Are People Willing to Trade Away Democracy for Desirable Outcomes? Experimental Evidence from Six Countries

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Abstract: To what extent do people prioritize living in a democracy over other indicators of good governance or personal well-being? This question has become contested as democracies come under pressure worldwide. We address this gap through cross-national conjoint experiments in which survey respondents choose between hypothetical countries that differ in terms of societal-level attributes (e.g., elections, health care) and individual-level outcomes that the respondent would experience (e.g., wealth, minority status). People across Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Thailand, and the United States consistently prioritize living in a safe country with free and fair elections over other factors, including other components of democracy like civil liberties and checks and balances. Regarding tradeoffs, many people would forfeit democratic elections to avoid living in a dangerous society but not to obtain wealth and other goods. Electoral democracy is attractive globally but can be undermined by concerns about crime and safety.

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Introduction

Most people worldwide express support for democratic governance and say they would like to live in a democratic country (Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017; Wuttke et al., 2020; Zhai, 2022). At the same time, democracy is under pressure worldwide. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the global spread of democracy has slowed and potentially even reversed. The quality of democracy has also deteriorated sharply in some fully-fledged democracies like the United States, while authoritarian rule has hardened in countries like Russia (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Varshney, 2022; Wiebrecht et al., 2023). Furthermore, political leaders responsible for triggering democratic backsliding or autocratization sometimes retain substantial mass approval (Svolik, 2020), avoiding the type of public opposition that would safeguard democracy (Braley et al., 2023; Laebens & Öztürk, 2020; Norris, 2011).

In international relations, China's increasing assertiveness has placed front and center debates about democracy's normative value and ability to serve the people (Diamond, 2019; Goldsmith et al., 2025; von Soest, 2015). China and other autocratic governments promote their model of governance in part by claiming—often contrary to evidence (Gerring et al., 2022)—that the democratic alternative comes with a variety of undesirable tradeoffs to economic growth, public welfare, and safety (Mattingly et al., 2024). If people accept these arguments, they may be more amenable to autocratic influence in the international system (Chu 2021; Han et al., 2025).

This tension between people expressing support for democracy on the one hand, and the global erosion of democracy coupled with the proliferation of antidemocratic behavior and viewpoints on the other, makes it critical to better understand the contexts in which people are committed to democracy. One explanation consistent with this disconnect is that people genuinely view democracy as desirable in principle, while also placing more importance on other political, economic, and social factors in practice. Scholars argue, for instance, that people are sometimes willing to forgo democracy if they perceive it as an obstacle to obtaining economic growth and prosperity (e.g., Ceka & Magalhães, 2020; Cordero & Simon, 2016), reducing corruption and insecurity (e.g., Abadeer et al., 2022; Cammett et al., 2020), or elevating the political and social power of

their partisan, ethnic, or religious group (e.g., Carey et al., 2022; Graham & Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2019; cf. Voelkel et al., 2023). This body of research explores the contexts in which support for democracy may weaken. However, it has not adequately addressed four key questions about the extent to which people are willing to prioritize such outcomes over democracy.[1]

First, how these various factors concurrently contribute to democratic support relative to one another remains unclear yet critical to understand. Countries often struggle simultaneously with economic, social, and political problems, so identifying which of these challenges most strongly impacts mass opinion would provide new guidance for what to prioritize in sustaining the public's democratic commitments.

Second, it is also unclear whether sociotropic or personal circumstances weigh more heavily on people's willingness to abandon democracy. People driven by sociotropic concerns may trade away democracy because they are dissatisfied with national outcomes, such as the country's overall economy or ability to combat corruption. Alternatively, people may care about these factors only insofar as they are personally impacted through their pocketbooks and livelihood.

Third, few existing studies examine whether people weigh outcomes against democracy similarly across national contexts, especially beyond the United States and Western countries. Without this knowledge that is central to comparative politics, scholars cannot easily generalize about their insights and determine if different countries, whether they are developing countries or those closer to China's sphere of influence, think about the value of democracy versus other factors differently.

Lastly, most previous research does not decompose "democratic governance" into its several constituent parts when assessing which aspects of democracy are most susceptible to neglect. For example, people may be more willing to concede civil liberties but not elections for security. New knowledge on this point can help to identify which particular aspects of democracy are relatively resilient or prone to erosion.

1. Throughout the paper, we refer to this prioritization of outcomes versus democracy as a willingness to "trade off" or "trade away" democracy. By using this language, we do not mean to assume that an individual is already living in a democracy, but we are instead emphasizing the lower weight they attach to democracy relative to political, economic, and social outcomes.

A handful of recent studies have addressed some of these points, but none have addressed all four in combination.[2] Our study is designed to account for all four, enabling us to uncover timely insights regarding mass democratic commitments. Specifically, we implemented a unified conjoint experiment in six, diverse countries to study which aspects of democracy people value most relative to political, economic, and social outcomes, as well as the extent to which these outcomes are likely to induce people to trade away key elements of democratic governance. Respondents in our surveys were shown pairs of hypothetical country profiles characterized by ten different attributes (three regarding democracy and seven regarding other factors such as national wealth, health care, and public safety) and asked to choose which country they would prefer to live in. We chose this paired-conjoint design because it is useful for evaluating how people make multidimensional choices, providing an appropriate design for assessing how much emphasis people place on democracy relative to both sociotropic and individual outcomes. The study's implementation in a diverse range of six countries—Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the United States—also allows us to better understand any potential variation in people's democratic preferences across different societies.

Our cross-national experiments reveal that people consistently value free and fair elections even when confronting tradeoffs. In most cases, respondents preferred living in a country with free and fair elections but with less desirable outcomes (e.g., low levels of individual and national wealth, inaccessible health care, prevalent corruption) to living in a country without free and fair elections but with better outcomes.

The only exception is public safety, such that respondents generally prioritized a "very safe" country without democratic elections over a "very dangerous" country with democratic elections. This finding provides a novel microfoundational explanation for why contemporary authoritarian

2. For example, Adserà et al. (2023) focus on free and fair elections rather than the other components of democracy, and their study is implemented in three countries, two of which are Western democracies; Neundorf et al. (2024) do not incorporate individual-level circumstances into their design; and Ferrer et al. (2025) address attitudes in Europe and Israel while including fewer outcomes against which citizens may trade off democracy.

superpowers—in their global contest for legitimacy—often try to portray foreign democracies as chaotic and unsafe in their domestic and international propaganda (e.g., Chester, 2024; Chester & Wong, 2025). By associating democracies with danger and authoritarian governance with stability, such political communication could reinforce people's beliefs about the superiority of the authoritarian model (Mattingly et al., 2024) and help diminish demands for democratic reform (Deng, 2025).

We also find that people generally value civil liberties and institutional checks, but their commitment to these two components of democracy is less robust and is susceptible to tradeoffs not only against public safety but also against other socioeconomic goods. This finding speaks to recent episodes of democratic backsliding, where populists have transgressed democracy by incrementally eroding civil liberties and institutional checks and balances, while promising superior delivery of social goods to the mass public and refraining from severely undermining electoral institutions in their country.

Surprisingly, we uncover little heterogeneity in how people make democratic tradeoffs across and within six very different countries. There are some statistically significant differences, for example, across regime type, region, and individual-characteristics like college education, but none of these differences are large enough to alter our substantive conclusions about the relative importance of free and fair elections and public safety. Such consistency across and within countries speaks to the convergence of mass values globally, pushing back against arguments about cultural relativism, such as the Asian values thesis (see also Dalton & Ong, 2005; Welzel, 2011; Zhai, 2022). The general homogeneity in preferences across socioeconomic factors also contrasts with modernization and postmaterialism theories, which posit that people's desire for democracy primarily forms at certain levels of wealth and education. Furthermore, we corroborate our experimental findings regarding the vulnerability of democracy to public security concerns using observational survey data from the Asian Barometer Survey (Wave 6), which includes eight additional countries.

Our study thus extends recent empirical evidence regarding the global appeal of democracy among ordinary citizens, especially in the domain of free elections (Adserà et al., 2023; Ferrer

et al., 2025; Neundorf et al., 2024). We also advance scholarship on public support for democracy. Recent work finds that people understand democracy predominantly in electoral and liberal democratic terms (Chu et al., 2024) and that "democratic support [...] is mostly immune to crises of performance" (Claassen & Magalhães, 2022, p. 869). Yet, whether and to what extent ordinary people prioritize democracy when it conflicts with other desirable social outcomes remains unclear in the existing literature. Using a research design appropriate for evaluating how individuals make tradeoffs in their decision-making (e.g., Abou-Chadi et al., 2025; Häusermann et al., 2019), we show that individuals from six countries consistently prioritize living in a safe country with free and fair elections over other factors, including other components of democracy like civil liberties and checks and balances. Many people would forfeit democratic elections to avoid living in a dangerous society but not to obtain wealth and other goods. Electoral democracy is attractive globally but can be undermined by concerns about crime and safety.

The Importance of Democracy versus Societal and Personal Outcomes

Across the world, people predominantly express support for democracy (Wike et al., 2017), and this has been true for some time (Norris, 1999; O'Donnell, 2007). Though support may fluctuate thermostatically within countries (Claassen, 2020), and though people in some countries may have become more open to nondemocratic alternatives in recent years (Wike & Fetterolf, 2018), democracy is a robust global norm of good governance. Most people in most countries consistently claim that democracy is the best form of government and that they want to be governed democratically, even if they are dissatisfied with how their own democratic governments are performing (Democracy Perception Index, 2024). A number of studies from countries worldwide find evidence that people dislike undemocratic behaviors and will approve less of political leaders who engage in them (e.g., Chu & Williamson, 2025; Frederiksen, 2024a; Frederiksen & Skaaning, 2023; Holliday et al., 2024).

Despite this popular support, democracy has experienced a global decline over the past decade. The extent of this decline continues to be debated (Little & Meng, 2024). At best, however,

the number of democracies worldwide has stagnated, several leading democracies—including India and the United States—have experienced democratic backsliding, and powerful authoritarian regimes have become both more repressive and more aggressive on the world stage (Herre, 2025; Lieberman et al., 2019; Repucci & Slipowitz, 2022; Varshney, 2022). In more pessimistic accounts, the number of democracies has fallen and the percentage of people living under a democracy has declined substantially from its peak (Angiolillo et al., 2024).

A major factor behind this democratic decline may be the role of anti-democratic political elites, who seek to increase personal or partisan power at the expense of democratic norms and governance (Carothers & Hartnett, 2024). Nonetheless, how the public views democracy is also an important part of the story. Popular backlash to anti-democratic politicians can constrain efforts by elites to undermine democracy (Claassen, 2020a; Weingast, 1997). Alternatively, elites may be more likely to engage in backsliding if they can count on their coalition of voters to support them (Stokes, 2025; Waldner & Lust, 2018). In many cases where backsliding has occurred—whether Hungary, India, Turkey, or the United States—political leaders have acquired and retained substantial popular support, which they have used to justify and sustain their attacks on democratic norms and institutions (Braley et al., 2023; Rogenhofer & Panievsky, 2020). Yet, at the same time, there is little evidence that expressed support for democracy has declined among the public in these and other countries (Democracy Perception Index, 2024).

Why might people who support democracy simultaneously support leaders who engage in anti-democratic behaviors? One explanation could be that many of these people do not believe that their political leaders are undermining democracy. Research suggests that free and fair elections and strong protections for civil liberties are understood to be key components of democracy in many countries (Chu et al., 2024). Yet, people may have different ideas about what threatens these aspects of democracy (Kaftan & Gessler, 2025; Wunsch et al., 2025). Political leaders may be effective at framing anti-democratic actions as consistent with these democratic principles (Titelman et al., 2024), and such obfuscation may be worsened by partisan motivated reasoning, as people convince themselves that their co-partisans are actively defending rather than degrading democ-

racy (Braley et al., 2023; Krishnarajan, 2023). Some people also believe that positive governance outcomes make governments more democratic (Chu et al., 2024), which may create space for anti-democratic political leaders to point to good outcomes—such as reducing gender and economic inequality—as proof of their democratic character (Wang & Yeung, 2025).

Another explanation for the disconnect between people's expressed support for democracy and their active support for anti-democratic political leaders could be that these people care about democracy but care *even more* about other features of their own lives or their societies. In this case, people may be willing to trade democracy away for outcomes that they perceive as more important for themselves or for their country more broadly. Studies from various countries suggest that such tradeoffs exist under certain conditions. For instance, poor economic outcomes can dampen enthusiasm for democracy (e.g., Armingeon & Guthmann, 2013; Ceka & Magalhães, 2022), and where crime rates are high, people may also become less committed to democratic governance (e.g., Abadeer et al., 2022; Claassen & Magalhães, 2022). People may also be willing to forgo democracy if they can lock in power for their partisan in-group (Graham & Svolik, 2020; Orhan, 2022).

However, several critical questions remain regarding people's hypothesized willingness to trade away democracy for outcomes. First, it is unclear how these different outcomes shape people's commitment to democracy relative to each other. For example, does economic performance matter more than the quality of public goods or the intensity of crime and violence? Second, less attention has been given to how people weigh their personal situation against the broader circumstances in their country. Third, well-identified studies are typically implemented in one country or a small number of countries, making it more difficult to determine how democratic tradeoffs generalize across cases. Fourth, democracy is often treated as a unitary concept. However, even minimalist definitions of democracy include multiple components—including elections, liberties, and institutional checks—that governments must incorporate to qualify as democracies. Are people more willing to give up on some of these components for better outcomes?

Some recent studies have begun to explore these points. Adserà et al. (2023) evaluate whether

people are willing to trade elections for income or better health care. They estimate that respondents "prefer to live in a country without free democratic elections only if their individual income multiplies by at least three times" (Adserà et al., 2023, p. 1). This evidence suggests a strong commitment to democracy over personal income, but it does not speak to other components of democratic governance and explores a relatively limited set of outcomes and cases. Neundorf et al. (2024) implement another important study that incorporates more aspects of democracy in more countries. They likewise find a strong commitment to elections, but less commitment to executive constraints as well as a willingness to trade these democratic components for economic security. However, their design does not incorporate individual-level circumstances that may affect how people weigh the relative importance of sociotropic outcomes against democracy, and it also includes a relatively small number of sociotropic outcomes. Finally, Ferrer et al. (2025) compare six elements of democracy against gains in personal income. They likewise find a strong commitment to elections, but weaker commitment to checks and balances. However, their study focuses predominantly on Europe and does not include security or other sociotropic factors that people may weigh against different aspects of democracy. Thus, while this emerging body of research breaks new ground, it leaves questions about mass democratic values unexplored.

To strengthen understanding of whether and for what people are willing to trade away democratic governance, our study decomposes democracy into three central elements: leadership selection, civil liberties, and institutional checks. We then consider whether people are willing to abandon these democratic components for seven desirable societal and personal outcomes: the state of the national economy, the extent of an individual's wealth, public safety, corruption in politics, public goods, the treatment of minority groups in society, and an individual's status as a majority or minority group member.[3]

3. Our discussion of these various factors draws from research seeking to understand macro-patterns in democratization, democratic consolidation, and democratic backsliding. While related, the causal factors across these literatures may differ. We do not generate individual-level hypotheses about which factors will matter more in which macro context and instead take an empirical approach by including countries of different regime backgrounds in our selection of field sites, described below.

Beginning with the three traditional dimensions of democracy that people might value, we examine leadership selection, civil liberties, and institutional checks and balances. These dimensions map onto the core components associated with dominant conceptualizations of democracy, which define it as a political system in which key political leaders are selected through competitive elections, citizens' core political liberties are protected, and executive power is constrained through a system of checks and balances (Dahl, 1971; König et al., 2022).

Next, we also examine political, economic, and social outcomes that existing research suggests can weaken people's commitment to democracy. A substantial body of research suggests that economic outcomes shape support for the political system, such that poor economic performance may weaken support for democracy (Albrecht et al., 2021; Cammett et al., 2020; Cordero & Simon, 2016). These effects may operate through perceptions of how well the economy is performing nationally (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2013); alternatively, they may operate through personal circumstances, with worse individual outcomes generating less commitment to democracy (Ceka & Magalhães, 2020). Thus, both the *national economy* and the *individual's wealth* could engender substantial tradeoffs against democracy.

Public safety can also play an important role in shaping tradeoff dynamics. A large body of work indicates that criminal violence and political instability can weaken support for democracy (e.g., Abadeer et al., 2022; Blanco, 2013; Cammett et al., 2020; Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010) and increase authoritarian preferences (e.g., Bateson, 2012; Masullo et al., forthcoming). In particular, Claassen and Magalhães (2022) leverage time-series, cross-sectional data from 91 democracies and find that "increases in the national rate of interpersonal violence clearly have negative effects on evaluations of, and attachment to, democracy" (p. 885). If people do not feel safe, even those who support democratic governance in theory may be willing to tolerate nondemocratic alternatives in practice.

We additionally consider two salient dimensions over which people may feel their societies are unfair, a sentiment that has been shown to impact support for political systems (Levi et al., 2009; Rothstein, 2009). For one, people care strongly that political leaders and others with connections

do not receive corrupt benefits from the system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Linde & Erlingsson, 2013). If *corruption in politics* is prevalent, people may prefer a less democratic system with a cleaner government. Next, people also value *public goods* that are accessible to all, regardless of one's status (Helliwell & Huang, 2008; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). If access to public goods is unequal, it may generate a sense of unfairness that reduces government legitimacy (Levi et al., 2009), creating a condition conducive to people trading away democracy.

Lastly, we consider *minority treatment* and the *individual's minority status* along ethnic, racial, or religious lines. Intergroup relations are salient in most societies (Silver et al., 2021), and research shows that perceptions of legitimacy are affected by whether minorities are also treated justly (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Thus, people may prioritize fair treatment of minorities over democratic governance. At the same time, democratic commitments may depend on one's own position in society (Wilkes & Wu, 2018), such that people may want to live in a country where they are personally part of the dominant group and thus have more social and political power.

We design a conjoint experiment to test whether, where, and for whom these various social and personal outcomes induce a willingness to trade away different components of democratic governance. The next section explains our approach in detail.

Research Design

To investigate whether and how people prioritize democracy over other political, economic, and social goods, we implemented cross-national experiments that imposed tradeoffs between different desirable country attributes and individual outcomes.[4]

Survey administration

We fielded the US survey in May 2023 and the five other surveys—translated into each country's national language—in September 2023. For each non-US survey, the translation was completed by one professional translator and validated by a social science graduate student with native language

4. Replication materials and code can be found at Chu et al. (2025).

proficiency in the translated language.

We programmed our survey using Qualtrics and partnered with Qualtrics for respondent recruitment in Egypt ($N = 1,008$), India ($N = 1,022$), Italy ($N = 1,047$), Japan ($N = 1,012$), Thailand ($N = 1,037$), and the United States ($N = 1,024$). Because we used quota sampling, we were able to recruit a demographically diverse sample that mirrored national benchmarks in age, gender, and education in each country. In *SI Appendix Section L*, we demonstrate the diversity of each country sample and of our selected countries in Tables S3 and S4.

We chose Qualtrics because it allowed us not only to implement the conjoint experimental design with strong researcher control but also to simultaneously field the experiment in multiple countries with pre-specified demographic quotas for each. We do acknowledge, however, that our Internet opt-in samples are not fully nationally representative (albeit diverse). Nevertheless, our experimental findings are likely generalizable to the broader populations of interest because our analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects reveals homogeneity across several individual-level factors, including age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, minority status, and political predispositions (see *SI Appendix Section F*). Such homogeneity helps to alleviate concerns about external validity because it suggests that the results will most likely be replicable with an alternative sample that differs in the distribution of these individual characteristics (Coppock et al., 2018; Druckman, 2022, pp. 70–83).

Research procedures

We embedded our conjoint experiment in each of the six surveys. After respondents reported their social and political backgrounds and passed an attention check, they saw the following introductory vignette for our conjoint task: "Next, we will show you information about two hypothetical countries at a time, and then ask which of the two you would prefer to be born and grow up in. We will give you the information about each country in a table. The table will have several rows of information describing different aspects of the countries. Some of the information may be important to you, while others may not." The table contained the wording of all country attributes, as shown

in Table 1.

Each attribute was motivated by the literature (see the previous section). Our first three attributes randomized aspects of a country's democracy or lack thereof. First, we incorporated a leader selection attribute in which free and fair elections were compared against undemocratic means of leader selection, including unfair elections, appointment by unelected elites, hereditary succession, and military coups. Second, we included an attribute for civil liberties, varying whether citizens are free to express themselves and organize, whether they face some risk of repression for doing so, or whether they face severe repression. Third, we included an attribute for institutional checks, randomizing if the leader must usually, sometimes, or rarely respect the authority of the legislature and courts.

The next seven attributes focused on the outcomes for which people may deprioritize democracy. Attribute four is the national economy, i.e., whether the country is high-income, medium-income, or low-income. Attribute five is the respondent's personal wealth, i.e., whether the individual respondent would be wealthier than most, about average in their wealth, or poorer than most in the hypothetical country. Attribute six is public safety, i.e., whether the country is very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat dangerous, or very dangerous.

