A new cultural cleavage? Anti-transgender attitudes and the 2024 US presidential election

Jack Thompson[1]

[1]Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds

October 12, 2025

Abstract

Despite growing public acceptance of LGB rights, transgender rights have become a focal point of partisan polarization in the US, raising questions about their relative electoral impact. This paper examines the rising electoral salience of anti-transgender attitudes in the 2024 US presidential election, positing that they have surpassed anti-LGB attitudes as a predictor of Republican vote choice. Drawing on data from the 2024 ANES, I test whether affective orientations toward transgender individuals and opposition to transgender-inclusive policies more strongly predict support for Trump in the 2024 US presidential election compared to attitudes toward LGB individuals. Overall, I find that negative estimations of transgender individuals and opposition to pro-transgender policies are significantly associated with vote choice for Trump, outpacing analogous anti-LGB measures. This shift reflects a realignment in social conservative priorities. My findings highlight that issues surrounding gender identity are emerging as a new cultural cleavage, reshaping identity politics and partisan polarization in US elections, with implications for understanding evolving voter behavior and cultural backlash.

Keywords: LGBT politics; voting behavior; public opinion.

Introduction

Over the past decade, public opinion on transgender issues in the US has shifted from growing support toward increasing polarization, driven by a series of increasingly contentious cultural, legal, and political debates. While a majority of the public favors nondiscrimination laws in employment and housing for transgender individuals, unease has risen over policies such as gender-affirming care for minors and transgender sports participation (Gallup 2024, Pew Research Center 2025, PRRI 2025). This shift in public opinion aligns with recent legal battles, such as the 2020 Supreme Court ruling in *Bostock v. Clayton County*, which extended federal workplace protections to transgender employees, contrasted by the 2025 *United States v. Skrmetti* decision upholding Tennessee's ban on gender-affirming care for minors. Republican-led initiatives - including Trump administration policies limiting transgender military service, and 122 anti-trans state bills passed in 2025 so far (Tracker 2025) – have also intensified.

The evolving landscape of public opinion and legal restrictions on transgender rights has set the stage for anti-trans attitudes to emerge as a salient mobilizing factor in contemporary US elections, potentially outpacing the influence of attitudes towards lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals. As public acceptance of LGB rights has grown (Flores 2014), opposition to transgender-specific policies - such as gender-affirming care for minors and transgender sports participation - has become a focal point for Republican political mobilization, resonating with voters concerned about cultural change (Castle 2019).[1] This divergence is evident in political messaging and rhetoric (Congressional Equality Caucus 2025, Campbell-Fox et al. 2024, Turnbull-Dugarte & McMillan 2023), where GOP elites increasingly emphasize anti-trans policies, leveraging growing pub-

[1]Though I posit that anti-LGB attitudes have diminished as a predictor of Republican vote choice due to the growing normalization of LGB identities, pockets of resistance to pro-LGB policies likely persist - particularly among groups where anti-LGB sentiment still holds electoral salience. Still, my argument is that the broader cultural and legal mainstreaming of LGB identities - evidenced by landmark rulings such as *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015) and widespread media representation - suggests that anti-LGB attitudes are becoming less potent as a mobilizing force compared to the emotionally charged and less socially constrained opposition to trans rights.

lic unease towards some pro-transgender policies observed in public opinion surveys (Gallup 2024, Pew Research Center 2025, PRRI 2025). Unlike anti-LGB attitudes, which may have waned as an electoral driver of Republican support due to greater cultural, legal, and social normalization, anti-trans sentiment offers a fresh wedge issue, thereby amplifying partisan polarization and shaping Republican voter preferences in ways that may redefine the electoral salience of identity politics.

In this paper, I argue that anti-trans attitudes emerged as a stronger predictor of Republican vote choice in 2024 than anti-LGB attitudes. I posit that anti-trans attitudes are not only distinct in their electoral impact but also reflect a broader realignment of social conservative priorities within the Republican base. While opposition to LGB rights has historically unified Republican voters (Daniels 2019), the increasing normalization of LGB identities may have diminished their salience as a mobilizing force, whereas anti-trans sentiment has gained traction as a potent wedge issue. I hypothesize that anti-trans attitudes are more strongly associated with Republican electoral mobilization due to their ongoing alignment with anxieties about cultural change and perceived threats to traditional norms.[2] My paper therefore tests whether anti-trans attitudes, as opposed to anti-LGB attitudes, more significantly shaped voter preferences in the 2024 election.

Empirically, I draw on data from the 2024 ANES. Across my models of presidential vote choice, I find that affective orientations toward transgender individuals and opposition to transgender-inclusive policies are significantly and consistently associated with support for Trump in 2024 - more so than analogous measures of affect and policy opposition toward LGB individuals. This pattern of results suggests that transgender issues may have overtaken LGB issues as an important cultural cleavage shaping electoral behavior in 2024. Importantly, anti-trans effects are rivalled by sociotropic evaluations and racial resentment, suggesting that, while transgender issues are emerging as a potent cultural

[2]Importantly, while my paper focuses on associations between attitudes and vote choice, I treats these links as reciprocal and mutually reinforcing rather than strictly causal. That is, anti-trans attitudes may both shape and be shaped by partisan identification and elite messaging, reflecting feedback effects between mass opinion and party strategies.

wedge, they operate alongside other key drivers of vote choice. Together, these findings provide evidence that the politicization of transgender rights may have crystallized into a new and electorally consequential dimension of partisan conflict in the US.

My paper advances current understanding of US political behavior in three ways. First, it suggests that anti-trans attitudes may have surpassed anti-LGB attitudes as a predictor of Republican vote choice, signalling a shift in the hierarchy of cultural issues driving polarization (Egan 2020). Second, it contributes to research on identity politics by illustrating how anxieties surrounding gender identity have been strategically leveraged as wedge issues to mobilize voters (Fetner 2008, McAdam & Kloos 2014, Brewer 2003). In doing so, it builds on scholarship demonstrating how moralized identity threats, particularly those tied to gender and sexuality, structure affective polarization and partisan sorting (Mason 2018, Huddy et al. 2015). Finally, it extends the literature on cultural backlash by highlighting how Republican elites have reoriented their electoral strategy around the defense of "traditional" gender norms, transforming trans rights into a symbolic battleground over cultural authority and moral order (Gidron & Hall 2020, Inglehart & Norris 2016, Mutz 2018).

Evolving Public Opinion and Elite Leadership on Transgender Issues

By the mid-2010s, public opinion began shifting toward greater acceptance of some transgender rights, driven by increased visibility and elite-driven policy advocacy. For instance, public opinion surveys illustrated strong support for nondiscrimination protections in areas such as employment and housing (Marist Poll 2016). Elite leadership played in important part in this evolution, with the Obama administration advancing transgender-inclusive policies such as the 2016 guidance allowing transgender students to use facilities matching their gender identities (US Department of Justice and US Department of Edu-

cation 2016).[3] In addition, media portrayals, including high-profile cases such as Caitlyn Jenner, further normalized transgender identities among the wider public (Miller et al. 2020).

Since 2020, public opinion on transgender rights has entered a phase of polarization, with elite leadership amplifying divisions to mobilize voters. While overall support for nondiscrimination protections remains high among the wider public, specific policies such as gender-affirming care for minors and transgender sports participation have become political flashpoints (Gallup 2024, Pew Research Center 2025, PRRI 2025). Republican elites have strategically escalated anti-trans rhetoric around these issues, leveraging moral panic frameworks to portray transgender rights as a threat to children, families, and societal norms (Pepin-Neff & Cohen 2021).[4] This approach draws on historical tactics used in culture wars, where emotionally-charged issues are leveraged to galvanize conservative voters (Fetner 2008, Layman 2001). For instance, notable campaigns in states such as Florida and Texas have centered on legislation restricting gender-affirming care for minors, such as Florida's 2022 "Don't Say Gay" bill and Texas's SB 14 in 2023, which bans such care for those under 18 (Tracker 2025). These policies are often accompanied by rhetoric portraying transgender individuals as undermining traditional gender roles or endangering youth, a tactic that resonates with socially conservative voters and may drive turnout (Ayoub & Page 2020).

Conversely, Democratic elites have doubled down on inclusion for transgender individuals, emphasizing civil rights and healthcare access, though their messaging often struggles to counter the emotional resonance of Republican narratives. For instance, the Democratic Party's 2024 platform explicitly committed to expanding access to gender-

[3]Still, early indications of polarization emerged from state-level efforts such as South Carolina's 2016 "bathroom bill" (H.B. 3018), which sought to restrict transgender individuals' access to restrooms based on their sex assigned at birth, highlighting tensions with federal transgender-inclusive policies.

[4]While moral panic theory (Cohen 2011) effectively explains the role of elite-driven anti-trans rhetoric in amplifying public unease, it is important not to understate top-down manipulation and grassroots anxieties, such as those stemming from parents' concerns about youth healthcare or religious communities' defence of traditional gender norms (Amery & Mondon 2025).

affirming care, including federal health plan coverage for hormone therapy and surgery, while reversing Trump-era discriminatory policies in the military and healthcare (TransLash 2024). Yet post-2024 election analyses highlight messaging pitfalls. Harris largely sidestepped Republican anti-trans ads, leading to internal party debates over whether to frame transgender rights as a core civil rights issue or adapt to voter unease, with strategists noting that Democratic responses often come across as dismissive rather than empathetic to public concerns about fairness in sports or youth healthcare (Nagourney & Nehamas 2024). This has fuelled perceptions of Democrats as prioritizing "inclusivity" over relatable family issues, amplifying the emotional pull of Republican framing around child protection and "biological truth" (Sapir 2024). The sum of this polarization has been to elevate anti-trans attitudes as a key electoral wedge issue, particularly among Republican voters.

