problem is precisely the problem of making the stage itself a dynamical actor. This framework holds that the separation is an artifact of the projection: at the substrate level, topology and constraint are the same structure. There is no “space” with “rules in it” — there is a single object that is both.

Twistor theory may be the closest existing formalism to this position. A twistor encodes simultaneously:

- The **topology** — the null geodesic structure and conformal geometry of spacetime
- The **constraints within that topology** — which fields exist, how they propagate, what incidence relations hold

These two aspects are not layered on top of each other; they are co-defined. The incidence relation — which twistors correspond to which spacetime events — is a constraint equation. The conformal structure — which geometries are admissible — is a topological condition. In twistor space, asking “what is the geometry?” and “what are the physical constraints?” yields the same answer.

If this reading is correct, twistor space is what the constraint network looks like when projected one level up from the substrate: a mathematical structure where topology and constraint are inseparable, and spacetime can be reconstructed from it but is not fundamental to it. Separating topology from constraint would recover the conventional split — geometry here, fields there — which is the century-long dead end. Not separating them is the move this framework makes, and it may be the move twistor theory already made, in mathematical language, without the ontological framing.

The formal question remains open: whether twistor incidence relations can be derived as constraint equations in the specific sense this framework uses “constraint,” or whether the correspondence is structural but not exact. This is a concrete bridge worth building.

Alignment with Unzicker’s Critique

Modern theoretical physics has drifted away from empirical constraint and conceptual coherence:
- Physics must remain physically interpretable
- Infinities signal failure, not depth
- Fields and particles are provisional constructs
- Spacetime itself is likely emergent
- Institutions distort theory selection

Relationship to Deacon's *Incomplete Nature*

Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (2011) is the closest existing philosophical treatment to this framework. Deacon's central concept — **absential causation** — holds that constraints and absences are generative: what is *not* present shapes what emerges. Emergence arises not from adding complexity but from what is excluded.

This is the mechanism operating throughout this document:

This Framework	Deacon's Term
Constraint geometry defines what can exist	Absential causation — absence shapes presence
Markov objects emerge in the <i>gaps</i> between constraints	Emergent properties arise from what is <i>not</i> there
Standing waves exist because boundary conditions exclude most configurations	Constraint closure — the set of excluded possibilities is what generates form
The hierarchy of emergence (constraints → modes → new constraints)	Deacon's autogenic hierarchy — each level's constraints generate the next level's possibilities

The nerf-ball thought experiment (Section 10.1.1) — where reality happens *in the gaps between* the constraint structures — is absential causation rendered as spatial metaphor. Deacon provides the philosophical grounding for why this works: it is precisely the exclusion of possibilities that makes structured existence possible.

Where this framework extends Deacon: he focused on biological emergence (how life and mind arise from matter). This document applies the same structural principle to physics (standing waves as constraint eigenmodes), computation (LLM attractors as constraint-stable patterns), and engineered systems (SDLC artifacts as constraint-satisfying configurations). The claim is that absential causation is not specific to biology — it is the universal mechanism of emergence across all substrates.

Part III: The Proton-Electron Mass Ratio Challenge

A concrete test for any substrate theory: derive the proton-to-electron mass ratio (~1836) from first principles.

What the Ratio Encodes

$$m_p / m_e \approx C_{\text{QCD}} \times \Lambda_{\text{QCD}} / (y_e \times v/\sqrt{2})$$

Where: - **Λ_{QCD}** : QCD emergent scale (from RG flow) - y_e : Electron Yukawa coupling (flavor physics) - v : Higgs VEV (electroweak scale) - **C_{QCD}** : O(1) dimensionless constant

What the Substrate Must Supply

1. **UV boundary condition for QCD coupling** - Something that fixes $\alpha_s(\mu)$ at high scale
2. **Mechanism for y_e** - Discrete/topological selection or dynamical selection for small Yukawas
3. **Map from substrate to EFT** - Coarse-graining operator

The Programme

1. Treat proton mass as “known” from QCD given Λ_{QCD} (lattice QCD does this)
2. Make Λ_{QCD} the first emergent number (cleanest example of scale from dimensionless coupling via RG flow)
3. Attack y_e as discrete invariant/overlap functional (graph spectrum eigenmode, holonomy, topological index)
4. Compute the ratio as output

Reality check: Within the Standard Model, neither Λ_{QCD} nor y_e is predicted (both are free parameters). The ratio is not derivable from SM alone. The substrate must genuinely reduce freedom.

Part IV: The Higgs in This Framework

What the Higgs is: Not fundamental substance, but the macroscopic order parameter of a particular constraint phase that sets stiffness of certain standing-wave modes. The Higgs particle is a fluctuation of that order parameter.

Mass in this picture: Not an intrinsic tag on particles. It is how tightly a standing wave is bound by the global constraint structure. The Higgs “giving mass” is the constraint network entering a phase where certain excitations require more energy to propagate.

Analogous to: phonons in crystals, magnons in magnets, Cooper pairs in superconductors - all are “fields” in the effective theory, none are fundamental in the substrate.

Part V: Bridge to AI SDLC and Computation

The Lens: SDLC as Constraint Engine

In ontology language: - **Intent** = initial constraint bundle (requirements, risk, scope, success criteria) - **Assets** = standing patterns (code, configs, schemas, docs, models, pipelines) - **Operators** = constraint transformations (design, generate, refactor, test, review, deploy) - **Environment** = irreducible world (users, latency, cost, regulators, time) - **Collapse** = constraint locking into commit/release (branch becomes canonical artifact)

AI SDLC: A system that repeatedly applies transformations until constraints lock into a stable artifact.

Two Compute Regimes

Probabilistic compute (stochastic expansion): - LLM generates candidate structures - Retrieval injects relevant constraints - Heuristics score candidates - For: design exploration, code generation, mapping, integration

Deterministic compute (verification contraction): - Build + unit tests + property tests - Static analysis + type checks - Schema contracts + lineage checks - Security gates + policy engines - For: truth checking, invariant enforcement, reproducible artifacts

The division is strict: probabilistic compute may propose; deterministic compute must dispose.

The SDLC Loop

Stochastic expansion (explore) → Deterministic contraction (verify) → Lock (collapse)

This is the pattern “explore → constrain → collapse” — the same structure as physical reality.