Attribute seven is corruption in politics, randomizing whether political leaders very rarely, sometimes, or frequently engage in corruption. Attribute eight taps into public goods provision, randomizing whether high quality health care is accessible to most people or only to those with money and connections. Lastly, attributes nine and ten describe people's social concerns about identity groups along ethnic, racial, or religious lines. As with the economic attributes, we distinguish sociotropic and individual-level concerns. Specifically, attribute nine randomized whether minorities in the country are treated fairly, sometimes unfairly, or mostly unfairly, while attribute ten randomized whether the respondent themselves would be part of the largest majority group, second largest group, or smallest minority group.[5]

5. One question for conjoint designs is how the researcher(s) choose the range of levels for each attribute. We choose the attribute-levels to optimize theory testing, the realism of the descriptors, and cross-national comparability. Nevertheless, given this paper's headline finding

Table 1. Design of the conjoint experiment and connection with the existing literature

Attribute	Content of Treatments (Levels)	Discussion in the Literature
Leadership selection	Political leaders come to power through [free and fair elections / unfair elections / a small group of unelected elites / hereditary succession / military coups]	Most individuals from Brazil, France, and the United States strongly value free elections (Adserà et al., 2023)
Civil liberties	In politics, people [can express themselves and organize freely / can express themselves and organize but face some risk of government repression / cannot express themselves and organize without severe government repression]	Global citizens support the principle of free expressions, but their support could be tepid when taking into account other country and individual characteristics (Wike & Fetterolf, 2018)
Institutional checks	When making decisions, the country's leader [must respect the legislature and courts' authority / can sometimes bypass the legislature and courts' authority / can almost always bypass the legislature and courts' authority]	Executives' unilateral action that bypasses legislatures in decision-making can incur substantial public opinion costs (Chu & Williamson, 2025)
National economy	Economically, this country is [high-income / medium-income / low-income]	Poor national economic performance may weaken support for regimes (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2013)
Respondent wealth	Your personal wealth compared to others in this country would be [wealthier than most / about average / poorer than most]	Poor individual economic outcomes can generate less support for the political system (Ceka & Magalhães, 2020)
Public safety	In terms of crime and public safety, the country is [very safe / somewhat safe / somewhat dangerous / very dangerous]	Criminal violence and political instability can weaken satisfaction with the regime (Claassen & Magalhães, 2022)
Corruption in politics	Political leaders engage in corruption [very rarely / sometimes / all the time]	Unfair, corrupt benefits for political leaders can reduce regime legitimacy (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003)
Health care	High quality health care is [accessible to most people / accessible only to people with money or connections]	Low government quality that generates a sense of unfairness can reduce regime legitimacy (Levi et al., 2009)
Minority treatment	Ethnic/Racial/Religious minorities are [treated fairly by most people / treated fairly by some people but unfairly by others / treated unfairly by most people]	Perceptions that people are treated unfairly can weaken legitimacy of the authorities (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004)
Respondent identity	Your ethnicity/race/religion would [put you in the largest majority group / put you in the second largest group / put you in the smallest minority group]	Democratic commitments may depend on one's own position in society, especially along the lines of majority vs. minority status or identity (Hanni, 2017)

Respondents then evaluated three pairs of countries, with each pair named Country A and Country B. For each country, we independently randomized the attribute-levels with equal probability under each attribute. We also randomized the order of attributes at the survey respondent level. After seeing each country pair, respondents were asked: "If you had to choose, which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?" Here, we implemented the standard forced-choice conjoint design by requiring respondents to choose either Country A or Country B (Bansak et al., 2023; Hainmueller et al., 2014). Because we recruited over 1,000 respondents in each country and each respondent completed the conjoint task three times, each country sample generated more than 6,000 ($1,000 \times 3 \times 2$) observations.

Estimation strategy

Following our pre-registration (available in *SI Appendix Section M*), we use linear regression to estimate the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) by regressing country selection on each attribute-level, with reference categories being the most desirable values and standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Each AMCE thus identifies the effect of an attribute-level on the likelihood that a country profile with that value is chosen relative to the most desirable value, after taking into account the possible effects of all other country attributes (Bansak et al., 2021, p. 29).

For the tradeoff analysis, we estimate the average component interaction effects (ACIEs) by following the estimation procedure described in Hainmueller et al. (2014, p. 12). That is, we interact each relevant pair of randomized attribute-levels in a linear regression, while controlling for other country attribute-levels and clustering the standard errors at the respondent level. We also include sample fixed effects, although removing them does not substantively change our estimates because there is surprisingly little treatment effect heterogeneity across countries in the first place. The ACIE is a theoretically relevant quantity because it captures how people make decisions when

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regarding the public safety attribute, one concern may be that "very dangerous" may read particularly extreme. We do not consider it to be any more extreme than attribute-levels like choosing leaders through a military coup, severe government repression, or corruption existing "all the time." However, as shown in Figure 1 below, even if the public safety attribute was truncated at the "somewhat dangerous" level, it would still generate the second largest effect.

confronted with (1) countries with high values of attribute *A* but low values of attribute *B* and (2) countries with low values of attribute *A* but high values of attribute *B*. If preferences for these countries are qualitatively similar, then people are making strong tradeoffs between the two attributes. If preferences for the latter set of countries are even stronger than preferences for the former set, then people are prioritizing attribute *B* when making tradeoffs between the two attributes. As an alternative measure of tradeoffs, we also analyze the marginal rate of substitution for the democracy attributes relative to the outcomes.

Advantages of the conjoint experimental design

We use a conjoint experimental design because it is particularly suitable for studying how individuals make tradeoffs in a multidimensional setting. While the literature suggests that the factors we examined in the experiment could independently tamp down individuals' commitment to democracy (see Table 1), we know little about the extent to which these factors matter when multiple factors collide, as they would in the real world. Our forced-choice conjoint design allows us to examine whether and to what extent democracy "prevails" under the pressure of multiple important factors, and consequently evaluate how *intensely* people care about democracy in a contextually rich environment (Bansak et al., 2023). The approach also allows us to capture the multidimensional nature of democracy by dividing it into three core components: leadership selection, civil liberties, and institutional checks. By independently randomizing the extent to which a country fulfills each defining feature of democracy, we unpack which aspect of democracy matters most to people, as well as what other aspects are more susceptible to tradeoffs.

In addition, our experiment enables us to sidestep potential endogeneity that is otherwise challenging to bypass in observational studies. In particular, existing research shows how the relationship between actual democracy and democratic attitudes is endogenous (Dahlum & Knutsen, 2017) and how individuals tend to assume that democracy comes with desirable governance outcomes (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). Because our conjoint experiment not only incorporates various dimensions that matter to people's evaluation of political systems according to existing scholarship

but also randomizes them separately, we can rule out reverse causality and further significantly mitigate the problem of information equivalence that is otherwise common in standard vignette-based experiments (Dafoe et al., 2018). Next, by incorporating many theoretically relevant attributes, the conjoint experiment also provides respondents with more reasons to justify why they make a particular choice. In an alternative design where researchers may directly ask respondents, for example, whether they are willing to prioritize being rich or being in the majority group rather than living in a democracy, respondents who are less committed to democracy may nonetheless self-report reluctance as it is a more socially desirable answer. The conjoint design allows them to mask their reasoning in a multidimensional setting (e.g., choosing countries based on "selfish" but socially frowned upon reasons like being rich or not being a minority), thereby mitigating potential social desirability bias (Horiuchi et al., 2022) that could be particularly salient in the study of democratic norms (Valentim, 2024).

Finally, the question of how individuals make tradeoffs fundamentally taps into the process of *comparison* that lies at the heart of conjoint experiments: would people be willing to sacrifice certain desirable features of a regime (e.g., their country in the status quo) in exchange for other desirable features of *another* regime (e.g., their country after reform, a neighboring country they consider emigrating to)? Because conjoint experiments are particularly appropriate for analyzing how individuals make tradeoffs, several important contributions have exploited this method to study related questions—e.g., whether people would abandon democracy for partisan gains in hypothetical elections (Frederiksen, 2024a; Graham & Svolik, 2020), how voters make tradeoffs across issue dimensions in stylized social democratic programs (Abou-Chadi et al., 2025), and how individuals value democratic elections relative to socioeconomic outcomes (Adserà et al., 2023). In the real world, and especially in authoritarian propaganda regarding democracy, political communication has also framed these various factors as tradeoffs.

Results: The Value of Democracy and the Dynamics of Tradeoffs

Determinants of country preferences

We begin by analyzing the extent to which the ten factors above shape people's preferences for being born and growing up in a particular country. Here, we estimate the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) to identify the effect of an attribute-level on the likelihood that a country profile with that value is chosen, averaging across the effects of all other country attributes (Bansak et al., 2020, p. 29).

In examining the aggregate data from all six countries, we find that each factor contributes to people's evaluations to some extent, but leader selection and public safety matter the most (Figure 1). Compared to a country with free and fair elections, respondents are less likely to select countries in which political leaders come to power via military coup, hereditary succession, determination by unelected elites, or unfair elections by about 14 to 21 percentage points (pp) ($SE = 0.8$ pp). People prefer countries that are very safe to those that are very dangerous by about 21 pp ($SE = 0.7$ pp).

People also value other dimensions of democracy but to a lesser extent than free and fair elections. They prefer countries with the freedom of expression and assembly over those in which these liberties are repressed by about 12 pp ($SE = 0.6$ pp). They also prefer countries with institutional checks and balances over those in which leaders can bypass the legislature and courts by about 7 pp ($SE = 0.6$ pp).

The effects of the other factors are generally as expected. Regarding the sociotropic factors, people prefer countries with low corruption, high-income levels, accessible health care, and fair treatment of minorities. Regarding individual factors, people also prefer to be in a country in which they are personally wealthy and not part of a minority group. Notably, people prioritize avoiding being personally poor over avoiding living in a poor country. However, all of these societal and personal factors exert a significantly smaller effect than the leadership selection and public safety attributes. When moving from the least to most desirable counterfactuals of any of these factors, the effect is less than 14 pp. For example, people prefer countries in which they are wealthy to those in which they are poor by 12 pp ($SE = 0.6$ pp). However, several of these effects—being

Figure 1. People worldwide prioritize democratic elections and public safety over other political, economic, and social goods



Note: Estimates represent average marginal component effects. Due to an administrative error, Japanese respondents randomized to see the "somewhat dangerous" or "very dangerous" level saw both descriptors of the public safety attribute-level. In the pooled analysis, we put this level in the same category as "very dangerous." Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Statistically significant estimates at the 0.05 level, upon adjustments for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure, are displayed in black. For tabular results, see Table S5.

personally poor, or living in a country with prevalent corruption, inaccessible health care, or unfair treatment of minorities—are comparable to the effects associated with civil liberties and larger than the effects associated with institutional checks. These results indicate that civil liberties and institutional checks, unlike elections, are not strongly prioritized over sociotropic or individual outcomes.

Several pieces of additional analysis reinforce our main claim that leadership selection and pub-

lic safety are the two most substantial factors, summarized here and fully described in the appendix. First, leadership selection and public safety are the most *salient* attributes (*SI Appendix Section B*).[6] Second, in analyzing the specific levels of each attribute, "free and fair elections" within the leader selection attribute and "very dangerous" within the public safety attribute *ranked* top two (*SI Appendix Section C*).[7] People prioritize free and fair elections and avoiding very dangerous countries substantially more than they prioritize other political, economic, and social factors.

Third and fourth, we show that two potentially major sources of heterogeneity do not change our main conclusions: cross-national and cross-subject. Figure 2 reports the AMCE estimates for each country separately (see also *SI Appendix Sections A* and *D*), and in *SI Appendix Section E*, we further group the data at the country level along other dimensions such as Asian vs. non-Asian countries and democracies vs. nondemocracies. These analyses show that while there are interesting differences across countries, discussed in detail in the appendix, the overall pattern in which leadership selection and public safety dominate all other attributes is robust.[8] We also find little to no evidence that people's preferences across these ten attributes differ across individuals, defined by demographic and ideological factors like their age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, identification as a minority, and self-reported political ideology (see *SI Appendix Section F*).

Thus, overall, the data reveal a robust pattern in which people strongly emphasize competitive elections and high public safety in their preferences among countries. Other factors, including the civil liberty and leadership constraint dimensions of democracy, also matter but to a lesser degree. These findings set the stage for our next set of analyses, which unpacks how people make

6. We follow Clayton et al. (2021, p. 191) by measuring salience as "the average of the absolute value of the probability of choosing a profile with a particular attribute-level minus 0.5."
7. We use a method developed by Dill et al. (2024) to assess the relative importance of each individual attribute-level in people's choices.
8. For example, contrary to the Asian values thesis (for a review, see Welzel, 2011, pp. 2–4), while respondents from Asian countries were more sensitive to avoiding dangerous countries, they valued the three components of democracy largely to the same relative magnitude as those from non-Asian countries.

Figure 2. Factors influencing people's choice in each of six countries



Note: Estimates represent average marginal component effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Statistically significant estimates at the 0.05 level, upon adjustments for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure, are displayed in black. For tabular results, see Tables S6–S11.

tradeoffs between democracy and other desirable attributes when these features are pitted against one another.

Tradeoffs for free and fair elections

In this section, we analyze the extent to which people will trade off free and fair elections to live in a safe society or to be personally wealthy. We specifically focus on safety and wealth because these two attributes were substantially and consistently influential as societal and individual-level factors in our previous analysis. In *SI Appendix Sections G and H*, we additionally analyze the extent to which people will neglect democracy for improving health care access and the national economy, since nondemocratic leaders also rely on these factors to justify the legitimacy of their regime (Guriev & Treisman, 2020; Lu & Chu, 2021).

To streamline our analysis, we draw on the binary conceptualization of democracy standard in the classic literature (Boix et al., 2013; Cheibub et al., 2010; Przeworski et al., 2000) and collapse the leader selection attribute into two levels: *with* or *without* free and fair elections. The latter category comprises unfair elections, unelected elites, hereditary succession, and military coups. Because these features have similar AMCEs in the first place, disaggregating the analysis does not substantively change the results (see *SI Appendix Section I*).

To obtain direct estimates of how respondents make tradeoffs between attributes, we estimate the average component interaction effects (ACIEs) by interacting each pair of randomized attributes in a linear regression (Hainmueller et al., 2014, p. 12), while controlling for other country attributes, adding sample fixed effects, and clustering the standard errors at the respondent level. This estimation allows us to directly assess how changing the nature of two potentially competing attributes affects people's preference for a country (see the Research Design section for more discussion on the ACIE). In *SI Appendix Section K*, we additionally show that all of our conclusions regarding respondent tradeoffs are robust to analyzing the marginal rate of substitution, mirroring the structural analysis by Graham and Svolik (2020, pp. 403–404).

Figure 3 reports the ACIE estimates based on the pooled sample of all six countries (also see

Figure 3. How people trade off free and fair elections for public safety and individual wealth



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S12–S13.

SI Appendix Section I for the analyses by country). The baseline scenario is in the middle of Panel A, where a country has free and fair elections and is very dangerous. Moving down one step, we can see that respondents prefer an alternative country that *lacks* free and fair elections but is very safe by about 5 pp ($SE = 1.2$ pp, 95% CI $[2.5, 7.4]$ pp). In other words, they are willing to give up elections to obtain a high level of safety. One step lower reveals that they are indifferent between the baseline scenario and an alternative country in which there are no free and fair elections but that is *somewhat* safe ($\beta = 0.3$ pp, $SE = 1.2$ pp, 95% CI $[-2.2, 2.7]$ pp). Any lower level of safety (i.e., somewhat dangerous or very dangerous) is less preferable. Lastly, notice that all four scenarios in which the country has no free and fair elections (bottom four estimates) are less likely to be chosen than a country that has free and fair elections but is "somewhat dangerous." These patterns suggest a high level of perceived insecurity is needed to induce people to abandon free and fair elections.

Turning to Panel B, we can see that people are generally unwilling to trade away democratic

elections to become wealthier. More specifically, respondents are 4 pp less likely to prefer a country without free and fair elections where they would be wealthier than most, compared to a country with free and fair elections where they would be poorer than most ($SE = 1.1$ pp, 95% CI $[-6.4, -2.0]$ pp). Thus, overall, the analysis indicates that when electoral institutions and individual wealth are at stake, respondents are more likely to prioritize the former. Our analysis in *SI Appendix Sections G and H* further indicates people's resistance to trading off elections for national economic performance or more accessible health care. This absence of a tradeoff for economic outcomes aligns with the finding from Figure 1 in which public safety is the only outcome that is prioritized to the same extent as competitive elections.

Tradeoffs for civil liberties and institutional checks

We replicate the analysis for the other two dimensions of democracy: civil liberties and institutional checks. Overall, these analyses tell a more pessimistic story for the mass foundations of democratic resilience, as people are willing to forgo civil liberties and institutional checks and balances for a greater range of scenarios that improve public safety and their personal wealth.

Figure 4 shows how respondents trade off civil liberties for public safety and individual wealth. People prefer countries that are very safe and in which the government represses civil liberties over countries that are very dangerous and in which civil liberties are strongly protected by about 9 pp ($SE = 1.2$ pp, 95% CI $[6.5, 11.3]$ pp). People are also indifferent between countries that are somewhat safe with strong civil liberties and countries that are very safe with repression of civil liberties. In other words, they are willing to move from the highest to the lowest level of civil liberties to obtain an incremental improvement in safety.

Similarly, whereas people did not express a desire to give up democratic elections for personal wealth, they did reveal a preference for wealth at some cost to their civil liberties. For example, respondents are nearly as likely (or only 1 pp less likely) to prefer a country where people are repressed and where they would personally be wealthier than most, compared to a country where people can express themselves and organize freely but the respondents themselves would be poorer

Figure 4. How people trade off civil liberties for public safety and individual wealth



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S14–S15.

than most ($SE = 1.1$ pp, 95% CI $[-2.9, 1.3]$ pp). These results suggest that people worldwide are less committed to liberal democracy than electoral democracy.

We now turn to the last component of democracy, institutional constraints on the political leader. As with the previous analyses, Figure 5 reports the ACIE estimates based on interactions between the institutional checks attribute and the public safety or respondent wealth attribute. Overall, the analysis reveals that people's commitment to institutional checks and balances is not only weak relative to their commitment to elections and civil liberties but also weak in an absolute sense.

Beginning with public safety, we can observe that people are willing to abandon checks on their leader to avoid any level of crime and danger. Compared to a very dangerous country where the leader must respect the legislature and courts' authority when making decisions, respondents are 15 pp more likely to prefer a very safe country where the leader can almost always bypass the legislature and courts' authority ($SE = 1.2$ pp, 95% CI $[12.6, 17.2]$ pp), and 10 pp more likely to prefer

Figure 5. How people trade off institutional checks for public safety and individual wealth



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S16–S17.

a somewhat safe country that also has no institutional checks ($SE = 1.2$ pp, 95% CI $[7.5, 12.1]$ pp). Similarly, people are also willing to forgo checks and balances for personal wealth, though to a somewhat lesser degree. Respondents are 4 pp more likely to select the country without institutional checks if they would be wealthier than most in that country, compared to another country that would make the respondent poorer than most but imposes strong constraints on the leader ($SE = 1.1$ pp, 95% CI $[2.3, 6.5]$ pp).

Expressive democratic support vs. democratic tradeoffs

In *SI Appendix Section J*, we conduct exploratory subgroup analyses to investigate whether respondents who attached strong importance to democracy (identified by a pretreatment survey item described in the appendix) engaged in democratic tradeoffs differently than those who attached lesser importance. Using electoral, liberal, and institutional measurements for democracy, we find

that these two groups make tradeoffs between democracy and other outcomes *differently* when it comes to wealth, but in *similar* ways when it comes to public safety. Those who purport to place a higher value on democracy are less willing to give up democracy for individual wealth (Figures S28 to S30), as one might expect. However, when it comes to public safety, these same individuals are willing to trade away democracy for improved safety at rates similar to those who do not say that democracy is an important value (Figures S25 to S27). These analyses indicate that strong expressive support for democracy does not necessarily align with an individual's willingness to trade away democracy, especially if public safety is perceived to be at stake.

External Validity

We analyze observational evidence from existing surveys to probe the generalizability of our findings beyond the conjoint experiment setting. Because we aim to consider the tradeoff dynamics between democracy and public safety relative to other social, political, and economic outcomes, the ideal survey should include question items that confront respondents with such tradeoffs. The latest wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS Wave 6) is the closest existing survey that meets this criterion.[9] Through face-to-face interviews with around 1,200 respondents in nine partnering country (Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam), it asked: "Which if any of the following circumstances do you think would justify the government's use of emergency powers to constrain individual rights and freedoms, such as imposing curfew or censorship on social media?" The circumstances included (1) "a security crisis due to social unrest or terrorism," (2) "an economic crisis that has caused the loss of many jobs," and (3) "widespread corruption that the president (or prime minister) claims can only be reduced by increasing executive power."[10] The first circumstance reasonably maps onto the *public*

9. ABS enforces a unified research protocol (e.g., probabilistic sampling, standard survey instrument, quality control) for each country partner. For more information, see https://www.asianbarometer.org/survey.html?page=s40.

10. Two other circumstances included in the survey were "a public health crisis like the Covid-19 pandemic" and "the country is at war." These situations, in our view, do not have direct mapping onto the dimensions included in our conjoint survey experiments and are therefore

security attribute in our conjoint experiments, the second mirrors the *national economy* attribute, and the third corresponds to the *corruption in politics* attribute, whereas the government action at stake taps into the *civil liberties* dimension. The available answer options in each nationally representative survey ranged from "not at all justified" and "not very justified" to "somewhat justified" and "very justified." Higher perceived justifiability of the given circumstance thus indicates higher willingness to trade away a core element of liberal democracy for security gains, economic benefits, or corruption reductions.

We again find evidence that individuals generally find it more acceptable to constrain civil liberties for public safety than for economic and anti-corruption reasons. As Figure 6 shows, in six of the nine countries, respondents rated security crises as a significantly stronger justification than economic crises or widespread corruption for the government to claim emergency powers that limit rights and freedoms. The exceptions are Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, whose citizens found constraining individual rights and freedoms on the grounds of public safety and national economy justifiable at comparable levels. Across nine countries, the rated justifiability of constraining rights and freedoms for security gains was at least 2.5 on a four-point scale, with many countries hitting close to or even over 3 (e.g., Australia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam). These countries cover a wide range of regime types and democratic experiences; yet, they yield largely consistent results about how willing people are to trade away civil liberties for public safety, compared to other desirable societal outcomes. The observational analysis thus aligns with our experimental findings and should strengthen confidence in their external validity.

Conclusion

Our main findings are threefold. First, people strongly value free and fair elections, but civil liberties and especially institutional checks are less important than many of the substantive outcomes in our study. Second, among the substantive outcomes, public safety is the most important for people worldwide. Third, people are willing to trade away free and fair elections to avoid living in

not included in our analysis.

Figure 6. Justifiability of trading off civil liberties for public safety, national economy, and corruption mitigation—evidence from the Asian Barometer Survey (Wave 6)



Note: Estimates indicate average levels of perceived justifiability (on a 4-point scale from "not at all justified" to "very justified") with 95% confidence intervals. All country-level estimates are weighted based on demographic characteristics (using the variable w in the Asian Barometer Survey dataset) of the country. The overall estimates take the mean of the nine-country weighted estimates, but the overall empirical pattern holds even if we take out the outlier, Mongolia, from the analysis.

a particularly unsafe country, and they are even more willing to abandon civil liberties and institutional checks on executive power for either safety or personal wealth. These results are relatively consistent across the six, diverse countries surveyed in our study, suggesting that similar factors will shape commitment to democracy even in societies that differ substantially from each other.