Although public opinion on transgender rights has polarized sharply since 2020, it is important to recognize that, in terms of issue salience, transgender rights have historically occupied a relatively low position among the American public's priorities. As aforenoted, public opinion surveys consistently demonstrate that most Americans support nondiscrimination protections (PRRI 2024). However, only a small fraction view transgender rights as an urgent national issue, and many believe political elites devote too much attention to it (Pew Research Center 2022, 2025, The 19th 2025, YouGov 2025). Nonetheless, Republican elites and media outlets have elevated the symbolic visibility of transgender issues far beyond their objective salience (Flores et al. 2018). Through selective amplification of emotionally charged topics – for instance youth healthcare, school sports, and restroom access - political and media elites have reframed a once-marginal social issue into a defining partisan identity marker (Lewis et al. 2024). This tension between low public salience and high symbolic salience is crucial to understanding how elite cueing and moral panic have transformed transgender rights into a central partisan boundary by 2024 (Bishin et al. 2020).[5]

[5]These mechanisms should not be understood as purely top-down processes. Public attitudes toward transgender rights likely interact with elite strategies in a feedback loop: as voters respond

Three theoretical mechanisms shed light on the evolution of public opinion and elite leadership towards transgender issues. First, issue evolution theory (Carmines & Stimson 1989) accounts for how low-salience issues become enduring partisan divides once political elites consistently attach partisan cues to them. As elites and activists strategically emphasize certain policy stances, voters internalize these cues, reshaping party coalitions around the issue. In the case of transgender rights, elite messaging has reframed questions of gender identity, medical care, and public access as defining ideological boundaries, transforming attitudes toward transgender people into a reliable indicator of partisan identity (Jones & Brewer 2020).

Second, *agenda-setting theory* (McCombs & Shaw 1972) highlights how media and political elites influence which transgender-related topics gain public visibility and political traction. Media attention has concentrated heavily on emotionally charged issues - such as youth gender-affirming healthcare, school sports participation, and restroom access - while comparatively neglecting less contentious areas like employment or housing protections (Billard 2019). This selective amplification shapes not only public salience but also the interpretive frames through which citizens engage these issues, often invoking moral or protective narratives that heighten perceived urgency and conflict (Westbrook & Schilt 2014).

Finally, moral panic theory (Cohen 2011) explains the rapid escalation of anti-trans sentiment through processes in which elites and media actors construct transgender rights as a symbolic threat to social order. Fear-based framing—particularly around children, family values, and public safety—mobilizes voters and justifies restrictive policies, creating a cycle of heightened anxiety and legislative response (Amery & Mondon 2025). Contemporary evidence indicates that these dynamics are intensified by partisan media ecosystems and social media amplification, which spread misinformation and reinforce

to partisan framing, their reactions in turn incentivize further elite emphasis on the issue. This iterative process complicates causal attribution, underscoring that mass polarization on transgender issues is both a product and a driver of elite polarization.

echo chambers of moral outrage (Farris & Silber Mohamed 2018). Taken together, these mechanisms reveal a feedback loop in which elite cueing, media salience, and moral panic interact to solidify partisan divisions and sustain the politicization of transgender rights over time.

In sum, the co-evolution of public opinion and elite leadership on trans issues has potentially significant implications for US electoral politics. As LGB rights gain broader acceptance, anti-trans attitudes have become a more potent mobilizing force, particularly for Republicans seeking to energize their base. The strategic focus on transgender issues as a wedge reflects a broader realignment in social conservative priorities, where cultural anxieties about gender identity increasingly overshadow older debates about sexuality. This shift underscores the power of elite cues in shaping public opinion (Zaller 1992) and highlights the challenges for advocates of transgender rights in countering emotionally charged narratives. By 2024, the salience of anti-trans attitudes in Republican vote choice signals a new phase in the politics of identity, where transgender rights serve as a battleground for competing visions of American society.

Anti Trans Issues in the 2024 Election

The partisan polarization surrounding transgender rights that intensified through the late 2010s and early 2020s reached full electoral expression in the 2024 campaign. The mechanisms outlined in the previous section – namely, elite cueing, selective media salience, and moral panic – have transformed transgender rights from a relatively low-salience social concern into a defining partisan boundary. As elite rhetoric and media framing link transgender visibility to broader narratives about parental rights, fairness, and moral decline, attitudes toward transgender people have become powerful signals of partisan alignment. The 2024 election therefore represents a culmination of this process, as Republican elites explicitly mobilized anti-trans sentiment as a core element of their culture-war

agenda.

By 2024, the Republican Party largely moved beyond opposition to LGB rights, which had lost mobilizing potential following the mainstreaming of same-sex marriage and increasing public acceptance of LGB individuals (Egan 2020, Rauch 2024). In place of these diminishing wedge issues, party elites reframed transgender rights as emblematic of progressive overreach - connecting them to anxieties about education, healthcare, and gender norms. This strategic shift positioned transgender inclusion as a moral and social threat, reinforcing conservative voters' perceptions of defending tradition and family values against liberal cultural imposition (Castle 2019, Kay & Dimakis 2024). State-level policy campaigns reflected this reframing. Legislation restricting bathroom access, banning gender-affirming care for minors, and excluding transgender athletes from sports were widely promoted as efforts to "protect children" and "defend women's spaces" (Jones 2025). Such policies extended beyond their immediate scope - they served as symbolic resistance to perceived elite moral decay. This alignment of policy, rhetoric, and identity made opposition to transgender rights an efficient vehicle for partisan mobilization.

If elite polarization and issue evolution have indeed recast transgender rights as a central partisan divide, then attitudes toward transgender individuals and related policies should now exert stronger influence on Republican vote choice than attitudes toward LGB individuals. While discomfort or prejudice toward LGB people persists, explicit opposition has become socially costly and less electorally effective (Egan 2020). Contrastingly, anti-trans attitudes remain more publicly acceptable within conservative discourse, particularly when framed in moral or protective terms (Flores et al. 2021). This suggests that affective and cognitive evaluations of transgender individuals – for instance, discomfort, perceived threat, or disapproval - should now be more tightly coupled to Republican identification and vote choice than analogous evaluations of LGB people.

H1a: Estimations of transgender individuals are more strongly associated with vote choice

for Trump than estimations of LGB individuals.

Similarly, opposition to transgender-inclusive policies should be a stronger predictor of Republican support than opposition to LGB rights. While same-sex marriage and employment nondiscrimination have become settled issues for much of the electorate, policies surrounding gender-affirming care, restroom access, and sports participation remain active flashpoints. These policy stances function as ideological signals within the broader "parental rights" and "biological truth" narratives that dominate Republican cultural messaging (Campbell-Fox et al. 2024, Turnbull-Dugarte & McMillan 2023). Consistent with partisan sorting theory (Mason 2018), I expect that individuals who oppose transgender-inclusive policies are more likely to align with the Republican Party in 2024.

H1b: Opposition to transgender rights is more strongly associated with vote choice for Trump than opposition to LGB rights.

To test the relative influence of anti-trans attitudes in the 2024 election, it is useful to compare their effects against established predictors of vote choice, such as voters' sociotropic and egotropic economic evaluations, as well as candidate specific factors, such as racial resentment and modern sexism. This comparison is important because it contextualizes the role of an emerging cultural wedge issue such as transgender rights within the broader landscape of electoral determinants, revealing whether anti-trans sentiment represents a potent new axis of polarization, or remains secondary to longstanding factors such as economic performance and identity-based prejudices.

Economic evaluations have long been robust predictors of vote choice in U.S. presidential elections, with sociotropic assessments often exerting a stronger influence than egotropic ones, as voters tend to reward or punish incumbents based on national economic conditions rather than purely personal finances (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2000,

Kinder & Kiewiet 1981). For Trump specifically, racial resentment - reflecting symbolic attitudes toward racial equality and perceived grievances - has been a key driver of support (Schaffner et al. 2018, Sides et al. 2019). Similarly, modern sexism, which captures ambivalent or subtle biases against women's roles in society, has predicted opposition to female candidates and is correlated with Republican vote choice (Deckman & Cassese 2021, McThomas & Tesler 2016, Knuckey 2019). Crucially, both racial resentment and modern sexism may be particularly relevant in contests involving women such as Harris, whose identity as a woman of color intersects with both sexist and racial resentments to heighten their relevance (Knuckey & Mathews 2024). However, while anti-trans attitudes have gained symbolic salience through elite-driven moral panics, their overall public priority remains low compared to economic concerns, with surveys indicating that transgender issues rank among the least important to voters' decisions (Gallup 2024). This suggests that, despite their mobilizing potential for conservative base turnout, the magnitude of anti-trans effects on vote choice may be comparable to that of racial resentment and modern sexism - serving as identity-reinforcing signals in a polarized electorate - but likely smaller than sociotropic economic evaluations, which consistently dominate as a retrospective accountability mechanisms and were likely to be particularly salient given voters' poor perceptions of the economy under Biden (Pew Research Center 2024).

H2: The magnitude of the effect of anti-trans attitudes on vote choice for Trump is comparable to that of racial resentment and modern sexism but smaller than that of sociotropic economic evaluations.

Taken together, my hypotheses translate the macro-level processes of elite polarization and moral panic into micro-level expectations about voter behavior in 2024. The politicization of transgender rights - shaped by elite cueing, selective media salience, and populist moral framing - suggests that anti-trans attitudes now serve as a central axis of parti-

san differentiation in American politics. The 2024 election thus provides a useful context to evaluate how far this new frontier of the culture wars has restructured the relationship between identity, morality, and vote choice.

