



Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi

I. Introduction

1. Since my previous report to the Security Council on the situation in and relating to Burundi on 14 November 2001 (S/2001/1076), important developments have taken place in the country and the region. The Implementation Monitoring Committee of the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation was relocated to Bujumbura from Arusha in November 2001. The Transitional National Assembly was formally installed on 10 January 2002, and elected Jean Minani, President of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), as its Speaker, while the Transitional Senate elected Libère Bararunyeretse, Secretary-General of the Union for National Progress Party (UPRONA), as its President.

2. The efforts aimed at negotiating a successful and all-inclusive ceasefire agreement have intensified under the leadership of Deputy President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, representing former President Nelson Mandela, with the assistance of representatives of Gabon and the United Republic of Tanzania. The United Nations and the African Union are also supporting these efforts, which resulted in the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement on 7 October 2002 between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Liberation Forces (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), led by Alain Mugabarabona.

3. The purpose of the present report is to bring the Security Council up to date on these and other developments in and relating to Burundi, as well as on the role of the United Nations in supporting the peace process in the country.

II. Political developments

A. Implementation Monitoring Committee

4. The Implementation Monitoring Committee, under the Chairmanship of the United Nations, has been entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the full and speedy implementation of the provisions of the Arusha Agreement. The Committee, which held its first substantive session in Arusha in January 2001 and was relocated

to Bujumbura in November of the same year, has been carrying out its mandate within the constraints imposed by the absence of a ceasefire and the insecurity prevailing in the country.

5. Since its relocation to Bujumbura, the Committee has held five ordinary sessions and endeavoured to implement the provisions of the Arusha Agreement that could be implemented under existing conditions. In that regard, the Committee has been working with the Government and the other transitional institutions for the adoption of various laws, including on freedom of activities for political parties; provisional immunity for political leaders returning from exile; the law against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the law on the establishment of the National Committee on Refugees and Sinistrés (CNRS).

6. The Implementation Monitoring Committee has established a mechanism for reconciling differences arising within and among signatory parties and transitional institutions. To that end, my Special Representative organized a meeting between President Pierre Buyoya and the members of the Committee on 28 June 2002 to discuss modalities for the joint management of the implementation process and to clear up misunderstandings between the executive branch and the Committee. The meeting helped not only to dispel misconceptions on both sides, but also laid the basis for closer collaboration through regular consultations. The Implementation Monitoring Committee is currently in the process of organizing similar meetings with the leadership of the Transitional National Assembly and of the Transitional Senate.

7. The Implementation Monitoring Committee actively supported the work of the Independent Commission established to investigate the issues of prisoners and prison conditions. The Commission, four of whose members were appointed by the United Nations, completed its task and presented its report to the Committee in February 2002. Currently, the Committee is monitoring the work of the Committee of Magistrates set up by the Government of Burundi to implement the recommendations of the Independent Commission. The Committee of Magistrates has begun its work and has already released some prisoners from prisons in Bujumbura and will soon proceed to other parts of the country for a similar exercise.

8. The members of the Implementation Monitoring Committee, in cooperation with the Ministry for the Mobilization for Peace, have undertaken the task of publicizing the Arusha Agreement to gain grass-root support for the peace process. In order to assist the Transitional Government in mobilizing resources for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country, the Committee is in constant contact with the donor community through its Chairman, my Special Representative. The tasks and the activities of the Committee are expected to undergo significant qualitative change with the signing of a ceasefire agreement and will necessitate an increase in the resources allocated to it. The Committee meets every two months and undertakes daily monitoring activities through its Executive Council which became operational on 6 December 2001.

B. Transitional arrangements

9. The establishment of the Transitional Government on 1 November 2001 was followed by the inauguration of the Transitional National Assembly and the Transitional Senate on 10 January 2002 and 6 February 2002, respectively. The

relationship between the three principal institutions has been generally harmonious. The two major political parties, FRODEBU and UPRONA, which head these institutions have been cooperating with each other much more than was previously thought possible. Difficulties that had surfaced from time to time were overcome through compromise.