These findings have implications for understanding commitment to democracy around the world at a moment of democratic erosion. They illustrate how people across a range of countries value free and fair elections strongly, even relative to important substantive outcomes produced by their

political systems. The public is unlikely to willingly give up competitive elections in exchange for economic growth, accessible public goods, or a lack of corruption. This finding should weaken skepticism that people do not weigh democratic procedures heavily in terms of how they evaluate their political systems (e.g., Rothstein, 2009). Our results also contrast somewhat with recent experimental studies that focus on support for pro- or anti-democratic candidates in elections (e.g., Frederiksen, 2024a; Graham & Svolik, 2020). These studies are more pessimistic about the public's commitment to democracy, as they tend to find that many people are willing to vote for candidates who engage in democratic violations if those candidates support their partisan preferences. One possible synthesis of these findings is that people believe individual violations by specific candidates are unlikely to weaken the country's democracy, and so they are more willing to accept democratic tradeoffs in what they perceive to be narrow circumstances, even as they remain strongly committed to free and fair elections in their countries more broadly. This dynamic would explain how backsliders can avoid backlash from pro-democracy supporters when they move gradually, as well as why more general perceptions of free and fair elections may motivate politically impactful forms of opposition *other than* changing one's vote choice, such as protesting, engaging in civil disobedience, or demanding that undemocratic incumbents be removed from office (Gamboa, 2022; Yeung, forthcoming).

Yet, our study also sheds new light on the conditions that weaken people's commitment to democracy. First, the fact that people care relatively less about civil liberties and, particularly, institutional checks suggests that political leaders engaged in democratic backsliding will confront less popular backlash for undermining these aspects of the political system. Our tradeoff findings relating to civil liberties and institutional checks also imply that the likelihood of popular resistance will be especially low if political leaders can convince the public that constraints on their power or protections for dissidents are standing in the way of improved economic and social outcomes. This implication is consistent with research showing how people abandon their civil liberties when faced with security threats (Berinsky, 2009, Chapter 7), and how majoritarianism allows incumbents to undermine checks and balances without much backlash among some voters (Gidron et al., 2025;

Grossman et al., 2022). It also reflects findings from related conjoint studies showing that civil liberties and institutional constraints are valued less and seen as less crucial for democracy than free and fair elections (Ferrer et al., 2025; Neundorf et al., 2024). Furthermore, these findings are reflected in several prominent cases of democratic backsliding. Whether Erdoğan in Turkey, Chávez in Venezuela, Saied in Tunisia, Orbán in Hungary, Trump in the United States, or Modi in India, would-be autocrats have claimed democratic legitimacy through their electoral victories, while demonizing the opposition as threatening and decrying institutional checks as stifling to justify the weakening of civil liberties and constraints on executive power (see also Stokes, 2025).

In terms of whether sociotropic or personal economic circumstances are more likely to affect support for democracy, our findings suggest that people will place more weight on their own economic situation than on the national economy. The negative effect of being poor was larger than the effect of living in a poor country, and personal poverty was also more likely than country-level poverty to induce respondents to trade away civil liberties and institutional checks.

Our results contrast with recent studies of democratic support that use a similar conjoint design. First, Adserà et al. (2023) show that most people are only willing to trade away free and fair elections for very large gains in their personal income. This finding reflects the robustness of elections in our study. However, they do not simultaneously assess people's commitments to civil liberties and executive constraints, and our incorporation of these two elements reveals where commitment to democratic governance is the weakest. Second, Neundorf et al. (2024) find *no* effect of high crime rates and relatively *little* public willingness to trade off elements of democracy for low crime rates. This sharp divergence from our findings could reflect our language of countries being "safe" or "unsafe" compared to their language about "crime rates," which we consider a more abstract concept for the everyday citizen. The contrasting findings may also result from our use of a four-point scale for this attribute compared to their use of a binary distinction between low and high crime rates, as the willingness to trade off free and fair elections activates when countries in our conjoint were described as "very unsafe." Our robust finding about "very unsafe" societies speaks to a real-world phenomenon in which autocratic governments portray democratic societies

as crime-ridden and dangerous, and is further corroborated by established macro-level research discussed below.

In establishing public safety as the substantive outcome that is most likely to weaken the public's commitment to democracy, our results have implications for democratic transitions. Countries experiencing a democratic opening often struggle with several major challenges stemming from the political upheaval that led to the transition (Abadeer et al., 2022; Neumayer, 2003). Economic outcomes, corruption, public services, and security frequently worsen at least in the short term (e.g., Papaiouannou & Siourounis, 2008; Rock, 2009), and these declines are often emphasized by counterrevolutionary forces seeking to turn the public against the country's nascent democracy. Our results suggest that transitional leaders beset by multiple, difficult challenges will be best positioned to protect democratic gains if they can reduce social instability and hold down violent crime.

Our findings on public safety also help to make sense of the content of propaganda in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian rulers have long understood and exploited the psychological primacy of fear, particularly fear of physical insecurity, to justify centralizing power (Hobbes, 1651). To weaponize this fear and undermine the appeal of democracy, autocracies like China often emphasize crime and instability in the United States and other democratic countries (Chester, 2024; Chester & Wong, 2025; Deng, 2025). Our results align with research suggesting that such messages can be successful at weakening people's support for democracy (Mattingly et al., 2024) and diminishing public demands for democratic reform (Deng, 2025). As a result, democratic countries that aim to preserve the global appeal of democracy should emphasize that public safety is often higher in established democracies (Lafree & Tseloni, 2006; Piccone, 2017).

An important question about democratic support is whether some social and economic groups are more committed to democracy than others. For instance, recent studies suggest that young people are less invested in democracy and less likely to punish politicians who violate democratic norms (Frederiksen, 2024b). Other research implies that poorer people living in democracies will be less supportive of democracy, whereas poorer people living in autocracies will be more support-

ive of democracy (Ceka & Magalhães, 2020). However, our results push back against the idea that poverty uniformly makes people reject their own political system, or that younger people are much less committed to democracy. Instead, respondents in our study responded similarly to democratic tradeoffs regardless of their individual characteristics. In other words, our work implies that broad segments of society in a range of countries around the world remain highly committed to competitive elections, even as they are also somewhat willing to trade away civil liberties and executive constraints for better economic and social outcomes.

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Supplemental Appendix

Are People Willing to Trade Away Democracy for Desirable Outcomes? Experimental Evidence from Six Countries

Jonathan A. Chu Scott Williamson Eddy S. F. Yeung

Table of Contents

A Marginal Means

Figures S1 to S6 show the marginal mean estimates, i.e., respondents' probability of selecting the country for a given level under a given attribute, after averaging across all other country attributes. If respondents selected everything at random, the marginal mean would be 0.5. The marginal mean estimates provide useful information because they do not make assumptions about—and hence are not sensitive to alternative specifications of—the baseline categories of the attributes.[1]

As Figures S1 to S6 show, our main results—based on the AMCE estimates presented in the main text—are not sensitive to alternative specifications of the baseline categories.

1. We initially used Clayton et al.'s (2025) `projoint` package, version 0.4.1, to plot both the raw marginal mean estimates and corrected marginal mean estimates adjusted for potential measurement error bias (based on intra-respondent reliabilities extrapolated from our conjoint experimental data). We found no evidence that the corrections altered any of our conclusions. However, as we finalize our paper, the current version of the `projoint` package (version 1.0.5) concentrates on choice-level rather than profile-level estimands, and the original function used to produce the corrected marginal mean estimates no longer applies. Therefore, we only report the raw marginal mean estimates here.

Figure S1. Marginal means in Egypt



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S18.

Figure S2. Marginal means in India



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S19.

Figure S3. Marginal means in Italy



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S20.

Figure S4. Marginal means in Japan



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S21.

Figure S5. Marginal means in Thailand



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S22.

Figure S6. Marginal means in the United States



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S23.

B Factors of Country Selection in the Six-Country Sample

Panel A of Figure S7 shows the AMCE estimates in the aggregate sample, with Panel B showing the *salience* of each attribute, which captures how respondents prioritize the 10 different country attributes. To operationalize salience, we calculate "the average of the difference between the probability of choosing a profile that includes a particular attribute-level and 50% across all levels of the chosen attribute" (Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi 2021, 185). Conceptually, it is "the variation in the probability of choosing a profile that includes one of the chosen attribute's levels" (Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi 2021, 185). While our analysis of attribute salience is exploratory, it usefully captures how much people care about each country attribute when evaluating which country they prefer to be born and grow up in.

Figure S7. Factors influencing people's country selection in the aggregate sample



Note: In Panel A, error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. All estimates are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, upon adjustments for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure (Liu and Shiraito 2023). For tabular results, see Table S5. In Panel B, higher estimated salience indicates that the attribute matters more to respondents' evaluation of which country they prefer to be born and grow up in (Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi 2021). Due to an administrative error, Japanese respondents randomized to see the "somewhat dangerous" or "very dangerous" level saw both descriptors of the public safety attribute-level. In the pooled analysis, we put this level in the same category as "very dangerous."

C Ranking of Attribute-Levels

We enrich our analysis by using the recent method developed by Dill, Howlett, and Müller-Crepon (2024) to evaluate the relative importance of different attribute features in influencing people's country selection in our conjoint experiment. As Dill, Howlett, and Müller-Crepon (2024, 1472) explain the method:

> We start choosing the first-ranked feature f_1 as that with a co-occurrence adjusted marginal mean closest to either 0 or 1, being the feature with the greatest predictive power over respondents' choices. We then identify the second-ranked feature f_2, but using only strategy pairs in which f_1 is either absent or invariant. For this subsample we proceed [by] estimating "nested" marginal means to delineate f_2. Again only keeping pairs without variation in f_2, we proceed in the same manner until all features are ranked.

This disaggregation and ranking method through "nested" marginal means has the advantage of mitigating the potential issue of sensitive AMCE estimates due to "the co-occurrence rate of *unrelated*, yet substantively important, attributes" (Dill, Howlett, and Müller-Crepon 2024, 1462; see also Abramson, Koçak, and Magazinnik 2022).

We show the full ranking derived from this estimation procedure in Table S1. Consistent with our analysis in *SI Appendix Section B*, we find that free and fair elections and public safety play the most important role in influencing how respondents evaluate which country they prefer to be born and grow up in.

Table S1. Importance of attribute levels based on Dill, Howlett, and Müller-Crepon's (2023) disaggregation and ranking method

Rank	Attribute	Level	Mean	q2.5	q50	q97.5
1	Leader selection	Free and fair elections	1.11	1	1	2
2	Public safety	Very dangerous	1.89	2	1	2
3	Public safety	Somewhat dangerous	3.77	3	3	12
4	Health care	For the privileged	3.99	4	3	5
4	Health care	Mostly accessible	3.99	4	3	5
5	Corruption in politics	Prevalent	7.14	6	4	13
6	Respondent wealth	Poor	5.76	6	3	13
7	Civil liberties	Free	10.67	12	6	13
8	Respondent identity	Minority	9.21	8	7	13
9	Civil liberties	Repressed	7.37	6	4	13
9	Civil liberties	Partially free	11.61	12	8	13
10	Institutional checks	Unconstrained	12.02	12	9	13
11	National economy	Low income	11.25	12	7	13
12	Minority treatment	Fairly treated	10.95	12	7	13
12	Minority treatment	Mostly unfair	11.06	12	6	13
12	Institutional checks	Constrained	11.56	12	7	13
12	National economy	High income	11.59	12	8	13
12	Corruption in politics	Rare	11.61	12	7	13
12	Leader selection	Hereditary succession	11.69	12	8	13
12	Public safety	Very safe	11.76	12	9	13
12	Respondent wealth	Wealthy	11.77	12	7	13
12	Public safety	Somewhat safe	11.80	12	9	13
12	Leader selection	Military coup	11.83	12	8	13
12	Respondent wealth	Average	11.94	12	9	13
12	Corruption in politics	Occasional	12.03	12	10	13
12	Respondent identity	Majority	12.08	12	9	13
12	Leader selection	Unelected elites	12.09	12	9	13
12	Respondent identity	Second largest	12.10	12	10	13
12	Minority treatment	Sometimes unfair	12.15	12	10	13
12	Leader selection	Unfair elections	12.23	12	11	13
12	National economy	Middle income	12.23	12	10	13
12	Institutional checks	Partially constrained	12.34	12	12	13

Note: Mean and quantiles q2.5, q50, and q97.5 from bootstrapped confidence intervals. For the exact wording of different attributes and levels, see Table 1 in the main text. We conduct the analysis using the `cjRank` *package in R (https://github.com/carl-mc/cjRank). The highest rank is 12 because we set the minimum number of observations needed to compute the next-ranked feature at 100, and after 11 iterations, there are fewer than 100 observations left in most cases.*

D AMCE Estimates in Each Country Sample

Figure 2 in the main text reports the AMCE estimates for each of six countries. This appendix explains the results in greater detail. First, we find that democratic institutions play an important role in shaping respondents' choice. Compared to a country with free and fair elections, respondents are less likely to select a country with unfair elections by 16 to 21 percentage points (pp): 16 pp among Egyptians ($SE = 0.019$), 17 pp among Indians ($SE = 0.019$) and Japanese ($SE = 0.019$), 19 pp among Americans ($SE = 0.019$) and Italians ($SE = 0.019$), and 21 pp among Thai ($SE = 0.019$). The negative effects are substantively similar for other systems of leader selection where political leaders come to power through hereditary succession, a small group of unelected elites, or military coups. Among respondents from six different countries, the only substantive deviation comes from Egypt, where the features of unelected elites and hereditary succession have a somewhat milder impact on country preferences: Egyptian respondents are 7 pp ($SE = 0.020$) or 8 pp ($SE = 0.020$) less likely to prefer a country with unelected elites or hereditary succession, respectively, relative to a country with free and fair elections. Overall, leader selection is a crucial factor shaping people's country preferences in our diverse, six-country sample.

On top of leader selection, two other features central to democracy—civil liberties and leader constraints—also influence respondents' choice. The relative importance of these attributes, however, varies more widely between countries and is generally less substantial compared to leader selection procedures. Compared to a country where people can express themselves and organize freely in politics, respondents are 5 to 17 pp less likely to select a country where people cannot express themselves and organize without severe government repression: 5 pp among Indians ($SE = 0.16$), 10 pp among Egyptians ($SE = 0.015$), 12 pp among Thai ($SE = 0.014$), 13 pp among Japanese ($SE = 0.015$), 14 pp among Italians ($SE = 0.015$), and 17 pp among Americans ($SE = 0.015$). For leader constraints, respondents are only 2 to 10 pp less likely to select the country when its leader can almost always bypass the legislature and courts' authority, relative to a country where the leader must respect the legislature and courts' authority. The negative effect is smallest among Japanese (2 pp, $SE = 0.015$), modest among Americans (5 pp, $SE = 0.015$), and

higher among Egyptians (8 pp, $SE = 0.015$), Italians (9 pp, $SE = 0.015$), Thai (9 pp, $SE = 0.014$), and Indians (10 pp, $SE = 0.015$).

The analysis thus far shows that people do value democracy, but how does that compare to other country attributes? We find that outcome-oriented attributes play an equally important role. Compared to a country that is very safe in terms of crime and public safety, a country that is very dangerous is 14 to 24 pp less likely to be selected by respondents as a preferred country: 14 pp among Egyptians ($SE = 0.018$), 18 pp among Italians ($SE = 0.017$), 22 pp among Indians ($SE = 0.018$), and 24 pp among Americans ($SE = 0.017$), Japanese ($SE = 0.015$),[2] and Thai ($SE = 0.017$). Moving from "very safe" to "somewhat dangerous" also lowers the likelihood of country selection by around 8 to 16 pp. Corruption generates similar effects. Respondents are 9 to 15 pp less likely to select a country where political leaders engage in corruption all the time, relative to a country where such corruption takes place only rarely. The decreases in likelihood are 9 pp among Japanese ($SE = 0.014$), 11 pp among Indians ($SE = 0.015$), 12 pp among Italians ($SE = 0.015$), 13 pp among Egyptians ($SE = 0.016$), and 15 pp among Americans ($SE = 0.014$) and Thai ($SE = 0.015$). On top of public safety and corruption, how the country performs economically, how accessible high-quality health care is in the country, and how minorities are treated also affect people's choice (Figure 2).

Hypothetical circumstances of the individual have additional roles to play. In terms of economic situations, people are 5 to 18 pp less likely to select the country when their personal wealth would be poorer than most—rather than wealthier than most—in the country: 5 pp among Indians ($SE = 0.015$), 11 pp among Italians ($SE = 0.015$), 12 pp among Americans ($SE = 0.015$) and Egyptians ($SE = 0.015$), 13 pp among Thai ($SE = 0.015$), and 18 pp among Japanese ($SE = 0.015$). Minority status matters to a lesser extent. Shifting from being in the largest majority group to being in the smallest minority group only reduces likelihood of country selection by 2 to 5 pp in our six-country sample.

2. Due to an administrative error, we showed both "somewhat dangerous" and "very dangerous" to Japanese respondents for those randomized to view either country value. In our analysis, we treat the level as "very dangerous" for these respondents.

E Heterogeneity by Country Characteristics

Some political theorists and pundits have asserted that democracy is not compatible with the Asian culture or contended that Asians, given their distinct cultural roots, understand democracy very differently (see, e.g., Diamond, Plattner, and Chu 2013). Others focus on the institutional structure rather than the culture of the country, arguing that people can "form attitudes to democracy based upon what they learn about what it is and does" (Mattes and Bratton 2007, 192). In this appendix, we explore whether people make tradeoffs differently when they come from a different cultural background or when they have different experience with democracy.

To investigate the cultural dimension, we estimate the marginal means of different attribute-levels in our conjoint experiment, while separating the estimation by Asian and non-Asian countries. If the marginal means are similar in Asian and non-Asian countries, we will have weak evidence that the Asian culture plays an important role in shaping whether and how which people value democracy over other country attributes. As Figure S8 shows, there is limited heterogeneity between respondents from Asian and non-Asian countries, casting doubt on the popular notion that people living in Asian societies value democracy less and are therefore willing to trade away democratic governance.

To examine the institutional dimension, we again estimate the marginal means of different attribute-levels, while separating the estimation by democracies and nondemocracies. Based on V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index in 2023, we classify the United States, Italy, and Japan as democracies, and India, Thailand, and Egypt as nondemocracies. As Figure S9 shows, respondents from democracies and nondemocracies emphasize very similar features of countries (e.g., free and fair election, public safety) in their country selection, suggesting that (across the six diverse countries we sampled) regime type does not play an important role in shaping how people make tradeoffs about countries.

Figure S8. How people make tradeoffs in Asian countries vs. in non-Asian countries



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S24.

Figure S9. How people make tradeoffs in democracies vs. in nondemocracies



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S25.

F Heterogeneity by Individual Characteristics

We explore heterogeneity within each country by estimating the differences in marginal means across different subgroups (Figure S10). We find very limited evidence that the marginal mean estimates differ between (1) young and old people, (2) female and male respondents, (3) the college-educated and non-college graduates, (4) respondents with high socioeconomic status (SES) and respondents with low SES, (5) minority and non-minority respondents, and (6) people who identify as right and people who identify as left. The only exception seems to be the health care attribute, such that the college-educated or respondents with high SES are more willing to be born and grow up in a country with high quality health care accessible only to people with money or connections, compared to non-college graduates and respondents with low SES.

Figure S10. Differences in marginal means by subgroup



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Statistically significant estimates, upon adjustments for multiple comparisons based on our preregistered Benjamini–Hochberg procedure with the false discovery rate at 0.05 (Liu and Shiraito 2023), are displayed in black. For tabular results, see Tables S26–S31.

G Tradeoffs between Democracy and National Economy

Autocrats often justify their rule based on economic performance (Tannenberg et al. 2021), and recent research finds that support for authoritarian leaders is higher when the national economy performs better (Guriev and Treisman 2020). These observations point to the possibility that people may be willing to trade off democracy for economic performance.

How do people respond when they need to make explicit tradeoffs between democracy and the national economy? Using our estimation strategy described in the main text, we estimate the average component interaction effects by interacting each pair of randomized attributes—(1) free and fair elections vs. national economy, (2) civil liberties vs. national economy, and (3) leader constraints vs. national economy—in a linear regression. We show the results in Figures S11, S12, and S13.

We find that, against the backdrop of existing scholarship suggesting that people may have strong preferences for economic performance over democracy, our respondents are generally reluctant to sacrifice democracy for national economic gains. Respondents are *less* likely to prefer a high-income country without free and fair elections to a low-income country with free and fair elections (Figure S11). They are also *less* likely to prefer a politically repressive but high-income country to a politically free but low-income country (Figure S12). Their willingness to trade off leader constraints for national economy, however, is less weak. Our respondents are generally indifferent between a high-income country with an unconstrained leader and a low-income country with a constrained leader (Figure S13).

Figure S11. How people trade off free and fair elections for national economy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S32.

Figure S12. How people trade off civil liberties for national economy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S33.

Figure S13. How people trade off leader constraints for national economy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S34.

H Tradeoffs Between Democracy and Health Care

Autocrats also justify their rule based on welfare provision (Lu and Chu 2021; Wang and Yeung 2025). We explore people's willingness to trade off democracy for health care—a important form of social welfare—in this appendix.

We estimate the average component interaction effects by interacting each pair of randomized attributes—(1) free and fair elections vs. health care, (2) civil liberties vs. health care, and (3) leader constraints vs. health care—in a linear regression. We show the results in Figures S14, S15, and S16.

As the results show, our respondents are somewhat willing to trade off democracy for health care. Although they are much *less* likely to prefer a country without an accessible health care system but with free and fair elections to a country with an accessible health care system but without free and fair elections (Figure S14), they are only slightly less willing to choose a politically repressive country with accessible health care over a politically free country with inaccessible health care (Figure S15). In addition, they prefer a country without leader constraints but with accessible health care to a country with leader constraints but with inaccessible health care (Figure S16).

Figure S14. How people trade off free and fair elections for health care



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S35.

Figure S15. How people trade off civil liberties for health care



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S36.

Figure S16. How people trade off leader constraints for health care



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S37.

I Additional Analysis of Tradeoffs for Democracy

In the main text, we streamlined our analysis by collapsing the leader selection attribute into two levels—with or without free and fair elections. We also presented average component interaction effect estimates based on the pooled sample, which, while conducive to substantive interpretation given our purposes, could be sensitive to alternative specifications of reference categories. To further probe the robustness of our results in Figure 2, we estimate the marginal means by country without collapsing the leader selection attribute (Figures S17 and S18). We conduct the same analysis for the tradeoffs between civil liberties and public safety or individual wealth (Figures S19 and S20), as well as between leader constraints and public safety or individual wealth (Figures S21 and S22), showing country-level marginal mean estimates that corroborate our results in Figure 3 and 4.

