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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations

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I. Introduction

1. On 21 August 2000, I transmitted to the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809). In my transmittal letter, I characterized the Panel's recommendations as "far-reaching yet sensible and practical" and I urged all Member States to join me in considering, approving and supporting the implementation of those recommendations.

2. The General Assembly, in paragraph 9 of its resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000 already took up the issue at the level of Heads of State and Government, by resolving to make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In that context, Heads of State and Government took note of the Panel's report and requested the General Assembly to consider its recommendations expeditiously.

3. The Security Council has already begun consideration of the recommendations falling within its purview. Meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, the Security Council (in resolution 1318 (2000)), welcomed the report and decided to consider the recommendations which fell within its area of responsibility expeditiously.

4. The present report provides supplementary information to the General Assembly to facilitate its consideration of the Panel's recommendations.

5. Many of the Panel's recommendations need no further elaboration on my part. The present report thus focuses on those recommendations which require further details on the steps that need to be taken and the time frames envisaged to implement them. It also provides clarification, where necessary, on the proposed creation of new mechanisms, structures, or working methods.

6. In order to implement a number of the Panel's recommendations, additional resources will be required. I am therefore submitting to the General Assembly very shortly, a separate and detailed report on the resource requirements for implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The budgetary implications of some of the

Panel's recommendations still require further study and I plan to submit to the General Assembly a second report on that issue in the course of 2001.

7. Before proceeding further, I would like to begin with a few general observations:

(a) I commissioned the Panel's report to contribute to the overall process of reform that I initiated since taking office. I am concurrently pursuing a major reform of the human resources management system and seeking to strengthen the Organization's ability to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel. Separate major reports on both subjects will be taken up by the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session and are closely inter-linked with the implementation of the Panel's recommendations. Furthermore, the work of the Panel should assist me in responding to the many recommendations and requests of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to strengthen the United Nations capacities to conduct peacekeeping operations efficiently and effectively.

(b) The Panel's report does not address the question of whether the United Nations should become involved in specific situations. It deals exclusively with how the United Nations can improve its performance, once a decision has been made to undertake a specific operation or activity.

(c) Peacekeeping is the responsibility of all Member States, first and foremost, the members of the Security Council. The performance of the United Nations in this area will not improve unless Member States, and particularly those possessing the greatest capacity and means to do so, are ready to participate with soldiers, police officers and civilian experts, to support cooperation between countries of the South and of the North, including with equipment and training, and to pay their fair share of the costs in full and on time.

(d) The Panel's recommendations reflect the realities of peacekeeping in the post cold war era. Most of the missions authorized by the Council since the mission to Cambodia in 1992 have entailed a wide variety of tasks that go beyond the mere interposition of lightly armed peacekeepers between former warring States. Many of those operations have met with resistance and, in too many instances, our inability to respond to such resistance has seriously undermined our ability to effectively achieve our mandate and has done grave damage to the reputation of this

Organization. Our policies, systems and procedures must reflect this reality.

(e) The Panel's recommendations regarding the use of force apply only to those operations in which armed United Nations peacekeepers have deployed with the consent of the parties concerned. I therefore do not interpret any portions of the Panel's report as a recommendation to turn the United Nations into a war-fighting machine or to fundamentally change the principles according to which peacekeepers use force. The Panel's recommendations for clear mandates, "robust" rules of engagement, and bigger and better equipped forces must be seen in that light. They are practical measures to achieve deterrence through strength, with the ultimate purpose of diminishing, not increasing, the likelihood for the need to use force, which should always be seen as a measure of last resort. Indeed, rules of engagement provide for a graduated response, precisely for that reason.

(f) The Panel argued that the Secretariat could do a better job of supporting peace operations, if provided with additional resources with which to do so. I agree. As long as we continue to peg our staffing levels according to what is needed to provide just the bare minimum of support to the field, we will not be able to improve the quality of that support, nor will we be able to build the systems that are required to be more efficient and effective in the long term. There is some scope for more efficiently utilizing existing resources and I plan to do this to the maximum extent possible, but this will not suffice. This is why I am submitting an emergency request for additional resources under the Support Account. In 2001, I will present proposals for more appropriate funding mechanisms for Headquarters support to peacekeeping operations. I am convinced that a judicious investment of additional resources into our peace missions will be beneficial for all Member States and may in fact result in reduced costs over time.

(g) I do not suggest, however, that increased resources is all that is needed to ensure a better performance by the United Nations. Rules and procedures must be better adapted to the demands placed on the Organization. Attitudes and work habits must change as well. Some progress has been made since I initiated my reform programme, but much remains to be done to improve management within the Secretariat and coordination between the Secretariat and other entities of the United Nations system.

(h) I echo the concerns expressed by many developing countries to the effect that the increase in resources for peace operations must not come at the expense of the resources needed for development. The Millennium Declaration makes it very clear that increased resources are needed on both fronts and I have called repeatedly on the developed countries to increase overseas development assistance, accelerate debt forgiveness and open their markets to imports from the poorer countries.

(i) With regard to the role in conflict prevention and peace-building envisaged in the report for the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the intention is not to displace the authority of their respective governing bodies in dictating their policies and priorities. My intention is to achieve greater coherence within the United Nations system as a whole in places of armed conflict, to ensure that all of our various efforts work in greater harmony. The aim is not to integrate the work of the agencies, funds and programmes around a narrow agenda, but to ensure that there is proper collaboration among all the United Nations actors in the field with common guidance and support from Headquarters. This will be crucial in addressing the point raised by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, namely, that peacekeeping operations should not be used as a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflict. Those causes should be addressed in a coherent, well-planned, coordinated and comprehensive manner with political, social and developmental instruments (A/54/839, para. 53).

8. I am conscious that other issues before the Assembly, notably the reform of the Security Council and the scales of assessments for Member States, are of considerable importance for the role of the United Nations in peace and security matters. I would urge Members not to hold the implementation of the Panel's recommendations hostage to the resolution of those issues. The need to improve the capacity of the United Nations to carry out peace operations is urgent. The impact of our success or failure is felt by millions of human beings, very often the poorest on this Earth.

II. Action taken since the issuance of the report of the Panel

9. I have already implemented the Panel's recommendation to designate a senior official to oversee the implementation of its report, by assigning the Deputy Secretary-General that responsibility, as I indicated in my transmittal letters to the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/55/305-S/2000/809).

10. The Deputy Secretary-General has involved the following entities in the preparation of this implementation plan: the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs, Management, Public Information and Disarmament Affairs; the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Offices of Internal Oversight Services, Legal Affairs, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, and the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the World Food Programme (WFP); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM); the World Health Organization (WHO); and the United Nations Office for Project Services.

11. Concurrent with internal planning for the preparation of the present report, the Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, met with individual delegations and groups that sought clarification on the details of the Panel's report, or its intent. He briefed the Francophone Summit, the ministerial-level meeting of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, an ambassadorial-level joint meeting of the coordinating committee of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, and regional groups, particularly from Africa, Arab States and Latin America. Furthermore, on 27 September 2000, the Deputy Secretary-General and Mr. Brahimi briefed the Security Council during its informal consultations on the report of the Panel. On 2 October 2000, they also met with the members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

12. I have asked the Deputy Secretary-General to oversee the implementation of the plans laid out in the present report. She and members of the Secretariat will

continue to be available to meet with any and all delegations that wish to make suggestions or obtain information on how the implementation process is progressing.

13. Many of the clarifications contained in the present report respond to concerns that we have heard from Member States over the past month. I sincerely appreciate the interest that they have taken in this important matter. It is this type of collaborative and collective process that I hope we can all pursue in the months to come.

III. Proposed action for implementing the recommendations of the Panel

A. Enhancing the effectiveness of key peace and security instruments

1. Conflict prevention

The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council's second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to "all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion" (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 34 (a)).

14. In my "Millennium report" (A/54/2000), I stressed that the majority of wars today are wars among the poor. I noted that poor countries have few economic and political resources with which to manage conflicts. They lack the capacity to make extensive financial transfers to minority groups or regions, for example, and they may fear that their state apparatus is too fragile to countenance devolution. I characterized every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth as a step towards conflict prevention. The Panel's recommendation must be seen in that light.

15. The initiatives we are now taking in the field of conflict prevention have their genesis in our collective realization that, in order to be effective, prevention strategies must address the root causes of violent

conflict and the environments that promote it. These strategies must target factors that inflame conflict. The biggest deterrent to violent conflict is the promotion of sustainable human development and a healthy democratic society based on strong rule of law and civic institutions, including adherence to all human rights — economic, social, political and cultural.

