# Stationarity of Clientwise Centered Clipping and Bound on Byzantine Weights

### See Section 1. Worst-Case Byzantine Impact Bound via Side Information.

**Proposition 0.1** (No  $\delta$ -threshold required). Assume the setup of Theorem 1.1 and that  $|\mathcal{H}| = (1 - \delta)n \ge 1$  (i.e., at least one honest client). Then, for any attacker fraction  $\delta \in [0,1)$ , the worst-case Byzantine aggregate obeys the side-information bound

$$\|\boldsymbol{B}\| \leq (2-\delta)\|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + (1-\delta)(\varepsilon_V + \bar{\zeta}_h), \tag{1}$$

which contains no denominator in  $\delta$  and thus imposes no threshold (e.g., no condition like  $\delta < 1/2$ ) for validity.

*Proof.* Equation (1) is exactly Theorem 1.1 (Equation (7)) restated. The right-hand side depends on  $\delta$  only via linear coefficients  $(2 - \delta)$  and  $(1 - \delta)$ , and does not place  $\delta$  in any denominator. Hence the bound holds uniformly for all  $\delta \in [0, 1)$ , requiring no threshold such as  $\delta < \delta_0$ .

Remark 0.2 (Behaviour as  $\delta \to 1$ ). When  $\delta \to 1$  (i.e.,  $|\mathcal{H}| \to 0$ ), the honest term vanishes and the bound reduces to

$$\|\boldsymbol{B}\| \leq \|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}.$$

Formally,  $\bar{x}$  and  $\bar{\zeta}_h$  are defined only when  $|\mathcal{H}| \geq 1$ ; the display should be read as the  $\delta \to 1$  limit of (1). In words: even if the attacker set occupies (almost) all clients, the Byzantine impact remains controlled by side-information alignment  $||g_{\mathcal{V}} - x_0||$  and the optimisation tolerance  $\varepsilon_{\nu}$ .

Remark 0.3 (Operational knobs unaffected by  $\delta$ ). The quantities  $\|\mathbf{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \mathbf{x}_0\|$  and  $\varepsilon_{\nu}$  are algorithmically controllable: recentering  $\mathbf{x}_0 \leftarrow \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{\nu}$  drives  $\|\mathbf{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \mathbf{x}_0\| \downarrow 0$ , and tightening the  $\nu$ -selection drives  $\varepsilon_{\nu} \downarrow 0$ . The validation bias  $\varepsilon_V$  decreases with better/larger  $\mathcal{V}$ . Thus, (1) yields an arbitrarily small Byzantine impact for fixed honest dispersion  $\bar{\zeta}_h$ , independently of any threshold on  $\delta$ .

### 1 Worst-Case Byzantine Impact Bound via Side Information

We give a bound on the aggregate Byzantine impact that holds even under a fully adversarial choice of Byzantine vectors (omniscient attackers who know  $x_0$ ), without using any coherence or norm-separation assumptions on  $\mathcal{B}$ . The bound depends only on quantities that are either (i) directly controlled by side information and optimisation tolerance, or (ii) intrinsic to the honest cohort.

**Setup and notation.** Let  $\mathcal{H}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  be the honest and Byzantine index sets, with  $|\mathcal{B}| = \delta n$  and  $|\mathcal{H}| = (1 - \delta)n$ . At the current round, the centre is  $\mathbf{x}_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$  and client proposals are  $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ . Define

$$m{d}_i := rac{m{x}_i - m{x}_0}{\|m{x}_i - m{x}_0\|} \quad (m{x}_i 
eq m{x}_0), \qquad lpha_i(m{
u}) := \min\Bigl(1, rac{
u_i}{\|m{x}_i - m{x}_0\|}\Bigr) \in [0, 1].$$

The one-step clipped aggregate is

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} = \boldsymbol{x}_0 + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) (\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0).$$

Let  $g_{\mathcal{V}}$  be the validation gradient (side information). Assume the  $\nu$ -selection is solved (up to tolerance  $\varepsilon_{\nu}$ ) so that

$$\|g_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{x}_{\nu}\| \le \varepsilon_{\nu}. \tag{2}$$

Let the honest mean be  $\bar{x} := \frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} x_i$  and define the validation bias w.r.t. the honest mean

$$\varepsilon_V := \| \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}} \|. \tag{3}$$

We also define the (average) honest dispersion

$$\bar{\zeta}_h := \frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}\|. \tag{4}$$

Byzantine aggregate. We denote the aggregate Byzantine contribution by

$$\boldsymbol{B} := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_j(\boldsymbol{\nu}) (\boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0), \quad \text{so that} \quad \hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0 = \boldsymbol{B} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) (\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0)}_{=: \boldsymbol{H}}.$$
 (5)

**Theorem 1.1** (Worst-case Byzantine impact bound without coherence). Under the setup above, for arbitrary Byzantine choices  $\{x_j\}_{j\in\mathcal{B}}$  and the one-step  $\nu$  selected to satisfy (2), the Byzantine aggregate obeys the following bounds:

$$\|\boldsymbol{B}\| \le \|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|$$
 (exact triangle bound), (6)

$$\|\boldsymbol{B}\| \le (2-\delta) \|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + (1-\delta) (\frac{\varepsilon_{V} + \bar{\zeta}_{h}}{\varepsilon_{h}})$$
 (side-information bound). (7)

Consequently, for fixed  $(\delta, \bar{\zeta}_h)$ , the Byzantine impact can be made arbitrarily small by driving the controllable quantities  $\|\mathbf{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \mathbf{x}_0\|$ ,  $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{V}}$ , and  $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{V}}$  to zero (via iteration, tighter optimisation, and larger validation).