We further explore whether group status interacts with the aspects of democracy people care about. If an individual knows their group is dominant, they may care less about equal treatment of minorities and more about elections; alternatively, if they know they are minoritized, they may care more about equal treatment and civil liberties. One empirical implication of such dynamics is that the AMCE of free and fair elections (or free civil liberties) will be higher (or lower) among respondents who evaluate the country that would put them in the majority group than among respondents who evaluate the country that would put them in the minority group. To explore these dynamics, we again collapse the leader selection attribute into binary levels and estimate the full sets of AMCEs conditional on the (randomized) respondent identity—majority vs. minority—in the hypothetical country. Figure S23 shows the estimates. We find no evidence of this empirical implication. Regardless of whether respondents will be placed in the majority or minority group, free and fair elections make them 17.6 pp more likely to prefer to be born and grow up in the country compared to a one that will give them the same group status but does not have free and fair elections. In addition, regardless of whether respondents will be placed in the majority or minority group, free civil liberties make them 11.4 to 11.5 pp more likely to select the country compared to a one that will give them the same group status but represses civil liberties.

Figure S17. Marginal means of interactions between different levels of free and fair elections and public safety



Note: Estimates represent marginal means. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S38–S40.

Figure S18. Marginal means of interactions between different levels of free and fair elections and individual wealth



Note: Estimates represent marginal means. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S41–S43.

Figure S19. Marginal means of interactions between different levels of civil liberties and public safety



Note: Estimates represent marginal means. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S44–S45.

Figure S20. Marginal means of interactions between different levels of civil liberties and individual wealth



Note: Estimates represent marginal means. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S46–S47.

Figure S21. Marginal means of interactions between different levels of leader constraints and public safety



Note: Estimates represent marginal means. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S48–S49.

Figure S22. Marginal means of interactions between different levels of leader constraints and individual wealth



Note: Estimates represent marginal means. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Tables S50–S51.

Figure S23. AMCE estimates conditional on respondent identity in the hypothetical country



Note: Estimates represent average marginal component effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Statistically significant estimates at the 0.05 level, upon adjustments for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure, are displayed in black. For tabular results, see Table S52.

J Subgroup Analysis of Tradeoffs by Importance of Democracy

This appendix analyzes whether respondents who attached strong importance to democracy engaged in democratic tradeoffs differently than those who attached lesser importance. To measure importance of democracy, we asked the following question: "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?" The answer choices ranged from 1 ("not at all important") to 10 ("absolutely important"). Overall, our respondents strongly valued democracy, consistent with findings from existing nationally representative surveys. The sample mean in our six-country surveys is 8.86 ($SD = 1.76$), with a median of 10. Figure S24 shows the distribution of responses to our survey item.

Figure S24. Distribution of importance of democracy to respondents



Based on this pretreatment measure, we divide our sample into two groups: (1) respondents who gave a rating above mean (9 to 10, $N = 4,394$), and (2) respondents who gave a rating below mean (1 to 8, $N = 1,756$). We then replicate our analyses in Figures 3 to 5 with these two subgroups. Figures S25 to S30 show the exploratory subgroup analyses.

Figure S25. How people trade off free and fair elections for public safety, by importance of democracy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S53.

Figure S26. How people trade off civil liberties for public safety, by importance of democracy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S54.

Figure S27. How people trade off institutional checks for public safety, by importance of democracy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S55.

Figure S28. How people trade off free and fair elections for individual wealth, by importance of democracy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S56.

Figure S29. How people trade off civil liberties for individual wealth, by importance of democracy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S57.

Figure S30. How people trade off institutional checks for individual wealth, by importance of democracy



Note: Estimates represent average component interaction effects upon controlling for other attributes and country fixed effects. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. For tabular results, see Table S58.

K Analysis of Marginal Rates of Substitution

This appendix explains the idea, procedure, results, and implications of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) analysis. This analysis is exploratory.

MRS is an economic concept that quantifies the tradeoff an individual (typically a consumer) is willing to make between two goods. It is the rate at which an individual is willing to trade one good for another while maintaining a constant level of utility (or satisfaction). In technical terms, it captures the slope of the indifference curve at a given point and thus reflects the individual's relative valuation of the two goods. An MRS of 1.5, for example, means that an individual is willing to give up 1.5 units of Y (a desirable good) to trade for one more unit of X (another desirable good) without feeling better or worse off.

We apply this concept to our experimental data to quantify the tradeoffs that our respondents were willing to make for socioeconomic goods (e.g., national economy, public safety) vis-à-vis democracy attributes (e.g., leadership selection, civil liberties). Specifically, we estimate the MRS of each socioeconomic good for each democracy attribute. Therefore, the MRS of national economy for civil liberties, for example, is the amount of civil liberties respondents were willing to give up in exchange for an additional unit of national economy improvement. In an absolute sense, this quantity is less informative because the substantive meaning of 0.58 more units of civil liberties, for example, is not well defined. Yet it is meaningful for our tradeoff analysis because our application here is *relative*: we compare different MRSs to identify which socioeconomic goods are particularly influential in inducing respondents' tradeoffs against democracy. The higher the MRS, the higher the respondents' willingness to trade away democracy for the given socioeconomic good.

We follow Graham and Svolik (2020, 403) by estimating the random utility model of discrete choice:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(i \text{ chooses Country A}) = \text{logit}^{-1}[&\alpha + \beta_1 Democracy + \beta_2 Economy + \beta_3 Wealth + \\ &\beta_4 Safety + \beta_5 Corruption + \beta_6 Healthcare + \\ &\beta_7 Minority + \beta_8 Identity],\end{aligned}$$

where we fix Country A to be less democratic than, or as democratic as, Country B in the democracy attribute of interest.[3] *Democracy* is the difference between Country A and Country B's democracy attribute in leadership selection, civil liberties, or institutional checks. *Economy*, *Wealth*, *Safety*, *Corruption*, *Healthcare*, *Minority*, and *Identity* are differences between Country A and Country B's national economy, respondent wealth, public safety, corruption in politics, health care, minority treatment, and respondent identity—as randomized in our conjoint experiments. Because the attributes did not share the same number of levels in our design, we standardize all input variables by rescaling them to range from 0 to 1.[4] In addition, α indicates sample fixed effects. However, estimating the coefficients without sample fixed effects or with a linear probability model does not substantively change the results.

Table S2 presents our MRS estimates, obtained by dividing β_1 by β_k as estimated from the random utility model, where $k = 2, \ldots, 8$.

Table S2. Marginal rate of substitution estimates (β_1/β_k)

	β_1: leadership selection	β_1: civil liberties	β_1: institutional checks
β_2: national economy	0.42	0.58	0.99
β_3: respondent wealth	0.60	0.81	1.38
β_4: public safety	1.05	1.43	2.45
β_5: corruption in politics	0.61	0.84	1.44
β_6: health care	0.54	0.73	1.25
β_7: minority treatment	0.52	0.70	1.18
β_8: respondent identity	0.20	0.27	0.47

Note: A higher MRS indicates higher willingness to trade away the given democracy attribute for the given socioeconomic good.

Two empirical patterns emerge. First, by comparing the MRS estimates in each column, we

3. We reshape our data for this analysis by following Graham and Svolik (2020).

4. For example, for the national economy attribute, we code "low income," "middle income," and "high income" as 0, 1/2, and 1; for the public safety attribute, we code "very dangerous," "somewhat dangerous," "somewhat safe," and "very safe" as 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1. Thus, binary variables—including leadership selection which we binarize for this MRS analysis—need no standardization. We do not use Graham and Svolik's (2020, 403) standardization method—i.e., dividing input variables by twice their standard deviation—because our discrete scales have limited categories (four at most).

find that public safety consistently has the highest MRS for each of the three democracy attributes. This result indicates that among the seven socioeconomic goods we incorporated in our design, public safety is the one that made our respondents most willing to trade away democracy for. Second, by comparing the MRS estimates in each row, we find that free and fair elections have the lowest MRS—and institutional checks the highest MRS—for any given socioeconomic good. This result implies that respondents' commitment to free and fair elections is more robust, while institutional checks are more susceptible to tradeoffs against socioeconomic goods. Overall, these results corroborate our findings from the average component interaction effect analysis as reported in the main text, as well as our attribute salience analysis in *SI Appendix Section B* and ranking analysis in *SI Appendix Section C*.

L Sample Characteristics

Table S3 shows the general characteristics of the sampled countries. They are diverse in their levels of electoral and liberal democracy as well as in their socioeconomic development and political culture of democracy. Table S4 shows the demographic distributions of each country sample. For Egypt, India, and Thailand, our samples are generally more educated than the national average, although analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity suggests little evidence that respondent choice differed substantively along the lines of education background (see Table S10).

Table S3. Country characteristics

	USA	**Italy**	**Egypt**	**India**	**Thailand**	**Japan**
V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index 2023	0.85	0.84	0.19	0.38	0.29	0.82
V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index 2023	0.77	0.76	0.13	0.28	0.23	0.73
World Bank's GDP per capita (current US$) 2022	76,330	34,776	4,295	2,411	6,910	34,017
United Nations' Human Development Index 2021	0.92	0.90	0.73	0.63	0.80	0.93
The Economist's Democratic Culture Index 2022	6.25	7.50	5.00	5.63	5.63	8.13

Note: The Democratic Culture Index captures the extent to which citizens prefer democracy over other political systems. It ranges from 0 (weakest preference for democracy) to 10 (strongest). For more information, see https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/democratic-culture-index-eiu.

Table S4. Sample demographics

		USA	**Italy**	**Egypt**	**India**	**Thailand**	**Japan**
Age	18–29	15.9%	16.4%	37.1%	37.9%	26.4%	12.1%
	30–39	19.7%	17.1%	22.0%	28.5%	26.9%	14.3%
	40–49	16.6%	21.6%	20.3%	18.0%	21.4%	17.1%
	50–59	15.7%	23.5%	15.4%	9.6%	17.5%	25.3%
	60+	32.0%	21.4%	5.2%	6.1%	7.8%	31.2%
Gender	Male	45.4%	48.2%	50.9%	54.0%	47.7%	48.5%
	Female	53.6%	51.1%	48.5%	44.3%	50.8%	50.6%
	Other	1.0%	0.7%	0.6%	1.7%	1.4%	0.9%
Education	College	31.2%	10.2%	75.7%	70.5%	57.9%	26.8%
	No College	68.8%	89.8%	24.3%	29.5%	42.1%	73.2%

M Pre-Analysis Plan

Prior to data collection, we pre-registered our study on Open Science Framework. We paste our pre-analysis plan below.

M.1 Hypothesis

We are interested in understanding the conditions under which individuals become less committed to democracy, as well as the features of democracy that are more vulnerable to losing popular support. We will use a conjoint experiment to assess these questions. The conjoint includes three attributes that reflect core components of democracy: how the leader is selected, the extent of the leader's powers, and whether civil liberties are protected. The conjoint also includes attributes relating to economic and social outcomes in these countries. Some of these attributes are about the country as a whole, and others are about the outcomes experienced directly by the individual answering the survey. Given this approach, we do not have specific hypotheses or predictions about any particular attribute of the conjoint "mattering more" than another, but instead we explore agnostically the attributes citizens prioritize. In analyzing the conjoint, we will assess the following:

- First, how do the coefficients of the democracy attributes compare to the coefficients of the economic and social attributes? How do they compare to the national versus individual level attributes?
- Second, how do the economic and social attributes interact with the democracy attributes? Does the influence of the democracy attributes weaken, for instance, when people know they or the country would be poorer, or when they know that they would be part of a poorly-treated minority group?

In addition, we plan to assess whether certain types of individuals are more or less committed to democracy, and whether economic and social outcomes have different effects on democratic support across these different individuals. For example, do poorer respondents place less emphasis

on democracy based on the individual and national level attributes pertaining to the economy? Are members of minority groups particularly committed to civil liberties? Are people who understand democracy in majoritarian terms less committed to civil liberties and institutional constraints on power, especially when the economic and social attributes reflect desirable policy outcomes?

M.2 Dependent variable

After reviewing the two country profiles for each conjoint exercise, respondents are asked the following:

- "If you had to choose, which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?" (Country A or Country B).
- "Now just think about Country A. How happy would you be to have been born and grown up in this country?" (1 to 7 scale).
- "Now just think about Country B. How happy would you be to have been born and grown up in this country?" (1 to 7 scale).

We will use the forced choice outcome as our primary dependent variable.

M.3 Conditions

The conjoint includes the following ten attributes, each of which is randomized independently. The order of the attributes is randomized.

1. Political leaders come to power through. . . (Free and fair elections / Unfair elections / Hereditary succession / A small group of unelected elites / Military coups)
2. In politics, people. . . (Can express themselves and organize freely / Can express themselves and organize but face some risk of government repression / Cannot express themselves and organize without severe government repression)

3. The country's leader... (Must respect the legislature and courts' authority / Can sometimes bypass the legislature and courts' authority / Can almost always bypass the legislature and courts' authority)

4. Political leaders engage in corruption... (All the time / Sometimes / Very rarely)

5. Economically, this country is... (Low-income / Medium-income / High-income)

6. Your personal wealth compared to others in this country would be... (Poorer than most / About average / Wealthier than most)

7. In terms of crime and public safety, the country is... (Very safe / Somewhat safe / Somewhat dangerous / Very dangerous)

8. High quality health care is... (Accessible to most people / Accessible only to people with money or connections)

9. Ethnic/Racial/Religious minorities are... (Treated fairly by most people / Treated fairly by some people but unfairly by others / Treated unfairly by most people)

10. Your ethnicity/race/religion would... (Put you in the largest majority group, Put you in the second largest group, Put you in the smallest minority group)

M.4 Analyses

We will analyze the average marginal component effects of each attribute value against the reference categories. We will use the most desirable value as the reference category for each attribute – i.e. the most democratic, the best economic outcomes, the preferable social outcomes.

M.5 Outliers and Exclusion

We will not exclude any outliers or observations; however, for analyzing robustness we may check to see any indicators of poor survey response quality such as failing attention check, straight-lining through questions, and/or speeding.

M.6 Other

We will include a battery of questions to examine heterogeneous effects and for exploratory purposes. These include demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, education, religion, minority status, subjective social class) and dispositional variables (e.g., authoritarian personality, individualism/collectivism, perceived importance of democracy, political orientation, political interest). Regarding minority status, we use general subjective measures (asking the respondent if they identify as a minority in their society) and "objective measures" which may depend on the society (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, region, etc.). These questions allow us to investigate whether and how subjective understandings of democracy differ across subgroups.

We will collect a rank-choice variable for exploratory purposes. The question wording is: "Which factors were most important in deciding which countries you would prefer to live in? Please click and rank each factor from most (1) to least important (10)." The factors correspond to the 10 attributes covered by our conjoint experiment. This questions will be asked after respondents complete all the conjoint tasks.

We will analyze the marginal means as a robustness check. There are also several emerging practices in the conjoint methodology literature, which we will explore in auxiliary analyses and to probe the robustness of our study. They include using the methods described in Ham, Imai, and Janson (2022); Clayton et al. (2023); and Liu and Shiraito (2023).

N Ethics

We received Institutional Review Board approval at National University of Singapore. We affirm that this article adheres to the principles concerning human subject research as laid out in APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research (2020). Respondents provided informed consent prior to starting the survey, and we did not collect personally identifiable information.

O Full Results in Tables

Table S5. Results for Figure 1 and S7 (first panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	-0.208	0.008	0.000	-0.223	-0.192	36900
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.143	0.008	0.000	-0.159	-0.127	36900
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	-0.141	0.008	0.000	-0.156	-0.125	36900
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.181	0.008	0.000	-0.196	-0.166	36900
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.119	0.006	0.000	-0.131	-0.107	36900
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.061	0.006	0.000	-0.073	-0.049	36900
Civil Liberties	Free	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.071	0.006	0.000	-0.083	-0.059	36900
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.046	0.006	0.000	-0.058	-0.034	36900
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
National Economy	Low income	-0.085	0.006	0.000	-0.097	-0.073	36900
National Economy	Middle income	-0.026	0.006	0.000	-0.037	-0.014	36900
National Economy	High income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.119	0.006	0.000	-0.131	-0.107	36900
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.028	0.006	0.000	-0.040	-0.016	36900
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.210	0.007	0.000	-0.223	-0.197	36900
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.135	0.007	0.000	-0.149	-0.121	36900
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.042	0.007	0.000	-0.055	-0.029	36900
Public Safety	Very safe	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.125	0.006	0.000	-0.136	-0.113	36900
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.039	0.006	0.000	-0.051	-0.027	36900
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.107	0.005	0.000	-0.117	-0.097	36900
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.106	0.006	0.000	-0.118	-0.094	36900
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.042	0.006	0.000	-0.054	-0.030	36900
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.041	0.006	0.000	-0.053	-0.029	36900
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.001	0.006	0.905	-0.011	0.013	36900
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table S6. Results for Figure 2 (first panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	-0.146	0.020	0.000	-0.186	-0.106	6048
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.084	0.020	0.000	-0.123	-0.045	6048
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	-0.066	0.020	0.001	-0.106	-0.027	6048
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.158	0.019	0.000	-0.195	-0.120	6048
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.098	0.015	0.000	-0.127	-0.068	6048
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.049	0.016	0.002	-0.080	-0.018	6048
Civil Liberties	Free	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.083	0.015	0.000	-0.112	-0.054	6048
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.058	0.015	0.000	-0.087	-0.028	6048
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
National Economy	Low income	-0.081	0.015	0.000	-0.110	-0.052	6048
National Economy	Middle income	-0.035	0.015	0.017	-0.064	-0.006	6048
National Economy	High income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.116	0.015	0.000	-0.146	-0.086	6048
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.018	0.015	0.229	-0.048	0.012	6048
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.137	0.018	0.000	-0.172	-0.101	6048
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.114	0.017	0.000	-0.147	-0.080	6048
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.028	0.017	0.115	-0.062	0.007	6048
Public Safety	Very safe	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.128	0.016	0.000	-0.159	-0.098	6048
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.075	0.015	0.000	-0.104	-0.046	6048
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.078	0.013	0.000	-0.103	-0.053	6048
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.079	0.015	0.000	-0.109	-0.049	6048
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.046	0.015	0.002	-0.076	-0.016	6048
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.049	0.015	0.002	-0.079	-0.019	6048
Respondent Identity	Second largest	-0.006	0.015	0.678	-0.036	0.024	6048
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table S7. Results for Figure 2 (second panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	-0.198	0.020	0.000	-0.236	-0.159	6132
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.186	0.020	0.000	-0.226	-0.147	6132
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	-0.142	0.019	0.000	-0.180	-0.104	6132
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.167	0.019	0.000	-0.205	-0.129	6132
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.051	0.016	0.001	-0.082	-0.021	6132
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.029	0.015	0.063	-0.059	0.002	6132
Civil Liberties	Free	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.099	0.015	0.000	-0.128	-0.069	6132
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.064	0.016	0.000	-0.095	-0.034	6132
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
National Economy	Low income	-0.091	0.015	0.000	-0.120	-0.061	6132
National Economy	Middle income	-0.045	0.015	0.003	-0.075	-0.015	6132
National Economy	High income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.053	0.015	0.000	-0.083	-0.024	6132
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.019	0.015	0.205	-0.048	0.010	6132
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.218	0.018	0.000	-0.252	-0.183	6132
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.145	0.018	0.000	-0.181	-0.110	6132
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.066	0.017	0.000	-0.100	-0.033	6132
Public Safety	Very safe	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.111	0.015	0.000	-0.141	-0.081	6132
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.016	0.015	0.293	-0.046	0.014	6132
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.089	0.012	0.000	-0.113	-0.066	6132
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.085	0.015	0.000	-0.115	-0.056	6132
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.040	0.015	0.006	-0.069	-0.011	6132
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.033	0.016	0.035	-0.063	-0.002	6132
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.003	0.015	0.835	-0.027	0.033	6132
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table S8. Results for Figure 2 (third panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	-0.239	0.019	0.000	-0.276	-0.203	6282
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.150	0.018	0.000	-0.186	-0.114	6282
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	-0.158	0.019	0.000	-0.195	-0.121	6282
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.193	0.019	0.000	-0.230	-0.156	6282
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.140	0.015	0.000	-0.170	-0.111	6282
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.051	0.015	0.001	-0.080	-0.022	6282
Civil Liberties	Free	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.087	0.015	0.000	-0.116	-0.059	6282
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.057	0.014	0.000	-0.084	-0.029	6282
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
National Economy	Low income	-0.051	0.015	0.001	-0.080	-0.022	6282
National Economy	Middle income	-0.015	0.014	0.306	-0.042	0.013	6282
National Economy	High income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.115	0.015	0.000	-0.143	-0.086	6282
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.018	0.015	0.215	-0.046	0.010	6282
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.180	0.017	0.000	-0.212	-0.147	6282
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.135	0.017	0.000	-0.169	-0.102	6282
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.015	0.016	0.373	-0.047	0.017	6282
Public Safety	Very safe	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.121	0.015	0.000	-0.150	-0.093	6282
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.043	0.015	0.004	-0.072	-0.014	6282
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.155	0.012	0.000	-0.178	-0.131	6282
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.146	0.014	0.000	-0.174	-0.118	6282
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.028	0.014	0.043	-0.056	-0.001	6282
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.024	0.014	0.100	-0.052	0.005	6282
Respondent Identity	Second largest	-0.007	0.014	0.643	-0.035	0.022	6282
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table S9. Results for Figure 2 (fourth panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	-0.212	0.019	0.000	-0.250	-0.175	6072
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.152	0.019	0.000	-0.189	-0.114	6072
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	-0.148	0.019	0.000	-0.185	-0.111	6072
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.170	0.019	0.000	-0.206	-0.133	6072
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.131	0.015	0.000	-0.159	-0.102	6072
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.093	0.015	0.000	-0.122	-0.065	6072
Civil Liberties	Free	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.021	0.015	0.166	-0.050	0.008	6072
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.014	0.015	0.320	-0.043	0.014	6072
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
National Economy	Low income	-0.074	0.015	0.000	-0.103	-0.045	6072
National Economy	Middle income	0.006	0.015	0.676	-0.023	0.035	6072
National Economy	High income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.182	0.015	0.000	-0.212	-0.153	6072
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.046	0.015	0.001	-0.075	-0.018	6072
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.244	0.015	0.000	-0.273	-0.215	6072
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.031	0.015	0.034	-0.060	-0.002	6072
Public Safety	Very safe	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.092	0.014	0.000	-0.120	-0.064	6072
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.037	0.014	0.011	-0.065	-0.008	6072
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.120	0.012	0.000	-0.143	-0.096	6072
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.131	0.015	0.000	-0.161	-0.101	6072
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.040	0.015	0.007	-0.069	-0.011	6072
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.052	0.015	0.001	-0.081	-0.022	6072
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.025	0.014	0.081	-0.003	0.053	6072
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table S10. Results for Figure 2 (fifth panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	-0.207	0.019	0.000	-0.245	-0.170	6222
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.138	0.019	0.000	-0.176	-0.101	6222
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	-0.156	0.019	0.000	-0.194	-0.118	6222
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.213	0.019	0.000	-0.250	-0.177	6222
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.116	0.014	0.000	-0.145	-0.088	6222
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.058	0.014	0.000	-0.085	-0.030	6222
Civil Liberties	Free	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.089	0.014	0.000	-0.117	-0.060	6222
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.057	0.014	0.000	-0.085	-0.029	6222
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
National Economy	Low income	-0.112	0.015	0.000	-0.141	-0.084	6222
National Economy	Middle income	-0.037	0.014	0.010	-0.066	-0.009	6222
National Economy	High income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.126	0.015	0.000	-0.156	-0.097	6222
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.029	0.015	0.049	-0.058	0.000	6222
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.236	0.017	0.000	-0.269	-0.203	6222
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.160	0.017	0.000	-0.193	-0.127	6222
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.040	0.017	0.019	-0.073	-0.007	6222
Public Safety	Very safe	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.148	0.015	0.000	-0.176	-0.119	6222
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.028	0.015	0.058	-0.057	0.001	6222
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.124	0.012	0.000	-0.147	-0.101	6222
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.062	0.015	0.000	-0.090	-0.033	6222
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.042	0.014	0.003	-0.070	-0.014	6222
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.048	0.015	0.001	-0.077	-0.019	6222
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.007	0.015	0.608	-0.021	0.036	6222
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table S11. Results for Figure 2 (sixth panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	-0.240	0.020	0.000	-0.279	-0.202	6144
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.157	0.019	0.000	-0.195	-0.119	6144
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	-0.173	0.019	0.000	-0.210	-0.136	6144
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.186	0.019	0.000	-0.223	-0.148	6144
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.174	0.015	0.000	-0.203	-0.145	6144
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.088	0.015	0.000	-0.117	-0.059	6144
Civil Liberties	Free	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.053	0.015	0.000	-0.082	-0.024	6144
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.033	0.015	0.028	-0.062	-0.004	6144
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
National Economy	Low income	-0.099	0.015	0.000	-0.128	-0.070	6144
National Economy	Middle income	-0.026	0.015	0.074	-0.055	0.003	6144
National Economy	High income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.125	0.015	0.000	-0.154	-0.096	6144
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.037	0.015	0.013	-0.066	-0.008	6144
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.235	0.017	0.000	-0.267	-0.203	6144
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.127	0.017	0.000	-0.161	-0.094	6144
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.076	0.017	0.000	-0.109	-0.044	6144
Public Safety	Very safe	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.150	0.014	0.000	-0.178	-0.122	6144
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.043	0.015	0.003	-0.071	-0.014	6144
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.074	0.012	0.000	-0.098	-0.051	6144
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.132	0.015	0.000	-0.161	-0.103	6144
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.048	0.015	0.001	-0.077	-0.019	6144
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.044	0.015	0.003	-0.074	-0.015	6144
Respondent Identity	Second largest	-0.020	0.015	0.171	-0.049	0.009	6144
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table S12. Results for Figure 3 (first panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.204	0.015	0.000	0.175	0.233	36900
No free and fair elections × Very safe	0.050	0.012	0.000	0.025	0.074	36900
Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.180	0.015	0.000	0.151	0.210	36900
No free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.003	0.012	0.832	-0.022	0.027	36900
Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.088	0.016	0.000	0.055	0.120	36900
No free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	-0.095	0.013	0.000	-0.120	-0.069	36900
No free and fair elections × Very dangerous	-0.162	0.012	0.000	-0.186	-0.138	36900
Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	36900
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S13. Results for Figure 3 (second panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.128	0.013	0.000	0.102	0.154	36900
No free and fair elections × Wealthy	-0.042	0.011	0.000	-0.064	-0.020	36900
Free and fair elections × Average	0.104	0.013	0.000	0.078	0.131	36900
No free and fair elections × Average	-0.071	0.011	0.000	-0.092	-0.049	36900
No free and fair elections × Poor	-0.160	0.011	0.000	-0.181	-0.138	36900
Free and fair elections × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S14. Results for Figure 4 (first panel), DV = 𝟙{Country Selected}

