Diasporic Assistance in Authoritarian Settings: Online Appendix

Contents

| 1 | A Brief Historical Background of Authoritarian Brazil | 1 |
|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| F | For Further Reading | 4 |
| 2 | Adolpho Bloch and Israel Klabin – Biographical Information | 5 |
| (| Sources Cited | 7 |
| 3 | Additional Hypotheses | 8 |
| (| 3.1. Refuted Hypothesis: Direct Benefit | 9 |
| ç | Sources Cited | 13 |
| (| 3.2. Hypothesis that Cannot be Tested Against the Data: Diaspora is Not Persecuted | 14 |
| , | Sources Cited | 16 |
| 4. / | A Note on the Sources | 18 |
| 5. | Notes on the Interviewees | 20 |
| | Chazan, Tzvi | 20 |
| | Dines, Alberto | 21 |
| | Dowek, Ephraim | 21 |
| | Falbel, Nachman | 21 |
| | Ghivelder, Zevi | 21 |
| | Klabin, Israel | 22 |
| | Knoplich, José | 22 |
| | Kremer, Aron | 22 |
| | Lafer, Celso | 22 |
| | Peres, Shimon | 22 |
| | Rotstein, Jaime | 23 |
| | Sotnik, Saul | 23 |
| | Veltman, Henrique | 23 |
| | Wurman Osias | 23 |

A Brief Historical Background of Authoritarian Brazil

In March and April 1964, the Brazilian armed forces, backed by conservative civilian circles and the United States, staged a coup d'état in the country. Under the pretext of preempting an imminent Cuban-style communist revolution, the conspirators deposed President João "Jango" Goulart (1961–1964) and established an authoritarian regime that lasted until 1985.

Goulart – a wealthy rancher from South Brazil who, over the years, became associated with radical leftist elements and labor unions – was directly elected vice president in 1960 (Brazil had a splitticket voting system). In August 1961, Brazil's incumbent president, the eccentric Jânio Quadros, suddenly resigned. According to the Constitution, Goulart was supposed to replace him, to the chagrin of many military and civilian conservatives and the United States.

For a moment, Brazil seemed to be on the verge of civil war over the question of succession. Eventually, a compromise was reached: Goulart would take on the role of president but Brazil would become a parliamentary democracy. Many powers of the executive branch would be transferred to Congress. However, in January 1963, Goulart regained full executive powers after winning a sweeping victory in a plebiscite over the restitution of the presidential system.

From that moment forward, especially in the second half of 1963, Brazilian politics quickly polarized. Having failed to resolve the financial crisis he had inherited from previous administrations, Goulart grew increasingly close to the radical left. In early 1964, he decided to bypass Congress and use his executive powers to authorize a series of "basic reforms" that enraged Brazil's conservatives and the United States. The proposed reforms included, among others, agrarian reform and the nationalization of some private oil refineries. At that point, conspiracies to depose Goulart and salvage Brazil from a presumed communist takeover abounded among civilian and military circles.

In March 1964, Goulart fired his navy minister over the arrest of a sailor who had attempted to unionize his comrades. Subsequently, the generals and their civilian accomplices decided to carry out the coup that they had been planning for months. On 31 March 1964, troops stationed in the

state of Minas Gerais began to march toward the presidential palace in Rio de Janeiro and were soon joined by other forces, including ones that had been sent to stop them and switched sides. On the next day, Goulart fled to Brasília and, from there, to his home state of Rio Grande do Sul. On 4 April, he went into exile in Uruguay. The revolt ended almost without bloodshed. Congress declared the presidency vacant (although Goulart was still in the country at the time). On 11 April, it elected the army chief of staff, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, as president of the republic.

Struggling to maintain a constitutional and democratic façade after the 1964 coup, the generals consolidated military rule by issuing "Institutional Acts" that gave a legalistic pretext to their authoritarian measures and by removing legislators and judges who challenged their decisions. In contrast to earlier military interventions, in which, after a period of institutional changes, the generals had eventually stepped down and restored democracy, this time the military hardliners perceived a prolonged authoritarian rule as the only cure against the purported dangers of corruption and communism.

As in previous coups, the military immediately began purging its perceived enemies. Leftist politicians, students, professors, leaders and members of labor unions and peasant leagues, military officers, civil servants, clergy, and other oppositionists were stripped of their mandates and political rights; fired from their jobs; arrested; driven into exile; and in some cases, tortured and killed. The dictatorship also created the National Intelligence Service (*Serviço Nacional de Informações*, SNI), which soon became a potent political power in the country, second only to the president.

Subsequent years saw the further cancelation of mandates, suspension of various elections for federal and state parliaments, infringement of human rights, censorship of the press, arrests, torture, and undocumented executions. At the same time, the opposition intensified its struggle against the dictatorship. Beginning in 1968, urban and rural *guerrilheiros* started to plant bombs, assassinate persons identified with the regime, rob banks and military installations to finance their operations and get arms and ammunition, and kidnap foreign diplomats (including US Ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick), who were released in exchange for the release of jailed comrades.

The dictatorship's response was swift and harsh. In late 1968, under the pretext of protecting the country from internal subversion, the armed forces cracked down on the opposition, implementing

a series of repressive measures. Congress was closed, the right of habeas corpus was suspended, and the press was censored. The repressive measures further consolidated the intelligence and security organizations' control over Brazilian politics and society. A wave of arrests, tortures, and armed clashes with opposition groups ensued. By 1972, most members of the armed opposition had been jailed, exiled, or were murdered. In 1975, after a protracted secret operation in the Araguaia river basin, the military finally eradicated the last rural guerilla fighters in the region. For practical purposes, the armed struggle was over.

