Who favor in-group politicians?

In-group voting in France, Germany and the Netherlands and the challenges to the descriptive and substantive representation of Muslims

Sanne van Oosten

Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Oxford

sanne.vanoosten@compas.ox.ac.uk

Abstract

Does sharing the same religion, migration background and gender impact voting in France, Germany and the Netherlands? Using survey experiments (N=3,058) and oversampling voters with a migration background (N=1,889/3,058), I explore this question from both majority and minority perspectives. Even when randomizing highly divisive policy positions, shared religion emerges as the most influential factor affecting voters. However, sharing the same migration background or gender has no discernible impact on voting likelihood. Interestingly, non-religious voters exhibit an in-group preference, slightly surpassing the preference shown by Muslim voters for in-group politicians, which varies significantly across countries. Notably, voters prioritize politicians who advocate their preferred policies, often in contrast to the positions supported by Muslim voters. These findings reveal challenges in achieving diversity in politics and minority representation, particularly concerning the political inclusion of Muslims.

Keywords: Descriptive representation, Social Identity Theory, Substantive representation, Islamophobia

Introduction – challenges to political inclusion

In the summer of 2024, the nomination of Kamala Harris brought much euphoria to the Democrats in the US-election race[1]. Does some of that enthusiasm come from women's, Black and Asian American's eagerness to vote for in-group politicians? When Harris was

[1] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/09/02/can-kamala-harris-keep-up-the-excitement-through-election-day

appointed running mate of Joe Biden in 2020, some political commentators understood that as a strategy to attract more women and voters of color[2], in line with extensive US-literature supporting that voters favour their in-group (e.g. English, Pearson, and Strolovitch 2018; Schwarz and Coppock 2022; van Oosten et al. 2024a). Is in-group voting a generalizable trend that extends beyond the idiosyncrasies of US-elections? In Europe, it remains unclear whether/which voters favour in-group politicians. In this paper, I explore the role of 'descriptive representation' i.e. whether a politician and voter share the same descriptive characteristics (Pitkin 1967), examining which voters tend to favour their in-group (based on shared religion, migration background, and gender) from both majority and minority perspectives in France, Germany and the Netherlands.

Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) posits that humans tend to exhibit in-group favoritism, as commonly referenced in experimental studies about descriptive representation of minorities (e.g. Snagovsky et al. 2020; Cammett, Kruszewska-Eduardo, and Parreira 2021). The literatures on gender affinity voting (Dolan 2008) and ethnic bloc voting (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011) are sizable and established, while the literature on Muslim affinity voting is small but growing (see Azabar et al., 2020; Heath et al., 2015). These literatures formed the basis for pre-registering[3] hypotheses stating that minorities and women prefer their in-group.

The outcomes of this research were not completely as expected. I find that instead of minorities, majorities are just as, if not more, likely to favor in-group politicians, though both groups care most about shared policy. The absence of in-group favoritism among minorities aligns with a less often cited line of argumentation in Social Identity Theory, which posits that "in-group favoritism is far from universal" and depends on social status (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 43). The influence of social status on in-group favoritism remains underexplored among researchers who cite Social Identity Theory (except Haslam, 2001, p. 21; Jardina, 2019b). High-status groups are more likely to favor their in-group, while low-status groups have incentives to favor the high-status out-group in some cases as well (ibid).

The independent impacts of both "descriptive," i.e. "being like" and "substantive representation," i.e. "standing for" (Pitkin 1967) are challenging to investigate and compare due to their interconnected nature. In many cases, descriptive leads to substantive

[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/14/poll-biden-black-vp-185043
[3] The pre-registration can be viewed here: osf.io/jtdqw

representation because politicians tend to support policies that resonate with their in-group (Dietrich and Hayes 2023; Tate 2003). Therefore, I employ conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014) and randomize descriptive *and* substantive representation independently from one another. Previous conjoint experiments on voter and politician race/ethnicity reveal in-group preferences (Aguilar et al. 2015; Adida 2015; Lemi and Brown 2019). However, these studies do not cover substantive representation nor religious identity in Europe, where minoritized groups in France, Germany, and the Netherlands often have a migration background in Muslim-majority countries.

Standard sampling strategies would not yield enough minority participants for statistical analyses (Font and Méndez 2013). Moreover, strict European privacy regulations limit the availability of sampling frames for racial/ethnic and religious minorities in the European context (Simon 2017). To overcome these challenges, I surveyed a large sample of Kantar-panelists and used a mini-survey to oversample voters from France, Germany, and the Netherlands with a migration background in Turkey (France, Germany, and the Netherlands), North Africa (France), Sub-Saharan Africa (France), the Former Soviet Union (Germany), Surinam (the Netherlands), and Morocco (the Netherlands). I sampled a high number of minority respondents, with 1889 out of a total N of 3058 respondents having a migration background, of which 649 self-identify as Muslim.

The findings suggest that in-group favoritism revolves around religion the most. Non-religious voters are slightly more likely to prefer their in-group and dislike the Muslim out-group than Muslims are to do the same. However, we find that voters with a migration background favor politicians without a migration background. Most significantly, the results show that voters overwhelmingly prefer substantive over descriptive representation, indicating that policy matters more than identity. Yet majority in-group favoritism reveals itself in policy positions as well; non-religious voters are the least likely to vote for politicians who stand for policies that Muslim voters tend to agree with more than non-religious voters do. The antagonistic treatment of Muslim politicians *and* Muslims preferred policy impedes the meaningful representation of Muslims, creating difficult dilemmas to fostering an inclusive political landscape where diversity of policy and identities can thrive (Dancygier 2017). The implications of this paper's conclusions are immense. Muslim politicians are electorally incentivized to actively speak out against the policy positions Muslims tend to prefer, garnering representation that is not substantive but suppressive (Aydemir and

Vliegenthart 2016; 2022), which leads to feelings of betrayal and misrepresentation amongst Muslims (Akachar, Celis, and Severs 2017) and ultimately leaving minority voters feeling unseen and unheard in the political systems we call our democracies.

Theory – positive distinctiveness and in-group favoritism

The outcomes of this research were somewhat surprising to me. Before I gathered the data for this paper, I expected minority and woman voters to prefer in-group politicians over their out-group counterparts in an effort to achieve, what Social Identity Theory calls, *positive distinctiveness* through *in-group favoritism* (Tajfel and Turner 1979), the tendency to seek a favorable comparison of one's self (positive distinctiveness) through preferring members of one's own group (in-group favoritism) (Haslam 2001, 21). Indeed, there is much literature on the importance of descriptive representation for minorities (Mansbridge 1999; Young 2000; Williams 2000) and I expected minority voters to follow these same lines of thought. I, therefore, pre-registered hypotheses stating that minorities (voters with a migration background, Muslims and women) prefer their in-group over their out-group (Hypotheses 1a,b,c). Even though I found very limited evidence for all three of these hypotheses, I still see it as important to outline how I came to these expectations prior to gathering the data because it speaks to the literatures that helped form my expectations. I had mistakenly assumed that in-group favoritism is a universal phenomenon, despite the pioneers in Social Identity Theory specifying specific conditions under which this occurs (Tajfel and Turner 1979: 36). After presenting H1a, b and c, I highlight how individuals can be incentivized to consider alternative strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness *without* in-group favoritism and the role social status plays in these dynamics. I also outline the mechanisms that can lead to these alternative strategies, with a stronger preference for substantive over descriptive representation as an outcome, culminating in a hypothesis that contrasts identity and policy, suggesting that sharing the same policy position is ultimately the most important driver for vote choice.