Data and Methods

Data

To test my hypotheses, data are taken from the American National Election (ANES) 2024 Time Series Study. The 2024 ANES is a nationally-representative, random probability-based mixed mode study composed of face-to-face, web video, phone, and paper-and-pencil interviews (N = 5,221) (ANES 2025). The survey is composed of a pre-election wave, with data collected between August 3, 2024, through November 5, 2024, and a post-election wave, with data collected between November 7, 2024, thru February 17, 2025 (ANES 2025). Because the vote choice items are measured in the post-election wave of the 2024 ANES, I limit my sample to respondents who took part in the post-election wave of the survey (N = 4,964). I handle missing data in the ANES – either "don't know" responses or nonresponse – via listwise deletion of cases. Further, all my multivariate analyses use the post-election full sample weight (item `V240107b`) to ensure that inferences are generalizable to the US adult population.[6]

Dependent Measure

Presential vote choice is operationalized with an item that asks respondents which candidate they voted for in the November election for President. Possible options were 1 =

[6]Because the 2024 ANES data are cross-sectional, my models identify associational rather than causal relationships. While I cannot determine the temporal ordering between attitudes and vote choice with certainty, I interpret these results within a theoretical framework of reciprocal influence—where both elite cueing and prior partisan alignment shape the development of anti-trans attitudes, which in turn reinforce electoral behavior

"Kamala Harris," 2 = "Donald Trump," 4 = "Cornel West," 5 = "Jill Stein," or 6 = "Another candidate." To simplify my analysis, I model two-party vote choice (1 = "Donald Trump," 0 = "Kamala Harris"). Excluding minor candidates, such as third-party or independent options, reduces noise in the data and aligns with the practical reality that such candidates rarely influence electoral outcomes significantly.[7]

Affect Towards Transgender and LGB Individuals

To measure group-based affect, I include two 101-point feeling thermometers that tap into respondents' feelings toward transgender individuals, as well as gays and lesbians. A rating of 100 is indicative of "very warm or favorable feelings," while a rating of 0 is indicative of "very cool or unfavorable feelings."

Opposition to Transgender and LGB Rights

The 2024 ANES contains three items that tap into public opinion on transgender rights. The first item is a 7-point ordinal measure that asks whether respondents support or oppose transgender people using the bathroom that matches their gender identity, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "favor a great deal," to 7 = "oppose a great deal." The second item is a 7-point ordinal measure that asks whether respondents favor or oppose banning transgender girls from K-12 girls sports, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "favor a great deal," to 7 = "oppose a great deal." The third item is a 7-point ordinal item that asks respondents whether they favor or oppose transgender people serving in the military, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "favor a great deal," to 7 = "oppose a great deal." The second item is reverse coded so that higher values indicate

[7]To assess the robustness of the two-party vote choice model, I estimate a series of additional models that include independent and third-party candidates in the reference category alongside Kamala Harris; however, the results are substantively similar to those obtained from the original dichotomized models. These additional models are presented in section **A** of the Supplemental Information.

greater opposition to trans rights. I then sum the three items and average them into a composite index opposition to transgender rights (Cronbach's α = .77).

For public opinion on LGB rights, the 2024 ANES contains two items. The first item is a 6-point ordinal item asking respondents how strongly they feel about whether or not gay/lesbian couples should be allowed to adopt children, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "feels very strongly gay/lesbian couples should be permitted to adopt," to 6 = "feels very strongly gay/lesbian couples should not be permitted to adopt." The second item is a 7-point ordinal item asking respondents whether favor or oppose the right of gay and lesbian couples to marry legally, with possible options ranging between 1 = "favor a great deal," to 7 = "oppose a great deal." Because the two items are measured on different scales, I z-transform both items to ensure that each contributes equally to the composite score.[8] After transformation, I sum and average the two items into a composite index of opposition to LGB rights (Cronbach's α = .85).[9]

Covariates

Models also include several covariates. For voters' sociotropic and egotropic evaluations, I include two items. For sociotropic evaluations, I include a 5-point ordinal item that

[8]By converting each item to a standard normal distribution (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1), z-transformation eliminates biases that could arise from differing ranges or variances. This allows for a more accurate and balanced representation of the underlying construct in the composite anti-LGB measure.

[9]To test whether these indices are tapping into distinct constructs, I perform two tests. First, a bivariate analysis between the two indices yields a moderate positive correlation between the two indices (r = .55, p = <.001) suggesting that, while opposition to transgender rights and LGB rights share come commonality, their distinctives is supported since the correlation is not excessively high. This aligns with my expectation that the indices reflect related-but-separate opposition. Second, I perform confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test my theoretically proposed structure that opposition to trans rights (measured by opposition to bathrooms, K-12 sports, serving in the military) and opposition to LGB rights (measured by opposition to adoption, opposition to same-sex marriage) represent separate latent constructs, and to compare this model against a single-factor alternative to confirm their distinctiveness. Overall, the CFA results strongly support my expectation that opposition to transgender rights and opposition to LGB rights are distinct constructs, with the two-factor model (CFI = 0.974, TLI = 0.934, SRMR = 0.032) fitting significantly better than the one-factor model (χ^2 diff = 1006.3, p = <.001), evidenced by strong factor loadings and a moderate latent factor correlation (0.690).

asks respondents whether they think the national economy has gotten better or worse in the past year, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "much better," to 5 = "much worse." For egotropic evaluations, I include a 5-point ordinal item that asks respondents how much better or worse off they are financially compared to a year ago, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "much better off," to 5 = "much worse off."

Models also include measures of racial resentment and hostile sexism. The racial resentment scale is composed of four items. The first item asks respondents whether they think Blacks should work their way up without any special favors. The second item asks respondents whether they think past slavery and discrimination has made it difficult for Blacks. The third item asks respondents whether they think Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. The fourth item asks respondents whether they think if Blacks tried harder, they would be as well off as whites. All four items are 5-point ordinal measures, with possible responses ranging between 1 = "strongly agree," to 5 = "strongly disagree." Items one and four are reversed coded so that higher values indicate greater resentment. After recoding, the items are summed and then averaged into a composite index of racial resentment (Cronbach's $\alpha = .91$).

The modern sexism scale is composed of two items. The first item asks respondents whether they think women demanding equality seek special favors. The second item asks respondents whether they think women complaining about discrimination cause more problems. Both items are 5-point ordinal items ranging between 1 = "always," to 5 = "never." Both items are reverse coded so that higher values indicate higher levels of sexism. After recoding, the items are summed and averaged into a composite index of modern sexism (Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$)

Lastly, I include sociopolitical, demographic, and structural covariates. Models control for party ID (7-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = "strong Democrat," to 7 = "strong Republican"), ideology (7-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = "extremely liberal," to 7 = "extremely conservative"), race (1 = "white, non-Hispanic," 0 = "other

race"), age (in years), gender (1 = "female," 0 = "male"), education (5-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = "less than high school graduate," to 5 = "graduate degree"), family income (28-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = "less than $5,000," to 28 = "$250,000 or more"), frequency of religious service attendance (5-point ordinal item ranging between 1 = "never," to 5 = "every week"), and region (1 = "South," 0 = "non-South").

Results

Group-Based Affect and Policy Opposition

First, **H1a** posited that estimations of transgender individuals would be more strongly associated with vote choice for Trump than estimations of gays and lesbians. To test whether estimations of transgender individuals are more strongly associated with vote choice for Trump, I estimate the effect of each thermometer on the probability of voting for Trump and compare their relative magnitudes. I do this by specifying a linear probability model (LPM) that estimates vote choice for Trump as a function of both thermometers, as well as my set of covariates. For each thermometer, I then generate predicted probabilities of voting for Trump across the full range of each measure (i.e., from 0 to 100 on each thermometer). I quantify the strength of association as the difference in the predicted probability of voting for Trump between the lowest and highest values of each thermometer, representing the total change in support attributable to variation in that thermometer rating. To compare the relative influence of estimations of transgender individuals and gays and lesbians, I evaluate which thermometer produces the largest difference in the predicted probability of voting for Trump. This approach captures the practical significance of each thermometer in driving vote choice in 2024. The results are presented below in **Figure 1**.

First, the left panel in **Figure 1** graphs the predicted probability of voting for Trump as a function of the feeling thermometer for transgender individuals. As evidenced here,

Figure 1: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of Affect Towards Transgender Individuals and Gays/Lesbians



Notes: Points represented the predicted probability of voting for Trump as a function of affect towards transgender individuals and gays/lesbians. The vertical lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Predicted values calculated by holding all other variables in model constant or at their respective mean values. Full model output presented in section **B** of the Supplemental Information.

a respondent who gives transgender individuals a score of 0 on the thermometer (i.e., "very cool or unfavorable feelings") has a .48 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Contrastingly, a respondent who gives transgender individuals a score of 100 on the thermometer (i.e., "very warm or favorable feelings") has a .39 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Therefore, moving from the lowest to highest values on the transgender feeling thermometer is associated with a 9-point decrease in the predicted probability of voting for Trump in 2024 (contrast p = <.001). Turning the right panel in Figure 1, a respondent who gives gays and lesbians a score of 0 on the thermometer has a .42 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Conversely, a respondent who gives gays and lesbians a score of 100 on the thermometer has .44 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Therefore, moving from the lowest to the highest values on the thermometer for gays and lesbians is associated with a 2-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for

Trump (contrast n/s).

The results from **Figure 1** support the logic of **H1a** in that they suggest that estimations of transgender individuals have a more substantial influence on Republican vote choice in 2024 compared to estimations of gays and lesbians. The significant decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump as feelings toward transgender individuals become more favorable suggests that estimations of transgender individuals were a substantive factor in shaping support for Trump. This effect is both statistically robust and practically meaningful, pointing to transgender-related attitudes as a potential wedge issue that could mobilize support for Trump. Conversely, estimations of gays and lesbians exhibit a minimal and non-significant impact on Trump support, suggesting that this group's salience in driving vote choice is somewhat limited.