16. Given the cross-cutting nature of long-term prevention, we have already begun to harness, to the widest extent possible, the resources and expertise of all relevant actors: the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods institutions, regional and subregional organizations, national and international non-governmental organizations and women's groups, including governments and civil society in recipient countries, academia, the private sector, etc. For this reason, I also intend to submit to the General Assembly and the Security Council in May 2001 the report on conflict prevention requested by the Council (S/PRST/2000/25).

17. In my annual report for 2000,¹ I have described some of our most recent initiatives to undertake conflict prevention measures in an integrated fashion. I am asking the Executive Committees on Peace and Security and on Humanitarian Affairs, and the United Nations Development Group to explore, together with the Bretton Woods institutions, additional initiatives over the next six months, in preparation for my forthcoming report.

18. Another of the Panel's recommendations is for the creation of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Strategic Information and Analysis Secretariat, which is described in subsequent portions of the present report. Given that the secretariat will provide a common analytical service for all United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes, I have proposed that it serve as the focal point for the various inter-agency coordinating mechanisms now in place for the formulation of conflict prevention strategies.

The Panel supports the Secretary-General's more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States obligations, under Article 2 (5) of the Charter, to give "every assistance" to such activities of the United Nations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 34 (b)).

19. I welcome the recommendation calling for more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension. There is no substitute for my being able to send an individual or a team of women and men to a place of potential armed conflict, to speak in person to the parties involved in the tension, to discuss the situation with both domestic and regional actors, including women and men, to identify for me the very specific and practical steps that the United Nations may take in averting war. This would help me to provide the legislative bodies with better informed and higher quality recommendations. I intend to engage Member States on ways in which these fact-finding missions may be best received by countries or regions on the verge of conflict.

20. I will elaborate further on this and other potential conflict-prevention tools, such as the preventive deployment of peacekeeping operations, the concept of preventive disarmament, the preventive role of human rights promotion and protection, and strengthening of rule of law in my forthcoming report dedicated to conflict prevention, to be submitted to Member States in May 2001.

2. Peace-building

The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 47 (d)).

21. Virtually every part of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, is currently engaged in one form of peace-building or another, including in the fields of: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including children; strengthening of rule of law institutions; human rights; electoral and governance assistance, including to national human rights institutions and national machineries for the advancement of women; the development of civil society and the support of free media; and the promotion of conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. This is but a very short list of activities in which many parts of the United Nations system are engaged, in the pursuit of not merely prolonging the absence of war, but helping to build the structures of durable peace and the foundations for sustainable development.

22. It makes sense that so many parts of the system are engaged in peace-building, because it embraces multiple sectors of activity including political, military, diplomatic, development, human rights, child protection, gender issues, humanitarian and many others. However, a clear division of labour has not yet emerged within the system, neither in the formulation of comprehensive peace-building strategies, nor in their implementation. As a result of this lack of clarity, the Panel implied that there were risks of competing demands on limited donor resources, potential duplication of efforts, and/or gaps in key areas that needed to be addressed.

23. Stronger measures to reduce poverty and promote economic growth are also important dimensions of peace-building. I therefore concur with the Panel's recommendation, and have instructed the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, in consultation with the other Executive Committees, to formulate a plan to address these issues, by the end of March 2001.

24. The plan must help to identify the ways in which different parts of the system might properly work together to devise country-specific peace-building strategies and to implement them together, in the context of the country team. Arrangements for peace-building must be coherent, flexible and field-driven, mobilizing all relevant resources of the United Nations system and other international actors in support of national initiatives, and building or reorienting ongoing activities so that they contribute to peace. What is required is a headquarters capacity to provide those resources necessary for the country team to propose specific strategies and see them through. This capacity must help to identify best practices and lessons to be learned from within the system, provide knowledge of discussions and debates on peace-building from external institutions and organizations and formulate system-wide guidelines and generic methodologies.

A small percentage of a mission's first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team's resident coordinator (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 47 (a)).

25. I will seek the legislative bodies' approval for the implementation of this recommendation, on a case-by-

case basis, when presenting concepts of operations and budgets for future peace operations. The percentage of the mission budgets to be sought for this purpose, and the manner in which the quick-impact projects would be conducted, will vary according to the specific nature of the mission environments and the status of ongoing programmes being undertaken by the United Nations system in the countries concerned. Quick-impact projects would be undertaken with the consent of the local parties and benefiting communities concerned, and in an impartial manner.

The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 47 (c)).

26. I have already stressed this point in my report to the Security Council (S/2000/101) of 11 February 2000. In response, the Security Council recognized that adequate and timely funding for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process, and called for coordination of voluntary and assessed funding to that end, including among all elements of the United Nations system (S/PRST/2000/10). The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations noted in its report that, in some peacekeeping operations, an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme can make a valuable contribution to peace and regional stability and it recommended that the programmes be provided with adequate resources (A/54/839, para. 106). I will include comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in my plans for future peace operations, as appropriate, so that the Security Council can consider including aspects of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in the operations' mandates and the General Assembly can review proposals for funding demobilization and reintegration programmes, in the start-up phase, through the mission budgets.

The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 47 (b)).

27. It should be recalled that, in the Millennium Declaration, Heads of State and Government pledged to spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the right to development (General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 24). Seen in this context, there is no “doctrinal shift” required, but rather, a need to review how civilian police, human rights experts and related specialists can work more closely together in peace operations to achieve the objective set out by Member States at the highest level.

28. The primary purpose of deploying international civilian police to a particular post-conflict environment is for them, in one way or another, to help strengthen the capacity of local police forces to maintain law and order and respect for human rights in a post-conflict environment, in which lawlessness and politically or ethnically motivated crime may be rampant. I agree with the Panel’s message that the police are but one part of the solution to strengthening local rule of law capacities, which may be plagued as well by deficiencies in or the non-existence of an independent judiciary and penal system. For example, local police forces might eventually reach the point when they are ready to and capable of arresting perpetrators of serious crimes, including gross human rights violations, only to have judges or prosecutors free such suspected criminals without bringing them to trial. It is therefore critical that United Nations civilian police and human rights specialists work closely together in such environments, and that the capacities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights be strengthened to assist with the training of United Nations civilian police.

29. I therefore intend, when presenting future concepts of operations and missions budgets to the General Assembly and the Security Council, to spell out more clearly what the United Nations system can collectively do to help strengthen local rule of law and human rights institutions, drawing on existing civilian

police, human rights, gender and judicial expertise. Thus, I will seek legislative approval for the implementation of this recommendation on a case-by-case basis.

3. Transitional administration

The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment of a local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 83).

30. It is worth noting that, of the 57 recommendations in the Panel’s report, this is the only one which specifically concerns a United Nations mission that has executive powers of the kind given to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) or the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Although they looked closely at the problems faced by these two important missions, members of the Panel were careful to address mainly those issues that are common to these two missions and other peacekeeping operations.

31. The Secretariat has already initiated action on this recommendation, by establishing a working group, comprised of experts at Headquarters and the legal and judicial experts in UNMIK and UNTAET, to examine the implications of the Panel’s proposal. The working group’s initial review concluded that the rebuilding of a legal system, or a sector thereof, and the promulgation of substantive rules of criminal law would be a long-term exercise. It requires extensive participation and training of the local judicial and legal communities concerned, which will ultimately bear the burden of applying the law. The group thus doubted whether it would be practical, or even desirable given the diversity of country specific legal traditions, for the Secretariat to try to elaborate a model criminal code, whether worldwide, regional, or civil or common law-based, for use by future transitional administration missions.

32. The working group agreed, however, that both UNMIK and UNTAET had faced serious difficulties

during the start-up phase, because the mission personnel engaged in law enforcement duties did not have a common set of criminal procedures on which to rely, for example, in the case of arrests, detentions, searches and seizures. In the absence of a common set of procedures, law enforcement officials were forced to resort to their national and widely differing procedures, which did not engender the local populations' confidence in the ability of the United Nations to uphold the law in a fair and consistent manner. The group thus agreed that further elaboration of the practical aspects of criminal procedures, as opposed to the substantive elements of the law itself, would be of great benefit. These rules should take fully into account the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

33. In fact, a number of United Nations organs have already made progress in the field of practical criminal procedures, notably the Centre for International Crime Prevention of the United Nations Office at Vienna, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNDP and UNICEF (in the area of juvenile justice), and the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues/Division for the Advancement of Women in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. I have therefore asked the aforementioned offices, together with the relevant experts in the Office of Legal Affairs, UNMIK and UNTAET, to conduct a needs assessment of the areas in which it would be feasible and useful to draft a simple, common set of interim procedures (referred to in legal parlance more precisely as interim "rules" of criminal law and criminal procedure). No additional resources are required to undertake this work, which should be completed by the end of January 2001.

