

# Diasporic Assistance in Authoritarian Settings: Annotations

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**Note:** All direct quotations are in **bold type**. All translations from Portuguese and Hebrew are mine. When possible, I included a scan of the relevant part of the cited documents.

## List of Archives

**AAD:** Alberto Dines Personal Archives, São Paulo, Brazil

**AHIB:** Itamaraty Historical Archives, Brasília, Brazil

**AIK:** Israel Klabin Archives, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

**ASM:** Samuel Malamud Personal Collection, General Archives of the City of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

**CZA:** Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Israel

**ISA:** Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, Israel

**MFA:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs files, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, Israel

**NARA:** General Records of the Department of State Central Foreign Policy File, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, United States

**YIVO:** YIVO Archives, New York, United States

## OAA #1

*Jewish Brazilians had both the will and means to provide this help, and they were not systematically discriminated against by the military regime.*

and


*An Israeli report from 1973 determined that Brazil, “a multiracial country,” in which “people from different and various national origins” coexisted in mutual tolerance, did not discriminate against Jews. Since 1969, Jewish soldiers, students, and civil servants in Rio de Janeiro were exempt from working on the Jewish High Holidays.*

Source 1: Unsigned report entitled “The Jews in Brazil,” undated (probably 1973): MFA/6527/18.

Excerpt 1: **“The relations [of the Jewish community] with the authorities are correct. Every Jewish New Year, the President of the Republic delivers to the community his greeting, which includes several sentences about Brazilian and human fraternity.**


[...]

**Brazil is a multiracial country, and people from different and various national origins live in it in tolerance. In this atmosphere, no discrimination against Jews is felt.”**




Source 2: Winterstein to World Jewish Congress and others, 9 May 1968: CZA/C2/1633.

Excerpt 2: "According to the custom initiated by the [Jewish] Confederation, the President of the Republic has been addressing the Jewish Community of Brazil on the occasion of the Jewish Holy Days. President Costa e Silva too was respecting this custom which, so we hope, will continue in any regime to come. On that occasion, the Governors of the States, as well as various M.P.s [members of parliament] are traditionally visiting the synagogues.



Source 3: Federação Israelita do Rio de Janeiro (Jewish Federation of Rio de Janeiro),  
“Relatório do executivo apresentado à Assembléia Geral Extraordinária realizada em 12  
dezembro de 1972, abrangendo todo o período de sua gestão iniciada em março de 1969,” 12  
December 1972: ASM, SM Inst. Jud. / fed. 01 / Instituições Judaicas / FIERJ.

Explanation: This is a report of the activities of the Rio de Janeiro Jewish Federation since  
March 1969. Among the **“activities worth mentioning,”** the report highlights the fact that  
the federation obtained exemption **“in the days of the Jewish New Year and Yom Kippur  
for Jewish civil servants, soldiers, and students.”**



## OAA #2

*As an Israeli report from the early 1970s stated, there was “total prohibition” of taking money out of the country and an “official policy of resistance to the emigration of citizens abroad.” Consequently, both activities had to be carried out “with relative secrecy.”*

and

*According to an Israeli report, that the authorities did not act against the donors required “great efforts” (whether these efforts were on the part of Israel or the diaspora is unclear) and “because the Brazilian government was not interested at the time in open conflict” with Israel or the diaspora.*

Source 1: Unsigned report entitled “The Jews in Brazil,” undated (probably 1973): MFA/6527/18.

Excerpt: “**Magbit and Aliya: In Brazil, there is a total prohibition on taking money abroad. Thus, the Magbit, the [Israel] Bonds, and the rest of the [diasporic assistance] institutions operate in relative secrecy and their representatives come to Brazil under different covers. [...] A few years ago, the police discovered a list of donors to the Magbit. The thing was done away with in great efforts because the Brazilian government was not interested at the time in open conflict.”**

מגביות ועליה: בברזיל חל היום איסור מוחלט על הוצאת כספים לחו"ל.  
לכן פועלים המגבית, הבונדס ושאר המוסדות כולל בנקים בחשאי יחסית  
ונציגיהם מביעים לברזיל בכסויים שונים. סך הכנסות המגבית בשנת 1972  
היו כ- 1,700,000 דולר. סך הכנסות הבונדס היו 2 1/2 מיליון דולר. לפני  
מספר שנים גילתה המשטרה רשימת תורמים למגבית. הענין חוסל במאמצים רבים  
כיוון שממשלת ברזיל לא היתה מעונינת אז בסכסוך גלוי.  
ריו דה ז'נרו שמשה במאי 72 מושב לכנס ההכנה לאזור האמל"סי לקראת "הועידה  
הכלכלית" שתיערך במאי 73 בירושלים ונועדו בה גדולי המשקיעים בכח והתעשינים  
היהודים באמל"ס. ישראל קלבין (ראח לעיל) היה המארח.  
העברה 400,000 דולר להקמת "בית אוסבלדו ארניה" במכון ויצמן העומד להחנך,  
נעשית באישור ממשלת ברזיל על פי הצעה של אדולפו בלור, בשיחתו עם הנשיא  
מדיצ'י.  
נטיעת יער לכבוד 150 שנות עצמאות ברזיל כמחווה ישראלית.  
גם הפעולות הקשורות בעליה נעשות בצנעה מאחר שהמדינות הרשמית היא של  
התנגדות להגירת אזרחים לחו"ל. מספר עולי ברזיל בארץ מגיע לחמשת אלפים  
בערך.

38.JPG (1200 x 1600)

Source 2: Harkavi to Jerusalem, Secret, 8 January 1969: MFA/3184/4.

Explanation: In this report, Itzhak Harkavi, the Israeli ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, complains that the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was wiring to the embassy telegrams concerning investments that had not been encrypted, **"despite the cable in which I asked to stop wiring open cables on matters that are prohibited in Brazil. Not taking into consideration my request to cipher such cables might cause us severe damages."**

משרד החוץ  
מחלקת הקשר

נכנס-מסווג

ס ו ד י

מס' 17

חומר : 081000 ינואר 69  
הודפס : 091200

ס ו ד י

המבכל העתק קבט, כלכלית, קשר.  
בוספת מברק גלוי בעניני השקעות על אף מברקי נו ביקשתי  
על ענינים שהם אסורים בברזיל. אי שימת לב לבקשתי  
עשויה לעלות לבו בגזקים חמורים.

הרכבי

קדרון שלוש כלכלית 2 קבט קשר מלט



### OAA #3

*In 1968, an Israeli Jewish Agency envoy similarly commented that “the regime knows about our deeds here, but we should not provide those interested in sabotaging our actions with too obvious proofs.”*

Source: Harpaz to WZO, 9 February 1969: CZA/S76/254.

Excerpts: **I have arrived, I have reported to duty, and I have found out that everything is not okay! No one pays attention to the situation, the mess is enormous, [Zionist] activity is executed and financed in a terribly black [illegal] manner. [...] The law of the country forbids encouraging and organizing emigration. [...] Furthermore, it is strictly prohibited to take hard currency out of the country. And behold, here we are, not only doing these things, but also abusing the country’s laws: we are not legal, we are not registered, we do not pay taxes, our emissaries are not registered at the labor ministry as tax-paying workers, our premises boast vast archives full of figures and names of emigrants from time immemorial, lists of donors to the Magbit, extensive hasbara regarding the essence of the Magbit, methods of fundraising, destinations of the funds, etc. – enough sins to fill many a prison, and for many years [underline in original].**

לבה-שבע שלום רב!

הערכת המצב. מוצא אני צורך דחוף לתאר בפניכם את המצב ואת סוג העבודה בה אני עוסק. טאז מכחבי האחרון אליכם השתנה המצב וחלה הרעה חמורה בהנאי העבודה. זכורני, שטרם נסיעתי, עת שוחחתי עם נציג הזכרות - שאלתי על המצב, ועל הבסיס החוקי לקיומנו ומעולחנו. לאור נסיוני משליחותי הקודמת בברזיל ידעתי שאנו עובדים בצורה "שלפריה" ביותר, ולכן רציתי למנוע מעצמי כניסת מחורשה לחוך "מצבים מיותרים" הוא ענה לי שחל בסדר, וכשאגיע לברזיל אחיצב בשגרירות, וחכל יהיה כשורה. ובכן, הועתי, אחיצבתי, ונוכחתי שחל לא בסדר! אף אחד לא פתחם למצב, חבלגן הוא עצום, המעולה המבוצעת וממומנת בצורה שחורה להבהיל. ובכל זאת כאן שולטת & דיקטטורה צבאית חחל משנת 1964. ישנם שני סוקדי מעולה במסגרתנו שהם נוגדים את חוק המדינה; עליה ומגבית. חוק המדינה אוסר עידוד להגירה וארגונה (ברזיל היא ארץ הקולטת אסיגורציה!) כמו כן אסור בחכלית להוציא משבע קשה מן המדינה. והנה, אהנו, לא די שמבצעים את הדברים הללו, אנו עוד מתעמרים בחוקי המדינה: איננו לבאליים, איננו רשומים ב"רשות החברות", איננו משלמים מסים, שליחנו אינם רשומים במשרד העבודה כעובדים המשלמים מסים, חדרינו מלאים ארכיונים ענקיים עם מספרים ושמות-עולים מקדמת דנא, רשימות חורמים למגבית, הסברה ענפה על פאות המגבית, אפני תחרפת יעדי הכסמים וכו' - חסאים הספיקים לפלא בתי-סתר רבים ולחרבת שנים.

## OAA #4

*Brazilian imports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria far surpassed those from Israel, whereas Lebanon was a thriving market for Brazilian exports.*

Explanation: Between 1965 and 1975, Brazilian exports to Israel amounted to US\$148 million and imports from Israel to US\$53 million, as opposed to such trade balances as US\$708 million and US\$1,106 million, respectively, with Sweden; or US\$424 million and US\$262 million with Poland (not to say US\$9,450 million and US\$13,514 million with the United States).

