


Anonymity Loves Resilience: The Case of Tor

Georg Koppen Alexander Hansen Færøy


April 14, 2025

FOSS North 2025




What is Tor?

- Online anonymity, and censorship circumvention.
 - Free software.
 - Open network.
 - Open specifications.
- Community of researchers, developers, users, and relay operators.
- U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization.




Threat Model




What can the attacker do?


Threat Model




Threat Model




Threat Model




Threat Model



Anonymity isn't Encryption



Encryption just protects contents.



Du var på vej ind på en ulovlig hjemmeside

Vi vil meget gerne hjælpe dig med at finde den film eller serie, du søger.

Søg med FilmFinder →

Hvis du er på udkig efter musik, bøger eller møbler

Gå til  SHARE WITH CARE →



SHARE
WITH
CARE

Hjemmesiden er blevet blokeret, fordi den er dømt ulovlig ved en dansk domstol. Brug Share With Care til at finde det, du leder efter, lovligt. På den måde passer du både på dig selv og på kulturen. [Læs mere om Share With Care](#)



RettighedsAlliancen



D



Digital

Metadata




"We Kill People Based on Metadata."


—Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA.

Unfortunately, network anonymity is often not enough on its own.

Application-specific integration and protection is often needed to ensure a more uniform fingerprint of the application's users.

Tails is our live operating system project that gives you a stateless operating system that uses Tor by default to access the internet.





Building a Community and an Ecosystem

But the Tor application ecosystem is larger than just "browsing". Onion Services is an important piece of the ecosystem too.

OnionShare is used for easy, anonymous, file-sharing.

SecureDrop is used for source and whistleblower handling in various media settings.

We host our own Onion Services, including our Debian mirror, too. See onion.torproject.org for more information.

Focus on building a library to work with the entire Tor ecosystem:

- Embed the Arti client into your own application.
- Parsing different Tor related network objects.
- Onion Services ecosystem.

... while avoiding the spaghetti architecture of C Tor.

But, why rewrite Tor?

Writing "safe C" is costly, and prone to mistakes:

21 out of 34 of Tor's TROVEs were due to errors that would be impossible (or very unlikely) in Rust.

Most of the Network Team at Tor is very excited about Rust, and was interested in spending more time writing software in it.

Development Process

Development work takes place via IRC/Matrix on various public channels on the OFTC IRC network.

All development happens in our self-hosted Gitlab instance at
gitlab.torproject.org.

Anonymous ticket interaction is available via anonticket.torproject.org.

Effective collaboration tooling, such as audio/video meetings, was adopted during the 2020-2022 period.

Protocol Specification Process

We have our own process for handling protocol changes over time. Work begins as a proposal and ends as part of a specification.

Specification work largely happens in gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec.


Protocol specifications can be found on spec.torproject.org, but discussions often take place on the tor-dev mailing list.

We heavily depend upon feedback from both community and the greater Tor research community.


Reproducible Builds




Reproducible Builds




Build Process



Build Process



Build Process



Reproducible Releases

For the Tor component of our software stack, we also build our source tarballs reproducibly.

Requires at least 2 out of 3 release engineers + CI to be able to do a release.

Same hash generated from multiple people allows us to have multiple people signing our releases using PGP.


Tor network resilience - Overview

What do we mean when we talk about network resilience?

- the Tor network is not going down or getting unreliable in the face of potential disruptions
 - when is the Tor network behaving "normal"?
 - potential disruptions have to be detected quickly (pre-emptively)
 - disruptions need to get mitigated early on
- the Tor network is diverse
 - distributed trust
 - diverse set of relay operators
 - diverse set of relay locations (operating systems etc.)


Tor network resilience - Disruptions

Directly connecting users from Lithuania




Tor network resilience - Disruptions

Directly connecting users from Germany




Tor network resilience - Disruptions

Directly connecting users from Germany



Tor network resilience - Disruptions


Directly connecting users from Germany



Tor network resilience - Disruptions

Total relay bandwidth

Advertised bandwidth Bandwidth history



Tor network resilience - Disruptions

Exception Reporting Framework - Analysis:

- powered by "sensors" in the network doing data collection
- establishment of baseline metrics
- anomaly analysis and reporting
- categorization according to profiles of past incidents

Tor network resilience - Disruptions

The screenshot shows a GitLab milestone page for 'Project 183: Exception Reporting Framework'. The URL is <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/milestones/2#tab-issues>. The page title is 'Project 183: Exception Reporting Framework'. A sidebar on the right provides summary statistics: Mar 3 (due date), Sep 30 (2025), 10 (issues), 1120h (estimated time), and 0 (closed issues). The main content area includes a 'Project goals' section with two bullet points, a 'This milestone is to achieve objectives 1 and 2 of the project:' section, and a 'Objective 1: Enhance data collection methods' section with a detailed list of sub-objectives and their outputs.

Open Milestone Mar 3, 2025–Sep 30, 2025 Close milestone ⋮

Project 183: Exception Reporting Framework

Discover patterns existing within the Tor network data that distinguish normal from anomalous behavior. These patterns can be correlated to external threats, blocking events, and network attacks. We want to use these to develop better solutions to make the network more secure and help users circumvent censorship when this is identified.

Project goals

- This project aims to implement proactive network health monitoring features for the Tor network—including tools to automatically identify threats like jurisdictional network-level blocking—so that we can address user-facing issues before they escalate and thereby enhance the stability and security of the Tor network.
- The ultimate goal of this project is to empower the Tor Project to be able to increase the stability of the Tor network by creating a proactive stance to addressing threats on the network. This ensures we can offer a tool for all Internet users to have reliable, secure access to the open web.

