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HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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Undergraduate Studies:

BA, Economics, University of Chicago, 2014

BS, Mathematics with Specialization in Economics, University of Chicago, 2014

Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2016 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in Business Economics

Thesis Title: "Essays in Industrial Organization"

Expected Completion Date: May 2021

References:

Professor Ariel Pakes

Harvard University

apakes@fas.harvard.edu

Professor Robin Lee

Harvard University

robinlee@fas.harvard.edu

Professor Dennis Yao

Harvard Business School

dyao@hbs.edu

Fields:

Primary field: Industrial Organization

Secondary field: Environmental Economics

Teaching Experience:

Fall 2019

Principles of Econometrics (Graduate), Harvard University, teaching fellow for
Professor Elie Tamer

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2018–2019

Research Assistant to Professors Kate Ho, Ariel Pakes, and Mark Shepard

2014–2016

Research Analyst at The Brattle Group (San Francisco, California)

Professional Activities

2019	Berkeley/Sloan Summer School in Environmental Economics
2019	Chicago Price Theory Summer Camp
2018	Jerusalem Summer School in Economics (Industrial Organization)

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2019–present	Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Pre-Doctoral Fellow
2016	Honorable Mention, NSF Graduate Research Fellowships Program

Job Market Paper:

“Regulatory Mandates and Electric Vehicle Product Variety” (with Sarah Armitage)

Abstract: When should policies to encourage new types of products operate on the supply side of the market, using regulations and mandates, and when should they operate on the demand side, using consumer incentives? We study an important supply-side policy in the early electric vehicle industry: the zero-emission vehicle mandate in California and nine other states. Focusing on the 2009–17 period, we examine the interaction between two channels that may cause supply-side and demand-side policies to differ: imperfect competition and endogenous product entry. After showing that firms internalized much of the social benefit of entry under the mandate, we evaluate a counterfactual policy that replaces the mandate with a demand-side subsidy and tax regime. Holding fixed the regulator's stated target, electric vehicle sales in regulated states, the demand-side policy generates a wider gap between private entry incentives and social welfare, suggesting that product variety would be lower. Consumer and producer surplus are both lower under the demand-side policy. When fewer products are introduced, producers avoid entry costs, but forego long run benefits of entry.