



## Security Council

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### REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI

#### I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to a decision taken by the Council following informal consultations on 16 September 1994. It follows a series of oral reports made regularly to the Council by my Special Representative to the Council (in particular, on 26 July and 11 August 1994). On 19 August, I myself reported to the Council on the situation and proposed preventive measures designed to avoid a repetition of the Rwandan tragedy in Burundi.

2. It will be recalled that, on 25 October 1993, the Security Council condemned the perpetrators of the military coup and expressed the view that those responsible for the deaths of President Melchior Ndadaye and members of the Government of Burundi and for the subsequent acts of violence should be brought to justice (S/26631).

3. At the same time, the Security Council requested me to monitor and follow closely the situation, in association with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It welcomed the dispatch of my Special Envoy, Mr. James O. C. Jonah, who visited Burundi from 27 to 29 October 1993. On his return, Mr. Jonah made an oral report to the Council. On 2 November 1993, I sent a letter to the Council (S/26745) informing it in detail of the results of the mission.

4. On 16 November 1993, the Security Council, deeply concerned over the abrupt and violent interruption of the democratic process, demanded the immediate cessation of acts of violence. At the same time, it welcomed my appointment of a Special Representative for Burundi, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, and authorized the dispatch of a small United Nations team to determine the facts and facilitate the efforts of the Government of Burundi and OAU to restore democratic institutions, rebuild confidence and stabilize the situation (S/26757).

5. Since the political situation in the country had stabilized somewhat - particularly with the resumption of the work of the legislature and the appointment of an interim President by the Parliament in January 1994 - I dispatched a fact-finding mission to Burundi, inter alia, to conduct an investigation into the attempted coup d'état of October 1993 and the subsequent

massacres. This preparatory fact-finding mission, composed of Mr. Siméon Aké (Côte d'Ivoire) and Mr. Martin Huslid (Norway), visited Burundi from 22 March to 20 April 1994. The report of the mission was transmitted to me on 24 May 1994, but I saw fit to defer its issuance. Now that a new President has been elected, I intend to bring the report to his attention and subsequently transmit it to the Security Council.

6. The events in Rwanda did not fail to have a negative impact on neighbouring Burundi, and they continue to do so. Following reports that the situation in the country was rapidly deteriorating, the Security Council, on 29 July 1994, expressed its support for the ongoing political dialogue in Burundi aimed at reaching an early agreement on the presidential succession. It called upon all parties to reach rapidly a settlement based on democratic principles and condemned those extremist elements who continued to reject the ongoing negotiations and sought to block progress towards a peaceful settlement. After having heard a detailed oral report by one of my special advisers, it demanded, in a presidential statement, that all parties cease immediately any incitement to violence or ethnic hatred (S/PRST/1994/38).

7. On 11 August 1994, when the situation was deteriorating dangerously, the Security Council decided, during informal consultations, that the members of its mission to Mozambique should proceed to Burundi for a two-day fact-finding mission. The mission, which was led by Mr. Ibrahim A. Gambari (Nigeria) and was composed of Mr. Karl F. Inderfurth (United States of America), Mr. Vasily S. Sidorov (Russian Federation) and Mr. Karel Kovanda (Czech Republic), visited Burundi on 13 and 14 August. Its report was transmitted to the Security Council on 7 September (S/1994/1039).

## II. POLITICAL SITUATION

8. Since 6 April 1994, the date on which President Cyprien Ntaryamira was killed when the aircraft in which he was returning with President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda from a regional peace conference held in the United Republic of Tanzania crashed, there have been constant rumours that Burundi was on the point of succumbing to a crisis as serious as that which Rwanda had just experienced. I have therefore followed the situation very closely and my Special Representative, Mr. Ould-Abdallah, has kept me informed on developments on a daily basis. Immediately following the death of President Ntaryamira, my Special Representative set himself the task of convincing the political class in Burundi that there was no advantage in giving an ethnic or political connotation to this purely accidental tragedy.

9. He appears to have achieved his objective since the situation, although still fragile, is not really explosive. The interim President, Mr. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, for example, felt that he could leave the country while negotiations on the presidential succession were in progress to participate in the summit meeting of OAU in Tunis in June 1994.