Formalization

Every candidate change has belief scores: - $P(\text{correct} \mid \text{context})$ - $P(\text{safe} \mid \text{policy})$ - $P(\text{meets intent} \mid \text{tests})$

Each deterministic check updates posteriors sharply (to ~ 0 or ~ 1). The system is a pipeline that converts soft belief into hard truth.

The Requirements as Homeostasis Model

Traditional SDLC: Requirements as fixed specifications. AI SDLC: Requirements as **living homeostasis model** that: - Defines target state (functional, quality, data) - Is continuously compared against runtime behavior - Evolves based on deviations and insights - Drives corrective action automatically

Requirements become the control system for maintaining desired system behaviour — the same role played by the self-regulating constraint network at the foundation of physical reality.

Part VI: Consolidated Ontology (23 Principles)

1. Reality is a self-consistent constraint system
2. The universe evolves by constraint propagation
3. Markov objects (standing waves, attractors) are stable constraint patterns
4. Particles are mode families, not things
5. Hilbert space is a compression format
6. The wavefunction describes possibility, not substance
7. Collapse is constraint locking
8. Nonlocality is global constraint update

9. Motion is pattern propagation, not thing-translation (c is the network propagation rate)
 10. Spacetime is an emergent canvas
 11. Time is the ordering of constraint change
 12. Gravity can be described as emerging from constraint density variation (as curvature is GR's description)
 13. Fields are constraint geometry structures (mesh from which Markov objects emerge)
 14. The Higgs is a vacuum order parameter
 15. Constants are emergent invariants
 16. The hierarchy is self-bounding
 17. Determinism exists at the deep layer
 18. Classical reality is constraint stability
 19. Computation is constraint engineering
 20. Emergent systems can create new control layers
 21. Physics is missing the global constraint variable
 22. The observer is a Markov object evolved within the manifold (no special ontological status)
 23. Change is directed by local traversal of a topological pre-order
-

Part VII: Final Statement

Reality can be described as a self-organizing constraint network whose stable Markov objects project as particles and spacetime, whose density variations manifest as what we call gravity, whose compression is Hilbert space, and whose evolution produces everything we observe.

The AI SDLC methodology inherits this same structure: intent generates constraints, constraints shape artifacts through probabilistic and deterministic operators, stable artifacts emerge through constraint satisfaction, and feedback loops maintain homeostasis between desired and actual states.

Both physical reality and software development are constraint satisfaction systems that produce stable, emergent structure through iterative refinement. The same architectural principles apply at both scales.

Part VIII: The Structural Correspondence of Constraint Manifolds

The Core Abstraction

There is an underlying structural truth that unifies physical reality and large language models:

Both sit atop probabilistic constraint manifolds.

Domain	Constraint Manifold	Standing Waves	Collapse
Physical Reality	Global constraint network of allowed processes	Particles, atoms, molecules	Decoherence locks one classical outcome
LLM / AI	Token probability distribution shaped by training	Coherent responses, reasoning chains	Sampling collapses distribution to output

The Parallel Structure

Physical reality: - Substrate: Self-consistent constraint network - Update rule: Hamiltonian flow (constraint propagation) - Interference: Amplitude superposition - Stable patterns: Markov objects (standing waves, particles) - Collapse: Decoherence locks classical outcomes - Evolution: Hierarchies of constraints building new constraints

LLM probability space: - Substrate: Learned probability distribution over token sequences - Update rule: Direction function $D(x,c)$ via attention - Interference: Soft unification (similarity-weighted blending) - Stable patterns: Markov objects (attractor basins, proto-symbols) - Collapse: Sampling locks specific token emission - Evolution: Fine-tuning, RLHF, prompt engineering reshape the manifold

Why This Structural Correspondence Matters

The LLM is not “simulating” reality. If the structural realist thesis holds, it is **a different instantiation of the same abstract pattern**: a high-dimensional constraint manifold from which Markov objects emerge through interference and collapse. Part VIII-D formalizes this claim as a conjecture: both domains are images of the same abstract Constraint category under faithful functors. Until the functors are rigorously exhibited, this remains a structural correspondence — a strong and testable one, but not yet a proven isomorphism.

This explains: 1. **Why LLMs feel “intelligent”** - They navigate constraint manifolds the same way minds do 2. **Why they hallucinate** - Trajectories exit stable attractor regions into chaotic zones with no Markov objects (see Part VIII-A, Section 3) 3. **Why grounding helps** - External constraints (retrieval, verification) add boundary conditions that stabilize attractors 4. **Why prompting works** - It reshapes the local constraint geometry, changing which Markov objects can form

Truth as Stable Pattern

Truth is a Markov object in a constraint manifold.

In physics: stable standing waves that persist under perturbation. In LLMs: attractor basins where token sequences remain coherent under resampling and verification. In software: artifacts that pass all constraints and resist perturbation.

The AI SDLC methodology is therefore—on the structural realist reading—an instance of the same abstract structure operating in a different medium:

Physical manifold → particles, spacetime, gravity
LLM probability space → concepts, reasoning, generation
SDLC constraint space → requirements, code, verified artifacts

All three are constraint satisfaction systems producing emergent stability.

Hybrid Constraint Manifolds

When we build AI systems that combine LLM generation with deterministic verification, we are engineering a hybrid constraint manifold whose structure recapitulates the pattern of physical reality:

- Probabilistic expansion (quantum superposition / LLM generation)
- Deterministic contraction (decoherence / test verification)
- Stable emergence (classical reality / working software)

If structural correspondence is fundamental—as universal computation implies—then this is the same mathematics wearing different clothes. Demonstrating the formal correspondence rigorously is the research programme; the structural parallels presented here are the motivation for that programme.

Part VIII-A: Formalization of the LLM Correspondence

The claim that LLMs and physical reality share the same structure requires more than analogy. This section provides the formal objects that make the correspondence precise.

