

Discussion of

# **International Reserve Management under Rollover Crises**

by M. Barbosa-Alves, J. Bianchi, and C. Sosa-Padilla

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The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management.

## The *want* operator

- Understand joint behavior of debt and reserves to manage rollover risk  
... focusing on case with rollover risk **only**
- Tradeoff
  - buying reserves: increases  $V_R^+$  and  $V_R^-$  but **also**  $V_D$
  - reducing debt: increases debt prices at the time of the buyback

### Main result

Sell any initial reserves to buy back debt, only purchase when exiting the crisis zone

...on the equilibrium path of a MPE

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
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
## How it works

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
## Never pick interior points




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


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




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## Comments

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# Models to understand models to understand the world

**Main result** [sell *all* reserves, buy debt back, jump to  $(a^*, b^*)$ ] **feels very discontinuous**

- Can you solve the model in **continuous time**?
  - ... would prevent moving  $(a, b)$  keeping  $q$  constant
  - ... Bornstein (2020) describes the numerical algorithm needed in detail
- Can you characterize **ranges** of  $\delta$  (or  $\beta$ ) at which different parts hold?
  - ... already know that for one-period debt and consols,  $b^-(a)$  is linear
  - ... interpret the range of  $\delta$  as maturities or period length

## General qualms and math suggestions

- Timing matters: investors know **both**  $b'$  and  $a'$ 
  - ... can you solve the model with debt issuance first, reserve accumulation later?
- Proof strategy suggestions
  - ... establish monotonicity *and concavity* of  $b^-(a)$  first, then conditions for  $\partial b^-(0) > 1$
  - ... get  $a^* > 0$  and bounds on  $\delta$  as corollary
  - ... what are the slopes of the iso- $T$  boundaries? relate to optimal  $a = 0$

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# Policy implications

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## Should the IMF tell countries to accumulate reserves?

- [This paper] To avoid rollover risk, better to buy debt back
- This model predicts reserve accumulation at end of **successful** programs
  - ... when conditionality is weakest
  - ... empirical validation?
- Predictions in an MPE: what about optimal path with commitment?
  - ... program conditionality could enforce reserve and/or debt targets
- What about insurance for shocks, currency crises?
- Using IMF resources to buy back the debt changes the seniority structure of the debt
  - ... critical to draw policy lessons
- What about **burden sharing**?
  - ... Buying back the debt could bail out creditors if  $\zeta$  materializes
  - ... Is constant  $\lambda$  appropriate?

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## Concluding remarks

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- Deep investigation of one force underlying models of rollover risk  
... and how a government might optimally address it
- Sharp characterization of decision times and maturity structure for main result  
... although a bit buried in the proof of proposition 4
- The paper sets the stage for thinking about IMF precautionary programs  
... would like to see an application with real shocks and ex-ante optimal reserve path

