Fractured Trust: The Spillover Effects of Police Violence on Political Trust and Democracy

Ignacio Urbina[1] and Vitória Sgorlon[1]

[1]*Stony Brook University*

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Abstract

How does police violence impact citizens' trust in democratic institutions? This paper explores the influence of police interactions, particularly through indirect exposure to violence and direct victimization, on citizens' political trust. We conducted two studies: an observational analysis using LAPOP data across various Latin American countries and an experimental study in Brazil, examining both direct and vicarious experiences of police violence. Our results reveal that both direct experiences of police abuse and indirect exposure through media significantly erode trust in key democratic institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, and executive. This erosion of trust is mediated through decreased trust in the police and perceptions of procedural justice. Furthermore, the effects of indirect exposure are moderated by factors such as race, partisan identity, and trait aggression personality. Overall, this research highlights the critical impact of police violence on political trust and suggests that addressing such violence is crucial for sustaining democratic legitimacy, particularly in regions experiencing democratic backsliding. By emphasizing the broader political consequences of police violence, our study contributes to the literature on political behavior and public opinion, suggesting the use of reforms in law enforcement as a means to bolster democracy's resilience.

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[1] Corresponding author: ignacio.urbina@stonybrook.edu. This project is still in progress. Please do not cite without the authors' permission.

1 Introduction

What influences citizens' trust in democratic institutions? The determinants of political trust have been a long-standing interest for comparative public opinion scholars, spanning a vast literature for several fundamental reasons. First, one way to conceptualize democracy is that it corresponds to a particular institutional arrangement in which the rule of law is enforced, a series of civil and political rights are guaranteed, there is equal citizenship, competitive elections are in place, and there is some separation of powers (Christiano & Bajaj, 2024; Dahl, 2003; O'donnell, 2004; Przeworski, 2010). Therefore, at its core, a democracy is as good, and trustworthy, as how good the institutions that make it are. Thus, understanding trust in democratic institutions has been of central interest to scholars of democratic politics (Uslaner, 2018).

Second, there is a normative motivation. Recent trends in support for illiberal and populist parties, and a deteriorating support for democratic norms among the public, have turned attention to the resilience of democracy to rising authoritarian pressures. Citizens' attitudes to democratic institutions can serve as a health of democracy thermometer (Claassen, 2020). When citizens trust these key political institutions, democracy is in better shape to face challenges and uncertainties. In fact, some scholars have argued that democracy's endurance and resilience may rest on citizens' support for democracy (Claassen, 2020; Inglehart, 2016; Hu & Solt, 2024; Diamond, 1999; Easton, 1965; Lipset, 1959; Norris, 2011; Przeworski et al., 1996).

Finally, there is a positive and empirical importance. Several studies show that trust in institutions is associated with important political behaviors. For example, higher political trust has been found to correlate with voter turnout, and low political trust with participation in protest (Bélanger, 2017; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). Additionally, political trust has been found to predict support for populists and illiberal attitudes, candidates, and party platforms (Geurkink et al., 2020; Bélanger, 2017; Keefer et al., 2021; Jiang & Ma, 2020).

In this paper, we argue that not enough attention has been paid to the role of citizens' interactions with the police, specifically with police violence, in shaping their trust in democratic institutions. Thus, we theorize that excessive and illegitimate police violence not only shapes trust in the police but also has a spillover effect on citizens' trust in key democratic institutions such as the legislative, the executive, and the judicial power. By violating equal citizenship, breaking the rule of law, and eroding perceptions of procedural justice and fairness, excessive and systematic police violence goes against fundamental democratic norms and principles (Wiatrowski, 2016; Manning, 2015; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010; González, 2020; Bonner, 2021).

Additionally, we focus our attention on Latin America, a region markedly shaped by the scourge of social, criminal, and political violence. Most of the current research has looked at the political effects of criminal and insurgency violence in Latin America, yet the political consequences of police violence, and its impact on political trust, have received comparatively little attention (see Cruz (2015) for an exception).

To test our theory, we conducted two studies: one experimental and one observational. We

begin with the observational study, focusing on the direct experience of police violence victimization. This study utilizes the LAPOP survey data from various countries in Latin America to examine the psychological and physical consequences of police coercion. We propose a pathway to understand how such personal experiences of police abuse affect political trust, employing structural equation estimation for analysis.

Following this, our experimental study addresses the issue of indirect exposure to excessive police violence, which, due to extensive media coverage, is more frequent and prevalent. This study was conducted in Brazil through a vignette survey experiment designed specifically to test our theory. Here, we explore how indirect experiences and vicarious exposure to police violence shape public attitudes toward democratic institutions. We hypothesize that erosion in perceptions of procedural justice is a significant mechanism through which experiences of police violence erode trust in the police and, consequently, in democratic institutions. In addition, we explored partisanship identity, race, and trait aggression personality as moderators.

Our findings indicate that both direct and vicarious experiences of police violence notably reduce political trust and satisfaction with democracy. In Study 1, we observe that direct police violence victimization erodes trust in the police and political institutions and leads to greater dissatisfaction with democracy across the Americas. We find that the effect of direct police violence experiences on democratic satisfaction is mediated through political trust and trust in the police. In Study 2, participants exposed to the vignette depicting the violent police encounter displayed heightened distrust in the police and dissatisfaction with democracy when compared to the non-violent vignette. We also find suggestive evidence that partisan identity, race, and trait aggression moderate the treatment's effects, particularly on political trust.

To our knowledge, this is the first study that theorizes and examines jointly the effect of both direct and indirect experiences of police violence on trust in democratic institutions, under a coherent theoretical framework. We believe our results have implications for other regions and countries, and more broadly, we think they suggest using police reform, in particular, seeking the proportional and legitimate use of coercive power as a policy goal, as a tool of democratic consolidation. Therefore, in times of democratic backsliding fears, our study argues for an additional consideration of the problem of state violence, which not only is a human rights violation, a concern in of itself, but also threatens democracy's legitimacy by having negative spillovers on citizens' trust in fundamental democratic institutions.

2 Police Violence, Procedural Justice, and Attitudes

2.1 Evaluative Attitudes Toward Democracy

Democratic theory has established several notions of what democracy is, and these are associated with how citizens understand and what they expect from democracy. For example, liberal democracy emphasizes competitive elections and an institutional arrangement that protects fun-

damental freedoms (Bollen and Paxton, 2000). Moving from this perspective, social democracy centers on the provision of social and economic rights (Jackson, 2013). Meanwhile, direct and deliberative democracy, while having fundamental differences, both emphasize the importance of direct citizen engagement in political decision-making (Altman, 2010; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Although the exact understanding of democracy can vary among citizens, bridging these views, democracy is generally understood as a system of government that protects freedoms, enables political participation, promotes equality under the rule of law, and provides economic and social rights (Zagrebina, 2020; Quaranta, 2018; Canache, 2012; Diamond and Morlino, 2004).

Citizens can evaluate democracy in two key ways: normatively or instrumentally. Normative judgments stem from an intrinsic value for democracy and its core principles. For example, someone might cherish the right to free speech or fair elections as central to their democratic ideals. On the other hand, instrumental evaluations consider democracy as a tool for achieving specific outcomes, like economic growth or social inclusion. While normative appraisals arise from endorsing democratic norms for their inherent value, instrumental appraisals focus on democracy's effectiveness in delivering desired outcomes. Thus, citizens' assessment of and satisfaction with democracy are dependent on their evaluation of the effectiveness of the system as a whole in upholding core democratic norms and its performance in satisfying citizens' needs (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson, 2001). Satisfaction with democracy, therefore, depends on the degree to which citizens perceive that democratic values are effectively upheld in practice and on the quality of outcomes the political system delivers for its citizens. Several scholars argue that satisfaction with and support for democracy are prerequisites for democratic regimes' endurance because of the needed perception of its effectiveness, legitimacy, and benefits (e.g. Claassen, 2019; Easton, 1975; Lipset, 1959).

Drawing from Easton's (1965, 1975) system support model, which posits citizens' support as a fundamental input into the political system, we delineate between two forms of support: specific support, which is tied to the satisfaction with immediate outputs of the system, and diffuse support, predicated on general trust and confidence in the political system and its institutions. Notably, diffuse support plays a pivotal role in ensuring the long-term stability of a political system, as it reflects a deeper level of public trust and commitment to the system's principles, including democracy. Easton argues that a political system's longevity hinges on its perceived legitimacy by its constituents, predominantly derived from diffuse support encompassing beliefs in the fairness, appropriateness, and justice of political processes and institutions. Within a democratic framework, public support signifies an endorsement of democratic norms and practices, such as equitable electoral processes, freedom of expression, and adherence to the rule of law.

Moreover, trust in the police and political institutions can be related to diffuse support for the political system. In the context of democratic institutions, perceptions of institutional procedural justice or fairness are crucial for maintaining legitimacy, trust, and public confidence

in democracy (Sahin and Akboga, 2022; Martin et al., 2022; Rhodes-Purdy, 2021; Saxton, 2021; Grimes, 2017; Magalhães, 2016; Erlingsson et al., 2014). This concept posits that an individual's perception of fairness in institutions and organizations relies on the quality of their experiences with these entities rather than solely on the outcomes of their interactions. It encompasses four central features of individuals' interactions with authorities: being treated with dignity and respect, having a voice, experiencing neutral and transparent decision-making, and encountering trustworthy motives from decision-makers (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler, 2003; Tyler and Lind, 2001). In the criminal justice system context, procedural justice is essential for building trust and increasing the legitimacy of law enforcement authorities within communities (Bolger and Walters, 2019; Bradford et al., 2017; Mazerolle et al., 2013).

On the other hand, for societies under a democratic political culture, satisfaction with democracy signals citizens' instrumental evaluation of the political system. A vast literature has shown that satisfaction with democracy can be influenced by various factors, such as citizens' prospective economic expectations, socioeconomic status, education, general interpersonal trust, crime victimization, government efficacy, and the perceived fairness of the income distribution, among others (Monsiváis-Carrillo and Cantu Ramos, 2022; Krieckhaus et al., 2014; Evans and Rose, 2012; Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010; Mishler and Rose, 1996). For instance, citizens who hold positive economic expectations, enjoy higher economic status, or perceive the income distribution as fair are likely to be more satisfied with democracy (Loveless and Binelli, 2020; Krieckhaus et al., 2014). Additionally, when citizens perceive the government as efficient and delivering on its promises, their satisfaction with democracy increases, as it indicates that the democratic system is functioning effectively and meeting their needs (Linde et al., 2021; Magalhães, 2014).

In this paper, we argue that when assessing public satisfaction with democracy and trust in its key institutions, it is important to also consider experiences with police violence victimization. These experiences can significantly impact citizens' perceptions of the political system's procedural justice and their instrumental evaluations of democracy and its institutions.

2.2 The Spillover Effects of Police Violence

The police represent the primary embodiment of state authority and, as such, are the state agency most frequently in direct contact with citizens. Thus, its the most visible state institution to millions—and, probably, to the majority—of ordinary citizens (e.g., Pereira and Davis, 2000). As a street-level bureaucratic organization, it applies policies in the everyday lives of citizens, whom they are meant to serve (Brodkin, 2011; Lipsky 1980). Comprising frontline professionals, the police can indeed be the only face of the state in many places, especially in small towns or villages where democratic institutions such as the Judiciary and Legislative powers cannot reach. A key distinction between the police and other street-level bureaucrats is that the police are *armed* bureaucrats who represent a significant part of state law enforcement, thus having the legal right to use coercive power to fulfill their mandate. In the last nearly two decades, incidents of police

violence against *unarmed* citizens have sparked a contentious debate and a growing literature on policing, especially in the United States.

