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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 993 (1995) of 12 May 1995, the Security Council asked me to report every three months from the date of the adoption of that resolution on all aspects of the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, including the operations of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

A. Activities of my Special Envoy

2. In my previous report (S/1995/342) I informed the Council of the activities of my Special Envoy, Mr. Edouard Brunner, and the efforts being made by the Russian Federation, in its capacity as facilitator, to draft a text that might provide the basis for a Georgian-Abkhaz settlement. Through the months of May, June and July, those efforts continued and my Special Envoy followed their progress by maintaining his regular contacts with the Russian authorities.

3. As an agreed text had not been achieved by early July, my Special Envoy visited the region from 15 to 18 July. In order to start with an authoritative briefing on the progress of the Russian-led discussions, my Special Envoy first met in Sochi with Mr. Boris Pastukhov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. Mr. Pastukhov described the advances made in preparing a draft protocol and the points on which difficulties had been encountered. The draft text, a copy of which was given to my Special Envoy, built on elements derived from earlier negotiations. It aimed at identifying an acceptable status for Abkhazia within the borders of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, including the identification of the competences of the federal authorities, the establishment of a federal legislative body, the treatment by that body of questions directly affecting Abkhaz interests and issues concerning the early and safe return of refugees and displaced persons.

4. From Sochi, my Special Envoy went to Gagra in Abkhazia for a meeting with Mr. Vladislav Ardzinba, the Abkhaz leader. After a review of the current



situation in Abkhazia, including the serious effects of recent heavy rains, discussion turned to the draft protocol. Mr. Ardzinba said that it was unacceptable without a number of changes. He was not against a federative arrangement as such but, in his view, it must be between two equal entities. Regarding the return of refugees, Mr. Ardzinba wished to work with the arrangement already set up under the quadripartite agreement of 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397, annex II). Moreover, he did not accept that the collective peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) should take an active part in providing security for returnees. In his view, there could be no police functions for anyone other than the Abkhaz authorities.

5. On concluding the discussions, Mr. Ardzinba expressed his wish that ways be found to continue the negotiation process

6. On 16 July, my Special Envoy returned to Sochi and, after further discussions with Mr. Pastukhov, proceeded to Tbilisi to meet with Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, Head of State of the Republic of Georgia. There were also meetings with a number of the Head of State's senior colleagues and advisers, with representatives of persons displaced from Abkhazia, with ambassadors of the "Friends of Georgia" represented in Tbilisi (France, Germany, Russian Federation and United States of America), with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Georgia and with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations agencies working in Georgia.

7. Mr. Shevardnadze expressed his deep unhappiness at the continued lack of real progress. Despite 10 resolutions of the Security Council and measures by other bodies, there had been no tangible results to date. Regarding the draft protocol, Mr. Shevardnadze and his senior advisers felt that they had already conceded as much as possible and that further concessions would be unacceptable. Work on the draft should nevertheless continue.

B. Appointment of a resident deputy to the Special Envoy

8. Since December 1993, my Special Envoy has endeavoured to bring the Georgian and Abkhaz parties to the negotiating table to find a comprehensive political settlement. During the past few months, additional efforts have been led by the Russian Federation. Although a certain amount of progress has been made, it has not been sufficient to resolve the pressing problem of the return of refugees and displaced persons. A significant gap also remains between the two sides regarding the political status of Abkhazia within the territorial integrity of Georgia. Even if it proves possible to find agreement on the draft protocol now under discussion, there would then have to be a prolonged period of detailed negotiations in order to agree on ways to implement the constitutional, economic, human rights and other practical aspects of the settlement. Such negotiations would require continuous attention in situ.

9. I have therefore decided to appoint a deputy to my Special Envoy, who would be resident in the area and thus able to provide a continuous presence at a senior political level. Following the models of other operations, such as those in Cyprus and Tajikistan, the Deputy will also be the Head of Mission of UNOMIG.

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In carrying out the tasks of political contact and negotiation, the Deputy will divide his/her time between Tbilisi and Sukhumi and will travel as necessary to Moscow for direct consultations with the Russian authorities. The appointment will be at a level commensurate with these responsibilities. I am hopeful that it will be possible to make this appointment as soon as practicable, so that the incumbent may be in place in the first half of September.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

A. Situation of refugees and displaced persons

10. Since my previous report to the Security Council, there has been no major change in the situation of displaced persons, in the possibilities for their voluntary return to Abkhazia in conditions of safety and dignity or in the situation in the Gali district. Large numbers continue to live in difficult circumstances in Zugdidi and elsewhere in Government-controlled territory, placing great strain on the Georgian economy, on human relations and on local services. In these circumstances, the level of frustration and distress is very high, leading to calls for mass spontaneous repatriation.