*Proof.* Starting from the decomposition  $\mathbf{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \mathbf{x}_0 = (\mathbf{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}) + (\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} - \mathbf{x}_0) = \mathbf{e} + (\mathbf{B} + \mathbf{H})$ , where  $\mathbf{e} := \mathbf{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}$ , we have

$$B = g_{\mathcal{V}} - x_0 - e - H. \tag{8}$$

Taking norms and using (2),

$$\|B\| \le \|g_{\mathcal{V}} - x_0\| + \|e\| + \|H\| \le \|g_{\mathcal{V}} - x_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + \|H\|.$$
 (9)

Since  $\alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \in [0,1]$ , we have

$$\|\boldsymbol{H}\| = \left\| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \left( \boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \right) \right\| \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|,$$

which substituted into (9) yields (6).

For (7), observe that

$$rac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|m{x}_i - m{x}_0\| \ \le \ rac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} ig( \|m{x}_i - ar{m{x}}\| + \|ar{m{x}} - m{x}_0\| ig) \ = \ ar{\zeta}_h + \|ar{m{x}} - m{x}_0\|.$$

Moreover,

$$\|ar{x} - x_0\| \le \|ar{x} - g_{\mathcal{V}}\| + \|g_{\mathcal{V}} - x_0\| = \varepsilon_V + \|g_{\mathcal{V}} - x_0\|.$$

Combining the two displays gives

$$rac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|}\sum_{i\in\mathcal{H}}\|oldsymbol{x}_i-oldsymbol{x}_0\|\ \leq\ ar{\zeta}_h+arepsilon_V+\|oldsymbol{g}_\mathcal{V}-oldsymbol{x}_0\|.$$

Multiplying by  $|\mathcal{H}|/n = (1 - \delta)$  and substituting into (9) yields

$$\|\boldsymbol{B}\| \leq \|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + (1 - \delta) \left(\bar{\zeta}_h + \varepsilon_V + \|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|\right) = (2 - \delta) \|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + (1 - \delta) (\varepsilon_V + \bar{\zeta}_h),$$
which is (7).

Interpretation and tunable knobs. The bound (7) is worst-case in that it imposes no constraints whatsoever on the geometry or norms of Byzantine proposals; the adversary may choose directions and magnitudes adversarially knowing  $x_0$ . Yet the Byzantine impact is upper-bounded entirely in terms of:

- Side-information alignment  $||g_{\mathcal{V}} x_0||$ : can be made arbitrarily small by iterating the centred clipping update and recentring at  $\hat{x}_{\nu}$ .
- Optimisation tolerance  $\varepsilon_{\nu}$ : directly controlled by how tightly (2) is solved each round.
- Validation bias  $\varepsilon_V$ : reduced by enlarging or improving the validation set  $\mathcal{V}$ .
- Honest dispersion  $\bar{\zeta}_h$  (intrinsic): a property of the honest cohort; independent of attackers.

Thus, for fixed  $(\delta, \bar{\zeta}_h)$ , increasing validation quality and optimisation accuracy, and recentering iterates toward  $g_{\mathcal{V}}$  jointly drive  $\|g_{\mathcal{V}} - x_0\| \downarrow 0$ ,  $\varepsilon_{\nu} \downarrow 0$ , and  $\varepsilon_{V} \downarrow 0$ , making the Byzantine impact  $\|B\|$  arbitrarily small (up to the honest dispersion envelope).

Variant using supremum dispersion. If one prefers a supremum heterogeneity parameter  $\zeta_h^{\max} := \max_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}\|$  instead of (4), the same proof yields

$$\|\boldsymbol{B}\| \leq (2-\delta)\|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + (1-\delta)(\varepsilon_V + \zeta_h^{\max}).$$

This is looser but may be convenient when only a uniform heterogeneity bound is available.

# Q1. 이 접근으로 "얻어지는 바" (What you get)

### 핵심 한 줄

한 라운드 클리핑 업데이트의 Byzantine 총 기여 벡터  $m{B}$ 에 대해

$$\|\boldsymbol{B}\| \leq (2-\delta)\|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}}-\boldsymbol{x}_0\| + \varepsilon_{\nu} + (1-\delta)(\varepsilon_V + \bar{\zeta}_h)$$

### 를 얻습니다.

- $g_{\mathcal{V}}$ : 검증 셋(Validation set)에서 얻은 **검증 그라디언트**(side information).
- **2**<sub>0</sub>: 이번 라운드의 **센터**(current center).
- $\varepsilon_{
  u}$ : \*\*u-선택(반경 최적화)\*\*을 얼마나 정밀하게 풀었는지의 **최적화 허용오차**(optimisation tolerance).
- $arepsilon_V = \|m{g}_{\mathcal{V}} ar{m{x}}\|$ : 검증 신호 vs. honest 평균의 편차(validation bias).
- $ar{\zeta}_h = rac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|m{x}_i ar{m{x}}\|$ : honest 분산(honest dispersion)의 평균 크기.
- $\delta = |\mathcal{B}|/n$ : Byzantine 비율.

