Received: 15 October 2015 | Revised: 28 October 2017 | Accepted: 15 February 2018

DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12407

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

WILEY European Journal of Philosophy

# Does intention involve belief?

Christian Kietzmann

Institut für Philosophie, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

**Correspondence**
Christian Kietzmann, Institut für Philosophie, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bismarckstr. 1, Erlangen 91054, Germany.
Email: christian.kietzmann@fau.de

**Abstract**

Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first-personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between "ordinary" and "first-personal beliefs." In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first-personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

Assume you intend to spend your next summer vacation in Italy. Does that imply you believe that you will go there? As a matter of fact, you may believe it. But if this is the case, does this mean that these two facts—your intending and your believing—are merely contingently related, or is there some necessary connection between the two? In other words: Does intention involve belief?[1]

The literature on the topic divides into two camps. On one side of this divide are the so-called *cognitivists about intention*. They claim that intentions do involve beliefs. On the other side are the so-called *noncognitivists*. They deny that intentions involve belief and claim that intention is a noncognitive attitude sui generis that cannot be reduced to, and need not entail, a belief about what one will do. Both camps motivate their defining claims with a critique of their respective opponent's views. And it seems to me that both positions succeed in articulating an important critical insight about the respective opposing position, which is at the same time an important positive thought that is worth preserving. Or at least they *almost* succeed in doing this. In what follows, I intend to show that cognitivists are right in contending that intention *does* involve a belief about what one will do, whereas noncognitivists are right in thinking

  

that intention does *not* involve *theoretical* belief. Yet both sides of the debate have been unable to articulate their respective insights adequately. Neither cognitivism nor noncognitivism as articulated so far is completely satisfying, and yet it seems these are the only two options available. So we are sent back and forth between the two positions.

I want to suggest that the debate rests on mistaken assumptions about the nature of the kind of belief allegedly involved in intention. Both sides of the debate fail to appreciate that these beliefs are, what I will call, "first-personal" beliefs. Although cognitivists insist that the beliefs involved in intention are somehow special, they fail to get this first-personal character properly into view. And noncognitivists likewise overlook this character and are thus compelled to deny the thesis that intention involves belief. At any rate, this is what I want to argue.

I will proceed in five steps. In Section 2, I will lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. In Section 3, I will discuss and dismiss Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I will introduce the distinction between "ordinary" and "first-personal beliefs." In Section 5, I will argue that intention invariably involves a first-personal belief, namely, that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I will return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal addresses them.

## 2 | THE DEBATE BETWEEN COGNITIVISM AND NONCOGNITIVISM

Cognitivists hold that intention involves belief. They think that having an intention inevitably means also having the belief that one will do what one intends to do. Cognitivism comes in two kinds. According to the position sometimes called "weak cognitivism," intention and belief are separate yet related attitudes, insofar as having the former entails having the latter. A position of this shape was first put forth by H. P. Grice. By contrast, according to "strong cognitivism," intention is *identical with* a belief—such a position has been defended by Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, and Kieran Setiya. This distinction need not concern us, however, for the moment.[2] Let us ask instead what motivates cognitivism quite generally.

There are several considerations that prima facie support a cognitivist position. First, on the face of it, it seems that we are usually aware of both what we are doing intentionally and why we are doing it; given the strong conceptual connection between acting intentionally and intending to act, it is very plausible that something similar holds for intentions. Second, in our practice of attributing actions, not believing that one is doing a certain thing is usually taken as an indication that one is not doing that thing intentionally (Anscombe, 1957, 11f). For instance, if someone asks me, while I am leaning against a wall, why I am ringing the doorbell, and I answer that I was not aware I was ringing it, this is prima facie evidence for the other person that my ringing the bell, while it is clearly something I am doing, is not something I am doing intentionally (Anscombe, 1957, 50f).[3] And this observation seems to apply in general to intentions. Suppose that I will in fact do something even though I am not aware that I will do it, or that I am even convinced beforehand that I will *not* do it. Can one correctly say of me that I intend or plan to do it? This is doubtful (Setiya, 2008, p. 392).[4] To the extent that I do not take it to be settled that I will do something, it seems doubtful that I really intend to do it.[5] So just as we have difficulty attributing an action to someone who does not have agentive awareness, we also have difficulty attributing an intention to someone who lacks a belief about what he will do. A third consideration in favour of cognitivism picks up Anscombe's linguistic observation that the phrase "I intend to spend the summer in Italy, but I will not do it" involves some sort of contradiction (Anscombe, 1957, 91ff).[6] Assuming this observation is correct, it needs to be explained, and cognitivism offers a straightforward account. Finally, notice that the planning of extended actions is only possible when the planning agent assumes that he will in fact do what he intends to do. This is because later stages of an extended action often depend on the success of earlier stages: When I build a house, I can only begin to fit in the windows once I have successfully finished laying the bricks for the walls. I can therefore only make plans for these later stages if I am confident that I will succeed in my plans for the earlier stages.[7]

The cognitivist's case thus primarily rests with intuitive arguments in favour of the claim that there is a necessary link between intentional action and intention, on the one hand, and the agent's awareness of what he is doing or will do, on the other. It is natural to read such a link as a conceptual truth about intentions: You have an intention only if you also have the corresponding belief. According to this reading, the belief that you will do *A* will necessarily be involved in your intention to do *A*. Henceforth, I will call this link "necessary involvement."

The foregoing arguments in favour of necessary involvement are not the only considerations motivating the positions of cognitivists. Some cognitivists assume that the rationality and normativity of belief is relatively perspicuous and well understood, at least when compared with the normativity and rationality of the practical sphere. So they hope for a philosophical payoff in the idea that the latter is somehow reducible to the former. Such a theory would not only be ontologically and theoretically parsimonious but would also be in a position to secure a certain theoretical standing for the norms of practical reason. If intention inevitably involves belief, it seems possible to explain rational requirements on intentions in terms of rational requirements on beliefs, that is, to reveal practical reason as a species or special case of theoretical reason.[8] It is obvious that at least some cognitivist positions on the nature of intention are fuelled by the hope for such a reduction. It bears emphasizing, however, that the hope for a reductive account of practical reason is detachable from the core cognitivist thesis that intention involves belief. One can affirm cognitivism about intention without subscribing to such a reductive programme.[9] The account I am going to propose aims at doing precisely this.

Prominent noncognitivists, including Donald Davidson, Michael Bratman, and Sarah K. Paul, usually raise two sorts of objections to these cognitivist arguments. First, they try to give counterexamples to the proposed link between intention and belief. Second, and more importantly, they argue that belief is the wrong kind of attitude for playing the distinctively practical roles that cognitivists want it to play in connection with intention.