**Table 1: Brazilian Commerce with the Middle East, 1967–1973**

**(In US\$1,000 FOB)**

Country	Brazilian Exports to...	Brazilian Imports from...
Egypt	21,133.00	16,978.10
Syria	23,749.80	28.2
Jordan	6,780.10	0
Lebanon	84,206.90	1,833.10
Saudi Arabia	1,570.70	651,111.80
Kuwait	1,804.60	163,378.80
Iraq	48,017.30	350,012.10
Algeria	116,248.40	115,216.70
Libya	1,932.70	98,340.10
Israel	76,459.90	21,727.10

**Table 2: Brazilian Commerce with Selected Countries, 1967–1975****(In US\$1,000 FOB)**

Year	Israel (ex.)	Israel (imp.)	Lebanon (ex.)	Lebanon (imp.)	Sweden (ex.)	Sweden (imp.)	Poland (ex.)	Poland (imp.)	USA (ex.)	USA (imp.)
1965	2,481.30	1,032.50	4,821.30	3.1	55,204.80	17,394.30	11,054.60	5,781.00	520,18 9.90	281,581.50
1966	1,931.10	601.4	18,327.80	8.7	54,799.90	28,576.30	8,896.80	9,521.60	581,39 4.00	522,852.40
1967	1,471.40	1,287.90	11,355.70	17.5	49,802.70	35,402.70	15,353.40	12,395.70	547,58 9.20	510,400.60
1968	3,485.50	1,828.80	13,752.40	50.7	50,822.70	48,299.20	14,945.70	11,923.90	626,99 6.30	612,649.90
1969	2,616.20	1,998.90	15,712.50	27	59,706.10	61,740.00	18,212.90	9,105.70	609,75 7.20	613,238.00
1970	6,121.40	2,672.50	8,240.90	35	69,201.70	49,735.90	23,841.20	9,593.50	676,05 8.40	823,775.50
1971	11,495.10	3,407.00	11,311.70	41	53,829.00	70,131.00	24,055.60	47,414.00	759,96 5.60	954,845.00
1972	12,706.70	3,149.00	7,683.20	852	66,396.30	88,313.00	45,359.20	31,268.00	931,23 2.70	1,211,818.90
1973	38,563.60	7,383.00	16,150.50	809.9	93,669.00	149,179.50	48,861.10	24,023.00	1,122,3 87.40	1,818,367.80
1974	13,727.80	16,306.90	27,409.70	14,692.70	72,440.00	240,260.20	79,130.10	23,465.10	1,737,1 08.90	3,078,564.90
1975	53,787.00	14,053.30	17,785.60	286.1	82,820.20	317,077.60	134,329.30	77,545.40	1,337,3 26.60	3,086,187.80
<b>Total</b> <b>1965–1975</b>	148,387.10	53,721.20	152,551.30	16823.7	708,692.40	1,106,109.7 0	424,039.90	262,036.90	9,450,0 06.20	13,514,282.3 0

Source: Brazil's Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Commerce historical data:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20201227153827/http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/comercio-exterior/estatisticas-de-comercio-exterior/outras-estatisticas-de-comercio-exterior> (27

December 2020). Alternatively, available at <https://archive.is/nEfoN> (27 December 2020).

## OAA #5

*Thus, during the 1968 authoritarian crackdown, which brought about unprecedented state violence and repression, the Brazilian authorities interrogated some Jewish diasporans about their remittances to Israel but were apparently satisfied with their anti-communism explanation that “Israel fights against Communism in the Middle East.”*

Source 1: “A Brief Survey of the United States of Brazil,” undated (probably mid-1966): MFA/4004/6.


Excerpt 1: **“The present government stands with both its feet in the Western camp. [...] Saving Brazil from a communist deterioration served as the main pretext for the 31 March 1964 Revolution. Therefore, the regime views resistance to communist penetration as a central goal. Brazil’s foreign relations, especially in the political realm, are directed to a notable degree by these considerations. Brazil views Israel as a Western and friendly element. [...] Brazil does not have considerable interests in the Middle East region per se. Its fundamentally positive position toward Israel is somewhat influenced by the need to balance its attitude to Israel and its attitude to Lebanon. The attitude to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq is reserved because of their neutralist tendencies, the communist influence over them, and their identification with Cuba.”**

המספר הברזילי ברזיל עומד בשתי רגליו במחנה המערבי. הוא רואה בקומוניזם הסובייטי ועוד יותר בסיבי גורם חתרני בעל כוונות זדון כלפי היבשת הדרום אמריקנית וביחוד כלפי ברזיל. הצלת ברזיל מהתרדמות קומוניסטית נמשכה עילה עיקרית למהסכת 31 במארס 1964. לפיכך רואה המספר בהתבגרות לחתירה הקומוניסטית יעד מרכזי. יחסי החוץ של ברזיל, בעיקר בשטח המדיני, מורכבים במידה ניכרת ע"י שיקולים אלה. ברזיל רואה בישראל גורם מערבי וידידותי. המדינה היחידה בין ארצות ערב הגהניות מיחס דומה היא לבנון שלה גם יתרון גוסף והוא נוכחותה של תפוצה גדולה (כמיליון נפש) בברזיל. האגדה על הצלחותיה וגבורתה של ישראל והשפעתה בעולם המערבי וביחוד בארה"ב מאזנת היתרון הלבנוני הנזכר.

לברזיל אין יחסי כבדי משקל באיזור המזרח התיכון בתור שכזה. עמדתה החיובית ביסודה כלפי ישראל מושפעת במידת מה גם מן הצורך להביא לידי איזון בין יחסה אל ישראל ויחסה אל לבנון. היחס למצרים סוריה ועיראק הוא מסוייג בשל בטיותיהן הנויטרליסטיות, ההשפעה הקומוניסטית בהן והזדהותן עם קובה. ירון וסעודיה אינן פעילות בברזיל ואין ההתעניינות בהן גדולה. אין גושים לזהות את ארצות המערב עם המזרח התיכון. היחס לאלג'יריה חיובי. כנראה מתוך יחס כבוד למלחמת הגבורה שנהלה במשך שנים להשגת עצמאותה. אפס, ביכרת בסיגת מה מאז הפלת מספרו של בן-בלה. מדינות ערב המיוצגות בברזיל הן מצרים, סוריה, לבנון ואלג'יריה. קיים גם נציג הליגה הערבית העוסק ביחוד בהאדרת תרבות ערב. בהשמצת ישראל הצלחותיו דלות.

Source 2: AJC, "The Political Situation in Brazil: To what extent does it affect the Jewish community," Strictly Confidential, undated: YIVO, RG 347.7.1, FAD-1, Box 15.

Excerpt 2: “Since the anti-Russian feeling in the armed forces reaches pathological [*sic.*] levels, it is expected that certain activities will be tolerated. Considering that they are not basically anti-Semitic, Israel is a natural ally against Communism. We already know of cases in which prominent Jews were questioned if they had economically contributed to Israel and why. Apparently they were pleased – although not completely satisfied – with the reply that they are anti-Communists and that Israel fights against Communism in the Middle East. On the other hand, this government has signed with Israel the most important contracts of financial and technical assistance that Brazil has ever known. Israeli technicians have been hired to carry out an integral plan for the irrigation of the country, the construction of highways and the expansion of the railway net. Brazilian Jews are now most concerned as to what will happen if something goes wrong with this work or if any other problem arises in connection with this program.”



There is no doubt that Jews will not feel comfortable under a regime of this kind. If they do not suffer as Jews, they will certainly suffer as an economic class. They will feel unsecure and will lack a feeling of future. Although the government is not specifically anti-Jewish, their policy will have negative repercussions for the Jewish community, including Jewish institutional life, aliyah, etc. (this, in fact, will depend to a great extent of the prestige and the position that Israel is able to build and how it will be seen by the Brazilian leaders). Since the anti-Russian feeling in the armed forces reaches pathological levels, it is expected that certain activities will be tolerated. Considering that they are not basically

anti-Semitic, Israel is a natural ally against Communism. We already know of cases in which prominent Jews were questioned if they had economically contributed to Israel and why. Apparently they were pleased -although not completely satisfied- with the reply that they are anti-Communists and that Israel fights against Communism in the Middle East. On the other hand, this government has signed with Israel the most important contracts of financial and technical assistance that Brazil has ever known. Israeli technicians have been hired to carry out an integral plan for the irrigation of the country, the construction of highways and the expansion of the railway net. Brazilian Jews are now most concerned as to what will happen if something goes wrong with this work or if any other problem arises in connection with this program.

Finally we should bear in mind that because of its strongly nationalistic psychological and political features, this government has considerable possibilities of becoming anti-Semitic.




## OAA #6

*The cooperation agreement between the countries was renewed in 1975, after Brazil's pro-Arab foreign policy shift.*

Source: Unsigned report entitled "Mashav" (ha-Machlaka le-Shituf Peula Beinleumi, the Division for International Cooperation at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs):  
MFA/245/1.

Excerpt: **"On the occasion of the renewal of the agreement, at the end of 1975, the appreciation of the heads of the Department [O Departamento Nacional de Obras Contra as Secas, National Department of Public Works against Drought] toward the work of the Israeli crew was expressed once again.**



## OAA #7

*In 1966, João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, chief of the Rio de Janeiro office of the National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações, SNI) and future president of Brazil (1979–1985), secretly visited Israeli security and intelligence installations. In 1967, SNI Chief Golbery do Couto e Silva conveyed to the Mossad (Israel's intelligence agency) his interest in tightening the collaboration between the two services. In 1973, Brazil appointed Colonel Otávio Aguiar de Medeiros, one of the SNI founders, who in 1978 would become chief of the organization and later a potential candidate for the presidency (Soares, Araújo, and Castro 1995, 116–19), as military attaché in Israel. Also in 1973, Israel and Brazil discussed a joint project of missile production.*

Source 1: Tel Aviv to Exteriores, 7 June 1966: AHIB, CTs-Telegramas, Secreto, 79.

Excerpt: “[...] **Colonel João Batista Figueiredo, Deputy Chief of the SNI, who visited Israel for 12 days, in strict confidence [...]. On that occasion, this officer told me that the most modern methods and devices known to the Western world, of which Israel disposes, were shown to him without reserve.**”

no meu ofício de referência, a propósito da alta qualidade e eficiência dos serviços israelenses de inteligência ao conversar aqui, após o meu regresso da Reunião dos Embaixadores em Roma, com o Coronel João Batista Figueiredo, Subchefe do SNI e que esteve em visita a Israel durante 12 dias, sob o maior sigilo, observado pelas autoridades israelistas. Nessa ocasião, disse-me, aquele militar, que lhe foram mostrados, sem reservas, os métodos e aparelhamentos, dos mais modernos conhecidos no mundo ocidental, de que dispõe Israel, para o exercício das suas atividades nesse campo. Assim sendo, não pode caber qualquer dúvida de que é uma realidade a existência de censura telefônica e postal neste país, fato de que se fala abertamente no corpo diplomático local. A esse respeito, desejo referir-me à recente suspeita atitude da Companhia Telefônica Israelense, de propriedade do Estado, a qual sabedora de que o terceiro

Source 2: Yadin to Malat, Secret, 20 January 1967: MFA/4004/4.

Excerpt: “Goldbery [sic] opined that the collaboration between the two services [the SNI and the Mossad] should be broadened.”

ה ט ו ט ד  
ס' שבט תשכ"ז  
20 ינו. 1967

353

מר אריה אשל, מל"ס/משה"ח

להלן מבציגנו בברזיל מיום 19 ינואר 1967  
על פי בקשת השגריר:-


" בהמשך למברקי מאתמול, גולדברי הביע  
דעתו שיש להרחיב את שיתוף הפעולה בין השרותים,  
בהוסיפו שהוא עוזב תפקידו ומקוה שמחליפו, שטרם  
נקבע, יעשה זאת" עד כאן.

ב ב ר כ ה,

דן ידיו

ט ו ד י

Excerpt: “[The Israeli] **government gave on this date its approval to** [the appointment of] **Military Attaché Colonel Octavio Aguilar de Medeiros.**”



Source 4: Schpun to Talbar, 25 September 1973: MFA/3248/10.

Explanation: This is a report on the 1973 São Paulo Air Show, in which potential collaborations were discussed. Concerning the Shafrir air-to-air missile, the report's author writes that there were **“discussions of assembling and producing the missile in Brazil.”** There was also Brazilian interest in the Gabriel anti-ship missile.