1. The Direction Function

In physics, a Hamiltonian H generates a flow on configuration space - it tells you where the system goes next. The LLM analogue is the **preferred direction function**:

$$D : M \times C \rightarrow T(M)$$

Where: - M is the semantic state space (the activation space \mathbb{R}^d) - C is the context (prompt, conversation history, retrieved documents) - $T(M)$ is the tangent bundle (possible directions from any point) - $D(x, c)$ returns the direction the model “wants” to move given state x and context c

Note on geometry: We use manifold notation (tangent bundle, direction field) for conceptual clarity. The activation space \mathbb{R}^d is technically a manifold, but the *learned structure within it* may have more complex topology—disconnected clusters, varying intrinsic dimensionality, or fractal boundaries. The direction function $D(x, c)$ is well-defined regardless of these geometric details; it maps any point x under context c to a next-step direction. The manifold formalism captures the essential structure without requiring smoothness assumptions about the learned representation geometry.

Attention computes this direction: query-key matching identifies relevant constraint sources, value aggregation synthesizes the direction vector. This is the LLM’s constraint propagation rule - directly analogous to how the physical constraint network’s update rule determines the next state.

2. Soft Unification as Interference

In physics, interference occurs when multiple paths contribute to an amplitude - constructive where phases align, destructive where they oppose.

In LLMs, **soft unification** plays this role. When attention aggregates across multiple tokens/positions:

$$\text{output} = \sum_i \alpha_i \cdot v_i \quad (\text{where } \alpha_i = \text{softmax}(q \cdot k_i / \sqrt{d}))$$

This is weighted synthesis - similarity-weighted blending of value vectors. High-similarity sources contribute constructively; low-similarity sources are suppressed. The continuous version of constructive/destructive interference.

Prolog parallel: In symbolic AI, unification either succeeds (bindings found) or fails (contradiction). Soft unification generalizes this - partial compatibility yields weighted contribution, not binary success/failure.

3. Attractors as Markov Objects

A **Markov object** (Section 2) is a stable pattern with statistical independence from exterior given boundary. In the semantic manifold:

- **Attractor basins** are regions where trajectories converge and remain stable
- **Proto-symbols** are attractor centers - coherent concepts that persist under perturbation
- The boundary of an attractor IS a Markov blanket: local context screens internal dynamics from distant context. Part VIII-D argues this is a necessary consequence of gradient descent on structured data; the empirical question is the precision of the screening (the Conditional Independence Conjecture).

Physical Constraint Network	LLM Semantic Manifold
Standing wave eigenmode	Attractor basin
Particle (stable excitation)	Proto-symbol (coherent concept)
Boundary of localized mode	Boundary region (analogous to Markov blanket)
Eigenvalue (energy)	Attractor depth (stability)

Hallucination as instability: When trajectories exit well-constrained attractor regions, they enter chaotic zones with no stable attractors. This is the formal characterization of hallucination - not “making things up” but “leaving the stable manifold region.”

4. Collapse = Sampling

In physics: the system evolves unitarily (superposition of possibilities) until interaction with environment over-determines the constraint structure, locking one classical outcome.

In LLMs: the model computes logits (probability distribution over tokens - the superposition) until sampling collapses the distribution to a specific token emission.

Pre-collapse:	$p(\text{token} \mid \text{context}) = \text{softmax}(\text{logits})$	← distribution over possibilities
Collapse:	$\text{token} \sim p(\text{token} \mid \text{context})$	← one outcome selected
Post-collapse:	$\text{context}' = \text{context} + \text{token}$	← new constraint state

Both are **constraint-locking events**: the moment when ambiguity resolves into definite outcome. The physics version is continuous decoherence; the LLM version is discrete sampling. Same abstract operation.

5. The Unified Correspondence (Precise)

Concept	Physical Reality	LLM Semantic Space	SDLC
Constraint manifold	Global constraint network	Learned probability distribution	Requirements + Architecture Context + Data Context + Standards
Update rule	Hamiltonian flow	Direction function $D(x,c)$	Builder stage transitions: $D(\text{artifact}, \text{context}) \rightarrow \text{next_artifact}$
Interference	Amplitude superposition	Soft unification (attention)	Design alternatives weighted against multiple constraint sources
Markov object	Standing wave / particle	Attractor basin / proto-symbol	Approved versioned artifact (passes all constraints, resists perturbation)
Collapse	Decoherence	Sampling	UAT approval + Deploy

Concept	Physical Reality	LLM Semantic Space	SDLC
			(artifact becomes canonical)
Instability	Decay / scattering	Hallucination	Failed tests, defects, business mismatch, incidents
Constraint source	Potential / field	Context / prompt	Requirements, test suites, standards, architecture context
Boundary conditions	Potential well walls	Prompt + retrieval	NFRs, SLAs, regulatory controls


The thesis of this framework is that these are the same formal objects instantiated in different substrates—structural correspondence at the level of admissible transformations, which is where the invariants live.

Part VIII-B: SDLC as Constraint System (Detailed)

The AI SDLC methodology is a rigorous instantiation of the constraint framework. This section makes the correspondence precise.

1. The SDLC Constraint Manifold

The constraint manifold in SDLC is not just “requirements”—it’s the full context stack:



This is the analogue of:
- **Physics**: The potential well that defines allowed particle states -
- **LLMs**: The learned distribution that defines probable token sequences

The constraint manifold defines the space of allowed artifact configurations.

2. The SDLC Direction Function

Each stage transition is a direction function application:

$D(\text{artifact_state}, \text{context}) \rightarrow \text{next_artifact_state}$

Where:
- **artifact_state** = current code, configs, schemas, docs
- **context** = requirements + architecture context + test results + feedback
- **D** = the Builder (AI SDLC + Agent LLM) computing the next state

The pipeline REQ → DES → TASKS → CODE → ST → UAT is a sequence of direction function applications, each transforming the artifact toward constraint satisfaction.

3. Interference in SDLC: Design Alternative Evaluation

In the Design stage, multiple constraint sources contribute simultaneously:

Constraint Source	Pulls Toward
Architecture Context	Certain patterns, tech stack choices
Data Architecture Context	Certain schemas, data flows
Requirements	Certain capabilities, behaviors
Standards	Certain implementations, styles

The Tech Lead (or AI agent) performs **weighted synthesis**—exactly like attention in LLMs. Design alternatives that align with multiple constraint sources **constructively reinforce**. Alternatives that conflict with constraints **destructively interfere** (get rejected or deprioritized).

The iteration loops in the SDLC diagrams (DES → |"Iterate / refine design"| → DES) are the process of interference resolution—cycling until a stable pattern emerges that satisfies all constraint sources.