In-group favoritism as a strategy to achieve positive distinctiveness

Migration background

In the US, evidence shows that shared ethnic/racial identification influences voting choices for candidates (Burge, Wamble, and Cuomo 2020; Schildkraut 2017). Similarly, studies

outside the US also suggest co-ethnic preferences in politics (Poertner 2022; Aguilar et al. 2015; Chauchard 2016). In Europe, ethnicity is typically measured through migration background. Causes of voters preferring a shared migration background are concerns over immigration-related topics (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011) and the concentration of immigrants in a particular neighborhood (Vermeulen et al., 2020). Other mechanisms mediating a co-ethnicity-effect are the assumed greater societal respect the in-group will receive (Ruedin 2009), showing the public your group has "ability to rule" (Mansbridge 1999, 628), a "survival strategy" when faced with a lack of societal acceptance (hooks 1995 as cited in Lemi & Brown, 2019, p. 272), targeting by political parties (Goerres, Mayer, and Spies 2020) and the assumption that descriptive representation will lead to substantive representation (Cutler 2002; Arnesen, Duell, and Johannesson 2019; Lerman and Sadin 2016). That is why I pre-reg[4]istered the following hypothesis:

H1.a. Racial/ethnic minority respondents prefer politicians of their own racial/ethnic minority group to politicians of a different group.

Religion

Cross-sectional research shows that Muslims are more likely to vote for Muslims (Azabar, Thijssen, and van Erkel 2020; Heath, Verniers, and Kumar 2015), not necessarily because of their faith itself, but because of the exclusion they experience as a Muslim (Azabar, Thijssen, and van Erkel 2020, 8) for which there is clear evidence on the labor market (Fernández-Reino, Di Stasio, and Veit 2023; Weichselbaumer 2020). As far as I know, there have not been any candidate experiments with Muslim politicians conducted on the European mainland (for US and UK examples see Bai 2021; Campbell and Cowley 2014), the only candidate experiment measuring voting likelihood I know finds a strong negative bias against Arab politicians (Dahl and Nyrup 2021, 209) in which "Arab" might serve as a proxy for "Muslim." People often assume that individuals with a background in Muslim-majority countries are automatically Muslim (Di Stasio et al. 2021; Otjes and Krouwel 2019) which is why I explicitly disentangle migration background and religion. Over the last two decades, Islam has become a severely politicized topic (Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Schmuck

[4] The pre-registration can be viewed here: osf.io/jtdqw

and Matthes 2019), exacerbated by the fact that Islam is seen as an obstacle to integration, mostly justified through political liberalism and a rejection of religious fundamentalism (Helbling and Traunmüller 2018). Amongst Muslims, politicization of Islam can lead to rejection of stereotypes (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2009), stronger collective identity and identity-threat among Muslims (Frey 2020; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Voas and Fleischmann 2012), causing Muslim voters to prefer Muslim politicians. That is why I pre-registered[5] the following hypothesis:

H1.b. Muslim respondents prefer Muslim politicians to non-religious and Christian politicians.

Gender

Research on the "gender affinity effect" (Dolan 2008), the tendency for women to vote for woman politicians, has mixed results. Some studies find that women reward woman candidates (Brians 2005; van Erkel 2019; Kirkland and Coppock 2018) while others find no significant differences (Cargile and Pringle 2019; Coffé and von Schoultz 2020; Cowley 2013, 148) and some finding women punish woman candidates (Bauer 2015; Eggers, Vivyan, and Wagner 2018; Mo 2015). The mixed results of individual studies may be because when discussions about underrepresentation of women are prominent, women are more likely to vote for woman candidates, but when these discussion are not salient women refrain from doing so (Campbell and Heath 2017, 227). Some researchers explain a possible "gender affinity" through the assumption amongst voters that woman politicians are more likely to share their policy views on issues such as healthcare and women's rights (Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2016; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Schneider and Bos 2016, 286). A meta-analysis found that both men and women prefer woman politicians, but women slightly more so than men (Schwarz and Coppock 2022, 9). That is why I pre-registered[6] the following hypothesis:

H1.c. Women prefer woman to man politicians.

[5] The pre-registration can be viewed here: osf.io/jtdqw
[6] The pre-registration can be viewed here: osf.io/jtdqw

Alternative strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness without in-group favoritism

Social Identity Theory proposes that individuals use three possible strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness: individual mobility, social creativity, and social competition. The choice of strategy depends on various factors such as the group's social status, belief in social mobility or change, the permeability of group boundaries, perceived security of group relations, and the perceived homogeneity/heterogeneity of the out-group. In the following section, I will outline how minorities and women may prefer their in-group only under certain conditions, and sometimes even prefer the out-group, whereas high-status groups tend to prefer their in-group under all conditions. The experimental design in which I also randomize policy positions enables respondents to abstain from letting in-group or out-group favoritism influence their vote choice, and I will discuss when and why this is most likely to occur.

Low-status groups, such as voters with a migration background or Muslims, can use the three strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness in different ways. Some groups may perceive their boundaries as permeable, for instance because they have a name or appearance that makes them pass as part of the high-status out-group. This could be the case amongst German citizens with a migration background in the Former Soviet Union or Maghrebi French with fair skin and a French name. If that is the case, they will be likely to strive for individual mobility to join the high-status group, leading to out-group favoritism through accepting the out-group's superiority. Other groups may perceive their boundaries as impermeable, possibly due to having a ethnoracially distinct name or black skin. This may be the case amongst citizens with a migration background in Turkey or French citizens from Sub-Saharan Africa. In that case, boundaries are impermeable. If group relations are seen as legitimate and stable, individuals will try to achieve positive distinctiveness through social creativity by redefining the dimensions of group comparison or attributing different meanings to current comparative dimensions (Haslam 2001, 25), think of Muslim women in Europe countering common stereotypes of themselves as complacent and docile (van Es 2019). This redefinition of group membership coincides with avoiding a direct challenge to the out-group's superiority. If group boundaries are perceived as impermeable and status differences as illegitimate and/or unstable, low-status groups are more likely to choose social competition, leading to direct and open in-group favoritism (Haslam 2001, 25), also known as “fighting fire with fire” in the case of Muslim voters voting for a political party

advocating for and run by Muslims in the Netherlands, DENK (Loukili, 2021a, 2021b). In summary, not all low-status groups favor their in-group.

For high-status groups, the same three strategies exist, but they always lead to in-group favoritism. If group boundaries are perceived as permeable, high-status groups expect low-status groups to exert individual mobility and join them. If not, high-status groups may argue that low-status groups are guilty of causing their own inferiority. If group boundaries are perceived as impermeable, legitimate, and stable, high-status group members may exhibit "magnanimity" while engaging in latent discrimination and covert repression (Haslam 2001, 26), which may be the case amongst high-status groups claiming to be color-blind (Tiberj and Michon 2013). If a high-status group perceives group relations as unstable and threatening, they may resort to supremacist ideologizing, conflict, open hostility, and antagonism by directly promoting the out-group's inferiority (Haslam 2001, 26), as is the case with some members of populist radical right parties (Kešić and Duyvendak 2019; Kortmann, Stecker, and Weiß 2019; van Oosten 2023b; 2024a). Thus, for low-status groups, the choice of strategy depends on various factors and may lead to different outcomes. For high-status groups, all strategies lead to in-group favoritism.

With regard to political representation, low-status groups might exhibit social creativity to redefine what representation means to them by leaning less on valuing descriptive representation, but by caring about substantive representation more, so as to not challenge the outgroup's superiority. Meanwhile, high-status groups might also exhibit social creativity by exhibiting how big-hearted they are by showing that policy matters more to them and that they are not racist, but colorblind and moreover, value policy over identity in political representation. Indeed, although there is not much research comparing the descriptive and substantive representation directly, the few existing studies find that policy matters more than identity (Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2016; Schneider and Bos 2016; Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011), such as when researchers add partisanship to the experimental design and find that it "crowds out" identity (Kirkland and Coppock 2018), even in within-party leadership races, arguably a least likely case (Wauters et al. 2022; Baron, Lauderdale, and Sheehy-Skeffington 2023) . A major caveat of the above studies is that they do not oversample minority groups and therefore mostly study the white majority. Nonetheless, I pre-registered the following hypothesis:

H2. Respondents prefer politicians with similar policy positions to politicians with similar descriptive characteristics.

