

Liquidity, Liquidity Everywhere, Not a Drop to Use: Why Flooding Banks with Central Bank Reserves May Not Expand Liquidity

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ABSTRACT

Central bank balance sheet expansion, through actions like quantitative easing, is run through commercial banks. While this increases liquid central bank reserves held on commercial bank balance sheets, demandable uninsured deposits issued to finance the reserves also increase. Subsequent shrinkage in the central bank balance sheet may entail shrinkage in bank-held reserves without a commensurate reduction in deposit claims. Furthermore, during episodes of liquidity stress, when many claims on liquidity are called, surplus banks may hoard reserves. As a result, central bank balance sheet expansion may create less additional liquidity than typically thought, and indeed, may increase the probability and severity of episodes of liquidity stress.

DESPITE A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION IN central bank balance sheets, some markets like the U.S. money market have experienced increasing interest rate volatility, including alarming spikes in the repo rate, notably in December 2018 and September 2019 (see D'Avernas and Vandeweyer (2021)). The disruption in markets that depend intimately on the availability of liquidity seems puzzling when Fed officials set reserve levels not just at a multiple of levels before the global financial crisis, but also above their estimate of private sector demands, with adequate buffers for unexpected variations such as in the

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Treasury's Fed account (see Logan (2019)).¹ Greater private sector reserve holdings do not seem to have made markets for liquidity fully immune to liquidity shocks. Indeed, even after the Fed injected more reserves in September 2019, markets were disrupted again in March 2020 at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the banking system was found short in its ability to accommodate the demand for liquidity.² In response, the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet even more (see, for example, Kovner and Martin (2020)), buying financial assets from the private sector and placing large quantities of liquid reserves with it (or promising to do so). In March 2023, a number of mid-sized regional banks failed, whereupon the authorities made liquidity freely available through the discount window and a new Fed facility, in addition to lending by the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), while the Treasury implicitly guaranteed all demandable deposits. Where had all the prior liquidity gone?

A number of possibilities have been suggested, including changes in liquidity, changes in capital regulation and supervision, and changes in the public demand for liquidity.³ While these have merit, we augment them by asking a fundamental question: What theoretical effect should the expansion of central bank balance sheets have on systemic liquidity, taking into account the endogenous response of the banking system?

Intuition would suggest that when the central bank issues more liquid central bank reserves to finance its balance sheet expansion, the supply of liquidity to the financial system increases, reducing both illiquidity premia in markets and private financing costs. This intuition neglects three key private sector responses. First, central banks effectively issue these reserves to commercial banks (henceforth "banks"), which typically finance them with short-term liabilities such as uninsured deposits, an offsetting claim on liquidity. Second, available reserves could shrink for a variety of reasons. Third, banks may exacerbate anticipated shortages by hoarding spare liquidity. In short, central bank reserves expansion works through commercial banks, which could raise future demand for liquidity and constrain its supply, limiting the benefits of reserve expansion and potentially creating costs.

On net then, the additional liquidity generated by central bank balance sheet expansion can be much smaller than one might think if bank behavior is not taken into account. Indeed, central bank balance sheet expansion

¹ Copeland, Duffie, and Yang (2021) estimate that banks made do with about \$50 billion in reserve balances before the global financial crisis, and had \$1.3 trillion in balances in September 2019.

² Corporate debt, but also segments of the U.S. Treasuries market experienced significant illiquidity; see Duffie (2020), Fleming and Ruela (2020), He, Nagel, and Song (2020), Liang and Parkinson (2020), Schrimp, Shin, and Sushko (2020), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020). Corporates drew down bank credit lines; see Kashyap (2020) and Acharya et al. (2023). Dealer banks also found it difficult to make markets; see Boyarchenko, Kovner and Shachar (2020), Breckenfelder and Ivashina (2021), Kargar et al. (2021), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020).

³ See, for example, Copeland, Duffie, and Yang (2021), Correa, Du, and Liao (2021), D'Avernas and Vandeweyer (2021, 2022), IAWG Treasury Market Surveillance Report (2021), Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022), Poszar (2019), and Yang (2021).

can leave the financial system more dependent on liquidity, and hence more vulnerable to adverse liquidity shocks. Particularly consequential could be liquidity shocks emanating from adverse macroeconomic shocks, such as the onset of the pandemic, or interest rate hikes.

To elaborate, we assume the central bank wants to expand its balance sheet over the medium term (via quantitative easing [QE]), buying financial assets from the private sector with newly issued reserves. We take any direct effect of the asset purchases on economic activity initially as given, so as to focus on what happens to liquidity thereafter. Reserves eventually find their way back to commercial bank balance sheets (so nonbanks cannot hold reserves, as is typically the case in most financial systems, and the public does not need more cash). More specifically, if the central bank simply buys long-term securities from commercial banks, the commercial banks will be swapping securities for central bank reserves. This requires no financing. However, a significant expansion of the central bank balance sheet will require it to buy securities from nonbanks, in which case, commercial bank balance sheet expansion occurs automatically; the nonbanks deposit the central bank's payment check in their banks, giving commercial banks both reserves and offsetting deposits. Of course, banks can rebalance their balance sheets after these transactions (which we allow in our model), but in aggregate, banks have to hold the reserves.

Key in our analysis is the mix of how banks finance these reserves. A number of authors (Flannery (1986), Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010), among others) argue that banks have a comparative advantage in issuing short-term or demandable debt. Others (see, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or Stein (2012)) attribute an implicit liquidity/money premium to demandable bank liabilities that makes them relatively attractive for investors, and Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that one leads to the other. We are agnostic as to why longer term financing (i.e., capital) is costlier for banks, but assume functional forms that make it so. Naturally then, a first effect of QE is that banks finance a large portion of the reserve expansion with demandable deposits, an effect the literature has underemphasized.

We assume that after commercial banks get reserves, make loans, and set their capital structure accordingly, there is a probability that the economy will become liquidity stressed, with the demand for liquidity in the real economy increasing significantly. Demand will be concentrated on some banks. Call these the stressed banks. We assume that their wholesale depositors, fearful of any loss, withdraw their cash in such states, increasing the stressed banks' need for funds.

Banks may find that some of the initially held bank reserves are not available to pay out in stressed states. For instance, they may have shrunk because of quantitative tightening (QT), whereby the central bank sells securities to commercial banks in exchange for reserves. We show that banks have an incentive to buy securities, even if less liquid than reserves. Reserves may also be unavailable for use because of regulatory encumbrances, or because banks

have pledged reserves to support speculative activity in order to obtain fees from doing so.

Given stressed banks experience a shortage of liquidity at times of liquidity stress, healthy banks may see a valuable convenience yield to liquid reserves, for instance, as a form of dry powder if conditions worsen.⁴ As a result, a fraction of healthy banks may hoard liquidity and seek to maintain unimpeachable balance sheets, in order to be perceived as safe and attract more deposit flows, rather than lend reserves out to stressed banks.


The financing of eventually shrunken or partially encumbered reserves with short-term deposits, coupled with reserve hoarding by some of the healthy banks that are recipients of flight-to-safety deposits, sets up an interesting dynamic in episodes of liquidity stress: Loan rates in the interbank market can shoot up as stressed banks try to attract liquidity from healthy banks (see Acharya and Mora (2015) for empirical documentation of such a dynamic during the Global Financial Crisis). The interbank market may even shut forcing banks to rely on costly capital issuance. A higher anticipated cost of funding in the future then cascades into a higher upfront rate for term loans made by banks (as in Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Diamond and Rajan (2011), or Stein (2012)), lower firm investment, and lower aggregate activity.

In sum, the demand for reserves is not static. Instead, it ratchets up with supply, leaving fewer “free” reserves than one might think. Under some circumstances, every additional dollar of reserves that the central bank issues can increase the net demand for liquidity in situations of liquidity stress and can increase the interbank borrowing premium.⁵ The ex ante supply of reserves affects the ex post demand for reserves because QE operates through commercial bank balance sheets; if central bank reserves were instead placed directly with households, or with financial intermediaries that did not issue claims on liquidity after swapping their assets for reserves, the effects that we hypothesize would be mitigated.

Evidence for our underlying assumptions and our results has accumulated since our early drafts. Exhibit 1 comes from Acharya et al. (2022). Panel A of the exhibit suggests that as the Federal Reserve expanded reserves through various rounds of QE between late 2008 and 2014, commercial banks increased their issuance, not just of deposits, but eventually also of lines of credit. Indeed, Acharya et al. (2022) find that overall deposits increased approximately one-for-one with reserves, but demandable deposits increased to a greater extent than reserve issuance (because banks brought down time deposits). Moreover, Panel B suggests it was uninsured demandable deposits—the most volatile form of borrowing—that increased the most with reserve expansion. Finally,

⁴ For earlier work on liquidity hoarding, see, for example, Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011), Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2012), Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2011), Bech (2008), Copeland, Duffie, and Yang (2021), and Diamond and Rajan (2011).

⁵ We show that if an implicit or explicit reserve requirement leads demand deposits to grow faster than reserves, a pattern suggested by the evidence, then an increase in the net demand for liquidity with an increase in reserves can arise even without any shrinkage of or encumbrance on reserves in the future.



Panel C shows that the ratio of claims on liquidity (outstanding credit lines and deposits, in particular, uninsured demandable deposits) to reserves reached a peak in September 2019 after QE ended in 2014 Q3. The Fed was then forced to resume QE to alleviate liquidity stress, suggesting the importance of tracking bank-issued claims on liquidity to understand liquidity stress.

Turning to pricing, Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022) argue that the opportunity value of liquidity, measured as the effective federal funds rate minus the central bank–paid interest on excess reserves, is affected not just by the quantity of outstanding reserves but also by the outstanding stock of commercial banking deposits. In the cross-section, Acharya et al. (2022) show that banks with substantial exogenous quantities of reserves do issue more demandable deposits to finance them. They also reduce the spread they are willing to pay for time deposits, and they originate more credit lines to firms. More generally, as our model suggests, the value of liquidity is negatively related to the supply of reserves, but only after correcting for claims on these reserves, which grow endogenously with reserves.

Closely related to our paper is that of Diamond, Jiang, and Ma (2021), who examine how the reserve build-up by the Federal Reserve could affect bank lending. While they too emphasize the need to finance reserves, they focus on the crowding-out effects of such reserve holdings on corporate loans. In contrast, our focus is on the effects of reserves on ex post liquidity, and how liquidity would impact corporate lending in turn.

Studies of the recent rate spikes in usually liquid money markets have attributed them to regulatory and supervisory action (see footnote 3), to

Exhibit 1. Time-series of credit lines, deposits, and reserves. This exhibit from Acharya et al. (2022) plots the time-series of credit lines, deposits and reserves of the 2008Q4 to 2023Q1 period using data from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds. Panel A plots credit lines (left y-axis), deposits (right y-axis) and reserves (left y-axis) as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for all commercial banks. Panel B shows the break-up of demand and time deposits into insured and uninsured time-series using FDIC's Call Reports Data. Estimation of Insured and Uninsured Domestic Deposits are based on the items in the call report schedule RC-O. Insured deposits are defined as deposits lying below the FDIC deposit insurance thresholds of \$100,000 before 2008Q4 and \$250,000 after 2008Q4. Uninsured deposits are domestic deposits above the aforementioned deposit insurance thresholds and all foreign deposits. Insured deposits and Uninsured Deposits should be adjusted for the FDIC Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) program. Split of Time Deposits into Insured vs. Uninsured Deposits are based by splits of Time Deposits by the aforementioned deposit insurance thresholds in schedule RC-E. Demandable Deposits (which is the sum of demand, savings, and money market deposits) are split into Insured and Uninsured deposits by taking the difference of Total Insured/Uninsured Deposits and Insured/Uninsured Time Deposits, respectively. All Deposit variables are shown on the right y-axis whereas Reserves are shown on the left y-axis. Panel C plots credit lines, total deposits, and uninsured demandable deposits as multiples of central bank reserves. Time deposits are the sum of small and large time deposits (H6 and H8 release). Demand and Other Liquid deposits are from the H6 release. The vertical lines correspond to the beginning of the different Federal Reserve QE / QT phases: (1) Nov 2008 (QE I), (2) Nov 2010 (QE II), (3) Nov 2012 (QE III), (4) Oct 2014 (Post-QE III), (5) QT period, (6) Sept 2019 (Pandemic QE). (a) Credit Lines, Deposits, and Reserves as Percentage of GDP. (b) Uninsured and Insured Demand and Time Deposits, and Reserves as Percentage of GDP. (c) Credit Lines, Deposits, and Uninsured Demandable Deposits as Multiples of Reserves.

sudden increases in demand for and decreases in supply of reserves due to Treasury actions (see, for example, Copeland, Duffie, and Yang (2021)), or to exogenous growth in household financial assets and thus mechanically to their demand for deposits (Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022)). Our theory, with banks affecting both demand for and supply of reserves after the central bank issues them, and thereby making the system more prone to disruption, complements these explanations. For instance, a binding capital or liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirement or rising household demand for deposits would not explain why banks deliberately reduced their share of financing from time deposits during QE, increased their share of financing from uninsured demand deposits (typically not held by households), and increased their issuance of lines of credit (typically to firms).

While an understandable response to liquidity stress is for the central bank to expand the supply of reserves yet more, if the claims on liquidity grow with higher levels of reserves, as we argue and Acharya et al. (2022) document, there will be a ratcheting up in needed reserves. We discuss ex post central bank interventions in depth.

There are many moving parts in a model with firms, banks, investors, and the central bank. We introduce the basic model in Section I and analyze it in Section II assuming a fixed exogenous fraction of hoarding by healthy banks and reserve shrinkage. In Section III, we endogenize hoarding and in Section IV, we examine anticipated reserve shrinkage from QT. In Section V, we examine robustness. In Section VI, we compare privately optimal choices to the central bank/planner's choices, and we discuss ex post central bank intervention. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude.

I. The Model

Consider an economy with three dates, 0, 1, and 2. In what follows, subscripts denote the date and Greek letters are parameters. There are four sets of agents in the economy: firms, banks, risk-averse savers, and risk-neutral savers (with the central bank playing a cameo role in determining reserves). The state of the economy \tilde{y} is revealed at date 1. It can be healthy ($y = 0$) or liquidity stressed ($y = 1$). Firms and banks maximize expected profits.

A. Firms

Each firm could be thought of as representing an entire sector of the real economy. The firm has access to an investment opportunity at date 0. The state of the firm \tilde{z} is revealed at date 1. It is always healthy ($z = 0$) when the economy is healthy. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), the firm can be hit by an independent and identically distributed shock that makes it stressed ($z = 1$) with probability θ when the economy is liquidity stressed, which occurs with probability $\frac{q}{\theta}$. So the date 0 probability of a firm getting stressed at date 1 is q . The timeline for the state space of economic outcomes is in Figure 1 (we will shortly explain the bank-level outcomes illustrated there).




Figure 1. Time line and state space of outcomes. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)

An investment of I_0 at date 0 produces $g_0(I_0)$ at date 2 if the firm is healthy. If stressed, the firm produces nothing at date 2 from its original investment. However, it has the possibility of “rescuing” some of its earlier investment at date 1 by investing an additional amount I_1 . The expected output from such an investment is $g_1(I_1)$. This output of the rescue investment is high enough in expectation to allow the firm to repay the expected value of its loans, both for the initial investment and the rescue investment. There is, however, a nonzero probability that nothing is produced from the rescue investment also and the entire sequence of investments is a write-off. Both g_0 and g_1 are increasing and concave, and obey Inada conditions.

