

The Fisher Channel According to HANK: Unexpected Inflation and the Missing Recession

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Views are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my employers

Swiss Macro Workshop

Link to the latest version

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Introduction

- Inflation creates winners and losers through many channels
 - ▶ Heterogeneity in consumption baskets, degree of wage stickiness ...
- Focus of this paper: "Fisher channel", i.e. redistribution from creditors to debtors
 - ▶ Many financial assets and liabilities in the US are *nominal*
 - ★ E.g. regular bonds, deposits, fixed-rate mortgages ...
- Research questions:
 - ① How much wealth redistribution among US households did this inflation shock generate?
 - ② How does this wealth redistribution transmit to consumption?
 - ③ How does accounting for the Fisher channel change our understanding of monetary policy in HANK?

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Methodology and preview of the answers

Q1 How much wealth redistribution did the current inflation shock generate?

- ▶ Estimate the reduction in the real value of nominal assets and liabilities generated by the 2021-22 inflation shock.

A: Losses concentrated among **rich** middle-aged and elderly, *gains* for the rest of hhs.

Q2 How does this wealth redistribution transmit to consumption?

- ▶ Construct a HANK model matching well households' exposure to inflation surprises.

A: Strong and persistent tailwind to aggregate demand ($\approx 0.5\%$ of US GDP in the model).

Q3 How does accounting for the Fisher channel influence monetary policy?

- ▶ Simulate monetary policy shocks in the HANK model.

A: Stronger effects of monetary policy, degree of nominal rigidity less crucial for its effects.

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Q1: Unexpected inflation and wealth redistribution

Constructing Net Nominal Positions (NNP)

- Obtain household direct holdings of nominal assets and liabilities through the SCF

Sources

Instruments

- To account for indirect positions, unveil investment intermediaries and the business sector, using their balance sheets from the Financial Accounts

Sectors

- I.e. e.g. nominal assets held in a mutual fund or a firm are assigned to their shareholders

- Obtain the net nominal position (NNP) of household i simply as:

$$NNP_i = NA_i - NL_i \quad (1)$$

Net Nominal Positions - within the US household sector




Figure 1: Average net nominal positions per hh, 2020 \$ '000. Source: Distributional Financial Accounts

NNP @ macro level

Average gain or loss for groups of households from the 2021-22 inflation shock

	Age cohort					
	≤ 35	36-45	46-55	56-65	66-75	>75
A. Low income						
\$ '000	1.5	6.1	3.1	0.35	-0.35	0.35
% Income	4	10	6	1	-1	1
B. Middle class						
\$ '000	13.6	19.5	11.8	0.35	-4.7	-6
% Income	10	10	5	0	-3	-6
C. Rich						
\$ '000	20.1	34	-66.1	-170.5	-220.7	-175.1
% Income	6	5	-6	-16	-29	-31

- Evolution of nominal position within the household sector in 2021

Results for macro sectors

Q2: Transmission to consumption

One-account HANK model

- Households subject to idiosyncratic risk borrow and save facing a borrowing constraint
- Government issues debt held by households, set taxes to finance spending, monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule
- Sticky wages, flexible prices that generates a New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve
 - No profits and constant real wage - consistent with post-pandemic labor market (Autor et al. (2023))

Key deviation from 'canonical' HANK:

- Hhs save and borrow in a *long-term nominal* asset
 - At price Q_t gives the stream of nominal payments $1, \delta, \delta^2 \dots$

Household problem

$$\max_{c_{it}} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \{u(c_{it}) - v(N_t)\} \right] \quad s.t.$$

$$P_t c_{i,t} + Q_t \Lambda_{i,t} = (1 + \delta) Q_t \Lambda_{i,t-1} + \tau_t (W_t e_{i,t} N_t)^{1-\theta}$$

$$Q_t \Lambda_t \geq \underline{a} P_t$$

- No arbitrage:

$$Q_t = \frac{1 + \delta E_t[Q_{t+1}]}{(1 + i_t)}$$

Supply side

Policy and Market Clearing

Extension with behavioural friction

Calibration matching distribution of NNPs and their covariance with MPC

table

NNP distribution			Consumption
Pct	Data	Model	Model
0.01	-6.8	-7.2	0.0%
0.05	-3.6	-4.9	0.8%
0.1	-2.5	-3.6	2.3%
0.25	-1.1	-2.3	8.7%
0.5	-0.1	-0.9	25.3%
0.75	0.4	0.5	51.3%
0.9	2.2	2.0	74.3%
0.95	4.1	2.9	84.7%
0.99	10	4.6	95.7%