34. Once the needs assessment is completed, I expect that the team, consulting with outside expertise, as required, could produce the first draft of interim rules by the end of July 2001. At that point, the Secretariat would be in a position to discuss with Member States how to take the project a step further, in terms of finalizing the rules and disseminating them to potential contributors for the training of contingents in future transitional administrations.

35. Naturally, it remains to be seen if the United Nations will be asked to take on governance mandates in the future. However, there are many lessons that could be learned from UNMIK and UNTAET on these and other areas such as the maintenance of physical and social infrastructure, operation of public utilities, creation and running of a banking system, and the collection of taxes, and work that could be done to better prepare for potential future transitional administration missions. Should the General Assembly indicate its interest in pursuing the matter further, I would submit to it a more detailed plan of action (and request for additional resources related thereto) in the context of my next report on the implementation of the report of the Panel.

4. Peacekeeping operations

Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 55).

36. While it is within the Secretariat's responsibility to draft rules of engagement for each operation, these are individually tailored to the mandates adopted by the Security Council. As such, the Council will have a leading role to play in the implementation of this recommendation.

37. The clarity and achievability of mandates on which the Panel made four specific recommendations (paras. 64 (a)-(d) are also issues for the Security Council's action. In this regard, the Council affirmed its determination at the level of Heads of State and Government, to adopt clearly defined, credible, achievable and appropriate mandates (resolution 1318 (2000), section III). I will remain in discussion with the Security Council on how to apply this principle in the case of individual missions.

38. Troop contributors will have an important role to play, because it is their military contingents who will be called upon to discharge their responsibilities professionally, in accordance with the mission mandates, the rules of engagement, and consistent with the long-established principle of "unity of command".

39. I therefore wholeheartedly concur with the Panel's assessment that closer consultation between troop contributors and the Security Council, including through new mechanisms and procedures, is needed (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 61). This would help to ensure that the contributors were fully aware of what was expected of them before they deployed personnel to the field, as well as during volatile situations. Indeed, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has stressed this point on several occasions. It is therefore a positive development that the Security Council, in section III of its resolution 1318 (2000), affirmed its intention to strengthen consultations with troop-contributing countries.

40. There are also a certain number of measures that the Secretariat could take to help peacekeepers in the field carry out their mandates in a professional manner, provided that it is given the means to do so. For example, the Secretariat could improve the way it assesses force requirements and devises concepts of operations. It could enhance the quality of military guidance provided to the field. It could promulgate standard operating procedures for a whole host of activities, as well as produce training materials and conduct more training for the benefit of troop contributors, including on international humanitarian and human rights law and on gender issues. While some of these issues have been stressed by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel, it must be recognized that no significant headway can be made on them within existing resources. As the Panel pointed out, there are only 32 posts authorized for military officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in comparison with over 30,000 military personnel in the field. I hope that few would doubt the need for additional staff in this regard, and I have thus requested an increase in resources for the Military Division (including for the Training Unit). The provision of additional posts should be accompanied by a restructuring of the Military Division, as described in section III.C.2 below.

41. Lessons learned from previous operations in which peacekeepers have been challenged also need to be reflected in the planning of new operations, as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has stressed (A/54/839, para. 102). I am therefore requesting a modest increase in resources for the Lessons Learned Unit in the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations, as recommended by the Panel.

B. New mechanisms for improving system-wide integration

1. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat

The Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, that would support the information and analysis needs of all members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 75).

42. I propose to create the above-mentioned secretariat, effective January 2001, primarily through the consolidation of existing resources in the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Public Information, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCR and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and through the loaning of posts from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues/Division for the Advancement of Women would maintain close contact with the secretariat, which should be headed by a Director, who would report to the Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, as recommended by the Panel. For administrative purposes, it would be backstopped by the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs, and its personnel and related expenditures would appear in that department's budget.

43. The primary objectives of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat would be as follows:

(a) Provide substantive secretariat services for the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, and

for interdepartmental/agency work in relation to conflict prevention;

(b) Serve as a catalyst and focal point for the formulation, in coordination with the other executive committees, of medium to long-term strategies of a cross-cutting nature that require a multidisciplinary approach, blending the political, military, development, socio-economic, humanitarian, human rights and gender perspectives into a coherent whole. This is particularly the case for the formulation of conflict prevention and peace-building strategies, and for the identification of options for United Nations presence following the termination of peacekeeping operations;

(c) Serve as an in-house centre of knowledge for mission planners and desk officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and other parts of the system, by researching and analysing issues which are fundamental to the successful implementation of mandated peace and security activities, but which those engaged in daily operational activities generally do not have either the time or expertise to look at more carefully. This is particularly the case for achieving a better understanding of the root causes of particular conflicts, which requires a multidisciplinary approach;

(d) Serve as the focal point for applying modern information systems and technology to the work of all parts of the United Nations system engaged in peace and security activities, thus rendering the dissemination and accumulation of information more efficient and effective, and enabling information products to be customized according to the needs of the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (as detailed in section III.G below).

44. I believe the creation of the secretariat could ultimately stand to benefit the Security Council, and troop contributors, by helping to improve the analytical content of the concepts of operations for new missions. It could also help to address the Panel's call for the Secretariat to provide would-be troop contributors with an assessment of risk that describes what the conflict and the peace are about, evaluates the capabilities and objectives of the local parties, and assesses the independent financial resources at their disposal and the implications of those resources for the maintenance of peace (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 52).

45. The information and analysis functions of the secretariat should not, in any way, be confused with the

creation of an "intelligence-gathering capacity" in the Secretariat. The secretariat would serve as the vehicle to better use information that already exists in the United Nations system or has been generated for public consumption by the media, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, etc.

46. The personnel of the secretariat would work in close cooperation with those best placed to initiate the formulation of strategies, notably the United Nations personnel on the ground and their parent departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes. The primary function of the secretariat's analysts would be to ensure that such strategies conformed to some basic standards of professionalism, consistency and analytical rigour, and had been tested against what outside specialists may have written on the subject, prior to being presented to the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. There should also be a reasonable degree of rotation to ensure that the secretariat's personnel are sufficiently up to date with developments in their parent organizations and their fields of expertise.

47. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat and its direct reporting line to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who is the United Nations focal point for peace-building in his capacity as convenor of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, it would seem logical to assign it the role of coordinating the formulation of system-wide peace-building strategies. I am thus establishing a Peace-building Unit, to be financed from extrabudgetary resources, to be located within the secretariat. It should be recalled that the Panel urged that the programme development of that Unit be evaluated in consultation with all stakeholders in the United Nations system (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 240). I am pleased that those stakeholders, notably the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, together with the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, have already addressed the issue and have arrived at this proposal together.

48. Further details on the structure envisaged for the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, and the resources required for its creation will be provided in my report on the resource requirements for

implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. I have made slight modifications to the Panel's proposals for constituting the secretariat. For example, I have decided not to transfer the Situation Centre/Department of Peacekeeping Operations to it, because of the necessity to maintain an around-the-clock duty room that is essential for contact with the field missions. Because this function is integrally linked with the day-to-day management of operations, I believe that it should remain in the Office of Operations/Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

2. Integrated mission task forces

Integrated mission task forces, with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. They should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and their leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 217).

49. In my view, the integrated mission task force concept is geared to providing the Secretariat with a management tool to ensure that all the relevant parts of the United Nations system are included in key mission planning activities, and during periods of crisis, from both the conceptual and operational perspectives, and that they each do their fair share, on time and within budget, to make sure that those missions are then deployed rapidly, with the human, material, financial, and information assets that they require to do their jobs.

50. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security (with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs taking the lead) supported by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, will decide when to recommend to me that an integrated mission task force should be formed, what its composition should be, who should lead it, when it should be disbanded and when it needs to be reconstituted in times of crisis. Task force leaders will report to the Under-Secretary-General for

Peacekeeping Operations in the case of peacekeeping operations, and to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs for peacemaking efforts, peace-building support offices, and special political missions.

51. I view an integrated mission task force as a project management team, with its head as the project manager. The primary task of the task force leader is to clearly define the parameters of the project, ensuring that all parts of the United Nations system are aware of what is expected of them during the mission planning process, and to then follow up to make sure that assignments are completed on time.