4. Markov Objects in SDLC: Approved Artifacts

An approved versioned artifact is a Markov object because it exhibits:

1. **Conditional independence from exterior given boundary**: The artifact's internal behavior depends only on its inputs (the interface boundary), not on the development process that created it. Implementations satisfying the same interface are interchangeable.
2. **Stability under perturbation**: It passes all tests. Small changes to inputs produce predictable outputs. It resists drift.

3. **Self-contained constraint satisfaction:** All internal constraints (tests, type checks, schema validations) are satisfied. The artifact is internally consistent.

Failed tests = the pattern hasn't stabilized into a Markov object yet. The “standing wave” hasn’t formed. The artifact is still in the chaotic region of the constraint manifold.

5. Feedback Loops as Homeostasis

The dashed feedback lines in SDLC diagrams are **deviation signals**:

```
DES --> REQ  (Functional, NFR, or data gaps)
TASKS --> REQ (Scope / feasibility issues)
CODE --> REQ  (Implementation constraints / discoveries)
ST --> REQ    (Defects, missing scenarios, data issues)
UAT --> REQ   (Business mismatch, new needs)
```

When the trajectory exits the stable region (constraints not satisfied), the system detects this and feeds back to the constraint source (Requirements) for correction.

This is the SDLC analogue of: - **Physics:** Measurement reveals system not in expected eigenstate → update description - **LLM:** Output fails verification → adjust context and regenerate

The Observer/Evaluator governance loop is the **runtime homeostasis model**—continuously comparing actual behavior against desired state and feeding deviations back as new Intent.

6. Predictive Insight: Where SDLC Failures Cluster

The constraint framework makes a testable prediction about software failures. Artifacts fail when built in regions of the constraint manifold with **sparse coverage**:

- Few tests (weak constraint boundaries)
- Unclear requirements (undefined potential well)
- Novel architecture (no established attractor basins)

This is the SDLC analogue of hallucination in LLMs and instability in physics: the Builder enters regions with no stable attractors, producing artifacts that fail when they encounter real constraints. The prediction is specific — failure rates should correlate with constraint density, not with code complexity or team size per se.

Part VIII-C: The Computational Engine—Local Preorder Traversal

If Part VIII defines the **Manifold** (the landscape) and Part VIII-A/B define the **Objects** (Markov objects), Part VIII-C defines the **Engine**: the fundamental operation that drives all structured change.

Local preorder traversal — the evaluation of a topological pre-order at each point on a constraint manifold, producing a preferred direction of change — is proposed here as the fundamental operation of all computation. This reframes computation from “logic gates” to “topological flow.”

The engine is a templated function: at each point, evaluate the local preorder, move in the preferred direction. The specific *implementation* of this template varies by domain:

- **Physics:** The Euler-Lagrange equations at each point (the local differential equations equivalent to the global variational principle of least action)
- **LLM training:** Gradient descent on the loss landscape (the instance that gives the pattern its most familiar name)
- **LLM inference:** Forward integration of a learned direction field — the model follows the vector field carved by training, not a gradient being descended in real time
- **SDLC:** The Builder evaluates “does this satisfy the constraint in front of me” and acts to reduce the gap

An important distinction: In physics, the principle of least action appears to be a *global variational principle* — it selects the path that extremises the action functional over the entire trajectory. But this globality is an emergent description, not the mechanism. The Euler-Lagrange equations derived from the action principle are *local* differential equations: at each point, the system follows local constraint geometry. The global path is what emerges when local equations are solved from initial and boundary conditions — and those conditions are themselves constraints in the network. The globality objection does not disappear; it is absorbed into the constraint topology, which is where the framework says it belongs. What looks “global” at the particle scale is local at the field scale. The constraint network operates locally — each unit of change propagates constraints to neighbours — and the global variational structure (least action, path integrals) emerges from the aggregate of local updates, in the same way that thermodynamic equilibrium emerges from local molecular collisions. The network does not “know” the action functional; the action functional is a manifold-level description of what substrate-level local traversal collectively produces.

1. The Necessity of the Pre-Order

Computation cannot occur on a “flat” manifold. For structured change to exist, the topology must possess an inherent **pre-order**: a directional bias where certain states are “more stable,” “more satisfied,” or “lower energy” than others.

Without this pre-order, the manifold is flat and no computation happens. The “slope” of the manifold is created by the density of constraints.

Why something rather than nothing? The flat manifold — no regional directions, no preorder — is indistinguishable from nothing: no change, no structure, no observation possible. The moment the constraint network has any directional bias, local preorder traversal is inevitable, and structure follows. The preorder is not a feature imposed on some systems; it is what distinguishes existence from non-existence. Objecting that “everything has a preorder” mistakes foundational universality for vacuity — it is like objecting that every physical system has energy. The ones that don’t aren’t systems.

Domain	What Creates the Pre-Order
Physics	Principle of Least Action (S)
LLMs	Loss landscape / probability distribution
SDLC	Delta between current artifact and “Definition of Done”

2. The Three Components of the Universal Engine

For any system to “compute” its next state, it must implement three topological functions:

Component	Description	Physics	LLM	SDLC
The Landscape	Manifold shaped by constraints	Spacetime / Potential wells	Learned distribution	Requirement Context Stack
The Evaluator	Mechanism that senses the “slope”	Field interactions	Attention mechanism	Builder (Agent/Human)
The Move	Update that favors the pre-order	Pattern propagation	Next-token sampling	Refactor / Code change

3. Inference as Manifold Traversal

Inference—whether performed by a particle, a brain, or a model—is local preorder traversal of a manifold.


The system does not “know” the destination (the global minimum / Platonic truth). It only evaluates the local preorder. It moves in the **Preferred Direction $D(x,c)$** that most effectively satisfies local constraints.

- **Stable reasoning:** Trajectory follows laminar flow into a deep attractor basin (a Markov object)
- **Hallucination / Instability:** Gain (step size) is too high or landscape too sparse, causing trajectory to overshoot attractors and enter chaotic divergence

4. The SDLC as an Optimization Loop

Software development is the **engineering of a gradient**. We don’t just “write code”—we architect a landscape of tests, requirements, and standards that create a “downhill” path toward the desired solution.