This milestone is to achieve objectives 1 and 2 of the project:

Objective 1: Enhance data collection methods

01.1 Identify the information about the network that we: (1) want to collect, (2) already collect, (3) can access from open source data sets
01.2 Review and update data collection tools
01.3 Review and update how we store and serve historical data
01.4 Evaluate and deploy tools for data management

Outputs:

- List of information and data about the network that is available
- Documented user needs discovery
- Updated data collection tools
- Historical network data that can be queried and analyzed

Exception Reporting Framework milestone

Tor network resilience - Disruptions

Exception Reporting Framework - Mitigations:

- the network-health team sits at the center of coordinating the mitigations
- other stakeholders need to get included (network, community, bad-relay teams, potentially Directory Authorities)
- evaluation of responses and mitigation strategy

Tor network resilience - Distributed trust

Relay Search

flag:authority

Show 10 entries

Advertised										Add. Flags	ORPort	DirPort	Type
Nickname [†]	Bandwidth	Uptime	Country	IPv4	IPv6	Flags							
● faravahar (1)	8 MiB/s	6d 19h	🇺🇸	216.218.219.41	2001:470:164:2::2	● ⚡ 🌐 🔍 ↗ ↘ 🔑	○	▀	443	80	Relay		
● dannenberg (1)	100 KiB/s	38d 15m	🇩🇪	193.23.244.244	2001:678:558:1000::244	● ⚡ 🌐 🔍 ↗ ↘ 🔑	○	▀	443	80	Relay		
● Serge (3)	100 KiB/s	1d 20h	🇺🇸	66.111.2.131	2610:1c0:0:5::131	● 🔍 🔍 🔍 🔑	○	▀	9001	9030	Relay		
● dizum (1)	88 KiB/s	12d 5h	🇳🇱	45.66.35.11	2a09:61c0::1337	● ⚡ 🌐 🔍 ↗ ↘ 🔑	○	▀	443	80	Relay		
● tor26 (1)	75 KiB/s	4d 3h	🇨🇳	217.196.147.77	2a02:16a8:662:2203::1	● 🔍 🔍 🔍 🔑	○	▀	443	80	Relay		
● bastet (1)	50 KiB/s	6d 11h	🇺🇸	204.13.164.118	2620:13:4000:6000::1000:118	● 🔍 🔍 🔍 🔑	○	▀	443	80	Relay		
● maatuska (3)	50 KiB/s	4d 23h	🇫🇮	171.25.193.9	2001:67c:289c::9	● 🔍 🔍 🔍 🔑	○	▀	80	443	Relay		
● moria1 (1)	40 KiB/s	6d 17h	🇺🇸	128.31.0.39	-	● 🔍 🔍 🔍 🔑	▲	●	9201	9231	Relay		
● gabelmoo (1)	40 KiB/s	4d 22h	🇩🇪	131.188.40.189	2001:638:a000:4140::ffff:189	● 🔍 🔍 🔍 🔑	○	▀	443	80	Relay		
● longclaw (1)	38 KiB/s	1d 23h	🇨🇦	199.58.81.140	-	● 🔍 🔍 🔍 🔑	○	▀	443	80	Relay		

<https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/flag:authority>


Tor network resilience - Distributed trust

The 9 Directory Authorities make and maintain the consensus which involves:

1. Keeping the service *available*.
2. Being *responsive* as an operator.
3. Having *integrity*.
4. Balancing maximizing network capacity and excluding *bad relays*.

More details can be found in the [Directory Authority expectations document](#).

Tor network resilience - Diversity



Tor network resilience - Diversity

Research question: How do we tune the diversity dial for maximum network resilience?

- How should we measure diversity?
- Do we have some reasonable baselines?
- Should we focus on operator diversity or relay country diversity or...?

We start working on answers during our exception reporting framework project and continue afterwards.

Tor network resilience - Diversity

We help the relay operator community helping the network by:

- outlining relay operator expectations
- providing a proposal process for network-health improvements with relay operators as key stakeholders
- holding regular relay operator meet-ups (virtual and in-person)
- encouraging interaction *within* the operator community

For the relay operator expectations, see:

<https://community.torproject.org/policies/relays/expectations-for-relay-operators/>


Tor project resilience

Resilience measures, which we already talked about in a software/code and community context, apply to the project itself as well:

- Diversity
- Openness and Transparency
- Community-building
- Trust

Tor project resilience - Funding

**Tor Project
Operating Revenue Mix**



Tor project resilience - Funding

As a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization we are committed to financial transparency via:

- financial audit reports
- IRS 990 forms

Those transparency documents can be found on
<https://www.torproject.org/about/reports/>.

Tor project resilience - Funding

There are indirect threats for non-profits to (funding) security as well:

- "foreign agent"-style laws around the world
- "nonprofit killer" plans in the US (aka bill H.R. 9495) (see:
<https://theintercept.com/2024/11/15/nonprofits-trump-bill-gop-republicans/>)

Tor is not affected by those threats yet but we need to be wary and prepare for scenarios like that.

How can you help?

- Hack on some of our cool projects.
- Find, and maybe fix, bugs in Tor.
- Test Tor on your platform of choice.
- Work on some of the many open research projects.
- Run a Tor relay or a bridge!
- Teach others about Tor and privacy in general.



Questions?



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