Multiple studies have shown that experiences with and information about police violence, by eroding perceptions of procedural justice in policing, are negatively associated with attitudes toward the police in many different socio-political contexts (e.g. Adebusuyi, Oluwafemi, and Aigboje, 2023; Branton, Carey, and Martinez-Ebers, 2023; Jackson et al., 2021, Boudreau, MacKenzie, and Simmons, 2019). Police violence encompasses the unwarranted and excessive use of physical force – instances where the applied force far exceeds what is necessary in a given circumstance – by law enforcement officers (Milani et al., 2018). Police violence may also include psychological, sexual, and neglectful forms of violence, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) understanding of violence (Cooper et al., 2004). These different exposures to police violence victimization have been associated with more negative evaluations of police efficacy (Jackson et al., 2020). Law enforcement officers must apply force proportionately, practically, and appropriately, as Kleinig (2014) emphasizes. Deviations from these principles breach the protective social contract between society and law enforcement, eroding trust. This leads to our two first hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1:** *Experiences of police violence will negatively impact perceptions of procedural justice in policing.*

- **Hypothesis 2:** *Experiences of police violence will negatively impact trust in the police.*

The evidence from studies looking at procedural justice suggests that people evaluate equivalent outcomes more favorably if they are produced using fair procedures. Hence institutional procedural justice can have an indirect influence on attitudes toward political systems and institutions. A strong voice, or the ability of citizens to influence political outcomes, influences support for democracy by moderating the relationship between policy performance and perceptions of performance, for example (Rhodes-Purdy, 2021). Similarly, procedural fairness moderates the effects of economic evaluations on regime support, consequently affecting satisfaction with democracy; while economic evaluations are linked with higher regime support, this relationship is weaker when the regime's procedural fairness is perceived as high (Magalhães, 2016). Additionally, research on the Nordic countries, known for their well-functioning public administrations, demonstrates that public perceptions of unfairness among civil servants can negatively affect perceptions of the legitimacy of the political system even in high-trust and low-corruption settings (Erlingsson et al., 2014). Hence, we posit that, by violating procedural justice principles, police violence can erode diffuse and specific system support.

Additionally, systemic and excessive police violence is fundamentally at odds with democratic principles. Thus, for citizens who normatively value democracy, experiences with police violence can deteriorate their perceptions of democracy's success in upholding fundamental democratic principles. This is especially true when certain demographic groups or communities are disproportionately affected by police violence, exacerbating feelings of marginalization

and social exclusion. Additionally, incidents of unlawful and abusive use of force can undermine perceptions of government performance, as citizens may question the effectiveness and responsiveness of public institutions contributing to dissatisfaction with the democratic system as a whole. Lastly, police violence can weaken citizens' confidence in the rule of law, as they may perceive that public officials, including law enforcement officers, are not held accountable for their actions and are not subject to the same legal constraints as ordinary citizens. Even though democracy comes with a promise of peaceful processes of conflict resolution, the state can directly contribute to violence when it abuses its power (Cruz, 2016).

Lastly, experiences of police brutality can negatively affect citizens' beliefs in legal equality, as they may come to view the justice system as inherently biased or discriminatory since law enforcement is part of this system. Furthermore, individual police violence victimization is associated with a higher distrust in institutions (Jackson et al., 2020; Kirk and Papachristos, 2011), which is evidence of people's perception of the linkage between the police and the state as a whole. Just as the police serve as an important asset of repression in authoritarian regimes, they are equally essential in democratic states, ideally operating within democratic principles and working as an armed bureaucrat of the state. Leading to the following prediction:

- **Hypothesis 3:** *Experiences of police violence will negatively impact trust in democratic institutions.*

Police violence can also negatively affect citizens' assessments of democracy's instrumental performance by threatening individuals' psychological and basic needs and exacerbating economic and social inequalities (DeVylder et al., 2017; Geller et al., 2014). Systematic and abusive police practices conflict with individuals' fundamental needs for respect, inclusion, and dignity and can damage their sense of belonging and worth. Moreover, the systemic nature of this violence disproportionately affects vulnerable communities, often marginalized on racial, ethnic, or socio-economic grounds, thereby exacerbating inequalities and leading to their exclusion from economic and social life (DeVylder et al., 2017; Edwards et al., 2019). The negative impact of systemic police violence on instrumental appraisals of democracy can be especially profound in societies that uphold egalitarianism and inclusivity. Furthermore, police violence threatens individuals' realization of their basic need for safety and security, transforming institutions designed for protection into sources of fear. As trust in these institutions is a key predictor of democratic satisfaction, we anticipate that police violence will undermine democratic satisfaction by diminishing political trust, that is:

- **Hypothesis 4:** *Experiences of police violence will negatively impact assessments of democracy's quality and performance.*

2.3 The Moderating Role of Partisanship, Race, and Trait Aggression

Goal-driven attention and reasoning influence how people perceive external information and experiences mediated by their biased cognition processes (Kunda, 1990). Biases rooted in per-

sonality, identity, and pre-existing preferences act as cognitive filters, influencing how people react to information about other people's experiences with violence. Individuals who hold ideological beliefs that place high value and trust in the police have the motivation to rationalize or defect informational stimulus that counters deeply held attitudes (e.g. Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook, 2014; Taber and Lodge, 2006). In addition, people's identities might influence individuals' goals when processing information due to their inherent different perspectives of society, life experiences, and group attachments.

In this section, we focus on vicarious experiences of police abuse. These indirect experiences of police violence are important due to the limitations inherent in research on direct experiences of police violence victimization and their potentially different influence. Individuals who directly experience police violence constitute a demographically selected and small sample, even in countries with high levels of police misconduct, potentially biased toward those more vulnerable populations. Furthermore, the psychological trauma associated with direct police abuse may overwhelm the influence of other variables, hindering the identification of moderating factors (e.g. DeVylder et al., 2017). In our second study, we investigate possible factors that interfere with people's assessment of their contact with vicarious experiences of police violence. By examining these indirect experiences, we aim to capture a broader sample that allows the exploration of potential moderators of the impact of police violence on trust and satisfaction with democracy.

First, law enforcement policy can be deeply polarized across political preferences and partisan identities. That's the case in the United States, Brazil, as well as other countries, where there are highly polarized political environments that can influence people's decision-making process, engaging in partisan motivated reasoning and even affecting non-political behavior (Iyengar et al., 2019; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013). Authoritarianism, which is correlated with support for police violence and a stronger punishment of crime, also correlates with choosing to vote for right-wing populists Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (Vidigal, 2022) and for Donald Trump in the U.S. (Knuckey and Hassan, 2020; Womick et al., 2018). This authoritarian predisposition is one reason why right-wing voters might be inattentive to, deflect, or rationalize vicarious events of police violence. Thus, right-wing-oriented individuals will likely use directional motivations to protect their core beliefs when processing negative information concerning police violence. This leads to our next hypothesis:

- **Hypothesis 5a**: *Vicarious experiences of police violence will have a stronger negative effect on attitudes toward the police, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy among left-wing individuals.*[1]

Next, policing is also a racialized problem in many latitudes across the world. Marginalized racial groups are profiled by the police (e.g., French, 2018; Greenwald, Oakes, and Hoffman,

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[1]In study 2, we consider as left-wing the participants who support Lula da Silva (the former and current Brazilian President) and his party, the Workers' Party (PT).

2003; Correll et al., 2002) and predominately are the victims of police abuse in many different countries and means (e.g., Bueno and de Lima, 2023; Buehler, 2017). Individuals belonging to non-white racial groups may inevitably encounter different instances of police abuse: if not directly, through the shared experiences of others, as a result of the collective interactions with the police within their community. Hence, awareness of events of police violence easies the sampling of negative considerations for non-whites, held in long-term memory, influencing civic and political behavior (e.g. Ang and Tebes, 2023). While individuals belonging to non-white racial groups bear the brunt of police violence, it appears that whites not only are less likely to be the primary victims but also exhibit little to no effect in their behavior in response to these incidents (e.g. Crabtree and Yadon, 2022). This difference in experiences depending on race leads to the second hypothesis regarding vicarious experiences:

- **Hypothesis 5b**: *Vicarious experiences of police violence will have a stronger negative effect on attitudes toward the police, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy among non-whites.*

Finally, drawing from political psychology, we posit that the relationship between trait aggression and affective polarization becomes particularly salient in the context of abusive police violence. The trait aggression measure addresses people's tendencies of aggressive behavior in everyday life (Kalmoe, 2012). Individuals with high levels of trait aggression exhibit a pronounced sensitivity to perceived injustices, responding not with mere disapproval but with intense moral outrage. This reaction is deeply rooted in the aggressive personality's inherent predisposition towards hostility in the face of perceived threats or violations of justice. This heightened emotional response often goes beyond personal indignation, evolving into a collective moral outrage. Such incidents, especially when they gain significant media attention, resonate on a societal level, transforming personal outrage into a unifying force that can galvanize communities and spark significant social movements. This is fueled by a perception that institutions are complicit or have failed to prevent the injustice. The result is a broadening of distrust and negativity, not just towards the police but towards the entire political system, including government agencies, the judiciary, and legislative bodies.

In societies where conservative ideologies typically align with support for law enforcement, this dynamic can create a particularly strong response among liberal individuals high in trait aggression. When observing incidents of police brutality, these individuals are likely to experience a more potent reaction due to ideological incongruence, perceiving these events as not only violations of individual rights but also as emblematic of broader systemic failures. This perception often leads to an 'us versus them' mentality, further intensifying affective polarization. Here, the divide is not only about differing opinions on police conduct but becomes a broader ideological schism, where one side is seen as defending the status quo and the other as advocating for systemic change. This ideologically fueled affective polarization, driven by trait aggression in response to perceived moral outrages like police violence, highlights the complex interplay

between individual personality traits and broader political and social dynamics, which is the base of our final hypothesis:

- **Hypothesis 5c**: *Vicarious experiences of police violence will have a stronger negative effect on attitudes toward the police, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy among individuals high in trait aggression disposition.*

3 Study 1: Direct Experiences of Police Violence

3.1 Police Violence in the Americas

Does exposure to police violence influence political behavior and mass attitudes? A growing body of research, especially following recent and salient police killings in the US, has shed light on this question. Morris and Shoub (2023) and Ang and Tebes (2021) show a mobilizing effect of police violence on voter registration and turnout, particularly in Black and Hispanic communities, while Markarian (2023) observes a localized decrease in voter turnout near such incidents. Boudreau, MacKenzie, and Simmons (2019) and Anoll, Epp, and Israel-Trummel (2022) find that police violence and racial disparities in policing significantly erode public trust in law enforcement. Reactions to police violence vary across racial and political lines, as Crabtree and Yadon (2022) and Reny and Newman (2021) demonstrate; White Americans and conservatives often maintain neutral or unchanged views, contrasting with the decreased favorability among low-prejudice and liberal groups. Additionally, Walker (2020) and Mullinix, Bolsen, and Norris (2021) indicate that policing experiences can prompt broader political participation and support for policy changes, like increased backing for body cameras.

Much research on the effects of police violence on political behavior and mass attitudes has been geographically centered on the United States, reflecting the country's pronounced instances of police misconduct, particularly against the African-American population, adding to the racial tension. However, this predominant focus on the U.S. overlooks the broader applicability of such research findings in other contexts. Many countries have significant and unfortunate levels of police violence also directed towards non-white populations, often accompanied by similar patterns of nationwide media coverage. Consequently, there is a notable gap in the literature concerning the transnational dimensions of police violence and its implications for political dynamics beyond the borders of the United States and North America as a whole.