- Cov(MPC, NNP) at -0.072, perfectly matching the most precise estimate in Auclert (2019)

The response of consumption to the wealth redistribution

- Of course, inflation is an endogenous variable in the model
- Difficult to pin down the exact structural shocks behind the 2021 inflation episode
 - Also, not necessary for the question at hand (how the redistribution of wealth transmitted to consumption)
- Simulate a "unit of account" shock that devalues nominal positions as in the 2021-22 episode shock
- Look at the IRFs of C and π in response to the wealth redistribution generated by the "unit of account" shock
 - Possible interpretation: compare a *real-asset* economy hit by structural shocks that generated the 2021-22 inflation spike (no redistribution) to a *nominal-asset* economy.

A strong and persistent tailwind to aggregate demand




Figure 2: IRF of consumption to the wealth redistribution generated by the 2021 inflation shock.

Decomposition of the effects on aggregate consumption





Figure 3: Decomposition of the effect on C in the shock itself, keynesian cross Y and policy reactions.

Extension with behavioural friction

Empirical evidence: fintech data

- Data on 100 billions of US transactions for 45 millions unique US account owners
 - ▶ Typically an account owner is an household
- Information on all flows in and out of the account
 - ▶ Can identify whether the account holder is paying down a mortgage or not
- Restrict the sample to a cohort of users present in each month from 2019 to 2023
 - ▶ Also remove outliers, include transactions only in USD etc, for a restricted sample of 12b transactions for 4.5m unique users

Remarkable track of some US aggregates - US retail sales



Identification strategy

- Inflation started exceeding 2% YoY in March 2021, reaching 5% by June. US CPI
- Regress household j spending growth from the start of inflation episode to the end of the sample ¹ on an indicator function on whether households had a mortgage over the period M

$$\Delta \log(C)_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \times M + \beta_2 \times \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

- Controls \mathbf{X}_i : income class and state fixed effects.

¹currently September 2023

MORTGAGE DEBT AND SPENDING GROWTH

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
M	0.0513 [0.05, 0.052]	0.0457 [0.044, 0.047]	0.0242 [0.023, 0.25]	0.0238 [0.023, 0.25]
Income FE.	✓	✓		
State FE	✓		✓	
N	3.4mn	4.2mn	3.4mn	4.2mn
R ²	0.008	0.006	0.002	0

- Mortgagors consumption growth has been 2-5% higher over the sample period
- Results are robust to the choice of the starting and end point of the sample over 2021-23
- Similar results (though not statistically significant) with county-level regressions counties

Looking across the income distribution

$$\Delta \log(C)_i = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^7 \gamma_k (M \times I\{\text{income class} = k\}) + \beta_2 \times \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

MORTGAGE DEBT AND SPENDING GROWTH

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
γ_k	-0.037 [-0.06, -0.014]	0.074 [0.05, 0.098]	0.09 [0.067, 0.114]	0.088 [0.064, 0.111]	0.089 [0.066, 0.112]	0.082 [0.058, 0.105]	0.07 [0.046, 0.093]
Income FE.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3.4mn	3.4mn	3.4mn	3.4mn	3.4mn	3.4mn	3.4mn
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01



- Effect uniform and stronger across middle and upper income classes, while the poorest with a mortgage saw a decline

Part III: Implications for monetary/fiscal policy

Monetary policy when inflation redistributes wealth

- How does our understanding of monetary and fiscal policy change in a HANK model where inflation redistributes wealth as in the data?
- First, monetary policy is more powerful when the Fisher channel is taken into account:
 - Simulate a monetary policy shock with standard persistence **shock**
 - Compare the IRFs in the model where households have nominal assets to those where they have real assets.

A standard monetary policy shock with and without nominal redistribution




- Monetary policy is 50% more powerful when unexpected inflation redistribute wealth as in the data, and it also has larger effects on prices.