Liquidity stress in our model stems from real needs for spending at date 1, which in turn precipitate larger financial demands for liquidity. A model in which losses on financial investment precipitate margin calls, which necessitate new funding to avoid fire sales, would have similar effects.

The firm starts out with own funds of W_0^F , which it supplements with L_0^F of long-term borrowing from the bank. Apart from the real investment at date 0, it can also place deposits of D_0^F in the bank. We can think of this as the firm’s precautionary liquidity holdings, and is isomorphic (up to the fees charged) to precontracted credit lines from the bank. At date 1, the stressed firm can withdraw its deposit, as well as borrow from the bank, in order to make its rescue investment, I_1 .

B. Banks

Each bank lends to a firm (or in the alternative interpretation, an entire sector), so a bank and a firm constitute a pair. We conduct the analysis on a

bank-firm pair basis. At date 0, the bank can make a two-period loan of amount L_0 at a cumulative gross interest rate of R_0^L . The bank incurs a cost of $\frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2$ to extend the loan—the cost is increasing and convex because the bank has to manage and lay off an increasing amount of risk. At date 0, each bank also has to hold S_0 of reserves that the central bank has issued. For now, we assume the bank has no choice about the size of reserves it holds but rather reserves arise automatically from the bank's (symmetric) share of financial activity, which is given. We refer to a bank that has lent to a firm that has become stressed at date 1 as stressed.

C. Bank Financing

To finance its asset holdings, a bank can raise deposits at date 0 from the risk-averse saver, whose rate of time preference is one. Let D_0 be the quantum of overall deposits that it raises. Then, $(D_0 - D_0^F)$ is what the bank raises from the risk-averse saver; the rest comes from the firm. An implicit assumption is that there are only a limited number of risk-neutral savers in the economy, so deposits cannot be financed by them.

The risk-averse saver has log utility over consumption at date 2. We assume that if the low-probability event that the stressed firm repays nothing on the rescue loan materializes at date 2, the bank will have to default on deposits at date 2. Anticipating that their deposits will be haircut, risk-averse depositors will run on the bank at date 2 to avoid being the one at the back of the line that gets nothing. In turn, anticipating a run at date 2 and thus possible zero consumption even with small probability, risk-averse depositors will seek to withdraw their money from a stressed bank at date 1. Put differently, even though the bank is solvent at date 1, as in Stein (2012) it will have to repay its risk-averse depositors immediately if stressed.⁶ The stressed firm also withdraws some or all of its bank deposits to make the date 1 rescue investment.

The bank can raise long-term bank capital (consisting of long-term bonds or equity) from the risk-neutral investor (a wealthy individual or a sovereign wealth fund) at both date 0 and date 1. The bank faces a repayment cost of $e_t + \frac{\alpha_t}{2}e_t^2$ at date 2 when it raises amount e_t at date t . The quadratic term represents costs associated with patient capital relative to short-term deposits, including higher illiquidity premia, higher term premia, higher borrower moral hazard, and due diligence costs. These costs could be higher at date 1, when the economy is liquidity stressed, than at date 0. An alternate interpretation of “capital” is that these are insured or sticky deposits, which can be paid the going zero rate of interest but raising these deposits requires opening branches

⁶ The assumption of savers with log utility is simply to produce a run at date 1 without assuming that banks are insolvent at date 1. Such behavior mirrors that of institutional wholesale depositors such as corporations or financial institutions where their CFOs lose their job if they have inadvertently left low-yielding transaction deposits in a bank that is risky or fails—this induces extreme risk-aversion about wholesale (uninsured) transaction deposit accounts. Alternatively, depositors could believe that only perfectly safe assets have the requisite “moneyiness” (Stein (2012)) or that they have no ability to monitor a bank's risky claims (Dang, Gorton, Holmstrom (2010)).

for servicing, which leads to convex costs for the bank (see, for example, Drechsler et al. (2023)). Viewed this way, D_0 represents the runnable uninsured deposits. Capital comprises all other bank liabilities that will not run at date 1.⁷

D. Firm Financing in the Stressed State at Date 1

To make its date 1 rescue investment, the stressed firm supplements the deposit it withdraws by borrowing l_1^F from its bank at date 1 (since the bank is never insolvent and aggregate liquidity conditions are all that matter, the assumption that it borrows from its bank is only for convenience). The bank has to do due diligence given the stressed state of the firm, so the interest rate charged will be $(1 + r_1 + \gamma)$, where γ is the bank's deadweight screening and monitoring costs that are passed on to the firm. For simplicity, we assume that all interest rates reflect expected values (so loan face values are set to deliver that rate after accounting for any default risk). This reduces notation and lets us focus on liquidity.

E. Reserves Shrinkage or Encumbrance at Date 1

We assume that a bank can use only $(1 - \tau)$ of its initial reserves to meet depositor or lending needs at date 1. The shrinkage of bank reserves is a critical assumption, which we endogenize in Section IV below, and can occur because of subsequent QT, regulatory encumbrances on reserves, or prepositioning of bank reserves to support funding of speculation. Importantly, bank assets and liabilities are optimally set assuming this expected shrinkage or encumbrance on reserves.⁸

F. Interbank Market

A stressed bank can borrow in the interbank market, where healthy banks with surplus reserves can lend. The gross interest rate over the second period in the interbank market is one if there is an excess of loanable funds relative to demand. If not, the gross interest rate will rise to $(1 + r_1)$ to equalize the demand and supply for funds. When this is the case, stressed banks and healthy banks that lend in the interbank market will find it attractive to issue some capital at date 1.

G. Flow of Reserves due to Deposit Flight

When there are ample reserves, the location of reserves is unimportant. In stressed times, when everyone dashes for cash for final settlement, location

⁷ If we assumed different convex costs of issuance for insured deposits and equity capital, the model would allow determination of the two quantities separately in equilibrium. However, this is not the focus of our paper.

⁸ In Section I.C of the Internet Appendix, we show that our results are robust to assuming that τ is a fixed level of reserves (instead of a fixed share of reserves).

is paramount. Where do deposits that flee the distressed banks go? This is a critical issue and will influence important results in the paper. We assume that these deposits get parked in safe banks. But what is safe? Any healthy bank that lends in the interbank market bears some risk of not being repaid, raising concerns among risk-averse institutional depositors about how much risk the bank is taking; in particular, these institutional depositors may learn from interbank markets that the bank has run down its reserve balances. We therefore assume that to be seen as safe, a healthy bank should maintain an unimpeachable balance sheet and, in particular, not lend to distressed banks in the date 1 interbank market. It will then attract a proportional share (along with other safe banks) of the flight-to-safety deposits that flee the distressed banks (see Figure 1). Of course, given the high rate prevailing in the interbank market at date 1, some fraction φ of healthy banks may lend. These banks become tainted. Tainted banks will not attract any flight-to-safety deposits.⁹

H. Convenience Yield on Reserves in Stressed State of the Economy

For a healthy bank's choice to remain safe to be interesting, there should be some value to attracting flight-to-safety deposits and passing up the opportunity to earn a premium in lending to the interbank market. To this end, we assume that when the economy is liquidity stressed, each dollar of reserves has a convenience yield $\delta \geq 0$ to the final holder. This could be thought of as the precautionary value of reserves in case there is further unmodeled stress (or in case assets are sold at a firesale discount in the future), their value in signaling a "fortress balance sheet" to investors looking for safety, or the franchise value of deposits associated with those reserves. Since the convenience yield is always enjoyed by the final holder, any reserve transfer is a private wealth transfer that washes out in aggregate. However, the convenience yield significantly affects banks' responses to a liquidity shock, as we will see.

I. Payments and Reserve Transfers

Note that the banking system as a whole does not gain or lose reserves as a result of date 1 capital issuance or payments, but any purchase or payment leads to a transfer of reserves between banks, which we have to keep track of. We assume that any date 1 bank capital issued is bought by risk-neutral investors who first acquire deposits in safe banks (for instance, by selling their Treasury bills to risk-averse depositors) and then transfer the safe bank's reserves to the capital-issuing bank by writing the latter a check (alternative assumptions would worsen the date 1 illiquidity problem). Conversely, any

⁹ We assume depositors of tainted banks do not run, though alternative assumptions are easily handled. Note also that if depositors that run on stressed banks flee indiscriminately across healthy banks, then the only case relevant in our model would be Section II with exogenously set $\varphi = 1$, as there would be no gain for any healthy bank from staying out of the interbank market. This case is covered by Theorem 1 and discussed in the text that follows.

payment received for equipment sold for the rescue investment is (naturally) deposited in the safe banks.

We further assume that banks have to hold all the reserves (this is a requirement in most financial systems), and we assume that all banks initially hold them symmetrically. This implies that nonbanks do not hold reserves. Finally, we net out the volume of deposit creation engendered by the issuance of high-powered reserves, looking only at final “reduced-form” balance sheets. The pyramiding of deposits via the money multiplier typically introduces additional complications as to how claims are run upon, netted, and settled (see, for example, Kashyap (2020)), which would magnify the problems we examine.

II. Analysis

We first solve the model assuming that the fraction of healthy banks that choose to become tainted by lending in the interbank market at date 1 is exogenously set at φ , which is known at date 0, and that the convenience yield, δ , from holding reserves is zero. We then allow $\delta > 0$ and endogenize the fraction of tainted healthy banks φ at date 1.

A. The Firm's Problem

To ease understanding of the calculations that follow, in Figure 2, we present firm and bank balance sheets at date 0 and date 1.

At date 1, the firm will be stressed with probability q and it will be healthy with probability $(1 - q)$. So its maximization problems at date 0 and date 1 are:

$$\text{Date 0 : } \text{Max}_{L_0^F, D_0^F} (1 - q)[g_0(I_0) + D_0^F] + q[g_1(I_1) - l_1^F(1 + \gamma + r_1)] - R_0^L L_0$$

$$\text{Date 1 : } \text{Max}_{l_1^F} g_1(I_1) - l_1^F(1 + \gamma + r_1)$$

$$\text{s.t. } I_0 = L_0 + W_0^F - D_0^F \text{ and } I_1 = l_1^F + D_0^F.$$

The constraints are just budget constraints at each date. The firm's first-order conditions (FOCs) then are
w.r.t. firm's long-term borrowing from bank L_0 :

$$(1 - q)g_0' - R_0^L = 0 \quad (1)$$

w.r.t. firm's deposit in the bank D_0^F :

$$(1 - q)(-g_0' + 1) + q(g_1') = 0 \quad (2)$$

w.r.t. date-1 firm borrowing from bank l_1^F :

$$g_1' - (1 + \gamma + r_1) = 0. \quad (3)$$

Firm Balance Sheet at Date 0		Bank Balance Sheet at Date 0	
Assets	Liabilities	Assets	Liabilities
I_0	$L_0^F \quad (= L_0^B)$	$L_0^B + \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0^B)^2$	D_0
D_0^F	W_0^F	S_0	e_0
	Net worth		Net worth
Firm Balance Sheet at Date 1 if stressed		Bank Balance Sheet at Date 1 if bank stressed	
Assets	Liabilities	Assets	Liabilities
I_1	l_1^F	$L_0^B + \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0^B)^2$	Possible interbank borrowing = b_1
	L_0^F	τS_0	e_1
	Net worth	$l_1^B \quad (= l_1^F)$	e_0
			Net worth
Firm Balance Sheet at Date 1 if healthy		Bank Balance Sheet at Date 1 if economy stressed, bank healthy but “tainted” (makes interbank loans)	
Assets	Liabilities	Assets	Liabilities
I_0	L_0^F	$L_0^B + \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0^B)^2$	D_0
D_0^F	W_0^F	Interbank loans of up to $e_1 + (1 - \tau) S_0$	e_1
	Net worth	Reserves of $(S_0 + e_1 - \text{interbank loans})$	e_0
			Net worth

Figure 2. Bank and firm balance sheets.

Substituting the value of g_1' from (3) into (2), we get $(1-q)g_0' = (1+q\gamma + qr_1)$. Denote the right-hand side of this expression by R_0^{DF} . It is the expected opportunity return to the firm of holding an additional dollar of deposit, and thus avoiding borrowing from the bank at date 1 if stressed. Comparing with (1), where the firm's marginal expected return on date 0 investment is equal to the cost of long-term borrowing from the bank, we get $R_0^L = R_0^{DF}$. In words, the cost of long-term borrowing is equal to the opportunity return on holding an additional dollar of deposit. We now turn to the bank's problem.

B. The Bank's Problem

The bank maximizes profits given constraints, that is,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{L_0^B, e_0, e_1} \quad & R_0^L L_0 + S_0 - e_0 - \frac{\alpha_0}{2} e_0^2 - D_0 \\ & + \frac{q}{\theta} \left[-\frac{\alpha_1}{2} e_1^2 - r_1 (b_1(y=1, z=1) - l_1^B) \right] \\ & + \frac{q}{\theta} (1-\theta) \varphi \left[-\frac{\alpha_1}{2} e_1^2 - r_1 b_1(y=1, z=0) \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & D_0 + e_0 = L_0 + \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0)^2 + S_0, \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

$$b_1(y=1, z=1) = l_1^B + D_0 - S_0(1-\tau) - e_1, \quad (5)$$

$$b_1(y=1, z=0) = -S_0(1-\tau) - e_1, \quad (6)$$

$$l_1^B = l_1^F = I_1 - D_0^F. \quad (7)$$

The first line of the maximization is the bank's expected profits at date 2 from date 0 lending and financing activities. The second line is the expected loss for a stressed bank. The stressed bank funds the loan to the stressed firm (in equilibrium, l_1^B , which equals l_1^F) and deposit repayments using shrunken reserves, date 1 capital raised, and interbank borrowing of $b_1(y=1, z=1)$ —see (5). Its expected loss is the probability of becoming stressed times the cost of capital raised plus the cost of interbank borrowing less the return on the loan to the firm. The third line of the maximization is the expected profits to a healthy bank from becoming tainted and lending $-b_1(y=1, z=0)$ to the interbank market when the economy is stressed at date 1, which it finances from its reserves and the capital it raises (see (6)). Note that both the stressed bank and the tainted bank raise the same amount of capital in equilibrium because they both see the same marginal return of using that capital in the interbank market (for the stressed bank, it reduces borrowing, while for the tainted bank, it increases loans).