52. In order for the integrated mission task force leader to be able to function effectively, (s)he must be given the authority to directly task individuals or offices with assignments, irrespective of the established hierarchical or bureaucratic structures in place. I have decided to delegate task force leaders that authority, and expect that all concerned will respect my decision. I realize that it will require a change in attitudes, but I am also confident that we are up to the challenge. Given this heavy responsibility, leaders should be at the rank of D-1 or D-2 and available on a full-time basis for the duration of the task force.

53. To ensure effective management and well-designed projects, the integrated mission task force leader will need a small core team of officers, with a range of relevant expertise, available full time and collocated with him/her. This team would normally include one or two political officers, involved from the beginning in pre-mission negotiations, one representative each from the humanitarian and development fields bringing specific field knowledge of the mission area, one military and/or civilian police officer (depending on the mission), and one representative from the administrative and logistics support area.

54. The membership of the task force would not be restricted to the core team, but would involve designated experts across the entire system, in the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes, in such areas as public information, human rights, legal affairs, security and safety of personnel, refugees and the internally displaced, disarmament affairs, gender equality issues and child protection. The non-core members of the integrated mission task forces would not be collocated, but would continue to work from within their respective offices.

55. During the planning process immediately leading up to mission deployment, the membership of the task force would also include the senior members of a mission start-up team, as discussed below.

56. Naturally, the entire membership of the integrated mission task force will need to keep in close contact with one another, meeting together as a group as frequently as required, and/or making more extensive use of video and teleconferencing. Such facilities should also be utilized to establish and maintain contact with the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator and the country team. I would expect the information service in the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat to explore new and more efficient ways of how internal and interactive web sites and project management software might also be employed to modernize the way in which this is done. I am asking the Learning Service in the Office of Human Resources Management to also put together training programmes on project management techniques, so that the ad hoc way in which projects are sometimes undertaken are professionalized.

57. I intend to institute the integrated mission task force mechanism for the planning and initial deployment phases of all new multidisciplinary operations, henceforth.

58. The mechanism will apply not only to the planning of new operations, but may also be instituted for support to peacemaking efforts, in which it is envisaged that the conclusion of a peace agreement would result in the deployment of a United Nations peace operation. As the Panel has pointed out, it is vital that all relevant parts of the United Nations system are able to advise my special envoys, who may be leading or participating in such peacemaking efforts, about the practicality and achievability of tasks and time frames envisaged in an agreement.

59. I believe that the participation of the Bretton Woods institutions, in particular, would be critical in that effort, so that realistic assessments of their support to a peace process can be taken into consideration. I will thus be inviting the Bretton Woods institutions to participate in the integrated mission task force structure, both during the peacemaking and mission planning stages, as appropriate.

60. This well-coordinated approach is required for support to all peace operations, in all their phases, even

when an integrated mission task force is not in existence. The "lead" department concept, which was clarified a few months ago, provides for such coordination. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as the lead department for peacekeeping operations, and the Department of Political Affairs for peacemaking efforts, peace-building support offices and special missions, will continue to have primary responsibility for managing all peace operations. These "lead" departments will work closely with all those departments, agencies, funds and programmes that have been or would normally be represented in an integrated mission task force, in particular with those representing the country team already in place. They will hold regular consultations of the group to provide consistent guidance on policy issues, exchange information on all matters of common interest and to coordinate activities.

61. The ability of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs to perform their daily coordinating role effectively and regularly, whether through the integrated mission task force mechanism or otherwise, requires that they have sufficient staff to do so. I should stress in this regard, as did the Panel, that I find it totally unreasonable that large multidisciplinary operations would have only one or two desk officers in the Office of Operations/Department of Peacekeeping Operations available on a full-time basis to support them. Desk officers should be able to spend more time responding to queries from members of the Security Council, troop contributors and the field missions, which they should visit more frequently. They would be able to do so if the regional divisions had enough staff to back one another up effectively. Since, at present, they do not, the support to Security Council members, troop contributors, field missions and senior Headquarters officials suffers. Similarly, Department of Political Affairs desk officers should be able to dedicate full-time attention to countries facing major conflicts, for which they are in the lead. The present level of staffing leaves virtually no flexibility for the two departments to respond to pressing or temporary needs.

62. I am requesting additional resources for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Operations to enable it to perform the full range of its activities effectively. I am also requesting a few additional posts for the Department of Political Affairs. I am not, however, requesting additional posts

specifically for the integrated mission task force mechanism, which will be activated and disbanded as and when required, for temporary periods of time.

63. I have decided, in principle, to form an integrated mission task force for Burundi but, pending additional resources, will only be able to employ an embryonic version of the concept at this stage.

The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in a mission leadership (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 101 (b)).

64. It should be recalled that, in its 1999 report (A/54/839), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations stressed the importance of having senior military commanders, police commissioners and key staff personnel selected, prepared and trained prior to their deployment to a peacekeeping operation (para. 72). I fully agree that those who will ultimately have to start up and run a mission on the ground should be involved in the planning of that mission. Once an integrated mission task force is formed, therefore, one of its first tasks will be to identify the individuals who will be the first to board the plane en route to establishing the mission headquarters. Among them, to the maximum extent possible, will be the prospective acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Representative of the Secretary-General, the prospective Chief Administrative Officer, and acting heads of mission components and other senior advisory personnel. Officers from the “on-call lists”, discussed in detail in paragraph 100 below, would also be in that group. The Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator should be actively involved in the mission-planning process, particularly when he/she will serve as a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and links will be maintained with her/him through videoconferencing and visits to Headquarters.

65. As soon as possible prior to the anticipated deployment of the start-up team, its members should be brought to Headquarters to participate in the planning of the mission and to serve as core integrated mission task force members for that period.

66. I have asked the Department of Management to identify office space that could be fully equipped and

set aside to accommodate at least one full integrated mission task force (consisting of its core members and a mission start-up team) at any given time.

C. Enhancing rapid and effective deployment capacities

1. Timelines for deployment

The United Nations should define “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 91).

67. The Panel noted that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, among others, has long emphasized the need for the United Nations to strengthen its rapid deployment capacities. I agree with the Panel that a first step in meeting that objective would be to define what “rapid” and “effective” deployment actually means. The standard that the Panel has proposed is very ambitious. At the same time, it must be recalled that the Secretariat was asked to fully deploy the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) in less than three weeks. Similar time constraints applied with regard to the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). Peace processes are often most fragile in the initial phases and we must be able to deploy operations when they can make the greatest contribution.

68. I have therefore asked the relevant parts of the Secretariat to use the timelines proposed by the Panel as the basis for evaluating the capacity of our existing systems to provide field missions with the human, material, financial and information assets that they require, in quantitative and qualitative terms.

2. Mission leadership

The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair

geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 101 (a)).

69. It will be recalled that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations also recommended that a more thorough review of candidates was needed, and noted that further refinements could be instituted in the selection of senior field appointments (A/54/839, para. 72). The Panel's recommendations on this subject were nearly identical and built upon what the Committee has already urged. I therefore take this issue very seriously, while being mindful of the Panel's assessment of the constraints faced (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 94).

70. The selection process could be improved in a number of ways, including in the areas of gender balance and geographical distribution. I have decided to form a senior appointments group, consisting of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNDP, the Office of Human Resources Management and the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues to oversee the formulation of recommendations to me for the selection of senior personnel. The senior appointments group will, inter alia, oversee the following, by February 2001:

(a) Establishment of a profile of general qualities required in special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, police commissioners, their deputies and other senior staff. In this connection, in addition to direct political, peace-building and peacekeeping experience, special emphasis will be placed on managerial experience;

(b) Expansion and centralization of the existing senior appointment roster system by consolidating one roster for all senior appointments to peace operations. The new central roster will be kept by the senior appointments group and by my Executive Office and will be updated on a regular basis;

(c) Identification of United Nations personnel ready to take on senior field assignments through consultation with the departments, agencies, funds and programmes concerned. These individuals should be included in the rapid deployment roster and appropriate arrangements made in advance to ensure cover of their regular duties so they can be quickly deployed;

(d) Revision of non-United Nations candidates and preparation of a short list of those who should be considered for senior positions. Every opportunity to meet and interview such personnel will be used. For instance, senior personnel on mission to the home countries of candidates should use this opportunity to meet with them.

71. Once the senior appointments group has finalized the profiles for the positions concerned, I will be sending a request to all Member States to propose candidates accordingly. I hope that this can take place by March 2001.

72. At present, there is no standard briefing and training procedure for senior staff of peace operations. I will therefore ask the new senior appointments group to recommend such a training/briefing procedure and will make it standard practice for all selected senior mission personnel.