11. Minor improvements to security conditions in the Gali district have resulted in increased daily movements back and forth across the Inguri river by displaced persons, primarily to the lower security zone, to work in the fields, trade or repair houses. Some of these persons have decided to stay in the Gali district as long as security does not again deteriorate. The size of the semi-resident population is estimated at 25,000 to 35,000 persons.

12. On 19 May 1995 the Quadripartite Commission convened in Moscow to explore once again possibilities for resuming the voluntary repatriation programme under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Representatives of UNHCR presented a concrete timetable for such returns, under which the displaced population from the Gali district would have returned before the end of 1995. Despite strenuous efforts to obtain a more flexible response, the Abkhaz side maintained its previous position of allowing only 200 persons per week to return. This continues to be unacceptable to the other parties.

13. Shortly after the meeting, the Abkhaz authorities announced that Abkhazia would start its own repatriation programme based on the offer of 200 persons per week. Returnees to Gali were informed that they were expected to fill in Abkhaz forms and provide details of relatives who had sought asylum elsewhere. Those refusing to do so would be excluded from humanitarian assistance. After clearance by Abkhaz authorities, the Gali residents would be expected to collect these relatives and bring them back to Abkhazia. It appears that so far few relatives have returned through this procedure.

14. Abkhazia also announced that it would start registering all inhabitants of the Gali district and that it expected UNHCR to participate in this exercise. UNHCR responded that it was unable to associate itself with that action, explaining that the registration of spontaneous returnees was directly linked with, and complementary to, the simultaneous official voluntary repatriation

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process under the terms of the quadripartite agreement. This, however, had come to a halt. Also, the purpose of registration was to extend international protection to those spontaneously returning, whereas the security situation did not permit UNHCR to provide this protection at the present time. Moreover, one could not speak of spontaneous permanent return, when displaced persons crossed back and forth across the Inguri river to and from an area where security remained extremely precarious.

15. UNHCR continues to monitor the situation of returnees and of the local population to the best of its ability, given its limited resources and difficulties arising from interventions by armed Abkhaz militia. UNHCR cooperates and liaises directly with UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force. Some difficulties have been experienced in interpersonal relations between UNHCR field personnel and Abkhaz authorities; these are being addressed.

16. Between March and July, UNHCR carried out a distribution of children's clothes, high-protein biscuits and World Food Programme (WFP) provisions to more than 7,000 highly vulnerable cases, in both the Gali and the Ochamchira districts. UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force provided logistical and security support. No reports of subsequent looting were received.

17. During his visit in July, my Special Envoy discussed the refugee situation first with Mr. Ardzinba and then with Mr. Shevardnadze. Mr. Ardzinba stated that altogether some 30,000 to 40,000 refugees and displaced persons had returned spontaneously and that Abkhaz authorities had already registered about 2,600 of them. He believed that about 10,000 persons from the Gali region would probably not want to return at all; the numbers yet to return were thus significantly less than was being claimed by Georgian authorities. He had already suggested that returns could continue at the rate of 200 per week. Mr. Shevardnadze expressed his serious concern that refugees had not been returned in safety or in sufficient numbers, returnees had been attacked and killed in the Gali region and the situation of displaced persons elsewhere in Georgia was deplorable.

18. In a session with some 50 representatives of persons displaced from Abkhazia, my Special Envoy heard several bitter, and at times passionate, statements critical of the lack of progress in the period of almost two years since the fall of Sukhumi and the Gali region in September 1993. My Special Envoy responded that he well understood the sense of frustration that was so widely expressed but the fact remained that it was necessary to find a political solution with the authorities that at present had physical control of Abkhazia. Any other course would lead to further bloodshed.

B. Consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Caucasus

19. Of all the difficulties currently facing Georgia as a whole, the most immediate are the scarcity of basic foods and the energy supply situation. After several years of very large budget deficits, the Government lacks the resources to ensure the continued provision of basic social services. Many primary health-care units and hospitals are unable to function because of

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shortages of medicines and equipment. Health care is now almost entirely dependent on international humanitarian assistance.

20. In addition, large numbers of orphans, abandoned children and people in need of special education are currently living in extremely poor circumstances because of reduced government spending. Most lack adequate food, bedding, warm clothes and learning materials. As in the neighbouring Caucasus republics, textbooks and school materials are in short supply and many school buildings urgently need rehabilitation.