Case and methods – oversamples and conjoints in France, Germany and the Netherlands

I conducted this research in France, Germany and the Netherlands, three countries with key differences. In France, there is a strong emphasis on citizenship, secularism and a strong division between church and state, there are no religious parties in the political landscape of France (Kuru 2008) and low minority representation in politics (Hughes 2016, 560). In Germany, Christian political parties have had a longstanding presence (Schotel 2022), there is an intermediate level of minority representation in politics (Hughes 2016, 560) and the approach towards Muslims is characterized by the history of integration of guestworkers (Yurdakul 2009). The Netherlands has a host of Christian parties (Kešić and Duyvendak 2019), a tradition of high minority representation in politics (Hughes 2016, 560), increased by the emergence of a political party run by Muslim parliamentarians and voicing Muslim interests in 2017, DENK (Vermeulen et al. 2020). All three countries have a history of parliamentarians from mainstream and populist radical right parties espousing Islamophobic rhetoric, with France and the Netherlands having a longer and more vociferous history of populist radical right parties and Germany being relatively new to the game and taking on a comparatively less strident tone (Brubaker 2017).

I oversampled respondents with specific migration backgrounds to make group-specific statistical inferences (Font and Méndez 2013, 48) and chose minoritized groups: numeric minorities that state experiencing discrimination to the largest extent (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017, 31). In France, the oversampled groups of ethnic minority citizens consists of French citizens with a North-African (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), Sub-Saharan African (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and Turkish background. In Germany, I oversampled German citizens with a Turkish and Former Soviet Union (FSU) background. In the Netherlands, I oversampled Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese background. Some groups have come to France, Germany or the Netherlands as a result of the colonial ties between host and home country, some came as guest workers (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017, 93). I also oversampled French citizens with a Turkish background and German re-migrants from the FSU. Some, but not all, of the oversampled

migration backgrounds are countries with Muslim-majority populations (Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten 2010; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2009; Dangubić, Verkuyten, and Stark 2020), making it possible to disentangle whether effects are either religiously or ethnically/racially driven.

After running pilots and obtaining the ethics approval, see Appendix 8, I gathered data between March and August of 2020 and presented experimental profiles to 3058 citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands, administered by survey agency Kantar Public (van Oosten et al. 2024bcd). One important challenge in surveying ethnic/racial minority groups comes from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European law legally restricting saving data on race and ethnicity (European Commission 2018). I overcame this challenge by employing a large scale filter question to the representative Kantar-panels in all three countries. I asked a very large sample to participate in a mini-survey. The first and only question of this mini-survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parents were born in a country of origin I wanted to oversample, we redirected this respondent to the full survey. If not, we either terminated the survey or redirected a small percentage to the full survey. This enabled us to form sizable groups of minority citizens for our final survey, ensuring ample diversity, a feature so often missing from survey research (Coppock and McClellan 2018; Krupnikov and Levine 2014; Mullinix et al. 2015). Though there is still a chance of selection bias, I have variables to weight the data on gender, migration background, education, age, urbanization and region, and the findings are broadly the same with and without weights.

Respondents received so-called “LifePoints” (France and Germany) or “Nipoints” (the Netherlands) for the completion of the survey. With these points, respondents can periodically convert their saved points to an online gift card. The survey took about fifteen minutes to complete, which translated to an equivalent of two euros in gift card value. I ended up with the following number of respondents in each group:

Table 1

Number of respondents with backgrounds divided by country or region

		France		Germany		The Netherlands	
Migration background	**France**	515	**Germany**	346	**Netherlands**	308
	Turkey	87	**Turkey**	198	**Turkey**	201
	North-Africa	304	**Former Soviet Union**	266	**Morocco**	136
	Sub-Saharan Africa	162	**Other**	144	**Surinam**	251
	Other	131			**Other**	9
Gender	**Male**	505	**Male**	415	**Male**	413
	Female	694	**Female**	539	**Female**	492
Religion	**Islam**	177	**Islam**	123	**Islam**	234
	Christianity	282	**Christianity**	287	**Christianity**	143
	Non-religious	701	**Non-religious**	502	**Non-religious**	462
	Other	39	**Other**	42	**Other**	64

I assessed migration background by inquiring about the birthplaces of respondents' mothers and fathers. It was necessary to ask this question first for sampling purposes. To minimize potential ordering effects on the data, I randomized the order in which respondents viewed the policy questions and experimental profiles. To mitigate acquiescence bias, where respondents tend to agree with statements, I randomized the wording of the policy questions. This approach had the added advantage of aligning with the policy positions expressed by the politicians in the experimental profiles. I measured respondent on a scale from 0 to 10 and counted a respondent as agreeing with the statement if they answered 6-10 and disagreeing if they answered 0-4. I did not find any additional effects in analyses with (only) respondents who answer 5, see appendix 3. In the experimental profiles, I randomized politician migration background, religion, gender and policy position, using conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015). See Table 2 for the full list of randomized attributes and values that made up the profiles of the politicians. After presenting two politicians I asked the respondent: "which politician are you most likely to vote for?" See image 1. I repeated this three times, resulting in six profile-views per respondent. I included religion as the final variable to measure, as it is typically considered an exogenous variable that is less likely to change based on the preceding questions. Kantar had already gathered data on respondent gender. I listed all survey questions in appendix 1.

Table 2

Full list of attributes and values of the experimental profiles				
	Same	France	Germany	Netherlands
Migration background				
		France	Germany	Netherlands
		North-Africa	Turkey	Turkey
		Sub-Saharan Africa	Former Soviet Union	Morocco
		Turkey		Surinam
Religion				
	Non-religious			
	Christian			
	Muslim			
Gender				
	Male			
	Female			
Policy positions				
	The tax rate for the rich must be lower/higher			
	Our government should lower/raise the support for the unemployed			
	Our government should do less/more to combat climate change than now			
	Our government needs to lower/raise fuel prices			
	Immigrants are a burden/an asset to our country			
	Islam should (not) be restricted by law			
	That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should (not) be regulated by law			
	Homosexual couples should (not) be allowed to adopt children			

Image 1



I analyze and present the data using marginal means because I compare different subgroups and wish to avoid confusing readers with different reference categories (Leeper et al., 2019). I present mostly voting likelihoods. A statistically significant finding does not majority

preference for that attribute, but that an individual is more *likely* to vote for the a politician with that attribute (Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik 2022). When the outcomes in are consistent in all three countries, I present visuals of the pooled data, with separate visuals for each country in appendix 2. When I make statements about the general population, I use population weights to weight down the impact of respondents with a migration background to the proportion they are in the population. In all analyses, I cluster the standard errors at the level of the respondent. I prepared the data using R-package "tidyr" (Wickham 2020), analyzed it using marginal means with R-package "cregg" (Leeper & Barnfield, 2020) and linear models using "miceadds" (Robitzsch, Grund, and Henke 2021), and visualized it with R-package "ggplot2" (Wickham et al. 2020). I pre-registered the hypotheses, see appendix 7 for an anonymized version of the pre-registration.

Analysis – shared policy or identity

To answer who favor in-group politicians, I systematically examine each of the pre-registered hypotheses, and I supplement these analyses with additional exploratory ones. In general, voters are most likely to prefer politicians with whom they share the same policy position, instead of politicians with whom they share the same identity. However, when running subgroup-analyses, I find that some groups are more likely to engage in in-group favoritism than others. I observe in-group favoritism based on religious and migration backgrounds, but not on gender. First (H1.a), I discuss how voter and politician migration background affects voting. Second (H1.b), I examine the influence of sharing the same religious affiliation on voting decisions. Third (H1.c), I scrutinize the impact of sharing the same gender on voting. Finally (H2), I analyze how voters evaluate politicians with whom they do and do not agree. For all full model results, see appendix 6.

Figure 1 (for all full model results, see appendix 6, page 20 – for sample sizes, see table 1) depicts the testing of hypothesis H1.a., which posits that respondents from racial/ethnic minority groups exhibit a preference for politicians from the same group. Using migration background as a proxy for minority status, I find no evidence to support this hypothesis. In other words, none of the voter groups with migration backgrounds displayed a significant preference for politicians from their own background over those from different backgrounds. Accordingly, I reject hypothesis H1.a.