The constraint (4) simply reflects the sources and uses of funds at date 0 (the bank raises money from deposits and long-term capital, and invests in long-term loans, the cost of making loans, as well as forced reserve holdings). The FOC

w.r.t. long-term loans to the firm L_0 :

$$R_0^L - (1 + \lambda L_0)(1 + qr_1) = 0.$$

From the bank's perspective, the date 0 return from making another dollar of loan should equal the cost of funding that dollar (and the associated marginal risk management cost, λL_0) via flighty deposits, which have an expected cost of $(1 + qr_1)$. Denote this term by R_0^{DB} . Hence, $R_0^L = (1 + \lambda L_0)R_0^{DB}$. The FOC

w.r.t. date 0 capital issuance e_0 :

$$-(1 + \alpha_0 e_0) + (1 + qr_1) = 0.$$

This implies that the marginal cost of raising an additional dollar of long-term funding or capital at date 0 should equal the saving on funding via deposits, and thus $e_0 = \frac{(R_0^{DB} - 1)}{\alpha_0} = \frac{qr_1}{\alpha_0}$. In words, the bank raises more capital at date 0 the higher the expected premium it will pay in the interbank market in the stressed state. Finally, the FOC

w.r.t. date 1 capital issuance e_1 :

$$-(1 + \alpha_1 e_1) + (1 + r_1) = 0.$$

So, the bank's cost of raising an additional dollar of capital at date 1 equals the cost of borrowing in the interbank market. Simplifying,

$$r_1 = \alpha_1 e_1. \quad (8)$$

Hence, the premium r_1 in the interbank market drives capital-raising at date 1 by stressed and healthy tainted banks and vice versa. Firm and bank maximizations also link the various interest rates to this premium. Hence,

$$R_0^L = R_0^{DF} = (1 + q\gamma + qr_1) = (1 + \lambda L_0)R_0^{DB} = (1 + \lambda L_0)(1 + qr_1). \quad (9)$$

C. Market-Clearing at Date 1

We know that the interbank premium is necessary to equalize the date 1 demand and supply of funds when the economy is liquidity stressed—essentially the premium draws forth more date 1 issuance in the capital market by stressed and tainted banks even while reducing rescue investment by stressed firms. The net date 1 shortfall in the interbank market in the liquidity stressed economy is $\theta[I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F)] - [\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]S_0(1 - \tau)$. The first term in the first square bracket is the “rescue” investment by stressed firms and the second term is the expected withdrawal by risk-averse depositors from stressed banks (which is redeposited in safe banks). The sum is the call on liquidity by the system, which is reduced by the last term, the available shrunken reserves with stressed and tainted healthy banks. This overall shortfall equals $[\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]e_1$, the date 1 capital raised by the tainted and stressed banks

(note that safe banks do not raise date 1 capital because they have no profitable way to deploy it). So when r_1 is positive, we have from (8) that

$$[\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta] \alpha_1^{-1} r_1 = \theta [I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F)] - [\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta] S_0(1 - \tau)$$

$$\text{or } r_1 \equiv \alpha_1 f(r_1, S_0),$$

$$\text{where } f(r_1, S_0) \equiv \frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]} [I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F)] - S_0(1 - \tau). \quad (10)$$

Note that in equilibrium, $D_0^F = L_0 + W_0^F - I_0$ and $D_0 = L_0 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2 + S_0 - e_0$. We denote the equilibrium interbank rate premium by \bar{r}_1 . Then, it is clear that if $f(0, S_0) \leq 0$, $\bar{r}_1 = 0$ because there is sufficient liquidity to meet needs at date 1 without capital issuances. Otherwise, $\bar{r}_1 > 0$. We thus have the following result.

THEOREM 1: *The date 1 equilibrium interest rate in the interbank market is (i) unique and (ii) $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} > 0$ if and only if (iff) $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$.*

PROOF: See Appendix A.

Uniqueness follows directly from (10) and $f(r_1, S_0)$ decreasing in r_1 , which we show in Appendix A. An interesting possibility is that $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} > 0$, that is, that more reserves supplied at date 0 increase liquidity stress at date 1. At first pass, the result seems counterintuitive, but only from a partial-equilibrium perspective, not taking into account the effect of running reserves through bank balance sheets. Recognize first that the marginal source of funding of the reserves is demand deposits, which potentially create their own demand for liquidity in the stressed state (in proportion to the fraction of stressed banks, θ). Moreover, only $(1 - \tau)$ of each dollar of any bank's reserves is available at date 1, and only a fraction φ of the $(1 - \theta)$ healthy banks use their shrunken reserves to meet the liquidity demands of stressed banks. Put differently, $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} > 0$ whenever θ , the marginal call on liquidity when demand deposits are withdrawn from stressed banks, is higher than the marginal liquidity provided by each dollar of reserves, $(1 - \tau)[\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]$. Rearranging, this leads to the condition $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ in Theorem 1.

The traditional view—that disregards bank responses—is that more reserves injected at date 0 will reduce the date 1 interbank premium. This will always be true if $\tau = 0$. Since every dollar of reserves is fully available at date 1 to pay down the dollar of deposit that financed it, any stressed bank is self-sufficient and has no need for the interbank market. In this case, the value of φ does not matter.

Conversely, when $\varphi = 0$ so that all healthy banks hoard and there is no lending from the interbank market, the condition $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ in Theorem 1 (for the counterintuitive result that $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} > 0$) is always met as long as $\tau > 0$. Intuitively, so long as there is some reserve shrinkage for every additional dollar of reserves issued, the stressed bank has to raise an increasing amount of date 1 capital to pay deposits issued to fund reserves, since nothing is available

from the interbank market. This raises \bar{r}_1 . As we will see when we endogenize φ , an interbank market that shuts down under stressed conditions is entirely possible.

Next, when $\varphi = 1$, so that all healthy banks lend in the interbank market, the condition in Theorem 1 holds whenever $\theta > (1 - \tau)$, that is, the aggregate stressed deposits θ that run exceeds aggregate shrunken reserves. This requires a high value of θ , suggesting a serious crisis or a low value of $(1 - \tau)$, suggesting in turn significant reserve shrinkage (e.g., substantial QT as we will argue). Finally, for intermediate values of τ and φ , the condition holds even for moderate values of θ .

D. Aggregate Reserves and Interest Rate Premia

Now consider the threshold level of reserves \hat{S}_0 that solves $f(0, \hat{S}_0) = 0$ after substituting the equilibrium values of D_0 and D_0^F in (10) when $r_1 = 0$. Rearranging, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{S}_0 \left(\frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]} - (1 - \tau) \right) &= \frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]} \left(W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0)^2 \Big|_{r_1=0} \right) \\ &\equiv NLS. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

The left-hand side is the net liquidity demand created by reserves. The right-hand side is the net liquidity supplied (*NLS*) by the corporate sector anticipating a date 1 interbank premium of zero (and adjusting for any cost to the bank of long-term lending). Note that *NLS* is high when the corporate sector has a high level of starting internal funds W_0^F and relatively low demand for funds for investment and loans. Theorem A1 suggests that if $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$, then there exists a threshold level of reserves, \hat{S}_0 , such that $\bar{r}_1 > 0$ is the unique equilibrium for $S_0 > \hat{S}_0$ and $\bar{r}_1 = 0$ for $S_0 \leq \hat{S}_0$. Conversely, if $\theta < \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$, then $\bar{r}_1 > 0$ is the unique equilibrium for $S_0 < \hat{S}_0$ and $\bar{r}_1 = 0$ for $S_0 \geq \hat{S}_0$. In Appendix A, we trace how \hat{S}_0 changes with θ in greater detail (in particular, depending on the sign of *NLS*).

E. The Central Bank/Planner's Problem and Optimal Reserves

In taking the ex ante level of reserves as given, we have in mind the central bank setting reserves for unmodeled monetary purposes.¹⁰ We now examine at what level the central bank/planner would set reserves with the view of maximizing welfare in the context of our framework, ignoring the unmodeled monetary effects of setting S_0 .

¹⁰ Central banks have sought to expand reserves to implement QE, where the effects range from signaling monetary policy stance (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)), recapitalizing banks through the back door, or repairing markets (see, for example, Acharya et al. (2019)).

The central bank/planner wants to maximize output net of real costs (such as due diligence and intermediation costs of capital issuances and term loans), that is, maximize w.r.t. S_0

$$U \equiv ((1-q)g_0(I_0) - I_0) + q(g_1(I_1) - I_1 - (I_1 - D_0^F)\gamma) - \frac{1}{2}\alpha_0 e_0^2 - \frac{q}{\theta}[(1-\theta)\varphi + \theta]\left(\frac{1}{2}\alpha_1 e_1^2\right) - \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2, \quad (12)$$

where $(I_1 - D_0^F)$ is the firm's date 1 borrowing from the bank that is associated with a per unit deadweight monitoring cost γ . It follows that $\frac{dU}{dS_0} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial \bar{r}_1} \cdot \frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0}$ since $\frac{\partial U}{\partial S_0} = 0$ (the central bank has no direct cost of supplying reserves as suggested by Friedman (1969)). It can be easily shown that $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \bar{r}_1} < 0$ (see Appendix A). Consequently, the central bank wants to raise S_0 only if the date 1 interbank market rate premium is positive and $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} < 0$. Conversely, if $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} > 0$, the central bank wants to reduce ex ante reserve issuance. In sum, the central bank will set reserves at any level such that the anticipated interbank rate premium \bar{r}_1 is zero.

F. Discussion

The interbank premium is always zero when the economy is healthy. Any idiosyncratic liquidity demands are likely to be diversified across a large set of liquidity suppliers (see Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002), for example). Central bank-supplied liquidity is likely to be ample for such needs and the location of reserves is unimportant. However, in stressed situations, liquidity demands are substantial (e.g., as witnessed by banks in the United States during 2007 to 2008, see Acharya and Mora (2015), or as witnessed by firms at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, see Kashyap (2020) and Acharya et al. (2023)), available liquidity with each bank can shrink ($\tau > 0$), and liquidity hoarding ($1 - \varphi > 0$) can further restrict supply. As discussed in Section II.D, there is a threshold ex ante central bank reserve issuance level at date 0 beyond which further issuance increases the net interbank date 1 rate r_1 . Whether increased ex ante reserves reduce ex post liquidity is an empirical question, depending on the extent of subsequent shrinkage and hoarding (which, as we will see in the next section, can be substantial). Undoubtedly, however, the “free” reserves available to deal with liquidity stress at date 1 will be significantly lower than the aggregate reserves issued at date 0 because of the endogenous issuance of claims on reserves by the banking sector. Reserve demand is not static—indeed supply creates some of its own demand, a phenomenon the literature has not emphasized to date.

Some commentators argue that central bank balance sheet expansion might reduce systemic risks (see Stein (2012) and Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2016)). Essentially, the argument is that central bank reserves will compete with short-term bank deposits for place on private investor portfolios. Being

more money-like, the former will displace the latter, and make the financial system safer (by avoiding deposit-induced run risk). Our analysis qualifies this conclusion by noting that because reserve expansion typically runs through commercial bank balance sheets, the demand for liquidity is affected by the issuance of reserves. Far from crowding out bank deposits, central bank reserve issuance may enhance them (as also pointed out by Nagel (2016)). Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2016) argue that the optimal way for the central bank to crowd out the money premium in deposits is to conduct reverse repo transactions directly with a broader set of nonbank investors, as the Fed started doing in 2021 with money market funds. But so long as much of central bank reserve expansion runs through bank balance sheets, our qualifications hold.

III. Endogenous φ : Liquidity Hoarding

We have assumed so far that in stressed situations, an exogenous fraction φ of healthy banks lend in interbank markets, and the remaining fraction receives the flighty deposits of stressed banks. We now endogenize the fraction φ , by allowing healthy banks to choose between lending in the interbank markets and consequently becoming tainted, or staying clear of profitable albeit risky interbank lending and instead attracting flight-to-safety deposits on which recipient banks earn a convenience yield $\delta > 0$.¹¹ In equilibrium, healthy banks must be indifferent between these choices.

In the benchmark model of Section II.A, the interbank market was always open and thus r_1 was both the interbank rate and the lending rate to stressed firms net of bank monitoring cost γ (i.e., firms borrow at $r_1 + \gamma$ but the bank earns the net rate r_1). Now, the interbank market may be shut, that is, $\varphi = 0$. However, stressed firms will still borrow from their banks, and r_1 is the bank lending rate to the firm net of the monitoring cost. As before, we use the notation \bar{r}_1 to denote the equilibrium interbank lending rate when the interbank market is open (in which case, it will equal r_1). However, when the interbank market is closed in a stressed situation, we denote the equilibrium rate as the *autarky* rate r_1^A . This is simply the rate that equilibrates liquidity demand and

¹¹ Why do safe banks not compete for flight-to-safety deposits by raising deposit rates? Acharya and Mora (2015) show that safe banks did not raise deposit rates during the Global Financial Crisis, while distressed banks did. Caglio, Dlugosz, and Rezende (2023) document a similar pattern in deposit rates when regional banks lost a significant quantity of deposits to large banks in early 2023. One explanation is that safe banks were trying to signal that they did not need funds in an effort to avoid the stigma associated with risky banks. A related one is that the inflow from risk-averse flight-to-safety institutional depositors is driven by convenience and a desire for principal protection rather than to exploit small differences in rates. For instance, depositors may flee their stressed bank to the most proximate safe bank. Finally, a bank will have to pay any higher rate to all its depositors. If the flight-to-safety deposits are only a small fraction of a receiving bank's overall deposits, safe banks may be reluctant to compete for them. This is a similar effect to Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017), who document that banks in concentrated banking areas are reluctant to pay flighty depositors higher rates when the Fed raises rates, since they have to also pay captive depositors that rate. Given these considerations, we assume that safe banks cannot (or will not) raise rates to attract more flight-to-safety deposits.

supply (via capital issuance) when the interbank market is closed. Finally, the presence of a convenience yield for reserves implies that the interbank market will be open only if the interbank rate exceeds a breakeven rate that we denote by r_1^φ .

A. Equilibrium as S_0 Changes

In the liquidity stressed state, three cases may arise (see Appendix B):

Case 1: Stressed banks have enough liquidity (while raising date 1 capital commensurate with the convenience yield) to meet the needs of deposit outflows and to fund rescue investment without accessing the interbank market.

This first case arises when the level of reserves, and in turn demandable deposits, is sufficiently low.

Case 2: The liquidity needs of each stressed bank can be entirely met by its raising date 1 capital (beyond that warranted by the convenience yield).

In this second case, the level of reserves is moderately high and the interbank market remains shut ($\varphi = 0$) even though stressed banks are liquidity-deficient; formally, this occurs because the autarky rate r_1^A is below the breakeven rate r_1^φ that healthy banks require to enter the interbank market.

Case 3: The liquidity needs of the stressed banks are high enough that at the equilibrium autarkic interest rate, some of the healthy banks are willing to lend in the interbank market and become tainted. The equilibrium rate is then lower than the (now counterfactual) autarkic rate.

The third case arises when the level of reserves is high enough that the autarky rate r_1^A rises above the breakeven rate r_1^φ and the interbank market opens ($\varphi > 0$). Some surplus banks are induced by the high interbank premium to provide liquidity to deficient banks.¹²

B. Determining φ When the Interbank Market Opens

Let us characterize the third case to understand when in equilibrium the interbank market opens or remains shut. The φ healthy banks that choose to lend in the date 1 interbank market will lend all their shrunken reserves as well as the capital raised at date 1 at rate r_1 . The date 1 profits from doing so are $V_1^\varphi = [(r_1 - \delta)S_0(1 - \tau) + r_1^2/2\alpha_1]$, where the first term is the incremental value from lending out own shrunken reserves, and the second term is the profit from raising capital ($e_1 = r_1/\alpha_1$) and lending the proceeds. The net reserve outflows from the stressed and now tainted banks amount to

¹² We assume that δ is sufficiently large for these cases to arise. The condition is formally stated in Appendix B, in the proof of Theorems 2 and 3. When the convenience yield δ is small, it is possible that only Cases 1 and 3 arise since the breakeven rate r_1^φ may be lower than δ at the level of reserves that requires a switch out of Case 1.