21. As described in my previous report of 1 May (S/1995/342), the second consolidated inter-agency appeal for Georgia, covering the period from 1 April 1995 to 31 March 1996, was launched in Geneva on 23 March 1995 and requested US\$ 36,473,385 in financial assistance for United Nations-system agency projects that addressed the immediate needs of internally displaced persons, as well as other vulnerable groups in the community. These included relief projects to be undertaken by United Nations agencies/organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the food, non-food, shelter and health sectors, as well as projects bridging the continuum from emergency assistance to development.

22. Donors' response to the appeal has been disappointing. As of 30 June 1995, only US\$ 5 million of total funding requirements had been met, which seriously jeopardizes the United Nations humanitarian assistance programme in the country. In spite of the pressing need to continue to assist the internally displaced population, this lack of funds will oblige UNHCR to close down its activities in the very near future unless urgent financial assistance is forthcoming.

C. Human rights

23. In paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 993 (1995), the Council requested me, in the context of paragraph 7 of resolution 971 (1995), to consider ways of improving observance of human rights in the region. At my request, the High Commissioner for Human Rights dispatched a senior human rights officer to Georgia to discuss the possible establishment of a human rights monitoring mission there. The visit took place from 24 June to 2 July 1995. My Special Envoy also addressed this question during his visit from 15 to 18 July.

24. Representatives of the Government of Georgia referred in their meetings with my Envoy and the senior human rights officer to a number of serious human rights problems relating to the Gali region. They expressed concern at the absence of any visible progress in the organized return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as at the lack of security for the local population. They considered that progress in those areas was being obstructed by the Abkhaz authorities. The Government strongly supported the establishment of a human rights monitoring mission in the Gali region operating from Georgian-controlled territory.

25. The Abkhaz authorities, in particular Mr Ardzinba, stated that human rights violations in the Gali region were either being carried out by bandits or being committed or provoked by Georgian agents and forces. Mr. Ardzinba offered

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full cooperation with a possible human rights mission. However, he expressed the view that for the time being periodic visits by human rights monitors would be more acceptable than a permanent monitoring presence.

26. When my Special Envoy suggested to Mr. Ardzinba that a human rights monitoring mission established in the region jointly by the United Nations and OSCE would avoid duplication of effort, Mr. Ardzinba strongly objected to the establishment of such a mission in Gali.

27. A human rights monitoring mission would provide both local authorities and the international community with reliable assessments of the human rights situation, with particular attention being given to returning displaced persons and refugees. In the absence of such an objective picture, mutual and unsubstantiated accusations are creating additional tensions and impeding the return of refugees and displaced persons. In cooperation with other international organizations and bodies active in the region, a human rights monitoring mission in Gali would also assist in building confidence and developing technical assistance activities to help to establish the rule of law and strengthen institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. The objectives and methods of such a mission are set out in annex I to the present report. My Special Envoy and the High Commissioner for Human Rights will continue their efforts to secure an agreement for its establishment in Gali.

28. As in many other conflicts of this type, the question of crimes committed in the recent past and the impunity of their perpetrators is a major obstacle to the establishment of mutual confidence. In order to resolve this problem, further contacts with the parties are necessary to explore various formulas for dealing with past abuses. The proposed human rights monitoring mission would mainly address the present situation in the Gali region but would also be able to express its opinion about human rights in other regions of Georgia, in so far as they may have a bearing on the Gali region.

IV. OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG)

29. During the period covered by the present report, UNOMIG continued to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Security Council, operating in the security and restricted weapons zones and in the Kodori valley. The Mission continues to be commanded by the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General John Hvidegaard (Denmark). It maintains its full authorized strength of 136 military observers (see annex II) and also has 55 international and 69 local civilian staff. The Chief Military Observer and a small staff are based at UNOMIG headquarters in Sukhumi, while the remainder of the staff are at Pitsunda, with a current strength of 103 (21 military, 46 international and 36 local). The Mission is organized in three sectors, with sector headquarters at Sukhumi, Gali and Zugdidi. There is a liaison office in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi (see map).

30. At present UNOMIG has six team-site bases: one in the Kodori valley, at Adjara; three in the Gali Sector, at Ingur Ges, Otobaya and Zemo-Bargebi; and two in the Zugdidi Sector, at Dzvari and Darcheli. These bases provide a

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permanent UNOMIG presence in key areas, thus increasing the population's confidence in the Mission. Their location enables UNOMIG to cooperate closely with the collective peace-keeping forces of CIS and to react swiftly to incidents. All team-site bases are in areas that are of importance to the Georgian or the Abkhaz side.