73. As part of my overall review of United Nations peace-building efforts, I will ask UNDP and the United Nations Development Group to offer recommendations, by March 2001, on improving the selection, training and support to resident coordinators who are sent to posts with strong prevention and peace-building demands, as well as procedures for reviewing those currently serving in such posts. In many cases, these resident coordinators will either lead United Nations peace-building efforts with the United Nations country team, or will serve as Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General or Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

74. I will try to meet the above-mentioned objective of the early identification of senior staff, but there will be cases when senior personnel must be dispatched to the field as soon as they are identified. For this reason, and in order to continue training in the field, I will establish the regular practice wherein a training team, including women and men, from Headquarters will deploy to the field when a mission is established to conduct training in situ for senior and middle managers as they arrive in the mission. I also intend to establish, as a matter of regular practice, training cells in each mission to conduct regular training for mission personnel at all levels and in all components. Provision will be made in the budgets of peace operations for such training.

75. In addition to the above, I have asked the Learning Service in the Office of Human Resources

Management, to work with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, which is developing a systematic approach for briefing and debriefing Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. In addition to preparing a handbook for Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, an annual seminar for them will be organized as a forum for sharing of experiences and discussion with Headquarters personnel. The first of these seminars will take place in the first part of 2001, on the basis of voluntary contributions.

The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation and, whenever possible, should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 101 (c)).

76. The proposed creation of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat should help to implement this recommendation, by creating the capacity to conduct the type of medium to long-term strategizing proposed. The early inclusion of mission leadership in the planning process, working together with the integrated mission task force members, will also help to implement this recommendation, with which I am in full agreement. Where a peace mission deploys to the field, it is also essential that the role and functions of my representative are defined in relation to those of senior officials of the United Nations already on the ground, such as the resident or humanitarian coordinator. Recent consultations between the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP have already produced clear guidance on this matter, which I have endorsed.

3. Military personnel

Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system, to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within

90 days for complex peacekeeping operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 117 (a)).

The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in the United Nations standby arrangements system to contribute troops to a potential operation once it appears likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations might be reached (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 117 (b)).

77. In its 1999 report (A/54/839), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations welcomed increased contributions of Member States to the standby arrangements system and encouraged other Member States which had not already done so to join it (para. 90). Therefore, there is already agreement that the standby arrangements system is a useful tool and could be further strengthened. I view the Panel's recommendations in that light.

78. At the same time, the Panel also made the point that it would not be particularly useful to continue to increase the numbers of troops and other personnel in the standby arrangements system, if it is not actually used as a basis for soliciting troop contributions for a particular operation. It is therefore important to address some fundamental shortcomings in how the system is presently utilized, before speaking directly to the Panel's recommendations.

79. First, I invite participants in the United Nations standby arrangements system to inform the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, by 1 December 2000, if the assets that they have listed in the system are in fact available for deployment, today. I anticipate that some of those assets have already been committed elsewhere, and thus may not be available. Such information will not be treated as an unconditional offer to contribute troops anywhere, but merely an indication that they are potentially available. It would be preferable to have a much smaller number of assets listed in the system that are actually available, rather than having a large figure that is unrealistic or bears little resemblance to what contributions may actually be made.

80. Second, I invite participants to automatically indicate, at the end of each month, any changes to the status of availability of the assets that have potentially been made available. I have asked the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to explore ways of enabling this information flow to occur in the most efficient

manner possible, and to report back to me before the issuance of my next report on the implementation of the Panel's report. While there are already provisions for a regular updating of the contributions to the United Nations standby arrangements system, they do not seem to be working as intended.

81. Third, I have asked the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to institute procedures to systematically contact standby arrangements system participants regarding the availability of their assets, in a mission-specific context. I expect that Department to maintain statistics on response rates, so that such information can be contained in my periodic status reports on the system.

82. Fourth, to better manage the system, the Standby Arrangements Unit now in the Mission Planning Service/Department of Peacekeeping Operations will need to be strengthened, as described in the request for additional resources.

83. The combination of these measures should help to at least partially meet the call by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for exercising transparency in selecting troop contributors, in particular in the use of the United Nations standby arrangements system (A/54/839, para. 90).

84. On a related note, the Panel rightly mentioned the importance of "enabling forces", which includes the provision of specialized units for movement control, communications, terminal or air-traffic control capability. I appeal to Member States to indicate by end February 2001 whether they are able to contribute any of these services. I also appeal to Member States to indicate at that time their ability and willingness to provide strategic lift assistance to troop contributors. The Secretariat would immediately commence thereafter detailed negotiations with those States to determine rates of reimbursement. The Secretariat could also complete detailed contingent-owned-equipment negotiations for all contributions involving equipment placed at two months' notice within the standby arrangements system.

85. As regards the "coherent brigade-size forces", I do not anticipate that the Panel expects this recommendation to be fully implemented immediately.

86. The first step in meeting the spirit of this recommendation would be to create a common standard and set of procedures for contingents to work

together when they arrive in theatre. Such standards and guidance documents should be prepared in consultation with Member States, finalized and then circulated to them so that they may be used during pre-mission training at the national level. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is not in a position to prepare all the documentation at this stage, because of resource constraints, as mentioned previously, and as detailed further in the request for additional resources.

87. The second step would be to enhance the Secretariat's capacity to assist Member States with training initiatives. The importance of training has also been stressed by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. I am therefore requesting additional resources for that purpose.

88. I have also asked the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to examine various proposals for the establishment of a new United Nations military staff college, and/or enhancements to existing capacities and facilities, such as in Turin, Italy, for the purposes of providing training to national command-level military staff in United Nations peacekeeping standards and techniques. I will report on this subject as and when concrete proposals are formulated by the Secretariat.

89. Last, I have asked the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to consult with the United Nations standby arrangements system participants regarding their concerns and views about the proposed formation of "coherent brigade-sized forces", and to then report to me by February 2001 on a detailed plan for taking the implementation of this recommendation a step further.

90. None of the aforementioned actions should preclude or delay those Member States with the means to enhance their bilateral and/or multilateral efforts to assist other Member States with training and equipment requirements. Nor should it preclude them from discussing how they might engage in joint training exercises with one another, at the command level, which would be a step in the direction the Panel recommended.

The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do

not meet the requirements must not deploy (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 117 (c)).

91. I ultimately view the implementation of this recommendation as a tremendous cost-saving measure for the Organization as a whole, because the expense of procuring basic equipment for contingents, once deployed, has been prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. Furthermore, the costs of sustaining contingents in situ, which do not possess the training or equipment to undertake their mandated tasks, is an unnecessary expense to the Organization, both in financial terms, and to its reputation. In some instances where the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been able to send a team out to troop-contributing countries, prior to deployment, it has helped to preclude deployments that would be premature. In some cases, bilateral assistance was rendered to help the countries concerned meet the requisite standards.

92. I am seeking an increase in resources to enable the Secretariat to implement this recommendation. While the cost of those additional posts may be in the thousands, the resulting savings could be in the millions.

93. I also propose to send a team from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to each mission every six months, to ensure that standards are continuing to be met. Any shortfalls noticed should be reflected in training efforts, so as to preclude such drops in standards in the future. I will seek appropriate funding in each of the mission budgets to dispatch these teams.

The Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 military officers be created in the United Nations standby arrangements system to be available on seven days’ notice to augment nuclei of Department of Peacekeeping Operations planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 117 (d)).

94. The Secretariat will be defining the profiles of the expertise required and will consult with Member States concerning implementation of the system during the next two months. The Secretariat will communicate its requirements to Member States by February 2001, along with a request for them to participate within the context of the standby arrangements system.

4. Civilian police and related personnel

Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 126 (a)).

Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools in order to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 126 (b)).

95. The Secretariat could assist Member States in strengthening their capacity to identify suitably qualified civilian police for peace operations, and cooperate with one another on training initiatives, by articulating more detailed standard profiles, generic job descriptions, standard operating procedures and guidelines. I am pleased to note that work has already begun in this area. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has addressed the broad operational issues through the development of “Principles and guidelines for United Nations civilian police operations”. This document reviews the shift in civilian police doctrine and sets down parameters and guidelines for their work. It was developed on the basis of inputs received from international police experts, Member States and related organizations. It will be finalized by 15 November 2000 and its publication and distribution is anticipated to be by the end of February 2001.