CONSULAT D'ISRAËL

- לברזיל בקרדיט ל-6-5 שנים ובריבית של 9%. כך מוכרים הימנים והאשריקאים  
לשוק האזרחי. יש צורך להעלות ולברוק אפשרויות מימון מחוץ לברזיל שיעמדו  
בקריטריונים הנ"ל. כמו-כן יש להחליט מידיה לאיזו חברה לתת את הנציגות  
משום שלכל אחת מהקומדות יש יתרונות וחסרונות.
2. טח"ל - מכשירים הדרולוגיים. הוברר ששטח זה בנושא יצור מקומי פפגר.  
מספר חברות עולמיות מתחרות על יצוג שחל בברזיל. יש התקנינות מצד חיל  
האוויר והתעסיה האווירית הסקומית במתוח הנושא בשתוף עם שחל. גם כאן יש  
צורך בהחלטה על נציג מקומי ושמירה על קשרים ומנעים הדוקים.
3. טורף - דיונים על הרכבה ויצוא תטיל בברזיל.
4. גבריאלי - משלחה חיל-הים הברזיליגית תבקר בימים הקרובים בארץ. הסיליס  
המתחרים (של צרפת ואיטליה) עדין לא יצאו לשוק ולגבריאלי מקדמה גדולה.
5. בוק - שפוך מנועים, גבדקוה מספר חברות כדי שאחת מהן תקנה ידע ומכשור  
לשפוך מנועים בהדרכת התע"א.
6. אלתא - ממשלה ברזיל בודקת עוד השנה, מהן תקציב לחברה אלקטרונגית  
מקומית, כדי שתסתח מערכת רדאר לשדות-תעופה באמצעות ידע, חלקים ומתוח  
של אלתא.
- ייר אלקטרונגית - טובין מיוחד של החברה מסתווה

## OAA #8

*Even during the height of authoritarian repression in Brazil, fewer than 3,000 people (about a third of them born outside Brazil) out of a population that in 1980 was estimated at almost 120 million (Fausto and Fausto 2014, 312) emigrated from Brazil to Israel. In less turbulent times, the numbers were significantly lower.*

Source: Herman, Donald L. 1984. *The Latin American Community of Israel*. New York: Praeger, 32.

**Table 1: Jewish Immigration from Brazil, 1960–1977**

	Immigrants from Brazil	Immigrants born in Brazil
1960	96	76
1961	108	73
1962	213	108
1963	283	181
1964	404	275
1965	290	204
1966	201	119
1967	145	112
1968	199	139
1969	604	429
1970	752	548
1971	594	413
1972	451	337
1973	291	206
1974	244	196
1975	222	181
1976	286	226
1977	257	213

Note: “Immigrants from Brazil” refers to those immigrants whose last country of residence before Israel was Brazil, regardless of their country of birth. “Brazilian-born immigrants” are only those immigrants who were born in Brazil.




## OAA #9

*Indeed, some Brazilian diplomats were concerned over the illegality of Jewish fundraising and recommended that the SNI investigate it along with similar campaigns among Arab diasporans.*

Source 1: “Memorandum para o Sr. Secretário Geral Adjunto, interino, para Assuntos da África e Oriente Próximo,” 23 July 1969: AHIB, Memorandos, Confidencial, DOP/49.

Explanation 1: In this memorandum to Itamaraty’s secretary-general, the head of the ministry’s Middle East Division suggests that **“Perhaps the SNI should be asked to study the activities of both Arabs and Jews that are aimed at obtaining, in Brazil, [and] to the detriment of our economy, funds for financing war and propaganda in the Middle East.”**



generosamente atendido.


7. Talvez fôsse o caso de solicitar-se ao SNI um estudo a respeito das atividades, tanto de árabes quanto de judeus, para obter no Brasil, em detrimento de nossa economia, fundos para financiar guerra e propaganda no Oriente Próximo.

Respeitosamente,

( Antônio Amaral de Sampaio )  
Chefe da Divisão do Oriente Próximo

Source 2: Nogueira Porto to Exteriores, 21 August 1972: AHIB, Ofícios, Confidencial, 370.

Explanation 2: In this letter to Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign ministry, Luiz de Almeida Nogueira Porto, the Brazilian ambassador in Tel Aviv, protests against private visits to Brazil by Israeli dignitaries, such as the recent visit of Israeli Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir. According to Nogueira Porto, **“The purpose of these [visits] is, in part, ideological, aiming to maintain the Diaspora’s unity and integrity, but, above all, economic, through the collection of funds from Jewish communities abroad to supplement deficits in the budget of the State of Israel.”**




## OAA #10

*During the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and several Arab countries, Brazil attempted to smother any activity “capable of creating eventual domestic, if not international, problems for Brazil,” in the words of one Brazilian diplomat in Egypt. The dictatorship temporarily prohibited any “written, spoken, or televised manifestation of solidarity with any of the countries involved in the war,” and tapped the phones of Israeli and Arab emissaries in the country to prevent remittances to the Middle East.*

Source 1: Cairo to Exteriores, 27 February 1969 – 5 March 1969: AHIB, Telegramas, Confidencial, 75.

Explanation: The Brazilian ambassador in Cairo, warning against both Arab Brazilian anti-Israeli propaganda and Jewish Brazilian pro-Israeli propaganda, writes that **“My only intention is to make our authorities aware of this game of propaganda and counter-propaganda that could lead to the formation of minority groups hostile to each other, which, eventually, would be capable of creating internal problems, if not international ones, for Brazil.**



Source 2: Polícia Federal, Censorship order 134, 24 October 1973: AAD.

Excerpt: “[Censorship Order 134 prohibits] **any manifestation, through written, spoken, or televised press, of solidarity motions, messages, letters, [or] telegrams of support for any of the countries involved in the Middle East War, even when emanating from the [Israeli and Arab] consulates.**”

Rio, 24/10/73

134  
LHM

De ordem superior fica terminante-  
mente proibido qualquer manifestação  
através imprensa escrita, falada ou  
televisada ou publicações de moções de  
solidariedade mensagens cartas, telegra-  
mas de apoio a quaisquer dos países envol-  
vidos Guerra Oriente Médio, mesmo quando  
oriundo dos consulados.


Polícia Federal

Orlando Mendes

20150516\_191624.jpg (2448 x 3264)

Source 3: Shneerson to MFA and the Jewish Agency, Secret, 18 December 1973:  
MFA/3248/10.

Explanation: The Israeli ambassador reports in this secret telegram that **“Following the arrest of the representative of [an Israeli bank] in São Paulo, certified sources in the police confided to us that [...] their [Brazil’s] special information [agency?] is regularly listening to the phones of Israeli emissaries and following them in order to find remittances from Brazil. According to the source, there is pressure from above to find both Jews and Arabs who send money out of Brazil following the post-war fundraising campaigns.**



## OAA #11

*Similarly, in 1976, the Jewish media tycoon Adolpho Bloch published, in his magazine Manchete, a series of articles in which he vehemently denounced Arab countries and their leaders. Following an official protest from the Algerian embassy, the Brazilian minister of justice “personally warned” the journal’s board to halt such publications.*

and

*In 1976, the journal’s board was warned by Brazil’s justice minister after Bloch had strongly attacked several Arab leaders in his column, at a time when relations with the Arab world were an important Brazilian diplomatic goal.*

Source: “Memorandum para o Chefe do Departamento da África, Ásia e Oceania,” 8 June 1976: AHIB, Memorandos, Confidencial, DOP/74.

Explanation: In this memorandum, the head of the Middle East Division at Brazil’s foreign ministry describes the article in *Manchete* in which Adolpho Bloch attacks some Arab leaders. With regard to one article, he remarks that Brazil’s justice minister “**had communicated to Itamaraty that he had personally warned the board of the “Manchete” journal, represented by [Manchete’s Brasília correspondent] Murilo Melo Filho, with the latter ensuring that ‘what had caused the protest of the mentioned countries would not be reproduced.’”**

2. Um dos artigos citados no documento em apreço ("O Covil dos Assassinos") já dera motivo a protesto formal por parte da Embaixada da Argélia (vide Memoranda DOP/03, de 10.01.76, DOP/06, de 13.01.76, e DOP/31, de 25.02.76), tendo o assunto sido objeto de In formação para o Senhor Presidente da República e de Avi so DOP/37/691.7 (A-28) (B-46), de 26 de abril último, di rigido ao Senhor Ministro da Justiça.

3. Pelo Aviso G.2192-B, de 1º de junho em cur so, o Senhor Ministro da Justiça, em resposta, comunicou ao Senhor Ministro de Estado haver advertido pessoalmente a diretoria da revista "Manchete", representada pelo Doutor Murilo Melo Filho, tendo este assegurado que "não se reproduziria o fato que ocasionou os protestos de Embaixadores dos mencionados países".

11 G. 81



## OAA #12

*Thus, both Adolpho Bloch and Israel Klabin, the paladins of Jewish diasporic assistance, maintained close contacts with well-known rivals of the dictatorship but also managed to remain acceptable and were consequently well-positioned to assist Israel.*

and

*Indeed, as late as 1965, the leftist Senator Aarão Steinbruch still clung to his political mandate and thus remained someone to whom Israel could turn for help – although “to a lesser extent” than Bloch and Klabin.*

Source: Nahmias to Eshel, 3 January 1966: MFA/244/3.

Explanation: In this dispatch, Israeli Ambassador Yosef Nahmias replies to his foreign ministry regarding Israel's wish to obtain an official invitation for Israeli President Zalman Shazar to visit Brazil as part of the latter's planned South American tour. The invitation was eventually obtained and Shazar became the first Israeli head of state to have visited Brazil. Regarding the need to gather information from people close to the regime, Nahmias remarked that **“Under the current regime, there are almost no Jews who are close to the authorities, at least in the top ranks. Still, we can try to get information [from] – and if you find it justified, to use for soundings – such people as Klabin, Adolpho Bloch, and to a lesser extent Senator Aarão Steinbruch.**

הממשלה  
מפורמץ זה להחליט על הצעד

תחת הממשל הברוכי אין כמעט יהודים המקורבים לרשות, לפחות  
בדרגים העליונים. בכל זאת אפשר לבסות ולהשיג אינפורמציה ואם  
זאת תצדיק הדבר ניתן להפעיל לגישושים אנשים כקלבין, אדולפו בלון  
ובמידה פחותה סנטור אהרון שטיינברוך. מובן כי אין בטחון שלא  
ניחשד באחריות ליוזמה ומשום כך אצפה להוראתכם (למען הסודיות  
רצוי במברק) בטרם אעשה צעד כלשהו. לדעתי עלינו ליטול את הסיכון.

אגב, הנסיתם לרובב את בחום סירוצקי בנדרון.

ב ב ר כ ה,



י. נחמיאס

של

4-186 (1200 x 1600)

## OAA #13

*When Brazilian Foreign Minister Mário Gibson Barboza visited Israel in early 1973, Bloch accompanied the minister's delegation. At a festive dinner at the Israeli embassy in 1974, Foreign Minister Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira lauded Bloch's contributions to Brazil.*

Source 1: Gibson to Exteriores, 8 February 1973: AHIB, Telegramas, Confidencial, Serie Chanceler 50.