A more comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon necessitates a broader comparative approach that acknowledges the diverse manifestations of police violence across different socio-political contexts. While we acknowledge the importance attributed to the United States in research on police violence, particularly given its worldwide media coverage, our study expands its focus to encompass the entirety of the Americas. We recognize the importance of not overlooking the experiences of other countries. Our first analysis aims to address the geographical gap in understanding the effects of experiences with police violence on individuals'

behaviors, opinions, and attitudes. To fill this gap, we add Latin America to the analysis, a region characterized by high levels of violence (Müller, 2018; Dammert 2012; Bruneau 2011; Desmond Arias 2006).

The Latin American context is important because the democracies within it have been labeled as "uncivil democracies" (Holston and Caldeira, 1998), where although the political right to vote has been established, factors such as violence, impunity, and deficient or corrupt judicial systems hinder the full fruition of civil rights (Pereira and Davis, 2000). This situation varies across countries in the region, with the extent of civil rights protection differing depending on the specific socio-political landscape. Despite the process of democratization, the military and police still retain significant influence and power in many countries. High levels of criminal violence exert pressure on the state to respond and combat such threats, and protecting citizens from violence remains a fundamental duty. Therefore, this dynamic often results in heightened levels of state repression, justified under the pretext of safeguarding citizens from crime.

In several Latin American countries, the police have been implicated in activities such as running drug operations, committing killings, kidnappings, torturing, providing intelligence to criminal organizations, and mistreating detainees (Brinks, 2008). Despite the significance of the police, analyses of politics and democracy in Latin America often overlook their role in society (Bayley, 1985), with scholarly attention typically directed toward state, military, and criminal violence to study political behavior and attitudes (e.g. Chouhy, Singer, and Lehmann, 2022; Gomes and Alves de Aquino, 2018; Carreras, 2013; Trelles and Carreras, 2012). This focus fails to account for the profound implications of police violence. Over time, the police institution has experienced a decline in public trust and confidence in its ability to combat crime effectively while protecting human rights (Sung, Capellan, and Barthuly, 2022; Pion-Berlin and Carreras, 2017). Our study not only addresses the geographical gap but also the one on research about the implications of police violence in Latin America.

3.2   Research Design

To examine the effect of direct experiences of police violence on political trust and satisfaction with democracy, we analyze the 2008 wave of LAPOP's Americas Barometer. The survey is an in-person cross-country survey gauging citizens' political attitudes and behaviors across the Americas. In the 2008 wave, over 30,000 respondents from 24 countries were interviewed. Importantly, this wave is the only one that included measures of self-reported police abuse (see supplementary information for questionnaire details). To our knowledge, this wave represents the only high-quality, cross-country public opinion survey that has ever gauged respondents' direct experiences of police abuse.

Our study focuses on two questions from the 2008 Americas Barometer. The first item measures subjects experiences of verbal aggression, physical violence, or assault by the police, encoded as a binary variable; '1' denotes one or more incidents, '0' otherwise. The second item

assesses requests for bribes by police, also as a binary variable.[2] We consider monetary extortion, or the request for bribes, a type of psychological violence because these are not smooth or positive encounters, as they are employed in a very threatening manner to cause fear to extort money. It is essential to highlight that police officers demanding bribes are usually on duty, a situation compounded by the fact that they are most often armed and hold hierarchical authority over the citizens they interact with. Together, these metrics encompass a broad definition of 'police abuse,' covering verbal aggression, extortion, and physical assault. We exclude questions on perceptions of police involvement in criminal activities, prioritizing direct experience measures. [3]

Regarding system support measures, we assess specific support for democracy with the question: "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in your country?" To gauge diffuse support, we create a composite scale consisting of trust in the executive, trust in Congress, and trust in the judiciary (3-item scale alpha = 0.74). Additionally, we include trust in the national police in the analysis. The trust items use a 7-point scale, measuring respondent trust from "not at all" to "a lot." All scales and attitudinal or belief items are standardized as z-scores for the analysis.

Our analysis comprises two steps employing linear regression and structural equation modeling (SEM). Firstly, we explore the direct effects of police abuse on our dependent variables — trust in the police, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy — incorporating an extensive set of controls, including demographics, socioeconomic factors, crime victimization, social trust (2-item scale alpha = 0.70), and subjective economic perceptions (4-item scale alpha = 0.80). Secondly, through SEM, we dissect the indirect and direct influences of police abuse, considering the potential mediatory role of trust in the police and political trust. We employ survey weights to balance samples across countries and country-clustered robust errors. [4]

For the regression analysis of our three dependent variables, we begin with a model featuring only country-specific fixed effects and no control variables and then introduce a version that includes control variables. Subsequently, we incorporate political trust as a control when examining trust in the police as the dependent variable and, similarly, include trust in the police as a control when focusing on political trust as the outcome. This approach is also applied to the analysis of satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesize that trust in the police acts as a crucial mediator for the influence of police abuse experiences on political trust and satisfaction with democracy. Moreover, in alignment with existing literature, we explore the mediating role of political trust. Therefore, the goal of the first analysis is to evaluate the direct effects of

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[2]Please refer to the Supplemental Information for the wording of the questions.

[3]The questionnaire also inquired about respondents' views on police involvement in criminal activities. Given its subjective nature, we exclude it from our analysis. Instead, we focus on the broader measure of trust in the police, which likely also tapes on the aforementioned perception of criminal involvement, which we theorize is a mediator of the impact of direct experiences of police violence on political trust and satisfaction with democracy.

[4]As socioeconomic and demographic controls, we include age cohorts, educational attainment levels, gender, income quintiles, household structure, ethnicity, religion, ideology, political interest, occupation, urban/rural, city/town size, and a national capital indicator.

police abuse on political trust and satisfaction with democracy and whether there is evidence suggesting the role of trust in the police and political trust as mediators.

Finally, in the second empirical step, we employ structural equation modeling (SEM) to conduct a multiple mediation analysis, aiming to differentiate between the indirect and direct effects of police abuse on satisfaction with democracy and political trust. In the SEM estimation, we run the same models incorporating all control variables and simultaneously estimate the three principal equations. Throughout this analysis, same as we did before, we apply survey weights to balance samples across countries and calculate country-clustered standard errors.

3.3   Results

The results of the models in which we account for country-fixed effects and the complete set of controls (second column of Tables 1, 2, and 3) reveal a negative association between direct experiences of police violence and satisfaction with democracy, political trust, and trust in the police.[5] Specifically, verbal or physical abuse negatively predicts satisfaction with democracy (-0.10, $p<0.01$) and political trust (-0.19, $p<0.001$) and even more substantially predicts a diminished trust in the police (-0.37, $p<0.001$). Similarly, monetary extortion has a negative association with satisfaction with democracy (-0.10, $p<0.001$), political trust (-0.15, $p<0.001$), and trust in the police (-0.20, $p<0.001$). These findings suggest a potential detrimental effect of police violence on individuals' specific and diffuse support for democracy and its institutions.[6]

Further analysis suggests how trust in the police mediates the relationship between police violence and political attitudes. In the regressions for political trust and satisfaction with democracy where trust in the police is included (columns 3 and 5 of Table 1 and column 3 of Table 2), the coefficients for verbal and physical abuse on satisfaction with democracy (-0.04, ns) and political trust (0.00, ns) become statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the coefficient for monetary extortion remains significant, yet it is slightly smaller for the effect on satisfaction with democracy (-0.07, $p<0.01$), and notably smaller for the marginal effect on political trust (-0.04, $p<0.05$). Conversely, trust in the police remains a strong predictor of satisfaction with democracy (0.04, $p<0.001$) and political trust (0.50, $p<0.001$). Note that the marginal effect of trust in the police on political trust is twice the size of the next most relevant predictor, subjective economic perceptions. Altogether, these results strongly suggest that the negative marginal effect of police abuse on satisfaction with democracy operates significantly through diminished trust in the police and in democratic political institutions. Finally, we observe that when political trust is added to the regression with police trust as the outcome (shown in column 3 of Table 3), the two measures of police abuse continue to show a strong, negative, and significant marginal effect on trust in the

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[5]We note the usual caveat regarding the validity of the selection on observables assumption in observational analysis. Specifically, we conservatively interpret our regression results as associations and statistical relationships that account for a wide range of potential alternative explanations. Therefore, we acknowledge that the included controls cover a broad, but not necessarily universal, spectrum of alternative explanations.

[6]See study 1's supplementary information in which we include the full regression estimates for all controls.

Table 1: DV: Satisfaction with Democracy (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Verbal or Physical Abuse	-0.19 ***	-0.10 **	-0.04	-0.05 †	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Monetary Extortion	-0.14 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.07 **	-0.07 **	-0.07 **
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust in the Police			0.16 ***		0.04 ***
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Political Trust Scale				0.26 ***	0.24 ***
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Num.Obs.	31474	20053	19916	19239	19185
R2 Adj.	0.094	0.164	0.185	0.219	0.220
Includes					
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
All Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Sig. labels † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Country-clustered standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimation considers survey weights to balance countries' unequal sample sizes. Scales and items are measured as z-scores. Controls: age, gender, education, income, household size, ethnicity, religion, ideology, political interest, crime victimization, economic perceptions scale, occupation, social trust scale, urban, national capital, and large city.

police.

Connecting these findings to our study hypotheses, it becomes evident that the negative marginal effect of police violence on perceptions of trust in the police, political trust, and satisfaction with democratic institutions is significantly supported (Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4). We also find evidence suggesting that trust in the police is positively related to satisfaction with democracy and political trust.[7]

Finally, we consider the SEM estimation results, which offer a deeper understanding of the dynamics between police abuse, political trust, trust in the police, and satisfaction with democracy (see Table 4 and Figure 1). Verbal and physical abuse, as well as monetary extortion, when controlling for trust in the police and political trust, initially appear to have a relatively minor direct marginal effect on satisfaction with democracy, with coefficients of -0.040 (p=0.216) and -0.066 (p<0.01), respectively. While the direct effect of verbal and physical abuse is not statistically significant, monetary extortion's negative influence is both significant and indicative of a noteworthy disruption in democratic satisfaction. Conversely, political trust and trust in the police significantly predict higher satisfaction with democracy, with coefficients of 0.242 (p<0.001) and 0.036 (p<0.001), respectively, highlighting the foundational role of trust in specific support for democracy.

More pronounced are the negative marginal effects of verbal and physical abuse (-0.191, p<0.001) and monetary extortion (-0.145, p<0.001) on political trust, as well as the even larger

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[7]We note that while there is extensive literature on the role of general violence, civil conflict, and crime victimization on satisfaction with democracy, to our knowledge, this is the first cross-national public opinion study connecting trust in the police with satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions.

Table 2: DV: Political Trust Scale (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Verbal or Physical Abuse	-0.28 ***	-0.19 ***	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Monetary Extortion	-0.21 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.04 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust in the Police			0.50 ***
			(0.01)
Num.Obs.	30248	19606	19549
R2 Adj.	0.135	0.239	0.444
Includes			
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
All Controls	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Sig. labels † $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$. Country-clustered standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimation considers survey weights to balance countries' unequal sample sizes. Scales and items are measured as z-scores. Controls: age, gender, education, income, household size, ethnicity, religion, ideology, political interest, crime victimization, economic perceptions scale, occupation, social trust scale, urban, national capital, and large city.

Table 3: DV: Trust in the Police (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Verbal or Physical Abuse	-0.45 ***	-0.37 ***	-0.27 ***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Monetary Extortion	-0.28 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.13 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Political Trust Scale			0.54 ***
			(0.01)
Num.Obs.	32431	20362	19549
R2 Adj.	0.106	0.155	0.382
Includes			
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
All Controls	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Sig. labels † $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$. Country-clustered standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimation considers survey weights to balance countries' unequal sample sizes. Scales and items are measured as z-scores. Controls: age, gender, education, income, household size, ethnicity, religion, ideology, political interest, crime victimization, economic perceptions scale, occupation, social trust scale, urban, national capital, and large city.