Next, **H1b** posited that opposition to transgender rights will be more strongly associated with vote choice for Trump than opposition to LGB rights. To test this possibility, I re-estimate by vote choice model by replacing the group thermometers with my composite measures gauging opposition to transgender rights and opposition to LGB rights. After estimation, I once again generate predicted probabilities of voting for Trump across the full range of each measure. The results are presented below in **Figure 2**.

I begin by assessing the impact of opposition to transgender rights on vote choice for Trump. These results are presented in the left-hand panel in **Figure 2**. As evidenced here, a respondent who is the least opposed to transgender rights has a .35 predicted probability of voting for Trump. By contrast, a respondent who is the most opposed to transgender rights has a .50 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Thus, moving from least to most opposed on the scale gauging opposition to transgender rights is associated with a 15-point increase in the predicted probability of having voted for Trump (contrast p = <.001). Turning to the right-hand panel in **Figure 2**, a respondent who is the least opposed to LGB rights has a .44 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Conversely, a respondent who is the most opposed to LGB rights has a .42 predicted probability of

Figure 2: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of Policy Oppositions Towards Transgender and LGB Rights



Notes: Points represented the predicted probability of voting for Trump as a function of opposition to transgender rights and LGB rights. The vertical lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Predicted values calculated by holding all other variables in model constant or at their respective mean values. Full model output presented in section **B** of the Supplemental Information.

voting for Trump. Consequently, moving from least to most opposed on the scale gauging opposition to LGB rights is associated with a .2 decrease in the predicted probability of having voted for Trump (contrast n/s).

Overall, the findings from **Figure 2** provide support for **H1b**. Specifically, the statistically significant increase in the predicted probability of having voted for Trump as opposition to transgender rights intensifies suggests such views were a salient predictor of electoral behavior in 2024. Contrastingly, opposition to LGB rights shows a negligible and non-significant impact on vote choice for Trump, indicating that attitudes toward LGB rights were less consequential in driving vote choice in 2024.

Putting The Magnitude of Anti-Trans Attitudes in Context

The results from the previous section demonstrate that anti-transgender attitudes, including negative estimations of transgender individuals and opposition to transgender rights, are more strongly associated with voting for Trump in 2024 than anti-LGB attitudes. However, it is also useful to assess the predictive power of anti-transgender attitudes relative to other factors that likely influenced vote choice in 2024 (**H2**). To this end, I generate additional predicted probabilities for several of my covariates – namely voters' sociotropic and egotropic evaluations, levels of racial resentment, and levels of modern sexism. The logic of these additional estimations is threefold. First, economic evaluations are long-established predictors of vote choice, often outweighing other factors in retrospective voting models. Second, in the context of Trump running against Harris, a woman of color, racial resentment may capture attitudes towards Harris's racial and ethnic identity that could drive support for Trump. Finally, modern sexism captures attitudes towards Harris's gender and the gendered rhetoric often associated with Trump.

I begin with by comparing relative effect sizes in the vote choice model with the transgender thermometer. The results are presented below in **Figure 3**. In this model, the baseline comparison is the 9-point change in the predicted probability of voting for Trump as one moves from least to most favorable on the thermometer measure (contrast $p = <.001$). Turning to voters' sociotropic evaluations, a respondent who thought that the national economy was "much better" compared to a year before has a .31 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Conversely, a respondent who thought that the national economy was "much worse" compared to a year ago has a .50 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Therefore, moving from better to worse evaluations of the national economy is associated with a 19-point increase in the predicted probability of having voted for Trump (contrast $p = <.001$). Elsewhere, moving from the best to the worst evaluations of a respondent's personal financial situation is associated with an 8-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump (contrast $p = <.001$), moving from the least to the most resentful

on the racial resentment scale is associated with a 17-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump (contrast p = <.001), while moving from the least to the most sexist on the modern sexism scale is associated with a 6-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump (contrast p = <.05).

Figure 3: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of Affect Towards Transgender Individuals, Sociotropic/Egotropic Evaluations, Racial Resentment, and Modern Sexism



Notes: Points represented the predicted probability of voting for Trump as a function of affect towards transgender individuals, sociotropic and egotropic evaluations, racial resentment, and modern sexism. The vertical lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Predicted values calculated by holding all other variables in model constant or at their respective mean values.

Of the four covariates, sociotropic economic evaluations demonstrate a substantially larger effect size, with a shift from positive to negative evaluations producing a significantly greater increase in the likelihood of voting for Trump relative to the transgender thermometer. Likewise, racial resentment also exhibits a strong effect, with a shift from

least to most resentful yielding a larger increase in Trump support than the transgender thermometer. Conversely, egotropic economic evaluations and modern sexism have smaller effect sizes relative to the transgender thermometer, with shifts in these attitudes resulting in more modest increases in the probability of voting for Trump. Overall, then, while affect towards transgender individuals is a substantive predictor of vote choice for Trump, sociotropic economic evaluations and racial resentment exhibit stronger relative effects, with modern sexism and egotropic evaluations playing comparatively lesser roles in driving Trump support.

Next, I compare relative effect sizes in the vote choice model with the index of opposition to transgender rights. These results are presented below in **Figure 4**. Here, the baseline comparison is the 15-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump as one moves from being the least to the most opposed to transgender rights (contrast p = <.001). Beginning with voters' sociotropic evaluations, moving from the best to the worst evaluations of the national economy is associated with a 17-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump (contrast p = <.001). Meanwhile, moving from the best to the worst evaluations of a respondent's personal financial situation is associated with a 7-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump (contrast p = <.001), while moving from being the least to the most resentful on the racial resentment scale is associated with a 12-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump (p = <.001). Lastly, moving from the least to the most sexist on the modern sexism scale is associated with a 4-point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump (contrast n/s).

Comparing the relative effect sizes of other covariates, sociotropic economic evaluations yield a slightly larger increase in Trump support, suggesting that economic concerns about the nation's performance were a marginally stronger driver of vote choice than opposition to transgender rights. Racial resentment also has a significant but somewhat smaller effect compared to opposition to transgender rights, indicating that atti-

Figure 4: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of Policy Opposition Towards Transgender Rights, Sociotropic/Egotropic Evaluations, Racial Resentment, and Modern Sexism



Notes: Points represented the predicted probability of voting for Trump as a function of opposition to transgender rights, sociotropic and egotropic evaluations, racial resentment, and modern sexism. The vertical lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Predicted values calculated by holding all other variables in model constant or at their respective mean values.

tudes toward race were influential but less dominant than economic perceptions or anti-transgender sentiment. Meanwhile, egotropic economic evaluations exhibit a notably smaller effect size, implying that individual economic concerns were less predictive of Trump support. Finally, modern sexism has the smallest and least statistically significant effect, suggesting that gender-based attitudes played a minimal role relative to other factors. Overall, then, opposition to transgender rights appears to be a strong predictor of Trump support, closely rivalled by sociotropic economic evaluations, with racial resentment moderately influential, while personal economic concerns and sexism contribute

less substantially to explaining vote choice.

Are Anti-LGB Attitudes Really No Longer Predictive?

To further assess my finding that anti-LGB attitudes are relatively weak predictors of vote choice for Trump in 2024, I conduct a series of further analyses to probe the stability of this result across alternate model specifications, variable constructions, and population subgroups. These tests address potential concerns – namely, model misspecification, measurement artifacts, and heterogeneity in voter attitudes - which might otherwise mask or distort the influence of anti-LGB attitudes on vote choice. Thus, I evaluate whether the diminished electoral salience of anti-LGB attitudes reflects a genuine shift in voter priorities - consistent with the broader normalization of LGB rights - or if this finding is sensitive to methodological choices.

In my first test, I estimate separate models for anti-LGB and anti-trans attitudes, including both feeling thermometers and policy opposition composites. This approach addresses potential multicollinearity, as anti-LGB and anti-trans attitudes are moderately correlated.[10] Therefore, I estimate models i) trans thermometer only, ii) LGB thermometer only, iii) trans policy opposition only, and iv) LGB policy opposition only. By isolating each attitude, I am able to assess their independent predictive power and compare their significance and effect sizes. This strategy ensures that any non-significant effect of anti-LGB attitudes is not an artifact of collinearity with anti-trans attitudes, providing a clearer test of whether anti-LGB attitudes retains electoral relevance or has indeed been overshadowed by anti-trans sentiment in 2024. Overall, the separate models yield results consistent with the main findings, confirming that anti-LGB attitudes - both affect and

[10]While this study posits that anti-trans attitudes have surpassed anti-LGB attitudes as a driver of Republican vote choice, it is possible that these attitudes coexist or interact, potentially sharing moral foundations such as traditionalism or intersecting with other identity-based prejudices (Flores et al. 2021). Recent public opinion also suggest some backsliding in LGB acceptance among certain groups post-2020, particularly among conservative voters, which could amplify anti-trans sentiment through overlapping cultural anxieties (Gallup 2025).

policy opposition - remain relatively weak predictors of vote choice. Across models, the predicted probability changes for anti-LGB measures are minimal (< 4 points, contrast $p > 0.05$), whereas anti-trans measures produce substantial increases (9–16 points, contrast $p < 0.001$), reinforcing the diminished electoral salience of anti-LGB sentiment.[11]