Monetary policy and nominal rigidities

- Second, decreasing the degrees of nominal rigidities generates now two competing effects:
 - ① The real interest rate responds less to a monetary policy shock (conventional wisdom)
 - ② There is more redistribution of wealth across households (new)
- Quantitatively, the first channel dominates
 - ▶ Monetary policy is still more effective the higher the degree of nominal rigidities
- But the Fisher channel significantly attenuates the role of nominal rigidity as a determinant of monetary policy effectiveness

The Fisher channel, nominal rigidities and monetary policy effectiveness



Model without the Fisher Channel



Model with the Fisher Channel

- Smaller differences across degrees of nominal rigidities in the transmission to consumption.

Conclusions

Conclusions

Q1 Sizable wealth redistribution generated by the 2021-22 inflation shock

- ▶ From **rich** middle-aged and elderly to the rest of hhs groups, especially young mortgagors.

Q2 In a HANK model with long-term nominal assets C and π increase despite MP tightening

- ▶ Consistent with the surprising resilience of the US economy in 2022-2023.
- ▶ Response of C supported by household-level and cross-county empirical evidence.

Q3 Fisher channel makes monetary policy more powerful and also less dependent on the degree of nominal rigidity in the economy

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Appendix I: Unexpected inflation and wealth redistribution

Sources of data

① NNP at the sector level:

- Financial Accounts of the United States (FA):
 - ★ Quarterly balance sheets for 30 sectors that compose the US economy Sectors
 - ★ Financial assets and liabilities according to 24 instruments Instruments

② NNP at the household level:

- Distributed Financial Accounts
- Survey of Consumer Finance

③ Maturity structure of nominal payments:

- CRSP, FHFA

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Aggregation process (continued)

② Unveil investment intermediaries

- ▶ Each claim attributed to their shareholders

③ Calculate Direct Net Nominal Position (DNP):

$$DNP = NA - NL \quad (2)$$

④ Consolidate the business sector

- ▶ Letting $\theta = \frac{\text{DNP of the business sector}}{\text{total outside equity}}$
- ▶ The net nominal position (NNP) of sector i is defined as

$$NNP_i = DNP_i + \theta equity_i \quad (3)$$

- ▶ Sufficient statistic for redistribution after a shock to the price level

Sectors

Macro-Sector	Sector	Macro-Sector	Sector
Households Government	Households and nonprofit Federal, state, and local Monetary authority DB federal ret. funds DB state ret. funds Rest of the world Foreign banks in U.S. Foreign fund. corp.	Business	Corporate business Non-corp. business Commercial banks Saving institutions Credit unions Life insurance (general) Other insurance Closed-end funds GSEs Issuers of ABS Finance companies Mortgage companies REITs Security brokers and dealers Funding corporations
Rest of the World			
Intermediaries	Money market funds Mutual funds DC private pension DC federal ret. funds DC state ret. funds Life insurance (separate) Federal mortgage pools		

Measurement

Aggregation

Households		
	Assets	Liabilities
Pension entitlement	30	Total mortgages 11
Corporate equities	26	Consumer credit 4
Proprietors' equity in noncorporate business	13	Other loans 1
Mutual fund shares	11	
Savings deposits	10	
Checkable deposits	3	
MMMF shares	3	
Treasury securities	2	
Municipal securities	2	
Life insurance reserves	2	
Other loans	1	
Corporate and foreign bonds	1	
Trade credit	1	

Commercial banks		
	Assets	Liabilities
Mortgages	3	Savings deposits 12
Agency- and GSE-securities	3	Checkable deposits 5
Other institutional loans	3	
Consumer credit	2	
Commercial mortgages	2	
Treasuries	1	
Federal funds and repo	1	
Net interbank transactions	1	

Mutual funds		
	Assets	Liabilities
Corporate equities	13	Mutual fund shares 20
Corporate and foreign bonds	3	
Agency- and GSE securities	1	
Treasury securities	1	
Municipal securities	1	

Measurement

Aggregation

Instruments

Class	Instrument	Class	Instrument
Short	Checking deposits Fed funds Deposits abroad Net interbank trans. Savings deposit Open market p. Trade credit Taxes payables Consumer credit Oth. loans and adv. Dep. institutional loans Tbills	Long Intermed. Equity	Treasuries Corporate bonds Agency and GSE sec. Municipal securities Pension entitlements Life insurance res. Home mortgages Commercial mortg. Money market sh. Mutual funds sh. Corporate equities Non-corp equity

Measurement

Total nominal claims relative to US GDP




Figure 4: Market value of all outstanding nominal claims between different sectors of the US economy as a percentage of GDP, 1968-2021.