As to the first point, noncognitivists tend to think that the link between intention and belief, while perhaps present in many or even most cases, is not inevitably present, for there are intentions that are not accompanied by a belief and yet which nonetheless successfully result in an action. In particular, the link breaks down in cases where one lacks sufficient confidence in one's abilities. Donald Davidson gives the following example:

> *[I]n writing heavily on this page I may be intending to produce ten legible carbon copies. I do not know, or believe with any confidence, that I am succeeding. But if I am producing ten legible carbon copies, I am certainly doing it intentionally. These examples do not prove that pure intending may not imply belief, for the examples involve acting with an intention. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that the point does not carry over to pure intending. (Davidson, 1980c, p. 92)*[10]

One may object that such skepticism about necessary involvement should be confined to cases where one lacks confidence in one's success but nevertheless gives it a try. However, the doubt can be generalized. This is shown by Michael Bratman's example of an intention that does not even involve the confidence that one will make an attempt when the right time comes, perhaps simply because one will forget to do so:

> *I might intend now to stop at the bookstore on the way home while knowing of my tendency toward absentmindedness—especially once I get on my bike and go into "automatic pilot." If I were to reflect on the matter I would be agnostic about my stopping there, for I know I may well forget. It is not that I believe I will not stop; I just do not believe I will. (Bratman, 1987, p. 37)*

According to Davidson and Bratman, intention does not inevitably involve belief. To be sure, both agree that often enough it does (and *why* it does so often is an important question noncognitivists usually fail to address).[11] Yet they think the examples show that it is not a *conceptual truth* that intention must be accompanied by the belief that one will do what one intends to do. One may object, however, that these counterexamples do not decide the case and one may attempt, as several philosophers have done, to demonstrate that these examples do not undermine the proposed link between intention and belief. Two such philosophers are Michael Thompson and Gilbert Harman. Thompson observes that reports of intentional action and intention exhibit what linguists call "imperfective aspect"

and thus describe processes that are in some broad sense underway. Reports with this feature are not undermined by the fact that a mistake of execution occurs, as long as there is a possibility to mend these mistakes, or make another attempt to finish the process.[12] Harman points out several features that distinguish intention proper from various other states, which enables him to save the intention-belief entailment for intention while leaving it open for the other states (Harman, 1986, pp. 364–366).[13] The mere existence of these proposals, whether or not they turn out to be successful, shows that there is conceptual room for dealing with the alleged counter examples.

But there are other and more systematic worries behind the noncognitivist's doubts about the cognitivist thesis. They all have to do, I think, with the theoretical character of the beliefs in question. Noncognitivists emphasize the *practical* role of intentions, their role in structuring and guiding action. I suggested that *one* motivation behind cognitivism is the idea that the norms of practical reason might be explicable in terms of the norms of theoretical reason. Noncognitivists object that intention and belief, practical and theoretical reason, are too different for this to be possible. This suspicion expresses itself in two kinds of worries that one frequently encounters in the literature.

The first problem concerns the justification of beliefs and intentions. On the face of it, the reasons that give rise to a belief are different in kind from the reasons that give rise to an intention: Beliefs are based on evidence, whereas intentions are based on practical reasons, that is, on normative judgements, desires, preferences, or evaluations. Thus, it seems Donald Davidson is correct to conclude that "reasons for intending to do something are in general quite different from reasons for believing one will do it" (Davidson, 1980c, p. 95). This would suggest that the reasons underlying an intention are generally not the same as those underlying the corresponding belief that one will do what one intends, and vice versa. This suggests in turn not only that intentions cannot be identical with beliefs, but that it is doubtful that they are necessarily connected in the way cognitivists envisage. For nothing seems to guarantee that the right kind of evidence for a belief that one will do *A* is present whenever there is sufficient reason to intend to do *A*.

In fact, things may be even worse. It is widely accepted that beliefs are in need of proper justification. Beliefs aim not only at being true but also at being well justified. The problem for the cognitivist is that it is not clear what would qualify as good justification for the beliefs allegedly involved in intention. Cognitivists usually agree that such beliefs rest neither on perception or testimony nor on inferences from background beliefs.[14] But these seem to be the only sources from which beliefs ordinarily flow. Unless another kind of justification is found for the beliefs involved in intention, they seem, epistemically speaking, to hang in the air. Nothing seems to entitle us to hold these beliefs. It will not help to insist that intentions ultimately rest on reasons, namely, on practical reasons—for ordinary beliefs are not, and should not be, in this way sensitive to practical considerations.[15] We ought not to believe at will. The cognitivist seems to suggest that the cognition involved in intention is an exception to this rule. As H. P. Grice once put it, "the theory represents having an intention as being a case of licensed wishful thinking" (Grice, 1971, p. 262). And it is not at all clear why something that is usually categorically ruled out should be allowed, even demanded, in this special case. We have in fact two difficulties here: First, the cognition allegedly involved in intention lacks the kind of epistemic warrant one would usually expect of a belief; second, the sort of grounding that is apt for intentions is not of the right kind to justify a belief. Let me call this cluster of objections the *justification problem*.

A second worry about the intention-belief entailment concerns the distinction between intentions and predictions. As Anscombe observes, "in some cases one can be as certain as possible that one will do something, and yet intend not to do it. … [A] man could be as certain as possible that he will break down under torture, and yet determined not to break down" (Anscombe, 1957, p. 94). If intention involves the belief that one will do what one intends, then the situation that Anscombe describes would be impossible, or at least seriously irrational, for it would mean that in such a situation, we are entertaining contradictory beliefs. But such cases do seem to be possible, and on the face of it to not be irrational. This suggests that we must either distinguish between the kind of belief involved in intention and the kind of belief that a prediction is or give up the idea that intention involves belief.

A related problem concerns strong cognitivism in particular.[16] It centres on the difference between intended consequences and foreseen side effects. That such a difference exists is prima facie very plausible, and it is arguably an important thread in the fabric of our ethical life.[17] So we should not give up on it too quickly. But it seems that strong cognitivists have a hard time distinguishing between the two and are thus forced to abandon it. Once you

identify an intention to do *A* with a belief that you will do *A*, it is not clear why not just any belief about what you will do ought to count as an intention. An expectation of side effects is such a belief: You are aware that you will bring about such and such an effect. So your expectation of the side effect will count as an intention, too. There is then no longer any relevant difference between what you intend to do and what you expect to bring about as a side effect of what you do. Let me call this second cluster of difficulties the *demarcation problem*.