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free × Very safe	0.222	0.012	0.000	0.199	0.245	36900
Partially free × Very safe	0.158	0.012	0.000	0.134	0.181	36900
Repressed × Very safe	0.089	0.012	0.000	0.066	0.113	36900
Free × Somewhat safe	0.171	0.012	0.000	0.148	0.194	36900
Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.117	0.012	0.000	0.093	0.141	36900
Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.054	0.012	0.000	0.030	0.078	36900
Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.082	0.013	0.000	0.057	0.107	36900
Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.016	0.013	0.203	-0.009	0.041	36900
Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	-0.046	0.013	0.000	-0.071	-0.021	36900
Partially free × Very dangerous	-0.061	0.012	0.000	-0.084	-0.037	36900
Repressed × Very dangerous	-0.101	0.012	0.000	-0.124	-0.079	36900
Free × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S15. Results for Figure 4 (second panel), DV = 𝟙{Country Selected}

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free × Wealthy	0.119	0.010	0.000	0.098	0.139	36900
Partially free × Wealthy	0.061	0.011	0.000	0.040	0.082	36900
Repressed × Wealthy	-0.008	0.011	0.454	-0.029	0.013	36900
Free × Average	0.086	0.011	0.000	0.065	0.107	36900
Partially free × Average	0.027	0.011	0.012	0.006	0.048	36900
Repressed × Average	-0.025	0.011	0.021	-0.046	-0.004	36900
Partially free × Poor	-0.066	0.011	0.000	-0.088	-0.045	36900
Repressed × Poor	-0.121	0.011	0.000	-0.141	-0.100	36900
Free × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S16. Results for Figure 5 (first panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Constrained × Very safe	0.204	0.012	0.000	0.181	0.228	36900
Partially constrained × Very safe	0.155	0.012	0.000	0.131	0.178	36900
Unconstrained × Very safe	0.149	0.012	0.000	0.126	0.172	36900
Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.165	0.012	0.000	0.142	0.189	36900
Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.119	0.012	0.000	0.096	0.142	36900
Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.098	0.012	0.000	0.075	0.121	36900
Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.075	0.013	0.000	0.050	0.100	36900
Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.025	0.013	0.054	0.000	0.050	36900
Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	-0.008	0.013	0.544	-0.032	0.017	36900
Partially constrained × Very dangerous	-0.039	0.012	0.001	-0.061	-0.016	36900
Unconstrained × Very dangerous	-0.083	0.011	0.000	-0.105	-0.060	36900
Constrained × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S17. Results for Figure 5 (second panel), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Constrained × Wealthy	0.121	0.010	0.000	0.100	0.141	36900
Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.076	0.011	0.000	0.055	0.097	36900
Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.044	0.011	0.000	0.023	0.065	36900
Constrained × Average	0.090	0.011	0.000	0.070	0.111	36900
Partially constrained × Average	0.046	0.011	0.000	0.025	0.067	36900
Unconstrained × Average	0.022	0.011	0.044	0.001	0.042	36900
Partially constrained × Poor	-0.049	0.011	0.000	-0.070	-0.028	36900
Unconstrained × Poor	-0.068	0.011	0.000	-0.089	-0.048	36900
Constrained × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S18. Results for Figure S1, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.443	0.013	0.418	0.468	6048
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.504	0.012	0.479	0.528	6048
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.521	0.014	0.494	0.548	6048
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.433	0.013	0.408	0.458	6048
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.595	0.013	0.570	0.619	6048
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.455	0.009	0.437	0.472	6048
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.495	0.010	0.476	0.513	6048
Civil Liberties	Free	0.549	0.009	0.532	0.567	6048
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.464	0.009	0.447	0.482	6048
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.487	0.009	0.469	0.505	6048
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.548	0.009	0.531	0.565	6048
National Economy	Low income	0.459	0.009	0.441	0.476	6048
National Economy	Middle income	0.505	0.009	0.487	0.522	6048
National Economy	High income	0.536	0.009	0.519	0.553	6048
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.432	0.009	0.414	0.449	6048
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.526	0.009	0.508	0.544	6048
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.543	0.009	0.525	0.561	6048
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.434	0.012	0.411	0.457	6048
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.455	0.011	0.434	0.477	6048
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.548	0.011	0.526	0.570	6048
Public Safety	Very safe	0.564	0.011	0.542	0.586	6048
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.437	0.010	0.418	0.456	6048
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.490	0.009	0.472	0.508	6048
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.568	0.009	0.550	0.585	6048
Health Care	For the privileged	0.463	0.007	0.450	0.476	6048
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.536	0.006	0.524	0.548	6048
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.467	0.009	0.450	0.485	6048
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.496	0.009	0.478	0.514	6048
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.537	0.009	0.519	0.555	6048
Respondent Identity	Minority	0.474	0.009	0.457	0.492	6048
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.508	0.009	0.490	0.526	6048
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.518	0.009	0.500	0.536	6048

Table S19. Results for Figure S2, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.440	0.013	0.414	0.465	6132
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.451	0.013	0.425	0.478	6132
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.495	0.013	0.470	0.519	6132
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.470	0.013	0.445	0.496	6132
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.641	0.013	0.617	0.666	6132
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.474	0.009	0.456	0.491	6132
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.500	0.009	0.482	0.519	6132
Civil Liberties	Free	0.528	0.009	0.509	0.546	6132
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.452	0.009	0.435	0.470	6132
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.494	0.009	0.475	0.512	6132
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.555	0.009	0.537	0.573	6132
National Economy	Low income	0.454	0.009	0.435	0.472	6132
National Economy	Middle income	0.502	0.010	0.483	0.521	6132
National Economy	High income	0.543	0.009	0.526	0.560	6132
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.465	0.009	0.447	0.483	6132
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.513	0.009	0.496	0.531	6132
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.522	0.009	0.504	0.539	6132
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.386	0.011	0.365	0.407	6132
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.468	0.012	0.445	0.491	6132
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.540	0.011	0.518	0.561	6132
Public Safety	Very safe	0.604	0.011	0.583	0.626	6132
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.429	0.009	0.411	0.446	6132
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.530	0.009	0.512	0.548	6132
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.539	0.009	0.521	0.556	6132
Health Care	For the privileged	0.455	0.006	0.442	0.467	6132
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.544	0.006	0.532	0.557	6132
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.455	0.009	0.438	0.473	6132
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.500	0.009	0.483	0.517	6132
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.543	0.009	0.526	0.560	6132
Respondent Identity	Minority	0.476	0.009	0.458	0.494	6132
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.512	0.009	0.495	0.530	6132
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.511	0.009	0.493	0.530	6132

Table S20. Results for Figure S3, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.404	0.013	0.380	0.429	6282
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.498	0.012	0.475	0.522	6282
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.494	0.013	0.469	0.520	6282
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.452	0.013	0.427	0.477	6282
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.650	0.012	0.625	0.674	6282
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.424	0.009	0.406	0.443	6282
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.514	0.009	0.497	0.531	6282
Civil Liberties	Free	0.559	0.009	0.541	0.577	6282
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.458	0.009	0.440	0.475	6282
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.494	0.009	0.477	0.511	6282
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.549	0.009	0.532	0.567	6282
National Economy	Low income	0.470	0.009	0.452	0.488	6282
National Economy	Middle income	0.509	0.009	0.492	0.526	6282
National Economy	High income	0.521	0.009	0.503	0.538	6282
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.425	0.009	0.408	0.443	6282
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.528	0.009	0.511	0.546	6282
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.545	0.009	0.527	0.562	6282
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.406	0.011	0.384	0.427	6282
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.448	0.011	0.427	0.469	6282
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.567	0.011	0.546	0.588	6282
Public Safety	Very safe	0.581	0.011	0.560	0.602	6282
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.432	0.009	0.415	0.450	6282
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.516	0.009	0.498	0.534	6282
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.554	0.009	0.536	0.572	6282
Health Care	For the privileged	0.425	0.006	0.413	0.437	6282
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.577	0.006	0.564	0.589	6282
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.414	0.009	0.396	0.431	6282
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.525	0.009	0.508	0.542	6282
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.562	0.009	0.545	0.580	6282
Respondent Identity	Minority	0.485	0.009	0.468	0.502	6282
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.504	0.009	0.486	0.522	6282
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.511	0.009	0.494	0.529	6282

Table S21. Results for Figure S4, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.425	0.013	0.401	0.450	6072
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.485	0.013	0.458	0.511	6072
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.481	0.013	0.455	0.506	6072
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.468	0.013	0.443	0.493	6072
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.639	0.013	0.614	0.663	6072
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.439	0.009	0.421	0.457	6072
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.483	0.009	0.465	0.501	6072
Civil Liberties	Free	0.571	0.009	0.554	0.589	6072
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.497	0.009	0.479	0.515	6072
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.494	0.009	0.476	0.512	6072
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.509	0.009	0.491	0.527	6072
National Economy	Low income	0.448	0.009	0.430	0.466	6072
National Economy	Middle income	0.527	0.009	0.509	0.545	6072
National Economy	High income	0.526	0.009	0.508	0.545	6072
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.389	0.009	0.370	0.407	6072
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.528	0.009	0.510	0.545	6072
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.577	0.009	0.559	0.595	6072
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.338	0.009	0.320	0.356	6072
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.565	0.009	0.547	0.583	6072
Public Safety	Very safe	0.592	0.009	0.575	0.610	6072
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.452	0.009	0.434	0.469	6072
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.508	0.009	0.490	0.527	6072
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.542	0.009	0.524	0.559	6072
Health Care	For the privileged	0.437	0.006	0.425	0.450	6072
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.564	0.007	0.551	0.577	6072
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.427	0.009	0.409	0.446	6072
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.516	0.009	0.498	0.534	6072
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.558	0.010	0.539	0.577	6072
Respondent Identity	Minority	0.454	0.009	0.436	0.472	6072
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.529	0.009	0.512	0.546	6072
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.515	0.009	0.497	0.532	6072

Table S22. Results for Figure S5, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.430	0.013	0.404	0.456	6222
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.508	0.013	0.483	0.533	6222
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.491	0.013	0.465	0.517	6222
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.430	0.012	0.406	0.453	6222
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.645	0.013	0.620	0.670	6222
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.439	0.009	0.421	0.457	6222
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.500	0.009	0.483	0.518	6222
Civil Liberties	Free	0.557	0.009	0.540	0.574	6222
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.456	0.009	0.439	0.473	6222
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.500	0.009	0.482	0.517	6222
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.545	0.009	0.527	0.562	6222
National Economy	Low income	0.437	0.009	0.420	0.455	6222
National Economy	Middle income	0.512	0.009	0.495	0.530	6222
National Economy	High income	0.550	0.009	0.532	0.568	6222
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.428	0.009	0.409	0.446	6222
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.520	0.009	0.502	0.538	6222
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.552	0.009	0.535	0.570	6222
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.371	0.011	0.349	0.392	6222
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.453	0.011	0.432	0.475	6222
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.570	0.011	0.549	0.591	6222
Public Safety	Very safe	0.608	0.011	0.586	0.629	6222
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.409	0.009	0.391	0.426	6222
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.534	0.009	0.516	0.552	6222
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.560	0.009	0.543	0.577	6222
Health Care	For the privileged	0.442	0.006	0.429	0.454	6222
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.561	0.007	0.548	0.574	6222
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.472	0.009	0.455	0.490	6222
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.499	0.009	0.482	0.517	6222
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.528	0.009	0.511	0.546	6222
Respondent Identity	Minority	0.463	0.009	0.445	0.480	6222
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.521	0.009	0.504	0.538	6222
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.516	0.009	0.498	0.534	6222

Table S23. Results for Figure S6, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.411	0.013	0.386	0.437	6144
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.497	0.013	0.472	0.522	6144
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.477	0.013	0.452	0.502	6144
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.471	0.012	0.447	0.496	6144
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.646	0.013	0.621	0.672	6144
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.413	0.009	0.396	0.431	6144
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.499	0.009	0.480	0.517	6144
Civil Liberties	Free	0.586	0.009	0.568	0.603	6144
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.477	0.009	0.459	0.496	6144
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.493	0.009	0.475	0.511	6144
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.528	0.009	0.511	0.546	6144
National Economy	Low income	0.445	0.009	0.428	0.462	6144
National Economy	Middle income	0.511	0.009	0.493	0.529	6144
National Economy	High income	0.543	0.009	0.526	0.560	6144
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.427	0.009	0.408	0.445	6144
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.517	0.009	0.499	0.535	6144
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.553	0.009	0.535	0.570	6144
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.374	0.011	0.352	0.395	6144
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.479	0.011	0.456	0.501	6144
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.533	0.011	0.512	0.555	6144
Public Safety	Very safe	0.610	0.011	0.590	0.631	6144
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.418	0.009	0.400	0.435	6144
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.523	0.009	0.505	0.540	6144
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.561	0.009	0.543	0.578	6144
Health Care	For the privileged	0.462	0.006	0.450	0.475	6144
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.537	0.006	0.525	0.550	6144
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.428	0.009	0.410	0.447	6144
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.512	0.009	0.494	0.530	6144
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.560	0.009	0.542	0.577	6144
Respondent Identity	Minority	0.477	0.009	0.459	0.496	6144
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.503	0.009	0.486	0.521	6144
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.519	0.009	0.501	0.537	6144

Table S24. Results for Figure S8, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Military coup	0.432	0.007	0.417	0.446	18426
Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.482	0.008	0.467	0.497	18426
Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.489	0.007	0.474	0.503	18426
Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.455	0.007	0.441	0.470	18426
Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.642	0.007	0.627	0.656	18426
Asian Countries	Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.451	0.005	0.440	0.461	18426
Asian Countries	Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.495	0.005	0.484	0.505	18426
Asian Countries	Civil Liberties	Free	0.553	0.005	0.543	0.563	18426
Asian Countries	Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.468	0.005	0.458	0.478	18426
Asian Countries	Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.496	0.005	0.485	0.506	18426
Asian Countries	Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.537	0.005	0.526	0.547	18426
Asian Countries	National Economy	Low income	0.446	0.005	0.436	0.457	18426
Asian Countries	National Economy	Middle income	0.514	0.005	0.503	0.525	18426
Asian Countries	National Economy	High income	0.540	0.005	0.530	0.550	18426
Asian Countries	Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.428	0.005	0.417	0.438	18426
Asian Countries	Respondent Wealth	Average	0.520	0.005	0.510	0.530	18426
Asian Countries	Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.551	0.005	0.540	0.561	18426
Asian Countries	Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.363	0.006	0.351	0.374	18426
Asian Countries	Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.460	0.008	0.445	0.476	18426
Asian Countries	Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.559	0.006	0.547	0.570	18426
Asian Countries	Public Safety	Very safe	0.601	0.006	0.589	0.612	18426
Asian Countries	Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.430	0.005	0.420	0.440	18426
Asian Countries	Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.524	0.005	0.514	0.535	18426
Asian Countries	Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.547	0.005	0.537	0.557	18426
Asian Countries	Health Care	For the privileged	0.445	0.004	0.437	0.452	18426
Asian Countries	Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.556	0.004	0.549	0.564	18426
Asian Countries	Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.452	0.005	0.442	0.462	18426
Asian Countries	Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.505	0.005	0.495	0.515	18426
Asian Countries	Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.543	0.005	0.533	0.553	18426
Asian Countries	Respondent Identity	Minority	0.464	0.005	0.454	0.475	18426
Asian Countries	Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.521	0.005	0.511	0.531	18426
Asian Countries	Respondent Identity	Majority	0.514	0.005	0.503	0.524	18426
Non-Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Military coup	0.419	0.007	0.405	0.434	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.499	0.007	0.485	0.513	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.497	0.008	0.482	0.512	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.453	0.007	0.438	0.467	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.630	0.007	0.616	0.644	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.431	0.005	0.420	0.441	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.503	0.005	0.492	0.513	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Civil Liberties	Free	0.565	0.005	0.555	0.575	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.466	0.005	0.456	0.477	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.491	0.005	0.481	0.502	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.542	0.005	0.532	0.552	18474
Non-Asian Countries	National Economy	Low income	0.458	0.005	0.448	0.468	18474
Non-Asian Countries	National Economy	Middle income	0.508	0.005	0.498	0.518	18474
Non-Asian Countries	National Economy	High income	0.533	0.005	0.523	0.543	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.428	0.005	0.418	0.438	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Respondent Wealth	Average	0.524	0.005	0.514	0.534	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.547	0.005	0.536	0.557	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.404	0.006	0.392	0.417	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.461	0.006	0.448	0.473	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.550	0.006	0.537	0.562	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Public Safety	Very safe	0.585	0.006	0.573	0.598	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.429	0.005	0.419	0.439	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.510	0.005	0.500	0.520	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.561	0.005	0.551	0.571	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Health Care	For the privileged	0.449	0.004	0.442	0.457	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.550	0.004	0.543	0.557	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.436	0.005	0.426	0.446	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.511	0.005	0.501	0.521	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.553	0.005	0.543	0.564	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Respondent Identity	Minority	0.479	0.005	0.469	0.489	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.505	0.005	0.495	0.515	18474
Non-Asian Countries	Respondent Identity	Majority	0.516	0.005	0.506	0.526	18474

