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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 26 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 19 September 1995, addressed to His Excellency Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, Head of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, by His Excellency Mr. Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(<u>Signed</u>) Ravân FARHÂDI Ambassador Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 19 September 1995 from the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan addressed to the Head of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan

While expressing the best wishes for your success, as well as our highest consideration, at the threshold of your new round of your mission the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan would like to underscore the fact that the timing arrangements for this new stage of efforts coincide with highly critical developments that led to the occupation of some western parts of Afghanistan, including Herat, by the mercenary forces called Taleban, with the assistance of the Pakistan Militia. As a result of this occupation the previously wide interference has developed into an audacious aggression.

It is our official view that this crucial juncture of events marks a situation totally different from the pre-occupation circumstances as has been stated in our communications of 4 and 5 September 1995 to His Excellency Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Those documents (S/1995/767 and S/1995/795) contained an account of recent events in Herat and their impact on the mind frame of our people country-wide, as well as the subsequent adverse and sad events in the Embassy of Pakistan in Kabul.

It had been noted in our communication of 7 September 1995 (S/1995/791) that, owing to the intensity and imminence of dangers entailing Pakistani occupation over a part of western and south-western Afghanistan and threats posed to the peace and security in the region, this question should be placed at the top of the agenda of any political talks concerning the fate of the Afghan people, including the present round of your peace talks.

Concerning the ongoing current of events that have unfortunately caused Afghan-Pakistani relations to attain a new stage of eventful exacerbation, the Special Mission is kindly called upon by the Islamic State of Afghanistan to undertake open diplomacy based on frankness.

On the basis of an open diplomacy, I should like to point out the following:

We are of the conviction that a new realistic look at re-evaluation of both positive and negative aspects of the past endeavours of the Special Mission would prepare the ground which would be conducive to peace and understanding in our war-stricken country. It would only be under such a realistic re-evaluation that your mission would get out of the present deadlock.

At various stages in the past, we have had serious questions about the newly emergent phenomenon of the Taleban in the southern parts of Afghanistan. Their original identity is still unknown to most of the people. The Special Mission, however, could not offer any response to these questions. For example, concerning the questions as who could be the source of funding of millions of

dollars of military and logistic expenditures of the so-called Taleban, the Special Mission had no possible response to this puzzling query. Instead, the Special Mission continued its optimistic vision of the group and it even once called the Taleban "constructive factors and elements [conducive] to peace".

Consequently, this group of mercenaries, forged by the hands of short-sighted Pakistani rulers, was not only disproved of being "constructive to peace", but acted as destructive elements to peace and tranquillity with regard to Herat, a city described by you on several occasions as the best model province of a healthy administration. They not only deprived the city residents of their freedom and tranquillity, but inflicted upon them insecurity and turbulence under an alien occupation. This leads us to a logical conclusion. As we had foreseen, the mercenary group not only were not "constructive elements to peace and stability", but proved the other way round, as being elements of destabilization and insecurity.

Taleban not only undermined peace and tranquillity in the western parts of the country, but in the meantime, posed an external practical menace to the territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

We requested you to take a bold position $\underline{\text{vis-a-vis}}$ foreign interference as the root cause of the present critical situation. Unfortunately, this request has not been met with practical action. Thus foreign interventionists, e.g., Pakistani rulers were further encouraged to directly dispatch hundreds of militia, supported by air and ground forces, to occupy a part of Afghan territory.

Also, we had requested the Special Mission, as an international mediator, to strictly adhere to impartiality in dealing with the parties involved.

This would have been the only way by which the Special Mission could have enjoyed the equal confidence of all sides towards a successful peace mission.

In our view, the most reasonable and practical way to peace, and appropriate atmosphere for a peaceful transfer of power to an elected authority enjoying the confidence of the people, is first and foremost the need to ease off the present "crisis of confidence", created as a result of the Pakistani aggression. Foreign interference should be condemned and stopped, and the territorial integrity of Afghanistan should be restored by the termination of the state of occupation.

To achieve this objective, the following steps are recommended to be taken into consideration by the United Nations Special Mission.

- 1. Based upon the internationally accepted principle that the free will of the nations is the source of national sovereignty, respecting and observing the above as one of the basic factors for the solution of the political issues with which the Afghan nation is confronted, should be taken into account by the Special Mission.
- 2. In the light of the recent major and peace-threatening developments in the country, there is a need for the reordering of the priorities on the agenda of

the United Nations Special Mission's endeavours by placing the occupation of Herat at the top of the agenda and thus trying to lessen the tension and create an atmosphere leading to peace and stability and encouraging negotiation and dialogue as the only way for the solution of the problems.

- 3. The Islamic State of Afghanistan, while continuing its expression of full readiness to work for the transfer of power in appropriate circumstances and to legitimate and lawful authority within a framework outlined in the Islamic State of Afghanistan's peace proposal, declares its conviction that the United Nations Special Mission, instead of putting the means in place of the goal should consider the fact that the ultimate goal is to establish peace and that the power transfer is only a means to achieve that goal, not only the objective.
- 4. The new circumstances, particularly the Pakistani direct aggression, makes it further imperative that the Islamic State of Afghanistan officially recognizes Pakistan as the opposite side of the conflict and the basic instigator of armed conflict and dispute. One of the results of aggression is that the Pakistani rulers have lost the confidence that the Afghan people and Afghan Government had entrusted to them. Therefore, it is requested that the Special Envoy pay particular attention to the fact that from now on Pakistan could not play the role of mediator in inter-Afghan affairs as it did before.
- 5. Once again, as a result of the latest events, official meetings on the peace process of the Afghan parties could not be held outside the territory of Afghanistan, and particularly not on Pakistani soil.
- 6. It is requested that, in the new round of your mission, you depart from the previous position of considering all groups, even those not existing today, on an equal footing in the name of impartiality. It is also requested that the painful outcry of the Afghan nation, which by now feels the threat against their territorial integrity, should not remain unheard.
- 7. In paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 49/140 of 20 December 1994, adopted by the General Assembly at its last session, the exertion of efforts towards putting an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan was considered and recommended; it is precisely this that characterizes the responsibilities of the Special Mission. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses astonishment and regret over the silence symbolizing the reaction of the Special Mission towards the occupation of parts of Afghan territory by the Pakistani militia, a development that seriously arouses the national sentiments of millions of Afghans inside and outside of the country. The Islamic State of Afghanistan expects a clear stand to be taken by the United Nations Special Mission so that it may thus enjoy the further confidence of the Afghan nation.

The United Nations, in its new sets of efforts towards establishing peace and achieving a national accord, will enjoy the goodwill and spirit of harmony as well as all possibilities for cooperation, and will have the resolute support of the State and the people of Afghanistan in achieving this ultimate goal.

(<u>Signed</u>) Abdul Rahim GHAFOORZAI Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