Noncognitivists have a ready response to these difficulties. They suggest that both problems arise inevitably from the difference between the nature of belief and the nature of intention: Beliefs aim at being true and at being justified by sufficient prior evidence; intentions, by contrast, do not. They draw the conclusion that intention and belief are, logically speaking, too unlike one another for the former to necessarily involve the latter. Thus, according to noncognitivists, intention is a sui generis attitude not necessarily involving belief.[18] Although intentions are often enough joined by the belief that one will do what one intends to do, noncognitivists insist that it is not the concept of intention as such that accounts for this fact. By their lights, intentions are distinctively practical commitments that guide our actions and structure our reasoning in characteristic ways. They are neither identical with beliefs, nor do they entail them.[19]

Noncognitivism avoids the problems of cognitivism by abandoning the idea that intention involves belief, thereby emphasizing the distinctively and irreducibly practical character of intention. But it pays a high price for this undeniable advantage. Noncognitivists allow that intention is often, or perhaps even in most cases, joined by a belief about what one will do. However, they must take this to be something of a coincidence, at least conceptually speaking. The concept of an intention does not demand it, they think, and whatever accounts for it must therefore be accidentally related to the intention considered by itself.[20] Noncognitivists apparently see no problem in imagining intentional agents who are zombies—aware neither of what they are doing nor of whether they will do what they intend to do. If intentional agents are in fact also characterized by the kind of agential self-awareness that, as everybody agrees, is at least sometimes involved in intentional agency, this will be a further and merely contingent property of such agents.[21] Cognitivists will feel that this is absurd, and to my mind, they are right. The considerations in favour of cognitivism that I have rehearsed above do seem to point in the direction of a conceptual truth.[22]

The challenge facing cognitivism is thus to make sense of what I have called "necessary involvement" without falling prey to the problems noncognitivists point out. And on reflection, it seems clear what the root of the problem is: The noncognitivist objections rest on the assumption that the beliefs allegedly involved in intention are ordinary theoretical beliefs. So it is no surprise that cognitivists have responded by devising theories in which the beliefs involved in intention are somehow special.

## 3 | VELLEMAN'S RESPONSE

There are several respects in which the beliefs allegedly involved in intention have been thought to be special. They include at least the following three:

a. These beliefs are *epistemically* special because they are formed in response to practical reasons and not in response to evidence;
b. they are *causally* special because they make their content true instead of being caused by what they represent;
c. their *content* is special because it is self-referential.

There are different versions of these claims, and several authors combine two or more of them. In this section, I will concentrate on Velleman's theory, a version of *strong cognitivism* according to which intentions *are* beliefs, for two reasons: First, his account is perhaps the most sophisticated and also the most influential cognitivist attempt to develop this line of argument; second, his theory combines all three claims I have just distinguished.[23] I will lay out his theory as a response to the justification and demarcation problems and afterwards discuss some of the difficulties it generates.

In response to the *justification problem*, Velleman suggests that intentions are a special kind of belief. Like ordinary beliefs, intentions represent how things are, as opposed to how things are to be arranged—they have a *cognitive direction of fit*. And like ordinary beliefs, intentions aim at representing their content as true only if it is true—they have the *constitutive aim of truth*. But unlike ordinary beliefs, intentions fulfil this aim by reliably causing what they represent as true, as opposed to reliably being caused by what they represent—they have a *practical direction of guidance* (Velleman, 2000b, pp. 24–26).[24] According to Velleman, intentions are "self-fulfilling expectations that are motivated by a desire for their fulfillment and that represent themselves as such" (Velleman, 1989, p. 109). They are, he thinks, beliefs about what one will do in light of one's desires. These beliefs are formed in response to one's desires and, in the context of a general tendency towards self-knowledge, are self-fulfilling: They interact with one's desires and the general tendency in such a way that they reliably cause what they represent. Moreover, these beliefs represent their own workings. Velleman thinks that, given a context of appropriate desires and a tendency towards self-knowledge, one can reasonably take such beliefs to be adequately warranted: I am justified in forming and holding beliefs of this kind because I can rely on the fact that my tendency towards self-knowledge, together with my desires, will make it true post hoc (Velleman, 1989, 1996; Velleman, 2000b).

In response to the *demarcation problem*, Velleman suggests that predictions differ from intentions in their direction of guidance. This must mean that predictions are caused by what they represent, whereas intentions make their content true. To be sure, the picture is somewhat more complicated, because facts that are predicted do not yet obtain, and therefore cannot cause anything. But perhaps we can say instead that predictions are made true by certain present tendencies that already point in the direction of what will likely happen in the future, whereas intentions make true what they represent.[25]

We will see that both of Velleman's responses run into difficulties.[26] First, concerning Velleman's solution to the justification problem, Rae Langton has raised an important objection. She draws attention to the fact that, by Velleman's own lights, intention and faith appear indistinguishable, even though intuitively both are clearly different things. Furthermore, she argues that by assimilating intention with faith, Velleman's account of intention inherits all the problems that make faith epistemically dubious (Langton, 2004).[27] So it is not clear whether the epistemic warrant Velleman offers is really suitable for the task. Moreover, his solution to the demarcation problem is open to criticism. As Bratman has pointed out, once a tendency towards self-knowledge of the kind Velleman describes is in place, we should expect it to interact not only with desire-based beliefs but also with ordinary predictions, for example, the evidence-based expectation that I will fail in my repeated attempt to give up smoking. If this is right, not only does it make mere expectations appear too much like intentions (Bratman, 1991, 261f); it also undermines Velleman's response to the demarcation problem, because there is not much of a difference between intentions and predictions with respect to their direction of guidance.

It is thus doubtful whether Velleman's way of spelling out the special nature of beliefs involved in intention really helps us in addressing the problems noncognitivists point out. To prepare the way for my own alternative proposal, I will now try to show that Velleman overlooks the most important distinguishing features of such beliefs. To this end, consider the following passage in which he points out the properties that he believes distinguish intention-beliefs from ordinary beliefs:

> *[T]he belief with which I have identified intention is not an ordinary belief. It is an extraordinary belief, because it is consciously self-fulfilling, and one of the extraordinary features of such a belief is precisely that the reasons for it are more like reasons for intending than reasons for believing. (Velleman, 1989, 123f)*[28]

Velleman highlights here two features of intention-beliefs that to his mind make them special. First, he says, these beliefs are "consciously self-fulfilling." He construes this as a matter of the belief's *content*, which is thought to contain the self-referential clause that one *will do A in virtue of this very belief*. Annette Baier has pointed out a crucial flaw in this conception of efficacy in virtue of self-referring content. With respect to Gilbert Harman's original version of the idea, she writes,

> *He is wrong … in making the self referential efficacy something intended by an individual agent. One can intend only what is in one's power, and the essence of intention is not within the jurisdiction of any one intender. If recognized efficacy is a formal unvarying feature of any intention then it should appear in a specific intention as the form or structure to which that intention gives an individual content, not as an extra self referential clause, adding to that content. One is not in a position to intend intentions to be what they are regardless of one's intentions. To include, in the content of an individual intention, the intention that this one be effective would be to imply that other intentions are intended as ineffective, which is absurd. (Baier, 1977, p. 401)*

The self-referential efficacy of intention is part of its form, not of its content. It is part of what it is to be an intention and not part of what one can intend. Why, then, does Velleman assume that self-referential efficacy is part of its content? Evidently, an important motivation is his (correct) observation that conscious self-fulfilingness is not among the formal properties of ordinary beliefs. He therefore assumes the belief's self-referential efficacy must be located among the variable properties of belief, and the most likely place will be the belief's content. So Velleman's mistake apparently arises from his implicit assumption that all beliefs behave like ordinary beliefs with respect to their *form* and vary only in their *content*.