$S_0(1 - \tau)[\theta + (1 - \theta)\varphi]$, and these go to the $(1 - \theta)(1 - \varphi)$ banks that choose to be safe. So the profit from being seen as safe and attracting the flight-to-safety deposits is $V_1^{1-\varphi} = \frac{\delta S_0(1-\tau)[\theta+(1-\theta)\varphi]}{(1-\theta)(1-\varphi)} = \delta S_0(1 - \tau) \left(\frac{1}{(1-\theta)(1-\varphi)} - 1 \right)$. In equilibrium, healthy banks should be indifferent between choosing to become tainted or stay safe. So $V_1^\varphi = V_1^{1-\varphi}$. Rearranging terms yields

$$(1 - \varphi) = \frac{\delta S_0(1 - \tau)}{(1 - \theta)(r_1 S_0(1 - \tau) + r_1^2/2\alpha_1)}. \quad (13)$$

Inspecting (13), it is clear that $\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial S_0} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial \delta} < 0$, and $\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} > 0$. In words, the share of healthy banks lending in the interbank market decreases in the ex ante level of reserves (because as S_0 increases, the relative profits from raising and lending capital fall relative to attracting the flight-to-safety deposits) and in the convenience yield, while it increases in the available interbank rate.¹³

Thus, requiring that $\varphi > 0$ yields the “breakeven interbank rate” r_1^φ , which induces some banks to lend in the interbank market. When $\varphi > 0$, the equilibrium interest rate \bar{r}_1 and φ are now jointly determined by equations (10) and (13). Finally, comparing the breakeven interbank rate r_1^φ and the autarky rate r_1^A determines when Case 2 versus Case 3 will arise. These details are worked out in Appendix B, where we formally show the following result.

THEOREM 2: *For $\delta > 0$ and $\tau > 0$, there exist critical thresholds for the level of reserves, S_0^* and S_0^{**} , where $S_0^{**} > S_0^* > 0$, such that the interbank market is open, that is, $\varphi > 0$, only for $S_0 > S_0^{**}$. Moreover,*

- (i) *For $S_0 \leq S_0^*$, stressed banks are not liquidity-deficient (taking into account the capital they raise as dictated by the convenience yield), and r_1 charged to firms equals δ .*
- (ii) *For $S_0 \in (S_0^*, S_0^{**}]$, stressed banks are liquidity-deficient and raise more capital at date 1 than dictated by the convenience yield, but the interbank market remains shut (autarky). Furthermore, the autarkic lending rate to firms r_1^A satisfies $r_1^A > \delta$, $\frac{dr_1^A}{dS_0} > 0$, and $r_1^A(S_0^{**}) = r_1^\varphi(S_0^{**}) > 0$.*
- (iii) *For $S_0 > S_0^{**}$, stressed banks are liquidity-deficient and raise capital as well as borrow in the interbank market at date 1. The interbank rate satisfies $\bar{r}_1(S_0) \geq r_1^\varphi(S_0) > 0$, with $r_1^\varphi(S_0)$ increasing in S_0 .*

We also show in Appendix B that the equilibrium r_1 is increasing in S_0 in case (iii) whenever $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ as in Section II.A. However, it is only a sufficient condition now, since with endogenous φ , the incentive to hoard and attract deposits also increases in S_0 , further increasing the equilibrium interest rate. Furthermore, since φ rises from zero at the breakeven interest

¹³ As an aside, as $\delta \rightarrow 0$, we have $\varphi \rightarrow 1$. That is, as the convenience yield of reserves falls to zero, virtually all healthy banks choose to lend in the interbank market. Only an infinitesimal share of the healthy banks prefers being seen as safe, and these attract all the flight-to-safety reserves, which carry an infinitesimal convenience yield δ .

rate r_1^φ at which the interbank market opens, there is always a region in case (iii) in which r_1 increases in S_0 .

Finally, as the convenience yield δ associated with reserves increases, the interbank market remains shut over a wider range of the level of reserves, and the level of the interbank rate increases with δ whenever the interbank market is open. Formally,

THEOREM 3: (i) S_0^* and S_0^{**} are increasing in δ and (ii) for $S_0 > S_0^{**}$, $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{d\delta} > 0$.

Interestingly, because the decisions the bank makes at date 0 does not affect flight to safety inflows (whether they are received depends on whether the bank chooses to be tainted or safe, an equally profitable date 1 decision, and their size depends on decisions by other banks at date 0), and because banks take φ and \bar{r}_1 as given, the ex ante bank maximization problem is the same as that analyzed above, though φ , \bar{r}_1 , and bank expected profits will be altered by δ .

C. Examples and Details

In Figure 3, Panels A and B illustrate model outcomes for the specific parameterization in which $\delta = 0.2$, and $\tau = 0.2$. In Panel A, $\theta = 0.8 = (1 - \tau)$; and in Panel B, $\theta = 0.6 < (1 - \tau)$. The other parameters are $\lambda = 1$, $\gamma = 0.4$, $q = 0.1$, $\alpha_0 = \alpha_1 = 1$, $W_0^F = 2$, and $g'_0 = g'_1 = 1/I$. The breakeven interbank rate $r_1^\varphi(S_0)$ is in green, the autarkic bank lending rate $r_1^A(S_0)$ is in yellow (with its hypothetical value extrapolated if the interbank market were to remain shut even for $S_0 > S_0^{**}$), and the equilibrium interbank rate $\bar{r}_1(S_0)$ when some healthy banks choose to enter the interbank market is in blue. While the entry of some healthy banks pulls the interbank rate down (blue line relative to the yellow line), it nevertheless remains above $r_1^\varphi(S_0)$ and is increasing in S_0 for both sets of parameters.

In Figure 4, Panels A and B illustrate the effects of varying the convenience yield δ , with θ set at 0.6, less than $(1 - \tau)$. In Panel A, δ takes values close to zero, whereas in Panel B, it takes significantly higher values. In both cases, as δ increases, the threshold reserve level above which the interbank market opens shifts higher to the right, though this shift is relatively modest at low values of δ . Also, as δ increases, the interbank rate is higher whenever the interbank market is open. Finally, Panel C shows that as δ increases, the proportion φ of surplus banks that enter the interbank market decreases.

D. Endogenous δ

Thus far, we have assumed the date 1 convenience yield is exogenous, but it likely depends on the net liquidity mismatch. A good proxy for the date 1 mismatch is r_1 . The higher is r_1 , the more worried market participants may be about hidden problems (and opportunities to buy in fire sales) emanating from the current stress, and the more they may value the convenience yield in holding reserves. If $\delta(r_1) = \delta^A + \delta^B r_1^2$, where $\delta^A \geq 0$ and $\delta^B \geq 0$ we




Figure 3. Numerical example for the model of Section II.B with endogenous interbank market opening: The effect of varying the size of the shock θ . (a) Market rate and reserves for $\delta = 0.2$, $\tau = 0.2$, $\theta = 0.8$. (b) Market rate and reserves for $\delta = 0.2$, $\tau = 0.2$, $\theta = 0.6$. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)

show in Appendix B that such a convenience yield on reserves that rises in liquidity-stressed states magnifies date 1 stress as the interbank market remains closed over a wider parameter range.¹⁴

¹⁴ Specifically, we show that depending on parameters, it is possible that (i) the interbank market never opens (particularly when δ^B is sufficiently high, because the convenience yield grows fast with the interbank premium, increasing the returns to hoarding more than lending), (ii) that




Figure 4. Numerical example for the model of Section II.B with endogenous interbank market opening: The effect of varying the convenience yield on reserves δ . (a) Market rate and reserves for low δ . (b) Market rate and reserves for high δ . (c) ϕ and reserves for various δ (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)

E. Discussion

In a stressed situation, healthy banks may be unwilling to lend, especially if the convenience yield associated with reserves is high. With the interbank market shut ($\varphi \rightarrow 0$)—a plausible scenario in recent stress episodes—the condition for the interbank rate to rise in the level of reserves (Theorem 1) holds even with minor reserve shrinkage ($\tau \rightarrow 0$). Additional reserve issuance at date 0 then raises the risk premium conditional on the market getting stressed.

Is liquidity hoarding significant? Studies do indeed find that the interbank market is disrupted during periods of stress or likely reserve shortage (see, for example, Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2011), Copeland, Duffie, and Yang (2021), and Iyer et al. (2014)). In the United States, one measure of the reluctance of commercial banks to lend to one another at such times is the amount of funding that is run through the FHLBs, institutions that are considered to be implicitly guaranteed by the federal government and thus entail almost no credit risk. Essentially, by acting as a counterparty between banks (or between banks and money market funds), the FHLB intermediates funds when the private market for liquidity is stressed or frozen. Put differently, the implicitly guaranteed FHLBs do not fear the taint from lending that private banks fear, and thus reallocate liquidity when banks would not do so on their own.¹⁵ Cecchetti, Schoenholtz, and White (2023) document a huge expansion in FHLB balance sheets in 2008, again as reserves shrank after QE ended in 2014 until the Fed resumed QE in September 2019, again in March 2020 before the Fed flooded the market with reserves, and again when the Fed started QT in March 2022.

IV. Shrinkage of Reserves in QT and Expansion of Commercial Bank Balance Sheets in QE

We have argued above that a share τ of reserves is not available at date 1 for any interbank transfers, because of either shrinkage or encumbrances. We now discuss in greater detail the role of QT (where the central bank sells government bonds or other eligible securities for reserves) in shrinking bank reserves. In Sections I.A and I.B of the [Internet Appendix](#), we consider, respectively, banks tying up “spare” reserves in funding speculative activity and regulations as two other channels through which reserve encumbrance can be endogenized.¹⁶

it opens only if the date 1 rate lies in a given range and is closed otherwise, or (iii) it opens above a certain rate as with a fixed δ .

¹⁵ In so doing, the FHLBs prevent more damage from stress situations, but at the potential cost of taking on significant lending risk and crowding out private interbank market in the first place (a theme we will return to when we consider ex post central bank interventions in Section VI.B).

¹⁶ The [Internet Appendix](#) is available in the online version of this article on *The Journal of Finance* website.

A. Reserves Shrinkage Factor τ due to QT

In Exhibit 1, Panels A–C show that while injecting reserves into the banking system during QE leads to an expansion of bank balance sheets via a corresponding increase in demandable bank claims (such as uninsured demandable deposits and lines of credit), the withdrawal of reserves during QT is *not* associated with a corresponding reduction in these claims.

To generalize our model in this direction, consider the central bank undertaking QT just before date 1 uncertainty is realized. Suppose that QT shrinks each bank's reserves by τS_0 and also shrinks bank deposits in the process (symmetrically across banks for simplicity) by a factor $\tau^D S_0$, where $\tau^D \leq \tau$. Thus, each bank swaps some of its reserves with the central bank for securities (as elaborated below) and now holds $(\tau - \tau^D)S_0$ in securities. The date 1 market-clearing condition (10) takes the modified form

$$[\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]\alpha_1^{-1}r_1 = \theta[I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F) - \tau^D S_0] - [\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta]S_0(1 - \tau).$$

It is straightforward to show that a *necessary* condition for higher S_0 followed by QT to raise r_1 is $\tau^D < \tau$. Conversely, if QT is exactly a reversal of QE, that is $\tau^D = \tau$, then we have to appeal to encumbrances (see Sections I.A and I.B of the Internet Appendix) rather than QT to explain liquidity stress. Further, the sufficient condition for reserves to be destabilizing now takes the form $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{(\tau-\tau^D)+\varphi(1-\tau)}$.

Empirically, Acharya et al. (2022) find that $\tau^D \approx 0$ in the post-QE period before the pandemic, validating our starting assumption in the model that $\tau^D = 0$. This could be due, for example, to QT being in large part an asset swap with banks.

Let us put $\tau^D < \tau$ on firmer footing. Suppose the central bank announces QT, where it will sell a quantity τS_0 of securities (per bank). Each bank is a primary broker-dealer, which has to decide what fraction s of reserves to use to purchase securities being offered by the central bank, and thus what residual fraction it offers to its nonbank clients. Nonbanks will purchase securities and pay for them with their deposit accounts held at the bank.¹⁷ So the total reduction of reserves in the banking system is τS_0 regardless of the bank's choice. However, if the bank purchases securities, it simply swaps reserves for securities, which does not alter the quantity of its deposits, whereas nonbank purchases reduce bank reserves and deposits by $\tau^D S_0 = (1 - s)\tau S_0$. Finally, suppose that securities are sold at market value and they can be tendered at the central bank's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) operations for reserves in the future at a haircut $h \leq 1$.

We can then solve for banks' optimal choice of participation in QT, summarized by s , as in Section II.B (equations (4) to (7)). In particular, banks

¹⁷ The implicit assumption is that the central bank relies on its broker-dealer banks to place/purchase securities, and these broker-dealers determine the mix of what they buy and therefore the share their clients buy.

anticipate their liquidity need when stressed as

$$b_1(y = 1, z = 1) = (I_1 - D_0^F) + [D_0 - (1 - s)\tau S_0] \\ - [S_0(1 - \tau) + (1 - h)s\tau S_0] - e_1,$$

which captures the reduction in deposits due to security purchases by non-banks, as well as the state-contingent increase in reserves if the bank borrows reserves from the LOLR, collateralized by its security purchases amounting to $s\tau S_0$ at a haircut h . Similarly, banks anticipate that when they are not stressed but other banks are, their spare liquidity to lend in interbank markets is

$b_1(y = 1, z = 0) = -[S_0(1 - \tau) + (1 - h)s\tau S_0] - e_1$. Banks' choice of s then maximizes the objective function

$$\text{Max}_s \quad -\frac{q}{\theta} \theta [r_1 (b_1(y = 1, z = 1) - (I_1 - D_0^F))] - \frac{q}{\theta} (1 - \theta) \varphi [r_1 b_1(y = 1, z = 0)].$$

Simplifying the FOC with respect to s indicates that it is positive iff $qr_1 S_0 [(1 + \frac{(1-\theta)}{\theta} \varphi)(1 - h) - 1] > 0$ or iff $(1 + \frac{(1-\theta)}{\theta} \varphi) > (\frac{1}{1-h})$, which always holds for a small enough haircut on securities, h , provided that $\varphi > 0$.

Intuitively, the bank prefers to swap reserves with the central bank for liquid securities ($s = 1$) whenever the LOLR haircut against securities is sufficiently small, rather than see both its reserves and deposits fall when it leaves the securities purchases to its nonbank clients. The reason is interesting. If the bank is stressed, it is always better off with lower reserves and lower deposits than holding securities, so long as the haircut is positive—essentially, its need for funds in the stressed state increases because securities are not as good a source of liquidity as reserves. However, healthy banks that propose to lend in the interbank market are always better off if they bought securities with reserves rather than see both sides of the balance sheet shrink; their depositors do not run, while their securities can be used to raise reserves that can be lent in the interbank market. So the higher the ratio of healthy banks that lend to stressed banks, and the lower the haircut, the more likely QT is to occur as an asset swap with banks (with bank deposits not falling) rather than as an asset purchase from nonbanks.