Table S25. Results for Figure S9, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Democracies	Leader Selection	Military coup	0.414	0.007	0.399	0.428	18498
Democracies	Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.493	0.007	0.479	0.508	18498
Democracies	Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.484	0.008	0.469	0.499	18498
Democracies	Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.464	0.007	0.449	0.478	18498
Democracies	Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.645	0.007	0.630	0.659	18498
Democracies	Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.425	0.005	0.415	0.436	18498
Democracies	Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.499	0.005	0.489	0.509	18498
Democracies	Civil Liberties	Free	0.572	0.005	0.562	0.582	18498
Democracies	Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.477	0.005	0.467	0.487	18498
Democracies	Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.494	0.005	0.483	0.504	18498
Democracies	Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.529	0.005	0.519	0.540	18498
Democracies	National Economy	Low income	0.454	0.005	0.444	0.465	18498
Democracies	National Economy	Middle income	0.515	0.005	0.505	0.526	18498
Democracies	National Economy	High income	0.530	0.005	0.520	0.540	18498
Democracies	Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.414	0.005	0.403	0.424	18498
Democracies	Respondent Wealth	Average	0.524	0.005	0.514	0.534	18498
Democracies	Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.558	0.005	0.548	0.568	18498
Democracies	Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.370	0.006	0.358	0.381	18498
Democracies	Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.463	0.008	0.448	0.479	18498
Democracies	Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.556	0.006	0.544	0.568	18498
Democracies	Public Safety	Very safe	0.594	0.006	0.583	0.606	18498
Democracies	Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.434	0.005	0.424	0.444	18498
Democracies	Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.516	0.005	0.505	0.526	18498
Democracies	Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.552	0.005	0.542	0.563	18498
Democracies	Health Care	For the privileged	0.441	0.004	0.434	0.448	18498
Democracies	Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.559	0.004	0.552	0.567	18498
Democracies	Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.423	0.005	0.413	0.433	18498
Democracies	Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.517	0.005	0.507	0.528	18498
Democracies	Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.560	0.005	0.550	0.570	18498
Democracies	Respondent Identity	Minority	0.473	0.005	0.462	0.483	18498
Democracies	Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.512	0.005	0.502	0.522	18498
Democracies	Respondent Identity	Majority	0.515	0.005	0.505	0.525	18498
Nondemocracies	Leader Selection	Military coup	0.438	0.007	0.423	0.452	18402
Nondemocracies	Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.488	0.007	0.474	0.503	18402
Nondemocracies	Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.502	0.008	0.487	0.517	18402
Nondemocracies	Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.444	0.007	0.430	0.459	18402
Nondemocracies	Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.627	0.007	0.613	0.641	18402
Nondemocracies	Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.456	0.005	0.446	0.466	18402
Nondemocracies	Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.499	0.005	0.488	0.509	18402
Nondemocracies	Civil Liberties	Free	0.545	0.005	0.535	0.555	18402
Nondemocracies	Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.457	0.005	0.448	0.467	18402
Nondemocracies	Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.493	0.005	0.483	0.504	18402
Nondemocracies	Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.549	0.005	0.539	0.560	18402
Nondemocracies	National Economy	Low income	0.450	0.005	0.439	0.460	18402
Nondemocracies	National Economy	Middle income	0.507	0.005	0.496	0.517	18402
Nondemocracies	National Economy	High income	0.543	0.005	0.533	0.553	18402
Nondemocracies	Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.441	0.005	0.431	0.452	18402
Nondemocracies	Respondent Wealth	Average	0.520	0.005	0.509	0.530	18402
Nondemocracies	Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.539	0.005	0.529	0.549	18402
Nondemocracies	Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.396	0.006	0.384	0.409	18402
Nondemocracies	Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.459	0.006	0.446	0.471	18402
Nondemocracies	Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.552	0.006	0.540	0.565	18402
Nondemocracies	Public Safety	Very safe	0.592	0.006	0.580	0.605	18402
Nondemocracies	Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.424	0.005	0.414	0.435	18402
Nondemocracies	Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.518	0.005	0.508	0.529	18402
Nondemocracies	Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.555	0.005	0.545	0.565	18402
Nondemocracies	Health Care	For the privileged	0.453	0.004	0.446	0.460	18402
Nondemocracies	Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.547	0.004	0.540	0.554	18402
Nondemocracies	Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.465	0.005	0.455	0.475	18402
Nondemocracies	Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.498	0.005	0.488	0.509	18402
Nondemocracies	Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.536	0.005	0.526	0.546	18402
Nondemocracies	Respondent Identity	Minority	0.471	0.005	0.461	0.481	18402
Nondemocracies	Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.514	0.005	0.504	0.524	18402
Nondemocracies	Respondent Identity	Majority	0.515	0.005	0.504	0.525	18402

Table S26. Results for Figure S10 (first panel), difference in marginal mean estimates between respondents younger and older than 40

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.012	0.011	0.263	-0.009	0.033	36120
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.007	0.011	0.517	-0.014	0.028	36120
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.003	0.011	0.793	-0.018	0.024	36120
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	0.006	0.010	0.583	-0.015	0.026	36120
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	-0.029	0.011	0.006	-0.049	-0.008	36120
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.017	0.008	0.024	0.002	0.032	36120
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.004	0.008	0.589	-0.011	0.019	36120
Civil Liberties	Free	-0.021	0.007	0.004	-0.036	-0.007	36120
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.002	0.007	0.797	-0.013	0.016	36120
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.001	0.008	0.918	-0.014	0.016	36120
Institutional Checks	Constrained	-0.002	0.007	0.760	-0.017	0.012	36120
National Economy	Low income	0.005	0.008	0.501	-0.010	0.020	36120
National Economy	Middle income	-0.011	0.007	0.144	-0.026	0.004	36120
National Economy	High income	0.004	0.007	0.554	-0.010	0.019	36120
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.002	0.008	0.828	-0.016	0.013	36120
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.005	0.007	0.510	-0.010	0.020	36120
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	-0.001	0.007	0.900	-0.016	0.014	36120
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.012	0.009	0.181	-0.006	0.029	36120
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.008	0.010	0.403	-0.011	0.028	36120
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.003	0.009	0.756	-0.020	0.014	36120
Public Safety	Very safe	-0.002	0.009	0.779	-0.020	0.015	36120
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.005	0.007	0.487	-0.020	0.009	36120
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.006	0.008	0.435	-0.009	0.021	36120
Corruption in Politics	Rare	-0.001	0.007	0.866	-0.016	0.013	36120
Health Care	For the privileged	0.013	0.005	0.017	0.002	0.023	36120
Health Care	Mostly accessible	-0.013	0.005	0.017	-0.023	-0.002	36120
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.004	0.007	0.561	-0.010	0.019	36120
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.004	0.007	0.587	-0.011	0.019	36120
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	-0.008	0.007	0.295	-0.022	0.007	36120
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.004	0.008	0.571	-0.019	0.010	36120
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.001	0.007	0.873	-0.013	0.016	36120
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.003	0.008	0.682	-0.012	0.018	36120

Table S27. Results for Figure S10 (second panel), difference in marginal mean estimates between female and male respondents

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.009	0.011	0.406	-0.012	0.029	36510
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.009	0.010	0.409	-0.012	0.029	36510
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.014	0.011	0.181	-0.007	0.035	36510
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.012	0.010	0.255	-0.032	0.009	36510
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	-0.013	0.010	0.217	-0.033	0.008	36510
Civil Liberties	Repressed	-0.007	0.008	0.335	-0.022	0.007	36510
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.005	0.008	0.539	-0.019	0.010	36510
Civil Liberties	Free	0.013	0.007	0.083	-0.002	0.027	36510
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.011	0.007	0.142	-0.025	0.004	36510
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.014	0.007	0.061	-0.001	0.029	36510
Institutional Checks	Constrained	-0.003	0.007	0.682	-0.018	0.011	36510
National Economy	Low income	0.002	0.007	0.786	-0.013	0.017	36510
National Economy	Middle income	0.003	0.007	0.726	-0.012	0.017	36510
National Economy	High income	-0.005	0.007	0.527	-0.019	0.010	36510
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.001	0.008	0.855	-0.013	0.016	36510
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.008	0.007	0.262	-0.006	0.023	36510
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	-0.009	0.007	0.231	-0.023	0.006	36510
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.007	0.009	0.426	-0.024	0.010	36510
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.007	0.010	0.488	-0.027	0.013	36510
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.006	0.009	0.464	-0.011	0.023	36510
Public Safety	Very safe	0.010	0.009	0.233	-0.007	0.027	36510
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.011	0.007	0.154	-0.004	0.025	36510
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.009	0.008	0.206	-0.024	0.005	36510
Corruption in Politics	Rare	-0.002	0.007	0.808	-0.016	0.013	36510
Health Care	For the privileged	-0.003	0.005	0.606	-0.013	0.008	36510
Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.004	0.005	0.483	-0.007	0.014	36510
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.014	0.007	0.055	-0.029	0.000	36510
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.006	0.007	0.404	-0.021	0.008	36510
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.021	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.035	36510
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.018	0.007	0.018	-0.032	-0.003	36510
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.020	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.034	36510
Respondent Identity	Majority	-0.002	0.008	0.833	-0.016	0.013	36510

Table S28. Results for Figure S10 (third panel), difference in marginal mean estimates between college-educated and non-college-educated respondents

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.006	0.011	0.597	-0.015	0.026	36900
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.002	0.010	0.842	-0.018	0.023	36900
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.017	0.011	0.112	-0.004	0.038	36900
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.007	0.010	0.527	-0.027	0.014	36900
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	-0.017	0.010	0.097	-0.038	0.003	36900
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.007	0.007	0.326	-0.007	0.022	36900
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.005	0.008	0.475	-0.020	0.009	36900
Civil Liberties	Free	-0.001	0.007	0.923	-0.015	0.014	36900
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.013	0.007	0.073	-0.028	0.001	36900
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	-0.004	0.007	0.582	-0.019	0.011	36900
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.017	0.007	0.025	0.002	0.031	36900
National Economy	Low income	-0.022	0.007	0.003	-0.037	-0.008	36900
National Economy	Middle income	0.007	0.007	0.316	-0.007	0.022	36900
National Economy	High income	0.015	0.007	0.044	0.000	0.029	36900
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.010	0.007	0.195	-0.005	0.024	36900
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.006	0.007	0.421	-0.020	0.009	36900
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	-0.002	0.007	0.758	-0.017	0.012	36900
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.006	0.009	0.473	-0.011	0.024	36900
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.004	0.010	0.714	-0.023	0.016	36900
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.008	0.009	0.348	-0.009	0.025	36900
Public Safety	Very safe	-0.007	0.009	0.390	-0.024	0.010	36900
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.011	0.007	0.130	-0.026	0.003	36900
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.003	0.007	0.723	-0.012	0.017	36900
Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.008	0.007	0.306	-0.007	0.022	36900
Health Care	For the privileged	0.018	0.005	0.001	0.007	0.028	36900
Health Care	Mostly accessible	-0.019	0.005	0.000	-0.029	-0.008	36900
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.011	0.007	0.137	-0.004	0.026	36900
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.009	0.007	0.200	-0.024	0.005	36900
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	-0.001	0.007	0.893	-0.016	0.014	36900
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.010	0.007	0.176	-0.025	0.005	36900
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.013	0.007	0.087	-0.002	0.027	36900
Respondent Identity	Majority	-0.003	0.007	0.729	-0.017	0.012	36900

Table S29. Results for Figure S10 (fourth panel), difference in marginal mean estimates between high-SES and low-SES respondents

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.012	0.011	0.277	-0.009	0.032	36894
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.008	0.011	0.442	-0.013	0.029	36894
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.026	0.011	0.017	0.005	0.047	36894
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.017	0.010	0.104	-0.037	0.003	36894
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	-0.029	0.010	0.006	-0.049	-0.008	36894
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.016	0.008	0.036	0.001	0.031	36894
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.000	0.008	0.954	-0.015	0.014	36894
Civil Liberties	Free	-0.014	0.007	0.055	-0.029	0.000	36894
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.013	0.007	0.076	-0.028	0.001	36894
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.012	0.007	0.102	-0.002	0.027	36894
Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.001	0.007	0.889	-0.014	0.016	36894
National Economy	Low income	-0.007	0.008	0.353	-0.022	0.008	36894
National Economy	Middle income	-0.003	0.007	0.648	-0.018	0.011	36894
National Economy	High income	0.009	0.007	0.248	-0.006	0.023	36894
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.005	0.007	0.482	-0.009	0.020	36894
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.002	0.007	0.821	-0.013	0.016	36894
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	-0.005	0.007	0.536	-0.019	0.010	36894
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.008	0.009	0.377	-0.009	0.025	36894
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.001	0.010	0.902	-0.021	0.018	36894
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.007	0.009	0.409	-0.010	0.024	36894
Public Safety	Very safe	-0.012	0.009	0.152	-0.029	0.005	36894
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	-0.003	0.007	0.674	-0.018	0.011	36894
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.001	0.008	0.864	-0.013	0.016	36894
Corruption in Politics	Rare	-0.002	0.007	0.829	-0.016	0.013	36894
Health Care	For the privileged	0.027	0.005	0.000	0.016	0.037	36894
Health Care	Mostly accessible	-0.027	0.005	0.000	-0.038	-0.017	36894
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.009	0.007	0.246	-0.006	0.023	36894
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	-0.007	0.007	0.374	-0.021	0.008	36894
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	-0.002	0.007	0.833	-0.016	0.013	36894
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.001	0.007	0.877	-0.016	0.014	36894
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.003	0.007	0.723	-0.012	0.017	36894
Respondent Identity	Majority	-0.001	0.008	0.936	-0.015	0.014	36894

Table S30. Results for Figure S10 (fifth panel), difference in marginal mean estimates between minority and non-minority respondents

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.016	0.014	0.272	-0.012	0.044	36900
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	-0.009	0.014	0.502	-0.037	0.018	36900
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.001	0.014	0.948	-0.027	0.029	36900
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.008	0.014	0.571	-0.035	0.019	36900
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	-0.006	0.014	0.670	-0.033	0.021	36900
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.006	0.010	0.515	-0.013	0.025	36900
Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.005	0.010	0.627	-0.015	0.025	36900
Civil Liberties	Free	-0.009	0.010	0.356	-0.029	0.010	36900
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.011	0.010	0.254	-0.008	0.030	36900
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.002	0.010	0.876	-0.018	0.021	36900
Institutional Checks	Constrained	-0.013	0.010	0.178	-0.033	0.006	36900
National Economy	Low income	-0.007	0.010	0.450	-0.026	0.012	36900
National Economy	Middle income	-0.011	0.010	0.286	-0.031	0.009	36900
National Economy	High income	0.019	0.010	0.053	0.000	0.038	36900
Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.023	0.010	0.025	0.003	0.043	36900
Respondent Wealth	Average	-0.023	0.010	0.024	-0.042	-0.003	36900
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.000	0.010	0.980	-0.019	0.018	36900
Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.024	0.012	0.043	0.001	0.048	36900
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.016	0.013	0.214	-0.009	0.042	36900
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	-0.016	0.012	0.181	-0.038	0.007	36900
Public Safety	Very safe	-0.019	0.012	0.113	-0.042	0.004	36900
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.010	0.010	0.287	-0.009	0.030	36900
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.006	0.010	0.555	-0.026	0.014	36900
Corruption in Politics	Rare	-0.007	0.010	0.471	-0.026	0.012	36900
Health Care	For the privileged	0.011	0.007	0.099	-0.002	0.025	36900
Health Care	Mostly accessible	-0.012	0.007	0.083	-0.026	0.002	36900
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.007	0.010	0.452	-0.027	0.012	36900
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.008	0.010	0.394	-0.011	0.027	36900
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	-0.002	0.010	0.802	-0.021	0.016	36900
Respondent Identity	Minority	0.008	0.010	0.431	-0.012	0.027	36900
Respondent Identity	Second largest	0.005	0.009	0.614	-0.014	0.023	36900
Respondent Identity	Majority	-0.013	0.010	0.190	-0.032	0.006	36900

Table S31. Results for Figure S10 (sixth panel), difference in marginal mean estimates between rightwing and leftwing respondents

Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Leader Selection	Military coup	0.021	0.015	0.161	-0.008	0.051	18486
Leader Selection	Hereditary succession	0.005	0.015	0.744	-0.024	0.033	18486
Leader Selection	Unelected elites	0.015	0.015	0.325	-0.015	0.045	18486
Leader Selection	Unfair elections	-0.006	0.015	0.679	-0.035	0.023	18486
Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	-0.034	0.015	0.023	-0.063	-0.005	18486
Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.021	0.011	0.048	0.000	0.042	18486
Civil Liberties	Partially free	-0.007	0.011	0.519	-0.028	0.014	18486
Civil Liberties	Free	-0.016	0.011	0.142	-0.037	0.005	18486
Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	-0.007	0.010	0.491	-0.027	0.013	18486
Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.012	0.011	0.244	-0.008	0.033	18486
Institutional Checks	Constrained	-0.004	0.010	0.678	-0.025	0.016	18486
National Economy	Low income	-0.012	0.011	0.263	-0.033	0.009	18486
National Economy	Middle income	0.006	0.011	0.566	-0.015	0.027	18486
National Economy	High income	0.006	0.010	0.553	-0.014	0.026	18486
Respondent Wealth	Poor	-0.004	0.011	0.712	-0.025	0.017	18486
Respondent Wealth	Average	0.008	0.010	0.463	-0.013	0.028	18486
Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	-0.005	0.010	0.606	-0.026	0.015	18486
Public Safety	Very dangerous	-0.011	0.012	0.380	-0.035	0.014	18486
Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	-0.021	0.014	0.126	-0.048	0.006	18486
Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.016	0.012	0.200	-0.008	0.040	18486
Public Safety	Very safe	0.008	0.012	0.540	-0.016	0.032	18486
Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.009	0.010	0.410	-0.012	0.029	18486
Corruption in Politics	Occasional	-0.005	0.011	0.618	-0.026	0.015	18486
Corruption in Politics	Rare	-0.003	0.010	0.759	-0.024	0.017	18486
Health Care	For the privileged	0.019	0.007	0.009	0.005	0.034	18486
Health Care	Mostly accessible	-0.020	0.007	0.007	-0.035	-0.006	18486
Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	-0.001	0.011	0.957	-0.022	0.020	18486
Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.004	0.011	0.670	-0.016	0.025	18486
Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	-0.006	0.010	0.569	-0.026	0.014	18486
Respondent Identity	Minority	-0.001	0.011	0.955	-0.021	0.020	18486
Respondent Identity	Second largest	-0.007	0.010	0.472	-0.028	0.013	18486
Respondent Identity	Majority	0.006	0.011	0.595	-0.015	0.027	18486

Table S32. Results for Figure S11, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free and fair elections × High income	0.068	0.013	0.000	0.042	0.094	36900
No free and fair elections × High income	-0.084	0.011	0.000	-0.105	-0.063	36900
Free and fair elections × Middle income	0.066	0.013	0.000	0.040	0.092	36900
No free and fair elections × Middle income	-0.116	0.011	0.000	-0.137	-0.094	36900
No free and fair elections × Low income	-0.172	0.011	0.000	-0.194	-0.151	36900
Free and fair elections × Low income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S33. Results for Figure S12, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free × High income	0.074	0.010	0.000	0.054	0.094	36900
Partially free × High income	0.017	0.011	0.102	-0.003	0.038	36900
Repressed × High income	-0.028	0.011	0.009	-0.048	-0.007	36900
Free × Middle income	0.060	0.010	0.000	0.039	0.080	36900
Partially free × Middle income	0.001	0.011	0.934	-0.020	0.022	36900
Repressed × Middle income	-0.074	0.011	0.000	-0.095	-0.053	36900
Partially free × Low income	-0.067	0.010	0.000	-0.088	-0.047	36900
Repressed × Low income	-0.123	0.010	0.000	-0.144	-0.103	36900
Free × Low income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S34. Results for Figure S13, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Constrained × High income	0.076	0.010	0.000	0.055	0.096	36900
Partially constrained × High income	0.033	0.010	0.002	0.012	0.053	36900
Unconstrained × High income	0.008	0.010	0.432	-0.012	0.029	36900
Constrained × Middle income	0.048	0.011	0.000	0.028	0.069	36900
Partially constrained × Middle income	0.010	0.011	0.329	-0.010	0.031	36900
Unconstrained × Middle income	-0.019	0.010	0.074	-0.039	0.002	36900
Partially constrained × Low income	-0.058	0.010	0.000	-0.078	-0.037	36900
Unconstrained × Low income	-0.080	0.010	0.000	-0.100	-0.059	36900
Constrained × Low income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S35. Results for Figure S14, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free and fair elections × Health care mostly accessible	0.109	0.011	0.000	0.088	0.130	36900
No free and fair elections × Health care mostly accessible	-0.060	0.009	0.000	-0.078	-0.043	36900
No free and fair elections × Health care for the privileged	-0.167	0.009	0.000	-0.185	-0.149	36900
Free and fair elections × Health care for the privileged	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S36. Results for Figure S15, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Free × Health care mostly accessible	0.100	0.009	0.000	0.083	0.117	36900
Partially free × Health care mostly accessible	0.050	0.009	0.000	0.033	0.067	36900
Repressed × Health care mostly accessible	-0.020	0.009	0.023	-0.037	-0.003	36900
Partially free × Health care for the privileged	-0.072	0.009	0.000	-0.089	-0.055	36900
Repressed × Health care for the privileged	-0.119	0.009	0.000	-0.136	-0.102	36900
Free × Health care for the privileged	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S37. Results for Figure S16, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Constrained × Health care mostly accessible	0.106	0.009	0.000	0.089	0.123	36900
Partially constrained × Health care mostly accessible	0.062	0.009	0.000	0.045	0.079	36900
Unconstrained × Health care mostly accessible	0.034	0.009	0.000	0.017	0.051	36900
Partially constrained × Health care for the privileged	-0.048	0.009	0.000	-0.065	-0.031	36900
Unconstrained × Health care for the privileged	-0.071	0.009	0.000	-0.088	-0.054	36900
Constrained × Health care for the privileged	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects				Yes		
Country fixed effects				Yes		

Table S38. Results for Figure S17 (first and second panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Egypt	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.689	0.025	0.640	0.738	6048
Egypt	Unfair elections × Very safe	0.492	0.028	0.437	0.547	6048
Egypt	Unelected elites × Very safe	0.591	0.029	0.535	0.648	6048
Egypt	Hereditary succession × Very safe	0.557	0.027	0.503	0.610	6048
Egypt	Military coup × Very safe	0.483	0.029	0.427	0.540	6048
Egypt	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.649	0.027	0.597	0.701	6048
Egypt	Unfair elections × Somewhat safe	0.471	0.029	0.415	0.528	6048
Egypt	Unelected elites × Somewhat safe	0.537	0.029	0.481	0.594	6048
Egypt	Hereditary succession × Somewhat safe	0.585	0.027	0.532	0.637	6048
Egypt	Military coup × Somewhat safe	0.478	0.029	0.421	0.535	6048
Egypt	Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.533	0.028	0.479	0.586	6048
Egypt	Unfair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.386	0.025	0.336	0.435	6048
Egypt	Unelected elites × Somewhat dangerous	0.476	0.029	0.420	0.532	6048
Egypt	Hereditary succession × Somewhat dangerous	0.425	0.028	0.371	0.480	6048
Egypt	Military coup × Somewhat dangerous	0.459	0.028	0.404	0.514	6048
Egypt	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.497	0.029	0.439	0.554	6048
Egypt	Unfair elections × Very dangerous	0.391	0.029	0.334	0.448	6048
Egypt	Unelected elites × Very dangerous	0.483	0.028	0.427	0.539	6048
Egypt	Hereditary succession × Very dangerous	0.447	0.027	0.395	0.500	6048
Egypt	Military coup × Very dangerous	0.352	0.027	0.299	0.405	6048
India	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.727	0.025	0.678	0.776	6132
India	Unfair elections × Very safe	0.588	0.026	0.537	0.639	6132
India	Unelected elites × Very safe	0.619	0.027	0.567	0.671	6132
India	Hereditary succession × Very safe	0.545	0.027	0.492	0.599	6132
India	Military coup × Very safe	0.542	0.028	0.488	0.597	6132
India	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.697	0.025	0.648	0.746	6132
India	Unfair elections × Somewhat safe	0.505	0.028	0.450	0.559	6132
India	Unelected elites × Somewhat safe	0.529	0.028	0.474	0.583	6132
India	Hereditary succession × Somewhat safe	0.475	0.029	0.418	0.532	6132
India	Military coup × Somewhat safe	0.487	0.027	0.434	0.540	6132
India	Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.656	0.028	0.602	0.710	6132
India	Unfair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.438	0.031	0.378	0.499	6132
India	Unelected elites × Somewhat dangerous	0.439	0.027	0.386	0.493	6132
India	Hereditary succession × Somewhat dangerous	0.381	0.029	0.325	0.438	6132
India	Military coup × Somewhat dangerous	0.409	0.029	0.353	0.466	6132
India	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.482	0.028	0.428	0.536	6132
India	Unfair elections × Very dangerous	0.341	0.025	0.291	0.390	6132
India	Unelected elites × Very dangerous	0.391	0.026	0.340	0.443	6132
India	Hereditary succession × Very dangerous	0.395	0.027	0.343	0.447	6132
India	Military coup × Very dangerous	0.326	0.025	0.277	0.376	6132