According to the Polity IV Project's database "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018," Brazil was most autocratic from the 1964 coup d'état that ousted President Goulart to the beginning of the "slow, gradual, and secure" liberalization process initiated by President Ernesto Beckmann Geisel (1974–1979). However, liberalization did not immediately follow Geisel's ascension to the presidency or the elimination of the armed opposition; it took another three years of intra-military struggles between moderates and hardliners before Geisel finally began to implement his reforms with success.

The presidential terms of Geisel and his successor, João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979–1985), were characterized by a constant struggle between moderates and hardliners within the armed forces over the redemocratization of the country and the relaxation of repression. As a result, these years witnessed the continuation of both the liberalization process and the torture and execution of oppositionists. In 1985, the military regime officially ended when the electoral college elected the opposition's candidate as president of Brazil. However, direct presidential elections were not held until much later in 1989.

Notably, the number of victims of the authoritarian government was low relative to other South American dictatorships – according to the Brazilian National Truth Commission's 2014 report, 434 people were killed or "disappeared" during the 21 years of military rule. Less deadly repressive measures (such as torture and censorship) coupled with a massive pro-government propaganda campaign kept the vast majority of the population under control. Also, despite increasing repression in the country, the significant growth of Brazil's economy during the first decade of the dictatorship made authoritarianism bearable for many middle- and upper-class Brazilians, including a large portion of the country's Jewish population; for many, it seemed an acceptable

price of pay for the marked improvement of their living conditions, especially at the time with only limited access to information about the dictatorship's repressive strategies.

For Further Reading

- Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. 1985. *State and Opposition in Military Brazil*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Chirio, Maud. 2018. *Politics in Uniform: Military Officers and Dictatorship in Brazil, 1960-1980*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Dávila, Jerry. 2013. Dictatorship in South America. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Fausto, Boris, and Sergio Fausto. 2014. *A Concise History of Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Gaspari, Elio. 2002a. A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- . 2002b. *A Ditadura Escancarada*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- . 2003. *A Ditadura Derrotada*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- ——. 2004. A Ditadura Encurralada. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- Green, James N. 2010. We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Leacock, Ruth. 1990. *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969.* Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Rattner, Henrique. 1987. "Economic and Social Mobility of Jews in Brazil." In *The Jewish Presence* in Latin America, eds. Judith Laikin Elkin and Gilbert W. Merkx. Boston, MA: Allen & Un, 187–200.
- Skidmore, Thomas E. 1988. *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil: 1964-85*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- ——. 2007. *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adolpho Bloch and Israel Klabin – Biographical Information

Adolpho Bloch (1908–1995) and Israel Klabin (born 1926) were the most prominent figures involved in Jewish Brazilian diasporic assistance to Israel. Their names appear repeatedly in Israeli archival documents about diasporic help. When I was interviewing community leaders, politicians, and journalists about Jewish Brazilian relations with Israel, they were singled by several of my interviewees as key figures. In 2014, I was able to interview Klabin, who granted me access to his personal archives. Since Bloch had already died in 1995, I interviewed several of his friends, relatives, colleagues, and confidants.

Adolpho Bloch was born in Ukraine and immigrated to Brazil as a child. In 1952, he established the popular weekly *Manchete*, which grew into a media empire (Bloch 2008; Niskier 2012). Until the late 1960s, Bloch was not publicly identified by other people as a Zionist. Yet, on different occasions, he used his political connections – above all, his intimate friendship with President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) – to promote Israeli interests. After the 1967 War, a transformative moment of national awakening across many Latin American Jewish communities (Roniger 2010, 193), Bloch became a staunch advocate of Israel and Zionism in the Brazilian media and started to visit Israel frequently (Chazan Interview; Dines Interview; Ghivelder Interview).

Bloch financed and raised funds for many projects in Israel, both "kosher and un-kosher," as a former employee of his reminisces (Wurman Interview). These projects included, for example, the creation of a geophysical observatory in the south of Israel and numerous donations to the Weizmann Institute of Science (Ghivelder Interview; Klabin Interview; Wurman interview). He also funded, organized, and advertised pro-Israel events and activities in Brazil. An Israeli diplomat recalls that for "Everything that you needed – you could use [Bloch and his nephew]" (Dowek Interview).

Bloch did not hesitate to help Israel, even when controversial issues were at stake. For example, after Brazil voted in favor of the 1975 UN Resolution that equated Zionism with racism (see Santos and Uziel 2015), Bloch attacked the resolution in *Manchete* and helped organize and publicize the "Night of Gratitude" – a Jewish community rally that showed solidarity with Israel in the face of

an increasingly pro-Palestinian Brazilian foreign policy (Veltman Interview; Ghivelder Interview). In 1976, the journal's board was warned by Brazil's justice minister after Bloch had strongly attacked several Arab leaders in his column, at a time when relations with the Arab world were an important Brazilian diplomatic goal (OAA #11).

