

Mini Conferencia 2025

La mini conferencia de este año tendrá lugar los días 8 (virtual) y 15 (presencial en el campus) de diciembre. Cada participante presentará un paper reciente en la literatura de macro internacional. Las reglas son las siguientes: presentaciones de 10 a 15 minutos, seguidas de 5 minutos para preguntas. Las preguntas pueden ser tanto para clarificar como de interpretación (se esperaría que quien presente defienda el paper como si lo hubiera escrito) o de crítica (pensando en utilizar estos papers como puntos de partida para tesis de maestría u otros trabajos).

El programa será el siguiente

8 de diciembre (virtual)

Horario	Presentado por	Paper
10:00	Tomás Buscaglia Nina Di Costanzo Pereira Luca Armelini	Bocola (2016) Bocola and Dovis (2019) Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008)
11:10		Break
11:20	Tomás Kairuz Giulia Bellicoso	Bianchi, Bolivar, and Sosa-Padilla (2025) Arce, Morgan, and Werquin (2024)

15 de diciembre (campus M109)

Horario	Presentado por	Paper
10:00	Federico López Anabel Vitaliani Maximiliano Cucher Yago Cortondo	Almeida, Esquivel, Kehoe, and Nicolini (2024) Espino, Kozlowski, Martin, and Sánchez (2025) Bianchi and Sosa-Padilla (2018) Fourakis (2024)
11:15		Break
11:25	Dolores Tognolotti Julia Nina Fazio Fernando Agustín Acosta Genaro Martín Damiani Luca Bentivenga	Pouzo and Presno (2016) Roch and Roldán (2023) Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2022) Boz, Daude, and Durdu (2011) Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2020)

REFERENCES

- ALMEIDA, V., C. ESQUIVEL, T. J. KEHOE, AND J. P. NICOLINI (2024): “Default and Interest Rate Shocks: Renegotiation Matters,” Working Papers 806, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- ARCE, F., J. MORGAN, AND N. WERQUIN (2024): “Tax Revolts and Sovereign Defaults,” Working Paper Series WP 2024-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- BIANCHI, J., C. BOLIVAR, AND C. SOSA-PADILLA (2025): “The Political Economy of Credit Booms and Macroprudential Regulation,” mimeo, University of Minnesota.
- BIANCHI, J. AND C. SOSA-PADILLA (2018): “Reserve Accumulation, Macroeconomic Stabilization and Sovereign Risk,” 2018 Meeting Papers 1166, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- BOCOLA, L. (2016): “The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 124, 879–926.
- BOCOLA, L. AND A. DOVIS (2019): “Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis,” *American Economic Review*, 109, 4343–77.
- BOZ, E., C. DAUDE, AND C. B. DURDU (2011): “Emerging market business cycles: Learning about the trend,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 58, 616–631.
- CABALLERO, R. J., E. FARHI, AND P.-O. GOURINCHAS (2008): “An Equilibrium Model of ”Global Imbalances” and Low Interest Rates,” *American Economic Review*, 98, 358–93.
- ESPINO, E., J. KOZLOWSKI, F. M. MARTIN, AND J. M. SÁNCHEZ (2025): “Domestic Policies and Sovereign Default,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 17, 74–113.
- FOURAKIS, S. (2024): “Sovereign Default and Government Reputation,” mimeo, Johns Hopkins University.
- HATCHONDO, J. C., L. MARTINEZ, AND F. ROCH (2022): “Constrained Efficient Borrowing with Sovereign Default Risk,” Working Papers 126, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- POUZO, D. AND I. PRESNO (2016): “Sovereign Default Risk and Uncertainty Premia,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 8, 230–66.
- ROCH, F. AND F. ROLDÁN (2023): “Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt,” *Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics*, 1, 334–370.
- SCHMITT-GROHÉ, S. AND M. URIBE (2020): “Reviving the Salter-Swan Small Open Economy Model,” Working Paper 27447, National Bureau of Economic Research.