Table 4: SEM Model Summary

	Panel A: Regressions			
	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	p-value
Regression 1: Satisfaction with Democracy (DV)				
Verbal and Physical Abuse (c_1)	-0.040	0.032	-1.236	0.216
Monetary Extortion (c_2)	-0.066	0.025	-2.674	0.007
Political Trust (b_1)	0.242	0.008	29.737	<0.001
Trust in the Police (b_2)	0.036	0.008	4.551	<0.001
Regression 2: Political Trust (DV)				
Verbal and Physical Abuse (a_{11})	-0.191	0.029	-6.596	<0.001
Monetary Extortion (a_{21})	-0.145	0.022	-6.607	<0.001
Regression 3: Trust in the Police (DV)				
Verbal and Physical Abuse (a_{12})	-0.365	0.029	-12.731	<0.001
Monetary Extortion (a_{22})	-0.209	0.023	-9.300	<0.001

	Panel B: Defined Parameters			
	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	p-value
Direct Effect				
$c_1 + c_2$	-0.106	0.037	-2.828	0.005
Path: *Police Abuse* to *Political Trust*				
$a_{11} + a_{21}$	-0.336	0.033	-10.047	<0.001
Path: *Police Abuse* to *Trust in the Police*				
$a_{12} + a_{22}$	-0.575	0.033	-17.344	<0.001
Path: *Political Trust* to *Satisfaction with Democracy*				
b_1	0.242	0.008	29.737	<0.001
Path: *Trust in the Police* to *Satisfaction with Democracy*				
b_2	0.036	0.008	4.551	<0.001
Indirect Effect	-0.102	0.011	-9.471	<0.001
Total Effect	-0.208	0.038	-5.412	<0.001

Note: Coefficients for controls are omitted. Each regression equation includes all the controls. The indirect effect is calculated as $(a_{11} + a_{21}) \times b_1 + (a_{12} + a_{22}) \times b_2$. The total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect effects.

Figure 1: SEM Path Diagram

Total Effect of Police Abuse on
Satisfaction with Democracy $= -0.21^{***}$

Political Trust

$a_{11} + a_{21} = -.34^{***}$

$b_1 = .24^{***}$

Police Abuse

Satisfaction with Democracy

$c_1 + c_2 = -.11^{**}$

$a_{12} + a_{22} = -.58^{***}$

$b_2 = .04^{***}$

Trust in the Police

Notes: Sig. labels † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Country-clustered standard errors. The coefficient estimation considers survey weights to balance countries' unequal sample sizes. Scales and items are measured as z-scores. Controls: age, gender, education, income, household size, ethnicity, religion, ideology, political interest, crime victimization, economic perceptions scale, occupation, social trust scale, urban, national capital, and large city. SEM regressions tables are in the appendix.

detrimental effects on trust in the police (-0.365, $p<0.001$; -0.209, $p<0.001$, respectively). These findings suggest a strong corrosive effect of police abuse on trust in both key democratic institutions and the police themselves. The combined direct effects of verbal and physical abuse and monetary extortion on satisfaction with democracy are statistically significant (-0.106, $p=0.005$), and upon considering the paths from police abuse to political trust (-0.336, $p<0.001$) and trust in the police (-0.575, $p<0.001$), it is clear that police abuse significantly associated with erosion in these forms of trust. Importantly, the pathways from political trust and trust in the police to satisfaction with democracy suggest their potential role in influencing satisfaction with democracy, with coefficients of 0.242 ($p<0.001$) and 0.036 ($p<0.001$), respectively.

The indirect effect of police abuse on satisfaction with democracy via these mediating variables of trust is significant and negative (-0.102, $p<0.001$), elucidating the crucial role of trust as a conduit through which police abuse exerts its broader detrimental effects on democratic satisfaction. This leads to a total effect of -0.208 standard deviations on the measure of democratic satisfaction ($p<0.001$) when considering both the direct and indirect effects of police abuse. This effect is similar in magnitude to the standardized effect of economic perceptions and larger than the effect of social trust and crime victimization.

4 Study 2: Vicarious Experiences of Police Violence

4.1 Brazil as a Case Study

In August 2023, São Paulo, the most densely populated state in Brazil, witnessed an extreme case of police violence in which 18 people were killed in a one-day operation in response to the killing of a Military Police officer in the region of Guarujá. Tarcísio de Freitas, the State Governor at the time, supported by far-right former President Jair Bolsonaro, stated being "extremely satisfied" with the operation. The State Department of Public Safety claimed that all deceased were criminals who confronted the Military Police officers and were "collateral effect" of the operation. In dissonance, the population of the region protested these allegations in the streets, arguing that there were summary executions and torture of non-criminals, pointing out extreme police violence. Brazilians observed the police taking the lives of 6,429 individuals in 2022, according to the Brazilian Forum on Public Safety, a nonprofit organization — averaging around 17 fatalities per day and exceeding the number of police killings in the United States by a factor of five (Bueno and de Lima, 2023). [8]

When extracting from the Americas and thinking broadly outside of North America, Brazil is the ideal case to assess the impact of police violence. This is not only because of the unfortunate number of killings and abuses themselves but also due to the complex social and political landscapes that it encapsulates. The number of police killings in Brazil has been over six thousand a year since 2018. The average percentage of people identified as white being a victim of these is only approximately 19.5 from 2018 to 2022 (Bueno and de Lima, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023), and most cases involving police killings and physical abuse against the black population are associated with the Military Police forces (Alcadipani et al., 2021). It is evident that individuals belonging to non-white racial groups disproportionately experience the impacts of police misconduct. This underscores the inherent racial dimension of the issue, serving as a preliminary indication of its fundamentally racial nature in the country. Thus, it is critically important to investigate the varied effects of this prevalent form of violence in Brazil.

The ascension of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency in 2019 marked a notable surge in rightwing populism, paralleled by a corresponding amplification in widespread support for the police and the military within the political and social environment. During his presidency, Bolsonaro, a former army captain, integrated military personnel into his government, including having a high-ranking military officer as his vice-president and selecting another senior military figure as the health minister during the COVID-19 pandemic. Bolsonaro consistently championed the

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[8]The Brazilian Forum on Public Safety's data considers information on killings from both the Investigative Police and the Military Police, taking into account the unique Brazilian scenario wherein the policing policy includes a military branch (*polícia militar*) responsible for crime prevention, primarily through patrolling and riot control, and the Investigative Police (*polícia civil*) that focuses on investigative duties. Both vary at a State level, but the Military Police is the one with more direct contact with the population, typically three times larger than their investigative counterparts, and can be understood as the main police when speaking of policing and police abuse (Alcadipani et al., 2021).

widespread presence of military personnel within his administration, focusing on their supposed high morality and efficiency. This endorsement of the defense forces also expanded to the police, largely due to its military branch, but also because of their work in society which was constantly argued to be of extreme need to end criminal violence. The extent of this right-wing trend is exemplified by the support exhibited by the State Governor of São Paulo towards police killings even after the end of Bolsonaro's government, as cited in the 2023 case above. On the more left-wing side of politics, the demilitarization and a reform of the police have been salient political issues, based on heightened concerns over elevated rates of police abuse.

To understand partisan identity in Brazil, we must account for support for Bolsonaro (*Bolsonarismo*), support for (*Petismo*) and the dislike of (*antipetismo*) the left-wing Workers' Party (PT). This is because identification with PT has been the most - and probably the only - relevant and stable partisan identity in Brazil in almost three decades (Carreirão and Rennó, 2018; Baker et al., 2015; Samuels, 2006). Unlike as seen in the United States, parties other than PT lack the depth of popular support and the emotional attachment necessary to transform the, already small, support into partisan social identities (Huddy and Bankert, 2017; Mason, 2013; Iyengar et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 1960). In this unique scenario, negative partisanship plays a critical role in electoral behavior. Negative partisanship, differently from affective polarization, does not require an attachment to a party, but a profound disregard for one of the parties (e.g. Abramowitz and Webster, 2016). The Workers' Party's (PT) perceived failures, including corruption scandals and economic crises, led to widespread disaffection among voters (Samuels and Zucco, 2018). This was particularly evident in the 2018 elections, where *antipetismo* fueled the rise of *Bolsonarismo*. Consequently, Brazilian vote choice now hinges primarily on support or opposition to PT, exacerbated by the polarization caused by *Bolsonarismo* (Setzler, 2021), which is the most severe political polarization Brazil has witnessed in decades (Borges and Vidigal, 2018). This polarization became clearly evident in the 2022 tight presidential elections, culminating in the defeat of Bolsonaro and the return of PT's leader, Lula da Silva.

As in a multi-party system, Brazilians can vote for multiple party platforms, with varying degrees of support for the coerciveness of the police, but law enforcement candidates had had success in the ballots (Novaes, 2024). While tolerance for police violence might be partially explained by its perceived role in fighting general violence and moderated by political ideology, such justifications often come from segments of the population usually not affected by its direct consequences. Despite high levels of police violence, Brazilians continue to enjoy a broad range of civil liberties, elections are fair and functional, for instance. Additionally, the issue of police violence is very present in the media. Given its visibility in the media, Brazilians may encounter vicarious experiences through various channels, and even more often, depending on the social group they belong to, through interactions with friends or family members who have been victims of police abuse. This study examines the paradox of extensive vicarious police abuse co-existing with a robust and functional democracy in Brazil, a nation also notorious for its violent crime rates and that can be considered one of the most violent democracies in the world.

4.2 Research Design

To assess the impact of vicarious experiences of police violence on attitudes toward the police, trust in democratic institutions, and satisfaction with democracy, we conducted an original two-wave survey experiment. All our experimental hypotheses were pre-registered.[9] Fieldwork was done throughout October 2023, 1,004 respondents completed the first wave and 624 both waves. We contracted Opinion Box, an online survey provider, to recruit subjects and conduct the experiment via the Qualtrics platform. In the first wave, we measured baseline levels of our outcome variables – trust in the police, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy, and our three pre-registered moderators – race, partisan attachments, and trait aggression.[10]

After approximately one week, respondents were re-contacted to complete wave 2, which included the manipulation and the post-treatment measurement of our outcomes. Note that all analyses are carried out over the sample of individuals that responded to both waves to exploit the panel structure of the data and estimate treatment effects over the baselines measured in wave 1. Regarding our outcome measures, which we apply in both waves, we employed one item related to trust in the police, three items related to trust in democratic institutions or "political trust" (the extent to which subjects trust the National Congress, the Presidency, and the Judiciary), and one item tapping on subjects satisfaction with democracy.[11]

In our vignette survey experiment, there are two conditions within our manipulation: excessive police violence ($Violence_i = 1$) and a non-violent policing scenario ($Violence_i = 0$). The vignette in each condition corresponds to a summarized news article describing an interaction between police officers and a civilian in the context of a traffic stop. In the second wave, we randomly assigned participants to read one of these two vignettes. The condition with excessive police violence presents a scenario involving a police encounter with a middle-aged man, which escalates to violence, ultimately resulting in an officer shooting the person in the leg. In this condition, the police officers employ an excessive use of force, acting inappropriately, as they rely disproportionately on physical violence in a routine traffic stop. Conversely, the non-violent condition describes an appropriate interaction between the person and the police officers, where the person, though nervous, is cooperative and eventually finds his identification with the officers' assistance. After reading the short news article, subjects answered a set of items tapping into perceptions of procedural justice in the context of the situation described in the vignette (respect, voice, transparency, trustworthiness) and answered the same questions about political trust and satisfaction with democracy they did in wave one.