Net Nominal Positions (NNP) at the macro level




Figure 5: NNP as percentage of GDP for 1968-2021 for the three ultimate users of any claim in the US.

[DS](#) [Details](#) [Back](#)

NNP as a % of GDP, detail




Figure 6: Net nominal positions as a percentage of US GDP, 1988-2022, by sector and class of instrument. [Back](#)

Doepeke and Schneider (2006) replication with minor adjustments




Figure 7: Net nominal positions by sector - my results (blue) versus DS (green). Minor differences are due to revision in FA data and slightly different treatment of sectors and instruments.

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My results vs DS




Figure 8: Net nominal positions by sector - my results (blue) versus DS (green). Differences now reflect also market value data reported by the FA and adjustment to SCF aggregates. [Back](#)

Duration of nominal positions




Figure 9: Duration in years of nominal positions for households (panel a), government (b), business (c) and the rest of the world (d)

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Shock to inflation expectations in 2021




Figure 10: Revision in the term structure of inflation expectations between December 2021 and December 2020 according to the Cleveland Fed model (blue line) and to the Survey of Professional Forecasters (red line).

Redistributive effects

- Inflation expectations adjusted gradually during 2021: upper and lower bound on the revaluations for nominal positions maturing within 2021.

① Full anticipation:

$$w_t^p = \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-(i_t^{t+s} + \hat{\Pi}_s)} - \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-i_t^{t+s}} \quad (4)$$

② Full surprise:

$$w_t^p = \begin{cases} \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-(i_t^{t+s} + \hat{\Pi}_4)} - \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-i_t^{t+s}} & \text{if } S \leq 4 \\ \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-(i_t^{t+s} + \hat{\Pi}_s)} - \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-i_t^{t+s}} & \text{if } S > 4 \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

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Back

- Full surprise may overstate if agents were able to intertemporally substitute.
- Baseline:

$$w_t^p = \begin{cases} \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-(i_t^{t+s} + \hat{\Pi}_2)} - \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-i_t^{t+s}} & \text{if } S \leq 2 \\ \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-(i_t^{t+s} + \hat{\Pi}_s)} - \sum_{s=0}^S d_{t+s} e^{-i_t^{t+s}} & \text{if } S > 2 \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

- No clear evidence of nominal risk being transferred significantly during 2021 at the sector/group level.

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Gain and losses for macro sectors from the 2021 inflation shock, % GDP

	Full anticipation	Baseline	Full Surprise
Government	3.88	4.28	5.05
Rest of the World	-3.68	-3.55	-3.67
Households	-0.23	-0.83	-1.56

Present value gain or loss from the 2021 surge in inflation expectations, measured by the Cleveland FED model, for government, rest of the world and households.

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Gain and losses within the business sector, % GDP

	Full anticipation	Baseline	Full Surprise
Non-corporate business	2.13	2.15	2.16
Nonfinancial corporate business	2.90	2.92	2.89
Financial business	-4.34	-3.70	-3.16

Present value gain or loss from the 2021 surge in inflation expectations, measured by the Cleveland FED model for non-corporate business, non-financial corporate business and financial business.

Within the household sector

- Latest wave of the Survey of Consumer Finance (2019)
- Scale the value of each single nominal positions of a household according to the evolution for the household sector as a whole.
 - Substantial adjustment only of deposits

Average nominal positions as a percentage of net worth - 2019

Instrument	Age cohort					
	≤ 35	36-45	46-55	56-65	66-75	>75
A. All households						
Short-term	17	8	9	9	10	11
Bonds	10	9	12	13	14	12
Mortgages	-98	-33	-16	-8	-6	-4
Equity	-2	-2	-1	-1	0	0
Total NNP	-73	-18	3	13	18	19
B. Low income						
Short-term	92	-17	4	3	10	21
Bonds	10	7	6	6	5	2
Mortgages	-251	-117	-34	-9	-8	-15
Equity	-2	0	0	-1	-1	-1
Total NNP	-151	-126	-25	-1	6	7

Breakdown of NNP by type of instrument held for different groups of U.S. households in 2019. Value for each group as a percentage of average net worth in the group. In each group, components sum to 100%.