### 이게 의미하는 것

- $\|\boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}}-\boldsymbol{x}_0\|$ ,  $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{V}}$ 는 \*\*우리가 줄일 수 있는 노브(knobs)\*\*입니다.
  - 반복적으로 **리센터링**(recentering): 매 라운드  $m{x}_0 \leftarrow \hat{m{x}}_{m{\nu}}$ 로 옮기면  $\|m{g}_{m{\mathcal{V}}} m{x}_0\| \downarrow 0$ .
  - $\nu$ -최적화를 더 **정밀**하게 풀면  $\varepsilon_{\nu}\downarrow 0$ .
  - 검증 셋 품질/규모를 키우면  $\varepsilon_V \downarrow 0$ .
- 따라서  $\delta$ 와  $ar{\zeta}_h$ 가 주어지면, \*\*공격자 기여 상한  $\|m{B}\|$ \*\*을 **임의로 작게** 만들 수 있습니다.
- 특히, 이 상한은 \*\*공격자의 기하(방향 정렬, 노름 크기)\*\*에 어떤 제약도 두지 않습니다. 공격자가  $x_0$ 을 알고, 방향을 맞추고, 노름을 크게/작게 조작해도 **위 상한은 유효**합니다.
- 요컨대, worst-case에서도 side information + 최적화 정밀도만으로 공격 영향의 상한을 우리가 직접 컨트롤합니다.

## Q2. 이 접근의 "가정"과 그 현실성

아래는 위 상한을 얻는 데 실제로 쓰인 가정들만 명시적으로 정리한 것입니다. (일부는 선택적 대안도 병기)

### (A) 검증 신호 가정 (Side information)

- 가정: 서버가 공격자가 건드릴 수 없는 검증 데이터셋( $\mathcal{V}$ )을 가지고, 그로부터  $g_{\mathcal{V}}$ 를 계산합니다.
- **현실성**: 연합학습/분산학습에서 서버가 중앙 검증셋을 보유하거나, 라운드별 **프라이빗 샘플링/부트스트랩**으로  $g_{\mathcal{V}}$ 를 만드는 건 **일반적**입니다. 공격자가  $g_{\mathcal{V}}$ 를 "안다고" 해도, 본 상한은 유효합니다(비밀성 없이도 성립). 중요한 것은 공격자가 **검증 데이터 자체를 조작할 수 없다**는 점입니다.

### (B) 반경 최적화 정밀도 (Optimisation tolerance)

- 가정:  $\nu$ -선택 문제를 풀어  $\|oldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} \hat{oldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}\| \leq \varepsilon_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}$ 를 달성합니다.
- 현실성: 목표 함수  $\psi_0(m{
  u})=rac{1}{2}\|m{g}_{\mathcal{V}}-\hat{m{x}}_{m{
  u}}\|^2$ 는 연속/구간별 매끄러운(piecewise smooth) 구조이고, 실무적으로 그리디/좌표강하/선형탐색으로 원하는  $arepsilon_{m{
  u}}$ 까지 쉽게 내려갑니다. 즉,  $arepsilon_{m{
  u}}$ 는 엔지니어링 가능한 노브입니다.

### (C) honest 분산의 유한성 (Honest dispersion)

- ullet 가정:  $ar{\zeta}_h=rac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|}\sum_{i\in\mathcal{H}}\|oldsymbol{x}_i-ar{oldsymbol{x}}\|$  (또는  $\zeta_h^{ ext{max}}=\max\|\cdot\|$ )가 유한합니다.
- **현실성**: 표준 데이터 전처리/정규화(예: 스케일링, 그래디언트 클리핑) 하에서는 자연스럽게 성립합니다.  $\bar{\zeta}_h$ 는 **데이터 특성**이므로 우리가 "0으로 만드는" 값은 아니지만, 바운드에서 **선형 항**으로만 등장합니다.

### (D) 공격자 비율 $\delta$ (Attacker fraction)

- 가정:  $|\mathcal{B}| = \delta n$  (혹은 상계  $\delta_{ ext{max}}$ )를 씁니다.
- **현실성**: 실제 시스템에서는  $\delta$ 를 정확히 모를 수 있지만, **상계**만 알아도 위 식에서  $\delta \to \delta_{\max}$ 로 대체해 **보수적 상 한**을 즉시 얻습니다. (바운드 사용에는 충분)

### (E) 불필요한 가정들 (Not assumed)

- 필요 없음: Byzantine 사이의 정렬도/코히어런스(κβ) 가정 불요.
- 필요 없음: Byzantine 노름의 하한/상한(R<sub>B</sub>, M<sub>B</sub>) 가정 불요.
- 필요 없음: 확률적/무작위성 가정 **불요**. ↓
  - → 즉, \*\*적대적 최악(adversarial worst-case)\*\*에서도 성립하는 상한입니다.