31. UNOMIG's operations continue to be based on mobile patrols operating from the sector headquarters and the team-site bases. In the Gali Sector, a number of these patrols are conducted jointly with the CIS peace-keeping force. The Mission's current strength of military observers permits comprehensive coverage of the sectors and the patrols' activities, in addition to ensuring that the parties adhere to the provisions of the Moscow agreement, have an acknowledged deterrent effect on criminal activity.

32. Other than the restrictions outlined in paragraphs 39 to 41 below, cooperation with both sides has continued at an acceptable level. At the same time, however, both sides have continued to criticize UNOMIG: the Georgians over the lack of progress in the repatriation of the refugees, and the Abkhaz over the Mission's alleged failure to prevent the infiltration of armed elements into the security zone on the west bank of the Inguri river. UNOMIG is continuing its efforts to explain its mandate. In recent weeks, expectations of the return of large numbers of refugees to the Gali region increased markedly on two occasions, the first around 15 May and the second around 15 July. In both cases, this was due to statements by Georgian politicians in Tbilisi and in western Georgia encouraging or promising mass repatriation. The Abkhaz reaction was hostile on both occasions and statements in early July by the Commander of the CIS peace-keeping force that a mass return of refugees would be protected by his forces resulted in threats by the Abkhaz side that this would result in a resumption of conflict.

33. Since my last report to the Security Council (S/1995/342), there have been a number of incidents of armed robberies of UNOMIG personnel on patrol, but the Chief Military Observer does not think that these incidents reflect a pattern of planned and deliberate action against the Mission.

34. UNOMIG has continued to cooperate closely with UNHCR. Cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organizations is also close and includes security briefings.

35. Cooperation between UNOMIG and OSCE continues as outlined in my report of 6 March 1995 (S/1995/181, para. 21). During the period covered by the present report, OSCE members visited the Abkhaz authorities in Sukhumi and Gali; UNOMIG facilitated these visits and briefed OSCE on the situation in Abkhazia either through its liaison office in Tbilisi or in the region itself. The Chief Military Observer has also briefed the OSCE mission during his visits to Tbilisi.

V. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

A. General

36. Between 1 May and the end of July, the situation in the security zone continued to be unstable, although the number of spontaneous returns to the Gali region increased during the period. In spite of the control that the CIS peace-keeping force exercises over the Abkhaz militia's freedom of action, returnees are fearful that the militia will take action against them, such as confiscating their crops at harvest time. These concerns are not unjustified in light of developments in the Gumurishi area, where the CIS peace-keeping force no longer has a permanent checkpoint. Many former returnees have now gone back to Zugdidi from this area, reportedly as a result of the militia's violent behaviour towards the local population. Criminal activity has also continued, with 7 killings and 12 kidnappings recorded during the period. This activity has been concentrated in the Gali region, where the operations of the CIS peace-keeping force were significantly reduced during the force's rotation and training period from mid-May to mid-June 1995. Looting and destruction of property have also continued, albeit at levels lower than during the period covered by my previous report.

37. The local Georgian authorities claim to control the forces of the Ministry of the Interior, which include the so-called "Uberia Battalion" and the former Rescue Corps (Mkhedrioni members). In UNOMIG's view, however, not all elements of the forces of the Ministry of the Interior are fully under the control of the Georgian authorities. The CIS peace-keeping force is administering a weapons-permit regime, but it is UNOMIG's assessment that this requirement is not comprehensive and that significant quantities of weapons remain available in the area even though they are not openly displayed. There are regular crossings of the Inguri river by armed groups which are extremely difficult for UNOMIG or the CIS peace-keeping force to prevent. There is also circumstantial evidence of strong links between Abkhaz and Georgian criminal groups across the Inguri river.

B. Security and restricted weapons zones

38. The security zone has remained free of Georgian and Abkhaz army personnel and is relatively calm on the surface. On both sides of the Inguri river, small-scale agriculture is proceeding successfully and some of the land in the Gali region is being cultivated for the first time since the war of 1992-1993. Although a number of serious incidents occurred in the Gali region during the reporting period, there has been no repetition of operations such as those conducted by the Abkhaz militia earlier this year and the area has seen less violent activity than during the previous reporting period. The presence of the CIS peace-keeping force and that of UNOMIG have contributed significantly to this decrease. On the Georgian side of the Inguri river, the village of Shamgona remains a centre for radical armed groups and, at Anaklia, where there is also a concentration of refugees, feelings of frustration frequently run high. A new team-site base was established at Dzvari on 5 May 1995.