Second, Velleman claims (in the quotation above) that reasons for intention-belief "are more like reasons for intending than reasons for believing." But notice that these reasons are still thought to warrant believing something, albeit in an unusual way that rests on the reliability of a certain psychic mechanism—involving the belief in question and a context of appropriate desires as well as a tendency for self-knowledge—to causally make true the belief's content. The crucial point is that this mechanism is thought by Velleman to serve as a *substitute* for the usual kinds of epistemic warrant (i.e., perception, testimony, and inference). This shows that for him, the beliefs in question do stand in need of *some kind* of epistemic justification.

I think that these two observations point in the direction of a different proposal for how and why the beliefs involved in intention are extraordinary. They differ from ordinary beliefs with regard to their form, without thereby ceasing to be beliefs, and they are constituted in such a way that they are not in need of epistemic warrant. In the next section, I will try to show how beliefs can be extraordinary in these ways.

## 4 | FIRST-PERSONAL BELIEFS

How is the kind of belief in question—for instance, my belief that I will spend my next summer vacation in Italy—relevantly different from ordinary belief? As we have just seen, Velleman's answer to this question is unsatisfactory. In what follows, I will propose a different answer. According to my proposal, intentions involve beliefs that are special in being *immediately first-personal*. A belief is *first-personal* when it essentially, that is, ineliminably, employs the first-person pronoun: The same content cannot be expressed without using "I" or a reflexive pronoun like "oneself." It is *immediately* first-personal when it is acquired in a special way, which I will describe in more detail in the next section. My diagnosis of the dispute between noncognitivists such as Bratman, Davidson, and Paul and cognitivists such as Velleman, Harman, and Setiya is that neither camp appreciates this fact with all its consequences. Because much will hang on the first-personal character of these beliefs, let us begin by asking, quite generally, what sets first-person beliefs apart from other beliefs.[29]

I will start by pointing out three features that I think make first-person beliefs so special that they deserve to be distinguished from ordinary beliefs:

1. It has been frequently observed that certain beliefs employing "I" are immune to the kind of error that results when there is a failure in reference through misidentification.[30] When I have a belief of this kind about myself, I cannot be wrong about the fact that it is me about whom I believe whatever I believe. (Of course this does not imply that my belief cannot be wrong in other ways, for instance, in that the predicate in question really applies

to me.) Where does this immunity come from? Wherever identification occurs, that is, wherever a belief rests in part on an act of recognition involving an identity judgement, misidentification is possible, for it is always possible that one gets the identity judgement wrong. So it is reasonable to think that the immunity to error through misidentification has its source in the fact that there is no identification involved in those uses of "I" to which this feature applies. If reference is not secured here through identification, misidentification is not possible. The beliefs I call "first-personal" have this feature. By contrast, the beliefs I call "ordinary" employ referring terms the use of which involves identity statements and thus is liable to failure by picking out the wrong object.

2. A key insight of philosophers such as Gareth Evans is that semantics and epistemology are tied to one another: Ways of referring and ways of acquiring beliefs come on the scene together.[31] For instance, there is a mutual interdependence of demonstratives and perception. Immediate perceptual beliefs—that is, perceptual beliefs whose acquisition does not rest in part on an identity judgement—essentially employ demonstratives, and there would be no demonstratives if there were no perceptual ways of acquiring beliefs about one's environment. (This of course does not rule out that demonstratives are employed in beliefs that are acquired in some way other than by perception, but it does mean that in these cases the demonstrative beliefs are mediated in the sense that some identity assumption connecting a description, say, with *this* or *that*, is involved in acquiring them. Something similar holds for perceptual beliefs employing names.) We can put this point by saying that demonstrative beliefs are immediately acquired through perception. Now, it has often been observed that "I" is paradigmatically employed in self-awareness, for instance, in beliefs about what one is thinking, believing, or doing.[32] And arguably, such beliefs have a peculiar epistemological status, for self-awareness seems not to rest on ordinary means of justification such as inference, perception, or testimony. Sebastian Rödl suggests that "I know in a first person way that an object is F by being that object, i.e. by being F" (Rödl, 2007, p. 17). What he means is this: When I hold a belief or have an intention, I am immediately aware of that belief or intention simply in virtue of having it, and "I" marks this peculiar nonevidential way of acquiring my awareness of my belief or intention. (Again, this does not mean that first-personal beliefs cannot be acquired in some other way. This is obviously possible, for instance, when someone tells me, or I see in a mirror, that I have a blot on my shirt. But first-personal beliefs that are acquired in this way rest in part on an identity judgement. By contrast, first-personal beliefs in the primary sense are *immediately* acquired simply through being the subject of the facts these beliefs are about, and this distinguishes them from all other beliefs.) Of course, it is by no means obvious that one can acquire beliefs about certain facts in this way. I will return to this claim, and explain it further, in the next section.
3. Several philosophers have remarked on the close link between first-personal beliefs and action and reasoning. John Perry tells the following story to make the point:

> *I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And I was right. But I did not believe that I was making a mess. That seems to be something I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following the trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in behavior. (Perry, 1979, p. 3)*

I think the lesson we can draw from Perry's story is that facts become relevant for us as agents *only* when we understand what they have to do with us. I think this goes together with another observation frequently made, that is, that our practical reasoning is conducted from the first-person standpoint. In genuine practical deliberation, I address the question of what *I* am to do, and I do this with a view to action.[33] Facts therefore need to be related

to the standpoint of the first person in order to get a grip on practical thinking. Something similar to what has been said about dying—that everyone has to die for himself—is true of acting and the reasoning leading up to it as well: Ultimately, no one can stand proxy for someone else in these activities.[34] Practical reasoning and acting are done from the first-person standpoint, and first-person beliefs are *immediately* relevant to this standpoint. Other, ordinary beliefs can be made relevant only by means of a further step of identification. It seems reasonable to expect that something like this point generalizes to other forms of reasoning.