Formally, it follows from Theorem 1 that if $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau + \varphi(1-\tau)}$, then $\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} > 0$ and in turn $r_1 > 0$ for high enough S_0 . Furthermore, if $(1 + \frac{(1-\theta)}{\theta} \varphi) > (\frac{1}{1-h})$, then QT occurs as an asset swap with banks ($s = 1$), bank deposits do not shrink ($\tau^D = 0$), and $r_1 > 0$ in equilibrium for high enough S_0 . In other words, each bank buys securities in QT from the central bank to maximize profits, taking aggregate liquidity risk (r_1) as given, but collectively this ensures that bank deposits do not shrink, giving rise to aggregate liquidity risk ($r_1 > 0$) in equilibrium. This form of QT is socially undesirable, however, as it would be better if securities were sold to nonbanks ($s = 0$) and bank deposits shrink one-for-one with reserves ($\tau^D = \tau$), so there is no aggregate liquidity risk ($r_1 = 0$) in equilibrium, even when $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau + \varphi(1-\tau)}$.

In sum, each broker bank prefers to buy securities in QT from the central bank because, individually, it prefers to maintain the size of its runnable demand deposits without sacrificing substantial liquidity on the asset side of its balance sheet. It turns out that at date 0 of the model when the central bank undertakes QE, there is an almost identical mechanism at work in which banks individually prefer to expand the size of their demand deposits while simultaneously augmenting reserves on the asset side of their balance sheets. We formalize this next.

B. Why Commercial Bank Balance Sheets Expand during QE

Suppose that at date 0 of our model when the central bank engages in QE, that is, securities purchases, each bank has a legacy stock of securities $T > 0$. The bank chooses how much of these securities to sell, (say) equal to a fraction t of the reserves injection S_0 . The broker bank directs the remainder of the securities that the central bank intends to purchase, $(1 - t)S_0$, to its nonbank clients, which implies that its reserves and its deposits expand by this amount when its clients deposit the central bank's payment in their bank. Once again, we can solve for banks' optimal choice of participation via asset swaps in QE, summarized by t , as in Section II.B (equations (4) to (7)). For simplicity, we assume that QT occurs as an asset swap with banks ($s = 1$ in Section IV.A), but this is not necessary for the results that follow. In particular, banks anticipate their liquidity need when stressed as

$$b_1(y = 1, z = 1) = (I_1 - D_0^F) + D_0 - [S_0(1 - \tau) + (1 - h)(T - tS_0 + \tau S_0)] - e_1.$$

Similarly, banks anticipate that when they are not stressed but other banks are, their spare liquidity to lend in interbank markets is $b_1(y = 1, z = 0) = -[S_0(1 - \tau) + (1 - h)(T - tS_0 + \tau S_0)] - e_1$.

Banks' choice of s then maximizes the objective function

$$\text{Max}_t -\frac{q}{\theta} [r_1(b_1(y = 1, z = 1) - (I_1 - D_0^F))] - \frac{q}{\theta} (1 - \theta) \varphi [r_1 b_1(y = 1, z = 0)]$$

subject to the budget constraint $D_0 + e_0 = L_0 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2 + S_0 + (T - tS_0)$.

The FOC with respect to t is $qr_1S_0(h - \frac{(1-\theta)}{\theta}\varphi(1-h))$, which is less than zero iff $(1 + \frac{(1-\theta)}{\theta}\varphi) > (\frac{1}{1-h})$, the same as the condition in Section IV.A. In other words, when the condition holds, banks choose $t = 0$, that is, allow their nonbank clients to sell securities during QE instead of selling any of their own. This expands bank balance sheets on both the asset and liability sides, which they privately prefer as it gives them profits when they are not stressed in the future but other banks are. Banks do not internalize the possibility that by doing so, they may collectively exacerbate liquidity stress in the system in the future. Interestingly, it is the same private incentive that implies that during QT, banks engage in asset swaps with the central bank and do not contract their balance sheets.

Combining the results of Sections IV.A and IV.B, it follows that if the haircut h on eligible collateral at the central bank is sufficiently small, in particular, if $(1 + \frac{(1-\theta)}{\theta}\varphi) > (\frac{1}{1-h})$, then commercial banks do not sell securities but see their balance sheets expand as a result of the central bank's reserves injection S_0 during QE, while they buy securities and do not contract their balance sheets during QT. In this case, liquidity stress obtains ex post ($r_1 > 0$) when $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau + \varphi(1-\tau)}$ for high enough S_0 (Theorem 1).

In practice, other considerations may also be at play. For instance, if policy rates are rising sharply at the same time as QT is underway, depositors may search for yield outside the banking system. If so, bank balance sheets may contract for reasons outside the model, offsetting banker incentives to maintain large balance sheets. We then have to appeal to regulations and banks tying up "spare" reserves in funding speculative activity, which we model in Section I.A of the Internet Appendix, to explain why τ is large.

V. Robustness

We now elaborate on some of the assumptions we have made and discuss their robustness.

A. Binding Reserve Requirement, Reserve Expansion, Activity, and Financial Fragility

Thus far, we have taken the central bank's monetary motives in injecting reserves as given, and focus on the consequences of commercial bank decisions. Since there are many rationales for why central bank reserve expansion could directly affect date 0 activity, we focus on an obvious one—it alleviates an explicit or implicit reserve requirement on the commercial bank's deposit issuance. Explicit reserve requirements used to be the norm, but more recently implicit requirements such as an LCR, whereby liquid assets must exceed some "run-offs" on deposits (and other demandable claims on the bank), have taken their place. We show that with a binding reserve requirement, deposits issued can be a multiple greater than one of reserves and we no longer need $\tau > 0$ for $\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} > 0$. Interestingly, real activity need not be enhanced by additional reserves, even when the reserve constraint is binding.

Suppose we add to the model in Section I a requirement that a bank's deposits cannot exceed a multiplier $\varsigma > 1$ of its reserves holding, that is, $D_0 \leq \varsigma S_0$. The requirement likely binds when date 0 equity issue costs, α_0 , are so high that no additional equity is issued. We assume this for simplicity, although by continuity the results will hold when equity issuance costs are merely high. When the requirement binds, deposits are no longer the residual from the date 0 funding constraint (equation (4)).

Formally, denoting the Lagrangian on the reserve constraint on deposits as $\Lambda \geq 0$, the cost of deposits when the constraint binds is $(1 + qr_1 + \Lambda)$. Then, $(1 + \lambda L_0) = (1 + qr_1 + \Lambda)^{-1}(1 + q\gamma + qr_1)$. As before, we have $\frac{r_1}{\alpha_1} =$

$\frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]}[I_0 + I_1 - L_0 - W_0^F + D_0] - S_0(1-\tau) \equiv f(r_1, S_0)$. Totally differentiating, we have $(\frac{1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1})\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial S_0}$. We know that $\frac{\partial I_0}{\partial r_1} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial I_1}{\partial r_1} < 0$. Also, when the deposit constraint binds, $D_0 = \zeta S_0$, and with no date 0 equity issuance, the date 0 resource constraint for the bank takes the form $L_0 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2 = (\zeta - 1)S_0$, so that $\frac{\partial D_0}{\partial r_1} = 0$, $\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial r_1} = 0$, and $\frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} < 0$ as before. Therefore, $Sign(\frac{dr_1}{dS_0}) = Sign(\frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]}(\frac{\partial D_0}{\partial S_0} - \frac{\partial L_0}{\partial S_0}) - (1-\tau))$. Furthermore, $\frac{\partial D_0}{\partial S_0} = \zeta$ and $\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial S_0} = \frac{(\zeta-1)}{1+\lambda L_0} < (\zeta - 1)$. So $\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} > 0$ iff $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{(\zeta - \frac{(\zeta-1)}{1+\lambda L_0}) - (1-\varphi)(1-\tau)}$, which can also be expressed as the condition $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau + \varphi(1-\tau) + (\zeta - 1)\frac{\lambda L_0}{1+\lambda L_0}}$, the same as before except for the extra positive term in the denominator $(\zeta - 1)\frac{\lambda L_0}{1+\lambda L_0}$.

Note that even if $\tau = 0$, the condition can now hold because the right-hand side of the condition is always smaller than one. When the condition does hold, the date 1 demand for liquidity increases more than one-for-one with reserves because deposit issuance was constrained by reserves earlier. So somewhat paradoxically, date 0 corporate investment falls (because r_1 is higher), date 0 firm borrowing L_0 increases, and the excess is stored as a deposit with the bank (equivalently, this is a committed line of credit). Central bank balance sheet expansion then raises term lending and corporate leverage, but this translates into greater corporate deposits or savings rather than real investment.

Throughout this paper, we have taken the effects of QE on activity as given. It is difficult, however, to quantify the net positive macroeconomic effects of QE (see Greenlaw et al. (2018), Moreno (2019), and Fabo et al. (2021)). One reason is perhaps because so much else is going on over the period of the interventions. Our analysis suggests another possible reason, namely, enhanced ex post stress stemming from higher ex ante reserves. Earlier, we focus on enhanced stress stemming from high reserve shrinkage, τ , or hoarding, $(1-\varphi)$. Here, we focus only on the possible offsetting effects of central bank balance sheet expansion of an even greater expansion of the banking sector's demandable deposits. All of these sources can lead to financial fragility and increase the interbank premium r_1 , which dampens real investment. This may help account for why the effects of unconventional monetary policy are hard to determine.

B. Private Incentives to Hold Reserves: Gap between Effective Fed Funds Rate and Interest on Reserves

What if banks were not forced to hold S_0 ? It turns out, not surprisingly, that banks will privately not have the same incentives as the planner/central bank and will want to optimally hold different levels of reserves (often lower) in a variety of circumstances. Formally, suppose that banks can pass around the reserves after date 0 in a secondary market at the ("effective federal funds") rate r^{EFFR} , which for simplicity of exposition we assume is earned at date 2. As before, we continue to assume that the central bank pays the "risk-free" rate

on reserves $r^{IOR} = 0$. The trade-off faced by the bank is that it can seek to earn an extra return on its reserves in the secondary market, but this enhances its rollover risk as liquidity stress and a depositor run could materialize before its loans in the federal funds market are repaid, which reduces its ability to gain from interbank lending in stressed conditions if it were to remain healthy.

Focusing only on the bank's marginal choice of releasing Δ of its reserves in the secondary market, and assuming for simplicity that $\delta \rightarrow 0$, so $\varphi \rightarrow 1$ (all surplus banks lend in the interbank market in the stressed state of the economy at date 1), this choice, based on bank's objective function in Section II.A, boils down to

$$\text{Max}_{\Delta} (r^{EFFR} - r^{IOR})\Delta - \frac{q}{\theta}\theta r_1\Delta - \frac{q}{\theta}(1 - \theta)r_1\Delta,$$

where $(r^{EFFR} - r^{IOR})$ represents the effective rate earned on reserves released in the secondary market relative to the opportunity cost of holding them on the balance sheet. The first-order derivative with respect to Δ is

$$(r^{EFFR} - r^{IOR}) - qr_1 - \frac{q}{\theta}(1 - \theta)r_1.$$

Therefore, the secondary-market rate r^{EFFR} at which banks are indifferent to holding reserves or not is given by

$$(r^{EFFR} - r^{IOR}) = \frac{q}{\theta}r_1.$$

This corresponds to the so-called *EFFR-IOR*, the difference between the effective federal funds rate and the interest on reserves, and has been the subject of recent empirical study in Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022) and Acharya et al. (2022).

Note that if $\theta > (1 - \tau)$, then as shown in Theorem 1, r_1 is positive for high enough reserves so that $r^{EFFR} > r^{IOR}$, reflecting that as with term loan rates, the secondary market rate on reserves must also compensate banks for the fact that deposits issued to finance the reserves lead to rollover problems at date 1. However, for low enough level of reserves, or $\theta < (1 - \tau)$, then $r_1 = 0$. The point is that if the impact of reserves on *EFFR-IOR* is estimated over low- and high-reserve periods, then the impact may not be easily identifiable from a statistical standpoint, as Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022) document. Even more interestingly, taking the derivative with respect to S_0 yields

$$\frac{d(r^{EFFR} - r^{IOR})}{dS_0} = \frac{q}{\theta} \frac{dr_1}{dS_0} = \frac{q}{\theta} \left[\frac{\partial r_1}{\partial S_0} + \frac{\partial r_1}{\partial D_0} \frac{dD_0}{dS_0} \right].$$

This then implies that to statistically “identify” the intuitive negative (stabilizing) effect of reserves on *EFFR-IOR* ($\frac{\partial r_1}{\partial S_0} < 0$), it is important to control

for deposits given the counterintuitive positive effect of reserves on *EFFR-IOR* working via deposits ($\frac{\partial r_1}{\partial D_0} > 0$, $\frac{dD_0}{dS_0} > 0$), the latter being the primary thrust of our model and analysis. This is indeed what Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022) and Acharya et al. (2022) find empirically to be the case. Finally, Lee Smith and Varcacel (2023) and Acharya et al. (2022) find that the sensitivity of *EFFR-IOR* to reserves and uninsured deposits is stronger in magnitude during active QT by the Fed, as would be the case if liquidity stress (q) is more likely then or if reserves shrinkage (τ) rises unexpectedly.

C. Reserves with the Nonbank Financial Sector and Growth of Its Demandable Claims

Our simple model allows for many other possible extensions and explorations. An important one concerns the question: What if the central bank issues reserves directly to the nonbank financial sector? Here again (see Section II of the [Internet Appendix](#)), a desire to match the duration of liabilities with assets to reduce risk will result in nonbanks financing with short-term liabilities.

There is evidence suggestive of this. In April 2021, the Federal Reserve reinstated the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) for commercial banks. This is a regulatory capital requirement that was suspended in April 2020 in the wake of the pandemic (see Covas (2021)). Given the increased cost to banks of funding reserves with long-term capital, they released reserves. Interestingly, money market funds, themselves funded with short-term liabilities, took on the reserves, redepositing them at the Fed through reverse-repo facilities. This suggests that the natural way for intermediaries, even from the nonbank financial sector, to fund reserves is short term and will likely lead to financial fragility concerns akin to those we analyze for the banking sector.

D. Assumptions About θ

An important simplification in our model is that the share of stressed banks, θ , is invariant to the build-up in reserves. It might seem that the risks to commercial bank balance sheets should fall as the share of reserves composing those balance sheets increases. If so, our model would hold only for the range of reserve expansion in which commercial bank credit risk is not swamped by reserve expansion. Yet, this neglects both leverage and additional sources of risk. First, as we have argued and Acharya et al. (2022) find, incremental reserves are fully (or more than fully) funded by demandable deposits. So absent commercial bank capital-raising, even small amounts of credit risk relative to the size of the commercial bank's assets can have large adverse consequences. Second, the unmodeled effects of central bank balance sheet expansion on activity, if sizable, should expand corporate borrowing and increase the risk thereof. Third, as we show in Section I.A of the [Internet Appendix](#), banks have an incentive to fund speculative activity and provide margin or collateral services, which can become a source of encumbrance on reserves. Thus, it is not obvious

that the assumption of an invariant θ is implausible. Deeper analysis of the underpinnings of θ and S_0 and their relationship is an important avenue for future research.

VI. Bank Capital Structure and Ex Post Central Bank Intervention

A. The Central Bank / Planner's Problem in Setting the Bank Capital Structure

It might seem that the planner can prevent all liquidity shortages by asking banks to finance with sufficient capital at date 0. However, this need not be either privately or socially optimal since capital is costly. It is therefore useful to ask whether bank capital requirements can be an added instrument for the central bank, for example, when it needs to set reserves for monetary reasons at a level that induces a positive r_1 .