10. Differences have, however, arisen within the G-7 (Hutu) and G-10 (Tutsi) political families. The differences within G-7 have been between FRODEBU and the smaller Hutu parties, and within G-10 between UPRONA and the smaller Tutsi parties. The smaller parties complain that they are not properly consulted when decisions are taken in the name of the groups, and that they have not been given their fair share in the distribution of government posts. Some parties opposed to the Transitional Government and to the Arusha Agreement have become more vocal at a time when ceasefire negotiations are being conducted at the highest level. This has resulted in the arrest, in October 2002, of Charles Mukasi, leader of UPRONA wing opposed to the Arusha Agreement, and the house arrest early in November 2002 of former President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, leader of the Party for National Recovery (PARENA). So far, the differences among and within parties, as well as the subversive campaigns against the transitional institutions led by extremist parties, are not expected to scuttle the peace process.

11. The transitional institutions and the political parties participating in them have been able to initiate the reform of the provincial administration and the civil service, including the diplomatic service. The Minister of Justice, following approval by the cabinet, unveiled in August 2002 a detailed plan for the long-awaited reform of the judiciary. The thrust of the reform is to ensure an equitable representation of all Burundian communities in public offices.

12. On the other hand, the reform of the army and other security structures, including the establishment of a Special Protection Unit agreed upon at Arusha, has not yet begun. Many in the transitional institutions have argued that it would be inappropriate, indeed counterproductive, to attempt to change the security structures currently in place, or to integrate former or active rebels into the army under the guise of the Unit, while the war was going on. It appears that there is no serious disagreement among the principal political actors in moving forward on this issue once a ceasefire agreement has been concluded.

13. The Transitional Government, with the concurrence of the other transitional institutions, has established the 15-member Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The law on the establishment of the National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Refugees and Sinistrés has been adopted and the law to create a national observatory for the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is being debated. On 24 July 2002, the Transitional Government formally requested the United Nations to establish an international judicial commission of inquiry on genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement. The request is under consideration by the Security Council.

C. Ceasefire negotiations

14. The signing of the Arusha Agreement, the establishment of the Implementation Monitoring Committee and the setting-up of the Transitional Government were important milestones in the search for peace and development in Burundi. The

optimism and enthusiasm generated by those positive events had created high expectation among Burundians and the international community that peace and stability could come to Burundi soon. Unfortunately, the absence of a ceasefire agreement and the continuation of violence have undermined efforts aimed at the full implementation of the Arusha Agreement.

15. The Facilitator, the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, delegated the task of conducting ceasefire negotiations between the armed groups and the Transitional Government to the Deputy President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma. The latter has undertaken extensive consultations with the leaders of the region and made every effort to contact the leaders of the armed groups, some of whom have remained elusive, with a view to initiating an all-inclusive ceasefire negotiation. The United Nations has continued to assist this effort by providing political support, material assistance and technical expertise.

16. As a result of the consultations undertaken by Deputy President Zuma and with the support of the Government of Gabon, the first contact between CNDD-FDD (Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye), the Facilitation and President Pierre Buyoya took place in Libreville in January 2001. The first formal and direct negotiation between CNDD-FDD and the Transitional Government then took place at the Vaal Dam, South Africa, from 18 to 21 February 2002, under the chairmanship of Deputy President Zuma. A Gabonese team led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs also participated. At the request of the parties, the United Nations was invited for the first time to participate in the negotiations as an observer. My then Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and current Special Representative for Burundi, Berhanu Dinka, took part in those and all subsequent negotiations.

17. At the request of the Facilitation, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania subsequently agreed to assist the ceasefire negotiations and convened a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam from 13 to 24 March to persuade the armed groups to negotiate a ceasefire agreement and to join the peace process. The effort resulted in the agreement by all parties to attend the negotiations held in Pretoria from 22 to 29 April.