Second, I test whether the weak predictivity of the LGB policy opposition composite stems from its measurement or scaling, given its construction from two items with z-transformation to account for their differing scales. To this end, I conduct three analyses. First, I estimate separate models using each LGB policy item individuals to assess if specific policies retain predictive power. Second, I reconstruct the LGB opposition composite without z-transformation, rescaling both items to a common 1-7 range via interpolation to ensure consistent measurement. This approach tests whether the null effect of anti-LGB attitudes is robust to alternative specifications of the composite, ensuring that the diminished electoral salience of anti-LGB sentiment is not an artifact of measurement choices, such as the z-transformation or aggregation of distinct policy items. Third, I construct two-item combinations of the transgender policy opposition measure and re-estimate the vote choice models to address potential measurement asymmetries between the transgender and LGB opposition composites. The logic of this test is to equalize the number of items across both measures, mitigating concerns that the stronger anti-trans effect is an artifact of measurement scale length. In the first test, the predicted probability changes for the same-sex marriage item (2-points, contrast n/s) and the adoption item (1-point, contrast n/s) are minimal and insignificant.[12] In the second test, the predicted probability changes in vote choice using the interpolated LGB policy opposition composite are practically the same as those using the z-transformed composite (2-points, contrast n/s).[13]. In the third test, the predicted probability chanfges in vote choice using two-item iterations of the anti-transgender policy composite range between 7-11 points (all contrasts p

[11]Full model outputs are presented in section **C.1** of the Supplemental Information.
[12]Full model outputs are presented in section **C.2** of the Supplemental Information
[13]Full model outputs are presented in section **C.3** of the Supplemental Information

= <.001). Meanwhile, the predicted probability changes in vote choice for the anti-LGB policy composite remain small and statistically insignificant.[14]

Lastly, I evaluate whether the weak predictive effect of anti-LGB attitudes persists across key voter groups, potentially masked by heterogeneity in the full sample. Therefore, I incorporate interaction terms between partisanship, ideology, and anti-LGB attitudes. Specifically, I add interactions between party ID and the anti-LGB measures, as well as between ideology and the anti-LGB measures, to test if these attitudes are more predictive among Republicans or conservatives, where cultural issues like opposition to LGB rights are more salient. This approach tests whether the diminished electoral salience of anti-LGB attitudes holds across partisan and ideological spectrums, or if their influence is stronger among Republicans or conservatives. This ensures my findings are not masked by aggregate analysis and accounting for the slower normalization of LGB rights in these groups. Among Republicans, I find that moving from 0 to 100 on the gay and lesbian thermometer changes the predicted probability of voting for Trump by 5 points (contrast n/s), and moving from lowest to highest on the LGB opposition composite changes it by 0.2 points (contrast n/s). Similarly, among conservatives, the changes are 1 point (contrast n/s) and 2 points (contrast n/s), respectively. These findings confirm that anti-LGB attitudes remain non-significant predictors of vote choice even among Republicans and conservatives.[15]

Robustness Tests

To evaluate the robustness of my finding that anti-trans attitudes are more strongly associated with vote choice than anti-LGB attitudes, I estimate additional models using alternate dependent variables, including vote choice in House and Senate races and feeling thermometers for Donald Trump, J.D. Vance, the Republican Party, and the MAGA

[14]Full model outputs are presented in section **C.4** of the Supplemental Information.
[15]Full model outputs are presented in section **C.5** of the Supplemental Information

movement. Results consistently demonstrate that anti-trans attitudes—both affective and policy-based - yielded larger and statistically significant effects (8–12-point increases in Republican House/Senate vote probability, $p = < .001$; 10–15-point increases in thermometer scores, $p = < .001$) compared to anti-LGB attitudes, which remained weak and non-significant (e.g., < 3-point changes, $p = > .05$). These findings confirm that the electoral salience of anti-trans attitudes extends beyond presidential vote choice to Congressional races and affect toward Republican-associated figures and institutions/movements.[16]

Conclusion

The findings from my paper provide evidence that anti-trans attitudes served as a more significant predictor of Republican vote choice in the 2024 presidential election than anti-LGB attitudes, supporting both H1a and H1b. Specifically, negative affective orientations toward transgender individuals and opposition to transgender-inclusive policies were associated with a significant increase in the predicted probability of voting for Trump in 2024. Conversely, analogous measures for LGB individuals exhibit negligible and non-significant effects, with changes in predicted probabilities hovering near zero. These results hold even when controlling for a robust set of covariates, including economic evaluations, racial resentment, modern sexism, and sociopolitical, demographic, and structural factors. Notably, the magnitude of anti-trans effects rivals that of established predictors such as sociotropic economic perceptions and racial resentment, underscoring their substantive role in shaping electoral outcomes.

This pattern of results aligns closely with the theoretical models outlined earlier, particularly *issue evolution theory* (Carmines & Stimson 1989), which posits that once elites attach consistent partisan cues to an issue, it may reshape voter alignments and become a durable cleavage. In the case of transgender rights, Republican elites' strategic empha-

[16]Full model outputs are presented in section **D** of the Supplemental Information.

sis on issues such as gender-affirming care for minors and sports participation – often framed as threats to children and traditional norms - appears to have crystallized anti-trans sentiment into a reliable indicator of partisan identity (Jones & Brewer 2020). Contrastingly, the negligible impact of anti-LGB attitudes reflects the broader normalization of LGB rights, as evidenced by widespread acceptance of same-sex marriage and nondiscrimination protections (Egan 2020, Flores 2014). As public unease over LGB issues has waned, transgender rights have filled the void as a fresh wedge issue, leveraging moral panic narratives to mobilize conservative voters (Cohen 2011, Pepin-Neff & Cohen 2021). The non-significant LGB effects suggest that LGB acceptance has become cross-partisan or even a liability for overt opposition within Republican discourse, consistent with observations on the mainstreaming of LGB identities (Rauch 2024).

Further, my additional analyses on the weak predictivity of my anti-LGB measures reinforce the distinct electoral salience of anti-trans attitudes. Separate models isolating trans and LGB measures rule out multicollinearity as an explanation for the null LGB effects, while alternative constructions of the LGB policy opposition composite yield similarly weak results. Subgroup analyses, including interactions with partisanship and ideology, also confirm that anti-LGB attitudes remain non-predictive even among Republicans and conservatives - groups where cultural conservatism might be expected to amplify such sentiments. This suggests a genuine realignment in social conservative priorities, where anxieties about gender identity might have overshadowed sexuality-based debates (Castle 2019, Kay & Dimakis 2024). The comparison of effect sizes also provides context: while the effect of anti-trans attitudes on vote choice does not eclipse sociotropic evaluations or racial resentment, their comparable effect sizes indicate that cultural issues remain a potent driver of polarization, echoing work on status threat (Mutz 2018) and analyses of cultural backlash against progressive change (Gidron & Hall 2017).

Overall, my findings extend existing scholarship on identity politics by illustrating how moralized threats tied to gender and sexuality structure affective polarization (Ma-

son 2018, Huddy et al. 2015). Unlike anti-LGB attitudes, which may have lost mobilizing power due to greater social acceptance and legal normalization (Flores et al. 2021), anti-trans sentiments benefit from selective media amplification of flashpoint issues such as youth healthcare and athletics (Billard 2019, Westbrook & Schilt 2014). This feedback loop - elite cueing intensifying public unease, which in turn justifies further restrictive policies - highlights the relationship between public opinion and political strategy (Zaller 1992, Layman 2001). In the context of the 2024 election, where Republican campaigns explicitly linked transgender inclusion to broader narratives of parental rights and moral decline (Campbell-Fox et al. 2024), these attitudes likely contributed to Trump's victory by energizing the base without alienating moderates who accept LGB rights.

My paper has three important implications. First, my findings signal a shift in the hierarchy of cultural issues driving U.S. partisan polarization. As LGB rights achieve greater normalization, transgender issues represent a new frontier in the culture wars, potentially redefining identity politics around gender norms rather than sexuality (Egan 2020). This realignment could exacerbate divisions, as trans rights become a symbolic battleground for competing visions of American society – i.e., progressive inclusion versus traditional order (Inglehart & Norris 2016). Policymakers and scholars should monitor how this shift influences legislative agendas, with anti-trans bills already proliferating at the state level (Tracker 2025).

Second, my results have strategic implications for electoral mobilization. For Republicans, leveraging anti-trans rhetoric as a wedge issue proves effective in consolidating support, particularly among voters responsive to moral panic frames around child protection and fairness (Ayoub & Page 2020, Fetner 2008). This tactic mirrors historical culture war strategies but adapts to contemporary anxieties, suggesting that GOP elites may continue prioritizing trans-related policies to maintain base enthusiasm (McAdam & Kloos 2014, Brewer 2003). Conversely, Democrats face challenges in countering these narratives; as post-election analyses indicate, sidestepping the issue or framing it solely as civil

rights may alienate swing voters concerned about sports equity or youth medical decisions (Nagourney & Nehamas 2024, Sapir 2024). Future campaigns might benefit from empathetic messaging that addresses public unease while emphasizing evidence-based benefits of gender-affirming care.

Third, my findings underscore broader societal implications for transgender communities. The electoral potency of anti-trans attitudes risks entrenching marginalization, as politicized opposition translates into restrictive laws that limit access to healthcare, education, and public spaces (Amery & Mondon 2025, Farris & Silber Mohamed 2018). This could heighten vulnerability to discrimination and violence, particularly in a polarized media ecosystem amplifying misinformation. However, it also presents opportunities for advocacy. By highlighting the disconnect between general nondiscrimination support and specific policy opposition (Pew Research Center 2025), activists might build coalitions to depoliticize trans rights, similar to LGB normalization efforts.