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39. Defensive preparations by the Abkhaz side have continued in the restricted weapons zone, in particular along the Gali canal. The Abkhaz have been particularly sensitive over access to the canal and to the area immediately south of Ochamchira. Similarly, UNOMIG has encountered occasional difficulties when trying to gain access to the Tkvarcheli area. In July, the Abkhaz authorities in Sukhumi requested UNOMIG to agree to new procedural arrangements for patrolling the restricted weapons zone on the Abkhaz side of the Inguri river. This request is in line with the Moscow agreement, which refers to the need for consultation between the parties when patrolling takes place outside the security zone. As of the date of the present report, the process is working, and UNOMIG continues to patrol the restricted weapons zone on the Abkhaz side.

40. There have been occasional violations on the northern boundary of the restricted weapons zone, but UNOMIG has not detected any permanent new stationing of heavy weapons inside the zone. In the beginning of May, patrols found on two factory premises in Tkvarcheli a total of 11 artillery pieces falling under the limitations of the Moscow agreement. These artillery pieces appear to have been in that location since the end of the 1993 war. None of the weapons was operational because of missing vital parts and obvious lack of maintenance. Following a joint UNOMIG/CIS peace-keeping force patrol and protest in early July, UNOMIG can confirm that nine of the weapons were finally removed to a location outside the restricted weapons zone. The two remaining weapons may still be in Tkvarcheli, but patrols have since been denied access to the factory premises. Negotiations between UNOMIG and the Abkhaz authorities are continuing, with a view to the maintenance of patrolling.

41. As the Security Council has been made aware, UNOMIG has been experiencing increasing difficulties with respect to its inspection of the heavy weapons storage sites maintained by the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities. In order to gain access to the Georgian site at Senaki, UNOMIG must now apply to the First Deputy Minister of Defence of Georgia, and access to the Abkhaz site at Ochamchira is made extremely difficult by the authorities' continuing lack of cooperation. Both sides claim that only non-operational equipment has been stored at the sites and that some of the equipment observed by UNOMIG at the sites was being stored there for reasons other than compliance with the terms of the Moscow agreement. The Mission has protested the restrictions on its activities, so far without success.

42. On the east bank of the Inguri river, an armoured vehicle has been stationed for a long time outside the Zugdidi police station in violation of the 14 May 1994 agreement, but UNOMIG has detected no other attempt to introduce heavy weapons into the restricted weapons zone.

C. Kodori valley

43. UNOMIG has established a new team-site base at Adjara, a Svan community high in the Kodori valley, which has significantly improved its ability to monitor the valley.

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44. Cooperation between UNOMIG and the permanent post of the CIS peace-keeping force at Lata, 20 kms west of Adjara, is extremely good and information and assistance are regularly exchanged. Relations between the Abkhaz and the Svans have remained stable and there is some evidence that in early July a significant number of Svans from the Mestla area in Georgia, who formerly lived in the Kodori valley, returned to the valley. Recently, however, discussions between Abkhaz and Svans have effectively ceased, including discussions over the identification of certain war graves.

VI. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA AND THE COLLECTIVE PEACE-KEEPING FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

45. In paragraph 6 (b) of resolution 937 (1994), the Security Council entrusted UNOMIG with observation of the operation of the CIS peace-keeping force within the framework of the implementation of the agreement of 14 May 1994. UNOMIG reports that the CIS peace-keeping force has been conducting its operations in accordance with the agreement. It is deployed on both sides of the security zone and, as agreed by the parties, in the Kodori valley. It maintains posts in these areas and patrols them, either jointly with UNOMIG or on its own.

46. Cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force continues to be very satisfactory to both parties. There are regular meetings and exchanges of information at the different levels of command. Low-level cooperation, in particular between UNOMIG's team-site bases and the checkpoints of the peace-keeping force, is particularly effective.

VII. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

47. Emergency relief and humanitarian aid currently remain the principal focus of United Nations assistance to Georgia. The efforts of UNHCR and other relief agencies have been described above. Mention should also be made of WFP's programme, through its Caucasus Logistic Advisory Unit, to optimize the use of the regional infrastructure to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies.