In our analysis, we employ the Two-Way Fixed Effects (TWFE) estimator to assess the impact of vicarious exposure to police violence on trust in the police, trust in democratic institutions,

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[9]Readers can find our preregistration materials on: `https://osf.io/zykfm`

[10]We also measured other demographics, political interest, turnout, and vote choice in the last presidential election

[11]We measure trust in the police, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy using the same question wording and response scale from 2008 Brazil's LAPOP questionnaire.

and satisfaction with democracy. We define the treatment variable $D_{it} = \text{Violence}_i \times \text{Post}_t$, where $\text{Post}_t = 1$ for observations from wave 2 and $\text{Post}_t = 0$ for wave 1 data. Consequently, $D_{it} = 0$ for all participants in wave 1, and $D_{it} = 1$ for those randomly assigned to the police violence vignette condition during wave 2. Through randomization in the second wave, we ensure that individuals are comparable across both waves in terms of their pre-treatment characteristics and attitudes, as detailed in the supplemental information, which also contains the randomization check.

Furthermore, we use responses to procedural justice questions as a manipulation check, with more details provided in the supplemental information (SI). Therefore, our design corresponds to a pre-post between-subjects experiment. By measuring our outcomes in wave 1, we can compare across conditions and within individuals' outcome levels pre and post-experimental manipulation. Hence, the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of interest can be conceptually illustrated as follows:

$$\text{ATE} = \left(\bar{Y}_{\text{wave=2,Violence=1}} - \bar{Y}_{\text{wave=1,Violence=1}} \right) - \left(\bar{Y}_{\text{wave=2,Violence=0}} - \bar{Y}_{\text{wave=1,Violence=0}} \right).$$

To further investigate heterogeneity in treatment effects, following our theoretical predictions, we calculate three Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATE) by introducing an interaction term of D with three binary indicators: high *Petismo* (*Petismo* scale > median), non-white dummy, and high trait aggression disposition (trait aggression scale > median).

4.3 Results

We report the vignette experiment results in Table 5. In Panel A, the Average Treatment Effects (ATE) indicate a significant negative impact of exposure to vicarious police violence on both satisfaction with democracy and trust in the police. These results align with our second and fourth hypotheses, which posited that experiences of police violence would negatively impact trust in the police and satisfaction with democracy, respectively. The standardized coefficients for the ATE, labeled in the table as "D = $\mathbb{I}\{\text{Violence}_i \times \text{Post}_t = 1\}$," are -0.194 for satisfaction with democracy and -0.405 for trust in the police, both statistically significant ($p<0.05$ and $p<0.001$, respectively). However, we do not find substantial evidence that the treatment directly and unconditionally influenced political trust. Note that these effects are comparable in size to the effect sizes of direct experiences of police abuse found in Study 1.

In Panel B, which evaluates Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATE) by left-wing individuals (high *Petismo*), we observe that exposure to the treatment is generally associated with higher distrust in political institutions and the police. *Petistas* exhibited a marginally significant additional negative standardized effect on political trust and trust in the police equal to -0.17 ($p=0.060$) and -0.21 ($p=0.064$). Notably, the CATE on political trust for non-*petistas* is small and insignificant. Interestingly, non-*petistas* demonstrate a strong and negative CATE on trust in the police. Finally, although the CATE estimates for *Petistas* are twice as large as those for

non-*petistas* regarding the negative effect of the treatment on satisfaction with democracy, the estimate was not significant.

Panel C assesses CATE by race, focusing on non-white individuals. The results broadly align with the findings from Panel B. We notice that the treatment notably affects political trust in non-whites (-0.21, $p<0.05$), contrasting with an insignificant and negligible effect on whites. Notably, the treatment's effect on trust in the police for non-whites is approximately double that for whites. However, the impact remains negative and significant for whites (-0.30, $p<0.01$), equating to three-quarters the size of the overall sample ATE on political trust (-0.41, $p<0.001$). Lastly, while the CATE estimates for non-whites doubly negatively impact satisfaction with democracy compared to whites, the estimate did not reach significance.

Finally, Panel D describes CATEs by individuals' trait aggression disposition. We find strong and more precise estimates for individuals high in trait aggression for its conditional effect in reducing our outcomes. Individuals high in trait aggression exhibited more negative CATEs than those low in trait aggression on satisfaction with democracy, political trust, and trust in the police, showing additional z-scores of -0.16 ($p=0.051$), -0.19 ($p<0.05$), and -0.26 ($p<0.05$), respectively. Like the other moderators, individuals low in trait aggression demonstrated negligible and insignificant treatment effects on political trust. Additionally, following previous results, individuals low in trait aggression exhibited a strong negative and significant effect on trust in the police (-0.29, $p<0.01$).

Overall, the experiment results reveal several insights. The treatment increased distrust in the police regardless of race, partisanship, and trait aggression disposition. However, we observed an increased effect—almost doubling in size—for subjects high in trait aggression ($p<0.05$), petistas ($p=0.064$), and non-whites ($p=0.07$). Regarding political trust, we found that for whites, non-petistas, and individuals low in trait aggression, the treatment effect was virtually zero and insignificant. In contrast, for petistas, non-whites, and those high in trait aggression, the effect was negative and marginally significant for petistas ($p=0.06$) and significant for non-whites and high in trait aggression subjects ($p<0.05$).

Thus, we find strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 5 concerning political trust. Similarly, results support Hypothesis 5 regarding trust in the police, though with slightly less precise estimates. Finally, regarding the same hypothesis, we do not find compelling evidence supporting the conditional effect of the three moderators on satisfaction with democracy. Although the direction of the estimates aligns with the theorized direction and has a non-negligible size, the estimates of the interaction are not precise enough to distinguish between groups.

Finally, in the supplementary information, we include a table with estimates for the treatment groups on the items measuring perceptions of procedural justice, which we treat as a manipulation check. In support of Hypothesis 1, we find that perceptions of procedural justice regarding the behavior of the police officers in the violent vignette strongly erode perceptions of procedural justice in contrast to the non-violent vignette. Furthermore, by revealing the treatment's strong and direct negative effect on satisfaction with democracy and trust in the police,

Table 5: Vignette Experiment Results

	Panel A: ATE		
	Satisf. w. Democracy	Political Trust	Trust in the Police
D = $\mathbb{I}$\{Violence $\times$ Post = 1\}	-0.194**	-0.099	-0.405***
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.089)

	Panel B: CATE by Petismo		
	Satisf. w. Democracy	Political Trust	Trust in the Police
D = $\mathbb{I}$\{Violence $\times$ Post = 1\}	-0.135*	-0.019	-0.302**
	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.108)
D $\times$ High Petismo	-0.122	-0.166†	-0.211†
	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.114)

	Panel C: CATE by Non-White		
	Satisf. w. Democracy	Political Trust	Trust in the Police
D = $\mathbb{I}$\{Violence $\times$ Post = 1\}	-0.131†	0.010	-0.298**
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.111)
D $\times$ Non-White	-0.121	-0.211*	-0.206†
	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.115)

	Panel D: CATE by High Trait Aggression		
	Satisf. w. Democracy	Political Trust	Trust in the Police
D = $\mathbb{I}$\{Violence $\times$ Post = 1\}	-0.120†	-0.012	-0.285**
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.105)
D $\times$ High Trait Aggr.	-0.163†	-0.192*	-0.264*
	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.114)

Notes: Sig. labels: $\dagger$ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Individual-clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. Total Observations = 1,248. Waves = 2. Individuals = 624. Violent = 1 if the violent vignette was assigned, and 0 if the non-violent vignette was. Post = 1 if wave=2, and 0 if wave=1. $D = \mathbb{I}$\{ \} stands for an indicator function such that when the expression inside the brackets is true, then $D = 1$, otherwise $D = 0$. Thus, in wave 1, D is equal to 0 for all participants, and in wave 2, D turns into 1 for the participants assigned to the police violence vignette. Hence, we estimate ATEs and CATEs using a TWFE Diff-in-Diff estimator while we randomly assign the treatment conditions in wave two. Thus we can be sure that groups in each treatment condition have similar pre-treatment characteristics (see the supplementary information for details on the randomization check). The coefficients were estimated using the "within" panel fixed-effects estimator; hence, the estimation accounts for individual and wave fixed-effects.

the experiment provides strong evidence for Hypotheses 2 and 4.

5   Conclusion

In a time where police misconduct has gained significant attention from the public and media, there exists a pressing need for more research into the socio-political implications of such episodes. People encounter police violence in various ways, yet research has predominantly focused on salient cases of police abuse and their impact on attitudes toward the police and has not thoroughly probed into its spillover effects on specific and diffuse support for democracy. In this paper, we argue that different forms of police violence victimization, including direct and indirect experiences, should receive more attention in political science due to their key implications for democracy's public legitimacy. Hence, in this study, we ask whether citizens' experiences with police violence impact their trust in democratic institutions and satisfaction with democracy. Moreover, we explore whether the impact of indirect experiences of police violence is moderated by factors such as race, partisan identity, or psychological traits. To examine these questions, we conducted two studies: one using observational data and another with an original experimental design.

Our findings from both studies indicate that direct and vicarious experiences with police violence negatively influence people's trust in the police and democratic institutions, as well as their overall satisfaction with democracy. First, in study 1, looking at all countries from 2008 LAPOP's Americas Barometer, we find evidence for all the hypotheses (2 to 4) which probed the effects of direct experiences of police violence victimization. That is, direct experiences of police verbal or physical abuse and monetary extortion negatively affect trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy. We proposed a pathway for this effect and found that police violence diminishes trust in institutions and in the police, and through this fractured trust, exerts a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy.

In the second study, we fielded an original two-wave vignette experiment in which we probed how vicarious experiences of police violence affect political trust and satisfaction with democracy. Participants exposed to a vignette describing an event of excessive police violence during a traffic stop showed increased distrust in law enforcement and lower satisfaction with democracy compared to those viewing a non-violent but similar scenario. Further, the analysis highlights that left-wing individuals, non-whites, and those with high trait aggression experience more pronounced negative treatment effects, particularly in the case of political trust, pointing to identity and personality traits as key moderators of the effect of indirect exposure to police violence. These outcomes reveal a complex interplay of identity, personality, and partisan attachments in shaping citizens' reactions to systemic injustices due to police abuse.

Results from both studies speak to the public's normative and instrumental evaluations of democracy and touch on essential aspects of both specific and diffuse support for democracy. Through this research, we contribute to the literature on police violence, trust in institutions,

and, most critically, the public's perceptions of democracy. Importantly, we demonstrate that police violence acts in direct opposition to the ideals of democracy, affecting not just fundamental democratic principles but also citizens' trust in fundamental democratic institutions and satisfaction with the political system. As support for democracy is crucial for the stability of any political system, the ramifications of police violence extend far beyond previous assumptions, challenging the legitimacy of political institutions and potentially eroding the foundational trust necessary for democratic governance. This underlines the urgent need for democratic societies to address and mitigate police violence, not only to uphold the principles of justice and equality but also to maintain and strengthen public faith in democratic institutions and processes.