While there is a pecuniary externality when a bank makes its financing choice between deposits and capital (the bank takes r_1 as given and does not internalize the fact that its choice of higher deposit financing will increase the net demand for liquidity at date 1 and raise r_1), it is well known that pecuniary externalities need not cause a divergence between the privately optimal and socially optimal choices. Indeed, we show in Appendix C that this is the case in our model when we take as given the fraction φ of banks that lend in the interbank market. So the planner will not want to alter bank capital choices in the basic model. This result is unlike that in Lorenzoni (2008) or Stein (2012), where banks finance excessively with deposits.

However, with endogenous φ , there is a divergence between the privately and the socially optimal choices, but interestingly in a different direction from Lorenzoni (2008) and Stein (2012). The social planner would finance with more deposits and less capital at date 0 than the bank privately would!

THEOREM 4: If $\bar{r}_1 > 0$, $\frac{dU}{de_0}|_{e_0=\frac{qr_1}{a_0}} < 0$, so at the private bank's optimal financing choice, the central bank/planner wants the bank to finance reserve holdings with less capital.

PROOF: See Appendix C.

Our result differs from Stein (2012) because the nature of the spillover differs. In Stein (2012), higher bank capital reduces the fire-sale discount, causing lending by nonbanks at date 0 to increase (the source of spillover). In a sense, nonbanks hoard less ex ante anticipating fewer fire sales, which increases lending. In our framework, the bank makes all lending decisions. So the pecuniary externality embedded in r_1 (our measure of fire-sale discounts) does not distort private financing choices away from the social optimal—there are no nonbanks to be influenced.

However, when φ is endogenous, something the bank ignores in its maximization, a higher date 0 capital issue directly reduces liquidity stress and hence r_1 , something the bank internalizes. As this lowers the gains to interbank lending, the higher induced hoarding by others indirectly increases the

liquidity shortfall and increases dissipative date 1 equity issuance. The indirect effect, which is not internalized, implies that the social planner wants date 0 capital below the private optimal. Importantly, our focus is only on liquidity. Incorporating costly bank insolvency in our model could certainly alter these implications.

Finally, Diamond, Jiang, and Ma (2021) and Liang and Parkinson (2020) suggest that the SLR (requiring capital to be held against *all* assets including the relatively safe ones) should not apply to reserves. However, their reason for weaker capital requirements is to eliminate a regulatory encumbrance on the use of reserves (see Section I.B of the [Internet Appendix](#)). Our point is different: Lower capital will reduce bank incentives to hoard liquidity *ex post*. Of course, in making policy, all externalities in banks' capital issuance decision will have to be accounted for, including those that we have not modeled.¹⁸

B. Ex Post Central Bank Intervention

A fundamental role of central banks is to provide temporary liquidity when the system is short. Indeed, Walter Bagehot's dictum to central bankers is to lend freely against good collateral at a penal rate when the system is stressed. Note that the central bank's provision of S_0 at date 0 in our model is not temporary (overnight or crisis-time) liquidity, rather it is (more) durable infusion of liquidity, caused by actions such as QE. In that sense, the liquidity mismatches it engenders are not temporary, fixed by intraday liquidity provision by the central bank, but more persistent. Of course, short-term fluctuations in liquidity, such as due to variations in government balances, could be superimposed on these mismatches. Could the central bank alleviate liquidity stress by temporary lending at date 1?

The most effective way for the central bank to intervene *ex post* is for it to lend unsecured into the interbank market. However, this entails significant risk of central bank loan losses. If it does lend against high-quality securities, the financial sector will have to hold those high-quality securities *ex ante*. If they are financed with deposit issuance, they add no extra liquidity to a stressed bank, even allowing for central bank lending against them. Of course, the central bank can broaden the range of assets it will lend against (e.g., lend against corporate securities) even while increasing the size of the haircut it levies on collateral value. The higher the haircut, the less liquidity it will provide the bank. So the central bank does face a trade-off between alleviating liquidity risk and taking on credit risk, with the weight increasingly on the latter as the quantum of required intervention increases.

¹⁸ For instance, as the SLR is a capital requirement, it would typically not affect the decisions banks make on taking liquidity risk, other than reducing demand deposit financing. This has two implications. First, reducing demand deposit financing will come at a welfare cost in our model since bank capital is costly. Second, outside of our model, it will not reduce other off-balance-sheet ways (regulatory arbitrage) of issuing liquidity claims like offering committed lines of credit or liquidity guarantees to bypass capital requirements.

Central bank reserve injection at date 1 will reduce the interbank rate. But then fewer healthy banks will want to lend into that interbank market. So the act of intervention *ex post* can crowd out private lending and associated price discovery (see Filardo (2020)), potentially keep interbank markets shut over a wider range of *ex ante* reserves, and increase the *ex post* quantum of needed central bank intervention. Another subtle effect is also at play. Note that in our model, the incentive of safe banks to hoard reserves is reduced by the capital issuance of stressed and tainted banks. If, however, capital issuances fall because the central bank adds new reserves to the system (which eventually find their way to the safe banks), it further increases the incentive to hoard beyond any effect on the interbank rate because a greater net stock of reserves flows to the safe banks.

Thus far, we have discussed temporary interventions. Yet, given that the underlying liquidity mismatches are persistent, it is unclear how the central bank can signal that its intervention will be temporary without risking the reappearance of liquidity stresses when the intervention ends. If the banking sector thinks the intervention will be longer term, as it appeared to believe with the pandemic QE that the Fed initiated in March 2020 to alleviate liquidity stress, then the banking sector may build up still more demandable liabilities to finance the reserve issuance or may be even more inclined *ex ante* to write future claims on liquidity such as credit lines, thereby becoming ever more dependent on the central bank backstop and setting the stage for yet larger possible intervention in the future. The central bank moves from temporary emergency infusions of liquidity to ever-increasing permanent infusions. In other words, central bank intervention may not be emergency “once and done,” but may continue to ratchet up, with attendant distortions to asset prices and capital allocation. The size of the central bank balance sheet may then eventually run up against political costs and limits (see Plosser (2018)) as well as aggregate constraints on the stock of pledgeable safe assets.

In a related vein, a number of papers that attribute market stress to regulatory and supervisory action (see, for example, Correa, Du, and Liao (2021), D’Avernas and Vandeweyer (2021, 2022), IAWG Treasury Market Surveillance Report (2021)) propose that a permanent increase in outstanding reserves and the size of the central bank balance sheet will be helpful (see also Copeland, Duffie, and Yang (2021)). Our theory, with banks increasing the demand for reserves once the central bank issues them, would qualify this solution because the subsequent endogenous bank response may make matters worse over the medium term (see below).

Anticipation of *ex post* intervention has its own costs. If leveraged illiquid banks expect to receive central bank funds *ex post*, they may not reduce their illiquid assets in a timely manner, taking on further liquidity risk in the process (Acharya and Tuckman (2014)). Similarly, the more the financial sector expects central bank intervention, the more it will increase the *ex ante* issuance of claims on liquidity, effectively reducing liquidity holdings net of liquidity promises (see Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011), Diamond and

Rajan (2012), or Farhi and Tirole (2012)) and necessitating intervention of yet greater magnitude.¹⁹

Our model suggests that the system is most vulnerable after a period of QT. QT is usually undertaken when inflation rises, since it is a form of monetary tightening. If a shock hits, the need for renewed balance sheet expansion to alleviate liquidity stress can undermine the central bank's fight against inflation—a form of financial dominance. It may also send confusing messages on the central bank's monetary stance. Indeed, the rate increases that accompany monetary tightening may be the source of the θ shock—it decapitalizes banks that have interest rate exposure, as was the case with mid-sized U.S. banks in March 2023, and can precipitate wider liquidity stress.²⁰

Finally, central bank balance sheet expansion typically eases government financing, and progressively larger central bank balance sheets induced by commercial bank illiquidity may lead to sustained monetary financing of fiscal deficits, a large cost when an economy is close to fiscal dominance. If there are eventual limits to central bank intervention for monetary or fiscal reasons, the private sector's greater liquidity dependence at that time could eventually result in significant losses.

VII. Conclusion

The significant expansion of central bank balance sheets in recent years should have reduced liquidity stress, and even perhaps increased real activity. Since the central bank's injection of reserves is typically financed by commercial banks with uninsured demandable deposits, the ex ante supply of reserves affects the ex post demand for them. The ex post supply of reserves may also shrink without a commensurate shrinkage in bank deposits, and some banks may hoard reserves during episodes of stress. Taken together, central bank balance sheet expansion (and subsequent contraction) may create and exacerbate situations of liquidity stress. Consequently, its usefulness in enhancing real activity may be more muted than one might think a priori. We have likely only scratched the surface in sketching out implications of this phenomenon. The scope for further research is clear.

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¹⁹ Indeed, some central banks recognize that their provision of liquidity on demand creates dependence for yet more liquidity. Nelson (2019) cites a Norges Bank statement in 2010 justifying its move to a deficit reserves position in the system: “When Norges Bank keeps reserves relatively high for a period, it appears that banks gradually adjust to this level...With ever increasing reserves in the banking system, there is a risk that Norges Bank assumes functions that should be left to the market. It is not Norges Bank's role to provide funding for banks...If a bank has a deficit of reserves towards the end of the day, banks must be able to deal with this by trading in the interbank market.”

²⁰ As of writing, this seems to have been brought under control by a blanket implicit insurance of demand deposits, substantial lending from the Fed's discount window, a new facility that lent against the full face value of securities presented as collateral, and a ratcheting up of loans from the FHLBs.

Appendix A: Proofs for Section II

PROOF OF THEOREM 1: The proof essentially demonstrates that the net need for capital issuance, $f(r_1, S_0)$, decreases in r_1 . To see this, note that the right-hand side of (10) is decreasing in r_1 (we will show this below). The left-hand side is obviously increasing in r_1 . If so, if the right-hand side of (10) is positive when $r_1 = 0$, then there is excess demand for funds in the interbank market when the premium is zero, and hence there is an unique positive crossing point, the equilibrium r_1 . If the right-hand side is non-positive when $r_1 = 0$, there is (weakly) excess supply and r_1 is zero. So it remains to show the right-hand side of (10) is decreasing in r_1 . From (3), $I_1 = g_1'^{-1}(1 + \gamma + r_1)$, which is decreasing in r_1 . Turn next to the second term in the square brackets, $(D_0 - D_0^F)$. This equals $[I_0 - e_0 + (S_0 - W_0^F) + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2]$.²¹ We know that $I_0 = g_0'^{-1}(\frac{1+q\gamma+qr_1}{(1-q)})$, which is decreasing in r_1 . Also, $-e_0 = -\frac{qr_1}{\alpha_0}$, which is decreasing in r_1 . The next term, $(S_0 - W_0^F)$, is a constant. That leaves the last term, $\frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2$. From (9), we have $L_0^B = \frac{1}{\lambda}(\frac{R_0^{DF} - R_0^{DB}}{R_0^{DB}}) = \frac{q}{\lambda}(\frac{\gamma}{1+q\gamma})$, which decreases in r_1 . Thus, given L_0 is positive, $\frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2$ also decreases in r_1 . This implies that $(D_0 - D_0^F)$, the deposits that the bank raises from the public, is decreasing in r_1 . Finally, the last term on the right-hand side of (10), $-\alpha_1 S_0(1 - \tau)$, is a constant. So the right-hand side of (10) is decreasing in r_1 and the equilibrium r_1 is unique.

Next, we examine how the possibly positive equilibrium rate, \bar{r}_1 , implicitly determined by (10), varies with central bank reserves. Totally differentiating (10), we have $\frac{1}{\alpha_1} \frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} \cdot \frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial S_0}$. Therefore, $(\frac{1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1}) \frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial S_0} = \frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]} - (1 - \tau)$. Since $\frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1}$ is negative as shown above, $(\frac{1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1})$ is positive, and $Sign(\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0}) = Sign(\frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]} - (1 - \tau))$. \square

Characterizing the threshold level of reserves determining when \bar{r}_1 is positive (Section II.D): Because $f(r_1, S_0)$ is decreasing in r_1 (see the proof of Theorem 1), it must be the case that \bar{r}_1 is positive iff $f(0, S_0) > 0$. We thus have $f(r_1, S_0) = \frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]}(g_1'^{-1}(1 + \gamma + r_1) + g_0'^{-1}(\frac{1+q\gamma+qr_1}{(1-q)}) - \frac{qr_1}{\alpha_0} - W_0^F + \frac{1}{2}\frac{q^2}{\lambda}(\frac{\gamma}{1+q\gamma})^2) + S_0(\frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]} - (1 - \tau))$.

So, for $f(0, S_0) > 0$, it must be the case that $S_0(\frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]} - (1 - \tau)) > \frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]}(-g_1'^{-1}(1 + \gamma) - g_0'^{-1}(\frac{1+q\gamma}{(1-q)}) + W_0^F - \frac{1}{2}\frac{q^2}{\lambda}(\gamma)^2) \equiv NLS$.

Note that NLS is the net liquidity supplied by the corporate sector anticipating a date 1 interbank premium of zero (and adjusting for any cost to lending). We can then characterize the level of date 0 central bank reserves \hat{S}_0 at which the interbank rate turns positive as well as how the interbank rate moves with reserves around that threshold.

²¹ This requires substituting in (10) $(D_0 - D_0^F) = (S_0 + L_0 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2 - e_0) - (W_0^F + L_0 - I_0) = I_0 - e_0 + (S_0 - W_0^F) + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2$.




Figure A1. Reserves are on the y axis, and θ on the x axis, with the axes intersecting at $\theta = \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)

THEOREM A1:

- (i) If $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$, then $\bar{r}_1 > 0$ is the unique equilibrium for $S_0 > \hat{S}_0$, with \bar{r}_1 increasing in S_0 and $\bar{r}_1 = 0$ for $S_0 \leq \hat{S}_0$. Note that $\hat{S}_0 \leq 0$ if $NLS \leq 0$.
- (ii) If $\theta \leq \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$, then $\bar{r}_1 > 0$ is the unique equilibrium for $S_0 < \hat{S}_0$, with \bar{r}_1 decreasing in S_0 and $\bar{r}_1 = 0$ for $S_0 \geq \hat{S}_0$. Note that $\hat{S}_0 \geq 0$ if $NLS \geq 0$.

Theorem A1 (ii) is the traditional view of reserves. An increase in reserves should alleviate future illiquidity, reduce the interbank rate, and increase current (and future) real investment. A preponderance of reserves, $S_0 \geq \hat{S}_0$, ensures that the date 1 interbank interest rate premium will be zero. Theorem A1 (i) is the alternative view that our model also offers.

Threshold level of reserves when $NLS < 0$: In Figure A1, we plot the threshold value of reserves at which the date 1 interbank rate is zero, \hat{S}_0 , for different values of θ (the fraction of the banking sector that becomes liquidity stressed) for the case in which $NLS < 0$. The size of reserves is on the vertical axis and θ is on the horizontal axis.