Limitations and Future Directions

Despite these contributions, my paper has some limitations that warrant further explorations. "First, the cross-sectional nature of the ANES data precludes definitive causal inference. Although my models demonstrate robust associations, they cannot disentangle whether anti-trans attitudes caused support for Trump or whether partisan cues and elite rhetoric amplified such attitudes among Republican-leaning voters. Future research employing panel data, experimental designs, or media exposure measures could better trace this reciprocal process of attitude formation and reinforcement. In addition, extending to state-level contexts could reveal how transgender politicization varies, informing strategies to bridge partisan divides.

Bibliography

Amery, F. & Mondon, A. (2025), 'Othering, peaking, populism and moral panics: The reactionary strategies of organised transphobia', *The Sociological Review* **73**(3), 680–696.

ANES (2025), 'ANES 2024 Time Series Study Full Release: User Guide and Codebook', Available at: `https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/anes_timeseries_2024_userguidecodebook_20250808.pdf`.

Ayoub, P. M. & Page, D. (2020), 'When do opponents of gay rights mobilize? explaining political participation in times of backlash against liberalism', *Political Research Quarterly* **73**(3), 696–713.

Billard, T. J. (2019), 'Setting the transgender agenda: Intermedia agenda-setting in the digital news environment', *Politics, Groups, and Identities* **7**(1), 165–176.

Bishin, B. G., Hayes, T. J., Incantalupo, M. B. & Smith, C. A. (2020), 'Elite mobilization: A theory explaining opposition to gay rights', *Law & Society Review* **54**(1), 233–264.

Brewer, P. R. (2003), 'The shifting foundations of public opinion about gay rights', *The Journal of Politics* **65**(4), 1208–1220.

Campbell-Fox, K., Kimball, D., Puckett, J. A., Dunn, T. & Rabine, S. (2024), "'stop playing politics with my kid": Thematic analysis of a trans-exclusionary sports legislation hearing in Texas', *International Journal of Transgender Health* pp. 1–17.

Carmines, E. G. & Stimson, J. A. (1989), *Issue evolution: Race and the transformation of American politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Castle, J. (2019), 'New fronts in the culture wars? religion, partisanship, and polarization on religious liberty and transgender rights in the United States', *American Politics Research* **47**(3), 650–679.

Cohen, S. (2011), *Folk devils and moral panics*, Routledge, Oxford, UK.

Congressional Equality Caucus (2025), 'Equality Caucus statement on increasing anti-trans rhetoric by members of Congress', `https://equality.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/`

equality-caucus-statement-increasing-anti-trans-rhetoric-members. Accessed: 2025-10-11.

Daniels, R. S. (2019), 'The evolution of attitudes on same-sex marriage in the United States, 1988–2014', *Social Science Quarterly* **100**(5), 1651–1663.

Deckman, M. & Cassese, E. (2021), 'Gendered nationalism and the 2016 us presidential election: How party, class, and beliefs about masculinity shaped voting behavior', *Politics & Gender* **17**(2), 277–300.

Egan, P. J. (2020), 'Identity as dependent variable: How Americans shift their identities to align with their politics', *American Journal of Political Science* **64**(3), 699–716.

Farris, E. M. & Silber Mohamed, H. (2018), 'Picturing immigration: How the media criminalizes immigrants', *Politics, Groups, and Identities* **6**(4), 814–824.

Fetner, T. (2008), *How the religious right shaped lesbian and gay activism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN.

Flores, A. (2014), 'National trends in public opinion on LGBT rights in the United States'.

Flores, A. R., Haider-Markel, D. P., Lewis, D. C., Miller, P. R., Tadlock, B. L. & Taylor, J. K. (2018), 'Challenged expectations: Mere exposure effects on attitudes about transgender people and rights', *Political Psychology* **39**(1), 197–216.

Flores, A. R., Haider-Markel, D. P., Lewis, D. C., Miller, P. R. & Taylor, J. K. (2021), 'Antidiscrimination interventions, political ads on transgender rights, and public opinion: results from two survey experiments on adults in the United States', *Frontiers in Psychology* **12**, 729322.

Gallup (2024), 'Slim majority of U.S. adults still say changing gender is morally wrong', https://news.gallup.com/poll/645704/slim-majority-adults-say-changing-gender-morally-wrong.aspx.

Gidron, N. & Hall, P. A. (2017), 'The politics of social status: Economic and cultural roots of the populist right', *The British Journal of Sociology* **68**, S57–S84.

Gidron, N. & Hall, P. A. (2020), 'Populism as a problem of social integration', *Comparative*

Political Studies **53**(7), 1027–1059.

Huddy, L., Mason, L. & Aarøe, L. (2015), 'Expressive partisanship: Campaign involvement, political emotion, and partisan identity', *American Political Science Review* **109**(1), 1–17.

Inglehart, R. F. & Norris, P. (2016), 'Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash', Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP16-026.

Jones, P. E. & Brewer, P. R. (2020), 'Elite cues and public polarization on transgender rights', *Politics, Groups, and Identities* **8**(1), 71–85.

Jones, T. (2025), 'Trans bans expand: Anti-LGBTIQ+ lawfare and neo-fascism', *Sexuality Research and Social Policy* **22**(1), 69–84.

Kay, C. S. & Dimakis, S. (2024), 'Moral foundations partially explain the associations of Machiavellianism, grandiose narcissism, and psychopathy with homonegativity and transnegativity', *Journal of Homosexuality* **71**(3), 775–802.

Kinder, D. R. & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981), 'Sociotropic politics: The american case', *British Journal of Political Science* **11**(2), 129–161.

Knuckey, J. (2019), "'i just don't think she has a presidential look'': Sexism and vote choice in the 2016 election', *Social Science Quarterly* **100**(1), 342–358.

Knuckey, J. & Mathews, A. (2024), 'Racial resentment, sexism, and evaluations of kamala harris in the 2020 us presidential election', *Social Science Quarterly* **105**(4), 1266–1279.

Layman, G. (2001), *The great divide: Religious and cultural conflict in American party politics*, Columbia University Press, New York City, NY.

Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Stegmaier, M. (2000), 'Economic determinants of electoral outcomes', *Annual Review of Political Science* **3**(1), 183–219.

Lewis, D. C., Flores, A. R., Haider-Markel, D. P., Miller, P. R. & Taylor, J. K. (2024), 'Cultural threat, outgroup discrimination, and attitudes toward transgender rights', *Political Behavior* **46**(4), 2401–2426.

Marist Poll (2016), '5/24: Defining gender', https://maristpoll.marist.edu/polls/524-defining-gender/.

Mason, L. (2018), *Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

McAdam, D. & Kloos, K. (2014), *Deeply divided: Racial politics and social movements in post-war America*, Oxford University Press, New York City, NY.

McCombs, M. E. & Shaw, D. L. (1972), 'The agenda-setting function of mass media', *Public Opinion Quarterly* **36**(2), 176–187.

McThomas, M. & Tesler, M. (2016), 'The growing influence of gender attitudes on public support for hillary clinton, 2008–2012', *Politics & Gender* **12**(1), 28–49.

Miller, P. R., Flores, A. R., Haider-Markel, D. P., Lewis, D. C., Tadlock, B. L. & Taylor, J. K. (2020), 'The politics of being "Cait": Caitlyn Jenner, transphobia, and parasocial contact effects on transgender-related political attitudes', *American Politics Research* **48**(5), 622–634.

Mutz, D. C. (2018), 'Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* **115**(19), E4330–E4339.

Nagourney, A. & Nehamas, N. (2024), 'Harris loss has democrats fighting over how to talk about transgender rights', https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/us/politics/presidential-campaign-transgender-rights.html.

Pepin-Neff, C. & Cohen, A. (2021), 'President Trump's transgender moral panic', *Policy Studies* **42**(5-6), 646–661.

Pew Research Center (2022), 'How Americans view policy proposals on transgender and gender identity issues, and where such policies exist', https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/09/15/how-americans-view-policy-proposals-on-transgender-and-gender-identity-issues-and-whe

Pew Research Center (2024), 'View's of the nation's economy', https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/05/23/

views-of-the-nations-economy-may-2024/.

Pew Research Center (2025), 'Americans have grown more supportive of restrictions for trans people in recent years', https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/02/26/americans-have-grown-more-supportive-of-restrictions-for-trans-people-in-recent-years

PRRI (2024), 'LGBTQ Rights Across All 50 States: Key Insights from PRRI's 2024 American Values Atlas', Available at: https://prri.org/research/lgbtq-rights-across-all-50-states-key-insights-2024-prri-american-values-atlas/.

PRRI (2025), 'Americans' views on transgender rights since november 2024', https://prri.org/spotlight/americans-views-on-transgender-rights-since-november-2024/.

Rauch, J. (2024), 'On LGBT issues, both parties move left', https://www.brookings.edu/articles/on-lgbt-issues-both-parties-move-left/.

Sapir, L. (2024), 'A Democratic reckoning on "gender identity"?', https://www.city-journal.org/article/a-democratic-reckoning-on-gender-identity.

Schaffner, B. F., MacWilliams, M. & Nteta, T. (2018), 'Understanding white polarization in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism', *Political Science Quarterly* **133**(1), 9–34.

Sides, J., Tesler, M. & Vavreck, L. (2019), *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

The 19th (2025), 'Trump is working to restrict trans rights. that's not what americans want', Available at: https://19thnews.org/2025/04/americans-politicians-trans-issues-poll/.

Tracker, T. L. (2025), '2025 anti-trans bills tracker', https://translegislation.com/.

TransLash (2024), 'Here's what Democrats promise to do for LGBTQ+ people in their 2024 platform', https://translash.org/articles/heres-what-democrats-promise-to-do-for-lgbtq-people-in-their-2024-platform/.