18. During those negotiations, the delegation of the Transitional Government and CNDD-FDD (Pierre Nkurunziza) held discussions on the provisions of the Arusha Agreement and the draft ceasefire document. They were assisted by a technical team from South Africa and military experts from the United Nations. The PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Alain Mugabarabona) and the Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye wing of CNDD-FDD did not participate.

19. A group of experts from the United Nations, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania met in Pretoria from 28 to 30 July and elaborated a draft ceasefire agreement that was presented for discussion at the Dar-es-Salaam negotiations held from 12 to 26 August. The Transitional Government and the two wings of CNDD-FDD participated in the meeting. The Facilitation consisted of South Africa, Gabon and the United Republic of Tanzania, with the United Nations providing expertise. The session ended with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Transitional Government and CNDD-FDD (Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye) committing themselves to sign, at a date to be fixed by the Facilitation, a ceasefire document which they approved and initialled.

20. The negotiation with CNDD-FDD (Pierre Nkurunziza) was not as successful, owing to its insistence that the Transitional Government sign a joint declaration of commitment before substantive negotiations were entered into. The declaration, which was rejected by the Government, would have required it to accept responsibility for the coup d'état of October 1993, the subsequent violence and its consequences. The negotiations were suspended and it was decided that that wing of CNDD-FDD would continue consultations and return to the second round of talks scheduled to be held in Dar-es-Salaam in September.

21. PALIPEHUTU-FNL did not arrive on time in Dar-es-Salaam for the negotiations and was therefore requested to proceed to Pretoria to hold consultations (from 6 to 9 September) with the Facilitation and United Nations experts. The group arrived in Pretoria and was briefed by South African and United Nations experts on the Arusha Agreement and the draft ceasefire document. The briefing was intended to prepare the PALIPEHUTU-FNL delegation for the ceasefire negotiations scheduled to be held in Dar-es-Salaam from 18 to 27 September.

22. As planned, the negotiations resumed in Dar-es-Salaam with the arrival of Deputy President Zuma on 18 September. On the same day, he held consultations with CNDD-FDD (Pierre Nkurunziza) and submitted to them the draft agenda for the negotiating session on the following day. However, the CNDD-FDD delegation failed to arrive, claiming that it was mourning the death of hundreds of Hutus killed by the Burundian army in the province of Gitega on 9 September. They arrived only on 21 September with the same demand for a declaration of commitment as was made during the previous session in August. The talks collapsed despite efforts by the Facilitation, Gabon and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as by my Special Representative and the African Union.

23. The meeting on 23 September between the Transitional Government and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Alain Mugabarabona) was the first face-to-face encounter between the two parties. Although the meeting started well, it soon became apparent that serious difficulties lay ahead. PALIPEHUTU-FNL, contrary to what it had agreed to during the preparatory negotiations held in Dar-es-Salaam and Pretoria, insisted that it was not a party to the Arusha Agreement and had no confidence in its provisions. Consequently, it argued, the negotiations should not be limited to ceasefire talks but should include broader political issues.

24. Deputy President Zuma made it clear that his mandate was not to reopen the Arusha peace negotiations but to facilitate the conclusion of an all-inclusive ceasefire agreement, and advised PALIPEHUTU-FNL to focus on the ceasefire negotiations. As a compromise, he suggested that PALIPEHUTU-FNL express in detail any political concerns that they might have and promised that every effort would be made to address those concerns in the course of implementing the Arusha Agreement. FNL was not persuaded, and the talks were suspended on 25 September.

25. The ceasefire talks resumed on the eve of the Eighteenth Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, held in Dar-es-Salaam on 7 October in the presence of the presidents of Uganda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania and South Africa, the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, the Deputy President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, and the ministers of foreign affairs of Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia (see A/57/580-S/2002/1217 and S/2002/1124). A ceasefire agreement was signed at the Summit between the

Transitional Government of Burundi and CNDD-FDD (Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye) and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Alain Mugabarabona). The Summit Meeting welcomed the commitment made by the leader of CNDD-FDD (Pierre Nkurunziza) to resume substantive negotiations, without preconditions, on the basis of the Arusha Agreement. The Meeting gave 30 days to CNDD-FDD (Pierre Nkurunziza) and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Agathon Rwasa) to conclude ceasefire agreements, following which it would meet to review the situation and take appropriate measures in respect of those that failed to sign a ceasefire agreement.