First-person beliefs are special; they are different from ordinary theoretical beliefs in at least the three respects introduced above. I conjecture that what lies at the root of these differences is point (2): Ordinary beliefs are acquired immediately through some epistemic activity that relates the believer to the states of affairs the belief is about, an activity such as perception, inference, or testimony, whereas first-personal beliefs are immediately acquired *by being in the state the beliefs are about*, as I will put it. Although ordinary beliefs may employ the first-person pronoun, they do so only in an indirect way, by way of an inference involving an identity judgement. By contrast, first-personal beliefs are directly or immediately first-personal. I think this nexus of ways of reference and ways of belief-acquisition ultimately accounts for the two other differences I mentioned. First, as we will see in the next section, one can acquire first-personal beliefs about some states by being in these states because the person holding these beliefs is in those states in virtue of *adopting* them for a reason. This accounts for the special link between first-personal beliefs and reasoning and action: Only I myself as a reasoning person can adopt a belief or intention on account of my deliberation, and in order to influence such deliberation, all information must be integrated into my first-person standpoint as a reasoner. Second, on that account, deliberation lies at the root of two things at the same time: On the one hand, it accounts for being in a state like belief or intention, and on the other hand, it accounts for the person holding a belief about the adopted states. The referent of the latter belief is therefore necessarily identical with the person who is in the state the belief is about. The question whether the person who is in the state is the same as the person who has the belief about the state cannot arise for the believer. Therefore, reference here does not rest on an identity judgement and therefore cannot fail through misidentification.

But why call such first-personal attitudes *belief*, as opposed to some other, sui generis attitude? Because they share certain essential features with ordinary beliefs. Recall how Velleman characterized beliefs, namely, as attitudes that represent their content as true, and therein aim at representing these contents as true only if they are in fact true. In short, according to Velleman, beliefs combine a cognitive direction of fit with the constitutive aim of truth. Now, by that criterion, what I called first-person beliefs *are* genuine beliefs. A first-person belief represents the concept that it predicates of a person as really applying to her, and it therein aims to capture a fact about this person.

These considerations suggest that first-personal belief is a genuine form of belief, yet which differs from ordinary belief in deep and interesting ways. They also suggest that this contrast has its roots in the way we acquire the states that are thematized in genuine first-personal beliefs. Now, what matters for our purposes is that this might offer a way to articulate and defend a sophisticated version of cognitivism about intention. If we can show that intention invariably involves a first-personal belief, we might be able to hold onto a version of cognitivism while fending off the objections that led noncognitivists to deny necessary involvement. In the next section I will give an argument for such a sophisticated version of cognitivism.

## 5 | TRANSPARENCY AND MENTAL AGENCY IN BELIEF AND INTENTION

My intention-based belief that I will do *A* is, on the face of it, a first-personal belief: It is a belief about myself. When I have it—and remember it is beyond dispute that people have such beliefs at least some of the time—it essentially employs the pronoun "I." Absent further information, my intention could not lead me to expect anyone else but *me* to do what I intend to do. What is more, my belief is apparently unmediatedly first-personal. I do not believe that I will do *A* because I believe that N. N. will do *A* and that I am N. N.; rather, I believe it directly. In other words, my intention-based belief that I will do *A* is a genuine first-personal belief that I have by way of self-awareness.

I suggested above that a person acquires self-aware beliefs by being in the state that the beliefs are about. This may seem to be an odd way of acquiring beliefs, to say the least. So how exactly does this way of acquiring beliefs work? My answer is based on the conviction, shared by many philosophers, that we do not just stumble or get pushed into states such as intention or belief but actively take them up and hold onto them in the light of reasons.[35] The thought that this insight ultimately accounts for our awareness of these states has been explored most fully in the case of self-awareness about beliefs, which I will take as my starting point.

There is a familiar and attractive story of how I have beliefs about my beliefs that starts from the observation that one can answer the question whether one believes that *p* by attending to whatever resolves the question whether *p*.[36] In a passage that has inspired many philosophers in recent years, Gareth Evans writes,

> *In making a self-ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world. If someone asks me "Do you think there is going to be a third world war?," I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question "Will there be a third world war?" I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p. (Evans, 1982, p. 225)*

When the question concerning what I believe about a certain topic comes up, the default way *for me* to answer it is not to ascertain further facts about myself but to look outward at the facts pertaining to the topic in question. This can seem puzzling, like a change of topic, for how can considerations about world politics, say, have a bearing on a question about me? However, it is not puzzling once we notice that whether or not we believe something is up to us, and the outward facts I attend to provide the epistemic reasons that determine what to think here. Insofar as I am a rational person, I will base my views on just these considerations and will take up a belief that conforms to them. I will then have that belief only *because* I have settled the question whether *p* for myself, in light of the reasons available to me. And because in this way I am, as it were, the author of my belief, I have thereby also settled the question whether *I believe that p*.

But why do I acquire *a view* on what I believe by being the author of that belief?[37] Could I not, for instance, fail to raise the question whether I believe that *p*, in which case I would settle on a belief without acquiring a view on it? I am arguing that our self-awareness of our beliefs is a kind of maker's awareness. Consider a craftsperson and her relation to something she is producing. Exercising her craft, she models the piece according to her conception of what it should be like. She thereby makes it the case that the piece acquires certain properties. But because the piece's relevant properties flow from the craftsperson's *conception* of them, the craftsperson cannot fail to be aware that the piece does have these properties—at least if she exercises her craft successfully. Indeed, it seems to hold quite generally that a maker cannot fail to be aware of the properties of a product that are due to her productive activity. And as I have argued, we are the "makers," as it were, of our beliefs. Now, there are of course important differences between a craftsperson's relation to her product and a rational agent's relation to her beliefs. For instance, beliefs are not made out of independently existing material. This is important because it removes the source for the possibility of failure which belongs to exercising a craft. It therefore cannot happen that your adoption of a belief results in your having a belief that is different from the one you meant to adopt. More important still, rational attitudes are arguably not products separable from the activity of exercising discretion, but rather this very activity itself.[38] These important differences do not, however, touch upon the crucial point, that is, that exercising discretion over certain properties entails an awareness of the very properties that are due to this exercise. One might object that the possibility of unconscious beliefs or intentions undermines the link I am proposing. But that would be wrong, for such unconscious states are pathological cases—otherwise, there would be no need to deal with them, say, in psychoanalysis—which are precisely *not* sensitive to reasons and therefore *not* the result of the active question settling I am talking about.