10. Nevertheless, even though the Government of Burundi has adopted a position of strict neutrality towards the Rwandan conflict and has decided to condemn the genocide while supporting the implementation of the Arusha Agreements and

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backing the Prime Minister, Mr. Twagiramungu, it has been impossible to prevent the two ethnic groups - the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority - which cohabit in Burundi from following closely the situation of their brothers in Rwanda. Inevitably, the Rwandan crisis has had, and continues to have, an impact on the political situation and on security conditions.

11. Since 6 April 1994, political life has revolved around the selection of a president, an essential element in the stabilization of the situation in Burundi. In the beginning, the political class hoped that a president would be elected in time for him to be able to participate in the OAU summit meeting. Then it was hoped that the new president would be installed by the national holiday, 1 July. Subsequently, since the negotiations continued to encounter obstacles, the political parties (list in annex I) agreed on a new deadline: 12 July, in other words the constitutional deadline for the installation of a new president.

12. These continual postponements reflected the complexity and underlined the difficulty of the negotiations, which were characterized by constant manoeuvres on the part of the opposition, for the most part Tutsi, 1/ and a lack of flexibility on the part of the essentially Hutu majority. 2/ The opposition, strengthened by the Tutsi victory in Rwanda, constantly introduced new demands and conditions which it was difficult for the President to take into account without losing his credibility with his own party, FRODEBU. Progress was thus extremely slow and in the meantime the situation deteriorated. Not a day went by without rumours of "dead city" operations or coups d'état circulating in Bujumbura.

13. The fact is that there continues to be great distrust between the Hutu and the Tutsi. FRODEBU was convinced that the Tutsi opposition, relying on the support of the army, was seeking to deprive it of the gains it had achieved in the elections of June 1993. Some of its supporters were inciting the population to fight to preserve those gains. On the other hand, the mainly Tutsi opposition parties, which had not forgotten the October 1993 massacres and the fate suffered by their Rwandan brothers, insisted on being given political guarantees and being allowed to participate in the Government. They virtually demanded that they should have the right of veto over all the major decisions of the Government.

14. It is clear that the negotiations have taken longer than necessary. Every time progress was achieved and a problem was resolved, the negotiators added a new item to the agenda. Extremist elements within the majority and the opposition were clearly playing a destabilizing role and thus contributing to the deterioration of the situation.

15. On 11 July 1994, in order to avoid a dangerous political vacuum, the Constitutional Court decided to extend by three months the interim period which was due to expire the following day. A forum of recognized political parties and representatives of civilian society, or Forum of the Negotiations, was then established to examine two major questions: power-sharing and the modalities for the appointment and election of a new president.

16. As indicated above, on 29 July 1994, the Security Council adopted a statement supporting the political dialogue and condemning the extremist elements who were opposed to the negotiations.

17. On 10 September 1994, the Forum of the Negotiations reached a first agreement, on power-sharing. Initially, 9 of the 13 political parties (subsequently joined by a tenth party) signed a Convention of Government which made provision, as soon as a new president had been chosen, for: a Government of 25 members (55 per cent from the Hutu majority) appointed by the President; a four-year transitional period; the appointment of a Prime Minister from the opposition who would countersign the President's decisions; and, lastly, the creation of a National Security Council of 10 members, equitably divided between FRODEBU and the opposition.

18. The Tutsi opposition had demanded (a) the creation of a post of Vice-President who would hold the defence and security portfolios and be selected from among its ranks; and (b) the establishment of a Council of State to counterbalance the President's powers. No action has been taken for the moment on those demands. It will be for the National Conference, which should, in principle, be held at the beginning of 1995, to take a decision in that regard.

19. Most of the people of Burundi were relieved at the news of the signing of the Convention of Government. I myself expressed my satisfaction on 14 September 1994 (SG/SM/5412) and encouraged the negotiators to pursue their efforts.

20. On 18 September, the Forum of the Negotiations reached a second agreement, on the modalities for the appointment of a new president. Of the 13 political parties, 10 decided that candidates for the presidency would have until 22 September to file their candidacies with the Ministry of the Interior. The National Assembly would then select the new president.

21. On 19 and 20 September respectively, the Prime Minister presented the Convention of Government to the army and to Parliament. For the first time, a FRODEBU/UPRONA delegation explained the terms of the Convention to members of the army. A number of ministers and government officials went into the countryside to explain it to local leaders.

22. By 22 September, only three candidates had filed their candidacies with the Ministry of the Interior: the interim President, Mr. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya; the President of UPRONA, Mr. Charles Mukasi; and an independent candidate.