When $\theta < \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ (to the left of the vertical axis), \hat{S}_0 is positive and rises in θ . Because higher ex ante reserves loosen liquidity conditions, \bar{r}_1 falls in S_0 and the unhatched region below the \hat{S}_0 curve is where \bar{r}_1 is positive with \bar{r}_1 decreasing in S_0 . When $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ (to the right of the vertical axis), \hat{S}_0 is negative and increases in θ . Because higher ex ante reserves tighten liquidity in the stressed state, \bar{r}_1 increases in S_0 , and the unhatched region above the \hat{S}_0 curve is where \bar{r}_1 is positive with \bar{r}_1 increasing in S_0 . In this unconventional case, the central bank cannot provide the demanded date 1 liquidity at date 0—reserve issuance also tends to absorb liquidity on net.

How general is this result? As can be seen from Theorem A1 and Figure A1, if $\varphi = 1$ and $\tau = 0$, we are always in case (i), but whenever $\varphi < 1$ and $\tau > 0$ there exists a critical value of $\theta = \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ to the right of which the unconventional




Figure A2. Reserves are on the y axis and θ on the x axis, with the two axes intersecting at $\theta = \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)

case (ii) arises. Formally, the figure and the theorem together clarify that in the economically more interesting region above the x-axis where $S_0 > 0$, as we traverse from the left of the critical value $\theta = \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ to its right, we switch discontinuously from $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} < 0$ (with $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} = 0$ in the hatched region) to $\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dS_0} > 0$. In other words, while case (ii) is unconventional, it arises robustly for high liquidity stress θ , high reserves shrinkage τ , and low participation of banks in the interbank market at date 1, φ .²²

Threshold level of reserves when $NLS > 0$: When $NLS > 0$ and the risk of liquidity stress in the economy is high, that is, $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ (this is the region to the right of the vertical axis in Figure A2), \hat{S}_0 is positive and decreasing in θ . Intuitively, because higher ex ante reserves tighten liquidity in the stressed state, and a higher θ consumes more liquidity per dollar of reserves, the reserve threshold at which the NLS by the corporate sector is fully consumed is positive and decreasing in θ . Furthermore, \bar{r}_1 increases in S_0 , and the unhatched region above the \hat{S}_0 curve is where \bar{r}_1 is positive. When $NLS > 0$ and the risk of liquidity stress in the economy is low, that is, $\theta < \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau+\varphi(1-\tau)}$ (in the region to the left of the vertical axis in Figure A2), \hat{S}_0 is negative, and decreasing in θ . Because higher ex ante reserves loosen liquidity conditions, \bar{r}_1 falls in S_0 , and the unhatched region below the \hat{S}_0 curve is where \bar{r}_1 is positive. The hatched area is where \bar{r}_1 is zero.

Proof that $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \bar{r}_1} < 0$ (Section II.E): Substituting $D_0^F = (L_0 + W_0^F - I_0)$ in (12), the planner maximizes objective $U = ((1-q)g_0(I_0) - I_0(1+q\gamma)) +$

²² What does it mean if the threshold level of reserves, \hat{S}_0 , is negative? While “negative” reserves may be required in theory, it is unclear how this can be implemented. Perhaps it is best to recognize that when reserves do not add to net future liquidity, the central bank should find other instruments—for instance make long-term loans to the banking sector to encourage the purchase of long-term corporate financial assets/loans, and then be prepared to lend against those assets in case the economy becomes liquidity stressed. Parenthetically, this may resemble the European Central Bank’s Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) interventions.

$$q(g_1(I_1) - I_1(1 + \gamma)) - 1/2\alpha_0 e_0^2 - \frac{q}{\theta} [\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta] (1/2\alpha_1 e_1^2) - 1/2\lambda(L_0)^2 + q(L_0 + W_0^F)\gamma$$

Differentiating U w.r.t. r_1 , we get $\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} = ((1 - q)g_0' - (1 + q\gamma))\frac{dL_0}{dr_1} + q(g_1' - (1 + \gamma))\frac{dI_1}{dr_1} - \alpha_0 e_0 \frac{de_0}{dr_1} - \frac{q}{\theta} [\varphi(1 - \theta) + \theta] \alpha_1 e_1 \frac{de_1}{dr_1} + (q\gamma - \lambda L_0) \frac{dL_0}{dr_1}$.

Substituting from the firm's FOC, that is, $(1 - q)g_0' = (1 + q(\gamma + r_1))$, $g_1' = (1 + \gamma + r_1)$, and $\lambda L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{1 + q\gamma}$, inspection indicates that the first four elements are all negative, so $\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} < 0$ if $(q\gamma - \lambda L_0) \frac{dL_0}{dr_1} \leq 0$. But $L_0 = \frac{q}{\lambda} (\frac{\gamma}{1 + q\gamma})$. So $(q\gamma - \lambda L_0) \geq 0$. Since $\frac{dL_0}{dr_1} < 0$, we have $\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} < 0$. \square

Appendix B: Proofs and Analysis for Section III.B

Bank Choices at Date 1 (in the presence of a convenience yield δ)

Consider the three cases for the aggregate liquidity condition at date 1. We denote the incremental value of a bank at date 1 by $V_1(y, z)$, where recall that $y = 1$ if the economy is liquidity stressed and zero otherwise, while $z = 1$ if the bank is stressed and zero otherwise.

Case 1: Stressed banks have enough liquidity to meet the needs of deposit outflows and to fund rescue investment without accessing the interbank market.

Since reserves have a convenience yield δ , stressed banks will issue some capital e_1 to add to reserves even if they do not need to use it for loans or deposit outflows. Furthermore, no bank will loan out reserves without earning at least the convenience yield. Finally, since liquidity is in surplus, any competition to make bank loans would push the bank lending rate down to the convenience yield. The bank solves $\max_{e_1} V_1(y = 1, z = 1) \equiv [r_1(I_1(r_1) - D_0^F) - \delta(D_0 - D_0^F + I_1(r_1) - e_1) - \frac{\alpha_1}{2} e_1^2]$, where the first term of the maximization is the return on loans, the second term is the cost of the reserve outflow reduced by the inflow of capital, and the last term is the incremental cost of raising capital over and above the gross cost of one. Since $r_1 = \delta$, the stressed bank makes no profit from the rescue loan. Solving, $e_1 = \delta/\alpha_1 > 0$ even if the stressed bank has no need to use the funds to meet depositor outflows or loan demand (details are in proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 below).

Safe banks will not issue capital since they know capital issuance will not alter their reserves on net since any investor in capital will first acquire reserves from the safe banks to buy the capital.²³ Since there is no need for interbank loans, no healthy bank will become tainted. This means that the reserve outflows from the stressed banks are spread across all the healthy banks, and their incremental date 1 value is $V_1(y = 1, z = 0) = \frac{\delta\theta(D_0 - D_0^F + I_1 - e_1)}{(1 - \theta)}$, where the numerator is the value of flight-to-safety deposit outflows (plus new deposits

²³ Of course, safe banks may issue capital assuming that it will come from reserve flows from other safe banks. If everyone does this, no one will have any additional reserves, but everyone will have issued capital commensurate with the size of the convenience yield and incurred the associated costs. Allowing for this possibility adds little to the analysis.

created by purchases less capital issued) to the healthy banks, and the denominator is the measure of healthy banks. It also follows that at date 0, $e_0 = q\delta/\alpha_0$.

Finally, Case 1 arises when the stressed bank's reserves are enough to meet the demands on it, that is, $S_0(1 - \tau) \geq (D_0 - D_0^F + I_1 - e_1)$. Substituting for the endogenous $(D_0 - D_0^F)$, we see that this case arises when $\tau S_0 \leq [(q\delta/\alpha_0 + \delta/\alpha_1) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda L_0^2]$ where I_1 is the optimized value evaluated at $r_1 = \delta$, I_0 is the optimal value at $R_0^L = (1 + q\gamma + q\delta)$, and $L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{\lambda(1+q\delta)}$ (see the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 for all steps). Note that since r_1 is a constant when the conditions for this case hold, as S_0 increases deposits increase dollar for dollar since no additional capital is issued. Since a fraction τ of the reserves will be encumbered, the distressed bank's net need for date 1 funds grows as S_0 grows. Eventually, it will exhaust available own funds at date 1 and have to issue more capital (compared to the amount that would be optimal considering only the convenience yield). This is when the economy moves into Case 2.

Case 2: The liquidity needs of each stressed bank can be met entirely by its raising date 1 capital (beyond that warranted by the convenience yield).

Now the rate at which the stressed bank lends to the firm, r_1 , rises above δ to incentivize further date 1 capital-raising. However, the rate stays too low for any of the healthy banks to lend in the interbank market. Essentially, the stressed bank is in autarky and has to issue costly capital even though there is plentiful lending capacity in the system. Let the equilibrium bank lending rate in autarky be r_1^A .

The stressed bank maximizes

$$V_1(y = 1, z = 1) = \max_{e_1} [r_1^A(I_1(r_1^A) - D_0^F) - \delta S_0(1 - \tau) - \alpha_2 e_1^2]$$

such that $e_1 = (D_0 + I_1(r_1^A) - D_0^F - S_0(1 - \tau))$. It follows that $e_1 = r_1^A/\alpha_1$ (and $e_0 = qr_1^A/\alpha_0$). As before, a rise in the date 1 interest rate equilibrates the demand and supply of liquidity by decreasing the size of the rescue investment and increasing the capital raised. Expanding the constraint for the maximization, we get $r_1^A/\alpha_1 = (I_0 + I_1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda L_0^2 - W_0^F - qr_1^A/\alpha_0 + \tau S_0)$. Furthermore, because the stressed banks are on their own, once again an increase in ex ante reserves S_0 always increases r_1^A , regardless of the size of τ (so long as $\tau > 0$).²⁴

Since the stressed banks just meet liquidity demand using all their shrunken reserves, the healthy banks get all of it. So $V_1(y = 1, z = 0) = \frac{\delta\theta S_0(1-\tau)}{(1-\theta)}$.

Case 3: The liquidity needs of the stressed banks are high enough that at the equilibrium autarkic interest rate, some of the healthy banks are willing to lend in the interbank market and become tainted. The equilibrium rate then is lower than the (now counterfactual) autarkic rate.

²⁴ Since all of the endogenous variables on the right hand side are decreasing in r_1^A while the left-hand side is increasing in r_1^A , there is a unique equilibrium r_1^A , and S_0 shifts it up whenever $\tau > 0$.

Given the analysis in Section III.B, for Case 3 to occur, we must have $\varphi > 0$, that is, $\frac{\delta S_0(1-\tau)}{(1-\theta)(r_1 S_0(1-\tau) + r_1^2/2\alpha_1)} < 1$. Rearranging, this requires $[r_1^2/2\alpha_1 + r_1 S_0(1-\tau) - \frac{\delta S_0(1-\tau)}{(1-\theta)}] > 0$. Since the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality is increasing in r_1 , it must be the case that the threshold value or “breakeven interbank rate” r_1^φ that induces banks to lend in the interbank market is the positive root of the quadratic equation obtained by setting the expression to zero. So $r_1^\varphi = \alpha_1 S_0(1-\tau)[\sqrt{1 + \frac{2\delta}{\alpha_1(1-\theta)S_0(1-\tau)}} - 1]$. Since this increases in S_0 , we know that in Case 2, an increase in S_0 increases both the autarky rate r_1^A and the rate r_1^φ necessary for the system to move into Case 3. However, under reasonable assumptions, we show in proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 that r_1^φ increases at a decreasing rate while r_1^A does not, so at a high enough S_0 , $r_1^A > r_1^\varphi$ and the interbank market will open.

PROOFS OF THEOREMS 2 AND 3: We now provide remaining steps of the proofs by first detailing the date 0 maximization problems in the presence of a convenience yield on reserves at date 1. The firm’s maximization problem remains unchanged. The bank’s maximization problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{L_0^B, e_0} \quad & R_0^L L_0^B + S_0 - e_0 - \frac{\alpha_0}{2} e_0^2 - D_0 + E_0 [V(y, z) | L_0, e_0] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & D_0 + e_0 = L_0 + 1/2 \lambda (L_0)^2 + S_0. \end{aligned}$$

Case 1: The convenience yield associated with reserves in the stressed state, δ , is an opportunity cost for stressed banks, and they pass it on while lending to their firm at date 1. So they lend at rate $(1 + \gamma + \delta)$, where γ is their monitoring cost. Therefore,

$$V(y = 1, z = 1) = \text{Max}_{e_1} [-\delta(D_0 - e_1) - \frac{\alpha_1}{2} e_1^2].$$

In turn, $e_1 = \delta/\alpha_1$, $e_0 = q\delta/\alpha_0$. The $(1 - \theta)$ healthy banks divide the deposit outflows from the stressed banks so

$$V(y = 1, z = 0) = \frac{\theta \delta (D_0 - D_0^F + I_1 - \delta/\alpha_1)}{(1 - \theta)}.$$

Note that in making decisions at date 0, the inflows that come into the bank if it were healthy at date 1 are unrelated to any decision it takes at date 0—the inflows stem from decisions (on the size of loans, capital raise, and deposit funding) taken by other banks.²⁵ So, maximizing at date 0 w.r.t. L_0 , we get $R_0^L = (1 + q\delta)(1 + \lambda L_0)$. From the firm’s maximization, we know $R_0^D = (1 + q\gamma + q\delta) = R_0^L$, so $L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{\lambda(1+q\delta)}$. We now derive when $(D_0 - D_0^F + I_1 - e_1) < S_0(1 - \tau)$. Since $(D_0 - D_0^F) = (S_0 + L_0 + \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0)^2 - e_0) - (W_0^F + L_0 - I_0) = I_0 -$

²⁵ Put differently, all of the variables in this expression should have a superscript O to indicate that they are decisions made by other banks. In the symmetric equilibrium, however, they will be equal to the values chosen by the bank whose maximization decisions we are studying.

$e_0 + (S_0 - W_0^F) + \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0)^2$, where the second equality uses $L_0^B = L_0^F$, the condition simplifies to $\tau S_0 \leq [(q\delta/\alpha_0 + \delta/\alpha_1) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2} \lambda L_0^2]$.

Case 2: Here, the opportunity cost of lending at date 1 is r_1 (since this is the marginal cost of raising capital, the source of incremental funding at date 1), and it replaces δ in the bank's maximization in Case 1. The stressed bank obtains $V(y = 1, z = 1) = \max_{e_1} [-r_1(D_0 - e_1) - \frac{\alpha_1}{2} e_1^2]$.

The healthy banks make $V(y = 1, z = 0) = \frac{\theta \delta S_0 (1 - \tau)}{(1 - \theta)}$. Furthermore, $\tau S_0 = [(qr_1/\alpha_0 + r_1/\alpha_1) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2} \lambda L_0^2]$ for liquidity demand to equal liquidity supply. Since the right-hand side increases in r_1 , a higher S_0 always induces a higher r_1 , whatever the level of τ so long as it is positive.

Case 3: For the bank, the date 0 maximization is similar to that in Case 2. In this case, if healthy, the bank may use its reserves to lend at date 1. However, this will not enter its maximization since it takes the reserves as given. The bank's maximization problem at date 0, and the stressed bank's problem at date 1 then is as in Case 2, where it takes r_1 as given.