Despite the lack of support for hypothesis H1.a., several noteworthy findings emerged from the analysis. Moroccan-Dutch voters in the Netherlands are the only minority group to display a preference for politicians from their in-group, although this preference did not reach statistical significance. Similarly, German and Dutch voters without migration backgrounds were more likely to vote for politicians from their own subgroup, but this tendency, too, fell short of statistical significance. In contrast, French voters without migration backgrounds exhibited a significant preference for politicians from their own group compared to one out-group, with a 51 percent likelihood of voting for their in-group, compared to a 44 percent likelihood of voting for Turkish politicians. Finally, French voters with a migration background in North-Africa significantly prefer politicians from their own group (53 percent) over politicians from Sub-Saharan Africa (46 percent).

Figure 1



Percentage of the vote, marginal means. Results of a forced-choice conjoint experiment asking respondents which one out of two politicians they were most likely to vote for. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Clustered at the level of the respondent. I omitted results with citizens with 'other' migration backgrounds due to a low number of respondents in each category.

Figure 2 (for all full model results, see appendix 6, page 21 – for sample sizes, see table 1) highlights another notable outcome. When combining all subsets of voters with and without

a migration background and comparing the likelihood of voting for politicians with or without a migration background, I observe that voters with migration backgrounds exhibit a significantly higher voting likelihood for politicians without migration backgrounds (54 percent) than for politicians with (49 percent).

Figure 2



Results of a forced-choice conjoint experiment asking respondents which one out of two politicians they were most likely to vote for. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Stacked data from France, Germany and the Netherlands. Weighted the subset with a migration background relative to their share of the population in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Clustered at the level of the respondent.

Figure 3 (for all full model results, see appendix 6, page 22 – for sample sizes, see table 1) illustrates the results of hypothesis H1.b., which contends that Muslim respondents prefer Muslim politicians over non-religious and Christian politicians. This hypothesis receives support only in the Netherlands, where Muslim voters demonstrate a significantly higher likelihood of voting for a Muslim politician (58 percent) than for a Christian (45 percent) or non-religious politician (46 percent). In France and Germany, however, I reject this hypothesis. In France, Muslim voters exhibit nearly identical levels of support for Muslim, Christian and non-religious politicians. In Germany, Muslim voters prefer Muslim politicians

(56 percent) over Christian politicians (43 percent), with non-religious politicians occupying an intermediary position between the two.

Figure 3 also shows the voting preferences of non-religious voters in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In France, non-religious voters exhibit no significant difference in voting likelihood between non-religious (58 percent) and Christian (58 percent) politicians, despite the strong separation of Church and State and the absence of Christian parties. However, they are significantly less likely to vote for Muslim politicians (43 percent). In Germany and the Netherlands, non-religious voters are most likely to vote for non-religious politicians (55 percent and 56 percent respectively) and least likely to vote for Muslim politicians (44 percent and 42 percent respectively), with Christian politicians occupying an intermediary position (51 percent in both countries).

Additional analyses reveal that, across the three countries, non-religious voters are slightly more likely to prefer their in-group and to dislike the Muslim out-group, see appendix 4. Despite the high effect sizes observed for Muslims' in-group preferences, the effect sizes were larger for non-religious voters, and non-significant for Muslim voters who vote for non-religious politicians. In other words, non-religious voters, rather than their Muslim counterparts, are slightly more inclined to engage in in-group favoritism.

Figure 3

Voting likelihood when voter and politician share the same religion:

France:

Muslim French voter +



Non-religious French voter +



Germany:

Muslim German voter +



Non-religious German voter +



Netherlands:

Muslim Dutch voter +



Non-religious Dutch voter +



Results of a forced-choice conjoint experiment asking respondents which one out of two politicians they are most likely to vote for. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. I weighted Christian and non-religious subsets on migration background, I clustered confidence intervals at the level of the respondent.

Figure 4 (for all full model results, see appendix 6, page 22 – for sample sizes, see table 1) shows the testing of hypothesis H1.c. in which I state that women prefer woman to man politicians. Contrary to the hypothesis, neither man nor woman voters exhibit a significant preference for man or woman politicians. Therefore, I reject hypothesis H1.c. This result is consistent across all three countries, as shown in appendix 2b. In the figure below, I therefore present stacked data from France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I conducted additional analyses to investigate whether there were any intersectional effects of migration background, religion with gender, but I found no consistent evidence for such effects. Similarly, when I examined the intersection of religion, migration background, and gender on both politicians and voters, I did not find any significant intersectional effects either.

Figure 4



Figure 5 (for all full model results, see appendix 6, page 23 – for sample sizes, see table 1) presents the outcomes of hypothesis H2, which examines whether respondents prefer politicians with similar policy positions or similar descriptive characteristics. The weighted outcomes show that policy agreement is more important to voters than sharing similar descriptive characteristics, by far. Voter have a 67 percent probability of voting for a politician when they share their policy stance, against 33 percent when they do not.

Although sharing the same religion is also important to voters, policy positions are much more critical. Irrespective of which religion, sharing the same religion leads to a voting likelihood of 55 percent, while not sharing the same religion reduces the likelihood to 48 percent. Sharing the same migration background and gender or not does not reveal any statistically significant differences.

Figure 5



Results of a forced-choice conjoint experiment asking respondents which one out of two politicians they are most likely to vote for. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Weighted analyses on policy position, religion and gender on migration background. Clustered confidence intervals at the level of the respondent.

In Figure 6 (for all full model results, see appendix 6, page 23 – for sample sizes, see table 1), I present the voting likelihoods per policy position. The most important conclusion is that politicians who support combatting climate change and regulating equal pay for equal work receive the highest voting likelihood from like-minded voters. On the other hand, the lowest voting likelihood comes from voters who support same-sex adoption when confronted with politicians who oppose it (in France, the policy position on Islam receives a slightly lower voting likelihood, as detailed in appendix 2c). The policy position on immigration reveals the most divisive outcomes across all three countries, where agreeing or disagreeing with the

policy has a significant impact on voting likelihood. While the policy position on Islam is also divisive, this is only the case in France and the Netherlands, not in Germany. On personal attitudes, Muslim voters barely differ from non-religious voters (less than one point, see appendix 5) on taxing the rich, supporting the unemployed, combatting climate change, raising fuel prices and gender equality. Non-religious and Muslim voters differ the most (more than one point, see appendix 5) on religious freedom for Muslims, followed by same-sex adoption and immigration. These are exactly the issues on which politicians receive the lowest voting likelihoods from the general population. I will discuss the implications of this finding in the discussion-section.

Figure 6

Voting likelihood when voter and politician share the same policy position:



Results of a forced-choice conjoint experiment asking respondents which one out of two politicians they are most likely to vote for. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Weighted on migration background, confidence intervals were clustered at the level of the respondent.

Discussion and conclusion – challenges to descriptive and substantive representation

Who favor in-group politicians? In general, I find shared policy is far more important to voters than shared identity (Figure 5) showing that identity compared to policy plays a limited role amongst voters on a whole. Nonetheless, I also reveal differences in voting likelihood based on sharing the same religion and migration backgrounds, but not on gender. Muslim voters in the Netherlands exhibit a preference for Muslim politicians over non-religious and Christian politicians, but this does not hold in France and Germany (Figure 4). The preference of non-religious voters for non-religious over Muslim politicians, however, holds across all three countries, though always with Christian politicians taking an intermediate position (Figure 3). Moreover, individuals with a migration background tend to align themselves more with the high-status out-group, politicians without a migration background, than with politicians with a migration background (Figure 2) even when that migration background is the same as their own (Figure 1). This research challenges the common assumption that in-group favoritism is specifically a characteristic of minority groups. Contrary to popular beliefs, but in line with the reasoning of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), I reveal that the non-religious majority tends to exhibit favoritism towards their own group and display disfavor towards others slightly more than Muslim minorities favor their in-group, while minorities with a migration background even prefer their out-group.