The fact that I can resolve the question whether I believe that *p* by attending to considerations bearing on the question whether *p* turns out to be a consequence of the fact that belief is a state that is not forced upon me, but one that I adopt and hold for a reason. Thus the "transparency" that Evans notes, between the one question and

the other, results from the active nature of the attitude of believing, that is, from its being an expression of the rational activity of determining oneself according to reasons.[39] Pathological cases aside, I have a belief because I have made up my mind about the belief's subject matter in this way. My commitment to believing that *p* is in place to the extent that I am committed in the light of some reason I take to speak in favour of believing precisely this. Whether or not I am so committed depends, then, on how I resolve the question whether *p*, because my reasons for and against believing that *p* come into view when I raise that question. And once I have resolved the question and am committed, I cannot fail to have a belief about how I am committed.

This establishes a close link between settling the question what I believe concerning *p* and settling the question what is the case concerning *p*.[40] And it suggests that quite generally, I can acquire a belief about a state by being in that state wherever I am the author of the state I am in. Now, a link of the kind I have described seems to hold not only for beliefs, but quite generally for all attitudes that are "judgement sensitive," that is, for attitudes that are sensitive to judgements about reasons.[41] And intention seems to be one of these rational attitudes: The question whether I intend to do *A* at *t* is settled by addressing the question whether to do *A* at *t*. So the question about my intention will be settled by my attending to the practical reasons for and against doing *A* at *t*.[42] Intention may be considered a rational attitude because intention is a commitment I take up in the light of reasons, that is, in light of addressing the question concerning what to do. Intention, like belief, but unlike, say, a headache, flows from my rational self-determining activity. My activity of settling the question what to do thus achieves two things at once: It settles the question concerning what I intend to do, in the sense of making it the case that I do intend to do the thing in question; and *at the same time* it settles the question for me, in the sense of making me aware that I have that intention.

This gives us a self-aware belief about what I am committed to doing, that is, a belief about my intention. However, what interests us is a belief about what I will in fact do. How do I get from the former to the latter? That there is really no gap between the two is a consequence of the nature of intention: Intentions are present states that reach out into the future. They purport to settle what the person with the intention will do at a later point in time. Therefore, if I believe that someone has an intention to do something, I *thereby* also believe that he will do it—if he is able to do it and nothing prevents him from doing it. This applies to everybody with an intention, including myself. Now notice that whereas with other people's intentions, one can have a belief about their commitment while one is in doubt about their abilities or actually thinks some factor will intervene, this is impossible with one's own intentions. For one's intention crucially depends on two beliefs that enter into one's practical deliberation: first, on the belief that one can do what one intends to do (to the extent that one thinks one is unable to do it, one will not be able to intend to do it); and second, on the belief that, as far as one can see, nothing will interfere (where one foresees serious obstacles, one must renounce one's commitment). So to the extent that I take myself to be committed, I will also be confident of my success and therefore be confident that I will in fact do what I am committed to doing. My belief that I intend to do *A*, that is, that I am committed to doing *A*, cannot leave open for me the question whether or not I will in fact do *A*. If I really take myself to be committed, I will ipso facto take it to be settled that what I am committed to will happen.

We should therefore expect that my intending to do *A* in the light of a reason involves a belief that I will in fact do *A*. This is so because of three facts: First, intention is a judgement-sensitive attitude that one has in virtue of adopting it for a reason; second, adopting an intention for a reason settles for oneself the question what one intends to do; and third, where the question what one intends to do is settled for oneself, one takes the question what one will do to be settled as well—in other words, one has a belief about what one will do. This is an immediately first-personal belief, because one has it in virtue of holding an intention.

## 6 | A RESPONSE TO THE NONCOGNITIVIST OBJECTIONS

I argued in the preceding section that a first-personal belief about what one will do is necessarily involved in intention. If that argument is correct, the key thesis of cognitivism is vindicated. But it is vindicated in a version that differs from the way cognitivists usually construe it, for although some of them recognize that the belief in question is first-

personal, they fail to fully appreciate the consequences of that fact.[43] So my version of necessary involvement is subtly different from theirs: It assumes that neither an *ordinary* belief nor an *extraordinary* belief of the kind cognitivists describe is necessarily involved in intention. According to my version of cognitivism, intention necessarily involves *first-personal* belief. I would like to end by reconsidering the two systematic noncognitivist objections against necessary involvement in light of what I have argued.

What about the justification problem, that is, the lack of an adequate epistemic grounding for the beliefs involved in intention? I have argued that there is a genuine way of acquiring a belief about a state through being in that state. Here, no justification is needed for that belief, if by justification one means the usual kinds of evidence. This is because the need for evidence is tied to the other ways of acquiring a belief—perception, inference, and testimony—that go together with the immediate use of characteristic kinds of referring expressions, including demonstratives and names. The absence of evidence for first-personal belief will appear strange only if one does not appreciate the difference between first-personal belief and ordinary belief. Consider what use evidence may have for me when I am already committed to an intention because I have settled the question what to do. Do I need evidence in order to single out the person who has the intention? No, because it is clear from the start that the person in question is me, for only I can exercise discretion over my own intentions. Do I need evidence in order to determine whether or not I intend? No, because that is something I need not find out afterwards, for whether or not I intend is entirely up to me. Finally, do I need evidence in order to find out what I intend to do? No, because what I intend to do is also settled by me. Of course, I may need evidence to determine whether or not I am able to do what I decide to do and whether something will prevent me from following through. But my outlook on these questions, based on the relevant evidence, is already invested in my practical deliberation about what to do, and once I have concluded my deliberation, no further question about abilities or obstacles arises. So apparently, there is no reasonable question that could be settled with evidence.

And what about the demarcation problem, that is, the lack of an adequate criterion for distinguishing between mere predictions and the expectation of side effects, on the one hand, and the beliefs involved in intention on the other? I can acquire beliefs about what intuitively are the same facts in different ways. I can, for instance, acquire a belief that the sea is nearby through perception (I hear or smell it) or through testimony (someone tells me). Similarly, I can acquire a belief that I will go to the beach tomorrow morning through inference (I derive it from my general knowledge that I go to the beach every morning) or through having an intention to that effect (I adopt that intention for some reason). But there is an important difference between the two cases. Whereas there is only one belief about the sea, acquired in two different ways, there are two different beliefs, exemplifying different kinds of belief, about my going to the beach. Only the latter of these two beliefs is a genuine immediate first-personal belief, whereas the former is a theoretical prediction based on evidence and inference involving identification. I suggest that the difference between intention-beliefs and mere predictions or expectations of unintended side effects lies in these different ways of acquiring a belief, and the correlated immediate and mediated ways in which these beliefs employ the first-person pronoun. This is what makes them two different kinds of belief.[44]

## ENDNOTES

[1] For the purpose of this discussion, I will focus on intentions for the future as the centrally important case. See, for example, Bratman (1987, p. 3ff) for a classical statement of that strategy.