## 정리: 제한적인가? 현실적인가?

- 제한적이지 않음: 위 상한은 공격자 기하에 대한 제약을 전혀 요구하지 않기 때문에, 특히  $(|\mathcal{B}|-1)\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}<1$  같은 구조적 가정 없이도 통합니다. 최악의 협공/정렬/노름조작에도 그대로 적용됩니다.
- **현실적**: 필요한 건
  - 1. 서버가 검증 신호( $g_{v}$ )를 만들 수 있고,
  - 2.  $\nu$ -선택을 원하는 정밀도 $(\varepsilon_{\nu})$ 로 풀 수 있으며,
  - 3. honest 분산( $\bar{\zeta}_h$ )을 측정/상계할 수 있다는 것. 이 셋은 현대 분산/연합 세팅에서 **일반적**으로 달성 가능한 운영 가정입니다.
- 컨트롤 가능 노브(Controllable knobs):  $\|m{g}_{\mathcal{V}}-m{x}_0\|$ ,  $arepsilon_{\nu}$ ,  $arepsilon_{V}$ 는 우리가 설계로 줄일 수 있는 항</mark>입니다. 따라서  $\delta$ ,  $ar{\zeta}_h$ 가 고정되어도, **반복**(recentering)·**정밀 최적화·검증 고도화**로  $\|m{B}\|$ 의 상한을 **임의로 작게** 만들 수 있습니다.

# Graveyard

### Setup and Definitions

**Data.** We have n client vectors  $\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n \in \mathbb{R}^d$ , a center (initial point)  $\mathbf{x}_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ , and a validation gradient (side information)  $\mathbf{g}_{\mathcal{V}} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ . Let  $\mathcal{H}$  be the index set of honest clients and  $\mathcal{B}$  that of Byzantine clients;  $\mathcal{H} \cup \mathcal{B} = \{1, \dots, n\}$  and  $\mathcal{H} \cap \mathcal{B} = \emptyset$ .

**Directions and clipping ratios.** For each i with  $x_i \neq x_0$  define the unit direction

$$\boldsymbol{d}_i := \frac{\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|}. \tag{10}$$

Given radii  $\boldsymbol{\nu} = (\nu_1, \dots, \nu_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ , the (client-wise) centered clipping ratio is

$$\alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) := \min\left(1, \frac{\nu_i}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|}\right) \in [0, 1]. \tag{11}$$

One-step aggregate. The clipped aggregate produced in a single step is

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} := \boldsymbol{x}_0 + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \left( \boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \right). \tag{12}$$

Validation fitting objective. We choose  $\nu$  by minimizing the validation mismatch

$$\psi_0(\nu) := \frac{1}{2} \| g_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{x}_{\nu} \|^2. \tag{13}$$

# Step 1. Stationarity in $\nu_j$

Differentiate (13) with respect to  $\nu_i$ . By the chain rule,

$$\frac{\partial \psi_0}{\partial \nu_j} = -\left\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}, \, \frac{\partial \hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}}{\partial \nu_j} \right\rangle. \tag{14}$$

From (12) and (11),

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}}{\partial \nu_j} = \frac{1}{n} \left( \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \right) \frac{\partial \alpha_j}{\partial \nu_j} = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{n} \, \boldsymbol{d}_j, & \text{if } \nu_j < \| \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| & \text{(unsaturated)}, \\ 0, & \text{if } \nu_j \ge \| \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| & \text{(saturated)}. \end{cases}$$

Hence, at any (first-order) stationary point with  $\nu_j < \|\boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|$ ,

$$\left| \left\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}, \ \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \right\rangle = 0. \right|$$
 (15)

### Step 2. Exact Projection Identity

Introduce the error vector

$$e := g_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{x}_{\nu}. \tag{16}$$

Plugging (12) into (16) and taking inner product with  $d_i$ ,

$$\langle \boldsymbol{e}, \ \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle = \left\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_{i}(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right), \ \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \right\rangle$$

$$= \underbrace{\left\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \ \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \right\rangle}_{\text{term (A)}} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_{i}(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \left\| \boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \right\| \left\langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \ \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \right\rangle. \tag{17}$$

By (15), the left-hand side of (17) equals 0 when  $\nu_j$  is unsaturated.

### Step 3. Splitting the Sum and Bounding Honest Cross Terms

Split the sum in (17) over  $\mathcal{H}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ :

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_{i} \| \boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle = \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_{i} \| \boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle}_{S_{\mathcal{H}}(j)} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_{i} \| \boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle}_{S_{\mathcal{B}}(j)}.$$
(18)

Assumptions for honest dispersion. Let  $\bar{x} := \frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{H}} x_k$  denote the honest mean. Assume there exist finite constants

$$\|\boldsymbol{x}_0 - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}\| \le \varepsilon_0,$$
  $\|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}\| \le \zeta_h \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{H},$   $\|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\| \ge R_H > 0 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{H}.$  (19)

These say: the current center  $x_0$  and honest client vectors stay in a bounded neighborhood of the honest mean, and honest displacements are not degenerate.

Bounding a single honest inner product. Write  $x_i - x_0 = (\bar{x} - x_0) + (x_i - \bar{x})$ . Then

$$|\langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle| = \frac{|\langle \boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \ \boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \rangle|}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| \|\boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\|}$$

$$= \frac{|\langle \bar{\boldsymbol{x}} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \ \boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \rangle + \langle \boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}, \ \boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \rangle|}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| \|\boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\|}$$

$$\leq \frac{\|\bar{\boldsymbol{x}} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| \|\boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| + \|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}\| \|\boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\|}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| \|\boldsymbol{x}_{j} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\|} \leq \frac{\varepsilon_{0} + \zeta_{h}}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\|} \leq \frac{\varepsilon_{0} + \zeta_{h}}{R_{H}}.$$
(20)

Bounding the honest sum  $S_{\mathcal{H}}(j)$ . Using  $0 \le \alpha_i \le 1$  and (20),

$$|S_{\mathcal{H}}(j)| \leq \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_i \|\mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{x}_0\| \ |\langle \mathbf{d}_i, \mathbf{d}_j \rangle| \leq \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{x}_0\| \ \frac{\varepsilon_0 + \zeta_h}{R_H}$$

$$\leq \frac{|\mathcal{H}| M_H}{R_H} \frac{\varepsilon_0 + \zeta_h}{R_H} =: \rho_H,$$
(21)

where  $M_H := \max_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|$ .