Average nominal positions as a percentage of net worth - 2019 (2)

Instrument	Age cohort					
	≤ 35	36-45	46-55	56-65	66-75	>75
C. Middle class						
Short-term	32	15	11	12	13	15
Bonds	16	13	14	14	13	10
Mortgages	-281	-86	-41	-21	-14	-10
Equity	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total NNP	-232	-57	-15	6	13	17
D. Rich						
Short-term	10	7	8	8	8	9
Bonds	8	8	11	13	15	14
Mortgages	-29	-14	-7	-4	-2	-2
Equity	-3	-3	-2	-2	0	0
Total NNP	-14	-3	10	15	20	21

Breakdown of NNP by type of instrument held for different groups of U.S. households in 2019. Value for each group as a percentage of average net worth in the group. In each group, components sum to 100%.

Nominal positions in bonds, market value




Figure 11: Nominal positions in bonds as a percentage of GDP for Households, Rest of the World, and Government. Dotted lines discount the stream of payments constructed above with the zero coupon yield curve, while solid lines use the market value reported by the Financial Accounts.

Results using the SPF

	Full anticipation	Baseline	Full Surprise
Government	3.2	3.58	4.36
Rest of the World	-2.45	-2.47	-2.72
Households	-0.77	-1.19	-1.76

Present value gain or loss as a percentage of GDP at the sector level from the 2021 surge in inflation expectations, measured by the SPF, based on nominal positions at the end of 2020.

Evolution of nominal positions - 2021




Figure 12: Evolution of net nominal positions relative to GDP for macro-sectors of the US economy, 2018-2021.

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Evolution of nominal positions - 2021




Figure 13: Evolution of net nominal positions relative to GDP for the business sector in the US economy, 2018-2021.

Evolution of nominal positions - 2021




Figure 14: Evolution of net nominal positions in thousands of dollars for different cuts of the household sector according to the DFA - 2019-2021.

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Average gain or loss for groups of households - mortgage holders

	Age cohort					
	≤ 35	36-45	46-55	56-65	66-75	>75
A. Low income						
\$ '000	16	15	10	5	8	4
% Income	80	31	26	12	49	33
B. Middle class						
\$ '000	17	16	10	6	3	5
% Income	21	13	8	6	4	7
C. Rich						
\$ '000	17	22	-14	-54	-71	-43
% Income	12	7	-3	-11	-16	-15


Present value gain or loss in thousands of dollars and as a percentage of household income from the 2021 surge in inflation expectations, measured by the Cleveland FED model. Gain or losses are conditional on having a mortgage for primary residence.

Percentage of mortgage holders in each cohort

	Age cohort					
	≤ 35	36-45	46-55	56-65	66-75	>75
Low income	2%	15%	16%	8%	8%	23%
Middle class	35%	58%	61%	52%	44%	27%
Rich	69%	83%	76%	55%	37%	20%

Fraction of households in each group having a mortgage.

Figure 15: Gains and losses from increasing the inflation target by 2 percentage points



Wealth gains or losses for government (dashed), households (dotted), rest of the world (solid) in present-value terms as percentages of GDP after a surprising announcement that future inflation will permanently increase by 2 percentage points per year. The announcement is simulated at every quarter, with gains and losses reflecting nominal positions and their term structure at the moment of the announcement.

Gain and losses for macro sectors under AIT, % GDP

	3 Years	5 Years	10 Years
Government	-2.63	-1.85	-1.05
Rest of the World	2.42	1.79	1.22
Households	0.25	0.07	-0.16

Present value gain or loss from a revision in inflation expectations due to a credible announcement by the FED of a three, five or ten year window for Average Inflation Targeting. I assume that the announcement by the FED of a window for AIT would entail keeping inflation at 2% in 2022 and setting a uniform inflation target for 2023 onward that will compensate for 2021 inflation spike in a window of three, five or ten years.