Accessed: 2025-10-11.

Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J. & McMillan, F. (2023), "'protect the women!" trans-exclusionary feminist issue framing and support for transgender rights', *Policy Studies Journal* **51**(3), 629–666.

US Department of Justice and US Department of Education (2016), 'Dear colleague letter on transgender students', https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/850986/dl?inline=. Accessed: 2025-10-11.

Westbrook, L. & Schilt, K. (2014), 'Doing gender, determining gender: Transgender people, gender panics, and the maintenance of the sex/gender/sexuality system', *Gender & Society* **28**(1), 32–57.

YouGov (2025), 'Party leaders, immigration, education, and transgender issues: March 22-25, 2025 Economist/YouGov Poll', https://today.yougov.com/politics/articles/51894-party-leaders-immigration-education-transgender-issues-march-22-25-2025-economi Accessed: 2025-10-11.

Zaller, J. (1992), *The nature and origins of mass opinion*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

Supplemental Information

A Modelling Vote Choice with Independent & 3rd Party Candidates

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump (Including Independent & 3rd Party Candidates in Reference Category)

	Thermometers	Policy Opposition
Thermometer: Transgender individuals	-0.001^{***}	
	(0.000)	
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians	0.000	
	(0.000)	
Policy opposition: Transgender		0.117^{**}
		(0.037)
Policy opposition: LGB		0.000
		(0.027)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.048^{***}	0.043^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.007)
Egotropic evaluations	0.018^{***}	0.011^{+}
	(0.005)	(0.007)
Racial resentment	0.188^{***}	0.151^{***}
	(0.024)	(0.034)
Modern sexism	0.067^{**}	0.051
	(0.024)	(0.034)
Party ID	0.118^{***}	0.118^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.005)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.012^{**}	0.017^{*}
	(0.004)	(0.007)
Non-white	0.033^{**}	0.055^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.015)
Age	0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	-0.017^{+}	-0.017
	(0.010)	(0.013)
Gender: Other	-0.036	-0.154^{**}
	(0.035)	(0.056)
Education	-0.014^{**}	-0.024^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Family income	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.005	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.005)
South	0.000	-0.051^{**}
	(0.011)	(0.016)
(Intercept)	-0.315^{***}	-0.299^{***}
	(0.039)	(0.046)
Num.Obs.	2973	1464
R2	0.750	0.760
R2 Adj.	0.748	0.758
AIC	1313.0	618.2
BIC	1421.0	713.4
Log.Lik.	-638.511	-291.107
RMSE	0.25	0.24

$^{+}$ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

B Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump

	Thermometers	Policy Opposition
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians	0.000	
	(0.000)	
Thermometer: Transgender individuals	−0.001***	
	(0.000)	
Policy opposition: LGB		−0.020
		(0.026)
Policy opposition: Transgender		0.151***
		(0.035)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.047***	0.042***
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Egotropic evaluations	0.019***	0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Racial resentment	0.171***	0.126***
	(0.023)	(0.032)
Modern sexism	0.068**	0.051
	(0.023)	(0.032)
Party ID	0.123***	0.126***
	(0.003)	(0.005)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.013**	0.011+
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Non-white	0.023*	0.038**
	(0.010)	(0.014)
Age	0.000	−0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	−0.022*	−0.005
	(0.009)	(0.013)
Gender: Other	−0.051	−0.152**
	(0.034)	(0.053)
Education	−0.013**	−0.021***
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Family income	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.006+	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.005)
South	0.011	−0.039**
	(0.011)	(0.015)
(Intercept)	−0.318***	−0.339***
	(0.037)	(0.044)
Num.Obs.	2913	1435
R2	0.774	0.789
R2 Adj.	0.772	0.787
AIC	1005.5	426.1
BIC	1113.1	520.9
Log.Lik.	−484.762	−195.039
F	618.712	
RMSE	0.24	0.23

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

C Are Anti-LGB Attitudes Really No Longer Predictive?

C.1 Separate Models for Anti-LGB and Anti-Trans Attitudes

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump (Separate Models for Anti-LGB and Anti-Trans Attitudes)

	Trans thermometer	Gay/lesbian thermometer	Trans policy opposition	LGB policy opposition
Thermometer: Transgender individuals	−0.001***			
	(0.000)			
Thermometer: gays and lesbians		0.000*		
		(0.000)		
Policy opposition: Transgender			0.162***	
			(0.024)	
Policy opposition: LGB				0.000
				(0.026)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.047***	0.047***	0.038***	0.049***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Egotropic evaluations	0.020***	0.020***	0.019***	0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Racial resentment	0.174***	0.189***	0.150***	0.176***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Modern sexism	0.066**	0.079***	0.068**	0.057+
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Party ID	0.123***	0.125***	0.124***	0.126***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.013**	0.015***	0.008+	0.019**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Non-white	0.024*	0.021*	0.024*	0.036*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	−0.022*	−0.023*	−0.020*	−0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Gender: Other	−0.052	−0.061+	−0.035	−0.177***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.053)
Education	−0.013**	−0.013**	−0.014**	−0.021***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Family income	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.005+	0.006+	0.005	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
South	0.011	0.008	0.009	−0.045**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.015)
(Intercept)	−0.308***	−0.351***	−0.367***	−0.341***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.044)
Num.Obs.	2922	2928	2945	1442
R2	0.773	0.773	0.776	0.785
R2 Adj.	0.772	0.772	0.775	0.783
AIC	1019.8	1019.9	985.8	453.5
BIC	1121.5	1121.6	1087.6	543.2
Log.Lik.	−492.902	−492.959	−475.921	−209.763
RMSE	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.23

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

C.2 Separate Models for LGB Policy Items

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump (Separate Models for LGB Policy Items)

	Same-sex marriage	Adoption
Policy opposition: Transgender	0.162^{***}	0.186^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.024)
Policy opposition: same-sex marriage	-0.004	
	(0.008)	
Policy opposition: same-sex adoption		0.003
		(0.006)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.043^{***}	
	(0.006)	
Egotropic evaluations	0.017^{**}	0.028^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Racial resentment	0.110^{***}	0.164^{***}
	(0.032)	(0.023)
Modern sexism	0.056^{+}	0.071^{**}
	(0.032)	(0.023)
Party ID	0.127^{***}	0.130^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.008	0.011^{*}
	(0.007)	(0.004)
Non-white	0.041^{**}	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.010)
Age	0.000	-0.001^{**}
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: female	-0.005	-0.010
	(0.013)	(0.009)
Gender: Other	-0.148^{**}	-0.019
	(0.053)	(0.034)
Education	-0.023^{***}	-0.016^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Family income	0.000	-0.001^{+}
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.006	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.003)
South	-0.030^{*}	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.011)
(Intercept)	-0.354^{***}	-0.272^{***}
	(0.046)	(0.031)
Num.Obs.	1447	2933
R2	0.786	0.772
R2 Adj.	0.784	0.771
AIC	455.1	1030.6
BIC	550.1	1132.3
Log.Lik.	-209.559	-498.309
RMSE	0.23	0.24

$^{+}$ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

C.3 Addressing Measurement Asymmetry in Policy Opposition Measures

Linear Probability of Vote Choice for Trump (Different Item Combinations of Transgender Policy Opposition Measure)

	Military ban + bathrooms	Military ban + K-12	Bathrooms + K-12
Policy opposition: Military ban + bathrooms	0.011^{+}		
	(0.006)		
Policy opposition: Military ban + K-12		0.018^{***}	
		(0.005)	
Policy opposition: Bathrooms + K-12			0.015^{**}
			(0.005)
Policy opposition: LGB	0.000	0.005	0.008
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.045^{***}	0.045^{***}	0.045^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Egotropic evaluations	0.011^{+}	0.010	0.011
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Racial resentment	0.164^{***}	0.156^{***}	0.161^{***}
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Modern sexism	0.052	0.046	0.054
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Party ID	0.119^{***}	0.119^{***}	0.118^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.020^{**}	0.017^{**}	0.018^{**}
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Non-white	0.055^{***}	0.054^{***}	0.054^{***}
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	-0.018	-0.016	-0.021
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Gender: Other	-0.164^{**}	-0.155^{**}	-0.156^{**}
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Education:	-0.024^{***}	-0.024^{***}	-0.024^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Family income	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
South	-0.053^{***}	-0.050^{**}	-0.050^{**}
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
(Intercept)	-0.309^{***}	-0.318^{***}	-0.314^{***}
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Num.Obs.	1465	1465	1469
R2	0.759	0.760	0.758
R2 Adj.	0.757	0.758	0.756
AIC	624.5	617.2	632.4
BIC	719.7	712.4	727.6
Log.Lik.	-294.256	-290.584	-298.179
RMSE	0.24	0.24	0.24

$^{+}$ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

C.4 Linear Interpolation of LGB Policy Opposition Composite

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump (Linearly Interpolated LGB Policy Opposition Measure)

	Linear interpolation
Policy opposition: Transgender	0.151^{***}
	(0.035)
Policy opposition: LGB	-0.003
	(0.004)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.042^{***}
	(0.006)
Egotropic evaluations	0.015^{*}
	(0.006)
Racial resentment	0.126^{***}
	(0.032)
Modern sexism	0.051
	(0.032)
Party ID	0.126^{***}
	(0.005)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.011^{+}
	(0.006)
Non-white	0.038^{**}
	(0.014)
Age	-0.001
	(0.000)
Gender: Female	-0.005
	(0.013)
Gender: Other	-0.152^{**}
	(0.053)
Education	-0.021^{***}
	(0.006)
Family income	-0.001
	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.005
	(0.005)
South	-0.039^{**}
	(0.015)
(Intercept)	-0.336^{***}
	(0.043)
Num.Obs.	1435
R2	0.789
R2 Adj.	0.787
AIC	426.1
BIC	520.9
Log.Lik.	-195.038
RMSE	0.23