### Step 4. Bounding Byzantine Cross Terms Except j

Write 
$$S_{\mathcal{B}}(j) = \alpha_j \| \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_j, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{B}, i \neq j} \alpha_i \| \boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle$$
. Since  $\langle \boldsymbol{d}_j, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle = 1$ ,  

$$S_{\mathcal{B}}(j) = \alpha_j \| \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| + S_{\mathcal{B}}^{-j}(j), \qquad S_{\mathcal{B}}^{-j}(j) := \sum_{\substack{i \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} \alpha_i \| \boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle. \tag{22}$$

Incoherence among Byzantine directions. Assume there exists  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} \in [0,1)$  such that

$$|\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle| \le \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}$$
 for all distinct  $i, j \in \mathcal{B}$ . (23)

Let  $M_{\mathcal{B}} := \max_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \| \boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \|$  and define the maximal Byzantine clipping ratio

$$\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max} := \max_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_i. \tag{24}$$

Then from (22) and (23),

$$|S_{\mathcal{B}}^{-j}(j)| \leq \sum_{\substack{i \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} \alpha_i \| \boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| \ |\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle| \leq (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max} M_{\mathcal{B}} \, \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}. \tag{25}$$

## Step 5. Solving Stationarity for $\alpha_i$ and a Fixed-Point Bound

Insert the split (18) into (17), use (21), (22), (25), and recall that  $\langle e, d_j \rangle = 0$  by (15). We obtain

$$0 = \langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0, \ \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle - \frac{1}{n} \left( \alpha_j \| \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| + S_{\mathcal{B}}^{-j}(j) + S_{\mathcal{H}}(j) \right). \tag{26}$$

Rearranging (26) yields the exact identity

$$\alpha_j = \frac{n \langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0, \ \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle - S_{\mathcal{B}}^{-j}(j) - S_{\mathcal{H}}(j)}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|}.$$
 (27)

Taking absolute values and using (21) and (25),

$$|\alpha_j| \leq \frac{n |\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0, \, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|} + \frac{\rho_H}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|} + \frac{(|\mathcal{B}| - 1) M_{\mathcal{B}} \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}}{\|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|} \alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max}.$$
(28)

Let 
$$R_{\mathcal{B}} := \min_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|$$
 and

$$\eta := \max_{j \in \mathcal{B}} |\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0, \ \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|. \tag{29}$$

Then from (28),

$$\max_{j \in \mathcal{B}} |\alpha_{j}| \leq \underbrace{\frac{n \eta + \rho_{H}}{R_{\mathcal{B}}}}_{=: \tau} + \underbrace{\frac{(|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}}{R_{\mathcal{B}}} M_{\mathcal{B}}}_{=: \beta} \alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max}.$$
(30)

Since the left side equals  $\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{max}}$  by definition (24), (30) is a fixed-point inequality:

$$\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{max}} \le \tau + \beta \alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{max}}.$$
 (31)

If the incoherence factor satisfies  $\beta < 1$  (i.e.,  $R_{\mathcal{B}} > (|\mathcal{B}| - 1)M_{\mathcal{B}}\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}$ ), then (31) implies the explicit bound

$$\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max} \le \frac{\tau}{1-\beta} = \frac{n\eta + \rho_H}{R_{\mathcal{B}} - (|\mathcal{B}| - 1)M_{\mathcal{B}}\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}}.$$
 (32)

Interpretation. The quantity  $\eta$  in (29) measures how well the validation direction  $g_{\mathcal{V}}$  suppresses any Byzantine direction  $d_j$  via the inner product;  $\rho_H$  from (21) is the (controlled) leakage from honest cross terms;  $\beta$  captures mutual alignment among Byzantine directions. When  $\eta$  and  $\rho_H$  are small (strong validation hint, tight honest dispersion) and  $\beta < 1$  (no near-collinearity among Byzantine directions), (45) forces every Byzantine clipping ratio to be small.

$$\begin{split} \eta &:= \max_{j \in \mathcal{B}} |\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0, \ \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|. \\ \rho_H &:= |\mathcal{H}| \ M_H \frac{\varepsilon_0 + \zeta_h}{R_H}, \\ M_H &:= \max_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|, \\ \varepsilon_0 &:= \|\boldsymbol{x}_0 - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}\| \\ \zeta_h &:= \max_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \bar{\boldsymbol{x}}\|, \\ \beta &:= \frac{(|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}}{R_{\mathcal{B}}} \ M_{\mathcal{B}}, \\ \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} &:= \max_{i \neq j} |\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|, \\ \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} &:= \min_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|, \\ M_{\mathcal{B}} &:= \max_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|, \\ \end{split}$$

Three values at the bottom are under full control of omniscient Byzantines.