Excerpt: **"After a greeting from [Israeli] Foreign Minister Abba Eban and my response, I went to the Brazilian embassy, where I was hosted with my wife, accompanied by Ambassadors Barromi and Shoham, while the members of my delegation went from there to the Dan Hotel, where they stayed. On the next day, I paid homage to the victims of the "Holocaust" at the Yad-Vashem monument with all the members of the delegation, plus Mr. Osvaldo Aranha [Junior] and Mr. Adolpho Bloch.**

RETARIO FRANCISCO JUNQUEIRA PT DEPOIS DE UMA SAUDACAO POR PARTE DO N  
MINISTRO ABBAEBAN ET DA MINHA RESPOSTA VG SEGUI PARAA ENBAIXADA DO  
BRASIL VG ONDE ME HOSPEDEI COM MINHA MULHER VG ACOMPANHADO PELOS EM  
BAIXADORES BARRONI ET SHOHAN VG ENQUANTO OS MEMBROS DA MINHA COMITIV  
ASEGUIRAM DALI PARA O HOTEL DAN ONDEFICARAM HOSPEDADOS PT NO DIA SE  
GUINTE VG COM TODOS OS MEMBROS DA COMITIVA MAIS OS SENHORES OS ALDO  
ARANHA ET ADOLFO BLOCH VG PRESTEI HOMENAGEM AAS VITIMAS DO ASP HOLO.  
CAUSTO ASP NO MONUMENTO DE YAD TRACO VASHEN PT EM SEGUINDA VISITEI C

11-04-74-Med 173/P/72

Source 2: Exteriores to Tel Aviv, 4 October 1974: AHIB, Telegramas, Ostensivo, 419.

Explanation: In this telegram, Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign ministry, relayed to the Brazilian embassy in Tel Aviv the main points from Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira's speech at a dinner held in his honor at the Israeli embassy in Brasília. The cable quotes passages from an article about this reception, which were published in Bloch's journal *Manchete*: **"Referring to the contribution of Jews to the process of Brazilian development, [the minister] stressed that among those present, there was one of the most brilliant examples of this participation. Minister Azeredo da Silveira highlighted the work of Adolpho Bloch, who has integrated here [into the Brazilian society] many years ago."**

Aliás, salientou o Chanceler, desde há muito é assim, posto que os Cristãos Novos que vieram para cá, não mais tinham vínculos com a comunidade israelita. dep

Ao referir-se à contribuição de judeus no processo de desenvolvimento brasileiro, frisou que, entre os presentes, encontrava-se um dos exemplos mais brilhantes dessa participação. O Ministro Azeredo da Silveira destacou a obra de Adolfo Bloch que aqui se integrou há já longos anos. Traz ele, disse, na sua personalidade, características da terra de onde veio, a Rússia, mas seus sobrinhos e netos, que o Chanceler manifestou conhecer bem, têm como única personalidade - e assim deve ser, salientou - a de bons e autênticos brasileiros. Auto

## OAA #14

*In July 1968, he wrote an affectionate letter to Deputy Márcio Moreira Alves, one of the dictatorship's most adamant critics (who four months later would provoke the military to initiate the 1968 authoritarian crackdown), noting that "you are the happy one, because you have something to fight against. As for me, I humbly confess that I do not know where I am going anymore."*

Source: Klabin to Moreira Alves, 30 July 1968: AIK, Israel, Correspondências, Márcio Moreira Alves.

Excerpt: **"Dear Marcito,**

**Your book is good.**

**I always thought that martyrology was a Jewish prerogative; I discovered that you have a circumcised spirit. I receive you, brother.**

**I am missing my conversations with you. Everything is a mystery today in our country.**

**You are the happy one, because you have something to fight against. As for me, I humbly confess that I do not know where I am going anymore.**

**A tight hug and thanks,**

**Yours,**


**Israel"**


## OAA #15

*His political leanings notwithstanding, Klabin was an insider. As one Israeli official described him in July 1964, Klabin used to view himself as “connected to leftist intellectual circles in Brazil, but in reality, he has served and collaborated with every regime in Brazil, including the present one.” Immediately after the 1964 coup, Klabin confided to an Israeli diplomat that he was “ready to accept a position in the new leadership if asked.” Several months later, Klabin wrote a letter to General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, the dictatorship’s first president (1964–1967), extolling his “government of national salvation.”*

Source 1: Dotan to Herlitz, 23 July 1964: MFA/3525/20.


Explanation 1: This is a report about Israel Klabin’s visit to Israel between 13 and 23 June 1964. The Israeli diplomat who compiled the report noted that **“Regarding the present regime, Klabin reiterated, on different occasions, that [people] abroad do not understand enough that it has a positive character and that it saved Brazil from a tangible threat of a communist takeover. Goulart’s was a regime of chaos, which brought Brazil to the abyss. Recently, Klabin was in the United States on behalf of the present government of Brazil to create contacts and disseminate information in different financial circles.**





Source 2: Shoham to MFA, 2 April 1964, Confidential: MFA/1618/12.

Excerpt: “**Klabin informs me that it will take about 10 days before he knows whether he can exit Brazil, in light of the new situation. I understand that he is ready to accept a position in the new leadership if asked, in which case he will have to stay. If not, he thinks about coming to Israel in early May.**”



Source 3: Klabin to Castelo Branco, 21 September 1964: AIK, Correspondências, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco.

Explanation 2: Klabin met with President Castelo Branco regarding a business matter – a crisis in the paper industry. He was accompanied by his uncle, Horácio Lafer, who had served as Brazil’s finance minister and foreign minister in the 1950s and early 1960s. Klabin’s words at the end of the letter are especially remarkable. He comments that “**Let our position, therefore, be the best proof that the fight against infamy is the first step for the defense of Your**

**Excellency and the national salvation government you represent (Que seja, portanto, a nossa posição, a melhor prova de que a luta contra a infâmia é o primeiro passo para a defesa de Vossa Excelência e do Governo de salvação nacional que representa)”, and asks the president to accept “the assurance of [Klabin’s] great admiration (Aceite os meus respeitosos votos de estima pessoal e a certeza da minha grande admiração).”**




## OAA #16

*The 1968 repressive measures further weakened the diasporic assistance capabilities of leftist Jewish Brazilians. The Israeli ambassador decried this fact, emphasizing that “now there is not a single Jewish Parliament member!”*

Source: Harkavi to Malat, Secret, 8 April 1969: MFA/4178/6.

Excerpt: “**In such a reality** [the government’s 1968 crackdown on the opposition and the growth of repression in Brazil], **our work is not easy. Two groups of Jews are negatively affected by this situation: 1. The intellectuals: the journalists, the politicians, the academics, and the students, whose number is not small; 2. The large factory owners.** These two groups suddenly felt that their influence had declined and their positions became very precarious and weak. Israel operated quite a bit through these two groups (now there is not a single Jewish Parliament member!), and we need to find new ways and new channels of operation. We are trying to find them in direct relations with the regime.




## OAA #17

*After his political expulsion in January 1969 (and the subsequent dismissal, eight months later, of his wife, Deputy Julia Steinbruch), Israel could no longer count on the Steinbruchs.*

Source 1: Rio de Janeiro to US Department of State (USDoS), 17 January 1969: NARA, POL 23-9 BRAZ, 474.

Explanation 1: This is a US embassy report entitled “**Cassations, suspensions of political rights and forced retirements.**” It includes the following passage: “**Two MDB senators, Aarão Steinbruch (State of Rio) and João Abrahão (Goiás) were cassated and had [their] political rights suspended for 10 years.**”




Source 2: Low to USDoS, 15 September 1969: NARA, POL 15-4 Braz, A-37.

Explanation 2: This is another report entitled “**Cassations of Federal Deputies.**” It includes the following text: “**The triumvirate of military ministers which has been acting in the name of ailing President Costa e Silva since August 31 announced on September 11 and 12, respectively, the cassations of two more federal deputies, Mrs. Julia Steinbruch (MDB) from Rio de Janeiro and Antonio Ferreira de Oliveira Brito (ARENA) from**

Bahia. The triumvirate's orders summarily ended the deputies' terms and stripped them of all political rights for ten years.

[...]

Mrs. Steinbruch, who is an attractive 36 year old mother of three, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1966. At the time it was rumored that she ran for the office principally because her husband, Senator Aarão Steinbruch, expected his mandate to be cassated and he wanted to maintain a political foothold. He eventually was cassated on January 17, 1969. As a deputy Mrs. Steinbruch denounced the government's labor and social insurance policies as inadequate. More significant was the prominent role she played in the opposition's successful effort to persuade Congress not to acquiesce in the executive branch's attempt in late 1968 to strip Deputy Marcio Morreira Alves of his parliamentary immunity and punish him for having insulted the armed forces. Thus, her record did not ingratiate her with the regime."



## OAA #18

*Israeli diplomats took frequent stock of which decision-makers were close to which diasporans. For example, in December 1973, the Israeli ambassador in Brasília reported that Bloch's and Klabin's ties with the government could be utilized in time of need as long as Jerusalem did not waste them "on minor issues."*

and

*Among Bloch's allies were Foreign Minister José de Magalhães Pinto (1967–1969), one of the civilian ringleaders of the 1964 coup...*

and

*Yet another was Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto.*

Source 1: Rio to Malat, 4 November 1968: MFA/A/7428/5.

Explanation: This is an Israeli dispatch from November 1968, drafted in preparation for a planned visit to Brazil by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (which was ultimately canceled due to the prime minister's failing health – Eshkol died in February 1969). The report lists the names of people whom Eshkol was supposed to meet, as well as their relations with the Jewish community.


Excerpts: **"The persons that the PM will meet [...]"**


**JOSÉ DE MAGALHÃES PINTO – Brazil's foreign minister. Former governor of Minas Gerais. A banker by profession. Aspires for the presidency. Has three Jewish associates: Mrs. Regine Feigl, Mr. Adolpho Bloch, and Mr. Israel Klabin.**

[...]

**GOVERNADOR FRANCISCO NEGRÃO DE LIMA** – Governor of the State of Guanabara, whose capital is Rio de Janeiro. Former foreign minister [...]. Maintains good relations with the Jewish community and has recently appointed a Jewish person [Arnaldo Niskier, a former *Manchete* journalist and a confidant of Adolpho Bloch] as state minister for technology and science.

**GOVERNADOR ROBERTO DE ABREU SODRÉ** – The State of São Paulo's energetic governor. Maintains good relations with the Jewish community. Helped a lot in the operations for the arrest of the Nazi criminal Franz Stangl, who had been the commandant of Auschwitz [in fact, Stangl had been the commandant of the Sobibor and Treblinka death camps, not Auschwitz].





Source 2: Shneerson to Amdar (The South America Department at the Israeli MFA), 16 December 1973: MFA/246/6.