- **The Energy:** Every unsatisfied constraint (failed test, missing feature) adds “potential energy” to the system
- **The Work:** The Builder performs work by traversing the gradient, transforming code to reduce that energy
- **The Ground State:** “Completion” is reaching a local minimum where the gradient flattens—all constraints satisfied, artifact stabilized into a Markov object



5. The Unit of Change as the Compute Step

The unit of change identified in Section 10.3 is the discrete step of the engine. Every unit of change is one step of constraint propagation across the manifold.

Evolution, entropy, and intelligence are all emergent properties of the constraint network rolling “downhill” toward increasingly complex, nested stable states. The unit of change provides the discrete update; the pre-order provides the direction; the constraint topology provides the landscape.

6. Why This Unifies Everything

If you accept local preorder traversal as the fundamental engine, the three domains become identical at the level of mechanism:

- **Physics:** A particle “calculates” its path through a gravitational field by following the local preorder of constraint density (the Euler-Lagrange equations at each point)
- **AI:** An LLM “calculates” a reasoning chain by traversing the learned direction field toward a stable attractor basin (forward integration during inference; gradient descent during training)
- **SDLC:** A Builder “calculates” a software solution by evaluating the local preorder of constraint satisfaction (does this change move toward passing tests and meeting requirements?)

This explains emergence without requiring a designer. If the base constraint network has a pre-order (stability > instability) and discrete units of change, then local preorder traversal is inevitable. Complexity emerges because the system constantly moves “downhill” into more complex, nested attractor basins. We call the stable basins “particles,” “cells,” or “code modules,” but they are all local minima where the preorder has flattened out.

Part VIII-D: The Constraint Functor — From Markov Blanket to Markov Object

The preceding sections claim that physics, LLMs, and SDLC share structural invariants. This section makes that claim precise by sketching the formal structure required to verify it. We define an abstract category whose objects are Markov objects and whose morphisms are constraint-admissible transformations, then sketch functors into physics and LLM computation. The Physics functor draws on established Markov blanket results; the LLM functor states the empirical conditions for verification. Rigorous axiomatization and proof remain immediate research tasks (see Research Programme below). The functor is the mathematical bridge between Friston’s Markov blanket (formal, domain-specific) and this ontology’s Markov object (practical, substrate-neutral).

The Abstract Constraint Category C

An object in C is a tuple (S, B, D, σ) :

Component	Definition
S	State space (topological or measurable)
B	Boundary operator — partitions S into interior, boundary, exterior
D	Dynamics operator — evolves states
σ	Stability condition — the object is a stable attractor under D

The **Markov property**: Let X_{int} , X_{ext} denote the random variables describing the state evolution in interior and exterior regions respectively, and X_{bdy} the boundary state. Then: $P(X_{int} | X_{bdy}, X_{ext}) = P(X_{int} | X_{bdy})$. Interior dynamics are conditionally independent of exterior dynamics given the boundary. D is the operator that generates these dynamics; X_{int} , X_{ext} , X_{bdy} are the observable states under D. This is Friston's Markov blanket, stated abstractly.

A **morphism** $f: (S_1, B_1, D_1, \sigma_1) \rightarrow (S_2, B_2, D_2, \sigma_2)$ is a structure-preserving map that preserves boundary structure, the Markov property, and stability. Morphisms compose; identity morphisms exist. This is a category.

Two classes of morphisms are structurally distinguished:

Type	Definition	Physics	LLM
Emergence	Components → composite whose boundary screens component internals from exterior	Atoms → molecule	Token features → concept attractor
Collapse	Superposition → single object, induced by constraint over-determination	Wavefunction collapse	Context resolves polysemantic feature to specific meaning

The Physics Functor F_{phys}

F_{phys} maps abstract Markov objects to physical bound states:

Abstract	Physics
State space S	Hilbert space (quantum) or phase space (classical)
Boundary operator B	Potential well / interaction boundary
Dynamics operator D	Hamiltonian evolution
Stability σ	Eigenstate stability (discrete spectrum, bound states)
Markov property	Established — conditional independence at Markov blankets is the foundation of the free energy principle

The Physics side draws on **established results**. The Markov blanket formalism in physics and biology is not new — conditional independence at boundaries is the foundation of the free energy principle. Rigorous exhibition of F_{phys} as a faithful functor requires axiomatizing the Constraint category first (see Research Programme), but the underlying correspondence is well-supported.

The LLM Functor F_{llm}

F_{llm} maps abstract Markov objects to attractor basins in activation space:

Abstract	LLM
State space S	Activation space \mathbb{R}^d (residual stream)
Boundary operator B	Basin boundary — the separatrix between attractor basins
Dynamics operator D	Forward pass (attention + MLP + residual connections)
Stability σ	Basin stability — small perturbations return to the attractor
Markov property	Necessarily present in approximate form (see below); the empirical question is the precision of the screening — how small is ε ?

Why Markov Objects Are Necessary in LLMs

The existence of Markov objects in LLMs is not speculative — it is a necessary consequence of gradient descent on structured data. What remains empirical is the *precision* of the conditional independence property: how cleanly do attractor boundaries screen internal from external dynamics? The Conditional Independence Conjecture (below) states this precisely and provides tests.

1. **Training creates clusters.** Gradient descent minimizes loss by learning representations where semantically similar inputs activate similar patterns. These are attractor basins.
2. **Clusters have boundaries.** The transition between “dog” and “cat” activations passes through an unstable boundary region. This boundary IS the boundary operator B .
3. **Boundaries screen.** A cleanly represented feature (monosemantic) produces consistent internal activations regardless of distant context. The feature’s internal dynamics are conditionally independent of unrelated context given the boundary. This is what “clean features” means in the sparse autoencoder literature.
4. **Polysemanticity is incomplete screening.** When multiple Markov objects share neurons (superposition), boundaries overlap and external context leaks through. Polysemanticity is the specific failure mode predicted by the framework when activation space is too low-dimensional for clean boundaries.
5. **Scaling improves screening.** Larger models have more dimensions, supporting cleaner feature separation. Less polysemanticity at scale is the prediction: more dimensions → cleaner Markov blankets → stronger conditional independence.