26. A new round of talks started in Dar-es-Salaam on 21 October, with technical meetings between the Facilitation and each of the delegations. President Buyoya arrived on 26 October and met with CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza. The President rejected the position of CNDD-FDD that belligerents conclude a cessation of hostilities before going into substantive negotiations on a ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, the two sides started substantive negotiations on 29 October, and CNDD-FDD issued a unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities effective from 3 November. Negotiations are still continuing.

III. Security and military situation

27. The military and security situation in Burundi deteriorated further in 2002. The situation was characterized by intensified action by the armed groups against the army, as well as repeated attacks on the civilian population in both urban and rural areas of the country. At the beginning of the year, armed elements, reportedly from CNDD-FDD, began infiltrating the Ruvubu park region in the eastern part of the country. The same situation was observed in northern Burundi, with the armed groups moving into the Kibira forest. The provinces of Ruyigi, Makamba and Cankuzo (south-east) as well as Bujumbura Rural experienced heavy and repeated attacks.

28. The frequency of attacks increased between May and July this year as the preparations for ceasefire negotiations in Dar-es-Salaam began to take shape. Bujumbura came under fire on 29 and 30 July and again on 25 August. A number of houses were damaged by mortar shells and several lives were lost. Two South African soldiers assigned to the protection of a Burundian cabinet minister were wounded.

29. Although calm has returned to those areas, abductions and car-jackings have increased. In the first few weeks of September, four local administrators (chefs de zone) were assassinated. The security situation in both rural and urban areas remains precarious.

IV. Economic situation

30. During the period under review, the economic situation in Burundi has been characterized by a significant increase in the poverty level and a marked decline in the rate of growth. The rate of growth of gross domestic product in 2002 is estimated at 2 per cent in real terms, less than the estimated 3 per cent growth in the rate of population.

31. External transactions in 2002 have decreased mainly owing to the 20 per cent decrease in the production of coffee and the decrease in the prices of exported commodities. The foreign exchange reserve has gone down to a precarious level, hardly enough to cover one month of imports. There has been a very slow rate of disbursement of the pledges made in Paris and Geneva in December 2000 and 2001, respectively.

32. The unfavourable terms of trade are reflected in the official rate of exchange of the national currency, which lost almost 30 per cent of its value against the United States dollar between 2001 and 2002. The rate of exchange has been even more seriously affected by the recent devaluation of the currency, leading to significant inflationary price increases with potentially damaging consequences for the stability and security of the country and the viability of the transitional institutions. At the same time, the high level of foreign debt owed by Burundi constitutes one of the main obstacles to the reduction of poverty. As much as 85 per cent of the debt is multilateral and represents 178 per cent of gross domestic product. Consequently, debt servicing absorbs 98.8 per cent of all revenues and the accumulation of arrears was estimated at US\$ 115.7 million in 2001.

33. Of the four external factors that contributed to the poor economic performance — the security situation, the drop in the price of coffee, the increase in socio-economic stagnation and the reduction of external financial assistance — the most significant in terms of its impact on social development has been the reduction in international financial assistance, which fell by 66 per cent between 1990 and 2002 — from US\$ 282 million to US\$ 97 million. Given that the state budget can barely meet the salaries of state workers, the reduction in external assistance is automatically reflected in the substantially reduced levels of expenditure on health, education and other social programmes. This could have serious consequences for the peace process. Poverty exacerbates ongoing conflicts and discourages the return of refugees and could adversely affect the response of armed groups to ceasefire negotiations.