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Appendix II: The Fisher channel according to HANK

Wages stickiness

- Wages for workers are set by unions subject to a quadratic costs in the utility function, following Erceg et al. (2000) and Auclert et al. (2024)
- In equilibrium, this leads to the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve: Unions

$$\log(1 + \pi_t^w) = \kappa_w \left(\phi N_t^{1+\nu} - \frac{(1 - \tau_t) w_t N_t}{\mu_w} \int e_{it} c_{it}^{-\sigma} di \right) + \beta \log(1 + \pi_{t+1}^w)$$

- Representative firms produces output

$$Y_t = Z_t N_t$$

- With flexible prices:

$$P_t = \frac{W_t}{Z_t} \implies \pi_t = \pi_t^w$$

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Closing the model

- Policy:

$$T_t + B_{t+1} = G_t + (1 + r_t)B_t$$

$$i_t = r_t^* + \phi \mathbb{E} \pi_{t+1} + \epsilon_t$$

- Market clearing:

$$Y_t = \int c_{it} di + G_t$$

$$B_t = \int Q_t \Lambda_{it} di$$

Back

- Sensitive to the Taylor rule coefficient
 - ▶ For $\phi_\pi = 1$, indeterminacy
 - ▶ For $\phi_\pi = 1.25$ the effects are very large
 - ▶ For $\phi_\pi = 2$, the effects are small but still meaningful (will report graphs for all).
- Sensitive to average maturity of nominal positions
- Robust to all other parameters (for reasonable parametrization)

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
Further policy implications

- The insight about monetary policy is more general: any type of demand shock has larger effects the more flexible prices are for standard parameters
 - Discount factor shock [Results](#)
 - Government spending shock [Results](#)
- The redistributive role of inflation also calls for a more active Taylor rule in HANK (in progress)
- Larger fiscal multipliers of deficit-financed spending (in progress)

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MP shock

- Monetary policy shock



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Unions

- Mass 1 of unions which set wages on behalf of workers, union k provides specific task made up from efficiency units of household labor, which is then aggregated into N_t

$$N_t = \left(\int \left(\int s_{it} n_{kit} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} dk \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

- Changing wages incur utility costs

$$\int \left(\frac{W_{kt}}{W_{kt-1}} - 1 \right)^2 dk$$

- Which yields the non-linear wage Phillips curve

$$\pi_t^w (1 + \pi_t^w) = \frac{\epsilon}{\psi} \int N_t \left(v'(N_t) - \frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon} \frac{\partial z_{it}}{\partial n_{it}} u'(c_{it}) \right) di + \beta \pi_{t+1}^w (1 + \pi_{t+1}^w)$$

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
Calibration

Calibration parameters for the model.

Parameter	Description	Value	Parameter	Description	Value
σ	IES	0.5	κ_w	Slope of wage Phillips curve	0.1
v	Frisch	0.5	μ_w	Wage markup	1.1
a	Borrowing constraint	-1	ϕ	Taylor Rule coefficient	1.25
θ	Tax progressivity	0.18	B	B/Y	0.2
ρ_e	Autocorrelation of earnings	0.91	G	Government spending	0.2
σ_e	Std of log earnings	0.92	γ_G	G response	0.1
β	Discount Factor	0.88	r^*	Eq. real rate	0.05
δ	Bond decay	0.80	π_{ss}	Steady-state inflation	0

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Inflation shock



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Robustness to the paradox of flexibility

- This paradox happens for any reasonable parametrization of wage stickiness $\kappa \in [0.001, 0.7]^2$
- But is very sensitive to the coefficient on expected inflation of the Taylor rule. The closer the coefficient is to 1.5, less this paradox is true. For $\phi > 1.5$, the sign flips.

²For $\kappa > 0.7$, the model is indeterminate

Response of households at different percentiles of the distribution




Figure 16: Response of households at different percentiles of the wealth and income distribution

- Debtors increase their consumption substantially

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Response of households at different percentiles of the distribution




Figure 17: Response of households at different percentiles of the wealth and income distribution.