The paper mogul Israel Klabin was, in many respects, the mirror image of Bloch. He was born in Rio de Janeiro to a rich and successful family of paper producers (Falbel 2008; Milgram 1995, 261–262), which *Time Magazine* once dubbed the "Rothschilds of the South." His Lithuanian-born father, Wolff Kadischewitz Klabin, was a Zionist leader who cultivated business and personal ties with some of Brazil's most important politicians, including President Getúlio Vargas, and donated great sums of money to Jewish and Israeli causes. His father's cousin, Horácio Lafer, was a successful politician who served as finance minister (1951–1953) and foreign minister (1959–1961) in Brazil's democratically elected governments (On the Klabin-Lafer family, see Dolinger 2008; Lafer and Cardim 2002; Margalho 2013; Veltman 1996, 31–34).

Israel Klabin, who went to graduate school at the prestigious *Institut de Sciences Politiques* in France, was involved in Zionist Brazilian politics and national politics from a very young age. After his father died in 1957, he became particularly attached to his father's cousin, Horácio Lafer, to whom he refers as his "uncle" (Wolff immigrated to Brazil alone and lived with his cousin's family. The two grew together like brothers. See Lafer Interview). When Horácio Lafer was appointed foreign minister, he brought the young Klabin with him to Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign ministry, in an informal apprenticeship of sorts. At Itamaraty, Klabin became "very much involved with [Brazilian] diplomats" and made some "good friends," who later helped him in various Israel-related undertakings, as he recalls (Klabin Interview).

Since his childhood, Klabin was used to spending time with some of the world's most prominent Zionist leaders and activists, who would later constitute the backbone of the Israeli government. In 1962, at the age of thirty-five, he already accompanied Foreign Minister Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas on a state visit to Israel (OAA #22). Even before that visit, Klabin helped Israel in many overt and covert ways and continued to do so during the dictatorship, sometimes in

¹ Time Magazine, 28 June 1963, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874996,00.html.

cooperation with Adolpho Bloch. Among other forms of assistance, he introduced Brazilian military officers to Israeli generals, devised and promoted plans to encourage the immigration of Palestinian refugees from the Occupied Territories to Latin America, facilitated the exportation of Brazilian meat to Israel, donated large sums to the Magbit, and financed the construction of a landing strip in the Sinai peninsula in the wake of the 1967 War. In the 1970s, when Shimon Peres was Israel's minister of defense, he allocated to Klabin an office at the ministry, where Klabin could work on Israel-related affairs (Klabin Interview; Peres Interview; OAA #23).

Sources Cited

- Bloch, Arnaldo. 2008. *Os irmãos Karamabloch: ascensão e queda de um império familiar*. Rio de Janeiro: Companhia das Letras.
- Dolinger, Rachelle Zweig. 2008. Homens de valor: uma memória dos homens que se destacaram na comunidade judaica do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Imago.
- Falbel, Nachman. 2008. Judeus no Brasil: estudos e notas. São Paulo: Humanitas, EDUSP.
- Lafer, Celso, and Carlos Henrique Cardim, eds. 2002. *Horácio Lafer: democracia, desenvolvimento e política externa*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.
- Margalho, Maurício Gonçalves. 2013. "Indústrias Klabin do Paraná de Celulose: A Sociogênese do Projeto Político-Empresarial (1930-1940)." *Revista História e Perspectivas* (48): 99–126.
- Milgram, Avraham. 1995. "Precursors of Zionism in Brazil before the Turn of the 20th Century." *Journal of Israeli History* 16(3): 257–66.
- Niskier, Arnaldo. 2012. *Memórias de um sobrevivente: a verdadeira história da ascensão e queda da Manchete*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira.
- Roniger, Luis. 2010. "Latin American Jews and Processes of Transnational Legitimization and De-Legitimization." *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* 9(2): 185–207.
- Santos, Norma Breda dos, and Eduardo Uziel. 2015. "Forty Years of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) on Zionism and Racism: The Brazilian Vote as an Instance of United States Brazil Relations." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 58(2): 80–97.
- Veltman, Henrique. 1996. A história dos judeus em São Paulo. Rio de Janeiro: Expressão e Cultura.

3. Additional Hypotheses

To develop the study of diasporic assistance in authoritarian contexts, I began with five main hypotheses derived from the literature on diasporas, minorities, authoritarian regimes, political opportunity structures, and civil society organizations. Namely, I hypothesized that diasporic assistance was more likely to be approved when the assistance was not at odds with the host country's vital interests; when the diasporans who extended the assistance were not identified with the opposition; when they were connected to policy makers and implementers in the authoritarian regime; when the latter had something to gain from the assistance; and when the diaspora group was not the target of institutionalized discrimination. Based on the Brazilian case study, I was able to prove the first three hypotheses and refute the fourth one. As for the fifth one, I was unable to either prove or refute it for lack of evidence. The body of the paper contains the proven hypotheses, which I merged into two broader conditions about the "acceptability" of diasporic assistance and assistance. The refuted and unproven ones are included here for reference for those who aim to continue and expand upon this research.

3.1. Refuted Hypothesis: Direct Benefit

According to this hypothesized condition, officials in the host country who are in a position to approve or preclude diasporic assistance are unlikely to allow or facilitate it unless there is something in it for them. In other words, if decision-makers or implementers have nothing to gain from approving diasporic assistance, they will have fewer incentives to allow acts of loyalty to a foreign country. Unlike the condition according to which the diasporic help should converge to some extent with the host country's interests for it to be authorized, here a more tangible, personal gain is hypothesized.