34. The approval by the International Monetary Fund on 9 October of a credit of about US\$ 13 million in emergency post-conflict assistance to support the Government's reconstruction and economic recovery programme was a welcome development. Also of note was the announcement by the World Bank of a firm commitment of US\$ 187 million for 2002/2003.

V. Humanitarian situation

35. The hostilities in Burundi have claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, primarily civilians, since the outbreak of the conflict in 1993, disrupted social development and worsened the humanitarian situation. The picture that emerges is gloomy: almost one of six Burundians continue to live away from their homes; almost 388,000 people are living in 226 camps in their own country, constituting the largest internally displaced population in the Great Lakes region; there are an estimated 639,000 Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries, and a further 200,000 who have been living in Tanzania since 1972; and every month, 311,000 people in Burundi receive food aid. Over 24,000 people are treated monthly for malnutrition in 233 therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres around the country. Their number would probably be much higher if all of the needy had access

to centres. More than 71 per cent of the people living in camps in Burundi have no access to the minimum daily requirement of drinking water. On the human development index for 2002, Burundi has dropped to the third-worst ranking country in the world, reflecting the accumulated impact of deteriorating indicators, such as vaccination coverage (down from 83 per cent in 1993 to 54 per cent in 2001), primary school attendance (down from 70 per cent in 1993 to 48 per cent in 2002) and an under-five mortality rate of 190 deaths per 1,000 live births.

36. While one third of the country's provinces remain troubled by conflict and hold high numbers of displaced, the others are in desperate need of rehabilitation and development. Yet even in those provinces, the relative stability is periodically disrupted by bursts of violence, leaving uncertainty and fear in their wake.

37. The incidence of HIV infection is increasing at an alarming rate. It is estimated that 20 per cent of the country's urban population and 6 per cent of its rural population are HIV-positive, and the number of AIDS orphans now exceeds 160,000.

38. The United Nations country team in Burundi is preparing a nationwide study on conditions at sites at which internally displaced persons are located in order to determine strategies for providing improved assistance. The technical group on follow-up, established within the Framework for Consultation on the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, is developing strategies for assisting those who are dispersed, in particular in the province of Bujumbura Rural. To improve follow-up of the situation of internally displaced persons at the communal level, communal focal points are to be appointed to help provide information. Strategic distribution points are being identified in each commune to ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided to populations that dwell in zones with limited or no access. In 2002 alone, an estimated 60,000 civilians have been displaced by fighting.

39. The Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator visited Burundi from 12 to 19 October in order to assess the most recent humanitarian developments in the country. The timing of the mission coincided with heavy fighting in Uvira and other places in the north-eastern sector of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which caused refugees to cross the Burundian border. From 12 to 20 October, more than 11,000 Congolese refugees fleeing conflicts in the Rusuzi Plain crossed into western Burundi through the border towns of Gatumba (Bujumbura Rural) and Rugombo (Cibitoke), where temporary transit camps were established and humanitarian assistance provided.

40. Clearly, any further deterioration of the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, accompanied by a large influx of refugees, would have serious humanitarian consequences not only for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, but for the region as a whole. Recent events have highlighted the necessity proactively to monitor the situation at an all-inclusive regional level. There is also a need to enhance the capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the ground to prepare for a massive reintegration of refugees and resettlement of displaced and dispersed persons in the event of peace.

41. Of concern also is the fact that thousands of refugees from eastern Burundi fled into the United Republic of Tanzania amid growing concerns about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cankunzo province. More than 5,000

Burundian refugees have arrived in Tanzania's Ngara province since 14 October, accounting for 65 per cent of all new Burundian arrivals across the border in 2002.

42. Recently, an estimated 50,000 persons have spontaneously returned to Burundi from the refugee camps in United Republic of Tanzania. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organizations working in Burundi have established transit centres in the provinces of Makamba, Ruyigi and Rutana to assist the returnees.