Explanation: Shortly after the Israeli embassy moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília, Mordechai Shneerson, the newly appointed Israeli ambassador, visited the State of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, which remained a political power center in Brazil (and the most important *Jewish* political center, given that there was practically no Jewish community in Brasília). Apart from his meetings with the established Jewish community organizations of the city, Shneerson “made some other appointments with a number of Jews who do not participate in the businesses of the community and maintain close contacts with the authorities and, in times of need, can prove helpful for us. They are all long known to us (I. Klabin, A. Bloch., [Journalist Alberto] Dines, etc.), and they all are willing to assist and to cooperate. The purpose of these meetings was to establish firmer personal ties with them and to translate their goodwill into the language of concrete assignments. I believe that we can

be assisted by them insofar as we do not operate them in matters of secondary importance and do not exhaust their contacts on minor issues.”

ב. בנוסף לאירועים במוסדות השונים של הקהילה ולדיונים עם ראשי הציבור קיימתי פגישות בנפרד עם מספר יהודים שאינם פעילים בעסקי הקהילה ושיש להם מגע קרוב עם השלטון ובשעת הצורך יכולים להיות לכו עוזר. כולם מוכרים לנו מכבר (א. קלבין, אדולפו בלור, י. דיניס ועוד) וכולם מוכנים לסייע ולשתף פעולה. מטרת הפגישות היתה ליצור קשר אישי אמיץ יותר ולתרגם את רצונם הטוב ללשון משימות קונקרטיות. דומני שנוכל להעזר בהם בתנאי שלא בפעילים בענינים שחשיבותם משנית ולא ננצל את קשריהם בבקשות שוליות. אשר ל. ק. העמיד עצמו לרשותם ללא סייג, ואם היו ספיקות לגבי נכונותו לשתף פעולה בשל "תקלה רומנטית" הרי שאלה נמוגו.

## OAA #19


*Israel Klabin, too, had numerous allies in the dictatorship and beyond. Like Bloch, he was close to Golbery. Another important friend was President Figueiredo, who appointed Klabin mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1979.*

And

*Klabin was also a personal friend of prominent US personalities, including Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller, US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, who played a central role in the US support for the 1964 coup and the military regime (see Green 2010, chap. 1), and others.*

Source 1: Shneerson to Barromi, 24 March 1974: MFA/245/1.

Explanation 1: In this dispatch, Ambassador Shneerson reports to Jerusalem about General Ernesto Geisel's new cabinet. Shneerson writes that **"The *eminence grise* in the new administration is, without doubt, General Golbery, head of the Civilian Presidential Staff. He is closer to Geisel than any of his colleagues, and [Geisel] would listen to his advice more than to those of other ministers. [...] Golbery maintains contacts with some of our friends – among others, with A. Bloch and with I. Klabin – who claim that they have access to him. With their help, I will try to meet him for a practical conversation."**





Source 2: Klabin to Figueiredo, 15 March 1979: Figueiredo to Klabin, 22 January 1975: AIK/Correspondências/João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo.


Explanation 2: This note, in Figueiredo's handwriting, is probably a response to Klabin's greetings for Figueiredo's birthday (on 15 January). In it, Figueiredo thanks his "**distinguished friend Israel.**" The rest of the text is illegible.

Source 3: Klabin to Figueiredo, 15 March 1979: AIK/Correspondências/João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo.

Explanation 3: In this letter, Klabin congratulates Figueiredo for his appointment as president, while celebrating his "**own appointment at the City Hall of Rio de Janeiro at Your Excellency's orders.**"

Source 4: Shneerson to Amdar, 25 February 1976: MFA/245/1.


Explanation 4: In this letter, Ambassador Shneerson informs the foreign ministry in Jerusalem about Henry Kissinger's recent visit to Brazil. Shneerson writes that "**Kissinger spent his last day in Brazil in Rio, in the company of our acquaintance Israel Klabin.**"



Source 5: Tekoah (New York) to Jerusalem, Secret, 18 March 1968: ISA/A/7446/13.

Excerpt: “Israel Klabin is staying here [in New York] for several days. I am going to meet him tomorrow. He telephoned this morning and told that he had spent the weekend with David Rockefeller, who had returned from a trip to the Middle East.

Rockefeller wants to invite me, together with Klabin and a few more persons [...] to an informal dinner to discuss the operations of NEED [an organization aimed at helping Palestinian refugees] and the possibilities of cooperating with us, especially concerning the resettlement of Arab [Palestinian] refugees overseas.”



Source 6: Klabin to Gordon, 21 January 1966: AIK/Correspondências/Lincoln Gordon.


Explanation 5: Klabin’s archives contain several very affectionate letters between Klabin and Lincoln Gordon. In this cable, sent on the occasion of the end of Gordon’s tenure, Klabin writes to him Gordon: “We are desolated by your most unfair and unilateral decision to abandon us. We were planning to have you crowned emperor of Brazil.”

## OAA #20

*The engineer Jaime Rotstein, who served as president of the Brazil-Israel Chamber of Commerce in the 1960s, was close to some of the dictatorship's most notorious generals. Among them were President Artur de Costa e Silva (1967–1969)...*

Source: Eshel to Rio, 2 November 1966: MFA/4004/4.

Explanation: In this telegram, the Israeli foreign ministry instructs the embassy in Rio de Janeiro to invite War Minister Costa e Silva to an official visit in Israel. Arie Eshel, the head of the Latin American Division at the Israeli foreign ministry and a former ambassador to Brazil, ordered the Israeli chargé d'affaires not to act through Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign ministry, when requesting the meeting with Costa e Silva. Instead, Costa e Silva was to be directly approached. Eshel explained that **“You can receive details and help in organizing the meeting from the engineer Jaime Rotstein, the chair of the Rio de Janeiro Brazil-Israel Chamber of Commerce. He is very close to the president-elect and is one of his closest advisers.”**



## OAA #21

*While not all community leaders were powerless – Eliezer Burla, the president of the Rio de Janeiro Jewish Federation and owner of a public relations firm, was a personal friend of President Figueiredo's and a business associate of Golbery's (Dowek Interview; Veltman Interview) – the ability to help Israel in meaningful ways was greatly diminished without such contacts.*

Source: Shneerson to Avidar, Secret, 23 September 1975: MFA/245/1.

Excerpt: **“When [the Jewish Brazilian leadership] wanted to officially protest, as citizens of the country who were offended by the anti-Semitic remarks of [Saudi Foreign Minister Omar Al-Saqqaf during the latter's visit to Brazil], they were unable to organize a meeting with the president's head of civilian staff [Golbery] (they did not even contemplate sending a delegation to Geisel himself), reasonably and directly, by appealing to him on behalf of the main representative organization of Brazil's Jews; instead, they had to act indirectly, with the help of I. Klabin and his lobbyist friends.**


[...]

**With the present atmosphere [Brazil's pro-Arab foreign policy shift under President Geisel], and when public opinion does not have much weight, the [Jewish] community's options for public action and its areas of influence are shrinking. I should not disparage the value and importance of the known community institutions and their leadership, but we must understand that they can only help us with such matters as assistance with propaganda and divulcation of material; commercial relations; assistance in organizing cultural activities; and to some extent, [we can] use their contacts with journalists and sources of**

information. But with respect to meaningful political action with consequences and influence on government circles, the community establishment is ill-equipped.

[...]

Within the Jewish Brazilian public, there are certainly some [potentially helpful] persons, including the heads of some of the country's largest industrial and commercial enterprises. They are integrated into the Brazilian society. Their status or wealth opens for them the government's lounges, and they have close personal ties with foreign policy and economic policymakers. Their number is not high, and most of them – although not all of them – are willing to help us to a certain extent with their connections and influence. The trouble is that they, of all people, are distancing themselves from the known community institutions and avoid any job or task assigned to them by the [Jewish Brazilian] establishment.



לית מאן דפליג כי יש סיבות אובייקטיביות למצב זה. סיבו של המסטר שאיננו מתיר ויכוח  
 חשאי, מטיל צנזורה קשה על העהונות ונוטל כמעט כל משקל מדיני ממוסדות ייצוגיים. התוצאה  
 היא שהעוונות, להוציא את "האסטר" דה סאו פאולו", ואמצעי החקשורה למיניהן מחמשים. התוצאה  
 וכמוהם גם מרבית האיסטלקטואלים ואנשי ציבור שיש להם יומרות פוליטיות או תואם את הקו הרשמי.  
 שטחי הפעולה הציונית של הקהילה והחומי השפעתה. חלילה לי מלזלזל בערכם וחשיבותם של  
 מוסדות היישוב המוכרים והנהגותיהם, אך עלינו לדעת כי נוכל להיעזר בהם בעניינים שונים  
 לבגל מביעים עם עתונאים ומקורות אינפורמציה, אך לפעולה מדינית משמעותית שיש לה השלכה  
 והשפעה על חוגי השלטון אין המימסד הקהילתי ערוך.

בתוך הציבור היהודי הברזילי נמצאים ללא ספק כמה אנשים, מהם ראשי מפעלים תעשייתיים  
 ומסחריים מן הגדולים במדינה. אלה מעורבים בחברה הברזילית מעמדם או הונם פוחח לפנייהם את  
 מרקליני הממשל ויש להם קשרים אישיים קרובים עם קובעי ההלכה המדינית או הכלכלית. מספרם  
 לא גדול, ורובם אם כי לא כולם, מוכנים לסייע לנו עד גבול מסוים בקשריהם ובהשפעתם. הצרה  
 היא שדווקא אנשים אלה מתרחקים ממוסדות הקהילה המוכרים ובורחים מכל חפקיד או משימה  
 המוטלים עליהם ע"י המימסד. כל זמן שנמשך המצב הקיים אין סיכוי לשלבם בעבודה האירגונית  
 והמוסדות. מאידך הם מוכנים לשיתוף פעולה הדוק עם הנציגות. בחודשים האחרונים עם התגברותה  
 של התעמולה הערבית ולאור מדיניותה החריפה של הממשלה ומשנחלבנו עמדותיה לגבי הסכסוך  
 הישראלי ערבי, מורגשת ההעוררות גם בשכבות הציבור שהיו רחוקות מכל עניין יהודי וישראלי  
 כולל אותם אישי עילית חברתית שאף נחרדו משלוותם. דומני כי בנסיבות אלו ניתן לרתום  
 אחרים מהם לפעולה, לא במסגרת המימסד אלא במגע ישיר עם השגרירות. שוחחתי בנושא זה עם  
 י. קליבין וסיכמנו שרצוי להקים קבוצה אנשים שיש להם מהלכים במסדרונות השלטון ושנוכל בעת  
 הצורך להסתיע בהם בעצה, בהערכה ובמעשה. ערכנו רשימה טנטטיבית שכללה כמובן גם שמוניהם  
 של נציגי הקונפדרציה והפדרציות וקלבהן קבל על עצמו לפעול לאירגונה של קבוצה כנ"ל.

## OAA #22

*In 1962, at the age of thirty-five, he already accompanied Foreign Minister Francisco Clementino San Thiago Dantas on a state visit to Israel.*

Source 1: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Visita a Israel de Sua Excelência o Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Doutor Francisco Clementino de San Thiago Dantas e Sua Esposa”: AIK, Israel, Correspondências, David Ben-Gurion.