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A discount factor shock and its inflation response




Figure 18: Discount factor shock and the response of consumption in the model. Flexible: $\kappa = 0.09$, baseline: $\kappa = 0.01$, stickier: $\kappa = 0.011$.

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A government spending shock and its inflation response




Figure 19: Government spending shock and the response of consumption in the model. Flexible: $\kappa = 0.09$, baseline: $\kappa = 0.01$, stickier: $\kappa = 0.011$.

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Cognitive discounting

- What if households don't fully understand the reduction in the real value of their NNP?
- Motivated by empirical evidence in Schnorpfeil et al. (2023)
- Simulate the redistribution shock as a sequence of wealth taxes over time $\hat{\theta}_{\pi t}$ where

$$\hat{\theta}_{\pi t} = \frac{\theta_\pi}{d}$$

And d is NNP duration, mimicking e.g. the reduction in real value of mortgage payments.

- Introduce behavioural friction where the expectations of the taxes $\hat{\theta}_{\pi t}$ are defined as

$$E_t^{BR}[\hat{\theta}_{\pi t+1}] = \hat{\theta}_{\pi ss} + \tilde{m} E_t[\hat{\theta}_{\pi t+1}]$$

- Can be microfounded from a noisy signal extraction problem (Gabaix (2020))

Smaller initial response, but more persistent tailwind to aggregate demand





Figure 20: Impulse response functions (IRFs) of consumption and inflation to the wealth redistribution generated by the 2021-22 inflation shock varying the degree of cognitive discounting.

Quantitative model with two assets

- Household problem

$$V_t(e, \Lambda_-, a_-) = \max_{c, \Lambda, a} \left\{ \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t V_{t+1}(e', \Lambda, a) \right\} \quad (1)$$

$$c + a + Q_t \Lambda = z_t(e) + (1 + r_t^a) a_- + (1 + \delta Q_t) \Lambda_- - \Psi(a, a_-) \quad (7)$$

$$a \geq \underline{a}, \quad Q_t \Lambda \geq \underline{b} P_t, \quad (8)$$

where $z_t(e)$ is net labor income and the adjustment cost function is specified as

$$\Psi(a, a_-) = \frac{\chi_1}{\chi_2} \left| \frac{a - (1 + r_t^a) a_-}{(1 + r_t^a) a_- + \chi_0} \right|^{\chi_2} [(1 + r_t^a) a_- + \chi_0],$$

with $\chi_0, \chi_1 > 0$ and $\chi_2 > 1$.

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Production

$$Y_t = Z_t K_{t-1}^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}$$

$$Q_t = 1 + \frac{1}{\delta \epsilon_I} \left(\frac{K_t - K_{t-1}}{K_{t-1}} \right)$$

$$(1+r_t)Q_t = \alpha Z_{t+1} \left(\frac{N_{t+1}}{K_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} mc_{t+1} - \left[\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} - (1-\delta) + \frac{1}{2\delta \epsilon_I} \left(\frac{K_{t+1} - K_t}{K_t} \right)^2 \right] + \frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} Q_{t+1}$$

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Introducing prices stickiness

- Competitive final good sector aggregates a continuum of intermediate goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms, facing quadratic adjustment costs Firms
- In equilibrium, we have:

$$\log(1 + \pi_t) = \kappa_\pi \left(\frac{w_t}{Z_t} - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) + \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \log(1 + \pi_{t+1}) \quad (9)$$

- κ_π and κ_w will govern different degrees of price and wage stickiness

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Paradox of flexibility






Figure 21: Monetary policy shock and the response of inflation and aggregate consumption in the model. Stickier: $\kappa_p = 0.05$, baseline: $\kappa_p = 0.10$, flexible: $\kappa_p = 0.15$.