96. A significant amount of additional work is required in carrying out related projects to support civilian police in the field, and provide potential police contributors with the information that they require to identify and prepare their personnel, and to enter into the regional training partnerships recommended. This includes, inter alia:

(a) Development of detailed operating procedures for missions with training, reform and restructuring mandates, as well as for missions mandated to establish institutions (standard curriculum, evaluation systems, local institutional development);

(b) Information management (as it relates to standardizing the management and deployment of United Nations civilian police, as well as the recruitment and management of local police, collection and analysis of crime statistics);

(c) Pre-mission training packages and programmes for civilian police;

(d) Strategies and standard operating procedures for assisting the development of local police institutions and local police (organizational policies, codes of conduct, including with respect to domestic crime and crime in general, evaluation and assessment mechanisms, standard curricula and recruitment policies);

(e) Development of tools through which local police can work with judicial counterparts;

(f) Development of methodologies and standard operating procedures for the transition from the provision of security by international military to international police and finally to local police.

97. At present, the Civilian Police Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with only nine officers in total, has been able to spare only one officer, part-time, to work on these various projects. I consider these to be essential activities that are urgently required to support existing missions, let alone implement the ambitious recommendations proposed by the Panel. I am therefore seeking additional resources to strengthen the Civilian Police Unit, as indicated in my report on resource requirements. In this regard, I appeal to Member States to redouble their efforts to identify female civilian police candidates (and, in fact, female candidates in all other areas covered by the United Nations standby arrangements system). The Civilian Police Unit will work closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues in implementing these projects.

98. Given the complexity of the initiatives, and provided that the additional resources are provided (and positions quickly filled), I expect completion of the entire range of projects noted above by mid-2002. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the standardization of the management and deployment of United Nations civilian police will be completed by March 2001, and

that a revised pre-deployment training package for civilian police will be finalized by April 2001.

99. It should be recalled that, in its 1999 report (A/55/839), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recommended that the Secretariat urgently undertake, in close cooperation with Member States, the development of a comprehensive set of policies on the activities carried out by United Nations civilian police. It recommended that these policies be articulated through the guidelines for civilian police (para. 133) and stressed the need to strengthen the Civilian Police Unit (para. 131). I believe that the steps outlined above are consistent with what the Special Committee has already asked of the Secretariat on this subject and should help to expedite it.

Member States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 126 (c)).

100. While the responsibility for implementing this recommendation rests entirely within the purview of individual Member States, I wish to offer a few clarifications on how I view its intent. The “point of contact” for the Secretariat will continue to be the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of the respective Member States. The recommendation is directed at States as a suggestion for how they might be able to coordinate with one another more easily, such as on regional training initiatives. A number of Member States have openly indicated previously that several of their ministries or governmental agencies might be involved in the selection and training of civilian police for deployment to United Nations peace operations. This could potentially, though not necessarily, hinder inter-State cooperation on policing matters. Moreover, it has made it difficult for some States to rapidly identify and deploy civilian police to peace operations.

The Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in the United Nations standby arrangements system to be available on seven days’ notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater

coherence at an early date (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 126 (d)).

101. The same procedure outlined in paragraph 94 applies with regard to this recommendation.

The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements for recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial "rule of law" teams (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 126 (e)).

102. Further work needs to be undertaken on the broader issues related to the rule of law in peace operations, in order to assist Member States in implementing this recommendation. I have therefore requested the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to work with the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNDP in drafting guidelines covering the principles and practices of the rule of law sector of peace operations. These guidelines and standard operating procedures should build on the considerable amount of work already undertaken within the system, as well as lessons learned in the field, and should be finalized only after consultations with Member States.

5. Civilian specialists

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission start-up, and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy" (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 145 (d)).

The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid- to senior-level in the administrative and logistics areas (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 145 (b)).

The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected

civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 145 (a)).

103. It should be recalled that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in its 1999 report, recommended that the internal staffing procedures in use by the Secretariat be reviewed with a view to ensuring that the process adequately supports the particular demands of rapid deployment (A/54/839, para. 77). The Panel's recommendations address the Committee's request.

104. A dedicated and interdepartmental team, working on these three inter-linked issues for nine months, is what I believe is required to prepare a comprehensive report on the subject, outlining those elements and financial implications which require legislative approval. Unfortunately, such a team cannot be financed from existing resources, which is why additional staff are being sought for this purpose, as well as to design other new efficiency enhancing systems on an ongoing basis, and to then maintain them.

105. The dedicated team should undertake the following tasks, inter alia:

(a) Conduct an in-depth study of all existing occupational groups in peace operations and devise generic job descriptions which will assist in identifying the right candidates;

(b) Evaluate the effectiveness (including cost-effectiveness) of various sources of personnel to fill the positions identified;

(c) Identify training requirements, training tools and develop a systematic training plan for all occupational groups;

(d) Conduct a technical review and redesign of existing roster systems to enable access on a system-wide basis, including for the field missions;

(e) Redesign the application process to be compatible with the Internet-based systems;

(f) Promulgate selection criteria and guidelines to ensure compliance with the existing regulatory framework adopted by the General Assembly;

(g) Clarify the roles and responsibilities of departments, agencies, funds and programmes to help manage the newly designed system, as well as to pre-select and make available their own staff for deployment to peace operations on short notice.

106. In preparing these various plans, I expect the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of Human Resources Management and all other departments concerned to ensure compliance with General Assembly resolutions related to the use of gratis personnel, and to make all the necessary provisions to preclude against disadvantaging candidates, particularly in developing countries, who may not have access to Internet-based facilities.

107. Should the resources requested be provided, I would expect a comprehensive package of reforms to be ready for submission to the General Assembly in early 2002. Given that some work has already been undertaken on the Field Service category, I expect that a proposal on this particular subject could be ready for submission to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session. Meaningful implementation of these three recommendations could be expected by end-2002.

108. In the interim, I believe that progress could be made in implementing the Panel's recommendation for greater delegation of authority to the field. Recruitment authority was delegated to UNMIK, on a pilot basis, in mid-2000. Vacancy rates in that mission have dropped considerably over the course of just a few months. I have asked the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in consultation with the Office of Human Resources Management and the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, to review the effectiveness of the delegated recruitment authority to UNMIK and to report to me, by March 2001, on a plan of action for delegating recruitment authority to a few additional missions and field offices, together with the guidelines required to ensure due regard for geographic distribution and gender balance.

Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 145 (c)).

109. Effective 1 July 2000, a revision of the compensation package of all field staff recruited under the 300 series appointments was undertaken, including providing eligible staff with a family supplement, access to life insurance, and subsidized medical insurance for themselves and their dependants. An enhanced rest and recuperation programme for field staff will be in place in early 2001.

110. These, among other enhancements, were undertaken within the authority delegated to me by the General Assembly. A number of other far-reaching proposals of the Panel on this subject have already been addressed in my report on human resources management reform, which is currently before the General Assembly (A/55/253). Nevertheless, a comprehensive review specific to the conditions of service in the field is also needed, for which additional resources will be required to dedicate experts to the task.

111. I have asked the Office of Human Resources Management, together with the departments concerned, to also look at two key issues of importance, which are related to the Panel's recommendation on this subject. First, a feasibility study should be conducted on the establishment of a system of staff rotation between field missions and between field missions and Headquarters. Such a study should address the need for better spouse employment and work/life arrangements. Second, adequate resources for staff counselling services and improved medical facilities and arrangements should be provided at all field missions, including those at the start-up phase. I have asked that a detailed proposal on both subjects be submitted to me by mid-2001.

6. Logistics support and expenditure management

The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 169 (a)).

The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. The start-up kits

should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 169 (b)).

The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US\$ 50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund once it becomes clear that an operation is likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 169 (c)).

The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 169 (d)).

The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 169 (e)).

The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from \$200,000 to as high as \$1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 169 (f)).

112. All of these issues are interrelated and need to be evaluated in the light of the Panel's proposed deployment timelines. The Secretariat is simply not able to meet those timelines within our existing logistics support systems. The system needs to be redesigned and this will require a thorough review of a variety of areas, including the procurement and financial procedures now in place.

113. I anticipate that the General Assembly would therefore not yet be in a position to approve those

aspects of the above-mentioned recommendations which are within its purview without fuller information and cost estimates for the overhauling of our existing systems. I have therefore asked the Field Administration and Logistics Division/Department of Peacekeeping Operations, supported by the Department of Management, to address all of these issues in tandem and to commence work in January 2001. I would expect them to prepare a detailed set of proposals, along with financial implications, for presentation to the General Assembly within the context of my next report on the implementation of the Panel's report. I have asked the Office of Internal Oversight Services to participate in this exercise, to ensure that internal controls are properly addressed.