Explanation 1: This is the official program of Foreign Minister Dantas’s state visit to Israel on 20–24 May 1962. According to the program, the delegation accompanying Dantas included “**Mr. Israel Klabin**” and “**Mrs. Klabin.**” Another Jewish Brazilian, the journalist Isaac Akcelrud, was also a member of the delegation.

Source 2: Israeli MFA, “Program for Mr. and Mrs. Israel Klabin”: AIK, Israel, Correspondências, David Ben-Gurion.

Explanation 2: This is the program of Klabin’s visit following Foreign Minister Dantas’s visit, printed on official Israeli Foreign Ministry stationery. Klabin stayed in Israel until 27 November 1962. His itinerary included meetings with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Finance Minister Levi Eshkol, and a visit to the Israeli nuclear reactor in Nahal Sorek (Rubin).


## OAA #23

*Even before that visit, Klabin helped Israel in many overt and covert ways and continued to do so during the dictatorship, sometimes in cooperation with Adolpho Bloch. Among other forms of assistance, he introduced Brazilian military officers to Israeli generals, devised and promoted plans to encourage the immigration of Palestinian refugees from the Occupied Territories to Latin America, facilitated the exportation of Brazilian meat to Israel, donated large sums to the Magbit, and financed the construction of a landing strip in the Sinai peninsula in the wake of the 1967 War. In the 1970s, when Shimon Peres was Israel's minister of defense, he allocated to Klabin an office at the ministry, where Klabin could work on Israel-related affairs.*

Source 1: Lorch to Harkavi, 22 April 1970: MFA/4567/16.

Explanation 1: In this letter, the head of *Malat* – the Latin America Department at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs – notifies the Israeli ambassador in Rio de Janeiro that an Israeli Defense Army general, Mordechai Limon, had met “**the commander of the Rio Area and other members of the military, with the mediation of Klabin.**” According to Klabin, he used to date General Limon's daughter for a time while they both lived in Paris (Interview with Israel Klabin, Rio de Janeiro, 2014)





Source 2: Klabin to Herzog, 20 November 1986: ISA/A/7446/13.

Explanation 2: This is a letter from Klabin to Rabbi Dr. Yaacov Herzog, the director-general of Israel's Prime Minister's Office, who coordinated many Israeli efforts to resettle Palestinian refugees abroad. Regarding the Palestinian refugee problem, Klabin writes that:

**“My basic idea after all our talks is still the same: we have in our hands a clearly defined problem of the Gaza people. We should concentrate on that on three levels of consideration:**

[...]

2. The pragmatic approach very obviously has to be tackled according to the instructions I received by giving first priority for emigration.”

IMHARL KLABIN  
Rio de Janeiro, November 20, 1968

*r.6.12*

*Dear Dr. Herzog*

I would be grateful if you could discuss the information I am enclosing with Gal. Z. and let me know if I should proceed along those lines.

I have also resumed contacts with some of my American friends that I am going to need to facilitate my "entrée" with the new administration.

My basic idea after all our talks is still the same: we have in our hands a clearly defined problem of the Gaza people. We should concentrate on that on three levels of consideration:

1. Politically, we should try to transfer the national responsibility for the problem to an international co-responsabilization.
2. The pragmatic approach very obviously has to be tackled according to the instructions I received by giving first priority for emigration.
3. I still think that a small regional development in the region of El Arish is very appealing if we can circumscribe the number of the people who are going to be involved.

I am expecting your call and instructions.

*Yours*  
*Imharl Klabin*

P. S. - Please remind the P.M. that I am still after the idea of building a small Synagogue on the top of the Sinai. Thank you.

Source 3: Harkavi to Jerusalem, Secret, 11 December 1968: ISA/A/7446/13.

Explanation 3: This is a secret telegram that Klabin sent to Herzog through the Israeli embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Klabin informs Herzog about several potential resettlement destinations

(Paraguay, Argentina, Colombia) as well as certain steps that can be taken to expedite resettlement. Regarding Brazil, he writes that “We may be able to force a case through high echelons for authorization for 8000 Jews from Siria and Irak [sic] plus equivalent number of Arab[s].”

משרד החוץ  
מחלקת הקשר  
ס ר י

מס' 27  
חברת 111500 דצמ 68  
הודפס: 121230

מברק נכנס - מסווג

אלו המשרד ירושלים  
מאחד ממישראל ריו

ינקב הרצוג ספרותם.  
סודי.

א. לחלו מברק שנקשר להעביר מישראל קלבין

ACCORDING INFORMATIONS GATHERED THROUGH BRAZILIAN SOURCES AND UNITED HIAS REPRESENTATIVE BELIEVE WE COULD TRY FOLLOWING STEP FIRST ARGENTINA THERE IS BIG POWER PROJECT IN CHOCRON CALLED SIERRA COLORADO THE DIRECCION NACIONAL NE INME-GRACION IS PREPARED TO GRANT LANDING PERMITS. THIS IS CASE WHERE SMALL CITY PLANNING PROJECT COULD BE ATTRACTIVE IF PRESENTED BY WORLD COUNCIL FOR CHURCHES OR EQUIVALENT ORGANIZATION. SECOND BRAZIL WE MAY BE ABLE TO FORCE A CASE THROUGH HIGH ECHELONS FOR AUTHORIZATION FOR 8000 JEWS FROM SIRIA AND IRAK PLUS EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF ARABE. THIRD AM CONVINCED GENERAL STROSSNER HEAD PARAGUAIAN GOVERNMENT CAN BE TALKED IN THE PROBLEM THROUGH VERY DISTINGUISHED BRAZILIAN FRIENDS OF JEWS(?) AM ALSO CONVINCED THAT PARAGUAY IS VERY PALATABLE COUNTRY FOR A MASSIVE PROGRAM IF PROPERLY FINANCED AND TECHNICALLY ASSISTED FOURTH COLOMBIA THE RIGHT MAN TOTALLY WITH GOVERNMENT IS THE UNITED NATION HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES SUPPOSE THAT REQUEST BY HIM FOR PERMITS FOR UP TO 500 FAMILIES MAY BE CONSIDERED. HIAS HAS MAN THERE CALLED SALVADOR ROSENTHAL WHO SEEMS HAVE FREE TRANSIT WITH AUTHORITIES FOR FURTHER ACTION SHALL BE EXPECTING WORD FROM YOU.

BEST REGARDS . KALBIN .

עד כאן

ב. חוזר על מברקי 60 מברקמבר ושם קבלתי תשובה.

Source 4: Sima to Talbar, 10 August 1971: MFA/3222/3.

Excerpt 1: At the beginning of t[his] y[ear], the Government of Brazil dramatically cut the exportation of meat and set a special quota, which cannot be exceeded. This issue demanded great attention from me [and] extensive activity. Also, the contacts of the

famous Klabin family helped me a lot, and I was successful in achieving a special quota of 8,000 tons for Israel.

ג. י ב ר א.  
 1. מטרת צאתי למקום כהונתי כאן, לא שערתי שיהיה עלי גם לספל בנושא של יבוא בשר בברזיל.  
 לרגלי הקשיים שנתעוררו בארץ בעקבות צמצום אפשרויות רכישת הבשר בארגנטינה ובאורוגוואי, נתבקשתי על ידי ה"ה לימור ויגיל לנסות ולפתח את אפשרויות רכישת הבשר בברזיל. בראשית ש.ז. קצצה ממשלת ברזיל בצורה דרסטית  
 4/...

- 4 -  
 אח יצוא הבשר לקבוצה מכסה מיוחד, שלא נתן לחרוג ממנו. נושא זה חבט בפני השומה לב רבה, פעילות ענפה, כן נעזרתי הרבה בקשרים של משפחת קלביין המפורסמת, ועלה בידי להשיג מכסה מיוחד עבור ישראל בגובה 8.000 טון. בימים אלה נתבקשתי שוב ע"י מר לימור להשתדל להשיג מכסה נוסף של 1.300 טון. השבוע נתבקשתי עם נציגים שונים מהרשויות המוסמכות, וחקורה אני שפניתי הענה.  
 השורות המפורסמות ודאי לא מסוגלות לשקף את המאמצים, השעות הרבות והשומה הלב שהקדשתי לנושא "הבשר".  
 סבורני כי תכנות האניות הפוקדות את ברזיל לשם הפענת הבשר, שרבתה בצורה ניכרת, תהיה גם לעזרה ליצואנים מישראל לברזיל.  
 2. הכרתי בעל פכרה של יהלומים, כאן והקמתי קשר בינו לבין הנורמים המעוניינים בארץ.  
 ד. ה ש ק ע ו ת .

Source 5: Goldstein Pincus and Sapir, 29 May 1968: CZA/S62/247.

Explanation 4: Rabbi Dr. Israel Goldstein, World Chairman of Keren Hayesod-United Israel Appeal, reported to Aryeh Louis Pincus, Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, and to Israeli Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir about Brazilian donations to the Magbit following the visit in Brazil of Menachem Begin, then a minister without portfolio in Israel's national unity government. Goldstein concludes that in São Paulo, Jewish donors committed to donating

**קרן היסוד · המגבית המאוחדת לישראל**  
**KEREN HAYESOD · UNITED ISRAEL APPEAL**

הנהלת ירושלים · HEAD OFFICE JERUSALEM  
טלפון 35222 · טלפקס P.O.B. 563 · קריית יוסף

משרד הדיכוי ראשי

ב' בסיון תשכ"ח  
29.5.1968

אני ממשיך לקבל דינאים וחשבונות חובביים ביותר על תוצאות ביקורו של השיר בגין.

בסך-מאולו הגיע ס"ה של ההתחייבויות ביום 12 לח"ז ל-800,000 דולר; בתוכן תרומה של קבוצת קלבין בגובה תרומה בשחקר, בסך 300,000 דולר ותרומה קונסול הכבוד פער בגובה תרומתו באשתקד, בסך 100,000 דולר.

בין שאר התרומות, תרומות נישורת בגובה התרומות בשנת 1967.

בריא-דה-ז'נירו מגיע ס"ה של ההתחייבויות ל-300,000 דולר, ואף זה נחשב כהתחלה טובה.

בברכה,


ד"ר ישראל גולדשטיין.

## OAA #24

*For example, in 1966, the Klabin company, one of Brazil's major paper producers, donated US\$20,000 to the construction of a Brazilian cultural center in Kibbutz Bror Hayil (whose members were mostly Jewish immigrants from Brazil and their offspring). The purpose of the center, named after Osvaldo Aranha (a Brazilian diplomat who had served as president of the 1947 United Nations General Assembly that approved the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine) was to disseminate Brazilian culture in Israel. The director-general of the Brazilian foreign ministry, Brazil's second-highest-ranking diplomat (who was Aranha's son-in-law), attended the cultural center's inauguration ceremony in 1967.*

Source 1: Exteriores to Tel Aviv, 15 September 1966: AHIB, Telegramas, Ostensivo, 70.

Explanation 1: Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign ministry, notifies the embassy in Tel Aviv that the sum of US\$20,000 was sent, through the Bank of Brazil, to the embassy for the purpose of completing the construction of the Oswaldo Aranha Cultural Center in Kibbutz Bror Hayil. The money was contributed by the Klabin Brothers company.




