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BACKGROUND: Neg-words in negative-concord languages have been analysed as indefinites in the scope of negation ($\neg\exists$ -approaches, e.g. [Zeijlstra 2004](#)), nonnegative universal quantifiers scoping above negation ($\forall\neg$ -approaches, e.g. [Giannakidou 2000](#)) or the carriers of semantically interpretable negation ([Haegeman & Zanuttini 1996](#)). Because of the logical equivalence in (1), the issue of which approach is the correct one cannot be decided on the basis of the truth conditions, and other, satellite, phenomena must be examined in search of evidence.

$$(1) \quad \neg\exists x: P(x) \equiv \forall x: \neg P(x)$$

SIGNIFICANCE OF FRAGMENT ANSWERS: [Watanabe \(2004\)](#) argues that fragment answers are an insurmountable challenge for $\forall\neg$ -approaches because these approaches require that, in an ellipsis context, a negative proposition must be recoverable from a nonnegative one, as in (2).

- (2) A: Kogo tȳ videl? — B: Nikogo [ya ne videl].
 who-ACC you saw No one I not saw

‘Who did you see? — Nobody.’

This, [Watanabe \(2004\)](#) argues, is insufficiently restrictive, as it predicts an unattested interpretation of a non-neg-word fragment answer as a *negative* fragment answer, as in (3). In actuality, such non-neg-word fragments can only be interpreted as an affirmative proposition.

- (3) A: Kogo ty videl? — B: Mashu [ya (*ne) videl].
 who-ACC you saw Masha.ACC I not saw

(‘Who did you see? — (I didn’t see) Masha.’)

[Watanabe’s \(2004\)](#) argument relies on two premises. **Premise 1:** affirmative and negative fragment answers with and without neg-words must form a homogeneous set. **Premise 2:** neg-word remnant *nikogo* ‘nobody’ in (2) and the non-NCI remnant *Mashu* ‘Masha’ in (3) must be viewed as making an identical contribution to the recoverability of ellipsis. I argue that both premises are false and the whole argument is therefore invalid.

PREMISE 1 IS FALSE: I take it as established consensus that answers to questions are more than mere assertions of a proposition but rather assertions to the effect of the proposition being a complete answer to the question posed ([Dayal 2016](#)). In a simple model with just two individuals, Masha and Natasha, the meaning of A’s question in (3) addressed at B would be something like (4) on the [Hamblin-Rooth](#) approach.

- (4) $\llbracket \text{Who did you see} \rrbracket = \{ B \text{ saw } m, B \text{ saw } n, B \text{ saw } m \oplus n, B \text{ saw nobody} \}$

The propositions underlying the affirmative and neg-word fragment answers, *B saw Masha* and *B saw nobody*, are contained within the meaning of the question, and by definition salient in the context. At the same time, the proposition underlying the unavailable, but allegedly predicted to be available, non-neg-word negative fragment answer is not a member of that set, as witnessed by the oddity of the dialogue in (5), crucially in the absence of ellipsis.

- (5) #A: Who did you see? — B: I didn’t see Masha.

If (5B), without ellipsis, is not an appropriate way to answer the question (5A), there is in fact no expectation that (3B), involving ellipsis, should be. There is neither any reason for A to expect a negation in (3B) nor any reason for B to expect A to be able to recover it. Now, while it is true that fragments that are not full exhaustive answers can be felicitous, they invariably require an additional

inference (Merchant et al. 2013). Full exhaustive fragment answers, on the other hand, require no inference and are available by virtue of being present and salient in the meaning of the question. The inference that could eventually result in recovering an elided negation is simply not triggered, and that is why the negative fragment answer interpretation in (3) is unavailable.

PREMISE 2 IS FALSE: Watanabe (2004) interprets the condition on the recoverability of elided material as relying solely on identity with the antecedent, without taking into account the relationship between the remnant and syntactic material properly contained in the ellipsis site. I argue that the relationship between the remnant and a head inside the ellipsis site matters for recoverability in that a featural dependency resulting from Agree enables elided material to be unambiguously recovered. Assuming, with Zeijlstra (2004), Rossyaykin (2021), Rudnev (2022), Lyutikova & Gerasimova (2023), negative concord to be syntactic agreement, the morphologically realised dependency between an unvalued polarity feature on the neg-word, [$\Sigma:\neg$] (Laka 1990), and a valued one, [$\Sigma:\neg$], on the negation marker, makes the latter recoverable. I further show that this configuration (7) characterises, besides fragment answers, such routinely available varieties of ellipsis as predicate ellipsis (8), sprouting (9), nominal ellipsis and force mismatches under CP-ellipsis (data not shown).

- (6) Nikogo_[$\Sigma:\neg$] [ya ne_[$\Sigma:\neg$] videl]. (7) ... XP ... YP ... – Probe_[F: α] [... Goal_[F: α] ...]
 No one I not saw
 ‘(Who did you see?) — Nobody.’
- (8) In my room there was_[φ :SG] a minibar_[φ :SG] but in theirs there weren’t_[φ :PL] minibars_[φ :PL] ...]
 antecedent remnant ellipsis site
- (9) John’s just left but I’m not sure in whose_[uQ] car [C_[iQ] he’s just left]
 AGREE

I conclude that Watanabe’s (2004) argument against the $\forall\neg$ -approaches to negative concord is invalid and fragment answers do not present a challenge for them.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: The discussion in this paper has implications for the theory of identity and recoverability of ellipsis as well as for the analysis of negation and (strict) negative concord. The fragment-answer facts are compatible with theories allowing certain mismatches between elided material and its antecedent (Rudin 2019, Ranero 2021). The contribution made by Agree-based dependencies to the recoverability of ellipsis in the face of non-identity supports the separation of identity from recoverability (cf. Stockwell 2022). As for the debate between $\forall\neg$ - and $\neg\exists$ -theories of negative concord, I have shown that the purported argument *against* the $\forall\neg$ -approach has no force. Fragment answers do not speak in favour of, or against, either the $\forall\neg$ -approach or the $\neg\exists$ -approach, being compatible with both. A careful consideration of other empirical domains (e.g. *almost*-modification) is required to settle the debate.

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