114. This work cannot commence immediately, owing to current serious staffing shortfalls in the logistics and procurement areas in meeting the present demands of the field missions, let alone to engage in such a labour-intensive exercise. In fact, I am requesting additional resources for all parts of the Field Administration and Logistics Division, in particular, the Logistics and Communications Service. Therefore, in order to enable the most knowledgeable staff to participate in this task, we will need to call upon seasoned staff in the field to assist with the process and/or to enable others at Headquarters to leave existing duties to participate in the exercise. This will have the added benefit not only of strengthening the team in quantitative terms, but also of helping to ensure that the field perspective is properly reflected in the review.

115. I expect particular emphasis to be placed on reducing as much as possible the delays that virtually all field missions have reported during the mission start-up phase, while ensuring that appropriate financial controls remain in place. When assessing different options available for achieving the rapidity of deployment that the Panel has recommended, the need to promote cost-effectiveness and transparency wherever possible should be borne in mind.

116. Troop-contributing countries will ultimately stand to benefit from an enhanced logistics support capacity. As such, they are one of the primary "customers" of this improved logistics system to be developed and should thus be consulted on the problems that they have been encountering in this area. The recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on this subject should therefore guide the determination of priorities during

the conduct of this comprehensive review. In this context, I wish to recall that the Special Committee has already invited the Secretariat to explore means of enhancing the logistics readiness of the United Nations, in particular through a broader use of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi and reserve stocks, as well as a reassessment of the start-up kits, including their scope and number (A/54/839, para. 93). The Committee has also reiterated its support for the provision of the necessary funding to permit immediate replenishment of start-up kits and has strongly urged the Secretariat to review the current role and function of the Logistics Base with a view to promoting its potential as a forward logistics and materiel staging area for peacekeeping operations (A/54/839, para. 147).

The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (d)).

117. In view of the fact that the entire logistics support system for the field needs to be enhanced and effectively redesigned, I think it would be premature at this stage to decide where these key functions and activities are performed, before having decided how they would be undertaken. I therefore believe that it would be prudent to postpone taking any action on this recommendation until the logistics support strategy and procedural reviews of the field procurement and financial systems have been completed.

To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division and the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peace-building field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 243 (c)).

118. Though I believe that the Field Administration and Logistics Division should, in principle, provide support to all United Nations peace operations and should be given the resources to do so, I agree, for the time being, with the Panel's recommendation.

Consequently, and until the Field Administration and Logistics Division and other Secretariat administrative structures have been given the necessary resources to adequately support non-military field missions and activities, the United Nations Office for Project Services will be called upon to do so.

D. Funding of Headquarters support to peacekeeping operations

The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 197 (a)).

Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for that purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennium programme budget of the Organization (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 197 (b)).

Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 197 (c)).

119. As stated in the introduction to the present report, I agree that additional resources are needed for the Secretariat to better support existing operations, build efficiency and performance enhancing systems for the future and then maintain them, as well as to implement the Panel's recommendations.

120. I am therefore requesting, on an emergency basis, through the Support Account for 2000-2001, additional resources for the Secretariat to better support peacekeeping operations. That request does not represent our complete needs, but it is a realistic indication of the areas that need to be strengthened on a priority basis. Some of the key areas requiring immediate strengthening have been mentioned in this document.

121. There remains a need to properly define a predictable baseline level and mechanism of funding for Headquarters support to peacekeeping and for temporary increases in activity, as the Panel suggested. We will be developing proposals to do this over the course of the next six months. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping had already called for a comprehensive review (to include the management, structure, recruitment processes and interrelationships of all relevant elements within the Secretariat that play a role in peacekeeping operations, which should focus on the coordinated planning, deployment, management and support of United Nations peacekeeping operations, logistics and procurement (A/54/839, para. 67). I will be initiating that review within the next month and may consider calling upon Member States and/or experts in the private sector to help conduct it.

122. At the same time, I consider that the work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations represents a partial completion of the review called for by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

E. Proposed restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

1. Senior management

Consideration should be given to increasing the number of assistant secretaries-general in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations from two to three, with one of the three designated as the "Principal Assistant Secretary-General" and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General" (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (f)).

123. I agree that the responsibilities invested in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are heavy. They involve the management of missions with annual budgets totalling over two billion dollars per annum, and tens of thousands of military, police and civilian personnel, whose security and safety are directly affected by the decisions taken by the department's senior management. The time demands on the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-Generals are also heavy, given their reporting responsibilities to me and the legislative bodies. The addition of one Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is a necessary investment to

ensure that the department's senior management team is big enough to enable high-level availability, to manage the department effectively, share the burden of responsibility, provide back-up for one another, and enable greater and more frequent interaction with the field missions, including through extended visits and deployment thereto as heads of mission start-up teams. I am therefore requesting the addition of one Assistant Secretary-General.

124. The proposed responsibilities of each of the three Assistant Secretary-Generals are detailed in the report on the resource requirements for implementing the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The Assistant Secretary-General for Operations would be the senior of the three.

125. The Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs should be a civilian who has accumulated extensive experience managing large numbers of military and/or civilian police personnel, either in a United Nations field mission and/or in a national capacity. While the Military Adviser would report to the Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs, (s)he will nonetheless be the highest ranking military officer at Headquarters and, as such, should continue to have direct access to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and to me, as required.

2. The Military and Civilian Police Division(s)

The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (a)).

126. I am proposing in the request for additional resources that the rank of the Civilian Police Adviser be upgraded to the D-2 level and that (s)he no longer report to the Military Adviser, but rather to the Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs. I believe this to be consistent with the expressed desire of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to enhance the role of the Civilian Police Adviser (A/54/839, para. 131).

A new unit should be established in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and staffed with the relevant expertise for the

provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in United Nations peace operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para 233 (c)).

127. Every police force in the world has the benefit of legal advice during the conduct of its work. The United Nations should not be any different. When the Civilian Police Adviser is asked to propose a concept of operations for the civilian police component of a new mission, (s)he should have the benefit of counsel on the type of judicial system in place, the interrelation between the police and the judiciary in a particular country and the nature of criminal procedures and laws in effect. If the civilian police component is mandated to restructure a local police force, then it is imperative that such restructuring be done with some cognizance of the entire criminal justice system in the country concerned. Before civilian police deploy to a country, they should be properly trained in the applicable criminal and judicial system, so that they have credibility with their local counterparts. The Office of Legal Affairs cannot provide this kind of expertise to the Civilian Police Unit, nor is it designed to do so.

128. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNDP are engaged in institution and capacity-building programmes to strengthen rule of law institutions. They are the appropriate organizations for engaging in this kind of work, and the new Unit would not be asked to duplicate their efforts. It would, instead, draw on their expertise to provide the necessary advice and support to peace operations.

129. The new Unit would be primarily of an operational nature, working alongside the officers of the Civilian Police Unit on a daily basis, providing them and mission counterparts with relevant guidance and providing interface with the rest of the United Nations system to mobilize expertise and resources to assist peace operations in the development of comprehensive rule of law strategies.

130. The existence of such a unit (staffed with just a handful of experts) would have been of great benefit, for example, during the planning of and support to police-oriented missions in Haiti (United Nations Mission in Haiti/United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti) and Bosnia (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well as those in East Timor (UNTAET) and Kosovo (UNMIK).

The Military Adviser's Office [Division] in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (b)).

131. I am proposing not only to strengthen the Military Division, but to extensively restructure it as well, as described in the request for additional resources. In summary, the Military Division would consist of the following:

- (a) Office of the Military Adviser;
- (b) Current Military Operations Service;
- (c) Military Planning Service;
- (d) Force Generation and Military Personnel Service (including United Nations standby arrangements system management);
- (e) Training and Evaluation Service.

132. I believe that this structure would provide greater clarity for and support to troop contributors and the field missions with regard to the allocation of responsibilities in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, by designating a senior military officer (at the rank of colonel) to be in charge of each of the key military activities specific to peacekeeping operations. A significant change would be the separation of force generation activities (the identification, deployment and rotation of troops) and the United Nations standby arrangements system management from the Mission Planning Service. The Training Unit would also be strengthened and expanded to enable it to take on the evaluation tasks referred to previously.

3. Operational planning and support for public information

A unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 238)).

133. Past experience has shown that the public information components of peacekeeping operations

have often not been properly planned or effectively supported, contrary to the extreme importance of this function as a force-multiplier, particularly during times of crises. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recognized the important contribution which public information, especially radio, can make towards the attainment of mission mandates (para. 120). It also reinforced its support for the Secretariat's efforts to address public information requirements in the planning process as well as in the start-up phase of peacekeeping operations and strongly supported the close cooperation between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Public Information and encouraged further enhancement of that cooperation (para. 120). I am therefore in full agreement that the establishment of a distinct unit responsible for operational planning and support of public information components in peace operations is warranted.