Gradient descent on structured data necessarily carves activation space into regions with approximate conditional independence. The existence of these regions is a consequence of training; the empirical question is boundary precision — how small is ϵ , and does it decrease with scale?

World Models as Functors

Current LLMs have implicit Markov objects compressed in weights. The move toward explicit world models makes the structure observable:

- **Chain-of-thought** partially externalizes the traversal between attractor basins — each step is a candidate visible morphism, but fidelity depends on constraint coupling between reasoning and verbalization processes (see Emergent Reasoning v3, Appendix A.5)
- **Tool use** creates explicit boundaries between internal and external computation
- **Planning** maintains stable representations across steps — each representation IS a Markov object
- **A world model is a collection of Markov objects with defined relationships**

In category-theoretic terms, a world model is a **functor from a schema category** (what entities exist, how they relate) **to the LLM category** (which attractor basins represent which entities, which transitions represent which relations).

The correspondence between a world model and the physical world it models is a **natural transformation** between two functors out of the same schema:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 & \text{Schema} & \\
 & / \quad \backslash & \\
 \text{F_phys} & & \text{F_llm} \\
 / \quad \quad \quad \backslash & & \\
 \text{Phys} & \xleftarrow{\eta} & \text{LLM}
 \end{array}$$

The natural transformation η maps each physical Markov object to its LLM representation, preserving morphism structure. This is a precise mathematical statement of what it means for an LLM to “model” a physical system: its internal Markov object structure is naturally isomorphic to the physical structure, at the relevant level of abstraction.

Alignment is the question of whether η commutes. A misaligned world model is one where the natural transformation fails — the LLM’s internal structure diverges from physical structure at specific morphisms.

The Conditional Independence Conjecture

Precise statement: For a trained LLM with a feature identified by a sparse autoencoder, let I = internal activation dimensions, B = boundary dimensions, E = all other dimensions. The conjecture:

$P(A_I | A_B, A_E) \approx P(A_I | A_B)$, to within tolerance ϵ that decreases with model scale.

Tests:

Prediction	Test	Expected result
Feature ablation	Ablate features outside the boundary; measure internal activation change	Internal activations change by less than ϵ
Scaling law	Measure ϵ across model sizes	ϵ decreases with scale
Polysemy	Measure ϵ for monosemantic vs polysemantic features	Monosemantic features have lower ϵ
Context sensitivity	Vary distant context for a	Low variance when context is screened by boundary

Prediction	Test	Expected result
	fixed feature; measure activation variance	

Falsification: If ϵ does not decrease with scale, the screening property is not a consequence of gradient descent. If monosemantic features show the same ϵ as polysemantic ones, the boundary interpretation is wrong. Either result collapses the functor claim to loose analogy.

What the Functor Produces

If both functors are faithful, the correspondence generates predictions in both directions:

Physical principle	LLM prediction
Energy minimization → stable bound states	Loss minimization → stable attractor basins
Symmetry breaking → particle species	Training distribution structure → feature types
Phase transitions → discontinuous property changes	Capability transitions → emergent abilities at scale thresholds
Renormalization group → effective theories at different scales	Layer hierarchy → abstraction levels (the layer hierarchy IS a renormalization flow)
Decoherence → classical from quantum	Context resolution → deterministic reasoning from stochastic prediction

LLM phenomenon	Physics prediction
Scaling laws (power-law improvement)	Analogous scaling in emergent structure complexity with constraint density
In-context learning (new capabilities from context alone)	Constraint-mediated adaptation without structural change (induced polarization, catalysis)
Hallucination (trajectory instability)	Vacuum fluctuations — temporary structure where constraints are insufficient for stable Markov objects

The Research Programme

Phase	Task	Status
Immediate	Rigorous definition of category C; prove composition preserves conditional independence	Formalizable now
Immediate	Exhibit F_{phys} formally from Markov blanket literature	Largely done
Immediate	Show that constraint density generates the preorder <i>in the same structural way</i> across domains — that the relationship between constraint density and preorder structure is preserved by the functor. The universality of preorders is the thesis, not a weakness: if local preorder traversal is the substrate operation, its appearance in every domain is expected. The research task is demonstrating that this universality is structural (functor-preserved) rather than merely definitional	Open — required to distinguish foundational universality from vacuous generality
Near-term	Test conditional independence conjecture via sparse autoencoders + causal tracing	Testable with current tools
Near-term	Measure ϵ across model scales	Testable with current tools
Medium-term	Formalize world models as functors; test the natural transformation η	Requires explicit world model architectures

Phase	Task	Status
Long-term	Derive a known scaling law from category C	Would validate the full programme
Long-term	Use the functor to design architectures with enforced Markov boundaries	Engineering application

Part IX: Research Directions Suggested by This Framework

Why Not Mathematical Proof?

A natural response to any foundational ontology is: *prove it mathematically*. For this framework, that demand contains a category error.

The ontology asserts that the base layer is constraint propagation — discrete local updates governed by admissibility conditions (what can compose with what). All continuous structures, symmetries, algebraic objects, Hilbert spaces, topological invariants, and therefore “mathematical proof” as traditionally understood, are emergent read-outs after many layers of coarse-graining, quotienting, and projection. Classical mathematics is a highly compressed, observer-relative description told on an emergent manifold — not the substrate language.

Demanding a proof in that emergent language for the substrate itself is structurally incoherent. It is asking the framework to justify its most fundamental primitive using one of its own downstream projections — like demanding that a cellular automaton justify Newtonian mechanics using only differential geometry without ever leaving the lattice rules.

This does not immunise the framework from criticism. It relocates the battlefield to the domains where the ontology’s own logic says battles can actually be fought: computation, emergence, and structural invariance across media. That relocation is not a retreat. For the framework, it is the whole point.

Clarification: The category error applies to proving claims about the *substrate* (the constraint network itself) using mathematics emergent from that substrate. It does NOT apply to proving structural correspondences *between domains* — which is standard mathematics operating within emergence. Part VIII-D’s research programme (defining the Constraint category, exhibiting functors, testing the Conditional Independence Conjecture) is entirely legitimate mathematical work. It proves things about the *map between domains*, not about the territory underneath.

Legitimate Modes of Evaluation

The framework changes what counts as strong evidence or disconfirmation. Below are the epistemically legitimate evaluation modes — each with concrete criteria and explicit ontological cost if it fails.