$^{+}$ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

C.5 Interactive Effects for Party ID and Ideology

C.5.1 Party ID

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump (Interactive Effects for Party ID)

	Thermometers	Policy Opposition
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians	0.001**	
	(0.000)	
Party ID: Independent	0.058	0.395***
	(0.088)	(0.054)
Party ID: Republican	0.741***	0.645***
	(0.025)	(0.023)
	−0.001***	
	(0.000)	
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians × Party ID: Independent	0.005***	
	(0.001)	
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians × Party ID: Republican	−0.001***	
	(0.000)	
Thermometer: Transgender individuals	−0.001***	
	(0.000)	
Policy opposition: LGB		−0.088+
		(0.045)
Policy opposition: LGB × Party ID: Independent		−0.356**
		(0.137)
Policy opposition: LGB × Party ID: Republican		0.085+
		(0.049)
Policy opposition: Transgender		0.112***
		(0.033)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.043***	0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Egotropic evaluations	0.012**	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Racial resentment	0.134***	0.082**
	(0.021)	(0.030)
Modern sexism	0.037+	0.029
	(0.021)	(0.030)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.017***	0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Non-white	0.018+	0.019
	(0.010)	(0.014)
Age	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	−0.016+	−0.008
	(0.008)	(0.012)
Gender: Other	−0.030	−0.031
	(0.031)	(0.049)
Education	−0.016***	−0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Family income	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.004	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)
South	−0.001	−0.038**
	(0.010)	(0.014)
(Intercept)	−0.124**	−0.075+
	(0.038)	(0.042)
Num.Obs.	2913	1435
R2	0.810	0.820
R2 Adj.	0.809	0.818
AIC	503.8	203.7
BIC	629.3	314.3
Log.Lik.	−230.886	−80.831
F	648.584	
RMSE	0.22	0.21

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

C.5.2 Ideology

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for Trump (Interactive Effects for Ideology)

	Thermometers	Policy Opposition
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians	0.001**	
	(0.000)	
Ideology: Moderate	0.111**	0.050*
	(0.038)	(0.021)
Ideology: Conservative	0.205***	0.144***
	(0.033)	(0.027)
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians × Ideology: Moderate	−0.001*	
	(0.001)	
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians x Ideology: Conservative	−0.001**	
Thermometer: Transgender individuals	−0.001***	
	(0.000)	
Policy opposition: LGB		−0.034
		(0.063)
Policy opposition: LGB × Ideology: Moderate		−0.060
		(0.079)
Policy opposition: LGB × Ideology: Conservative		0.014
		(0.066)
Policy opposition: Transgender		0.119***
		(0.035)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.045***	0.041***
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Egotropic evaluations	0.019***	0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Racial resentment	0.162***	0.120***
	(0.023)	(0.032)
Modern sexism	0.062**	0.044
	(0.023)	(0.032)
Party ID	0.117***	0.117***
	(0.003)	(0.005)
Non-white	0.020+	0.030*
	(0.010)	(0.014)
Age	0.000	−0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	−0.020*	−0.004
	(0.009)	(0.012)
Gender: other	−0.060+	−0.145**
	(0.033)	(0.052)
Education	−0.013**	−0.019**
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Family income	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.004	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.005)
South	0.010	−0.041**
	(0.011)	(0.015)
	(0.000)	
(Intercept)	−0.343***	−0.288***
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Num.Obs.	2913	1435
R2	0.778	0.795
R2 Adj.	0.777	0.793
AIC	953.0	388.8
BIC	1078.5	499.4
Log.Lik.	−455.516	−173.382
F	534.126	
RMSE	0.24	0.23

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

D Alternate DVs

D.1 Vote Choice for House and Senate

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for House/Senate Republicans (Group Thermometers)

	House	Senate
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Thermometer: Transgender individuals	−0.001*	−0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.031***	0.028***
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Egotropic evaluations	0.005	0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Racial resentment	0.165***	0.129***
	(0.025)	(0.030)
Modern sexism	0.070**	0.164***
	(0.025)	(0.032)
Party ID	0.129***	0.129***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.019***	0.010+
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Non-white	0.023*	0.037**
	(0.011)	(0.014)
Age	−0.001+	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	0.000	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.012)
Gender: Other	−0.047	0.136**
	(0.035)	(0.045)
Education	−0.005	−0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Family income	0.000	0.002+
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.003	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.004)
South	0.003	0.026+
	(0.011)	(0.014)
(Intercept)	−0.260***	−0.342***
	(0.042)	(0.052)
Num.Obs.	2731	2035
R2	0.757	0.723
R2 Adj.	0.755	0.721
AIC	1132.1	1094.0
BIC	1238.5	1195.2
Log.Lik.	−548.048	−529.020
RMSE	0.24	0.26

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Linear Probability Estimates of Vote Choice for House/Senate Republicans (Policy Opposition Measures)

	House	Senate
Policy opposition: LGB	0.043	0.090**
	(0.028)	(0.034)
Policy opposition: Transgender	0.178***	0.196***
	(0.038)	(0.046)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.036***	0.022**
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Egotropic evaluations	0.008	0.028***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Racial resentment	0.138***	0.081+
	(0.036)	(0.043)
Modern sexism	0.036	0.129**
	(0.035)	(0.044)
Partry ID	0.129***	0.132***
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.002	−0.009
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Non-white	0.036*	0.067***
	(0.016)	(0.019)
Age	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Gender: Female	−0.004	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.017)
Gender: Other	−0.149**	0.274***
	(0.055)	(0.069)
Education	0.000	−0.007
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Family income	−0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.003	−0.015**
	(0.005)	(0.006)
South	−0.019	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.019)
(Intercept)	−0.364***	−0.414***
	(0.049)	(0.061)
Num.Obs.	1345	1002
R2	0.771	0.746
R2 Adj.	0.768	0.741
AIC	501.7	477.1
BIC	595.4	565.4
Log.Lik.	−232.875	−220.530
RMSE	0.24	0.26

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

D.2 Thermometers for Elites and Institutions/Movements

OLS Estimates of Thermometers for Elites and Institutions/Movements (Group Thermometers)

	Trump thermometer	Vance thermometer	GOP thermometer	MAGA thermometer
Thermometer: Gays and lesbians	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000+
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Thermometer: Transgender individuals	−0.001***	0.000	0.000	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.038***	0.050***	0.022***	0.042***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Egotropic evaluations	0.010**	0.010**	−0.006*	0.008*
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Racial resentment	0.125***	0.166***	0.065***	0.193***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Modern sexism	0.100***	0.128***	0.064***	0.110***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Party ID	0.096***	0.067***	0.084***	0.061***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.023***	0.034***	0.027***	0.030***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Non-white	−0.003	0.021**	−0.005	0.027**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Age	0.000	0.000+	0.000	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	−0.027***	−0.027***	0.021***	−0.014+
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Gender: Other	−0.017	−0.043+	0.013	0.026
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Education	−0.014***	0.001	−0.006+	−0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Family income	−0.001+	0.000	−0.001	−0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.002	0.006*	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
South	−0.003	0.003	0.011	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
(Intercept)	−0.236***	−0.290***	−0.079***	−0.262***
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.029)
Num.Obs.	3642	3545	3637	3544
R2	0.753	0.698	0.695	0.658
R2 Adj.	0.752	0.697	0.694	0.657
AIC	−157.1	176.0	−788.6	453.8
BIC	−45.5	287.1	−677.0	564.9
Log.Lik.	96.533	−70.008	412.297	−208.880
RMSE	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.21

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

OLS Estimates of Thermometers for Elites and Institutions/Movements (Policy Opposition Measures)

	Trump thermometer	Vance thermometer	GOP thermometer	MAGA thermometer
Policy opposition: LGB	0.050^{**}	-0.017	0.032^{+}	0.071^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Policy opposition: Transgender	0.055^{*}	0.122^{***}	0.040^{+}	0.038
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Sociotropic evaluations	0.039^{***}	0.041^{***}	0.033^{***}	0.039^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Egotropic evaluations	0.008^{+}	0.013^{**}	-0.008^{+}	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Racial resentment	0.120^{***}	0.125^{***}	0.055^{**}	0.164^{***}
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Modern sexism	0.097^{***}	0.126^{***}	0.057^{**}	0.130^{***}
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Party ID	0.089^{***}	0.066^{***}	0.077^{***}	0.057^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Ideology	0.025^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.020^{***}	0.031^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Non-white	0.018^{+}	0.030^{**}	0.013	0.050^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Age	-0.001^{*}	-0.001^{**}	0.000	0.001^{*}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender: Female	-0.020^{*}	-0.027^{**}	0.028^{**}	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Gender: Other	-0.031	-0.060	-0.015	-0.036
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.040)
Education	-0.021^{***}	-0.008^{+}	-0.012^{**}	-0.021^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Fmaily income:	-0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.002^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Church attendance	0.001	0.011^{**}	0.000	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
South	-0.025^{*}	-0.007	0.002	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)
(Intercept)	-0.227^{***}	-0.244^{***}	-0.101^{***}	-0.231^{***}
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Num.Obs.	1812	1758	1810	1759
R2	0.758	0.713	0.701	0.676
R2 Adj.	0.756	0.711	0.698	0.673
AIC	−96.5	27.7	−491.9	155.0
BIC	2.5	126.2	−392.9	253.5
Log.Lik.	66.275	4.146	263.955	−59.501
RMSE	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.21

$^{+}$ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001