[2] For the distinction between weak and strong cognitivism, compare Paul (2009a).

[3] It is often thought that the dependence in question is merely formal and that, as Anscombe puts it, without the agent's awareness "what happens would not come under the description—execution of intentions" (Anscombe, 1957, p. 88). An example originally given by J. David Velleman shows otherwise (see Velleman, 1989, pp. 15ff). He imagines a man walking down Fifth Avenue, stopping in the middle upon realizing he is not aware of what he is up to. The progress of the man's action is interrupted once he is no longer aware of what he is doing and why he is doing it. This seems to show that the existence of the movement itself and not merely its status as an intentional action of such and such a type depends on the man's awareness of what he is doing. In other words, there is not only a formal but also an existential dependence of the action on the agent's awareness.

[4] "Just as one cannot intend to do what one is sure one will not do, so one cannot be doing φ intentionally with the unqualified conviction that one is doing no such thing" (Setiya, 2008, p. 392).

[5] Setiya (2007b, p. 34) interprets Anscombe's observation that the verbal expression of an intention to do A is "I am going to do A" (Anscombe, 1957, p. 1) as saying that expressions of intention are *always also* expressions of belief.

[6] Compare Grice (1971, pp. 264f).

[7] Michael Bratman has frequently emphasized the importance of planning structures for understanding intention. See, for example, Bratman (1987).

[8] See, for example, Velleman (1989), Setiya (2007a), and Wallace (2006). Although Harman (1976) distinguishes practical from theoretical reasoning, he nonetheless sees a close connection between them.

[9] This is shown by G. E. M. Anscombe's position. Consider her scathing remarks about attempts to assimilate the logic of practical reasoning to that of theoretical thought (Anscombe, 1957, p. 58).

[10] Compare Bratman (1987, pp. 37f): "[T]here seem to be cases in which there is intention in the face of agnosticism about whether one will succeed when one tries. Perhaps I intend to carry out a rescue operation, one that requires a series of difficult steps. I am confident that at each stage I will try my best. But if I were to reflect on the matter, I would have my doubts about success. I do not have other plans or beliefs which are inconsistent with such success; I do not actually believe I will fail. But neither do I believe I will succeed."

[11] See Davidson (1980b, p. 50), Bratman (2009, p. 48), and also Paul (2009a, pp. 556f).

[12] See, for example, Thompson (2011).

[13] Velleman (1989, pp. 114–121) adopts these points and elaborates them further. Harman mentions a third distinction, which I will not discuss here.

[14] See Setiya (2008, section II), Velleman (1989, p. 22), and Grice (1971, p. 266).

[15] A classic discussion of this point can be found in Williams (1973).

[16] The objection is considered by Harman (1976, section III). Bratman (1991) uses it against Velleman (1989).

[17] Some consequentialists may not agree. For evidence to the contrary, compare Anscombe (1958) and the vast body of literature on "double effect."

[18] In my characterization of the noncognitivist account of intention, I have mainly Bratman (1987) in mind. Davidson (1980c) is a precursor of Bratman's theory, and Paul (2009b) seems to accept it for the most part.

[19] There is of course some disagreement among noncognitivists about how exactly to understand intentions. For Davidson (1980c), intentions are identical with all-out (as opposed to prima facie) judgements that a certain course of action is desirable. For Bratman (1987), intentions are planning states which play a characteristic role in the coordination of action over time and in practical reasoning. Sarah Paul similarly thinks "of intentions generally in terms of the functional role they play as settled objectives that shape further practical thinking, initiate and sustain action, and at least usually engage certain norms of practical rationality" (Paul, 2009b, p. 12).

[20] Paul (2009b) suggests that our awareness of our actions is the conclusion of an inference from our awareness of our intentions, together with an awareness that certain conditions are satisfied. But, as Setiya (2008, pp. 394f) observes, and Paul (2009b, p. 5) acknowledges, one can fail to draw an inference, wherefore intentions do not inevitably involve belief. It even seems possible that there are creatures who have a will and thus are able to form and realize intentions without possessing the inferential capacities needed to arrive at the corresponding beliefs.

[21] A reviewer for this journal drew my attention to a middle-ground position, according to which it is a requirement of rationality on intention that one also believe that one will do what one intends. Insofar as one is rational, one will have beliefs corresponding to one's intentions. But not everybody who intends will have such corresponding beliefs, since irrationality is possible and rationality requirements can be flouted. Such a position introduces a tight connection between intention and belief while avoiding the entailment claim. However, I think this is not enough to save the important intuition that supports cognitivism. Someone who is self-blind is not merely being irrational. Something deeper is wrong with her, for according to the intuition, self-blind persons and processes are arational, not irrational.

[22] Setiya expresses something like this thought when he says that "the will is a capacity for practical knowledge" (2009, p. 131).

[23] Setiya's position is importantly different from Velleman's. He rejects two key tenets of Velleman's: (1) he identifies intentions not with beliefs, but with the *sui generis* attitude of "desire-like belief" (Setiya, 2007b, pp. 39–48 and 107–114); and (2) he does not accept Velleman's construal of the aim of self-knowledge as a tendency that interacts with beliefs and desires in such a way that we normally do what seems intelligible to us (Setiya, 2007b, p. 109).

[24] Compare Velleman (1989, p. 26), and, on beliefs in general, Velleman (2000c).

[25] Compare Langton (2004, p. 252) who suggests that predictions are true in virtue of present evidence for the future.

[26] Compare also Marušić (2012, p. 13) for objections to Velleman's theory.

[27] Setiya (2008) acknowledges the problem and suggests, as a remedy, that we add knowing-how and knowledge of ability to the context in which intentions are formed: "I am justified in coming to believe that I am clenching my fist, when that is what I intend to be doing, so long as I do so as an exercise of knowledge how and I know that I am able to clench my fist" (Setiya, 2008, p. 408). Paul (2009a, pp. 554–557) responds that, even if we add knowing-how, the problem remains in place.

[28] Compare also Velleman (2007, p. xix) for a clarification of the thesis that intentions are beliefs.

[29] Let me point out from the start that what is to come is in some respects a partisan account with which some, but by no means all, philosophers will agree. But even for those who don't agree, the following remarks may be instructive, for they may nevertheless offer an interesting diagnosis of the disagreement surrounding the relation between intention and belief: the source of this debate may lie in a disagreement about the nature and properties of first-personal beliefs.

[30] Compare Wittgenstein (1958, pp. 66–67), Shoemaker (1994), and Anscombe (1981).

[31] See Evans (1982) and Rödl (2007) for a systematic elaboration of that claim.