In dictatorships, decisions are often made by a small group of insiders (Gandhi 2008, 20). However, in charge of enforcing these decisions are the "state personnel in the trenches" and their immediate supervisors – officials such as police officers and captains, who implement state policies and can allow or preclude single acts of diasporic assistance (Migdal 2001, 117–119). *Prima facie*, neither high-level nor low-level officials have strong incentives to allow diasporans to help a foreign country. Given the already problematic image of such assistance – especially in authoritarian contexts (Shain and Barth 2003, 464), where such exchanges are often frowned upon, if not formally illegal – allowing the assistance may seem counterintuitive. We would thus expect that the default choice for decision-makers and implementers would be to prohibit it.

However, if diasporic assistance entails a tangible and measurable gain for the individual involved – in other words, if decision-makers or lower-level officials can benefit from the assistance or from allowing it – they may be inclined to make an exception and enable or even facilitate it, even if it is discouraged or formally prohibited. In authoritarian countries, citizens are often able to circumvent legal restrictions through such informal transactions as bribing authorities (Nguyen 2020). Similar practices may also exist at the highest levels of the regime. As Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee (2015, 9–10) expound, "unlike in democracies, autocratic leaders cannot be held effectively accountable by their populations because of the regime's ability to control the media, the legal and police systems to various degrees, their capability to weaken and infiltrate civil society groups, and, if they are held, the ability to control elections." This lack of accountability gives authoritarian leaders the power to allow corrupt practices or directly engage in them. If the diasporic assistance is not detrimental to the state, if they can personally gain from

it, and if they cannot be held accountable for allowing or tolerating it, they might be more open to the possibility of doing so.

The direct benefits or gains that leaders might enjoy may be material or immaterial. Social actors enjoy a more open political opportunity structure if their actions create political opportunities for elites that can influence policy decisions (Tarrow 1998, 88–89). In some cases, decision-makers may authorize diasporic assistance because it benefits the organization under their control – a municipal or state agency, a department, a ministry, or even the entire country. Such benefits, of course, are expected to translate into political capital that may elevate the status and legitimacy of those individuals heading the organization, and thus indirectly benefit them.

While testing this hypothesis against the case of the Jewish diaspora in authoritarian Brazil, I found some evidence that Brazil or Brazilian decision-makers indirectly benefited from allowing Jewish Brazilian diasporic assistance. One such gain was the diaspora taking upon itself a part of the financial burden of bilateral relations with Israel. For example, in 1966, the Klabin company, one of Brazil's major paper producers, donated US\$20,000 to the construction of a Brazilian cultural center in Kibbutz Bror Hayil (whose members were mostly Jewish immigrants from Brazil and their offspring). The purpose of the center, named after Osvaldo Aranha (a Brazilian diplomat who had served as president of the 1947 United Nations General Assembly that approved the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine) was to disseminate Brazilian culture in Israel. The director-general of the Brazilian foreign ministry, Brazil's second-highest-ranking diplomat (who was Aranha's son-in-law), attended the cultural center's inauguration ceremony in 1967 (OAA #24). Because the Klabin brothers took upon themselves the financing of a project that was intended to benefit the Brazilian government, such Brazilian officials as the ambassador in Israel and even the foreign minister not only authorized the transfer but also encouraged and collaborated with the project.

Sometimes, even organized immigration activities were indirectly beneficial to Brazil. In the late 1970s, the Jewish Organization of Brazil cut a deal with the Brazilian Ministry of Education, according to which Jewish Brazilian high school students could study some of their Brazilian curriculum in Israel. Most of the participants of this program eventually immigrated to Israel, after having graduated from Brazilian universities. Brazil was aware of the purpose of the program but authorized it on the condition that non-Jewish Brazilian students could equally participate in it and receive agricultural training – an area in which Israel excelled (Sotnik Interview). In this way, the

Brazilian Ministry of Education was hoping to gain skilled workers for the country's development in exchange for its authorization of the program (although, in fact, no non-Jewish Brazilian enrolled in the program).

Notwithstanding these examples, the evidence supporting the hypothesis is inconsistent. There are other cases in which there is no evidence that either the Brazilian government or specific Brazilian decision-makers or policy implementers benefited, either directly or indirectly, from the assistance. One such form of assistance was Jewish fundraising. Although some Jewish Brazilian interviewees said that officials were sometimes paid to turn a blind eye to Jewish fundraising and remittances, none of them provided any details about these exchanges or admitted that they participated in them. I could not find any reproducible, on-the-record evidence for such quid-proquo, or evidence that decision-makers who authorized diasporic assistance benefited from it or believed that they or their organization would gain from it. Without this evidence, this hypothesis is impossible to definitively prove or disprove.

It can be argued that there was some indirect benefit for Brazil, and hence for Brazilian officials, in allowing Jewish diasporans to raise funds and remit them to Israel. The Magbit revenues were divided – one part went to Israel, while another part was invested in local Jewish institutions. When the collected sums were low, all of them remained in Brazil (a fact that Zionist emissaries to the country tried to conceal, so as not to deter potential donors who believed that their money had gone to Israel: OAA #25). Since these collected funds were invested in domestic Jewish organizations engaged in welfare, health, and education activities, it can be argued that thanks to the Magbit, the authorities could spend less money on such social programs in areas with a large Jewish population and thus channel more resources to other neighborhoods. However, there is no evidence that any Brazilian decision-maker considered the Magbit profitable for this reason.