Let S_0^* be the level of reserves at which the stressed bank can just meet liquidity needs with the (shadow) rate δ and reserves having a convenience yield δ . That is, $S_0^* = \frac{1}{\tau} [(q\delta/\alpha_0 + \delta/\alpha_1) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2} \lambda L_0^2]$, where $g_0'(I_0) = \frac{1+q(\gamma+\delta)}{1-q}$, $g_1'(I_1) = (1 + \gamma + \delta)$, and $L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{\lambda(1+q\delta)}$. Note that the right-hand side is increasing in δ , so S_0^* is increasing in δ . Furthermore, the net rate that the stressed banks charge firms is $(\gamma + \delta)$ for $S_0 < S_0^*$. When S_0 rises from S_0^* , the (shadow autarky) rate r_1^A rises from δ . It solves $\tau S_0 = [(qr_1/\alpha_0 + r_1/\alpha_1) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2} \lambda L_0^2]$, where $g_0'(I_0) = \frac{1+q(\gamma+r_1)}{1-q}$, $g_1'(I_1) = (1 + \gamma + r_1)$, and $L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{\lambda(1+qr_1)}$. Clearly, r_1^A is increasing in S_0 . If we further assume that g_0''' and g_1''' are both positive, then it is convex.

Moreover, $r_1^\varphi = \alpha_1 S_0 (1 - \tau) [\sqrt{1 + \frac{2\delta}{\alpha_1(1-\theta)S_0(1-\tau)}} - 1]$. So $r_1^\varphi > 0$ for $S_0 > 0$. It is straightforward to show that r_1^φ is increasing and concave in S_0 . The interbank market is closed at S_0^* if $r_1^\varphi > r_1^A$ (we will derive the condition for this below). Since both rates are increasing in S_0 , and r_1^A is convex in S_0 while r_1^φ is concave, they can intersect only once at S_0^{**} . So the (shadow) rate is r_1^A as S_0 increases from S_0^* to S_0^{**} , after which it becomes the rate dictated by the interbank market. Finally, r_1^φ increases in δ (as does r_1^A , see above), so S_0^{**} increases in δ . Since the equilibrium φ falls in δ , the required equilibrating interbank rate also increases in δ . It can now be shown using the second order Taylor-series expansion of $\sqrt{1+x}$ in r_1^φ that at S_0^* , $r_1^\varphi - r_1^A > \frac{\delta\theta}{(1-\theta)} - \frac{\delta^2}{2\alpha_1(1-\theta)^2 S_0^*(1-\tau)} > 0$ if $\delta < 2\alpha_1\theta(1-\theta)(1-\tau)S_0^*$. Substituting for S_0^* and doing some algebra, it can be shown that a sufficient condition for this to obtain is that $\theta(1-\theta) > \frac{\tau}{2(1-\tau)}$ and $\delta > \delta^*$, where δ^* satisfies $\frac{\tau}{2\alpha_1\theta(1-\theta)(1-\tau)}\delta^* = [(q\delta^*/\alpha_0 + \delta^*/\alpha_1) + W_0^F - I_0(\delta^*) - I_1(\delta^*) - \frac{1}{2} \lambda [L_0(\delta^*)]^2]$. This guarantees that there exists a unique $S_0^{**} > S_0^*$ such that $r_1^\varphi < r_1^A$ (interbank market is open) iff $S_0 > S_0^{**}$. \square

Condition for r_1 to be increasing in S_0 in Case 3: Note that in this region, r_1 is determined by equating the demand by stressed banks for loans in the interbank market to the supply by tainted banks of those loans. So $\theta[D_0 - D_0^F + I_1 - S_0(1 - \tau) - e_1] = \varphi(1 - \theta)[S_0(1 - \tau) + e_1]$. Substituting $(D_0 - D_0^F) = [I_0 - e_0 + (S_0 - W_0^F) + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0^B)^2]$ and $e_1 = \frac{r_1}{\alpha_1}$ and rearranging, we get $\frac{r_1}{\alpha_1} = \frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]}[I_0 + I_1 - e_0 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0^B)^2 - W_0^F] + \frac{[\theta\tau - \varphi(1-\theta)(1-\tau)]}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]}S_0$. Denoting the right-hand side of this equality as f as before and totally differentiating, we get $[\frac{1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1}]\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi}\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial S_0} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial S_0}$. Since $\frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} < 0$, we have $\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} > 0$ if $\frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi}\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial S_0} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial S_0} > 0$. But $\frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} < 0$ by inspection, and we argued in the text that $\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial S_0} < 0$. So $\frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi}\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial S_0} > 0$ and a sufficient condition for $\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} > 0$ is that $\frac{\partial f}{\partial S_0} > 0$. This then requires $[\theta\tau - \varphi(1 - \theta)(1 - \tau)] > 0$, which on simplifying requires $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau)}{\tau + \varphi(1-\tau)}$. Note that this is only sufficient, since even if it does not hold, it may still be the case that $\frac{dr_1}{dS_0} > 0$. Intuitively, there is now a new channel through which a higher S_0 leads to a higher r_1 : A higher S_0 leads to a lower φ , ceteris paribus, since healthy banks have more incentive to stay safe given the larger flight-to-safety flows, which in turn lead to greater net need for liquidity from capital-raising, and hence a higher r_1 .

Section III.D: Endogenous δ .

If $\delta(r_1) = \delta^A + \delta^B r_1^2$, where $\delta^A \geq 0$ and $\delta^B \geq 0$ then it follows from (13) that $(1 - \varphi) = \frac{(\delta^A + \delta^B r_1^2)S_0(1 - \tau)}{(1 - \theta)(r_1 S_0(1 - \tau) + r_1^2/2\alpha_1)}$. Let $A = \frac{\delta^B}{(1 - \theta)}$, $B = \frac{1}{2\alpha_1 S_0(1 - \tau)}$, $C = \frac{\delta^A}{(1 - \theta)}$. Then, the previous expression is $(1 - \varphi) = \frac{C + Ar_1^2}{r_1 + Br_1^2}$. Note that A , B , and C are all positive.

We want to see when the right-hand side of the above expression is greater than or equal to one, so that there is no r_1 for which $\varphi > 0$. This requires $(A - B)r_1^2 - r_1 + C \geq 0$. The roots of the quadratic are $r_1 = \frac{1 \pm \sqrt{1 - 4C(A - B)}}{2(A - B)}$.

Case 1: If $4C(A - B) > 1$, there are no real roots to the quadratic. So $C + Ar_1^2$ always lies above $r_1 + Br_1^2$ (as at $r_1 = 0$), which implies φ is always zero. The interbank market never opens in this case.

Case 2: If $4C(A - B) \leq 1$ and $A > B$, there are two positive real roots, $r_1^+ > r_1^-$, and $\varphi > 0$ iff $r_1 \in (r_1^-, r_1^+)$. Essentially, the two curves $C + Ar_1^2$ and $r_1 + Br_1^2$ intersect at two points, and $\varphi > 0$ in between. The interbank market opens only in a range of rates and is closed both above and below.

Case 3: If $A < B$, then there is only one positive root, $r_1^+ = \frac{-1 + \sqrt{1 - 4C(B - A)}}{2(B - A)}$, and $\varphi > 0$ iff $r_1 > r_1^+$. Essentially, the slope of $r_1 + Br_1^2$ is higher than $C + Ar_1^2$, so it intersects once from below, after which $\varphi > 0$. The interbank market opens only above a specific rate.

Appendix C: Proofs and Analysis for Section VI.A

Proof that with exogenous φ , $\frac{dU}{de_0} = 0$ at the privately optimal $e_0 = \frac{qr_1}{\alpha_0}$: Recall from (12) that

$$U = ((1-q)g_0(I_0) - I_0(1+q\gamma)) + q(g_1(I_1) - I_1(1+\gamma)) - \frac{1}{2}\alpha_0 e_0^2 - \frac{q}{\theta} [\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta] \left(\frac{1}{2}\alpha_1 e_1^2 \right) - \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2 + q(L_0 + W_0^F)\gamma.$$

Assume that e_0 is set exogenously (so it does not respond to the interest rate). We know that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dU}{de_0} &= \frac{\partial U}{\partial e_0} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} \frac{dr_1}{de_0} = -\alpha_0 e_0 + \frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} \frac{dr_1}{de_0}, \\ \frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} &= [(1-q)g_0' - (1+q\gamma)] \frac{\partial I_0}{\partial r_1} + q[g_1' - (1+\gamma)] \frac{\partial I_1}{\partial r_1} \\ &\quad - \frac{q}{\theta} [\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta] \alpha_1 e_1 \frac{\partial e_1}{\partial r_1} + [q\gamma - \lambda L_0] \frac{\partial L_0}{\partial r_1}. \end{aligned}$$

Substituting from the firm's FOC, that is, $(1-q)g_0' = (1+q(\gamma+r_1))$, $g_1' = (1+\gamma+r_1)$, and $\lambda L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{1+q r_1}$, as well as recognizing that $e_1 = \frac{r_1}{\alpha_1}$, we get

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} = q r_1 \left[\frac{\partial I_0}{\partial r_1} + \frac{\partial I_1}{\partial r_1} + \frac{q\gamma}{1+q r_1} \frac{\partial L_0}{\partial r_1} + \frac{\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta}{\alpha_1 \theta} \right].$$

From (10), we have $r_1 = \frac{\alpha_1 \theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]} [I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F)] - S_0(1-\tau)$. Therefore, $\frac{dr_1}{de_0} = \frac{\alpha_1 \theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]} [\lambda L_0 \cdot \frac{dL_0}{dr_1} \cdot \frac{dr_1}{de_0} - 1 + \frac{dI_0}{dr_1} \cdot \frac{dr_1}{de_0} + \frac{dI_1}{dr_1} \cdot \frac{dr_1}{de_0}]$.

Rearranging and substituting $\lambda L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{1+q r_1}$, we have $\frac{dr_1}{de_0} = \frac{-\frac{\alpha_1 \theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]}}{1 - \frac{\alpha_1 \theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta)+\theta]} [\frac{q\gamma}{1+q r_1} \frac{dL_0}{dr_1} + \frac{dI_0}{dr_1} + \frac{dI_1}{dr_1}]}$. From above, $\frac{dU}{de_0} = -\alpha_0 e_0 + \frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} \frac{dr_1}{de_0}$. We know that $\alpha_0 e_0 = q r_1$ at the private optimal. Also, substituting the values of $\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1}$ and $\frac{dr_1}{de_0}$, we get $\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} \frac{dr_1}{de_0} = q r_1$, so $\frac{dU}{de_0} \big|_{e_0 = \frac{q r_1}{\alpha_0}} = 0$. \square

PROOF OF THEOREM 4 (endogenous φ): Recall from (12) that

$$U = ((1-q)g_0(I_0) - I_0(1+q\gamma)) + q(g_1(I_1) - I_1(1+\gamma)) - \frac{1}{2}\alpha_0 e_0^2 - \frac{q}{\theta} [\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta] \left(\frac{1}{2}\alpha_1 e_1^2 \right) - \frac{1}{2}\lambda(L_0)^2 + q(L_0 + W_0^F)\gamma.$$

Since φ is not influenced directly by e_0 but only indirectly via r_1 , we have $\frac{dU}{de_0} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial e_0} + (\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} \big|_{\varphi=\text{const}}) \frac{dr_1}{de_0} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} \frac{dr_1}{de_0} = -\alpha_0 e_0 + ((\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} \big|_{\varphi=\text{const}}) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1}) \frac{dr_1}{de_0}$. Also, $r_1 = \alpha_1 f(r_1, \varphi, e_0)$. Therefore, $\frac{dr_1}{de_0} = \alpha_1 [\frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} \cdot \frac{dr_1}{de_0} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} \cdot \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} \frac{dr_1}{de_0}]$.

Rearranging, $\frac{dr_1}{de_0} = \frac{\alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0}}{[1 - \alpha_1 (\frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} \cdot \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1})]}$. Substituting in the earlier expression, we get

$$\frac{dU}{de_0} = -\alpha_0 e_0 + \left(\left(\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1} \big|_{\varphi=\text{const}} \right) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} \right) \frac{\alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0}}{\left[1 - \alpha_1 \left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} \cdot \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} \right) \right]}. \quad (\text{C1})$$

We can now see that $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} = -\frac{q}{\theta}(1-\theta)\frac{1}{2}\alpha_1 e_1^2 < 0$, that is, the direct effect of a higher φ is more dissipative date-1 equity issuance by tainted banks. Also from (13), $(1-\varphi) = \frac{\delta S_0(1-\tau)}{(1-\theta)(r_1 S_0(1-\tau) + r_1^2/2\alpha_1)}$.

So $\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} = \frac{\delta S_0(1-\tau)}{(1-\theta)} \frac{(S_0(1-\tau) + r_1/\alpha_1)}{(r_1 S_0(1-\tau) + r_1^2/2\alpha_1)^2} > 0$, and $\frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} = \frac{-\theta(1-\theta)}{(\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta)^2} [I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F)] < 0$.

We can now see how the social planner's knowing that φ is affected by date 0 choices would choose e_0 . In the numerator on the right-hand side of (C1), $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} \alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0} > 0$. An increase in e_0 reduces the liquidity shortfall f , reducing the rate r_1 , reducing the mass of tainted banks φ , and reducing dissipative date-1 equity issues by tainted banks, thus increasing welfare. However, there is an offsetting dampening effect from the term in the denominator, $-\alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} \cdot \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1} > 0$, because a fall in the ex post interbank rate increases the degree of liquidity hoarding, and thus increases the degree of liquidity shortfall that has to be met by date 1 dissipative capital issues.

To check whether the social planner's capital choice is higher than the private optimal (which ignores the dependence of φ on the bank's date 0 capital issuance), we need to see whether

$\frac{dU}{de_0} = -\alpha_0 e_0 + ((\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1}|_{\varphi=\text{const}}) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1}) \frac{\alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0}}{[1 - \alpha_1 (\frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} \cdot \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1})]}$ is greater or less than zero at the private optimal $e_0 = \frac{qr_1}{\alpha_0}$. In other words, we need to check whether

$((\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1}|_{\varphi=\text{const}}) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1}) \frac{\alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0}}{[1 - \alpha_1 (\frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} \cdot \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r_1})]} > qr_1$. Multiplying both sides by the denominator on the left-hand side, and recognizing from our earlier analysis with exogenous φ that $(\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_1}|_{\varphi=\text{const}}) \alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0} = qr_1(1 - \alpha_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_1})$, we require that $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0} > -qr_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi}$.

Now $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0} = (-\frac{q}{\theta}(1-\theta)\frac{1}{2}\alpha_1 e_1^2) \cdot (\frac{-\theta}{\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta})$. We substitute $e_1 = \frac{r_1}{\alpha_1}$.

Note also that $-qr_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi} = -qr_1 \cdot (\frac{-\theta(1-\theta)}{(\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta)^2} (I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F)))$. Substituting on both sides of the inequality and recognizing that $r_1 = \frac{\alpha_1 \theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta]} [I_1 + (D_0 - D_0^F)] - \alpha_1 S_0(1-\tau)$, we get $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \varphi} \frac{\partial f}{\partial e_0} > -qr_1 \frac{\partial f}{\partial \varphi}$ iff $r_1 > r_1 + \alpha_1 S_0(1-\tau)$, which is impossible. Indeed, the inequality goes the other way, so $\frac{dU}{de_0}|_{e_0=\frac{qr_1}{\alpha_0}} < 0$. The social planner prefers lower capital than the privately optimal level. \square

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Supporting Information

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Appendix S1: Internet Appendix.
Replication Code.