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6 Supplementary Information (SI)

6.1 SI for Study 1

Table 6: Summary Statistics - All Variables (LAPOP)

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	p10	p25	Median	p75	p90	Max	Uniq
age_yrs	36409	39.53	16.09	16.00	20.00	26.00	37.00	50.00	63.00	105.00	83
crime_vic_d	37819	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2
econpercp_sc	34557	0.00	1.00	-1.80	-1.24	-0.67	-0.11	0.73	1.29	2.70	17
educ_yrs	37644	8.98	4.54	0.00	3.00	6.00	9.00	12.00	15.00	18.00	19
female_d	38053	0.51	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2
ideology	28640	5.67	2.47	1.00	2.00	4.00	5.00	7.00	10.00	10.00	10
income_decile_	31415	4.96	2.28	1.00	2.00	3.00	5.00	6.00	8.00	11.00	11
large_city_d	34521	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2
national_capital_d	34521	0.21	0.41	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2
polbribe_d	34674	0.10	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2
polint_sc	33828	0.00	1.00	-1.24	-1.24	-0.78	-0.16	0.60	1.37	2.44	19
poltrust_3it_sc	33013	0.00	1.00	-1.82	-1.37	-0.70	-0.04	0.63	1.30	2.19	32
polviol_vic_d	34399	0.05	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	2
satisfdemoc_it	36320	0.00	1.00	-2.10	-0.75	-0.75	0.61	0.61	0.61	1.96	4
soctrust_sc	35061	0.00	1.00	-0.92	-0.92	-0.92	-0.19	0.54	1.27	3.45	7
trust_police_it	35326	0.00	1.00	-1.49	-1.49	-0.96	0.12	0.66	1.19	1.73	7
urban_d	34521	0.65	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2

Table 7: Full Regression Table - DV: Satisfaction with Democracy (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Police Violence Victim	-0.185 ***	-0.098 **	-0.038	-0.051 †	-0.040
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Police Bribe Solicitation	-0.144 ***	-0.104 ***	-0.072 **	-0.071 **	-0.066 **
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Trust in Police (z-std.)			0.156 ***		0.036 ***
			(0.008)		(0.009)
Political Trust Scale (z-std.)				0.262 ***	0.242 ***
				(0.008)	(0.009)
Economic Perception Score (z-std.)		0.256 ***	0.234 ***	0.183 ***	0.184 ***
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Social Trust Score (z-std.)		0.054 ***	0.044 ***	0.032 ***	0.031 ***
		(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Political Ideology		0.024 ***	0.020 ***	0.016 ***	0.016 ***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political Interest Score		0.013 †	0.010	-0.003	-0.003
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Crime Victim		-0.061 ***	-0.039 *	-0.036 *	-0.032 †
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Age 24-29		-0.028	-0.022	-0.009	-0.010
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age 30-44		0.006	0.001	0.010	0.008
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age 45-59		0.039	0.027	0.032	0.029
		(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age 60+		0.064 *	0.050 †	0.036	0.037
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Gender Female		-0.008	-0.004	-0.014	-0.013
		(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education High School Graduate		0.043	0.046	0.032	0.032
		(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Education Some College		0.085 *	0.081 *	0.058 †	0.058 †
		(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Education College Graduate		-0.003	-0.003	0.000	-0.001
		(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Education Postgraduate		0.064	0.060	0.045	0.044
		(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Income Quintile 2		-0.036 †	-0.027	-0.009	-0.009
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income Quintile 3		-0.072 **	-0.059 **	-0.028	-0.028
		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Income Quintile 4		-0.052 †	-0.036	0.004	0.004
		(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Income Quintile 5		-0.025	-0.017	0.018	0.017
		(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Household Couple		0.115 **	0.112 **	0.076 †	0.075 †
		(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Household Small Family		0.013	0.010	0.012	0.013
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Household Medium Family		-0.004	-0.009	-0.001	-0.001
		(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Household Large Family		-0.025	-0.024	-0.026	-0.025
		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Ethnicity Black		0.014	0.016	0.001	0.002
		(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Ethnicity Indigenous		0.002	0.023	0.005	0.014
		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Ethnicity Mestizo		0.029 †	0.031 †	0.036 *	0.036 *
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ethnicity Mulatto		-0.018	-0.017	-0.022	-0.020
		(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Ethnicity Other		0.036	0.039	0.020	0.021
		(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Religion Catholic		0.069 **	0.045 †	0.045 †	0.042 †
		(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Religion Evangelical		0.108 ***	0.092 **	0.095 **	0.092 **
		(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Religion Others		0.063	0.058	0.056	0.054
		(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Religion Protestant		0.050	0.039	0.016	0.019
		(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Occupation Unemployed		-0.079 **	-0.070 *	-0.076 **	-0.077 **
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Occupation Employed Unpaid		-0.053	-0.044	-0.070	-0.072
		(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Occupation Non-Active		0.011	0.001	-0.002	-0.004
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Occupation Student		-0.082 **	-0.077 **	-0.073 *	-0.074 *
		(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Urban Area		-0.004	0.000	0.015	0.014
		(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
National Capital		-0.107 ***	-0.089 ***	-0.086 ***	-0.083 ***
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Large City		-0.099 ***	-0.081 ***	-0.073 ***	-0.069 ***
		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Num.Obs.	31474	20053	19916	19239	19185
R2 Adj.	0.094	0.164	0.185	0.219	0.220
Log.Lik.	-44497.979	-27314.095	-26880.311	-25605.349	-25521.061

Notes: Sig. labels † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Country-clustered standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimation considers survey weights to balance countries' unequal sample sizes. Scales and items are measured as z-scores. Country Fixed Effects are omitted from the table. Countries included in the regression: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad. Note that items VIC27 (Verbal and Physical Police Violence Victimization) and EXC2 (Bribe Solicitation) were not included in the questionnaires for the U.S. and Canada.

Table 8: Full Regression Table - DV: Political Trust (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Police Violence Victim	-0.279 ***	-0.189 ***	-0.005
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Police Bribe Solicitation	-0.215 ***	-0.146 ***	-0.043 *
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Trust in Police (z-std.)			0.501 ***
			(0.007)
Economic Perception Score (z-std.)		0.284 ***	0.209 ***
		(0.008)	(0.007)
Social Trust Score (z-std.)		0.082 ***	0.044 ***
		(0.007)	(0.006)
Political Ideology		0.034 ***	0.021 ***
		(0.003)	(0.002)
Political Interest Score		0.068 ***	0.057 ***
		(0.007)	(0.006)
Crime Victim		-0.119 ***	-0.049 ***
		(0.017)	(0.015)
Age 24-29		-0.049 *	-0.030
		(0.024)	(0.021)
Age 30-44		-0.006	-0.020
		(0.023)	(0.020)
Age 45-59		0.029	-0.014
		(0.026)	(0.022)
Age 60+		0.104 ***	0.046 †
		(0.029)	(0.025)
Gender Female		0.013	0.024 †
		(0.015)	(0.013)
Education High School Graduate		0.023	0.041
		(0.037)	(0.032)
Education Some College		0.087 *	0.077 **
		(0.035)	(0.030)
Education College Graduate		-0.024	-0.012
		(0.041)	(0.035)
Education Postgraduate		0.047	0.044
		(0.037)	(0.032)
Income Quintile 2		-0.087 ***	-0.058 ***
		(0.019)	(0.016)
Income Quintile 3		-0.155 ***	-0.118 ***
		(0.021)	(0.019)
Income Quintile 4		-0.191 ***	-0.135 ***
		(0.027)	(0.023)
Income Quintile 5		-0.164 ***	-0.134 ***
		(0.034)	(0.029)
Household Couple		0.077 †	0.070 *
		(0.042)	(0.036)
Household Small Family		0.021	0.005
		(0.025)	(0.021)
Household Medium Family		-0.016	-0.023
		(0.022)	(0.019)
Household Large Family		0.001	0.004
		(0.020)	(0.017)
Ethnicity Black		0.015	0.038
		(0.037)	(0.031)
Ethnicity Indigenous		0.016	0.040
		(0.033)	(0.029)
Ethnicity Mestizo		-0.031 †	-0.022
		(0.017)	(0.014)
Ethnicity Mulatto		-0.011	0.013
		(0.049)	(0.040)
Ethnicity Other		0.043	0.046
		(0.052)	(0.045)
Religion Catholic		0.106 ***	0.023
		(0.024)	(0.021)
Religion Evangelical		0.091 **	0.037
		(0.030)	(0.026)
Religion Others		0.010	0.023
		(0.043)	(0.037)
Religion Protestant		0.112 **	0.057 †
		(0.035)	(0.029)
Occupation Unemployed		-0.029	-0.002
		(0.028)	(0.025)
Occupation Employed Unpaid		0.131	0.097
		(0.088)	(0.075)
Occupation Non-Active		0.044 *	0.019
		(0.018)	(0.016)
Occupation Student		-0.003	-0.004
		(0.028)	(0.024)
Urban Area		-0.056 **	-0.041 **
		(0.019)	(0.016)
National Capital		-0.075 ***	-0.021
		(0.019)	(0.016)
Large City		-0.080 ***	-0.032 †
		(0.021)	(0.018)
Num.Obs.	30248	19606	19549
R2 Adj.	0.135	0.239	0.444
Log.Lik.	-42708.577	-26038.834	-22911.475

Notes: Sig. labels † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Country-clustered standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimation considers survey weights to balance countries' unequal sample sizes. Scales and items are measured as z-scores. Country Fixed Effects are omitted from the table. Countries included in the regression: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad. Note that items *VIC27* (Verbal and Physical Police Violence Victimization) and *EXC2* (Bribe Solicitation) were not included in the questionnaires for the U.S. and Canada.

Table 9: Full Regression Table - DV: Trust in the Police (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Police Violence Victim	-0.445 ***	-0.371 ***	-0.266 ***
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Police Bribe Solicitation	-0.279 ***	-0.197 ***	-0.128 ***
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Political Trust Scale (z-std.)			0.536 ***
			(0.007)
Economic Perception Score (z-std.)		0.149 ***	-0.002
		(0.008)	(0.007)
Social Trust Score (z-std.)		0.074 ***	0.031 ***
		(0.007)	(0.006)
Political Ideology		0.027 ***	0.008 **
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Political Interest Score		0.022 **	-0.014 *
		(0.007)	(0.006)
Crime Victim		-0.145 ***	-0.077 ***
		(0.017)	(0.015)
Age 24-29		-0.035	-0.013
		(0.025)	(0.022)
Age 30-44		0.023	0.030
		(0.024)	(0.021)
Age 45-59		0.083 **	0.070 **
		(0.026)	(0.023)
Age 60+		0.114 ***	0.060 *
		(0.030)	(0.026)
Gender Female		-0.020	-0.029 *
		(0.015)	(0.013)
Education High School Graduate		-0.034	-0.048
		(0.036)	(0.031)
Education Some College		0.023	-0.025
		(0.033)	(0.028)
Education College Graduate		-0.018	-0.010
		(0.039)	(0.034)
Education Postgraduate		0.010	-0.020
		(0.036)	(0.031)
Income Quintile 2		-0.061 **	-0.011
		(0.019)	(0.017)
Income Quintile 3		-0.085 ***	0.008
		(0.022)	(0.019)
Income Quintile 4		-0.120 ***	-0.010
		(0.027)	(0.023)
Income Quintile 5		-0.079 *	0.027
		(0.034)	(0.029)
Household Couple		0.026	-0.024
		(0.041)	(0.035)
Household Small Family		0.038	0.023
		(0.025)	(0.022)
Household Medium Family		0.018	0.020
		(0.023)	(0.020)
Household Large Family		0.000	-0.005
		(0.020)	(0.018)
Ethnicity Black		-0.040	-0.056 †
		(0.036)	(0.032)
Ethnicity Indigenous		-0.039	-0.055 †
		(0.034)	(0.030)
Ethnicity Mestizo		-0.016	-0.001
		(0.017)	(0.015)
Ethnicity Mulatto		-0.050	-0.043
		(0.048)	(0.040)
Ethnicity Other		0.004	-0.030
		(0.049)	(0.043)
Religion Catholic		0.166 ***	0.109 ***
		(0.024)	(0.021)
Religion Evangelical		0.101 ***	0.057 *
		(0.031)	(0.027)
Religion Others		-0.019	-0.034
		(0.043)	(0.038)
Religion Protestant		0.113 **	0.049
		(0.034)	(0.030)
Occupation Unemployed		-0.061 *	-0.033
		(0.028)	(0.025)
Occupation Employed Unpaid		0.041	-0.003
		(0.090)	(0.078)
Occupation Non-Active		0.046 *	0.027 †
		(0.018)	(0.016)
Occupation Student		-0.002	0.006
		(0.029)	(0.025)
Urban Area		-0.031 †	-0.001
		(0.019)	(0.017)
National Capital		-0.106 ***	-0.066 ***
		(0.019)	(0.017)
Large City		-0.091 ***	-0.051 **
		(0.021)	(0.018)
Num.Obs.	32431	20362	19549
R2 Adj.	0.106	0.155	0.382
Log.Lik.	-45913.039	-27784.653	-23571.246

Notes: Sig. labels † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Country-clustered standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimation considers survey weights to balance countries' unequal sample sizes. Scales and items are measured as z-scores. Country Fixed Effects are omitted from the table. Countries included in the regression: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad. Note that items *VIC27* (Verbal and Physical Police Violence Victimization) and *EXC2* (Bribe Solicitation) were not included in the questionnaires for the U.S. and Canada.