Source 2: Klabin to Magalhães, 16 August 1966: AIK, Correspondência, Oswaldo Aranha.

Explanation 2: Writing to Foreign Minister Juracy Montenegro Magalhães, Israel Klabin, on behalf of the Klabin Brothers company, declares that **“we have the honor of transferring to Your Excellency’s hands the check [...] for the amount of Cr\$44,400,000 [...], equivalent to US\$20,000.00 (twenty thousand dollars), intended for the completion of the Oswaldo Aranha Center in ‘Kibbutz’ Bror Chail, in the State of Israel.**


**In this way, we believe that we help in maintaining the idea of *brasilidade* [Brazilianness] alive in such a faraway corner of the planet.”**

Source 3: Bittencourt to Magalhães, 3 June 1966: AHIB, Ofícios, Ostensivo, 152.

Explanation 3: In this letter, Aluysio Guedes Regis Bittencourt, the Brazilian ambassador in Israel, informs Brazilian Foreign Minister Juracy Montenegro Magalhães about a meeting with the general secretary of Kibbutz Bror Hayil in the South of Israel regarding the construction of the Oswaldo Aranha Cultural Center. Bittencourt explains that the kibbutz has 600 inhabitants, **“of which, all the adults are from Brazil, whereas the children, while not born here [in Brazil], speak Portuguese correctly.”**



Bittencourt goes on to describe the purposes of the Oswaldo Aranha Center, including **“marking Brazil’s presence in the Israeli Kibbutz Movement, in addition to preserving the ties of its [Bror Hayil’s] inhabitants with the country of origin, and paying a special tribute to the late Brazilian foreign minister [Oswaldo Aranha].”**





Emb. 100/2.  
habitantes com o país de origem, prestando ainda uma homenagem especial ao falecido Chanceler brasileiro, Presidente da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas que criou o Estado de Israel. Informou-me, mais, o Senhor Roizmann, que os membros dos "centros culturais" das comunidades brasileiras em Israel, desejam estabelecer uma ligação mais estreita com o Brasil.

Bittencourt recommends the strengthening of Brazilian ties with the kibbutz, whose members **“have revealed, with that [approach to the embassy regarding the cultural center], their desire to identify with our country, and have closely collaborated with this embassy in cultural initiatives.”**

9. Ao encaminhar, assim, as solicitações que me foram dirigidas pelo Senhor Roizmann, desejo opinar no sentido que, a meu ver, seria de toda conveniência preservarmos e intensificarmos os laços espirituais e de outra ordem que ligam aquela comunidade ao Brasil. É oportuno notar que a mesma, além de fazer questão de manter a nacionalidade brasileira de origem, representa, também, em larga medida, a presença do Brasil em Israel. Possuidores todos os seus membros de Passaportes brasileiros, tem revelado, com isso, o desejo de identificação com o nosso país, e tem colaborado, estreitamente, com esta Embaixada nas iniciativas de caráter cultural aqui levados a efeito, conforme ainda aconteceu, por exemplo, com a "Semana Cultural" realizada no ano passado, em Tel-Aviv e Jerusalém.

Source 4: Bittencourt to Magalhães Pinto, 8 May 1967: AHIB, Ofícios, Ostensivo, 165.

Explanation 4: In this report, Bittencourt describes the Oswaldo Aranha Cultural Center inauguration ceremony on 4 May 1967, including the attendees, among whom was **“His Excellency, Mr. Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, secretary-general of Itamaraty”**

Senhor Ministro,

Tenho a honra de levar ao conhecimento de Vossa Excelência que, no dia 4 do corrente mês, e na presença de Sua Excelência o Senhor Embaixador Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, Secretário-Geral do Itamaraty; do Senhor Euclides Aranha Neto; e de Sua Excelência o Senhor Abba Eban, Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros; além de numeroso público, foi solenemente inaugurado o "Centro Cultural Oswaldo Aranha", do "Kibutz Bror Chail".

## OAA #25

*When the collected sums were low, all of them remained in Brazil (a fact that Zionist emissaries to the country tried to conceal, so as not to deter potential donors who believed that their money had gone to Israel).*

Source: Ososkin and Giladi to Gilad (in Montevideo), 19 January 1966: CZA/KH4/12836.

Explanation: In this communique, the Jewish Agency's emissaries to Brazil report that the organization's expenses in Brazil are higher than the total incomes from the Magbit. This means that **"not only that we do not take a dime out of Brazil, [but] this year, once again – in addition to using the revenues of the Magbit** [to finance the Agency's activities in the country] **– we have to send to Brazil tens of thousands of dollars to cover the Agency's expenses. [...] We fear that if the donors will learn about this, it might influence their donations unfavorably because the donors intend to donate money that would go to Israel – for aliya, immigrant absorption, and other activities in Israel."** Next, the emissaries inquire whether there is a possibility to reach an agreement with the Brazilian authorities so that the Agency would be allowed to take donation money out of Brazil in exchange for US dollars that would be sent into the country. I could not find any evidence for such an agreement.

ג. קיימת הבעיה הכללית כיצד להשתמש בהכנסות קרן היסוד בברזיל. זאת לא  
 על סן-פאולו בלבד. ליריעתך, לפי תקציב הסוכנות, הרי היא סוציאלית פרט לתוצ  
 עליה, לפי התקציב כ-581,590 ל"י, ששה כמעט \$200,000. מכוב זה עולה, לפי  
 טעם על כל ההכנסות בברזיל. לכאורה, אנו בסדר. לא סוציאליסטים בברזיל מדווחים,  
 אלא צריכים, נוסף על הסכום בהכנסות המגבית, להזרים גם הסנה עשרות אלפי  
 דולרים לכסוי הוצאות הסוכנות. אלא, מתעוררת אצלנו סאלה האם מתוך ראות  
 מראית לבת הדרך הזאת טובה. אנו חוששים שאם הדבר יודע לתורמים, זה ישפיע  
 רע על תרומותיהם. כי, התורמים מתכוונים לתרום כסף סיניע לישראל לצרכי  
 עליה, קליטה ויתר הפעולות בארץ. לפיכך, היינו רוצים שתכדוק אם קיימת  
 אפשרות של פניה ישירה אל השלטונות ולהגיש אתם לידי הסכם שתכנון יהיה התאמת  
 מצד הסוכנות וקרן היסוד בברזיל ו/או בישראל שתמורת הכספים שיוצאו בברזיל  
 יוורמו לברזיל דולרים לפחות באותו הסכום המקומות אמריים.

2/.

## OAA #26

*In Brazil, diasporans donated US\$5.3 million in cash in 1967 and pledged to donate another million – twenty-four times the profits of the 1966 campaign, which amounted to US\$220 thousand. Pinchas Sapir, the Israeli finance minister, supervised the campaign from Rio de Janeiro (Sapir 2011, 426–427). At the same time, the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and other Arab groups launched a similar campaign among Arab diasporans in the country. By mid-June 1967, around 3,000 Jewish Brazilians volunteered to go to Israel to fight for the Israel Defense Force or to work in civilian jobs in lieu of Israeli civilians who had been drafted.*

Source 1: Administration Officer of the Embassy to Divon, Top Secret, 25 August 1967: MFA/3172/3.

Explanation 1: In this top secret communication, Israeli Ambassador Shmuel Divon reports that Magbit funds in the sum of US\$2,160,770 were collected in Rio de Janeiro; US\$3,137,500 were collected in São Paulo, and US\$5,295,000 were sent to Israel through a direct transfer of US\$140,500 (possibly through an Israeli bank in Brazil) and in cash delivered by three couriers.

ריו דה-ז'ניירו, יס' באב תשכ"ז  
25 באוגוסט 1967

111.1

העתק....מחור 3 עותקים  
3 דפים

483

סודי ביותר

אל : השגריר

מאת: קבין המיבהלה

# הברון: סגבית חרום - דוח

1. אני מבקש להביא לידיעתך הפרטים הבאים  
במסגרת מבצע סגבית החרום רוכזו הכספים בשגרירות כדלקמן:-  
א. ריו (כולל ערי השדה)

	\$ דולרים	1,960.770.-
	פרנקים שווייצריים	112.900.-
	כסף ספרדי	60.000.-
	כסף צרפתי	4.950.-
	כסף ישראלי	1.581.-
	לי"ש	3.601.-
	גרמני	25.484.-
	פורטוגזי	3,464.162.10
	אורוגואי	7.000.-
	ארגנטינאי	6.000.-

כ- \$200.000.-

\$ 2,160,770.00 ס"ה

- ב. סאן-פאולו (כולל ערי השדה)

א. בדולרים ובכסף זר אחר \$ 2,997.000.-

ב. העברה ישירה שלהם \$ 140.500.-

\$ 3,137.500.-

-2-

ש"ה הנגביה  
בריו ובסאן-פאולו לירוב העברות יאיריות  
ליום 10.8.67 שפאכסות 2-חשט פליון 1-פלוש סאום  
אלף דולר.

2. בספי הסגבית הועברו 2-4 פאיריות כדלקמן:

א.	העברת יאירה ע"י ס. פאולו	\$ 140,500.-
ב.	<u>בלדרות ראשונה</u> (3.7.67)	\$ 3,419,204.77
1.	בפזוסגים	\$ 200,000.-
2.	בכספים שובים	\$ 3,619,204.77
ג.	<u>בלדרות שניה</u> (17.7.67)	\$ 820,872.87
1.	בפזוסגים	\$ 7,000.-
2.	בכספים שובים	\$ 827,872.87
ד.	<u>בלדרות שלישייה</u> (18.8.67)	\$ 700,072.99
1.	בפזוסגים	\$ 2,500.-
2.	בכספים שובים	\$ 702,572.99
	<u>ס"ה</u>	\$ 5,295,000.-

3. התחייבויות עד לסיום הסגבית הן כדלקמן:

א. ריו

התחייבויות בעות סביב 500-600 אלף דולר.  
90% מהתחייבויות יסולמו כנראה תוך 60 יום ובאשר ליתרה מרם  
ידוע. ההנחה המשווערת שס"ה הכספים שהסגבית הקבל מריו תהא  
בסביבות 2.7 - 2.8 פליון דולר.

ב. סאן-פאולו

גם כאן ישנם התחייבויות הסובבות סביב חצי פליון דולר.  
50% - 60% מהתחייבויות יסומשו ויועברו כבר בימים הקרובים  
לריו וסמס למקום הריכוז. ובאשר ליתרה, ההנחה שזה יספך עוד  
כחודש ומחצה.

Source 2: AJC Foreign Affairs Department, "Reactions in Latin America to the Situation in the Middle East," 22 June 1967: YIVO, RG 347.7.1, FAD-1, Box 105.

Explanation 2: According to this report by the American Jewish Committee, "the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization and a Palestine refugee group in that city [São Paulo] were reported to be recruiting young people and collecting money for the Arab cause.

[...]

In Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, volunteers for service in Israel, particularly young people, offered to take the places of men in the armed forces. By June 7, the total of such volunteers in Argentina had reached 1,000, including a number of non-Jews. Less than a week later, the number of volunteers in Brazil was 3,000."