There are several important caveats and implications for further research. Firstly, the eight policy positions randomized in the experiment do not cover the entire policy field, warranting the inclusion of other issues that could better capture Muslim or Islamophobic interests. Secondly, when confronted with a Muslim politician, individuals may rely on heuristics, stereotypes, or cognitive shortcuts to form their opinions about policy positions (Portmann 2022; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Cutler 2002; Koch 2000; van Oosten 2022a). This suggests that negative perceptions of Muslim politicians, even when they hold the same policy positions as non-religious politicians, may be influenced by additional policy positions and/or stereotypes that come to mind. Thirdly, it is important to understand that there might be a lack of information equivalence between non-religious and Muslim voters (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018), as voters may not necessarily associate any policy positions with politicians who "do not practice any religion," potentially leading to heuristics

based on projection instead of stereotyping, with more favorable outcomes for politicians who the respondent projected their own policy positions onto. Future research should explore which policy positions come to mind when voters evaluate politicians based on their religious practices or lack thereof. Fourthly, given that I used a novel oversampling method, potential issues could arise that may warrant further exploration using alternative sampling methods to validate results. Lastly, it is important to note that conjoint experiments only provide a snapshot of voters' initial impressions, and real-life campaigns may further shape their perceptions and thus voting behavior. Nevertheless, this research contributes to our understanding of Social Identity Theory and political representation.

These findings support Social Identity Theory's assertion that in-group favoritism is more likely to occur in high-status groups than in low-status groups, contradicting popular notions that suggest otherwise (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 36). I argue that voters with a migration background aligning themselves with high-status out-groups reflects a "social mobility belief system," as described by Social Identity Theory (Haslam 2001, 25). This belief system implies that group boundaries are permeable, and individuals can attain mobility and access high-status groups. As a result, voters with a migration background tend to reject politicians who share the same low-status group membership and instead prefer those with French, German, and Dutch backgrounds.

According to Social Identity Theory, the in-group favoritism amongst Muslims, particularly in the Netherlands, points more towards evidence of a "social change belief system" in which group boundaries are perceived as impermeable (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In situations where Muslim voters prefer their in-group and challenge the out-group's superiority (as apparent in the results from the Netherlands), this reflects the perception of impermeable group boundaries and *insecure* relations. They understand themselves as fixed within their religious category and reject the legitimacy of the status difference, leading to social competition. In cases where Muslim voters prefer their in-group without challenging the out-group's superiority (as in France and Germany), this reflects the perception of impermeable group boundaries and *secure* relations. They accept the status difference between Muslims and non-religious citizens as legitimate and stable. A reason for this difference between France and Germany on the one hand and the Netherlands on the other, could be that the Netherlands has historically seen comparatively high levels of Muslim representation (Hughes 2016), making Muslim politicians less incentivized to

broaden their electoral appeal by distancing themselves from their in-group (van Oosten 2024b). Another reason might be that there is a political party in the Netherlands that consists of Muslim parliamentarians from Turkey and Morocco who advocate for Muslim rights, DENK (Vermeulen et al. 2020; Otjes and Krouwel 2019; van Oosten et al. 2024e) and Muslim voters in the Netherlands are, therefore, more accustomed to Muslim politicians with whom they share the same policy positions.

While I deduce from Social Identity Theory that Muslim voters tend to view group boundaries as impermeable, non-religious voters may be more inclined to see religion as a matter of personal choice, resulting in perceived highly permeable group boundaries that reflect a "social mobility belief system" (Haslam 2001, 26). The wording of the experiment, particularly phrases such as "practices Islam" or "does not practice any religion," may have contributed to this perspective. If non-religious voters see religion as a choice, any Muslim could opt to stop "practicing Islam" and thereby "choose individual mobility." Not "choosing" for mobility could be seen as evidence of the "out-group's inferiority" (Haslam 2001, 26), expressed through non-religious voters giving a consistent and significantly lower voting likelihood to Muslim over Christian and Muslim politicians, despite this perceived convertibility being highly disputed (Meer and Modood 2012).

Non-religious voters who perceive religion as impermeable rather than a choice, with low permeability, may be more inclined to adopt a "social change belief system." Within this belief system, the perceived legitimacy and stability of religious identity may foster social creativity, including a sense of "magnanimity" or belief in one's own goodness. This may lead to latent discrimination and covert repression, where individuals signal gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights and anti-Semitism as a justification for being critical of Muslims, aligning with the concepts of femonationalism (Farris 2017), homonationalism (Puar 2013; van Oosten 2022ab; 2023a) and Judeonationalism (van Oosten 2024cdef). Conversely, perceived illegitimacy and instability (such as the belief that Muslims are taking over society) may generate insecure relations in which both social creativity and social competition promote out-group inferiority (Haslam 2001, 26), as exemplified by supporters of replacement theory (Bracke and Hernández Aguilar 2020). All three mechanisms that Social Identity Theory outlines for high-status groups lead to in-group favoritism. There is already much research on the mechanisms underlying in-group favoritism, racism, prejudice and discrimination towards Muslims (e.g. Fernández-Reino et al., 2022; Helbling & Traunmüller, 2018;

Weichselbaumer, 2020) and an implication of further research is that this should be extended to the field of political representation and identity politics in Europe (as already studied in the US by Jardina & Stephens-Dougan, 2021).

In addition to the mechanisms proposed by Social Identity Theory, this research underscores the significance of shared policy positions as compared to shared identity in influencing voter behavior. Specifically, policy positions that advocate for gender equality and combatting climate change resonate with voters who are in favor of these issues. For instance, a candidate who champions policies promoting gender equality, such as equal pay, paternity leave, and gender quotas, is most likely to gain support from voters who share these concerns. Similarly, a candidate who prioritizes policies addressing climate change, such as renewable energy and environmental conservation, is likely to attract voters who share these priorities as well. This makes these policy areas advisable for politicians of color and Muslims who aim to expand their appeal among voter bases that share these ideas.

Extant literature suggests that party selectors from parties with voters who hold egalitarian worldviews face challenges when promoting diversity and inclusion of Muslim politicians on their party list (Dancygier 2017). They aim to attract voters who value diversity and inclusion, but are cautious about candidates who may not support cosmopolitan issues like gender equality (idem) or also climate change. By including Muslim politicians who are outspoken in their support for gender equality on their list, they are pursuing a cautious solution (idem). My research aligns with these intuitions of party selectors, as it demonstrates the high appreciation of politicians, regardless of their religious affiliation, who support gender equality, among those who share their views (Figure 6).

Moreover, irrespective of the background of the voter or politician, politicians with policy positions related to religious freedom for Muslims, opposition to same-sex adoption and immigration tend to receive the lowest voting likelihood among voters who hold opposing opinions (Figure 6). For example, a candidate who advocates for policies supporting other religious freedom for Muslims, such as allowing the Islamic call to prayer to be heard in public spaces or allowing the construction of mosques, may also encounter heightened resistance from voters. Especially compared to policy positions on other topics, such as taxing the rich and gender equality. In a similar vein, a candidate who opposes same-sex adoption faces stronger backlash from voters who support LGBTQ+ rights and adoption equality as compared to disagreement on other topics. Additionally, policy

positions related to immigration also generate low voting likelihoods among voters who hold opposing opinions. For instance, a candidate who advocates for strict immigration policies, such as border control and deportation, may also face a relatively low voting likelihood opposition from voters who prioritize inclusivity and diversity in immigration policies and vice versa. Religious freedoms, immigration and same-sex adoption are exactly the three issues that Muslim and non-religious voters differ on the most in their personal opinions (Appendix 5).

These outcomes underscore the challenges of implementing diversity in politics, as candidates who speak out on topics that aim to promote substantive representation for certain groups, such as Muslims, may face significant pushback from voters who do not share the same opinion. This reveals the complex dynamics at play in navigating policy positions, shared identity, and voter preferences, and the delicate balance that politicians must strike in representing diverse interests while also managing potential backlash from voters with opposing viewpoints. Notably, speaking out on topics such as gender equality and climate change lead to "representation by coincidence" (Gilens and Page 2014): yes it leads to better substantive representation of Muslim voters, but only because they happen to agree to the same extent with non-religious citizens on this topic. Exactly on those three topics on which non-religious and Muslim voters differ, immigration, Islam, and same-sex adoption, the voting likelihoods are the lowest. This contributes to "suppressive representation" in which Muslim politicians are incentivized to vocally disagree with most Muslim voters (Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; 2022) and contribute to feelings of betrayal and misrepresentation (Akachar, Celis, and Severs 2017; Anderson 1997) on the part of Muslim citizens.