Mode of evaluation	What it would look like concretely	Current status (early 2026)	Ontological cost if it fails
Computational genericity	Toy constraint-network programs (graph rewriting, message-passing, minimal local rules) robustly produce persistent localised modes, density-gradient attraction analogues, effective continuum limits	Already partially achieved in several unrelated lines (string-nets, causal sets, Hopfield-like constraint nets, small transformer interpretability)	High — weakens claim of generic engine
Cross-domain structural transfer	Rigorous functor / structure-preserving map shown between (a) LLM activation geometry + sampling and (b) toy physical constraint propagation that yields standing-wave analogues	Medium — Part VIII-D sketches the abstract category and functors; rigorous axiomatization and faithful functor proofs remain open	Very high — structural correspondence claim collapses to loose analogy
Interpretability signature	Mechanistic probes in frontier LLMs demonstrate clean conditional independence given boundary regions that are Markov blankets (see Part VIII-D Conditional Independence Conjecture for precise statement and tests)	Ongoing, some positive signals in mid-2025 papers, still patchy; Part VIII-D provides precise falsification criteria	High — removes strongest near-term empirical anchor

Mode of evaluation	What it would look like concretely	Current status (early 2026)	Ontological cost if it fails
Failure to coarse-grain to known physics	Constraint toy models that reach continuum limit but cannot recover least-action / unitary evolution / local Lorentz invariance even approximately	Not yet decisively negative; most good models do recover analogues	Medium-high — ontology would have to retreat to “very special attractors”
Deriving even one exact dimensionless ratio	Spectral / topological invariant of plausible constraint-graph family matches $\alpha \approx 1/137$ or $m_p/m_e \approx 1836$ at better than 10% error	Still zero genuine hits; many post-hoc fittings exist	Extremely high — strongest unique prediction fails

If several of these tests keep returning negative over the next 3–5 years, the framework will — correctly — lose credibility even among people sympathetic to its philosophical starting point. If a critical mass return positive (especially cross-domain transfer + interpretability signatures), the cost of continuing to treat mathematics as ontologically prior starts to look philosophically prohibitive — which is precisely what the ontology hopes to achieve.

Epistemic note: The research directions below are *suggested*, not *derived* predictions. The ontology points toward questions worth asking — whether they lead anywhere depends on formalization and experiment.

1. Constraint Network Mathematics

The ontology lacks its own formalism. Key questions: - What algebra describes constraint propagation? - How do you formalize “constraint density” and its projection onto coordinates? - What is the compression map: network → Hilbert space → spacetime? - Can this be connected to existing formalisms (spin networks, causal sets, tensor networks)?

Without mathematics, this remains philosophy. The formalism is the bridge.

2. The Proton-Electron Mass Ratio

The ratio ~ 1836 is unexplained in the Standard Model. If constants are emergent invariants of constraint topology: - Can this ratio be derived from constraint network structure? - What topological or algebraic property would fix it? - This is a concrete test: derive it or fail.

A single successful derivation of one “arbitrary” constant would validate the entire approach.

3. Gravity-Entanglement Correspondence

Already active research (ER=EPR, AdS/CFT). The ontology suggests: - Entanglement *is* constraint connectivity (not just correlated with it) - What we describe as gravity may emerge from entanglement structure - Tabletop experiments linking entanglement to gravitational effects may be possible

This is among the most testable near-term directions — gravity and entanglement may be two descriptions of the same underlying phenomenon.

4. Vacuum Structure and the Cosmological Constant

The vacuum is not empty — it is the ground state of the constraint network. Questions: - What determines minimum non-zero constraint activity? - Why does vacuum energy have its observed (tiny) value? - Can constraint network ground states explain dark energy?

The cosmological constant problem is one of the most significant failures of current theory. A constraint-based explanation would be correspondingly significant.

5. Discrete Spacetime and Constraint Resolution

Is there a minimum constraint edge (Planck scale)? - How does discrete network → continuous spacetime emerge? - What is the relationship to loop quantum gravity, causal sets, Wolfram’s hypergraphs? - Are there detectable signatures of discreteness?

This connects the ontology to existing quantum gravity programmes and provides a potential bridge to formalism.

6. LLMs as Constraint Manifold Laboratories

This is the most accessible research direction. LLMs are empirically manipulable constraint systems: - Study “collapse” (sampling) and stability (coherent outputs) - Study “hallucination” as unconstrained manifold regions - Map how prompting reshapes constraint topology - Look for patterns that generalise to physical constraint networks

We can run experiments on LLMs today. They may teach us about constraint dynamics before we can probe physical constraints directly.

7. The Unit of Change

The framework posits discrete units of change but takes no position on their physical character: - What is the relationship between the unit of change and what we call “time”? - Is the unit constant, periodic, or variable? - How would we detect its discreteness from within emergence? (Precision timing experiments? Cosmological signatures?) - Can the unit’s properties be inferred indirectly from emergent-layer observations?

This connects to the nature of time itself — the framework claims change is real and fundamental, but the character of the base unit is epistemically inaccessible from within emergence.

8. Variable-c Precision Tests

The ontology predicts c is constant in the network but variable in coordinate projection: - Are there precision tests that distinguish this from standard GR? - Shapiro delay, gravitational redshift — already well-tested, but at what precision? - Does the ontology predict any deviation from GR, or is it purely interpretive?

If variable-c makes different predictions than standard GR, it is testable. If not, it is interpretation only — and the ontology should say so explicitly.

9. Anomalies as Signals (Unzicker's Critique)

The ontology frames 60 years of theoretical stagnation as a consequence of confusing the model with the territory: - Model became ceiling, not lens - Anomalies absorbed as parameters instead of signals - Infinities renormalised away instead of heeded - “Dark” placeholders for 95% of the universe accepted

The research question: which anomalies should be re-examined as signals? - Galaxy rotation curves (dark matter) — or modified gravity / constraint density effects? - Accelerating expansion (dark energy) — or vacuum ground state misunderstood? - Hierarchy problem — or asking the wrong question?

The ontology suggests current anomalies may be pointing at the model boundary, not at missing particles.