23. In the meantime, it was decided that, before proceeding to the selection of a new president, the Government would ask the National Assembly to amend the Constitution to incorporate into it the Convention of Government and its annex on the modalities for the appointment of a new president. The Government would therefore submit amendments for a legal opinion and would then refer them to the National Assembly for adoption. On 22 September, the National Assembly endorsed the amendments.

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24. By 26 September, there were six candidates in contention: the interim President and leader of FRODEBU, Mr. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya; the President of UPRONA, Mr. Charles Mukasi; and four independent candidates.

25. Finally, all the political parties, with the exception of PARENA, signed the Convention of Government and the annex thereto. The Forum of the Negotiations then convened the signatory parties in order to appoint a consensus candidate. Eight parties - four majority and four opposition - appointed the interim President, the official candidate of FRODEBU. The latter was elected by the National Assembly by 68 votes to 1, on 30 September 1994. On 1 October, he was sworn in before the National Assembly and the constituent bodies. On 3 October, after consultation with the signatory political parties, the Prime Minister, Anatole Kanyenkiko, was confirmed in his functions. He immediately initiated talks with a view to the formation of a new government of national unity, which was constituted on 5 October (see list in annex II). This Government, consisting of 25 members (of whom 12 were confirmed in their functions and 13 were new), is a coalition Government since 7 of the 13 political parties are included in it. With the exception of the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals, the members of the Government come from all the political groupings which signed the Convention of Government, the proportions being 55 per cent from the forces for democratic change and 45 per cent from the opposition political parties. The six parties which did not obtain places in the Government are: the Parti libéral, the Alliance nationale pour le droit et le développement (ANADDE), the Parti pour la réconciliation du peuple (PRP), the Parti socialiste démocrate (PSD), the Alliance burundo-africaine pour le salut (ABASA) and, lastly, the Parti pour le redressement national (PARENA), which had not signed the Convention of Government. Some of these parties will, however, probably be accommodated and will obtain other official responsibilities.

### III. SECURITY PROBLEMS

26. The situation in the country is characterized by a serious deterioration in security and a breakdown of law and order. As I have already pointed out, since 6 April 1994, there have been constant rumours of a coup d'état in Burundi. On 25 April, an attempted coup d'état was thwarted. In July, disturbances broke out in the largely Hutu suburbs north of the capital - Gasenyi, Kemengé and Kinama - which harbour armed groups. Some disturbances were politicized and were instigated by the (illegal) Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu, PALIPEHUTU; others were independent actions and anarchist; lastly, some were in opposition to the army. The security forces managed to disarm these groups in part, at Kamengé, in particular.

27. The atmosphere in the capital has, however, remained tense and many foreign residents have chosen to leave the country. The military forces have attempted to resolve the security problems and the interim President has not been sparing in his appeals for calm, encouraging displaced persons to return to their homes.

28. The climate of insecurity which persists in Burundi is linked to the investigations and revenge in connection with the crisis of October 1993: the Hutu believe that the investigations are not impartial and are essentially

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directed against them. They maintain that they disregard the civilian and military personnel involved in the attempted coup d'état. For their part, the Tutsi believe that the investigations are partial and do not take account of the perpetrators of the massacres subsequent to the coup d'état.

29. In the meantime, a clandestine radio station is operating intermittently, inciting hatred among the Hutu and encouraging them to take up arms against the Tutsi. These broadcasts have a clearly negative impact on security conditions.

30. The security situation therefore remains extremely unstable. Clashes between security forces and armed Hutu rebels occur very frequently in a number of provinces. Armed attacks on notables - especially Hutus - are common. The helpless population takes flight upon seeing or hearing about each violent incident. This is particularly true at Bujumbura where, after the slightest increase in attacks or repression, the population seeks refuge in the Buiza and Buyenzi districts. This is also true in the interior of the country, where the population flees to the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire or hides in the marshes and forests in order to avoid being set upon by the security forces or taken hostage by the radicals of their own ethnic group.

31. Consequently, about a dozen German cooperation workers have been urged by their Government to return home. The French and Belgian cooperation workers are still in Burundi but most of their families have remained in Europe and will not return until January 1995. Similarly, security problems led Kenya Airways and Ethiopian Airlines to suspend their flights to Burundi temporarily, since the reinsurance companies had decided not to cover the inherent risks in Burundi. Since then, however, Ethiopian Airlines has resumed its flights.