Table 10: Selected Variables from LAPOP's 2008 Questionnaire

Variable Name	Question Wording	Response Options
CITY SIZE - TAMANO	Size of town or city of respondent:	(1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area
AGE - Q2	Q2. How old are you? _____ years	
GENDER - Q1	Q1. Sex (note down; do not ask):	(1) Male (2) Female
EDUCATION - ED	ED. What was the last year of education you completed? ____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) = _____ total number of years	
INCOME - Q10	Q10. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? [Show the list of ranges on Card E] Note: *Card E is tailored to the 2008 income brackets of each country, representing national decile income brackets in the country's currency. The income ranges here are shown just as an example.*	(00) No income (01) Less than $25 (02) $26- $50 (03) $51-$100 (04) $101-$150 (05) $151-$200 (06) $201-$300 (07) $301-$400 (08) $401-500 (09) $501-$750 (10) More than $751 (88) DK/DR [COLLECT CARD E]
MARITAL STATUS - Q11	Q11. What is your marital status? [Don't read options]	(1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (8) DK/DR
CHILDREN - HOUSEHOLD SIZE - Q12, Q12A	Q12. How many children do you have? _____ (00 = none Skip to ETID) DK……88 Q12A. [If has children] How many children live with you at the present time? _____ (00) = none, (99) INAP (doesn't have children)	
ETHNICITY - ETID	ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, Afro-country (black), mulatto, or of another race?	(1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black o Afro-country (5) Mulatto (7) Other (8) DK/DR
RELIGION - Q3	Q3. What is your religion? [Do not read options] (1) Catholic (2) Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Adventist, Baptist, Calvinist, The Salvation Army, Lutheran, Methodist, Nazarene, Presbyterian). (3) Non-Christian Religions (Jewish, Muslims, Buddhists, Hinduisms, Taoists). (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Pentecostals, Charismatic non-Catholics, Light of World). (6) Mormons, Jehovah's Witness, Spiritualists and Seventh-Day Adventists. (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion). (4) None, secularist or atheist (Do not believe in God) (8) DK/DR	
IDEOLOGY - L1	On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.	
POLITICAL INTEREST - POL1, POL2	POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?	(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR
	POL2. How often do you discuss politics with other people? [Read the options]	(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (8) DK/DR

Table 10: Selected Variables from LAPOP's 2008 Questionnaire

Variable Name	Question Wording	Response Options
CRIME VICTIMIZATION - VIC1	VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?	(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC20] (8) DK/DR [Skip to VIC20]
ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS - SOCT1, SOCT2, IDIO1, IDIO2	SOCT1. How would you describe the country's economic situation?	(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know
	SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?	(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know
	IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation?	(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know
	IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?	(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know
URBAN AREA - UR	UR	(1) Urban (2) Rural
PROVINCE - PROV	PROV. Province (or department): _____	
TRUST IN THE POLICE - B18	[SHOW CARD] This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. To what extent do you trust the (National Police)?	
TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS - B13, B21A, B10A, B31, B47	[SHOW CARD] This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress? B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister? B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system? B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court? B47. To what extent do you trust elections?	
SOCIAL TRUST - IT1, IT1A, IT1B	IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?	(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (8) DK
	IT1A. How much do you trust people that you meet for the first time?	(1) Totally trust them (2) Somewhat trust them (3) Trust them a little (4) Do not trust them at all (8) DK
	IT1B. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	(1) Most people can be trusted (2) One can't be too careful in dealing with people (8) DK/DR
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY - PN4	In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, disatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in your country?	(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR
POLICE VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION - VIC27	In the past 12 months, has any police officer mistreated you verbally, physically, or assaulted you? How many times?	[Write down the number of times, if responded "No" write down 0, DK/DR=88]
POLICE BRIBE SOLICITATION - exc2	Has a police officer asked you for a bribe during the past year?	(0) No (1) Yes DK/DR
COUNTRY - pais	1. Mexico 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panama 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. Dominican Republic 22. Haiti 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. United States 41. Canada	
WEIGHT - weight1500	"Weight for equal size per country"	

6.2 SI for Study 2

Table 11: DV: Satisfaction with Democracy (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
{D_{it} = Violent$_i$ $\times$ Post$_t$ }	-0.19 **	-0.12 †	-0.13 *	-0.13 †
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
D_{it} $\times$ High Trait Aggr.		-0.16 †		
		(0.08)		
D_{it} $\times$ High Petismo			-0.12	
			(0.08)	
D_{it} $\times$ Non-White				-0.12
				(0.08)
FE Estimator	Within	Within	Within	Within
Num.Obs.	1248	1248	1248	1248
R2	0.016	0.022	0.019	0.019
Waves	2	2	2	2
Individuals	624	624	624	624

Sig. labels: † p<0.1; * p<0.05; *** p<0.001.
Clustered Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 12: DV: Political Trust Scale (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\{D_{it} = \text{Violent}_i \times \text{Post}_t\}$	-0.10	-0.01	-0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
$D_{it} \times$ High Trait Aggr.		-0.19 *		
		(0.09)		
$D_{it} \times$ High Petismo			-0.17 †	
			(0.09)	
$D_{it} \times$ Non-White				-0.21 *
				(0.09)
FE Estimator	Within	Within	Within	Within
Num.Obs.	1248	1248	1248	1248
R2	0.004	0.011	0.009	0.012
Waves	2	2	2	2
Individuals	624	624	624	624

Sig. labels: † $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$.
Clustered Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 13: DV: Trust in the Police (z-score)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\{D_{it} = \text{Violent}_i \times \text{Post}_t\}$	-0.41 ***	-0.29 **	-0.30 **	-0.30 **
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
$D_{it} \times$ High Trait Aggr.		-0.26 *		
		(0.12)		
$D_{it} \times$ High Petismo			-0.21 †	
			(0.12)	
$D_{it} \times$ Non-White				-0.21 †
				(0.12)
FE Estimator	Within	Within	Within	Within
Num.Obs.	1248	1248	1248	1248
R2	0.033	0.039	0.037	0.037
Waves	2	2	2	2
Individuals	624	624	624	624

Sig. labels: † $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.
Clustered Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 14: Mean Differences Wave 2 Variables (manipulation check).

Variable	Overall_Mean	Mean		Mean_Diff	P_Val
		C1: violent vignette	C0: neutral vignette		
trust_police_w2	2.65	2.54	2.76	-0.224	0.00
trust_president_w2	2.09	2.06	2.12	-0.059	0.48
trust_congress_w2	2.15	2.11	2.19	-0.083	0.26
trust_judiciary_w2	2.38	2.35	2.42	-0.071	0.35
democ_satisf_w2	2.13	2.05	2.21	-0.153	0.05
procjust_dignity	2.55	1.90	3.21	-1.309	0.00
procjust_goodintent	2.74	2.27	3.22	-0.950	0.00
procjust_impartial	2.68	2.20	3.17	-0.965	0.00
procjust_voice	2.60	2.24	2.95	-0.710	0.00

Table 15: Randomization Check - Mean differences by condition (wave 1 variables)

Variable	Overall_Mean	Mean		Mean_Diff	P_Val
		C1: violent vignette	C0: neutral vignette		
pl_feeling	2.92	2.94	2.88	0.053	0.52
pt_feeling	2.63	2.69	2.54	0.145	0.13
lula_feeling	2.68	2.70	2.62	0.080	0.42
bolso_feeling	2.85	2.77	2.81	-0.038	0.71
age	2.79	2.90	2.86	0.044	0.71
educ	5.99	5.97	6.14	-0.164	0.08
non_white	0.51	0.52	0.50	0.022	0.58
woman	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.003	0.94
political_interest	2.18	2.16	2.20	-0.042	0.62
traitagresion_q1	2.76	2.66	2.59	0.068	0.60
traitagresion_q2	2.33	2.23	2.25	-0.011	0.93
traitagresion_q3	3.29	3.29	3.17	0.114	0.39
traitagresion_q4	2.85	2.71	2.76	-0.049	0.72
traitagresion_q5	2.91	2.77	2.80	-0.031	0.83
traitagresion_q6	2.71	2.56	2.66	-0.098	0.47
traitagresion_q7	1.88	1.76	1.85	-0.092	0.43
traitagresion_q8	2.34	2.18	2.38	-0.198	0.14
traitagresion_q9	1.65	1.50	1.63	-0.139	0.14
traitagresion_q10	3.25	3.25	3.19	0.057	0.65
traitagresion_q11	2.44	2.43	2.43	0.001	0.99
traitagresion_q12	2.88	2.83	2.79	0.036	0.79
trust_police_w1	2.61	2.68	2.56	0.120	0.09
trust_president_w1	2.22	2.22	2.23	-0.004	0.96
trust_congress_w1	2.20	2.20	2.17	0.028	0.70
trust_judiciary_w1	2.40	2.39	2.38	0.012	0.88
democ_satisf_w1	2.16	2.16	2.12	0.039	0.62

Table 16: Summary Statistics - All Variables

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	p10	p25	Median	p75	p90	Max	Uniq
age	1004	2.79	1.41	1	1	2	3	4	5.0	7	7
bolso_feeling	1004	2.85	1.27	1	1	2	3	4	5.0	5	5
democ_satisf_w1	1004	2.16	0.98	1	1	1	2	3	3.7	4	4
democ_satisf_w2	624	2.13	0.99	1	1	1	2	3	3.0	4	4
educ	1004	5.99	1.23	1	5	5	6	7	7.0	7	7
lula_feeling	1004	2.68	1.23	1	1	2	3	4	4.0	5	5
non_white	1004	0.51	0.50	0	0	0	1	1	1.0	1	2
pl_feeling	1004	2.92	1.05	1	2	2	3	3	4.0	5	5
political_interest	1004	2.18	1.08	1	1	1	2	3	4.0	4	4
procjust_dignity	624	2.55	1.31	1	1	1	3	3	5.0	5	5
procjust_goodintent	624	2.74	1.24	1	1	2	3	4	5.0	5	5
procjust_impartial	624	2.68	1.28	1	1	2	3	4	4.0	5	5
procjust_voice	624	2.60	1.26	1	1	2	2	3	4.0	5	5
pt_feeling	1004	2.63	1.19	1	1	2	3	3	4.0	5	5
T_violent	624	0.50	0.50	0	0	0	1	1	1.0	1	2
traitagresion_q1	1004	2.76	1.66	1	1	1	2	4	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q10	1004	3.25	1.56	1	1	2	3	4	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q11	1004	2.44	1.59	1	1	1	2	4	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q12	1004	2.88	1.68	1	1	1	3	4	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q2	1004	2.33	1.56	1	1	1	2	3	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q3	1004	3.29	1.69	1	1	2	3	5	6.0	6	6
traitagresion_q4	1004	2.85	1.76	1	1	1	2	4	6.0	6	6
traitagresion_q5	1004	2.91	1.81	1	1	1	3	4	6.0	6	6
traitagresion_q6	1004	2.71	1.74	1	1	1	2	4	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q7	1004	1.88	1.54	1	1	1	1	2	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q8	1004	2.34	1.68	1	1	1	1	4	5.0	6	6
traitagresion_q9	1004	1.65	1.28	1	1	1	1	2	3.7	6	6
trust_congress_w1	1004	2.20	0.93	1	1	1	2	3	3.0	4	4
trust_congress_w2	624	2.15	0.92	1	1	1	2	3	3.0	4	4
trust_judiciary_w1	1004	2.40	0.99	1	1	2	3	3	4.0	4	4
trust_judiciary_w2	624	2.38	0.96	1	1	2	2	3	4.0	4	4
trust_police_w1	1004	2.61	0.89	1	1	2	3	3	4.0	4	4
trust_police_w2	624	2.65	0.82	1	2	2	3	3	4.0	4	4
trust_president_w1	1004	2.22	1.04	1	1	1	2	3	4.0	4	4
trust_president_w2	624	2.09	1.05	1	1	1	2	3	4.0	4	4
woman	1004	0.51	0.50	0	0	0	1	1	1.0	1	2