Another example of diasporic assistance that was more costly than beneficial for Brazilian officials was the mobilization of Jewish Brazilians during the 1967 Middle East Crisis and War. When the crisis escalated, the World Zionist Organization launched a worldwide emergency Magbit campaign. In Brazil, diasporans donated US\$5.3 million in cash in 1967 and pledged to donate another million – twenty-four times the profits of the 1966 campaign, which amounted to US\$220 thousand. Pinchas Sapir, the Israeli finance minister, supervised the campaign from Rio de Janeiro (Sapir 2011, 426–427). At the same time, the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization,

and other Arab groups launched a similar campaign among Arab diasporans in the country. By mid-June 1967, around 3,000 Jewish Brazilians volunteered to go to Israel to fight for the Israel Defense Force or to work in civilian jobs in lieu of Israeli civilians who had been drafted (OAA #26. On the 1967 volunteering campaign, see Segev 2007).

If, in the 1973 War, Brazil outlawed most forms of Jewish or Arab diasporic mobilization for threatening national unity and security, such mobilization did not seem to collide with Brazilian interests in 1967, presumably because it did not polarize the Jewish and Arab Brazilian diasporas. In fact, some members of these diasporic communities engaged in various peace and coexistence initiatives (OAA #27).

Nonetheless, the 1967 Jewish mobilization for Israel did not entail any tangible benefit for Brazil or Brazilian decision-makers. The Brazilian government went out of its way to remain equidistant toward the conflict in the Middle East. Although traveling out of the country was not illegal, the Brazilian regime was upset over the thousands of Jewish Brazilians volunteering to go to Israel (OAA #27). Nonetheless, it enabled Jewish, Syrian, and Lebanese citizens to donate large sums of money to their respective homelands, even though there is no evidence that Brazil or any Brazilian decision-maker gained anything from it.

This evidence could suggest that politicians may be unwilling to confess to any direct gain and that such gains have been well-hidden to protect their reputation. However, this possibility is unlikely because such bribery was easily discovered in many other cases. Thus, direct benefit for decision-makers in the host country was not a crucial element in the political opportunity structure that enabled diasporic assistance. For this reason, I did not include this condition in the article.

Sources Cited

- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nguyen, Tu Phuong. 2020. "Law and Precariousness in an Authoritarian State: The Case of Illegal House Construction in Vietnam." *Law & Policy* 42(2): 186–203.
- Sapir, Michal. 2011. *Ha-Yesh ha-gadol: A Biography of Pinchas Sapir (Hebrew)*. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth.
- Segev, Tom. 2007. 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Shain, Yossi, and Aharon Barth. 2003. "Diasporas and International Relations Theory." *International Organization* 57(3): 449–79.
- Tarrow, Sidney G. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*.

 Cambridge: New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Yadav, Vineeta, and Bumba Mukherjee. 2016. *The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

3.2. Hypothesis that Cannot be Tested Against the Data: Diaspora is Not Persecuted

Another hypothesis that emerged from the literature was that *institutionalized discrimination* against a diaspora in its host country is a major impediment for diasporans trying to legitimately assist their homeland. If the regime persecutes, securitizes (Buzan et al. 1998), or delegitimizes (Bar-Tal 1990) the diasporans' ethnic, national, racial, or religious group, their political opportunity structure would become especially challenging in terms of diasporic assistance.

Persecution or systematic discrimination against entire diaspora communities in authoritarian countries may considerably reduce diasporans' capacity to assist their homelands. According to Chaudhary and Moss (2019, 14), "immigrants associated with particular nationalities, ethnicities, religions, and inimical political movements can encounter marginalization in receiving societies that hinder collective action." Political opportunity structures that allow diasporic assistance are generally more closed in authoritarian host countries (Khagram et al. 2002, 17), and dictatorships may deny minorities collective rights or punish them in other ways. For example, the Chinese diaspora in Malaysia might be relatively large and affluent but its members have been politically marginalized by their host country's authoritarian government. As Nikola Mirilovic (2018, 359–360) shows, the Malaysian regime employs political and economic discrimination against non-Malay citizens and attempts to curtail Chinese Malaysians' political ties with China, while Malay politicians publicly question the loyalty of Chinese Malaysians to Malaysia. As a result, these diasporans have been unable to meaningfully influence Kuala Lumpur's policy toward their homeland.

This hypothesis was impossible to test in authoritarian Brazil, as no such widespread, systematic discrimination existed. Brazil was relatively free of institutionalized and unofficial anti-Jewish sentiments. Being mostly light-skinned and middle- and upper-class, Jewish Brazilians were not subject to the informal discrimination and racial inequality that afflicted such minorities as indigenous or black Brazilians before, during, and after the dictatorship (Dávila 2013, 51). Jewish Brazilians were well integrated into their host country's society and economy and attained high positions in the country's public and private sectors, the media, and even politics and the armed forces (Elkin 2014, 264–266; Uderman 2011). An Israeli report from 1973 determined that Brazil,

"a multiracial country," in which "people from different and various national origins" coexisted in mutual tolerance, did not discriminate against Jews. Since 1969, Jewish soldiers, students, and civil servants in Rio de Janeiro were exempt from working on the Jewish High Holidays. (OAA #1).

Nonetheless, certain anti-Jewish sentiments and stereotypes existed in Brazilian society. Many Brazilians, for example, associated Jews with communism and Bolshevism. In 1975, the dictatorship even cracked down on an alleged "Jewish sector" of the outlawed Brazilian Communist Party, and several leftist Jewish Brazilians were jailed and tortured (Rom 2019, 198). This offensive, however, focused on Jewish leftists, not Jews in general. State-sponsored, organized, and large-scale anti-Semitic movements did not exist in the country, and the security agencies were believed to monitor anti-Semitic activities (OAA #28).