32. For all these reasons, my Special Representative is concerned about the impact of the transfers of Rwandese refugees from Bukavu to Uvira. He fears that this flow of refugees, to a place only about 20 kilometres from the border, may further destabilize the situation. A delegation of the Burundi Government recently went to Kinshasa to discuss this problem with the Zairian authorities. It seized the opportunity to draw the attention of those authorities to the presence at the Zairian border of the former Minister of the Interior, Leonard Nyangoma, who was banished from the Government last April because of his extremist positions. Some sources allege that Mr. Nyangoma, who has set up a "National Council for the Defence of Democracy" to oppose the process which culminated recently in the signing of the Convention of Government, was at the origin of the disturbances which broke out at Kamengé in July.

33. In this connection, the Council will recall that on 19 August 1994, when I presented to it an oral report on the situation in Burundi, I suggested that a military presence should be maintained in Zaire so that it could intervene rapidly if the situation in Burundi deteriorated. In my opinion, it was necessary to take preventive measures to avoid a repetition of the events in Rwanda and to encourage the Burundi army to keep the country calm. I also supported the suggestion of my Special Representative favouring the establishment of a "humanitarian base" at Bujumbura airport. For many reasons, that idea was not put into practice.

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#### IV. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

34. Currently, just over one million people need humanitarian assistance: 600,000 displaced Burundi, 70,000 Rwandese refugees who arrived in the period 1959-1993 and 207,000 Rwandese refugees who arrived after April 1994. The earlier refugees have for the most part become relatively well integrated in their host countries. Currently, many of them have been registered by HCR with a view to organizing their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda. For the new group, with the exception of some 10,000 Rwandese refugees who arrived more recently, HCR has found sites to which the refugees have been transferred, where they are receiving multisectoral assistance.

35. In order to assist them, the World Food Programme (WFP) has established five regional offices. Its aim is to encourage self-sufficiency and reconstruction. Currently, WFP is trying to encourage the refugees to return home by giving them food rations for one month, together with seeds and tools to enable them to plant future crops. The refugees who cannot sow crops now will unfortunately have to depend greatly on food aid until at least July 1995. Since December 1993, WFP has provided 70,000 tons of food aid. This figure is expected to rise to 120,000 tons by the end of this year. Since Burundi is a land-locked country, most food aid arrives at the port of Dar es Salaam and is then transported by rail or road. On three occasions, aid has had to be carried by air from Luanda and Dar es Salaam. Transport is difficult, for trucks are sorely lacking in Burundi and when the coffee harvest season arrives, the trucks are mobilized and emergency aid operations are inevitably affected. The recent arrival of WFP trucks from Eritrea has improved the situation considerably.

36. HCR is continuing to look for lasting solutions for both the refugees and those who have been repatriated. It is clear that these solutions can only be found within the framework of a comprehensive political solution and a regional approach. That is why I asked Ambassador Dillon to undertake a mission to Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania from 8 to 22 September to examine the situation from a regional angle. Ambassador Dillon has just submitted his mission report to me and it is currently being studied.

#### V. HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

37. Although Burundi is now experiencing a relatively calm spell, the situation remains chronically insecure and there are many violations of human rights, both on the outskirts of Bujumbura and in the provinces. These violations, which in most cases go unpunished, originate in ethnic radicalism which leads to reprisals and violence.

38. It is against this background that the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights have initiated a technical assistance programme whose main objective is to help strengthen the implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

39. It was thus decided to establish at Bujumbura an office responsible for implementing this assistance programme, particularly as regards human rights

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education and training for all sectors of public life, the constituent bodies and the judicial system.

40. The human rights office began operations on 15 June 1994 and it has been estimated that it currently has sufficient resources and personnel to attain all the objectives defined in the assistance programme. This programme has aroused so much interest that during the High Commissioner's most recent visit to Burundi, on 18 and 19 August 1994, the Burundi authorities expressed the hope that staff of the Office would be increased to about 10 officials. The presence of this human rights office constitutes a model of preventive diplomacy aimed at stopping human rights violations, facilitating reconciliation and tolerance and creating a genuine human rights culture in Burundi.

## VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

41. Although the election of a new president has stabilized the situation somewhat, it nevertheless remains precarious and the international community should therefore continue encouraging the moderates to re-establish democracy in Burundi. From this standpoint, it has been noted that the declarations and encouragement provided by the Security Council and myself are producing results. The interest which Member States take in Burundi, as reflected in the many missions and visits by high-level politicians in recent months, should not decrease but should on the contrary be maintained.