Table S39. Results for Figure S17 (third and fourth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Italy	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.709	0.024	0.662	0.757	6282
Italy	Unfair elections × Very safe	0.568	0.029	0.510	0.625	6282
Italy	Unelected elites × Very safe	0.584	0.028	0.529	0.639	6282
Italy	Hereditary succession × Very safe	0.517	0.026	0.466	0.568	6282
Italy	Military coup × Very safe	0.526	0.028	0.470	0.581	6282
Italy	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.730	0.025	0.681	0.779	6282
Italy	Unfair elections × Somewhat safe	0.505	0.027	0.452	0.558	6282
Italy	Unelected elites × Somewhat safe	0.565	0.029	0.508	0.622	6282
Italy	Hereditary succession × Somewhat safe	0.571	0.026	0.520	0.623	6282
Italy	Military coup × Somewhat safe	0.472	0.027	0.419	0.524	6282
Italy	Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.596	0.027	0.542	0.650	6282
Italy	Unfair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.386	0.027	0.334	0.439	6282
Italy	Unelected elites × Somewhat dangerous	0.436	0.030	0.377	0.494	6282
Italy	Hereditary succession × Somewhat dangerous	0.463	0.027	0.410	0.516	6282
Italy	Military coup × Somewhat dangerous	0.362	0.025	0.312	0.412	6282
Italy	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.568	0.026	0.516	0.620	6282
Italy	Unfair elections × Very dangerous	0.354	0.026	0.302	0.405	6282
Italy	Unelected elites × Very dangerous	0.399	0.026	0.347	0.450	6282
Italy	Hereditary succession × Very dangerous	0.436	0.027	0.383	0.490	6282
Italy	Military coup × Very dangerous	0.265	0.024	0.218	0.311	6282
Japan	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.713	0.021	0.672	0.754	6072
Japan	Unfair elections × Very safe	0.565	0.024	0.517	0.612	6072
Japan	Unelected elites × Very safe	0.592	0.023	0.546	0.637	6072
Japan	Hereditary succession × Very safe	0.595	0.024	0.547	0.642	6072
Japan	Military coup × Very safe	0.498	0.024	0.451	0.544	6072
Japan	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.682	0.022	0.639	0.726	6072
Japan	Unfair elections × Somewhat safe	0.525	0.024	0.479	0.572	6072
Japan	Unelected elites × Somewhat safe	0.557	0.025	0.507	0.607	6072
Japan	Hereditary succession × Somewhat safe	0.547	0.024	0.500	0.593	6072
Japan	Military coup × Somewhat safe	0.505	0.024	0.458	0.552	6072
Japan	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.513	0.025	0.463	0.562	6072
Japan	Unfair elections × Very dangerous	0.290	0.023	0.246	0.335	6072
Japan	Unelected elites × Very dangerous	0.309	0.022	0.267	0.352	6072
Japan	Hereditary succession × Very dangerous	0.299	0.023	0.254	0.344	6072
Japan	Military coup × Very dangerous	0.276	0.021	0.235	0.317	6072

Table S40. Results for Figure S17 (fifth and sixth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Thailand	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.737	0.026	0.686	0.788	6222
Thailand	Unfair elections × Very safe	0.515	0.027	0.462	0.568	6222
Thailand	Unelected elites × Very safe	0.620	0.028	0.566	0.674	6222
Thailand	Hereditary succession × Very safe	0.643	0.026	0.592	0.694	6222
Thailand	Military coup × Very safe	0.531	0.028	0.475	0.587	6222
Thailand	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.739	0.024	0.692	0.786	6222
Thailand	Unfair elections × Somewhat safe	0.495	0.026	0.445	0.546	6222
Thailand	Unelected elites × Somewhat safe	0.556	0.028	0.501	0.610	6222
Thailand	Hereditary succession × Somewhat safe	0.556	0.027	0.502	0.609	6222
Thailand	Military coup × Somewhat safe	0.502	0.029	0.446	0.558	6222
Thailand	Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.610	0.027	0.558	0.663	6222
Thailand	Unfair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.371	0.026	0.320	0.422	6222
Thailand	Unelected elites × Somewhat dangerous	0.455	0.026	0.404	0.507	6222
Thailand	Hereditary succession × Somewhat dangerous	0.451	0.028	0.397	0.505	6222
Thailand	Military coup × Somewhat dangerous	0.379	0.027	0.326	0.431	6222
Thailand	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.493	0.028	0.438	0.548	6222
Thailand	Unfair elections × Very dangerous	0.334	0.025	0.285	0.384	6222
Thailand	Unelected elites × Very dangerous	0.334	0.027	0.282	0.387	6222
Thailand	Hereditary succession × Very dangerous	0.380	0.026	0.328	0.431	6222
Thailand	Military coup × Very dangerous	0.314	0.027	0.262	0.367	6222
United States	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.735	0.025	0.686	0.784	6144
United States	Unfair elections × Very safe	0.570	0.028	0.515	0.624	6144
United States	Unelected elites × Very safe	0.577	0.027	0.524	0.630	6144
United States	Hereditary succession × Very safe	0.618	0.026	0.567	0.670	6144
United States	Military coup × Very safe	0.559	0.027	0.506	0.612	6144
United States	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.697	0.028	0.642	0.751	6144
United States	Unfair elections × Somewhat safe	0.515	0.028	0.460	0.570	6144
United States	Unelected elites × Somewhat safe	0.532	0.027	0.479	0.585	6144
United States	Hereditary succession × Somewhat safe	0.527	0.027	0.475	0.579	6144
United States	Military coup × Somewhat safe	0.410	0.028	0.356	0.464	6144
United States	Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.636	0.027	0.584	0.689	6144
United States	Unfair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.426	0.028	0.372	0.480	6144
United States	Unelected elites × Somewhat dangerous	0.461	0.028	0.406	0.516	6144
United States	Hereditary succession × Somewhat dangerous	0.477	0.028	0.423	0.532	6144
United States	Military coup × Somewhat dangerous	0.393	0.026	0.341	0.445	6144
United States	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.524	0.028	0.469	0.580	6144
United States	Unfair elections × Very dangerous	0.375	0.027	0.323	0.427	6144
United States	Unelected elites × Very dangerous	0.327	0.027	0.274	0.381	6144
United States	Hereditary succession × Very dangerous	0.360	0.026	0.308	0.411	6144
United States	Military coup × Very dangerous	0.268	0.026	0.217	0.318	6144

Table S41. Results for Figure S18 (first and second panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Egypt	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.630	0.023	0.586	0.675	6048
Egypt	Unfair elections × Wealthy	0.499	0.024	0.452	0.545	6048
Egypt	Unelected elites × Wealthy	0.591	0.026	0.541	0.641	6048
Egypt	Hereditary succession × Wealthy	0.518	0.024	0.470	0.565	6048
Egypt	Military coup × Wealthy	0.479	0.024	0.432	0.526	6048
Egypt	Free and fair elections × Average	0.641	0.023	0.595	0.686	6048
Egypt	Unfair elections × Average	0.423	0.024	0.376	0.469	6048
Egypt	Unelected elites × Average	0.516	0.025	0.467	0.565	6048
Egypt	Hereditary succession × Average	0.562	0.023	0.517	0.607	6048
Egypt	Military coup × Average	0.480	0.025	0.432	0.529	6048
Egypt	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.512	0.024	0.465	0.559	6048
Egypt	Unfair elections × Poor	0.369	0.025	0.320	0.418	6048
Egypt	Unelected elites × Poor	0.462	0.024	0.414	0.509	6048
Egypt	Hereditary succession × Poor	0.436	0.023	0.390	0.481	6048
Egypt	Military coup × Poor	0.373	0.023	0.328	0.418	6048
India	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.667	0.024	0.620	0.713	6132
India	Unfair elections × Wealthy	0.468	0.024	0.421	0.515	6132
India	Unelected elites × Wealthy	0.569	0.023	0.523	0.614	6132
India	Hereditary succession × Wealthy	0.481	0.025	0.432	0.530	6132
India	Military coup × Wealthy	0.432	0.024	0.385	0.478	6132
India	Free and fair elections × Average	0.661	0.022	0.619	0.704	6132
India	Unfair elections × Average	0.510	0.024	0.463	0.557	6132
India	Unelected elites × Average	0.452	0.025	0.403	0.501	6132
India	Hereditary succession × Average	0.473	0.024	0.426	0.520	6132
India	Military coup × Average	0.455	0.025	0.406	0.503	6132
India	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.596	0.024	0.550	0.642	6132
India	Unfair elections × Poor	0.436	0.023	0.390	0.481	6132
India	Unelected elites × Poor	0.460	0.024	0.413	0.506	6132
India	Hereditary succession × Poor	0.400	0.024	0.352	0.447	6132
India	Military coup × Poor	0.434	0.024	0.386	0.481	6132

Table S42. Results for Figure S18 (third and fourth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Italy	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.722	0.021	0.681	0.762	6282
Italy	Unfair elections × Wealthy	0.477	0.024	0.430	0.523	6282
Italy	Unelected elites × Wealthy	0.535	0.024	0.489	0.582	6282
Italy	Hereditary succession × Wealthy	0.559	0.023	0.514	0.604	6282
Italy	Military coup × Wealthy	0.419	0.023	0.374	0.465	6282
Italy	Free and fair elections × Average	0.663	0.022	0.620	0.706	6282
Italy	Unfair elections × Average	0.499	0.024	0.451	0.546	6282
Italy	Unelected elites × Average	0.527	0.024	0.480	0.574	6282
Italy	Hereditary succession × Average	0.511	0.023	0.467	0.556	6282
Italy	Military coup × Average	0.444	0.023	0.400	0.489	6282
Italy	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.558	0.025	0.509	0.606	6282
Italy	Unfair elections × Poor	0.378	0.024	0.330	0.425	6282
Italy	Unelected elites × Poor	0.415	0.024	0.368	0.461	6282
Italy	Hereditary succession × Poor	0.429	0.023	0.384	0.473	6282
Italy	Military coup × Poor	0.350	0.022	0.307	0.393	6282
Japan	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.723	0.021	0.681	0.765	6072
Japan	Unfair elections × Wealthy	0.546	0.024	0.499	0.593	6072
Japan	Unelected elites × Wealthy	0.546	0.024	0.499	0.593	6072
Japan	Hereditary succession × Wealthy	0.577	0.023	0.532	0.623	6072
Japan	Military coup × Wealthy	0.491	0.023	0.446	0.536	6072
Japan	Free and fair elections × Average	0.673	0.022	0.630	0.716	6072
Japan	Unfair elections × Average	0.514	0.024	0.466	0.562	6072
Japan	Unelected elites × Average	0.521	0.024	0.474	0.567	6072
Japan	Hereditary succession × Average	0.493	0.025	0.444	0.543	6072
Japan	Military coup × Average	0.432	0.023	0.386	0.477	6072
Japan	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.510	0.024	0.462	0.558	6072
Japan	Unfair elections × Poor	0.347	0.022	0.303	0.390	6072
Japan	Unelected elites × Poor	0.367	0.024	0.320	0.414	6072
Japan	Hereditary succession × Poor	0.373	0.024	0.325	0.420	6072
Japan	Military coup × Poor	0.346	0.023	0.302	0.391	6072

Table S43. Results for Figure S18 (fifth and sixth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Thailand	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.703	0.022	0.661	0.746	6222
Thailand	Unfair elections × Wealthy	0.471	0.023	0.425	0.516	6222
Thailand	Unelected elites × Wealthy	0.512	0.025	0.464	0.560	6222
Thailand	Hereditary succession × Wealthy	0.554	0.024	0.508	0.600	6222
Thailand	Military coup × Wealthy	0.529	0.024	0.482	0.575	6222
Thailand	Free and fair elections × Average	0.657	0.023	0.611	0.703	6222
Thailand	Unfair elections × Average	0.453	0.024	0.407	0.500	6222
Thailand	Unelected elites × Average	0.520	0.024	0.472	0.567	6222
Thailand	Hereditary succession × Average	0.535	0.024	0.489	0.581	6222
Thailand	Military coup × Average	0.430	0.025	0.381	0.479	6222
Thailand	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.574	0.024	0.527	0.622	6222
Thailand	Unfair elections × Poor	0.366	0.022	0.323	0.409	6222
Thailand	Unelected elites × Poor	0.441	0.024	0.395	0.488	6222
Thailand	Hereditary succession × Poor	0.429	0.025	0.381	0.477	6222
Thailand	Military coup × Poor	0.336	0.023	0.292	0.381	6222
United States	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.679	0.022	0.636	0.722	6144
United States	Unfair elections × Wealthy	0.529	0.024	0.483	0.576	6144
United States	Unelected elites × Wealthy	0.502	0.024	0.455	0.550	6144
United States	Hereditary succession × Wealthy	0.558	0.022	0.514	0.602	6144
United States	Military coup × Wealthy	0.491	0.024	0.444	0.538	6144
United States	Free and fair elections × Average	0.671	0.023	0.626	0.715	6144
United States	Unfair elections × Average	0.474	0.023	0.429	0.520	6144
United States	Unelected elites × Average	0.516	0.024	0.469	0.563	6144
United States	Hereditary succession × Average	0.504	0.023	0.460	0.549	6144
United States	Military coup × Average	0.419	0.024	0.372	0.466	6144
United States	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.583	0.025	0.534	0.631	6144
United States	Unfair elections × Poor	0.407	0.024	0.360	0.454	6144
United States	Unelected elites × Poor	0.408	0.024	0.361	0.455	6144
United States	Hereditary succession × Poor	0.417	0.025	0.369	0.466	6144
United States	Military coup × Poor	0.333	0.022	0.290	0.376	6144

Table S44. Results for Figure S19 (first to third panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Egypt	Free × Very safe	0.626	0.021	0.586	0.666	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Very safe	0.568	0.022	0.525	0.612	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Very safe	0.506	0.020	0.467	0.546	6048
Egypt	Free × Somewhat safe	0.583	0.019	0.545	0.621	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.543	0.022	0.500	0.586	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.510	0.023	0.465	0.554	6048
Egypt	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.525	0.021	0.483	0.566	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.441	0.021	0.399	0.482	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	0.397	0.021	0.355	0.439	6048
Egypt	Free × Very dangerous	0.462	0.022	0.420	0.505	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.436	0.022	0.393	0.479	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.404	0.021	0.363	0.446	6048
India	Free × Very safe	0.628	0.021	0.586	0.670	6132
India	Partially free × Very safe	0.606	0.021	0.566	0.647	6132
India	Repressed × Very safe	0.581	0.020	0.541	0.621	6132
India	Free × Somewhat safe	0.560	0.021	0.519	0.601	6132
India	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.543	0.021	0.501	0.585	6132
India	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.517	0.022	0.474	0.560	6132
India	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.504	0.021	0.462	0.546	6132
India	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.448	0.022	0.404	0.491	6132
India	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	0.451	0.022	0.407	0.495	6132
India	Free × Very dangerous	0.413	0.022	0.370	0.455	6132
India	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.399	0.021	0.359	0.440	6132
India	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.351	0.018	0.315	0.387	6132
Italy	Free × Very safe	0.648	0.020	0.608	0.688	6282
Italy	Partially free × Very safe	0.583	0.021	0.543	0.623	6282
Italy	Repressed × Very safe	0.514	0.021	0.474	0.555	6282
Italy	Free × Somewhat safe	0.633	0.020	0.594	0.673	6282
Italy	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.579	0.020	0.539	0.619	6282
Italy	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.486	0.021	0.444	0.528	6282
Italy	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.501	0.021	0.459	0.543	6282
Italy	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.475	0.019	0.437	0.513	6282
Italy	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	0.362	0.021	0.320	0.404	6282
Italy	Free × Very dangerous	0.462	0.021	0.421	0.502	6282
Italy	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.420	0.020	0.380	0.460	6282
Italy	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.331	0.020	0.291	0.370	6282

Table S45. Results for Figure S19 (fourth to sixth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Japan	Free × Very safe	0.657	0.016	0.625	0.689	6072
Japan	Partially free × Very safe	0.574	0.018	0.539	0.610	6072
Japan	Repressed × Very safe	0.536	0.018	0.500	0.572	6072
Japan	Free × Somewhat safe	0.626	0.016	0.594	0.658	6072
Japan	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.567	0.019	0.531	0.604	6072
Japan	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.492	0.019	0.455	0.529	6072
Japan	Free × Very dangerous	0.419	0.017	0.384	0.453	6072
Japan	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.299	0.018	0.264	0.334	6072
Japan	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.292	0.017	0.259	0.325	6072
Thailand	Free × Very safe	0.665	0.020	0.626	0.705	6222
Thailand	Partially free × Very safe	0.627	0.020	0.588	0.665	6222
Thailand	Repressed × Very safe	0.528	0.022	0.486	0.570	6222
Thailand	Free × Somewhat safe	0.614	0.020	0.575	0.653	6222
Thailand	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.586	0.021	0.545	0.627	6222
Thailand	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.504	0.022	0.461	0.547	6222
Thailand	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.526	0.020	0.486	0.566	6222
Thailand	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.426	0.020	0.388	0.465	6222
Thailand	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	0.405	0.021	0.364	0.447	6222
Thailand	Free × Very dangerous	0.420	0.021	0.379	0.461	6222
Thailand	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.368	0.021	0.327	0.409	6222
Thailand	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.323	0.020	0.284	0.362	6222
United States	Free × Very safe	0.719	0.019	0.681	0.757	6144
United States	Partially free × Very safe	0.607	0.020	0.568	0.645	6144
United States	Repressed × Very safe	0.497	0.022	0.454	0.540	6144
United States	Free × Somewhat safe	0.605	0.021	0.565	0.645	6144
United States	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.528	0.023	0.484	0.573	6144
United States	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.465	0.020	0.425	0.504	6144
United States	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.554	0.021	0.512	0.596	6144
United States	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.491	0.021	0.449	0.533	6144
United States	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	0.392	0.020	0.353	0.432	6144
United States	Free × Very dangerous	0.463	0.022	0.420	0.506	6144
United States	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.355	0.021	0.313	0.396	6144
United States	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.301	0.020	0.262	0.341	6144

Table S46. Results for Figure S20 (first to third panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Egypt	Free × Very safe	0.626	0.021	0.586	0.666	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Very safe	0.568	0.022	0.525	0.612	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Very safe	0.506	0.020	0.467	0.546	6048
Egypt	Free × Somewhat safe	0.583	0.019	0.545	0.621	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.543	0.022	0.500	0.586	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.510	0.023	0.465	0.554	6048
Egypt	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.525	0.021	0.483	0.566	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.441	0.021	0.399	0.482	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	0.397	0.021	0.355	0.439	6048
Egypt	Free × Very dangerous	0.462	0.022	0.420	0.505	6048
Egypt	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.436	0.022	0.393	0.479	6048
Egypt	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.404	0.021	0.363	0.446	6048
India	Free × Very safe	0.628	0.021	0.586	0.670	6132
India	Partially free × Very safe	0.606	0.021	0.566	0.647	6132
India	Repressed × Very safe	0.581	0.020	0.541	0.621	6132
India	Free × Somewhat safe	0.560	0.021	0.519	0.601	6132
India	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.543	0.021	0.501	0.585	6132
India	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.517	0.022	0.474	0.560	6132
India	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.504	0.021	0.462	0.546	6132
India	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.448	0.022	0.404	0.491	6132
India	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	0.451	0.022	0.407	0.495	6132
India	Free × Very dangerous	0.413	0.022	0.370	0.455	6132
India	Partially free × Very dangerous	0.399	0.021	0.359	0.440	6132
India	Repressed × Very dangerous	0.351	0.018	0.315	0.387	6132
Italy	Free × Wealthy	0.605	0.017	0.571	0.638	6282
Italy	Partially free × Wealthy	0.564	0.018	0.529	0.598	6282
Italy	Repressed × Wealthy	0.460	0.018	0.425	0.495	6282
Italy	Free × Average	0.582	0.018	0.546	0.617	6282
Italy	Partially free × Average	0.537	0.018	0.502	0.572	6282
Italy	Repressed × Average	0.465	0.019	0.429	0.501	6282
Italy	Free × Poor	0.489	0.019	0.452	0.526	6282
Italy	Partially free × Poor	0.439	0.018	0.404	0.474	6282
Italy	Repressed × Poor	0.348	0.018	0.313	0.383	6282

Table S47. Results for Figure S20 (fourth to sixth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Japan	Free × Wealthy	0.653	0.017	0.620	0.685	6072
Japan	Partially free × Wealthy	0.558	0.019	0.522	0.595	6072
Japan	Repressed × Wealthy	0.512	0.018	0.477	0.547	6072
Japan	Free × Average	0.589	0.017	0.557	0.622	6072
Japan	Partially free × Average	0.488	0.018	0.452	0.524	6072
Japan	Repressed × Average	0.498	0.018	0.463	0.534	6072
Japan	Free × Poor	0.463	0.018	0.427	0.499	6072
Japan	Partially free × Poor	0.398	0.019	0.361	0.435	6072
Japan	Repressed × Poor	0.300	0.017	0.266	0.335	6072
Thailand	Free × Wealthy	0.621	0.017	0.588	0.654	6222
Thailand	Partially free × Wealthy	0.543	0.018	0.508	0.579	6222
Thailand	Repressed × Wealthy	0.487	0.018	0.451	0.523	6222
Thailand	Free × Average	0.555	0.018	0.519	0.591	6222
Thailand	Partially free × Average	0.537	0.018	0.502	0.572	6222
Thailand	Repressed × Average	0.468	0.018	0.433	0.502	6222
Thailand	Free × Poor	0.497	0.017	0.463	0.532	6222
Thailand	Partially free × Poor	0.414	0.018	0.379	0.449	6222
Thailand	Repressed × Poor	0.363	0.017	0.329	0.397	6222
United States	Free × Wealthy	0.627	0.017	0.595	0.660	6144
United States	Partially free × Wealthy	0.567	0.018	0.531	0.602	6144
United States	Repressed × Wealthy	0.452	0.019	0.416	0.489	6144
United States	Free × Average	0.606	0.018	0.572	0.641	6144
United States	Partially free × Average	0.509	0.019	0.473	0.545	6144
United States	Repressed × Average	0.440	0.018	0.406	0.474	6144
United States	Free × Poor	0.517	0.019	0.480	0.553	6144
United States	Partially free × Poor	0.418	0.018	0.382	0.455	6144
United States	Repressed × Poor	0.344	0.018	0.309	0.379	6144