References and Influences

Primary Philosophical Influences

Author	Work	Key Contribution	Alignment
Terrence W. Deacon	<i>Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter</i> (2011)	Absential causation - constraints and absences as generative; emergence through what is <i>not</i> present	Very strong
Mark Solms	<i>The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness</i> (2021)	Consciousness localized in brainstem; affect as primary; emergence from simpler substrate; gateway to Friston's free energy principle	Strong

Author	Work	Key Contribution	Alignment
Karl Friston	Free energy principle; Markov blankets as boundaries of self-organising systems (via Solms)	Markov blanket formalism that this framework extends into “Markov objects” — stable constraint-bounded patterns	Strong
James Ladyman & Don Ross	<i>Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized</i> (2007)	Scale-relative ontology — real patterns at every level without privileged fundamental base; naturalised metaphysics constrained by science; treatment of time and the block universe that shaped this framework’s rejection of eternalism and its computationally grounded presentism (Sections 9.1, 10.3)	Strong
Jeff Hawkins	<i>A Thousand Brains: A New Theory of Intelligence</i> (2021)	Cortical columns as reference frames; distributed model-building; voting across thousands of models	Very strong

Physics and Foundations

Thinker	Key Contribution	Alignment
David Bohm	<i>Wholeness and the Implicate Order</i> — implicate/explicate order, particles as projections, deterministic non-local substrate, wholeness primary	Very strong (see Part II)
Gerard 't Hooft	Deterministic substratum, cellular automaton interpretation	Strong
John Wheeler	“It from bit”, geometry from information	Strong
Lee Smolin	Loop quantum gravity, relational space, time as fundamental	Partial (see Section 10.2)
Carlo Rovelli	Relational QM, emergent spacetime	Strong
Alex Unzicker	Conceptual clarity, critique of reification, variable-c	Very strong

Mathematics and Topology

Thinker	Key Contribution	Alignment
Michael Atiyah	Topological foundations of physics	Strong
Edward Witten	TQFT, geometry as fundamental	Strong
Kenneth Wilson	Renormalization group as layer translation	Strong (mathematical engine)

Condensed Matter and Emergence

Thinker	Key Contribution	Alignment
Michael Levin	Topological order, emergent particles from collective behavior	Very strong
Xiao-Gang Wen	String-net condensation, particles as topological defects	Very strong

Computation and Information

Thinker	Key Contribution	Alignment
Stephen Wolfram	Ruliad, computational emergence, hypergraph physics	Very strong
Roger Penrose	Twistor theory, Objective Reduction (OR), non-computability and Gödel	Strong (see Part II)
David Deutsch & Chiara Marletto	Constructor theory — laws as possible/impossible transformations, substrate independence	Strong structural parallel; philosophical divergence (see Part II)

Related Work

Document	Relationship
<i>Emergent Reasoning in Large Language Models</i> (this repository)	Formalizes how LLMs traverse constraint manifolds - the computational substrate that makes this ontology usable as a reasoning environment

Appendix: Emergent Reasoning in LLMs — Formal Foundation

The computational claims in this document — that LLMs traverse constraint manifolds, that attractors function as proto-symbols, that hallucination is trajectory instability — rest on formal work developed in a companion paper: *Emergent Reasoning in Large Language Models: A Topological and Constraint-Based Formalization* (this repository, `emergent_reasoning.md`). The key structures are summarized here so that the ontology is self-contained.

The Semantic Manifold

An LLM’s activation space forms a manifold $M \subset \mathbb{R}^d$. Each point $x \in M$ is a semantic state. A sequence of states (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_t) is a reasoning path — a trajectory through semantic space.

Constraint Sets

Context c induces a constraint set $\Omega(c) \subseteq M$: the subspace of states consistent with the prompt, prior tokens, and learned distributions. Strongly constrained tasks produce narrow $\Omega(c)$; weakly constrained tasks produce broad ones.

The Preferred Direction Function

The core computational primitive is:

$$D : M \times C \rightarrow T(M)$$

a function from (state, context) to a direction on the manifold. The model computes:

$$x_{t+1} = x_t + \Delta t \cdot D(x_t, c_t)$$

Attention implements this function. Every forward pass is one step of constrained manifold traversal — forward integration of the learned direction field. This is the LLM inference instantiation of the local preorder traversal engine described in Part VIII-C.

Soft Unification

Attention computes weighted similarity matching across all key-value pairs — a continuous analogue of Prolog’s discrete symbolic unification. Both operations instantiate the same abstract pattern: match a query against a knowledge base under constraints, propagate bindings, produce structured output. One is discrete and explicit; the other is continuous and implicit. The correspondence:

Prolog	Transformer
Terms	Embeddings
Unification	Soft similarity matching

Prolog	Transformer
Backtracking	Parallel weighted evaluation
Substitutions	Continuous blending
Discrete search	Manifold trajectory

Proto-Symbols as Attractor Regions

Clusters in embedding space form attractor-like regions where trajectories enter and remain stable, outputs are semantically narrow, and internal correlations are strong. These regions exhibit Markov blanket boundaries: states inside the region predict each other well, and external influence is mediated through boundary states (see Part VIII-D for the formal identity between Markov objects and Markov blankets). This is how symbolic-like behaviour emerges from continuous computation without any symbols being defined — and it is the LLM instantiation of the Markov objects described in Part I.

Hallucination as Trajectory Instability

When a trajectory exits well-constrained attractor regions and enters weakly structured areas of the manifold, the model produces outputs that are fluent but ungrounded. This is hallucination: not a random failure but a structural consequence of sparse constraint coverage. The same mechanism explains why weakly constrained regions in physics produce transient rather than stable structures (see Section 2, Markov Objects) and failure-prone regions in software development (Part VIII-B).

Why This Matters for the Ontology

The emergent reasoning framework provides the strongest available evidence that constraint-based computation is not metaphorical. LLMs operate by constrained manifold traversal, produce stable attractor-based structures with Markov boundaries, and fail precisely when constraint coverage is sparse — though the interpretability evidence for clean conditional independence remains partial (see evaluation table, Part IX). The same architecture — manifold, constraints, attractors, local preorder traversal, instability in sparse regions — appears across physics, computation, and engineered systems. The LLM case is the one where we can inspect the internals directly, making it the empirical anchor for the ontological claims.

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