42. The activities of my Special Representative have likewise encouraged the principal actors on the political scene to act together in a spirit of consensus. The conference on democracy organized in January with the participation of such countries as Belgium, France, Sweden and the United States, the peace marathon in April, and the conference on national dialogue organized in May in cooperation with the Swedish Institute for African Studies, have all convinced the people of Burundi that they have not been forgotten.

43. It is clear that, as the months have passed, the mandate of my Special Representative has changed. His priorities (establishment of a political dialogue and re-establishment of institutions) have changed and are now concerned with restoring stability in Burundi and the organization, early in 1995, of a national debate on the problems of cohabitation between the two principal communities.

44. My Special Representative has always provided assistance in connection with the difficult negotiation process, giving much advice and making many appeals for moderation and calm. His responsibilities have increased and that is why I will not hesitate to implement one of the proposals made by the fact-finding mission led by Ambassador Aké - which was, moreover, endorsed by the mission which the Security Council sent to Burundi in August - namely, to strengthen the office of my Special Representative.

45. Furthermore, I feel bound to endorse another recommendation made by both missions, namely that an international conference on the problems of the subregion should be convened. I am currently studying the recommendations on this subject which Ambassador Dillon has just submitted to me.

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46. In the meantime, the United Nations is ready to provide assistance to the Burundi Government, at the latter's request, with a view to ensuring that the perpetrators of any violations of international law which may have been committed in Burundi are brought to court.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

47. Burundi constitutes a unique challenge for the international community, which is morally obliged to take action to ensure that the tragic events in Rwanda are not repeated in Burundi. The key to the problem is clearly in the hands of the Burundi people. Nevertheless, they deserve to receive the material and moral support of the whole international community in order to attain the objectives they have set themselves. Compared with the exorbitant amounts that would be needed for emergency assistance if the Rwandese tragedy were repeated in Burundi, the price to be paid for prevention today seems minimal.

48. In this connection, I should like to repeat the suggestions I made to the Security Council on 19 August 1994, for I feel that today they have an even greater claim on our attention. In addition to the establishment, already mentioned in paragraph 33, of a "humanitarian base" at Bujumbura airport, an idea on which, unfortunately, no unanimity could be reached in Burundi, the Council will recall that I suggested: (a) the maintenance in Zaire, subject to the agreement of the Zairian Government, of a military presence capable of intervening rapidly if the situation in Burundi should deteriorate suddenly, a preventive measure which I felt would avoid a repetition of the tragic events in Rwanda; (b) the deployment of a contingent of guards, similar to those sent to Iraq, to protect the humanitarian organization teams, which often have to work in insecure conditions; (c) the stepping-up of technical assistance to enable the Government of Burundi to set about reconstructing the country; (d) the deployment of human rights observers, as recommended by the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the many missions which have visited Burundi, in order to facilitate the process of national reconciliation; (e) the strengthening of the office of my Special Representative for Burundi which must currently, among other things, help the Government to prepare the national debate scheduled for the beginning of 1995; (f) the organization of a regional summit with the participation of all the countries that would be seriously affected by an explosion in Burundi; and, lastly, (g) more visits to Burundi by eminent persons from abroad in order to show the people of Burundi that they have not been forgotten by the international community.

49. The coalition government which has just been established must now tackle the critical task of reconstructing the country and reactivating, once again, the difficult process of national reconciliation. Burundi will therefore need the support of the international community more than ever. In that connection, I am glad that, at the meeting of donor countries held in Paris on 28 September, the partners of Burundi decided to coordinate their investment efforts and reiterated their desire to help Burundi to revive its economy, solve its budgetary problems and encourage the return of refugees and displaced persons. I hope that the round table that UNDP and the World Bank are to organize in Geneva in the first quarter of 1995 will enable those countries to pursue their coordination efforts.

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50. I would not wish to end this report without paying a tribute to the tireless efforts that my Special Representative, Mr. Ould Abdallah, has been making since he took up his duties to prevent a crisis. I also wish to thank the small team that works with him in difficult or even dangerous conditions, the non-governmental organizations active in Burundi and the Governments which have been good enough to provide moral and financial support to the Burundi authorities during this particularly difficult period.

Notes

1/ UPRONA, INKINZO, ANADDE, PSD, PIT, RADDES, PRP, ABASA and PARENA.

2/ FRODEBU, PP, RPB and PL.