In sum, 1) policy positions that exhibit divergent views between Muslims and non-religious voters and 2) Muslim politicians often face significant pushback in politics, making it challenging to achieve descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation of Muslims. Indeed, Muslims and politicians voicing Muslim interests encounter pushback, which can result in their exclusion from political decision-making processes and limit their ability to have their voices heard. Muslims and Muslim's preferred policies are often viewed through a contentious lens in politics, with some politicians and voters expressing disfavor, further hindering the meaningful representation of Muslims in the political sphere. On a whole, a

political arena in which both people who descriptively and/or substantively represent Muslims is very unlikely to emerge in this political climate.

This research highlights the role of in-group favoritism expressed through identity and policy and thus contributes to our understanding of Social Identity Theory and its implications for political representation in diverse societies. I highlight the importance of addressing all citizens' feelings of representation, promoting substantive representation, and fostering a more inclusive and functioning democracy. Furthermore, recognizing representation as a moral and epistemic obligation, and promoting justice and legitimacy in the political system, underscores the significance of diverse representation in shaping a fair and equitable society for all.

Literature

Abramson, Scott F., Korhan Kocak, and Asya Magazinnik. 2022. "What Do We Learn about Voter Preferences from Conjoint Experiments?" *American Journal of Political Science* 66 (4): 1008–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12714.

Adida, Claire L. 2015. "Do African Voters Favor Coethnics? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Benin." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2 (1): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2014.26.

Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow, Scott Desposato, and Leonardo Sangali Barone. 2015. "Ballot Structure, Candidate Race, and Vote Choice in Brazil." *Latin American Research Review* 50 (3): 175–202. https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0044.

Akachar, Soumia, Karen Celis, and Eline Severs. 2017. "Hoop En Verraad: Wat Moslimjongeren Verwachten van Vertegenwoordigers Met Een Etnische Minderheidsachtergrond." *Res Publica* 59 (4): 463–87.

Anderson, Elijah. 1997. "The Precarious Balance." In *The Darden Dilemma: 12 Black Writers on Justice, Race, and Conflicting Loyalties*, edited by Ellis Cose, 115–132. New York: Harper Collins.

Arnesen, Sveinung, Dominik Duell, and Mikael Poul Johannesson. 2019. "Do Citizens Make Inferences from Political Candidate Characteristics When Aiming for Substantive Representation?" *Electoral Studies* 57 (October 2018): 46–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.10.005.

Aydemir, Nermin, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2016. "Minority Representatives' in the Netherlands: Supporting, Silencing or Suppressing?" In *Parliamentary Affairs*. Vol. 69. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsv009.

———. 2022. "Tracing Roots of Group Representation among MPs with Immigrant Backgrounds: A Content Analysis on Parliamentary Questions in the Netherlands." *Ethnicities* 22 (3): 467–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968211005187.

Azabar, Samira, Peter Thijssen, and Patrick van Erkel. 2020. "Is There Such a Thing as a Muslim Vote?" *Electoral Studies* 66 (April): 102164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102164.

Bai, Hui. 2021. "When Racism and Sexism Benefit Black and Female Politicians: Politicians' Ideology Moderates Prejudice's Effect More than Politicians' Demographic Background." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 120 (6): 1480–1520. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000314.

Baron, Denise, Benjamin Lauderdale, and Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington. 2023. "A Leader Who Sees the World as I Do: Voters Prefer Candidates Whose Statements Reveal Matching Social-Psychological Attitudes." *Political Psychology* 0 (0). https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12891.

Bauer, Nichole M. 2015. "Emotional, Sensitive, and Unfit for Office? Gender Stereotype Activation and Support Female Candidates." *Political Psychology* 36 (6): 691–708. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12186.

Bergh, Johannes, and Tor Bjørklund. 2011. "The Revival of Group Voting: Explaining the Voting Preferences of Immigrants in Norway." *Political Studies* 59 (2): 308–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00863.x.

Bracke, Sarah, and Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar. 2020. "'They Love Death as We Love Life': The 'Muslim Question' and the Biopolitics of Replacement." *The British Journal of Sociology*, no. January: 680–701. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12742.

Brians, Craig Leonard. 2005. "Women for Women? Gender and Party Bias in Voting for Female Candidates." *American Politics Research* 33 (3): 357–75. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X04269415.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2017. "Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (8): 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700.

Burge, Camille D., Julian J. Wamble, and Rachel R. Cuomo. 2020. "A Certain Type of Descriptive Representative? Understanding How the Skin Tone and Gender of Candidates Influences Black Politics." *Journal of Politics* 82 (4): 0–5. https://doi.org/10.1086/708778.

Cammett, Melani, Dominika Kruszewska-Eduardo, and Christiana Parreira. 2021. "Coethnicity Beyond Clientelism: Insights from an Experimental Study of Political Behavior in Lebanon." *Politics and Religion*, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000201.

Campbell, Rosie, and Philip Cowley. 2014. "What Voters Want: Reactions to Candidate Characteristics in a Survey Experiment." *Political Studies* 62: 745–765. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12048.

Campbell, Rosie, and Oliver Heath. 2017. "Do Women Vote for Women Candidates? Attitudes toward Descriptive Representation and Voting Behavior in the 2010 British Election." *Politics and Gender* 13 (2): 209–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X16000672.

Cargile, Ivy A.M., and Lisa Pringle. 2019. "Context Not Candidate Sex: A Case Study of Female Vote Choice for Mayor." *Urban Affairs Review*. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087419861697.

Chauchard, Simon. 2016. "Unpacking Ethnic Preferences: Theory and Micro-Level Evidence From North India." *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (2): 253 –284. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015609356.

Coffé, Hilde, and Åsa von Schoultz. 2020. "How Candidate Characteristics Matter: Candidate Profiles, Political Sophistication, and Vote Choice." *Politics*, June, 026339572092207. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720922077.

Coppock, Alexander, and Oliver A McClellan. 2018. "Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and Experimental Results Obtained from a New Source of Online Survey Respondents." *Working Paper*. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018822174.

Cowley, Philip. 2013. "Why Not Ask the Audience Understanding the Public's Representational Priorities." *British Politics* 8 (2): 138–63. https://doi.org/10.1057/bp.2012.28.

Cutler, Fred. 2002. "The Simplest Shortcut of All: Sociodemographic Characteristics and Electoral Choice." *Journal of Politics* 64 (2): 466–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00135.

Dafoe, Allan, Baobao Zhang, and Devin Caughey. 2018. "Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments." *Political Analysis* 26 (4): 399–416. https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2018.9.

Dahl, Malte, and Jacob Nyrup. 2021. "Confident and Cautious Candidates: Explaining under-Representation of Women in Danish Municipal Politics." *European Journal of Political Research* 60 (1): 199–224. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12396.

Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2017. *Dilemmas of Inclusion*. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1vwmgf2.

Dangubić, Marija, Maykel Verkuyten, and Tobias H. Stark. 2020. "Rejecting Muslim or Christian Religious Practices in Five West European Countries: A Case of Discriminatory Rejection?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 43 (16): 306–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1792525.

Dietrich, Bryce J., and Matthew Hayes. 2023. "Symbols of the Struggle: Descriptive Representation and Issue-Based Symbolism in U.S. House Speeches." *The Journal of Politics*, January. https://doi.org/10.1086/723966.

Dolan, Kathleen. 2008. "Is There a 'Gender Affinity Effect' in American Politics? Information, Affect, and Candidate Sex in U.S. House Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (1): 79–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907307518.