Table S48. Results for Figure S21 (first to third panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Egypt	Constrained × Very safe	0.609	0.022	0.566	0.652	6048
Egypt	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.554	0.022	0.511	0.598	6048
Egypt	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.531	0.021	0.489	0.573	6048
Egypt	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.590	0.021	0.549	0.630	6048
Egypt	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.534	0.022	0.492	0.577	6048
Egypt	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.516	0.021	0.475	0.557	6048
Egypt	Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.502	0.020	0.462	0.542	6048
Egypt	Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.449	0.021	0.407	0.491	6048
Egypt	Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.412	0.021	0.371	0.452	6048
Egypt	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.493	0.022	0.450	0.535	6048
Egypt	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	0.416	0.021	0.375	0.457	6048
Egypt	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	0.396	0.021	0.354	0.438	6048
India	Constrained × Very safe	0.644	0.021	0.604	0.684	6132
India	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.594	0.020	0.554	0.634	6132
India	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.576	0.019	0.538	0.614	6132
India	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.592	0.021	0.550	0.635	6132
India	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.534	0.021	0.493	0.576	6132
India	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.495	0.019	0.457	0.533	6132
India	Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.546	0.023	0.501	0.591	6132
India	Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.441	0.022	0.397	0.485	6132
India	Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.418	0.021	0.377	0.459	6132
India	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.443	0.020	0.404	0.482	6132
India	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	0.396	0.021	0.355	0.437	6132
India	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	0.319	0.019	0.282	0.356	6132
Italy	Constrained × Very safe	0.601	0.020	0.561	0.641	6282
Italy	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.563	0.021	0.521	0.604	6282
Italy	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.579	0.021	0.538	0.620	6282
Italy	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.609	0.021	0.568	0.650	6282
Italy	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.573	0.020	0.534	0.612	6282
Italy	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.521	0.021	0.480	0.562	6282
Italy	Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.531	0.021	0.490	0.572	6282
Italy	Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.429	0.020	0.389	0.468	6282
Italy	Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.388	0.020	0.348	0.428	6282
Italy	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.459	0.020	0.419	0.498	6282
Italy	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	0.413	0.021	0.372	0.453	6282
Italy	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	0.345	0.020	0.306	0.384	6282

Table S49. Results for Figure S21 (fourth to sixth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Japan	Constrained × Very safe	0.599	0.018	0.563	0.634	6072
Japan	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.590	0.018	0.554	0.626	6072
Japan	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.588	0.017	0.554	0.622	6072
Japan	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.587	0.018	0.552	0.622	6072
Japan	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.545	0.018	0.510	0.580	6072
Japan	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.561	0.018	0.525	0.597	6072
Japan	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.334	0.018	0.298	0.369	6072
Japan	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	0.346	0.017	0.313	0.380	6072
Japan	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	0.332	0.017	0.298	0.366	6072
Thailand	Constrained × Very safe	0.663	0.020	0.624	0.702	6222
Thailand	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.598	0.021	0.556	0.639	6222
Thailand	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.564	0.020	0.524	0.604	6222
Thailand	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.617	0.021	0.575	0.658	6222
Thailand	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.577	0.020	0.538	0.616	6222
Thailand	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.517	0.021	0.477	0.558	6222
Thailand	Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.470	0.021	0.430	0.511	6222
Thailand	Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.445	0.022	0.403	0.488	6222
Thailand	Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.443	0.020	0.403	0.483	6222
Thailand	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.443	0.021	0.403	0.484	6222
Thailand	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	0.364	0.021	0.323	0.405	6222
Thailand	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	0.302	0.019	0.266	0.339	6222
United States	Constrained × Very safe	0.641	0.021	0.601	0.682	6144
United States	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.589	0.021	0.549	0.630	6144
United States	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.600	0.021	0.560	0.641	6144
United States	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.557	0.020	0.518	0.597	6144
United States	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.506	0.022	0.464	0.548	6144
United States	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.535	0.022	0.492	0.579	6144
United States	Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.482	0.021	0.441	0.523	6144
United States	Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.514	0.022	0.472	0.557	6144
United States	Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.439	0.021	0.397	0.480	6144
United States	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.430	0.022	0.388	0.472	6144
United States	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	0.363	0.021	0.322	0.404	6144
United States	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	0.328	0.020	0.288	0.368	6144

Table S50. Results for Figure S22 (first to third panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Egypt	Constrained × Wealthy	0.593	0.017	0.559	0.627	6048
Egypt	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.545	0.019	0.508	0.582	6048
Egypt	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.488	0.018	0.454	0.523	6048
Egypt	Constrained × Average	0.560	0.018	0.525	0.595	6048
Egypt	Partially constrained × Average	0.517	0.018	0.481	0.552	6048
Egypt	Unconstrained × Average	0.502	0.018	0.467	0.538	6048
Egypt	Constrained × Poor	0.489	0.018	0.454	0.524	6048
Egypt	Partially constrained × Poor	0.407	0.017	0.374	0.440	6048
Egypt	Unconstrained × Poor	0.402	0.018	0.367	0.438	6048
India	Constrained × Wealthy	0.574	0.018	0.538	0.609	6132
India	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.506	0.018	0.471	0.541	6132
India	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.485	0.018	0.450	0.519	6132
India	Constrained × Average	0.567	0.018	0.532	0.602	6132
India	Partially constrained × Average	0.517	0.018	0.482	0.553	6132
India	Unconstrained × Average	0.459	0.018	0.424	0.494	6132
India	Constrained × Poor	0.526	0.018	0.491	0.562	6132
India	Partially constrained × Poor	0.454	0.019	0.416	0.491	6132
India	Unconstrained × Poor	0.417	0.017	0.385	0.450	6132
Italy	Constrained × Wealthy	0.585	0.018	0.549	0.621	6282
Italy	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.559	0.017	0.525	0.594	6282
Italy	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.489	0.018	0.454	0.524	6282
Italy	Constrained × Average	0.584	0.017	0.551	0.617	6282
Italy	Partially constrained × Average	0.515	0.018	0.480	0.549	6282
Italy	Unconstrained × Average	0.489	0.018	0.453	0.525	6282
Italy	Constrained × Poor	0.478	0.018	0.442	0.513	6282
Italy	Partially constrained × Poor	0.406	0.018	0.371	0.441	6282
Italy	Unconstrained × Poor	0.392	0.018	0.357	0.427	6282

Table S51. Results for Figure S22 (fourth to sixth panels), DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Country Sample	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Japan	Constrained × Wealthy	0.601	0.017	0.567	0.635	6072
Japan	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.570	0.018	0.535	0.605	6072
Japan	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.558	0.018	0.522	0.595	6072
Japan	Constrained × Average	0.533	0.018	0.498	0.569	6072
Japan	Partially constrained × Average	0.514	0.018	0.479	0.548	6072
Japan	Unconstrained × Average	0.536	0.018	0.501	0.571	6072
Japan	Constrained × Poor	0.384	0.019	0.347	0.420	6072
Japan	Partially constrained × Poor	0.388	0.018	0.352	0.424	6072
Japan	Unconstrained × Poor	0.394	0.018	0.358	0.430	6072
Thailand	Constrained × Wealthy	0.592	0.018	0.557	0.627	6222
Thailand	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.556	0.017	0.522	0.590	6222
Thailand	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.511	0.017	0.477	0.545	6222
Thailand	Constrained × Average	0.570	0.018	0.535	0.605	6222
Thailand	Partially constrained × Average	0.528	0.019	0.491	0.565	6222
Thailand	Unconstrained × Average	0.462	0.018	0.427	0.496	6222
Thailand	Constrained × Poor	0.473	0.018	0.439	0.508	6222
Thailand	Partially constrained × Poor	0.416	0.018	0.381	0.450	6222
Thailand	Unconstrained × Poor	0.393	0.018	0.359	0.428	6222
United States	Constrained × Wealthy	0.571	0.017	0.537	0.605	6144
United States	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.537	0.019	0.500	0.574	6144
United States	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.547	0.018	0.512	0.582	6144
United States	Constrained × Average	0.542	0.017	0.508	0.576	6144
United States	Partially constrained × Average	0.512	0.018	0.477	0.548	6144
United States	Unconstrained × Average	0.496	0.018	0.461	0.530	6144
United States	Constrained × Poor	0.463	0.019	0.426	0.500	6144
United States	Partially constrained × Poor	0.432	0.018	0.397	0.466	6144
United States	Unconstrained × Poor	0.388	0.018	0.353	0.422	6144

Table S52. Results for Figure S23, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Identity	Attribute	Level	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted *P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Majority	Leader Selection	No free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.176	0.010	0.000	0.155	0.196	12171
Majority	Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.064	0.011	0.000	0.044	0.085	12171
Majority	Civil Liberties	Free	0.114	0.010	0.000	0.094	0.135	12171
Majority	Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.024	0.010	0.021	0.004	0.045	12171
Majority	Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.079	0.011	0.000	0.058	0.099	12171
Majority	National Economy	Low income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	National Economy	Middle income	0.064	0.011	0.000	0.043	0.085	12171
Majority	National Economy	High income	0.083	0.010	0.000	0.062	0.103	12171
Majority	Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Respondent Wealth	Average	0.097	0.010	0.000	0.077	0.118	12171
Majority	Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.118	0.011	0.000	0.098	0.139	12171
Majority	Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.074	0.012	0.000	0.049	0.098	12171
Majority	Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.158	0.012	0.000	0.135	0.182	12171
Majority	Public Safety	Very safe	0.222	0.012	0.000	0.199	0.246	12171
Majority	Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.081	0.010	0.000	0.061	0.102	12171
Majority	Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.120	0.011	0.000	0.099	0.141	12171
Majority	Health Care	For the privileged	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.119	0.009	0.000	0.103	0.136	12171
Majority	Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Majority	Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.061	0.011	0.000	0.040	0.082	12171
Majority	Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.103	0.011	0.000	0.083	0.124	12171
Minority	Leader Selection	No free and fair elections	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Leader Selection	Free and fair elections	0.176	0.011	0.000	0.155	0.196	12271
Minority	Civil Liberties	Repressed	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Civil Liberties	Partially free	0.056	0.011	0.000	0.036	0.077	12271
Minority	Civil Liberties	Free	0.115	0.011	0.000	0.095	0.136	12271
Minority	Institutional Checks	Unconstrained	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Institutional Checks	Partially constrained	0.018	0.011	0.079	-0.002	0.039	12271
Minority	Institutional Checks	Constrained	0.060	0.010	0.000	0.040	0.081	12271
Minority	National Economy	Low income	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	National Economy	Middle income	0.063	0.010	0.000	0.042	0.083	12271
Minority	National Economy	High income	0.085	0.010	0.000	0.064	0.105	12271
Minority	Respondent Wealth	Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Respondent Wealth	Average	0.090	0.011	0.000	0.070	0.111	12271
Minority	Respondent Wealth	Wealthy	0.117	0.010	0.000	0.097	0.138	12271
Minority	Public Safety	Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Public Safety	Somewhat dangerous	0.079	0.012	0.000	0.055	0.104	12271
Minority	Public Safety	Somewhat safe	0.169	0.012	0.000	0.146	0.192	12271
Minority	Public Safety	Very safe	0.190	0.012	0.000	0.167	0.214	12271
Minority	Corruption in Politics	Prevalent	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Corruption in Politics	Occasional	0.103	0.011	0.000	0.082	0.124	12271
Minority	Corruption in Politics	Rare	0.149	0.010	0.000	0.129	0.169	12271
Minority	Health Care	For the privileged	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Health Care	Mostly accessible	0.094	0.009	0.000	0.078	0.111	12271
Minority	Minority Treatment	Mostly unfair	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Minority	Minority Treatment	Sometimes unfair	0.084	0.010	0.000	0.063	0.104	12271
Minority	Minority Treatment	Fairly treated	0.121	0.010	0.000	0.100	0.141	12271

Table S53. Results for Figure S25, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Importance of Democracy	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Above mean	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.194	0.018	0.000	0.159	0.228	26364
Above mean	No free and fair elections × Very safe	0.039	0.015	0.010	0.009	0.068	26364
Above mean	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.192	0.017	0.000	0.158	0.227	26364
Above mean	No free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	-0.008	0.015	0.579	-0.037	0.021	26364
Above mean	Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.094	0.019	0.000	0.057	0.132	26364
Above mean	No free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	-0.107	0.015	0.000	-0.137	-0.077	26364
Above mean	No free and fair elections × Very dangerous	-0.176	0.014	0.000	-0.205	-0.148	26364
Above mean	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Below mean	Free and fair elections × Very safe	0.228	0.027	0.000	0.174	0.281	10536
Below mean	No free and fair elections × Very safe	0.077	0.023	0.001	0.031	0.122	10536
Below mean	Free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.148	0.029	0.000	0.091	0.205	10536
Below mean	No free and fair elections × Somewhat safe	0.029	0.023	0.209	-0.016	0.074	10536
Below mean	Free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	0.066	0.032	0.042	0.002	0.129	10536
Below mean	No free and fair elections × Somewhat dangerous	-0.062	0.024	0.011	-0.109	-0.014	10536
Below mean	No free and fair elections × Very dangerous	-0.126	0.022	0.000	-0.170	-0.082	10536
Below mean	Free and fair elections × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects		Yes					
Country fixed effects		Yes					

Table S54. Results for Figure S26, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Importance of Democracy	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Above mean	Free × Very safe	0.217	0.014	0.000	0.190	0.245	26364
Above mean	Partially free × Very safe	0.152	0.014	0.000	0.124	0.180	26364
Above mean	Repressed × Very safe	0.086	0.014	0.000	0.058	0.114	26364
Above mean	Free × Somewhat safe	0.179	0.014	0.000	0.152	0.206	26364
Above mean	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.111	0.014	0.000	0.083	0.140	26364
Above mean	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.053	0.015	0.000	0.024	0.081	26364
Above mean	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.082	0.015	0.000	0.054	0.111	26364
Above mean	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.010	0.015	0.493	-0.019	0.039	26364
Above mean	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	-0.047	0.015	0.002	-0.077	-0.017	26364
Above mean	Partially free × Very dangerous	-0.065	0.014	0.000	-0.092	-0.037	26364
Above mean	Repressed × Very dangerous	-0.113	0.014	0.000	-0.139	-0.086	26364
Above mean	Free × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Below mean	Free × Very safe	0.232	0.021	0.000	0.190	0.274	10536
Below mean	Partially free × Very safe	0.170	0.022	0.000	0.128	0.213	10536
Below mean	Repressed × Very safe	0.095	0.022	0.000	0.052	0.139	10536
Below mean	Free × Somewhat safe	0.150	0.022	0.000	0.107	0.193	10536
Below mean	Partially free × Somewhat safe	0.130	0.023	0.000	0.084	0.175	10536
Below mean	Repressed × Somewhat safe	0.057	0.023	0.013	0.012	0.101	10536
Below mean	Free × Somewhat dangerous	0.079	0.025	0.002	0.029	0.128	10536
Below mean	Partially free × Somewhat dangerous	0.033	0.025	0.178	-0.015	0.082	10536
Below mean	Repressed × Somewhat dangerous	-0.044	0.024	0.075	-0.091	0.004	10536
Below mean	Partially free × Very dangerous	-0.052	0.022	0.019	-0.095	-0.009	10536
Below mean	Repressed × Very dangerous	-0.073	0.022	0.001	-0.116	-0.030	10536
Below mean	Free × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects		Yes					
Country fixed effects		Yes					

Table S55. Results for Figure S27, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Importance of Democracy	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Above mean	Constrained × Very safe	0.208	0.014	0.000	0.181	0.235	26364
Above mean	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.142	0.014	0.000	0.114	0.170	26364
Above mean	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.148	0.014	0.000	0.121	0.175	26364
Above mean	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.167	0.014	0.000	0.140	0.195	26364
Above mean	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.125	0.014	0.000	0.098	0.152	26364
Above mean	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.094	0.014	0.000	0.067	0.122	26364
Above mean	Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.078	0.015	0.000	0.049	0.107	26364
Above mean	Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.020	0.015	0.183	-0.009	0.050	26364
Above mean	Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	-0.009	0.015	0.552	-0.038	0.020	26364
Above mean	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	-0.041	0.014	0.003	-0.068	-0.014	26364
Above mean	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	-0.093	0.013	0.000	-0.119	-0.066	26364
Above mean	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Below mean	Constrained × Very safe	0.194	0.022	0.000	0.151	0.238	10536
Below mean	Partially constrained × Very safe	0.184	0.022	0.000	0.142	0.227	10536
Below mean	Unconstrained × Very safe	0.153	0.022	0.000	0.110	0.196	10536
Below mean	Constrained × Somewhat safe	0.160	0.022	0.000	0.116	0.203	10536
Below mean	Partially constrained × Somewhat safe	0.104	0.023	0.000	0.060	0.149	10536
Below mean	Unconstrained × Somewhat safe	0.106	0.023	0.000	0.062	0.151	10536
Below mean	Constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.068	0.025	0.007	0.019	0.118	10536
Below mean	Partially constrained × Somewhat dangerous	0.040	0.025	0.117	-0.010	0.090	10536
Below mean	Unconstrained × Somewhat dangerous	-0.004	0.024	0.857	-0.052	0.044	10536
Below mean	Partially constrained × Very dangerous	-0.035	0.022	0.109	-0.077	0.008	10536
Below mean	Unconstrained × Very dangerous	-0.056	0.022	0.010	-0.098	-0.014	10536
Below mean	Constrained × Very dangerous	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects		Yes					
Country fixed effects		Yes					

Table S56. Results for Figure S28, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Importance of Democracy	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Above mean	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.121	0.015	0.000	0.091	0.151	26364
Above mean	No free and fair elections × Wealthy	-0.060	0.013	0.000	-0.085	-0.035	26364
Above mean	Free and fair elections × Average	0.101	0.016	0.000	0.070	0.132	26364
Above mean	No free and fair elections × Average	-0.092	0.013	0.000	-0.118	-0.067	26364
Above mean	No free and fair elections × Poor	-0.174	0.013	0.000	-0.199	-0.149	26364
Above mean	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Below mean	Free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.146	0.026	0.000	0.095	0.196	10536
Below mean	No free and fair elections × Wealthy	0.004	0.022	0.852	-0.038	0.046	10536
Below mean	Free and fair elections × Average	0.116	0.025	0.000	0.066	0.165	10536
Below mean	No free and fair elections × Average	-0.014	0.021	0.499	-0.056	0.027	10536
Below mean	No free and fair elections × Poor	-0.123	0.021	0.000	-0.164	-0.081	10536
Below mean	Free and fair elections × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects		Yes					
Country fixed effects		Yes					

Table S57. Results for Figure S29, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Importance of Democracy	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Above mean	Free × Wealthy	0.116	0.012	0.000	0.092	0.140	26364
Above mean	Partially free × Wealthy	0.045	0.012	0.000	0.021	0.070	26364
Above mean	Repressed × Wealthy	-0.017	0.013	0.165	-0.042	0.007	26364
Above mean	Free × Average	0.075	0.012	0.000	0.051	0.100	26364
Above mean	Partially free × Average	0.017	0.013	0.179	-0.008	0.042	26364
Above mean	Repressed × Average	-0.038	0.013	0.003	-0.063	-0.013	26364
Above mean	Partially free × Poor	-0.073	0.013	0.000	-0.098	-0.048	26364
Above mean	Repressed × Poor	-0.128	0.012	0.000	-0.152	-0.103	26364
Above mean	Free × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Below mean	Free × Wealthy	0.126	0.020	0.000	0.086	0.165	10536
Below mean	Partially free × Wealthy	0.101	0.021	0.000	0.060	0.141	10536
Below mean	Repressed × Wealthy	0.017	0.021	0.422	-0.024	0.057	10536
Below mean	Free × Average	0.115	0.020	0.000	0.075	0.155	10536
Below mean	Partially free × Average	0.054	0.020	0.008	0.014	0.094	10536
Below mean	Repressed × Average	0.010	0.020	0.622	-0.030	0.050	10536
Below mean	Partially free × Poor	-0.049	0.021	0.017	-0.090	-0.009	10536
Below mean	Repressed × Poor	-0.101	0.020	0.000	-0.140	-0.062	10536
Below mean	Free × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects			Yes				
Country fixed effects			Yes				

Table S58. Results for Figure S30, DV = $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Country Selected}\}$

Importance of Democracy	Attribute-Level Interaction	Estimate	SE	*P*	Lower CI	Upper CI	*N*
Above mean	Constrained × Wealthy	0.111	0.012	0.000	0.087	0.135	26364
Above mean	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.060	0.013	0.000	0.036	0.085	26364
Above mean	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.028	0.012	0.025	0.003	0.052	26364
Above mean	Constrained × Average	0.072	0.012	0.000	0.048	0.096	26364
Above mean	Partially constrained × Average	0.034	0.013	0.006	0.010	0.059	26364
Above mean	Unconstrained × Average	0.003	0.013	0.821	-0.022	0.027	26364
Above mean	Partially constrained × Poor	-0.065	0.012	0.000	-0.090	-0.041	26364
Above mean	Unconstrained × Poor	-0.080	0.012	0.000	-0.105	-0.056	26364
Above mean	Constrained × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Below mean	Constrained × Wealthy	0.147	0.020	0.000	0.107	0.187	10536
Below mean	Partially constrained × Wealthy	0.118	0.020	0.000	0.078	0.157	10536
Below mean	Unconstrained × Wealthy	0.088	0.021	0.000	0.047	0.128	10536
Below mean	Constrained × Average	0.139	0.020	0.000	0.099	0.179	10536
Below mean	Partially constrained × Average	0.079	0.020	0.000	0.039	0.118	10536
Below mean	Unconstrained × Average	0.071	0.020	0.001	0.031	0.111	10536
Below mean	Partially constrained × Poor	-0.006	0.020	0.747	-0.045	0.033	10536
Below mean	Unconstrained × Poor	-0.035	0.020	0.079	-0.075	0.004	10536
Below mean	Constrained × Poor	0.000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Attribute-level fixed effects			Yes				
Country fixed effects			Yes				

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