134. In principle, I do not favour creating new capacities in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations that might otherwise already exist in the United Nations system and could be marshalled in support of peace operations through stronger coordinating mechanisms. This has been the premise according to which the integrated mission task force mechanism has been established. However, there may be certain instances where proximity to the daily decision-making processes overrides the benefits of central support structures providing assistance to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations through the integrated mission task force mechanism.

135. Bearing in mind that the task force mechanism will not apply to the planning of smaller and traditional operations, nor to supporting fully deployed missions, I have decided that this unit would be best placed in the Office of Operations/Department of Peacekeeping Operations, so that it could be of benefit to the planning of and support to all missions at all times.

136. Its principal functions would be to ensure that the public information components in United Nations peace operations, both peacekeeping and political missions, are fully staffed and rapidly deployed with all necessary equipment, able to respond effectively to all information requirements in the field and provided with full support and guidance from Headquarters. A key responsibility of the unit would be to translate the overall political and strategic information requirements of each mission into operational public information

plans and to develop standard operating procedures and guidelines for the public information components of peace missions and familiarize mission information personnel with them. In addition, the unit would facilitate coverage of peace operations by the media, work with United Nations agencies active in the mission area on the shared use of information assets in field operations and, in particular, maintain a constant information exchange between the Office of the Spokesman and the spokespersons of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in the field.

137. In cooperation with other departments, particularly the Department of Public Information, the unit would lead the development of a rapidly deployable capacity for public information. This would include the establishment of a roster of pre-screened experts with field experience to be deployed on short notice for the initial phase of new peace missions, as well as a roster of pre-selected information experts who would be available for longer-term service. The new unit would develop and secure basic start-up kits, memoranda of understanding, or other standby arrangements with Member States and/or other United Nations system partners and non-governmental organizations, to enable team experts to work effectively in the field from the moment of arrival. Due consideration would be accorded to the need for a rapid procurement facility, given the early obsolescence of television and radio equipment, as well as standby arrangements with Member States.

138. The unit would be established primarily through redeployment of existing resources in the Department of Public Information as described in the report on the resource requirements for the implementation of the report of the Panel on Peace Operations.

Additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation's message out and build effective internal communications links (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 150).

139. I will be seeking the implementation of this recommendation on a case-by-case basis, within the context of mission budgets submitted to the General Assembly for its approval. The unit proposed above would bear primary responsibility for ensuring that due

consideration is given to the Panel's suggestions in this area.

4. The Lessons Learned Unit

The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (e)).

140. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has already recommended that experience derived from past peacekeeping operations be incorporated into peacekeeping policy and planning, so as to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of future missions (A/54/839, para. 102). The Panel's recommendation to enhance the Lessons Learned Unit is a step in that direction and I am thus seeking additional resources for it. An enhanced capacity of that Unit would enable it to make progress on the development of multidimensional doctrine, guidelines, and standard operating procedures, as well as sharing of "best practices" between missions.

141. In order to ensure that the work of the Unit is properly reflected in the mission-planning processes, its officers will work closely with each integrated mission task force, as a matter of practice. However, I do not propose to move it from the Office of the Under-Secretary-General/Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Office of Operations at this time. Given the importance that I attach to this function, I would like the Under-Secretary-General/Department of Peacekeeping Operations to personally oversee its development at this early stage.

5. Gender Unit/Department of Peacekeeping Operations

142. In keeping with the strengthened mandate for integrating gender perspectives into peace operations provided through the special session of the General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (June 2000), in its report, the Panel raises two important issues relating to gender balance in appointments to senior management positions and the need for gender sensitivity among personnel in their interaction with local communities. However, integrating gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations requires much more than that, as clearly

illustrated by the outcome document from the special session of the General Assembly and the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (May 2000). I am therefore proposing the creation of a small Gender Unit in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General/Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as described in the request for additional resources.

F. Strengthening other parts of the United Nations system

1. The Electoral Assistance Division/Department of Political Affairs

The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 243 (b)).

143. I agree with the Panel's view that there is a need to put electoral assistance on a more secure footing in order for the Organization to be able to respond to the increasing demand for this vital element of democratic institution-building. I believe that a measured increase in resources is needed in the regular budget to ensure a more effective response and follow-up to requests for electoral assistance. I propose to also increase provision for regular budget financing for needs-assessment missions, which are a prerequisite for all electoral-assistance activities. The relevant provisions are submitted in the report on the resource requirements for the implementation of the Panel's report.

2. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

The Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 245).

144. I fully agree with the Panel's conclusions on the centrality of human rights to United Nations peace activities and on the need to integrate human rights more effectively into prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building strategies. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the Organization's capacity both to plan, conceptualize and deploy human rights elements of peace operations and to provide them with specialized guidance and support, so as to achieve a more coherent and systematic approach to human rights work in peace operations.

145. Accordingly, I am seeking a modest increase in resources for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as detailed in my report on the resource requirements for the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, to strengthen its ability to take on the following tasks, among others:

(a) Analyse the experience of past peace operations and draw therefrom lessons applicable to future planning (both directly and by linking up to relevant expertise within research and civil society institutions);

(b) Develop best practices in the design of human rights components of peace operations, the definition of effective human rights strategies and the integration of human rights into the work of other components;

(c) Develop guidelines and methodological tools;

(d) Rapidly deploy staff to gather information and assess needs to support the planning of human rights components;

(e) Develop a standardized information management system for information gathered by human rights components of peace operations, to be applied consistently in all peace operations;

(f) Develop standard profiles for human rights staff of field operations and create a system for vetting candidates prior to their inclusion in the rosters;

(g) Develop cooperative arrangements and partnerships with non-governmental organizations and national institutes with a view to establishing standby arrangements for the staffing of human rights components of peace operations, as well as the fielding of human rights specialists to other components (for

example civilian police and judicial, penal and other specialists, as required;

(h) Develop training materials on human rights, provide and assist international, national and regional partners in providing pre-deployment and in-mission training for peace operations staff.

G. Information technology and knowledge management

Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat. Mission counterparts to that responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 251).

The Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division, should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 258 (a)).

Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 258 (b)).

The information technology needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 258 (c)).

146. A working group of information technology experts throughout the United Nations system has already prepared an initial plan for implementing the recommendations of the Panel. That group noted that, while the Panel's recommendations were fairly specific, they provided the impetus for rethinking information technology needs of members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security on a wider level and served as a catalyst to more closely coordinate ongoing efforts in several forums. To guard against duplication of effort, the group agreed upon a cost-effective and efficient division of labour, and a rough outline of the steps to be taken over the next six to twelve months.

147. Given its composition and functions, the Information Service of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat would be best equipped to play the role of coordinator and integrator of information management.

148. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Field Administration and Logistics Division is best positioned to provide information communications technology support for peace operations and their field counterparts in the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. (Information communications technology refers to the hardware, software and information systems etc., whereas information management refers to the management of the processes to populate and extract relevant information from those systems.)

149. At present there is no comprehensive system-wide inventory of the information systems and information and communications technology resources related to peace operations, including geographical information. Establishing and maintaining such an inventory should be the first step in any attempt to integrate and share information.

150. A working group comprised of all intended users of the products of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, will define the content and information needs for the information management capacity in the area of peace and security. The further development and enhancement of the above-mentioned information communications technology infrastructure by the Information Technology Services Division and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Field Administration and Logistics Division will require

initial investments and detailed studies of the requirements and design of the system.

151. The Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should also, in close liaison with the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, and in coordination with the relevant departments and agencies, assess the information management needs of peace operation components.

152. The United Nations Geographic Information Working Group, the Field Administration and Logistics Division and the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat should identify logistic support and other peacekeeping-related applications which would benefit from GIS technology, such as movements control, demobilization and civilian policing. All existing applications for these components identified in the geographic information inventory have to be evaluated, and a set of recommended application templates established.

153. The additional post and non-post requirements to get the project started are included in my report on the resources requirements for the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. I will submit a more detailed proposal in my second report.

The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 263).

154. I have asked the Department of Public Information, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other departments and offices, to thoroughly review current practices both at Headquarters and in the field, in order to establish a coordinated policy regarding the development, management and hosting of web sites by peace missions (including co-management by Headquarters), and to specify the resources required for its implementation (infrastructure, staff, budgeting, including any specific language requirements). In the meantime, the Department of Public Information

should continue to create and maintain web sites related to peace operations (including those with direct input from the field, for example, East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone), applying existing standards and guidelines such as those set forth in the “Internet publishing guidelines” approved by the Publications Board.

Notes

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/55/1).*