48. While relief efforts continue, the Bretton Woods institutions and a number of other organs of the United Nations system are helping the Government to convert Georgia from its current status as a recipient of relief and development assistance into a country with a sound financial system, offering new markets and an attractive environment for investment. As part of this effort, the "National Human Development Report" was published in May 1995 by the Government, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It contains the first comprehensive study of the country's socio-economic situation.

49. The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) advises the Government on ways to promote capacity and build institutions to facilitate the transition to a market economy. UNDP is helping the Government both to coordinate and manage the aid it receives and to reform and strengthen its public administration in order to adapt it to a market economy and a parliamentary democracy. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is carrying out a project to

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improve the country's customs administration. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is helping the Government to plan a restructuring of industry.

50. As regards social services, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is undertaking a number of projects related to the demand for health care, an expanded immunization programme and mother and child health.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

51. I shall in due course submit to the appropriate legislative bodies any requirements in addition to the UNOMIG cost estimate covering the period from 14 July 1995 to 30 June 1996 as a result of my decision to appoint a resident deputy to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Georgia and Head of Mission of UNOMIG, together with the identification of a limited staff and other facilities (see paras. 8 and 9).

IX. OBSERVATIONS

52. I have little to add to the observations in my previous report (S/1995/342, paras. 42-44). As I said on that occasion, it is the parties to a conflict that must make peace. At present both sides continue to take positions that cannot, as yet, be bridged: the Georgian side believes that it has made as many concessions of principle as it can, whereas the Abkhaz side believes its position has been consistent from the beginning and is unwilling to change.

53. As I have already indicated, work continues on the Russian drafted protocol and my Special Envoy is following it closely. The situation is, however, likely to be affected by the outcome of the Georgian Parliament's consideration of the revised draft constitution, and the presidential and parliamentary elections that are scheduled for November 1995.

54. Much remains to be done if a political settlement is to be found that will once again bring the peoples of Georgia together. The economy of Abkhazia is at a virtual standstill and will continue to be so until such time as the displaced population is permitted to return to their homes and normal social, economic, communication, legal, energy, transport and other links with the rest of Georgia are restored. The economy of the latter continues to be extremely weak and cannot be properly rebuilt when political and other energies and resources have to be diverted to the troubles in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the present report has shown, the United Nations is providing valuable assistance to Georgia in a number of ways as part of the international community's aid to a country in need.

55. The pursuit of a political solution to the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict needs to be conducted with appropriate support and resources. It is for this reason that I have decided to appoint a resident deputy to my Special Envoy who will assist him in the efforts to find and implement a comprehensive settlement, based on three essential elements: the safe and early return of the refugees and internally displaced persons, maintenance of the territorial integrity of

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the Republic of Georgia and a special status for Abkhazia. Without all three being met, the risk will remain that instability will continue and conflict will eventually break out again. Developments elsewhere in the Caucasus region will also affect the prospects for settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict.

56. The Chief Military Observer of UNDMIG, Brigadier-General John Hvidegaard, will shortly be leaving his post at the end of two years of duty. I wish to thank him, and all the military and civilian staff under his command, for their dedication and service.

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Annex I

Human rights monitoring Mission in Abkhazia,
Republic of Georgia

I. OBJECTIVES

1. The Mission will have the following objectives:

(a) Monitoring the human rights situation in the Gali region, with particular attention to the situation of returning persons and refugees;

(b) Contributing, in cooperation with other international agencies and bodies active in the region, to developing confidence-building measures;

(c) Developing technical assistance activities in order to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law and to strengthening institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights.

II. METHODS

2. The Mission will apply the following methods:

(a) Collect first-hand information about the human rights situation directly from witnesses and other reliable sources;

(b) Establish direct contact with the Government of Georgia and with the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and advise them about measures to be adopted in order to prevent and redress human rights violations in the region;

(c) Establish close contact and cooperation with United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia and the Commonwealth of Independent States peace-keeping force, as well as with other international agencies and bodies active in the region;

(d) Report to the High Commissioner for Human Rights and, through him, to the Secretary-General about the human rights situation and its impact on the solution of the conflict.

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Annex II

Composition of the United Nations Observer Mission
in Georgia as at 29 July 1995

Country	Military observers
Albania	1
Austria	4
Bangladesh	11
Cuba	4
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	6
Egypt	6
France	5
Germany	10
Greece	5
Hungary	6
Indonesia	6
Jordan	8
Pakistan	9
Poland	5
Republic of Korea	6
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	7
Switzerland	5
Turkey	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10
United States of America	4
Uruguay	4
	<u>135</u> a/

a/ Figures may vary owing to rotations.

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