Brazilian diplomats and decision-makers often frowned upon – and on certain occasions, publicly denounced – Jewish loyalty to Israel, which may have created challenges for the Jewish community. The delegitimization of Jewish diasporic loyalties surfaced when Israeli-Brazilian relations were tense. As the Israeli ambassador in Brasília emphasized in 1981, "Israel's standing in Brazil [had] immediate consequences on the standing of the Jewish community" (OAA #29). However, these denouncements and sentiments were not followed by any actual discriminatory measures against Jews.

This tolerance existed even at the nadir of the dictatorship's relationship with its Jewish citizens – Brazil's 1975 vote in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 that determined that Zionism was "a form of racism and racial discrimination." On that occasion, Brazilian officials issued virulent anti-Zionist declarations (OAA #30) but did not take any actual measures against diasporic assistance to Israel. Shortly after the vote, Brazil's president promised a delegation of Jewish community leaders that his administration would not tolerate any manifestation of anti-Semitism (OAA #31) and would not repress Zionism (Rom 2019, 201). Israeli and Brazilian diplomats and Zionist activists interviewed for this study confirmed that the vote was not followed by any actual constraints against diasporic assistance (Dowek Interview; Ghivelder Interview; Kremer Interview; Sotnik Interview).

This relative lack of anti-Jewish persecution probably contributed to the political opportunity structure that allowed Jewish diasporans to assist Israel. However, this condition proved impossible to test against the primary evidence from this study of military Brazil. Unlike the other hypotheses, which speak to distinct acts of diasporic assistance carried out by specific diasporans that I could trace in archival documents and interviews, this hypothesis presupposes a generalized form of discrimination against Jews as an ethnic, national, and religious group. Based on the research available, it is impossible to connect such generalized anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism to specific acts of diaspora assistance because no such discrimination existed. Thus, while this hypothesized condition could be researched on a smaller scale in relation to specific individuals in Brazil or, on a larger scale, in a cross-country comparison of persecuted and non-persecuted diaspora groups in several host countries, such research is beyond the scale of this study.

In other words, the data from military Brazil did not provide information on failed assistance resulting from anti-Jewish or anti-Zionist discrimination because there was no such discrimination. Testing this hypothesis against these data would risk selection bias. Thus, while this hypothesized condition is worthy of exploration, it would be more effectively researched in a cross-country comparison of persecuted and non-persecuted diaspora groups in several host countries.

Sources Cited

Bar-Tal, Daniel. 1990. "Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and Ethnocentrism." *Journal of Social Issues* 46(1): 65–81.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Chaudhary, Ali R., and Dana M. Moss. 2019. "Suppressing Transnationalism: Bringing Constraints into the Study of Transnational Political Action." *Comparative Migration Studies* 7(Article 9). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0112-z.

Dávila, Jerry. 2013. Dictatorship in South America. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Elkin, Judith Laikin. 2014. The Jews of Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2002. "From Santiago to Seattle:

Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics." In Restructuring World Politics:

- *Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*, Social movements, protest, and contention, eds. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 3–23.
- Mirilovic, Nikola. 2018. "Regime Type and Diaspora Politics: A Dyadic Approach." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14(3): 346–66.
- Rom, Michael. 2019. "Brazilian Belonging: Jewish Politics in Cold War Brazil, 1930–1985." Ph.D. dissertation. Yale University.
- Uderman, Hertz. 2011. Os judeus no desenvolvimento brasileiro: nomes, histórias e curiosidades da comunidade judaica no Brasil e no mundo. Rio de Janeiro: COP Editora.

4. A Note on the Sources

The evidence used for the analysis in this article was gathered between the years 2013–2017 in an effort to more broadly investigate the diplomatic history between Israel, Brazil, and the Jewish diaspora during the military dictatorship in Brazil. When I began this research, I had not considered the theoretical issue of diasporic assistance; instead, I was interested in the diaspora's role as facilitator and mediator of Brazilian-Israeli bilateral relations. During the data collection phase, I became interested in the historical question of how Jewish Brazilians managed to bypass the Brazilian dictatorship's official restrictions on such activities as fundraising and immigration. To this end, I specifically looked for archival materials related to these topics and inquired about them with my interviewees.

This research project led me to investigate archival materials in Brazil, Israel, and the United States. In Brazil, I visited the Itamaraty Historical Archives in Brasília and viewed diplomatic correspondence between Itamaraty (the Brazilian foreign ministry) and Brazil's diplomatic representations in Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and other Middle Eastern and Arab countries. I also read Itamaraty memorandums and circulars. At the Jewish Historical Archives in São Paulo, I browsed the records of the Jewish Confederation of Brazil, the Jewish Organization of Brazil, and the Jewish Federation of the State of São Paulo, as well as documents on Jewish individuals and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). I also reviewed Jewish Brazilian newspapers and magazines from the dictatorship period. At the General Archives of the City of Rio de Janeiro, I reviewed the personal collection of Samuel Malamud, a Jewish community leader who served as Israel's honorary consul in Brazil from 1949 to 1952 (when the first Israeli ambassador to the country presented his credentials). Israel Klabin, who I interviewed in 2014, gave me full access to his personal archives in Rio de Janeiro. Another interviewee, the late Alberto Dines, allowed me to access his collection of censorship decrees from the dictatorship.