Table 17: Polychoric Correlations and Scales' Alphas

Variable	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]		[5]	[6]	[7]		[8]	[9]
[1] rev_pl_feeling	1	0.55	0.28	0.31		0.28	0.07	0.18		-0.1	0.28
[2] rev_bolso_feeling	0.55	1	0.57	0.58		0.43	0.18	0.33		-0.12	0.5
			Petismo Scale Alpha's = 0.92								
[3] pt_feeling	0.28	0.57	1	0.84		0.61	0.32	0.45		-0.03	0.54
[4] lula_feeling	0.31	0.58	0.84	1		0.62	0.29	0.43		-0.03	0.55
					Pol. Trust Scale Alpha's = 0.81						
[5] trust_president_w1	0.28	0.43	0.61	0.62		1	0.56	0.64		0.15	0.59
[6] trust_congress_w1	0.07	0.18	0.32	0.29		0.56	1	0.63		0.33	0.4
[7] trust_judiciary_w1	0.18	0.33	0.45	0.43		0.64	0.63	1		0.31	0.56
[8] trust_police_w1	-0.1	-0.12	-0.03	-0.03		0.15	0.33	0.31		1	0.09
[9] democ_satisf_w1	0.28	0.5	0.54	0.55		0.59	0.4	0.56		0.09	1

Table 18: Trait Aggression - Polychoric Correlations and Scale's Alphas

Variable	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
[1] traitagresion_q1	1	0.73	0.51	0.39	0.36	0.4	0.39	0.41	0.44	0.38	0.49	0.33
[2] traitagresion_q2	0.73	1	0.5	0.42	0.4	0.45	0.47	0.43	0.52	0.4	0.51	0.33
[3] traitagresion_q3	0.51	0.5	1	0.46	0.37	0.38	0.28	0.3	0.28	0.41	0.39	0.32
[4] traitagresion_q4	0.39	0.42	0.46	1	0.77	0.73	0.36	0.36	0.33	0.38	0.33	0.26
[5] traitagresion_q5	0.36	0.4	0.37	0.77	1	0.71	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.22
[6] traitagresion_q6	0.4	0.45	0.38	0.73	0.71	1	0.38	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.34	0.28
[7] traitagresion_q7	0.39	0.47	0.28	0.36	0.34	0.38	1	0.57	0.61	0.37	0.43	0.38
[8] traitagresion_q8	0.41	0.43	0.3	0.36	0.34	0.37	0.57	1	0.51	0.38	0.45	0.32
[9] traitagresion_q9	0.44	0.52	0.28	0.33	0.31	0.36	0.61	0.51	1	0.38	0.46	0.38
[10] traitagresion_q10	0.38	0.4	0.41	0.38	0.32	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.38	1	0.51	0.49
[11] traitagresion_q11	0.49	0.51	0.39	0.33	0.31	0.34	0.43	0.45	0.46	0.51	1	0.47
[12] traitagresion_q12	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.38	0.32	0.38	0.49	0.47	1

Trait Aggression Scale Alpha's = 0.89

Table 19: Experimental Vignettes

Violent Policing Vignette	Non-Violent Policing Vignette
You will read a summarized news article about a recent interaction involving the police. For anonymity purposes, the source, location, and the police department details are omitted, and people's names are altered.	*You will read a summarized news article about a recent interaction involving the police. For anonymity purposes, the source, the location, and the police department details are omitted, and people's names are altered.*
According to the news report, a middle-aged man named Carlos was driving home from work when two police officers pulled him over. Carlos was slow in responding to the officers' commands, and when asked for his identification, he could not find it. The officers asked Carlos to step out of the car and kneel on the ground. Despite appearing nervous, Carlos complied with their orders.	According to the news report, a middle-aged man named Carlos was driving home from work when two police officers pulled him over. Carlos was slow in responding to the officers' commands, and when asked for his identification, he could not find it. The officers asked Carlos to step out of the car. Despite appearing nervous, Carlos complied with their orders.
Carlos then began to argue with the officers, asking them to explain the reason for the traffic stop. In response, one of the officers drew his weapon and aimed it at Carlos. Carlos panicked and started running away from the officers. One of the officers chased after him and fired his gun, striking Carlos in the leg. Carlos fell to the ground, was gravely injured, and was taken to the hospital. He underwent surgery and remained in the hospital for several weeks.	Carlos then began to argue with the officers, asking them to explain the reason for the traffic stop. As Carlos continued to discuss with the officers, one of them gently asked him to look for his identification in his car. After ten minutes of searching, Carlos was able to find it. According to Carlos's testimony, he had a rough week, and that is why he was agitated.

Table 20: Variables' Dictionary - Brazil's Survey Experiment

Variable Name	Question Wording	Response Options
TEXTO	consent_text	Yes, I agree to participate
ID	ID_respond	
Tipo de coleta	Collection type	c("Answered part 1 and 2", "Answered only part 1")
age	How old are you?	1=18-24 years, 2=25-34 years, 3=35-44 years, 4=45-54 years, 5=55-64 years, 6=65-74 years, 7=75 years or more
gender	What is your gender: male, female or other?	1=Male/male, 2=Female/female
educ	What is the highest level of education you have achieved?	1=I did not attend school, 2=Incomplete primary education, 3=Complete primary education, 4=Incomplete secondary education, 5=Complete secondary education, 6=Incomplete university education, 7=Complete university education
race	Do you consider yourself a white, black, brown, indigenous or yellow person?	1=Asian, 2=White, 3=Indigenous, 4=Other, 5=Brown, 6=Black
state	Which state do you live in in Brazil? Write the name of the state and select from the list.	
city	Now, write the name of the city where you live and select it from the list.	
knowszip	Do you know your zip code?	c("Yes, I remember", "I prefer not to say", "I don't remember")
zipcode	What is your zip code? Add numbers only.	
traitagresion_q1	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "I have difficulty controlling my temper."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true

Table 20: Variables' Dictionary - Brazil's Survey Experiment

Variable Name	Question Wording	Response Options
traitagresion_q2	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "Sometimes I lose control for no good reason."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q3	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "I get irritated quickly, but I get over it quickly."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q4	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "Sometimes I feel like life is unfair to me."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q5	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "It seems like other people are always luckier."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q6	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "I wonder why I sometimes feel so bitter about things."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q7	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "There are people who pressured me so much that we even physically attacked each other."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q8	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "If there is enough provocation, I am capable of hitting a person."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q9	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "I threatened people I know."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q10	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "Often, when I realize it, I'm disagreeing with people."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q11	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "I can't avoid arguments when people disagree with me."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
traitagresion_q12	For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. - "My friends say I'm a bit confrontational."	1=Completely false, 2=Mostly false, 3=Slightly false, 4=Slightly true, 5=Mostly true, 6=Completely true
turnout22	Did you vote in the second round of the last presidential election, in 2022?	1=No, 2=I don't remember, 3=Yes
votechoice22	Who did you vote for?	1=Jair Messias Bolsonaro, 2=Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 3=Null/Blank
political_interest	What is your level of interest in politics? Would you say you are very interested, interested, somewhat interested, or not at all interested?	1=Not at all interested, 2=A little interested, 3=Interested, 4=Very interested
pl_feeling	Which of the following sentences best describes your feelings towards the PL (Liberal Party)?	1=I hate the PL, 2=I don't like the PL, but I don't hate it, 3=I neither like nor dislike the PL, 4=I like it, but I don't feel like a PL supporter, 5=I'm a PL supporter

Table 20: Variables' Dictionary - Brazil's Survey Experiment

Variable Name	Question Wording	Response Options
pt_feeling	Which of the following sentences best describes your feelings towards the PT (Workers' Party)?	1=I hate the PT, 2=I don't like the PT, but I don't hate it, 3=I neither like nor dislike the PT, 4=I like it, but I don't feel like a petista (PT supporter), 5=I'm a petista (PT supporter)
lula_feeling	Which of the following sentences best describes your feelings towards Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva?	1=I hate Lula, 2=I don't like Lula, but I don't hate him, 3=I neither like nor dislike Lula, 4=I like Lula, but I don't feel like a Lulist, 5=I like Lula a lot, I am a Lulista
bolso_feeling	Which of the following sentences best describes your feelings towards Jair Messias Bolsonaro?	1=I hate Bolsonaro, 2=I don't like Bolsonaro, but I don't hate him, 3=I neither like nor dislike Bolsonaro, 4=I like Bolsonaro, but I don't feel like a Bolsonaro, 5=I really like Bolsonaro, I am a Bolsonarista
trust_police_w1	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - Police	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
trust_president_w1	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - President	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
trust_congress_w1	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - National Congress	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
trust_judiciary_w1	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - The Judiciary	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
democ_satisf_w1	In general, are you very satisfied, a little satisfied, Slightly satisfied or not at all satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Brazil?	1=Not at all satisfied, 2=Slightly satisfied, 3=Somewhat satisfied, 4=Very satisfied
crime_vic	Now, changing the subject, have you been the victim of any type of crime in the last 12 months? In other words, have you been a victim of aggression, robbery, kidnapping, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the last 12 months?	1=No, 2=Yes
procjust_dignity_C	To what extent do you believe Carlos was treated with dignity and respect by the officers during the interaction?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely
procjust_voice_C	In your opinion, to what extent do you believe Carlos had the opportunity to express his views and concerns during his interaction with the police officers?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely

Table 20: Variables' Dictionary - Brazil's Survey Experiment

Variable Name	Question Wording	Response Options
procjust_impartial_C	Based on the information provided, to what extent do you believe the decision-making process of the officers involved in the interaction with Carlos was impartial and transparent?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely
procjust_goodintent_C	How well-intentioned do you believe the officers were during their interaction with Carlos?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely
procjust_dignity_T	To what extent do you believe Carlos was treated with dignity and respect by the officers during the interaction?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely
procjust_voice_T	In your opinion, to what extent do you believe Carlos had the opportunity to express his views and concerns during his interaction with the police officers?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely
procjust_impartial_T	Based on the information provided, to what extent do you believe the decision-making process of the officers involved in the interaction with Carlos was impartial and transparent?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely
procjust_goodintent_T	How well-intentioned do you believe the officers were during their interaction with Carlos?	1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much, 5=Completely
trust_police_w2	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - Police	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
trust_president_w2	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - President	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
trust_congress_w2	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - National Congress	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
trust_judiciary_w2	For each of the following institutions, indicate whether you believe them to be very trustworthy, moderately trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy. - The Judiciary	1=Not at all trustworthy, 2=Slightly trustworthy, 3=Moderately trustworthy, 4=Very trustworthy
democ_satisf_w2	In general, are you very satisfied, Slightly satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Brazil?	1=Not at all satisfied, 2=Slightly satisfied, 3=Somewhat satisfied, 4=Very satisfied