Annex I

List of political parties

ABASA	Alliance burundo-africaine pour le salut (Mr. T�rence Nsanze, President)
ANADDE	Alliance nationale pour le droit et le d�veloppement (Mr. Ignace Bankamwabo, President)
FRODEBU	Front pour la d�mocratie au Burundi (Mr. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, President)
INKINZO Y'IGAMBO RY 'ABARUNDI	Parti d'opposition (Mr. Alphonse Rugambara, President)
PARENA	Parti pour le redressement national (Mr. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, President)
PBS (RPB)	Rassemblement du peuple burundais (Mr. Ernest Kabusnemeye, President)
PIT	Parti ind�pendent des travailleurs (Mr. Nic�phore Ndimurukundo, President)
PL	Parti lib�ral (Mr. Ga�tan Nikobamye, President)
PP	Parti du peuple (Mr. Shadrack Niyonkuru, President)
PRP	Parti pour la r�conciliation du Peuple (Mr. Mathias Hitamana, President)
PSD	Parti social d�mocrate (Mr. Vincent Ndikumasabo, President)
RADDES	Ralliement pour la d�mocratie et le d�veloppement �conomique et social (Mr. Cyrille Sigejeje, President)
UPRONA	Union pour le progr�s national (Mr. Charles Mukasi, President)

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Annex II

List of members of the Government, 5 October 1994

Prime Minister - Mr. Anatole Kanyenkiko (UPRONA), Tutsi

From the parliamentary majority (FRODEBU, PP and RPB parties and forces in favour of democratic change):

1. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation,  
Mr. Jean-Marie Ngendahayo (FRODEBU), Tutsi (Ganwa)
2. Minister of Finance, Mr. Salvador Toyi (FRODEBU), Hutu
3. Minister of Town and Country Planning and Environment, Mr. Séverin Mfatiye  
(FRODEBU), Hutu
4. Minister of Community Development, Mr. Pierre-Claver Nahimana (FRODEBU),  
Hutu
5. Minister of Labour, Crafts and Vocational Training,  
Mr. Vénérand Bakevyumusaya (FRODEBU), Hutu
6. Minister of Secondary and Higher Education and Scientific Research,  
Mr. Liboire Ngendahayo (FRODEBU), Hutu
7. Minister of Human Rights, Social Action and Advancement of Women,  
Mrs. Marcienne Mujawaha (FRODEBU), Hutu
8. Minister of Public Health, Mr. Charles Batungwanayo (FRODEBU), Hutu
9. Minister of Communications, Mr. Germain Nkeshimana (FRODEBU), Hutu
10. Secretary of State attached to the Minister of the Interior and Public  
Security, in charge of public security, Mr. Issa Ngendakumana (FRODEBU),  
Hutu
11. Minister of Transport, Postal Services and Telecommunications,  
Mr. Védaste Ngendanganya (PP), Hutu
12. Minister of Energy and Mines, Mr. Ernest Kabushemeye (RPB), Hutu

From the Parliamentary minority and other opposition parties (UPRONA, PIT,  
RADDES, INKINZO):

13. Minister of the Interior and Public Security, Mr. Jean-Baptiste Manwangari  
(UPRONA), Tutsi
14. Minister of Development Planning and Reconstruction,  
Mr. Salvator Nzigamasabo (UPRONA), Tutsi

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15. Minister of Reintegration and Reinstallation of Displaced and Repatriated Persons, Mr. Libéré Bararunyeretse (UPRONA), Tutsi
16. Minister of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, Mr. Pascal-Firmin Ndimira (UPRONA), Hutu
17. Minister of the Civil Service, Mrs. Claudine Matuturu (UPRONA), Tutsi
18. Minister of Public Works and Equipment, Mr. Onésime Ciza (UPRONA), Hutu
19. Secretary of State attached to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, in charge of cooperation, Mr. Luc Rukingama (UPRONA), Hutu
20. Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Mr. Joseph Nzeyimana (RADDES), Tutsi
21. Minister of Education, Basic Education and Adult Literacy, Mr. Nicéphore Ndimurukundo (PIT), Tutsi
22. Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture, Mr. Alphonse Rugambarara (INKINZO), Tutsi

Neutral members

23. Minister of Justice, Mr. Melchior Ntahobama, Hutu
24. Minister of National Defence, Mr. Firmin Sinzoyiheba, Tutsi
25. Minister for Institutional Reform and Relations with the National Assembly, Mr. Térencia Sinunguruza, Tutsi

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