## Step 6. Consequence for the One-Step Aggregate

From (12),

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} = \boldsymbol{x}_0 + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu})(\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_j(\boldsymbol{\nu})(\boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0). \tag{33}$$

Hence the Byzantine contribution is bounded by

$$\left\| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_j(\boldsymbol{\nu})(\boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0) \right\| \leq \frac{|\mathcal{B}|}{n} \alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max} M_{\mathcal{B}} = \delta \alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max} M_{\mathcal{B}},$$
(34)

where  $\delta = |\mathcal{B}|/n$ . Combining (34) with (45) gives a fully explicit upper bound on the Byzantine distortion of the one-step aggregate in terms of observable or design constants  $(\varepsilon_0, \zeta_h, R_H)$ ,  $(M_{\mathcal{B}}, R_{\mathcal{B}}, \kappa_{\mathcal{B}})$ , and the validation alignment  $\eta$ .

## A Byzantine Contribution Bound Without Using $\beta$

This section provides a bound on the actual Byzantine contribution that does not depend on the norm parameters  $R_{\mathcal{B}} = \min_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \| \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \|$  and  $M_{\mathcal{B}} = \max_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \| \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \|$ . The bound is stated directly in terms of: (i) the directional coherence among Byzantine directions, (ii) the validation alignment with Byzantine directions, and (iii) an a priori bound on the honest cross term.

Notation and standing assumptions. Let  $\mathcal{H}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  denote the honest and Byzantine index sets, respectively, with  $|\mathcal{B}| = \delta n$ . At the current round, the center is  $\mathbf{x}_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$  and the client proposals are  $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ . Define unit directions

$$d_i := \frac{x_i - x_0}{\|x_i - x_0\|} \quad (x_i \neq x_0), \qquad \alpha_i(\nu) := \min(1, \frac{\nu_i}{\|x_i - x_0\|}) \in [0, 1].$$
 (35)

The one-step clipped aggregate is  $\hat{x}_{\nu} = x_0 + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i(\nu)(x_i - x_0)$ . As in the main text, we assume the stationarity condition holds for every unsaturated coordinate (i.e.  $\nu_j < ||x_j - x_0||$ ):

$$\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}, \; \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle = 0.$$
 (36)

We will only invoke (36) for indices  $j \in \mathcal{B}$  that are unsaturated. Finally, define:

$$\eta := \max_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \left| \langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0, \ \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle \right|, \qquad \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} := \max_{\substack{i,j \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} \left| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle \right|, \tag{37}$$

and let  $\rho_H$  be any (uniform-in-j) bound on the honest cross term

$$\left| S_{\mathcal{H}}(j) \right| := \left| \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \| \boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \frac{\boldsymbol{d}_j}{\boldsymbol{d}_j} \rangle \right| \leq \rho_H, \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{B}.$$
 (38)

(For example, one may take the explicit  $\rho_H$  from the honest-dispersion bound in the main text.) We now work with the *Byzantine contribution magnitudes* 

$$C_j := \alpha_j(\nu) \|x_j - x_0\|, \qquad C_{\max} := \max_{j \in \mathcal{B}} C_j.$$
 (39)

**Lemma A.1** (Projection identity for a fixed Byzantine index). Fix  $j \in \mathcal{B}$  such that  $\nu_j < ||x_j - x_0||$ . Then, using (36),

$$n \left\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \; \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \right\rangle = \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \alpha_{i} \|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| \left\langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \right\rangle}_{S_{\mathcal{H}}(j)} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_{i} \|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| \left\langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \right\rangle}_{S_{\mathcal{B}}(j)}. \tag{40}$$

Moreover,

$$S_{\mathcal{B}}(j) = C_j + \sum_{\substack{i \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} C_i \langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle.$$
 (41)

*Proof.* From  $\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} = \boldsymbol{x}_0 + \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \alpha_i(\boldsymbol{\nu})(\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0)$  and (36), we get

$$0 = \langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle = \langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_{i} \|\boldsymbol{x}_{i} - \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\| \langle \boldsymbol{d}_{i}, \boldsymbol{d}_{j} \rangle,$$

which rearranges to (40). The decomposition (41) is the definition of  $C_i$  plus separating the i=j term.  $\square$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>If a particular  $j \in \mathcal{B}$  is saturated, then  $\alpha_j = 1$  and the bound below trivially controls its contribution through the  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}$  term; alternatively, one can work with subgradient KKT conditions.

**Theorem A.2** (Byzantine magnitude bound independent of norms). Assume (38) holds and define  $\eta$ ,  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}$  as in (37). Then

$$(1 - (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}) C_{\text{max}} \leq n \eta + \rho_{H}. \tag{42}$$

In particular, if  $(|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} < 1$ , then

$$C_{\text{max}} \leq \frac{n \eta + \rho_H}{1 - (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}}.$$
(43)

*Proof.* Fix  $j \in \mathcal{B}$  unsaturated and start from (40). Taking absolute values and using (37) and (38),

$$C_j \leq n \eta + |S_{\mathcal{H}}(j)| + \sum_{\substack{i \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} C_i |\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle| \leq n \eta + \rho_H + (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} C_{\max}.$$

Now take the maximum over  $j \in \mathcal{B}$  on the left to obtain

$$C_{\text{max}} \leq n \eta + \rho_H + (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} C_{\text{max}},$$

which rearranges to (42) and yields (43) when  $(|\mathcal{B}| - 1)\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} < 1$ .