In Jerusalem, I consulted the Israel State Archives, where I mostly concentrated on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) files, which include diplomatic correspondence between Jerusalem and the embassies in Rio de Janeiro and, from the early 1970s, Brasília; correspondence with the Israeli consulate in São Paulo; correspondence of Israeli officials with individuals and institutions in Brazil; and various reports. I also reviewed some dossiers relevant to Brazil and Latin America in

the Israeli Prime Minister's Office files. At the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, I scanned the documents of Zionist organizations that had offices or envoys in Brazil, such as the World Zionist Congress and the Jewish Agency.

In the United States, I combed through diplomatic documents from the American embassies in Israel and Brazil at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, in search of any mention of Brazilian-Israeli relations or Jewish Brazilians. At the YIVO Archives in New York City, I mostly focused on documents produced by the envoys and representatives of the American Jewish Committee in Latin America.

5. Notes on the Interviewees

All the interviews for this article were conducted by the author in 2014 and 2015 as part of a doctoral research about Israel-Brazil-Jewish diaspora relations in the 1960s and 1970s. The interviews took the form of non-structured oral histories of individuals who had participated in Jewish Brazilian diasporic assistance to Israel as diaspora activists, diasporic assistants, or Israeli officials. I also interviewed Jewish Brazilian journalists who had been close to the Jewish Brazilian media tycoon Adolpho Bloch. All the interviews were conducted in the language of the interviewee's choosing (Portuguese, Hebrew, or English) and recorded and transcribed by me.

I located and approached most of my interviewees through Brazilian or Israeli contact persons. In Brazil, it was practically impossible to access potential interviewees and gain their consent for an interview without someone who would introduce me to them and vouch for me. In some cases, it took more than one mediator to reach an interviewee. At the end of many interviews, the interviewee connected me with one or several potential interviewees.

Most of my interviewees were "public officials" and/or "powerful actors." My university's research authority, which approved this research, did not require consent forms for oral histories of elite actors. Nonetheless, I made sure that the interviews were conducted ethically: all my interviewees were aware of the purpose of the interview and of my research and agreed to be identified and quoted by me (one interviewee, a former public official, did not allow me to record the conversation or identify him. Therefore, I did not use this information in this or any other publication resulting from the research). At the beginning of each recording, I stated the interviewee's name, the date of the interview, and the location. When interviewees spoke "off the record," I turned off the recording device and did not use the information in my research. I did not include in the research any private information, and I did not share the interview recordings or transcripts with anyone. I consider all the information used in this research to be of "minimal risk" to my interviewees' safety or reputation, and I did not include in the article any information that may be harmful to them.

All my interviewees were men. Unfortunately, although I attempted to interview at least three women for this research project, I was unsuccessful in my effort, which leads to a certain all-male gender bias in my interviews.

Below are brief introductions to each of the people interviewed for this research. I have included the date, location, and language of the interview below each person's name.

Chazan, Tzvi

2 April 2015, Bror Hayil, Hebrew.

Tzvi Chazan was born in São Paulo in the 1930s. In 1957 he immigrated to Israel and settled in Kibbutz Bror Hayil, the "Brazilian Kibbutz." In 1968 he went to Brazil as an aliya envoy on behalf of the Jewish Agency. In 1970 he returned to Bror Hayil. From 1987 to 1991, he was Israel's consul-general in Rio de Janeiro.

Dines, Alberto

28 July 2014, São Paulo, English.

Alberto Dines (1932–2018) was a prominent Brazilian journalist and writer. His father was a Zionist Brazilian leader, and as a teenager in Rio de Janeiro, he was a member of the leftist Jewish youth movement Habonim Dror. Dines began working as a journalist in 1952. In the years 1957–1959 and 1961–1964, he worked for Adolpho Bloch's media organization. In 1959 he married Bloch's niece and left the Bloch network to work for Samuel Wainer, the leftist Jewish journalist, at *Última Hora*. After 1964, he worked in some of Brazil's largest newspapers, including *O Jornal do Brasil* and *Folha de São Paulo*. In 1968, he was arrested by the dictatorship and interrogated, but not tortured, after criticizing the censorship of the press in a speech. He also taught journalism in Rio de Janeiro and, as a guest lecturer in 1974, at Columbia University.

Dowek, Ephraim

7 April 2015, Jerusalem, Hebrew.

Ephraim Dowek (born 1930 in Cairo) is a retired Israeli diplomat. Between 1974 and 1978, he was Israel's consul-general in Rio de Janeiro. Among other things, he was in charge of Israel's connections with the Jewish communities of Brazil. He was later appointed Israel's ambassador to Egypt and India.

Falbel, Nachman

28 July 2014, São Paulo, Hebrew.

Nachman Falbel (born 1932) is a Jewish Brazilian medievalist and a historian of the Jewish community of Brazil. In his youth, he was active in the Jewish leftist youth movement Habonim Dror. In the early 1950s, he immigrated to Israel and worked for the Division for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but had to return to Brazil in late 1964 for family reasons. In Brazil, Falbel became active in the local Zionist Organization and in the Jewish Federation of São Paulo. When the 1967 War began, he organized the travel of Jewish volunteers to Israel. In the late 1960s, he founded a center for Jewish Studies at the University of São Paulo, and in the 1970s he established the Jewish Brazilian Historical Archives in the city.