[32] Compare Wittgenstein (1958) and Anscombe (1981).

[33] See, for instance, Williams (1985) and Müller (1977).

[34] Of course, I can adopt the conclusions of others' reasoning and I can order others to do something. But even here, there is still something left for me to do: I must appropriate the conclusion, make it my own, and I must bring the others to do what I want them to do.

[35] These philosophers include Burge (1998), Moran (2001), and Boyle (2011a).

[36] See, for instance, Moran (2001, pp. 60–64).

[37] Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this question.

[38] For such a picture, compare Hieronymi (2009b) and Boyle (2011a and 2011b).

[39] Several philosophers have recently drawn attention to the rationally active nature of judgement-sensitive attitudes and the consequences this has for our self-awareness of them. See, for instance, Burge (1998), Moran (2001), and Boyle (2011a).

[40] Compare Moran (2001).

[41] Compare Scanlon (1998, pp. 18–22) on judgement-sensitive attitudes.

[42] Some think that akrasia and Buridan cases show that some further act of commitment is needed here; compare Raz (1999) or Wallace (2006). Hieronymi (2009a) argues forcefully to the contrary.

[43] Velleman (1989, p. 88 fn. 8; 2007, p. xix).

[44] I presented earlier versions of this paper at a workshop on "Knowing and Acting" at the University of Potsdam in July 2014 and in Sebastian Rödl's research seminar at the University of Leipzig in December 2014. I would like to thank the participants for helpful discussion. I would also like to thank Jonas Held, Berislav Marušić, Dietrich Schotte, Aaron Shoichet, Daniel H. Smyth, Peter Wiersbinski and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on previous drafts.

## ORCID

*Christian Kietzmann* http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0049-6048

## REFERENCES

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). *Intention*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern moral philosophy. *Philosophy*, *33*(124), 1–19.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981). The first person. In G. E. M. Anscombe, *Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind: Collected papers, Vol. II* (pp. 21–36). Oxford: Blackwell.

Baier, A. (1977). The intentionality of intentions. *Review of Metaphysics*, *30*(3), 389–414.

Boyle, M. (2011a). 'Making up your mind' and the activity of reason. *Philosophers' Imprint*, *11*(17), 1–24.

Boyle, M. (2011b). Active belief. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary, *35*, 119–148.

Bratman, M. (1987). *Intentions, plans, and practical reasoning*. Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP.

Bratman, M. (1991). Cognitivism about practical reason. *Ethics*, *102*(1), 117–128.

Bratman, M. (2009). Intention, belief, practical, theoretical. In S. Robertson (Ed.), *Spheres of reason* (pp. 29–61). Oxford: Oxford UP.

Burge, T. (1998). Reason and the first person. In C. Wright, B. C. Smith, & C. Macdonald (Eds.), *Knowing our own minds* (pp. 243–270). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Davidson, D. (1980a). *Essays on actions and events*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Davidson, D. (1980b). Agency. In Davidson (1980a, 43–61).

Davidson, D. (1980c). Intending. In Davidson (1980a, 83–102).

Evans, G. (1982). *The varieties of reference*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Grice, H. P. (1971). Intention and uncertainty. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, *57*, 263–279.

Harman, G. (1976). Practical reasoning. In A. Mele (Ed.), *The philosophy of action* (pp. 149–177). Oxford: Oxford UP.

Harman, G. (1986). Willing and intending. In R. E. Grandy, & R. Warner (Eds.), *Philosophical grounds of rationality: Intentions, categories, ends* (pp. 363–380). Oxford: Clarendon.

Hieronymi, P. (2009a). The will as reason. *Philosophical Perspectives*, *23*, 201–220.

Hieronymi, P. (2009b). Two kinds of agency. In L. O'Brien, & M. Soteriou (Eds.), *Mental action* (pp. 138–162). Oxford: Oxford UP.

Langton, R. (2004). Intention as faith. In J. Hyman, & H. Steward (Eds.), *Agency and action* (pp. 243–258). Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Marušić, B. (2012). Belief and difficult action. *Philosophers' Imprint*, *12*(18), 1–30.

Moran, R. (2001). *Authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge*. Princeton/N.J: Princeton UP.

Müller, A. W. (1977). Radical subjectivity: Morality versus utilitarianism. *Ratio*, *19*(2), 115–132.

Paul, S. K. (2009a). Intention, belief, and wishful thinking: Setiya on 'practical knowledge'. *Ethics*, *119*, 546–557.

Paul, S. K. (2009b). How we know what we're doing. *Philosophers' Imprint*, *9*(11), 1–24.

Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. *Nous*, *13*(1), 3–21.

Raz, J. (1999). *Engaging reason*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Rödl, S. (2007). *Self-consciousness*. Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP.

Scanlon, T. M. (1998). *What we owe to each other*. Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP.

Setiya, K. (2007a). Cognitivism about practical reason. *Ethics*, *117*, 649–673.

Setiya, K. (2007b). *Reasons without rationalism*. Princeton/N.J: Princeton UP.

Setiya, K. (2008). Practical knowledge. *Ethics*, *118*, 388–409.

Setiya, K. (2009). Practical knowledge revisited. *Ethics*, *120*, 128–137.

Shoemaker, S. (1994). Self-reference and self-awareness. In Q. Cassam (Ed.), *Self-knowledge* (pp. 80–93). Oxford: Oxford UP.

Thompson, M. (2011). Anscombe's *intention* and practical knowledge. In A. Ford, J. Hornsby, & F. Stoutland (Eds.), *Essays on Anscombe's intention* (pp. 198–210). Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP.

Velleman, J. D. (1989). *Practical reflection*. Princeton/N.J: Princeton UP.

Velleman, J. D. (1996). The possibility of practical reason. *Ethics*, *106*, 694–726.

Velleman, J. D. (2000a). *The possibility of practical reason*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Velleman, J. D. (2000b). Introduction. In Velleman (2000a, 1–31).

Velleman, J. D. (2000c). On the aim of belief. In Velleman (2000a, 244–281).

Velleman, J. D. (2007). *Practical reflection, reissue in the David Hume series*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Wallace, R. J. (2006). Normativity, commitment, and instrumental reason. In R. Jay Wallace (Ed.), *Normativity and the will: Selected papers on moral psychology and practical reason* (pp. 82–120). Oxford: Oxford UP.

Williams, B. (1973). Deciding to Believe. In B. Williams, *Problems of the self* (pp. 136–151). Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Williams, B. (1985). *Ethics and the limits of philosophy*. Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP.

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). *The blue and brown books*. Oxford: Blackwell.

**How to cite this article:** Kietzmann C. Does intention involve belief? *Eur J Philos*. 2019;27:426–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12407