Corollary A.3 (Aggregate Byzantine contribution). The total Byzantine contribution to the one-step aggregate satisfies

$$\left\| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_j(\boldsymbol{\nu}) \left( \boldsymbol{x}_j - \boldsymbol{x}_0 \right) \right\| \leq \frac{|\mathcal{B}|}{n} C_{\text{max}} = \delta C_{\text{max}} \leq \left[ \frac{\delta}{1 - (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}} \left( n \eta + \rho_H \right) \right]$$
(44)

Remarks. (i) The bounds (43)–(44) do not involve  $R_{\mathcal{B}}$  or  $M_{\mathcal{B}}$ ; hence they are robust even if an attacker knows  $\mathbf{x}_0$  and attempts to manipulate vector norms. (ii) The only structural requirement is  $(|\mathcal{B}|-1)\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}<1$ , i.e. Byzantine directions are not nearly collinear; this condition is typically mild in moderate/high dimension (and can be enforced with tiny dithering). (iii) The numerators  $n\eta + \rho_H$  are algorithmically controllable: validation fitting and iteration can drive  $\eta \downarrow 0$ , and the honest bias/dispersion bound  $\rho_H$  can be reduced by iteration and data curation. Consequently, (44) shows the Byzantine impact can be made arbitrarily small under a mild directional incoherence condition.

# Sufficient Conditions for $\beta < 1$

To make this supplement self-contained and directly pluggable into res.tex, we recall the key quantities and the bound we reference. Let  $\mathcal{H}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  be the honest and Byzantine index sets, respectively. For each client i, let  $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$  and let the iteration center be  $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ . Define directions  $d_i := (x_i - x_0)/||x_i - x_0||$  whenever

$$M_{\mathcal{B}} := \max_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \| oldsymbol{x}_i - oldsymbol{x}_0 \|, \quad R_{\mathcal{B}} := \min_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \| oldsymbol{x}_i - oldsymbol{x}_0 \|, \quad \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} := \max_{\substack{i,j \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} |\langle oldsymbol{d}_i, oldsymbol{d}_j 
angle|.$$

Write  $\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max} := \max_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \alpha_i$  for the maximal Byzantine clipping ratio, and

$$\eta := \max_{j \in \mathcal{B}} |\langle \boldsymbol{g}_{\mathcal{V}} - \boldsymbol{x}_0, \ \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|, \qquad \rho_H := |\mathcal{H}| M_H (\varepsilon_0 + \zeta_h) / R_H,$$

where  $(\varepsilon_0, \zeta_h, R_H, M_H)$  summarize the honest dispersion/bias constants defined in the main text. The fixed-point inequality derived earlier yields the explicit bound

$$\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max} \leq \frac{n \eta + \rho_H}{R_{\mathcal{B}} - (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) M_{\mathcal{B}} \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}} \quad \text{whenever} \quad R_{\mathcal{B}} > (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) M_{\mathcal{B}} \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}.$$
 (45)

We now state clean sufficient conditions ensuring the denominator in (45) is positive, i.e.,  $\beta < 1$  below.

### Sufficient Conditions for $\beta < 1$

Recall (from (45)) that

$$\beta = \frac{(|\mathcal{B}| - 1) M_{\mathcal{B}} \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}}{R_{\mathcal{B}}}, \qquad M_{\mathcal{B}} := \max_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|, \quad R_{\mathcal{B}} := \min_{i \in \mathcal{B}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \boldsymbol{x}_0\|, \quad \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} := \max_{\substack{i,j \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} |\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|.$$

Lemma A.4 (Equivalences). The following are equivalent:

- (i)  $\beta < 1$ ,
- (ii)  $R_{\mathcal{B}} > (|\mathcal{B}| 1) M_{\mathcal{B}} \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}$ ,

(iii) 
$$\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} < \frac{R_{\mathcal{B}}}{(|\mathcal{B}| - 1) M_{\mathcal{B}}},$$

(iv) 
$$|\mathcal{B}| - 1 < \frac{R_{\mathcal{B}}}{M_{\mathcal{B}} \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}}$$
 (when  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} > 0$ ).

Proof. All statements are immediate rearrangements of  $\beta = (|\mathcal{B}| - 1)M_{\mathcal{B}}\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}/R_{\mathcal{B}}$ .

Corollary A.5 (Equal Byzantine magnitudes). If all Byzantine displacements have the same norm  $\|x_i - x_0\| \equiv r_{\mathcal{B}}$  (thus  $R_{\mathcal{B}} = R_{\mathcal{B}} = r_{\mathcal{B}}$ ), then

$$\beta = (|\mathcal{B}| - 1) \kappa_{\mathcal{B}}$$
 and hence  $\beta < 1 \iff \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} < \frac{1}{|\mathcal{B}| - 1}$ .

Corollary A.6 (Bound on attacker count for given geometry). Suppose  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} \leq \bar{\kappa} < 1$  and  $R_{\mathcal{B}} \geq r > 0$ ,  $M_{\mathcal{B}} \leq m < \infty$ . If

$$|\mathcal{B}| \leq 1 + \left\lfloor \frac{r}{m \bar{\kappa}} \right\rfloor,$$

then  $\beta < 1$ . Proof. By Lemma A.4(iv),  $|\mathcal{B}| - 1 < R_{\mathcal{B}}/(M_{\mathcal{B}}\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}) \ge r/(m\bar{\kappa})$ .