Ghivelder, Zevi

31 May 2015, Rio de Janeiro, Portuguese.

Zevi Ghivelder (born 1934 in Rio de Janeiro) was a Jewish journalist and Zionist activist. After attaining his Law degree in 1957, Ghivelder became a journalist in Adolpho Bloch's *Manchete* network in 1959. In 1964, he was already the manager of *Manchete*'s office and Bloch's right-hand man. Ghivelder was also a Zionist activist who maintained frequent contacts with the Israeli embassy. In 1980, he was elected president of the Rio de Janeiro Jewish Federation. In 1982, he became president of the Jewish Confederation of Brazil.

Klabin, Israel

5 August 2014, Rio de Janeiro, English.

Dr. Israel Klabin (born 1926 in Rio de Janeiro) is a Jewish Brazilian engineer and politician who served as mayor of Rio de Janeiro in the 1970s. A detailed biography can be found in the section "Adolpho Bloch and Israel Klabin – Biographical Information."

Knoplich, José

19 May 2015, São Paulo, Portuguese.

Dr. José Knoplich (born 1935) is a Jewish physician and Zionist activist. He occupied various positions in the Jewish Federation of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), including general secretary in the late 1960s and president in the mid-1980s. In the mid-1970s, he headed the Sao Paulo Board of Jewish Education. In these capacities, Knoplich was involved in the Jewish community's ties with Israel, with transnational Jewish organizations, and with the Brazilian authorities.

Kremer, Aron

15 May 2015, São Paulo, Hebrew.

Aron Kremer (born 1939 in São Paulo) immigrated to Israel in 1961 with his wife. In the early 1970s, they settled in Kibbutz Bror Hayil, whose members were mostly Jewish Brazilians and their descendants. In 1974, he was sent to São Paulo by the Jewish Agency, where he headed the local aliya department. In 1983, he was dispatched to Brazil by the kibbutz for business purposes, and eventually decided to remain there. Aron's sister, Ida Kremer, was active in a leftist opposition movement. In the late 1960s, she was arrested together with her German, non-Jewish husband. Her father was able to bribe their way to freedom on the condition that they immediately leave Brazil and go live on the kibbutz, where, presumably, the dictatorship had informants. Eventually, they left Israel and settled in Germany.

Lafer, Celso

19 May 2015, São Paulo, English.

Celso Lafer (born 1941 in São Paulo) is a Brazilian professor of Law and politician. Lafer served as Brazil's foreign minister (1992, 2001–2002) and commerce minister (1999). He is a member of the Klabin-Lafer family. His grandparents were the cousins of Wolff Kadischewitz Klabin, Israel Klabin's father.

Peres, Shimon

27 March 2015, Tel Aviv, Hebrew.

Shimon Peres (1923–2016) was Israel's prime minister during three tenures (1977, 1984–1986, 1995–1996) and president between 2007 and 2014. During the Brazilian dictatorship, Peres served in various capacities, including deputy defense minister, minister of defense, minister of immigrant absorption, minister of transportation, minister of communications, minister of information, and, finally, leader of the opposition.

Rotstein, Jaime

5 August 2014, Rio de Janeiro, English.

Jaime Rotstein (1928–2019) was a Jewish Brazilian engineer who founded the Sondotécnica engineering company in 1954. In 1965, he attended Brazil's Supreme War College. Around the same time, he became president of the Brazil-Israel Chamber of Commerce.

Sotnik, Saul

6 May 2015, Netanya, Hebrew.

Saul Sotnik (born 1946 in São Paulo) was the Jewish Agency's envoy to Brazil between 1972 and 1977. In his youth, he was active in the right-wing Jewish youth movement *Betar* in São Paulo. When the 1967 War erupted, he volunteered to fight for Israel. By the time he was drafted to the Israel Defense Force, the war had already ended. Sotnik remained in Israel and, in 1972, was sent to Brazil by the Jewish Agency to head the Youth Aliya enterprise. In this capacity, he was tasked with organizing aliya seminars, Hebrew classes, and training camps in rural areas that simulated life in the kibbutzim. Between 2002 and 2010, he was the CEO of Israel's national lottery.

Veltman, Henrique

18 May 2015, São Paulo, Portuguese.

Henrique Veltman (born 1931 in Rio de Janeiro) was a Jewish journalist and Zionist activist. In 1960, he was employed by Adolpho Bloch in Rio de Janeiro. In 1964, he worked for the Jewish leftist Samuel Wainer at his journal *Última Hora*. Weeks before the coup d'état, he started a new job at the journal *O Globo*. In 1971, Veltman moved to São Paulo and headed Bloch's office in the city. In the mid-1970s, he was a business associate of the Jewish leader Eliezer Burla at a PR firm. Thanks to his connection with Burla, Veltman had access to General Golbery de Couto e Silva. Veltman also served in various senior positions in the Jewish Organization of Brazil, the Jewish Federation of São Paulo, the Jewish Confederation of Brazil, and the Jewish Agency's Aliya Movement.

Wurman, Osias

6 August 2014, Rio de Janeiro, Portuguese.

Osias Wurman is a Brazilian engineer, journalist, Zionist activist, and Israel's honorary consul in Rio de Janeiro (2009 to the present). Wurman, who had studied civil engineering, did an internship at the engineering department at the *Manchete* building in Rio de Janeiro, where he met Adolpho Bloch and became close to him. Later, his sister-in-law married Bloch's nephew. In 1990, Wurman returned to *Manchete* as a journalist. In 2009, he was appointed Israel's honorary consul in Rio de Janeiro. Other positions that he held in recent years included the presidency of the Jewish Federation of Rio de Janeiro and vice-presidency of the Jewish Confederation of Brazil.