- Competitive final good firm aggregates a continuum of intermediate goods with constant elasticity of substitution $\frac{\mu}{1-\mu} > 1$
- Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms with production function $y_{jt} = Z_t n_{jt}$ which employ a representative workforce
- Each firm sets prices p_{jt} subject to quadratic adjustment costs
$$\phi_t(p_{jt}, p_{jt-1}) = \frac{\mu}{\mu-1} \frac{1}{2\kappa} \log(1 + \pi_t)^2 Y_t$$


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Appendix III: Empirical evidence

Large variation in debt-to-income (DTI) ratios at the county level - 2021



Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax,



Constructing relevant measures at the county level (j)

- For nominal liabilities, use county debt-to-income ratio (DTI_j) from the NY FED
- For nominal assets, assign those proportionally on yearly interest income (I_j), scaled by county income Y_j (both from IRS SOI)

$$\frac{NNP_j}{Y_j} = \frac{I_j}{I} \times \frac{NA}{Y_j} - DTI_j \quad (10)$$

- For consumption C_j , use credit/debit card spending at the county level from Chetty et al. (2020)
[Data](#) [Comparison with BEA](#)

County-level regression

- Same identification strategy
- Regress county j spending growth from the start of inflation episode on its 2021Q1 NNP, normalized by county income

$$\Delta \log(C)_j = \alpha + \beta_1 \times \frac{\text{NNP}_j}{Y_j} + \boldsymbol{\beta_2} \times \mathbf{X}_j + \epsilon_j \quad (11)$$

- Weighting each county by population

Results (1)

NNP AND SPENDING GROWTH

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
NNP/Y	-0.2866 (0.459)	-0.1018 (0.385)	0.1476 (0.295)	0.6640 (0.300)
State FE	✓	✓	✓	
Industry Comp.	✓	✓		
Employment	✓			
N	952	1607	1607	1607
R ²	0.447	0.394	0.371	0.007

Results (2)

SEPARATING NOMINAL ASSETS AND NOMINAL LIABILITIES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
NL/Y	0.7193 (0.691)	0.4640 (0.574)	0.0683 (0.351)	-0.1168 (0.678)
NA/Y	0.1300 (0.736)	0.277 (0.679)	0.4600 (0.795)	-1.2669 (0.525)
State FE	✓	✓	✓	
Industry Comp.	✓	✓		
Employment	✓			
N	952	1607	1607	1607
R ²	0.448	0.394	0.372	0.011


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Credit/debit card spending



Percent Change in All Consumer Spending*

In Dutchess, as of April 30 2023, total spending by all consumers increased by 9.2% compared to January 2020.



*Change in average consumer credit and debit card spending, indexed to January 4-31, 2020 and seasonally adjusted. The dashed segment of the line is provisional data, which may be subject to non-negligible revisions as newer data is posted. This series is based on data from Affinity Solutions.

last updated: May 10, 2023 next update expected: June 13, 2023

visit trackthereccovery.org to explore

Comparison with BEA

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Relatively good track of aggregate expenditures [\(Back\)](#)




Figure 22: Total consumer spending in the US - Affinity versus BEA Personal Consumption Expenditures

US CPI YoY



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Covid-19 cases in the US

OPPORTUNITY
INSIGHTS
ECONOMIC TRACKER


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GATES FOUNDATION

Weekly Reported COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, Tests, and Hospitalizations*

In the United States, on June 12, 2023, there were **2.83** newly reported patients currently hospitalized in an inpatient bed who have suspected or confirmed COVID-19 per 100,000 people



data sources: New York Times, Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health & Human Services

*Confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths as a 7-day rolling sum and confirmed COVID-19 tests and hospitalizations as a 7-day moving average. This series uses the data published by the New York Times, the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Negative numbers may appear if corrections to official statistics are made that, on net, reduce the daily count relative to new events.

last updated: June 14, 2023 next update expected: June 21, 2023

visit tracktherescovery.org to explore

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
Robustness - timing

- Results are robust to:
 - Measuring debt-to-income and asset-to-income ratios in 2019 (though not significant)
 - Measuring growth within the last 12 months (though magnitude smaller)
 - Controlling for cumulative Covid-19 cases at the beginning of the period (March 2021) and Covid-19 cases during the period
 - Measuring nominal debt per hh and nominal asset per hh (though not significant)

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Diff-in-diff design

- Look at counties' consumption growth for the top and bottom NNP quintiles.




- Without controls, low NNP counties seem to have been growing more (in contrast with the theory).

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Diff-in-diff after controls

- Regress spending and NNP on state FE, county-level industry comp., education and age, plot the residualized top and bottom quintiles



- Results show no differences among the two groups.

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