Corollary A.7 (Angular separation). Let  $\theta_{min}$  be the minimal pairwise angle between Byzantine directions:

$$\theta_{\min} := \min_{\substack{i,j \in \mathcal{B} \\ i \neq j}} \arccos(|\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|).$$

Then  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} = \max_{i \neq j} |\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle| \leq \cos \theta_{\min}$ , and a sufficient condition for  $\beta < 1$  is

$$\theta_{\min} > \arccos\left(\frac{R_{\mathcal{B}}}{(|\mathcal{B}|-1) M_{\mathcal{B}}}\right).$$

In particular, if Byzantine directions are pairwise orthogonal ( $\theta_{\min} = 90^{\circ}$ , so  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} = 0$ ), then  $\beta = 0$  automatically.

**Corollary A.8** (Norm separation). If Byzantine norms are not too imbalanced, i.e.,  $R_{\mathcal{B}}/M_{\mathcal{B}} \ge \gamma$  for some  $\gamma \in (0,1]$ , and the pairwise coherence satisfies  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} \le c$ , then

$$\beta \leq \frac{|\mathcal{B}| - 1}{\gamma} c.$$

Hence a simple sufficient condition is

$$c < \frac{\gamma}{|\mathcal{B}| - 1}$$
 (equivalently,  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} < \gamma/(|\mathcal{B}| - 1)$ ).

### Practical reading.

- Few attackers or weak alignment. For fixed geometry  $(R_{\mathcal{B}}, M_{\mathcal{B}})$ , either keep  $|\mathcal{B}|$  small or ensure Byzantine directions are poorly aligned  $(\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} \text{ small})$ .
- Equal-norm case is sharp. When  $R_{\mathcal{B}} = M_{\mathcal{B}}$ , the clean threshold is  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} < 1/(|\mathcal{B}| 1)$  (Cor. A.5).
- Angle or coherence budgets. If you can certify a minimum inter-attacker angle  $\theta_{\min}$ , then Cor. A.7 turns it into a direct check.
- Robust to scaling. If attackers cannot make one vector arbitrarily small ( $R_B$  not tiny) while growing the others ( $M_B$  not huge), Cor. A.8 gives an immediate margin.

Example: High-dimensional random directions ("extremely mild" coherence). Let  $m := |\mathcal{B}|$  and suppose the Byzantine directions  $\{d_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{B}}$  are independent and uniformly distributed on the unit sphere  $\mathbb{S}^{d-1}$  (or sufficiently "random-looking" so that spherical concentration applies).

Lemma (Spherical concentration + union bound). For any  $t \in (0,1)$ ,

$$\mathbb{P}\bigg(\max_{i\neq j\in\mathcal{B}}|\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i,\boldsymbol{d}_j\rangle| \geq t\bigg) \leq 2m(m-1)\,\exp\!\left(-\frac{(d-1)\,t^2}{2}\right).$$

Sketch. For fixed  $i \neq j$ ,  $|\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle|$  is sub-Gaussian with tail  $\leq 2 \exp(-(d-1)t^2/2)$ ; take a union bound over m(m-1) pairs.

Dimension threshold for the norm-separation condition. Target the sufficient condition of Cor. A.8 with  $c = t = \gamma/(m-1)$ . Given failure probability  $\delta \in (0,1)$ , it suffices to pick

$$d \ge 1 + \frac{2(m-1)^2}{\gamma^2} \log \left( \frac{2m(m-1)}{\delta} \right)$$
 (46)

so that with probability at least  $1 - \delta$  one has  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}} = \max_{i \neq j} |\langle \boldsymbol{d}_i, \boldsymbol{d}_j \rangle| \leq \gamma/(m-1)$  and hence  $\beta \leq \frac{m-1}{\gamma} \kappa_{\mathcal{B}} < 1$  by Cor. A.8.

#### Numerical illustrations.

• Moderate d, few attackers. Take  $\gamma = 1$  (equal Byzantine norms), m = 5 (four attackers), and  $\delta = 0.01$ . Then (46) gives

$$d \ge 1 + 2 \cdot 4^2 \log(\frac{2 \cdot 5 \cdot 4}{0.01}) = 1 + 32 \log(4000) \approx 267.$$

Thus in dimension  $d \ge 267$ , with probability at least 99% we have  $\kappa_B \le 1/4$  and the condition  $\beta < 1$  holds.

• Larger m, still mild in high d. Let  $\gamma = 1$ , m = 8 and  $\delta = 10^{-6}$ . Then (46) yields

$$d \, \geq \, 1 + 2 \cdot 7^2 \, \log\!\left( \tfrac{2 \cdot 8 \cdot 7}{10^{-6}} \right) \, \approx \, 1 + 98 \cdot 18.53 \, \approx \, 1818.$$

So in  $d \ge 1818$  (well within common model dimensions), with probability at least  $1 - 10^{-6}$  we have  $\kappa_B \le 1/7$  and hence  $\beta < 1$ .

Two-attacker special case (equal norms). When m=2 and  $R_{\mathcal{B}}=M_{\mathcal{B}}$  (equal norms), the condition is simply  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}<1$ , i.e., the two directions are not perfectly collinear. This holds with probability 1 under any continuous-noise model and is thus extremely mild. For a robust quantitative margin, one may enforce  $\kappa_{\mathcal{B}}\leq 1-\xi$  ( $\xi\in(0,1)$ ), which yields the well-conditioned bound  $\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}^{\max}\leq (n\,\eta+\rho_H)/(R_{\mathcal{B}}\,\xi)$  from the fixed-point inequality.