League efforts to stir up dissension. Several statements were issued by intellectuals in Sao Paulo, Brazil urging continued good relations. Meanwhile, the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization and a Palestine refugee group in that city were reported to be recruiting young people and collecting money for the Arab cause. In Argentina, a statement denouncing the "Zionists" was issued by the League for Arab-Argentine Cooperation, a "front" for the Arab League, following a meeting with the Minister of the Interior. It is believed that friction may develop between some Arab and Jewish elements there in the days ahead. In Mexico, Arab groups published advertisements and issued statements designed to create anti-Jewish and anti-Israel feeling.

In Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, volunteers for service in Israel, particularly young people, offered to take the places of men in the armed forces. By June 7, the total of such volunteers in Argentina had reached 1,000, including a number of non-Jews. Less than a week later, the number of volunteers in Brazil was 3,000. Various forms of aid were organized, including food, medical supplies and fund-raising. The Brazilian and Argentine Institutes were also active in these endeavors.



## OAA #27

*In fact, some members of these diasporic communities engaged in various peace and coexistence initiatives.*

and

*The Brazilian government went out of its way to remain equidistant toward the conflict in the Middle East. Although traveling out of the country was not illegal, the Brazilian regime was upset over the thousands of Jewish Brazilians volunteering to go to Israel.*

Source 1: Rosenthal to Forster, 22 June 1967: YIVO Archives, New York, RG 347.7.1, FAD-1, Box 105.

Excerpt 1: **“A Touching appeal for peace in the Middle East bearing the signature of more than 3,000 Arabs and Jews, members of the Arab-Jewish Union of São Paulo, was submitted to President Costa y Silva with copies to the Governments of Israel, the UAR, and the United Nations. A similar move was registered in both Parana and Belo Horizonte where both communities are linked by traditional bonds of friendship.”**

Excerpt 2: **“More than 3,000 offers to serve as volunteers were received at the Israeli embassy, growing to such an extent that government warned eventual volunteers against the loss of Brazilian nationality.”**

BRAZIL: As in Argentina, consulates and centers of Jewish and Arab concentration were heavily guarded. More than 3,000 offers to serve as volunteers were received at the Israel Embassy growing to such an extent that government warned eventual volunteers against the loss of Brazilian nationality.

A touching appeal for peace in the Middle East bearing the signatures of more than 3,000 Arabs and Jews, members of the Arab-Jewish Union of Sao Paulo, was submitted to President Costa y Silva with copies sent to the Governments of Israel, the UAR, and the United Nations. A similar move was registered in both Parana and Belo Horizonte where both communities are linked by traditional bonds of friendship. Brazilian Jewry collected over three million dollars (American) in a short emergency drive for Israel. Jewish families offered to receive Israeli women and children evacuees; blood donations and material support was organized and special services held in all synagogues. A public meeting of the Brazilian Jewish Confederation was well attended by Jews and non-Jews alike.


The Brazilian press was enthusiastic in its support of Israel. Even prior to the conflict, editorials in "Jornal do Brasil" furiously attacked Nasser for plotting a holy war of extermination against a small beleaguered country instead of waging a truly holy war against the misery of his own people. Another editorial, comparing Nasser's hate policy to Hitler's, appealed to the conscience of the world stating that the survival of the UN itself was linked to Israel's survival. "While Nasser's fate was unimportant in the eyes of history, that of the United Nations was vital for it contained all the hopes for a better world."

## OAA #28

*State-sponsored, organized, and large-scale anti-Semitic movements did not exist in the country, and the security agencies were believed to monitor anti-Semitic activities.*

Source 1: Winterstein to World Jewish Congress and others, 9 May 1968: CZA/C2/1633.

Explanation 1: This is a memorandum by Dr. Wojtech Winterstein, who directed the Brazilian office of the World Jewish Congress (WJC). Winterstein writes that **“We have always advocated the thesis that in Brazil there is no anti-Semitism, if the “ism” is to be understood as a movement or the manifestation of an organization or newspapers and literature or of the will of the Government, or political parties and classes; there, however, do exist individual antisemites exhibiting sometimes their dirty faces. Consequently even its euphemistic substitute, the anti-Zionism, is used but by a very small group of Moscow-oriented communists; even they are using it only since 1968 and limiting it to their academic discussions, thus, without any serious repercussion.”**



Source 2: Sorj, Bernardo. 2008. “Brazilian Non-Anti-Semite Sociability and Jewish Identity.”


*In Identities in an Era of Globalization and Multiculturalism: Latin America in the Jewish World*, edited by Judit Bokser Liwerant, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yossi Gorny, and Raanan Rein, 151–70. Leiden ; Boston, MA: Brill ([the chapter can be accessed here](#)).

Excerpt: **“Our starting point is the assumption that Brazil is a society with low levels of antiSemitic discourses or practices. This assumption is based on day-to-day information disseminated through the media, on reports by immigrants and on the empirical experience of the author. This assessment is confirmed by the Anti-Semitism World Report. In its 1995 edition it concludes that, "There is no indication of state-sponsored antisemitism since the end of Vargas regime (1945, B.S.)" (p.10-11). "Brazil has little popular antisemitism". (p. 13) (The Institute of Jewish affairs and the American Jewish Committee, 1995). In the two major cities where the broad majority of Jews are concentrated — Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo — anti-Semitic discourses and practices affecting quality of life and social co-existence or which influence effective opportunities for social mobility are on the whole exceptional. In this regard, and we shall return to this point later, the situation of Judaism in Brazil differs from that of the rest of Latin America.”**

Source 3: Doron to Malat, 20 January 1967: MFA/4004/4.

Explanation 2: In this letter, an Israeli diplomat recounts the meeting between the newly appointed Israeli Ambassador Shmuel Divon and SNI Chief Golbery do Couto e Silva. The two men discussed, among other things, the recent renewal of activities of the nativist Integralist Action movement in Rio de Janeiro, which, in the 1930s, was a hotbed of Brazilian anti-Semitism (see Jeffrey Lesser’s [Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question](#)). During the conversation, **“The general [Golbery] said that his department was watching this topic [the Integralist Action], although it did not view it, at that stage, as a dangerous issue. The general talked, on that occasion, on anti-Semitic manifestations in general, and mentioned the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Curitiba a few months ago. He also expressed his concerns about information that he had received about an attempt to republish in São Paulo *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.**


The ambassador's impressions from the conversations were that the [Brazilian] security authorities were watching prominent anti-Semitic manifestations (although, it should be noted, of course, that in the case of the Integralists – who had been notoriously known as anti-Semites – in their new version, they claim that they are not racist).”



*As the Israeli ambassador in Brasília emphasized in 1981, "Israel's standing in Brazil [had] immediate consequences on the standing of the Jewish community."*

Source: Ramati to Jerusalem, Secret, 17 September 1981: MFA/8798/35.

Explanation: Shaul Ramati, Israel's ambassador in Brasília, reports in this letter about a meeting with **"the largest Jewish donor to the Magbit in São Paulo."** The two men discussed the possibility of establishing a Jewish Advisory Committee that would consist of **"Jews with economic capability and influence to finance special operations."** Ramati writes that he **"insisted on the need for tight coordination [of the proposed committee] with the embassy, and acceptance of the principle that Israel's standing in Brazil has immediate consequences on the standing of the Jewish community."**



## OAA #30

*On that occasion, Brazilian officials issued virulent anti-Zionist declarations...*

Source: Shneerson to Doron, Secret, 23 July 1976: MFA/245/1.

Explanation: In this letter, Ambassador Shneerson communicates to Jerusalem the Hebrew translation of a speech that Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira delivered at the Naval Academy in Rio de Janeiro on 10 November 1975, the very same day on which Brazil voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 that determined that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination. In this speech, which covered various foreign policy issues, Azeredo argued that **“It should be understood that Brazil’s vote had nothing to do with anti-Semitism, ‘anti-Judaism,’ or anti-Israelism. Brazil has never had racial [racist?] tendencies of whatever nature. Within our borders, people of many different races feel like full Brazilians and are loyal to the homeland [Brazil] that gave them shelter.**

[...]

**I cannot fail to mention another issue regarding the Zionist movement, which is directly related to national security. Insofar as the said movement mobilizes identification with the cause of a foreign country, it is acting against the basic norms of international coexistence and against the most fundamental norms of Brazilian society. In the past, we had not tolerated Nazis and Fascists who established in Brazil ideological branches of their governments. We would be surprised if the descendants of foreigners who had been absorbed in the Brazilian society would constitute, today, a pressure group, which would support, from within Brazil, the policies of their ancestors’ homelands. [Therefore,] why should we allow a single foreign country – the State of Israel – to be an exception, as an exclusivist [*sic*] function of a racial criterion?**





## OAA #31

*Shortly after the vote, Brazil's president promised a delegation of Jewish community leaders that his administration would not tolerate any manifestation of anti-Semitism...*

Source: "Retrospectiva do Ano Judaico 5736," 24 September 1976: ASM/SM pi. – Produção Intelectual de Samuel Malamud/Pasta VI – 01/03/1971 a 10/1977.

Excerpt: **"The entire [Jewish] community mobilized in face of that unexpected vote and the highest representative instance of the Brazilian Jewish community – the Confederation – visited the President of the Republic to explain to him the surprise at the vote [...]."**

**The President of the Republic assured the delegation that in Brazil, there is no place for anti-Jewish movements, or racist movements in general, and that under his government, any threats or manifestations that target the Jewish community would not be tolerated.**

o voto anti-sionista como uma manifestação anti-semita e contrária às tradições da política tradicional do país. Além dos esclarecimentos fornecidos pelo próprio Ministro Das Relações Exteriores ainda tornaram mais evidente a justa reação da imprensa e da opinião pública nacional.

Toda a comunidade se mobilizou face aquele voto inesperado e a instância máxima representativa da comunidade judaica brasileira - a Confederação - visitou o Presidente da República para lhe expressar a surpresa diante do voto e a preocupação comunitária diante de eventuais consequências que a interpretação do voto por alguns aventureiros reacionários possa vir a causar aborrecimentos, tendo esclarecido devidamente que o sionismo jamais pode ser comparado com racismo, por se tratar de um movimento de autodeterminação e de reconquista da soberania nacional.

O presidente da República assegurou à delegação que no Brasil não há lugar para movimentos anti-judaicos ou racistas em geral e que no seu governo não serão toleradas quaisquer ameaças ou manifestações que objetivem a comunidade judaica.

Realmente, até hoje não foi de se notar qualquer atividade antisemita organizada no país que pudesse perturbar a vida comunitária judaica. Isso, entretanto, não significa que não se deve ficar alerta. A Liga Árabe e os grupos palestinos tentam também no Brasil fortalecer a sua atuação e é lamentável que aqui encontrem inimigos de Israel e do povo judeu prontos a ajudá-los.

No que tange as boas relações que sempre reinaram entre Brasil e Israel, é de se esperar que o voto anti-sionista em nada influirá. A condenação do voto pela opinião pública encontrou eco devido. Além já se nota uma certa mudança na atitude brasileira com relação a outras decisões tomadas nos fóruns internacionais, após o voto anti-sionista.