Eggers, Andrew C, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner. 2018. "Corruption, Accountability, and Gender: Do Female Politicians Face Higher Standards in Public Life?" *The Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 321–26. https://doi.org/10.1086/694649.

English, Ashley, Kathryn Pearson, and Dara Z. Strolovitch. 2018. "Who Represents Me? Race, Gender, Partisan Congruence, and Representational Alternatives in a Polarized America." *Political Research Quarterly* 00 (0): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918806048.

Erkel, Patrick F.A. van. 2019. "Sharing Is Caring: The Role of Voter-Candidate Similarities in Intra-Party Electoral Competition." *European Political Science Review* 11 (1): 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577391800022X.

Es, Margaretha A. van. 2019. "Muslim Women as 'Ambassadors' of Islam: Breaking Stereotypes in Everyday Life." *Identities* 26 (4): 375–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2017.1346985.

European Commission. 2018. "A New Era for Data Protection in the EU. What Changes after May 2018." https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/data-protection-factsheet-changes_en.pdf.
Farris, Sara R. 2017. *In the Name of Women's Rights, The Rise of Femonationalism*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Fernández-Reino, Mariña, Valentina Di Stasio, and Susanne Veit. 2023. "Discrimination Unveiled: A Field Experiment on the Barriers Faced by Muslim Women in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain." *European Sociological Review* 39 (3): 479–97. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcac032.
Fisher, Stephen D., Anthony F. Heath, David Sanders, and Maria Sobolewska. 2014. "Candidate Ethnicity and Vote Choice in Britain." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (4): 883–905. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000562.
Fleischmann, Fenella, Karen Phalet, and Olivier Klein. 2011. "Religious Identification and Politicization in the Face of Discrimination: Support for Political Islam and Political Action among the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Europe." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 50 (4): 628–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02072.x.
Font, J, and M Méndez. 2013. *Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research Amsterdam University Press. www.imiscoe.org.
FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2017. *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II): Main Results*. https://doi.org/10.2811/902610.
Frey, Arun. 2020. "'Cologne Changed Everything' - The Effect of Threatening Events on the Frequency and Distribution of Intergroup Conflict in Germany." *European Sociological Review* 36 (5): 684–99. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa007.
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (3): 564–81. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595.
Goerres, Achim, Sabrina J. Mayer, and Dennis C. Spies. 2020. "Immigrant Voters against Their Will: A Focus Group Analysis of Identities, Political Issues and Party Allegiances among German Resettlers during the 2017 Bundestag Election Campaign." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (7): 1205–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1503527.
Goodyear-Grant, Elizabeth, and Julie Croskill. 2011. "Gender Affinity Effects in Vote Choice in Westminster Systems: Assessing 'Flexible' Voters in Canada." *Politics and Gender* 7 (2): 223–50. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X11000079.
Hainmueller, Jens, Dominik Hangartner, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2015. "Validating Vignette and Conjoint Survey Experiments against Real-World Behavior." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1416587112.
Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J. Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. "Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments." *Political Analysis* 22 (1): 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt024.
Haslam, S Alexander. 2001. *Psychology in Organizations, the Social Identity Approach*. SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3858.1167.
Heath, Oliver, Gilles Verniers, and Sanjay Kumar. 2015. "Do Muslim Voters Prefer Muslim Candidates? Co-Religiosity and Voting Behaviour in India." *Electoral Studies* 38 (2015): 10–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.01.005.
Helbling, Marc, and Richard Traunmüller. 2018. "What Is Islamophobia? Disentangling Citizens' Feelings Towards Ethnicity, Religion and Religiosity Using a Survey Experiment." *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–18. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000054.
Holman, Mirya R., Jennifer L. Merolla, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2016. "Terrorist Threat, Male Stereotypes, and Candidate Evaluations." *Political Research Quarterly*. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915624018.

Hughes, Melanie M. 2016. "Electoral Systems and the Legislative Representation of Muslim Ethnic Minority Women in the West, 2000-2010." *Parliamentary Affairs* 69: 548–68. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsv062.

Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White Identity Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jardina, Ashley, and LaFleur Stephens-Dougan. 2021. "The Electoral Consequences of Anti-Muslim Prejudice." *Electoral Studies* 72 (June): 102364. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102364.

Kešić, Josip, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 2019. "The Nation under Threat: Secularist, Racial and Populist Nativism in the Netherlands." *Patterns of Prejudice* 53 (5): 441–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1656886.

Kirkland, Patricia A., and Alexander Coppock. 2018. "Candidate Choice Without Party Labels: New Insights from Conjoint Survey Experiments." *Political Behavior*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9414-8.

Koch, Jeffrey W. 2000. "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?" *Journal of Politics* 62 (2): 414–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00019.

Kortmann, Matthias, Christian Stecker, and Tobias Weiß. 2019. "Filling a Representation Gap? How Populist and Mainstream Parties Address Muslim Immigration and the Role of Islam." *Representation* 55 (4): 435–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1667419.

Krupnikov, Yanna, and Adam Seth Levine. 2014. "Cross-Sample Comparisons and External Validity." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 1 (1): 59–80. https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2014.7.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2008. "Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe Analyzing French Exceptionalism." *Comparative Politics* 41 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041508x12911362383552.

Lajevardi, Nazita, and Kassra Oskooii. 2018. "Old-Fashioned Racism, Contemporary Islamophobia, and the Isolation of Muslim Americans in the Age of Trump." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics*, no. 3: 112–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2017.37.

Lau, Richard R., and David P. Redlawsk. 2001. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (4): 951. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669334.

Leeper, Thomas, and Matthew Barnfield. 2020. "R-Package 'Cregg' for Simple Conjoint Tidying, Analysis, and Visualization." https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt024>.License.

Leeper, Thomas J., Sara B. Hobolt, and James Tilley. 2019. "Measuring Subgroup Preferences in Conjoint Experiments." *Political Analysis* 27 (3): 1–15.

Lemi, Danielle Casarez, and Nadia E. Brown. 2019. "Melanin and Curls: Evaluation of Black Women Candidates." *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 4 (2): 259–96. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2019.18.

Lerman, Amy E., and Meredith L. Sadin. 2016. "Stereotyping or Projection? How White and Black Voters Estimate Black Candidates' Ideology." *Political Psychology* 37 (2): 147–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12235.

Lim, M., van Oosten, S., & Wan Jaafar, W. M. (2024). Type of primary school attended influences bribe-giving intentions. Public Integrity, 26(3), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2024.2353710

Loukili, Sakina. 2021a. "Fighting Fire with Fire? 'Muslim' Political Parties in the Netherlands Countering Right-Wing Populism in the City of Rotterdam." *Journal of Muslims in Europe*, no. April. https://doi.org/10.1163/22117954-12341409.

———. 2021b. "Making Space , Claiming Place Social Media and the Emergence of the 'Muslim' Political Parties DENK and NIDA in the Netherlands." *Journal for Religion, Film and Media* 7 (2): 107–31. https://doi.org/10.25364/05.7.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *The Journal of Politics*. https://doi.org/10.2307/2647821.

Meer, Nasasr, and Tariq Modood. 2012. "For 'Jewish' Read 'Muslim'? Islamophobia as a Form of Racialisation of Ethno-Religious Groups in Britain Today." *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 1 (1): 34. https://doi.org/10.13169/islastudj.1.1.0034.

Mo, Cecilia Hyunjung. 2015. "The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in the Calculations of Voters." *Political Behavior* 37 (1): 357–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9436-2.

Mullinix, Kevin J., Thomas J. Leeper, James N. Druckman, and Jeremy Freese. 2015. "The Generalizability of Survey Experiments." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2 (2): 109–38. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2015.19.

Otjes, Simon, and André Krouwel. 2019. "Why Do Newcomers Vote for a Newcomer? Support for an Immigrant Party." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45 (7): 1148–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1427053.

Phalet, Karen, Gülseli Baysu, and Maykel Verkuyten. 2010. "Political Mobilization of Dutch Muslims: Religious Identity Salience, Goal Framing, and Normative Constraints." *Journal of Social Issues* 66 (4): 759–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2010.01674.x.

Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Poertner, Mathias. 2022. "Does Political Representation Increase Participation? Evidence from Party Candidate Lotteries in Mexico." *American Political Science Review*, August, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000533.

Portmann, Lea. 2022. "Do Stereotypes Explain Discrimination Against Minority Candidates or Discrimination in Favor of Majority Candidates?" *British Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 501–19. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000800.

Puar, Jasbir. 2013. "Rethinking Homonationalism." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (2): 336–39. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074381300007X.

Robitzsch, Alexander, Simon Grund, and Thorsten Henke. 2021. "Package 'Miceadds.'" *CRAN*. https://doi.org/https://github.com/alexanderrobitzsch/miceadds.

Ruedin, Didier. 2009. "Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National Comparison." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 15 (4): 335–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330903302448.

Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2017. "White Attitudes about Descriptive Representation in the US: The Roles of Identity, Discrimination, and Linked Fate." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5 (1): 84–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2015.1089296.

Schmuck, Desirée, and Jörg Matthes. 2019. "Voting 'Against Islamization'? How Anti-Islamic Right-Wing, Populist Political Campaign Ads Influence Explicit and Implicit Attitudes Toward Muslims as Well as Voting Preferences." *Political Psychology* 40 (4): 739–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12557.

Schneider, Monica C., and Angela L. Bos. 2016. "The Interplay of Candidate Party and Gender in Evaluations of Political Candidates." *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy* 37 (3): 274–294. https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2016.1188598.

Schotel, Anne-Louise. 2022. "A Rainbow Bundestag? An Intersectional Analysis of LGBTI Representation in Angela Merkel's Germany" *German Politics* 31 (1): 101–118 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.1991325

Schwarz, Susanne, and Alexander Coppock. 2022. "What Have We Learned about Gender from Candidate Choice Experiments? A Meta-Analysis of Sixty-Seven Factorial Survey Experiments." *The Journal of Politics* 84 (2).

Simon, Patrick. 2017. "The Failure of the Importation of Ethno-Racial Statistics in Europe: Debates and Controversies." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (13): 2326–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1344278.

Snagovsky, Feodor, Woo Chang Kang, Jillian Sheppard, and Nicholas Biddle. 2020. "Does Descriptive Representation Increase Perceptions of Legitimacy? Evidence from Australia." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 55 (4): 378–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2020.1804834.

Stasio, Valentina Di, Bram Lancee, Susanne Veit, and Ruta Yemane. 2021. "Muslim by Default or Religious Discrimination? Results from a Cross-National Field Experiment on Hiring Discrimination." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47 (6): 1305–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1622826.

Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.*, edited by W. G. Austin & S. Worchel. Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole .

Tate, Katherine. 2003. *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tiberj, Vincent, and Laure Michon. 2013. "Two-Tier Pluralism in 'Colour-Blind' France Two-Tier Pluralism in 'Colour-Blind'" 2382. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.773725.

van Oosten S (2022a) What shapes voter expectations of Muslim politicians' views on homosexuality: stereotyping or projection? *Electoral Studies* 80(December). Elsevier Ltd: 1–11. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102553.

van Oosten, S. (2022b). Stereotyperen kiezers Islamitische politici als homofoob? *Stuk Rood Vlees, 2022(12).* https://stukroodvlees.nl/stereotyperen-kiezers-islamitische-politici-als-homofoob/ Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten, S. (2023a). Which voters stereotype Muslim politicians as homophobic? *ECPR The Loop* 2023(2). https://theloop.ecpr.eu/which-voters-stereotype-muslim-politicians-as-homophobic/ Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten, S. (2023b). Why did the Netherlands vote PVV? *COMPAS Blog,* 2023(12). https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2023/why-did-the-netherlands-vote-for-wilders-pvv-implications-for-migration-policy/ Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten S, Mügge L and Van der Pas D (2024a) Race/Ethnicity in Candidate Experiments: a Meta-Analysis and the Case for Shared Identification. *Acta Politica* 58(1). Palgrave Macmillan UK. DOI: 10.1057/s41269-022-00279-y.

van Oosten S (2024a) Waarom stemmen mensen PVV? *Binnenlands Bestuur 2024(1).* Binnenlands Bestuur B.V. https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/carriere/verbeter-de-economische-positie-van-alle-nederlanders Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten S (2024b) Broadstancers hebben een electoraal voordeel. *Binnenlands Bestuur 2024(2).* Binnenlands Bestuur B.V. https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/negatieve-vooroordeel-tegen-islamitische-politici-verdwijnt-helemaal-wanneer Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten S (2024c) Nationalists Pit Jewish and Muslim People Against Each Other and Why This Needs To Stop. *COMPAS Blog, 2024(2).* https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/article/a-battle-of-rhetoric-and-racism-how-nationalists-pit-jewish-and-muslim-people-against-each-other-and-why-this-needs-to-stop Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten S (2024d) 'Judeonationalisme' als nieuwe beschavingsretoriek. *Binnenlands Bestuur 2024(3).* Binnenlands Bestuur B.V. https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/carriere/judeonationalisme-nadelig-voor-moslims-en-joden Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten S (2024e) Een wapen tegen moslims en links. *Binnenlands Bestuur 2024(6).* Binnenlands Bestuur B.V. https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/carriere/judeonationalisme-speelt-kwetsbare-groepen-tegen-elkaar-uit Accessed 5 August 2024.

van Oosten, S. (2024f). Judeonationalism: Calling out antisemitism to discredit Muslims. ECPR The Loop, 2024(6). https://theloop.ecpr.eu/judeonationalism-antisemitism-for-the-discrediting-of-muslims/ Accessed 5 August 2024

van Oosten S, Mügge L, Hakhverdian A, Van der Pas D and Vermeulen F (2024b) French Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination (EMMAVID) - EMMAVID Data France. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ULQEAY

van Oosten S, Mügge L, Hakhverdian A, Van der Pas D and Vermeulen F (2024c) German Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination (EMMAVID) - EMMAVID Data Germany. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GT4N9J

van Oosten S, Mügge L, Hakhverdian A, Van der Pas D and Vermeulen F (2024d) Dutch Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination (EMMAVID) - EMMAVID Data the Netherlands. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BGVJZQ

van Oosten S, Mügge L, Hakhverdian A, and Van der Pas D (2024e) What explains voting for DENK? Issues, discrimination or in-group favouritism? *Representation* 00(0). Taylor and Francis UK. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2024.2387011.

Verkuyten, Maykel, and Ali Aslan Yildiz. 2009. "Muslim Immigrants and Religious Group Feelings: Self-Identification and Attitudes among Sunni and Alevi Turkish-Dutch." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (7): 1121–1142. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870802379312.

Vermeulen, Floris, Eelco Harteveld, Anja van Heelsum, and Aad van der Veen. 2020. "The Potential of Immigrant Parties: Insights from the Dutch Case." *Acta Politica* 55 (3): 432–53. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-018-0123-z.

Voas, David, and Fenella Fleischmann. 2012. "Islam Moves West: Religious Change in the First and Second Generations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 38 (1): 525–45. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145455.

Wauters, Bram, Nicolas Bouteca, Anna Kern, and Audrey Vandeleene. 2022. "What's on a Party Member's Mind? Voting Motives in Competitive Party Leadership Elections." *Representation*, December, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2022.2158919.

Weichselbaumer, Doris. 2020. "Multiple Discrimination against Female Immigrants Wearing Headscarves." *ILR Review* 73 (3): 600–627. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919875707.

Wickham, Hadley. 2020. "Package ' Tidyr .'" Cran. https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tidyr/tidyr.pdf.

Wickham, Hadley, Winston Chang, Lionel Henry, Thomas Lin Pedersen, Kohske Takahashi, Claus Wilke, Kara Woo, Hiroaki Yutani, and Dewey Dunnington. 2020. "Package 'Ggplot2.'" Cran. https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/ggplot2/ggplot2.pdf.

Williams, Melissa S. 2000. *Voice, Trust and Memory. Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Young, Iris Marion. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yurdakul, Gökçe. 2009. *From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany*. Newcastle upon Tyne.