43. The United Nations system has undertaken a number of new initiatives to assist internally displaced persons, including a protocol for their protection, signed by the resident humanitarian coordinator and the Minister for Human Rights. The protocol would allow for joint teams, consisting of representatives of the Government and the humanitarian community, to follow through on ensuring the safe return of internally displaced persons and respect for human rights and humanitarian principles. The United Nations also continues to be one of the major supporters of community development programmes to improve living conditions and to help prepare communities to absorb returning internally displaced persons and refugees.

VI. Human rights situation

44. The human rights situation in Burundi remains volatile. The belligerents have killed hundreds of civilians, including men, women, children and elderly persons, in armed attacks in 2002 and seem to be increasingly targeting civilians. All parties to the armed conflict accuse local populations of aiding one side or the other. Classification of civilians as rebels by the military, because of their presence in locations designated as conflict areas or because of their perceived collaboration, is of grave concern to the international community. Reprisals committed against the civilian population represent the most serious violation of the right of every Burundian to live in safety and without fear. These abuses have the capacity to undermine the entire peace process and to ignite more vicious, ethnic-based violence.

45. On 17 September, the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly of Burundi announced the death on 9 September in Itaba, Gitega province, of 183 civilians, and demanded an immediate investigation be undertaken by an independent commission. The following day, a commission headed by the commander of the second military region and the Governor of Gitega was set up by the Government. In a declaration issued on 20 September, the Government acknowledged that 173 civilians had been killed during military operations. My Special Representative issued a statement the same day condemning the act and demanding that the perpetrators be brought to justice. Political parties and religious leaders also strongly condemned it. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights addressed a letter to President Buyoya denouncing the massacre of civilians in Itaba and in other areas and requesting that all cases be investigated.

46. The ongoing civil war has resulted in an increase in poverty, and a weakening of the legal and judicial system and has led to the breakdown of the existing social and communal infrastructure. In the process, communities have lost much of their capacity to care for themselves and their neighbours. Their destitution has been compounded by the trauma caused by the violence that they have seen and lived

through and by the looting being undertaken by the belligerents, which dispossesses whole communities of the few possessions that they have. As a result of traditional inequalities and the violence fostered by the continuing conflict, there is little respect for the rights of women and girls. Emotional, physical and sexual violence are commonplace. Girls are often deprived of their right to education and are compelled to work as child labour. Sexual violence leads to increasing HIV/AIDS infection rates and forced pregnancies, stigmatizing the victims and their children.

VII. Administrative and financial implications

47. The United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB) was established in November 1993 following the coup d'état of 21 October 1993 in that country and the tragic events that ensued. Since then, UNOB has played an active and constructive role in assisting the parties to the peace process in their effort to build and consolidate an internal political partnership, in supporting the Arusha peace talks and in providing information, analysis and advice to the United Nations. In my letter to the President of the Security Council of 2 November 1999 (S/1999/1136), I noted that UNOB would need to assume additional responsibilities in the post-conflict peace-building phase in order to help in the consolidation of peace and security following the Arusha Agreement. In the first instance, this would entail assisting in the implementation of the Agreement and the establishment of new institutions, as well as providing support for the various reforms envisaged in the Agreement.

48. Consequently, with the repatriation of the Implementation Monitoring Committee to Burundi, the primary role of UNOB was adjusted and refocused. Considering that the political role of the United Nations in Burundi derived primarily from its responsibilities as Chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee and its Executive Council, the staff and resources of UNOB were restructured and strengthened to support the Chairman, including the servicing of the meetings of the Committee and Council. The priority that is currently being given to the effort to reach a ceasefire agreement has added to the work of the Committee and its Chairman, as well as to UNOB.

49. As I informed the Security Council in 2001, there was a need to increase the staffing and resources of UNOB to provide it with the expertise and the capability needed to support adequately the work of the Implementation Monitoring Committee, the ceasefire negotiations and the political role previously entrusted to UNOB. All this was reflected in the budget for 2002.

50. For 2003, the net additional staff requirements would amount to two international posts to accommodate a spokesperson and a close protection officer for the Special Representative, as well as eight local staff. Three military advisers and civilian police would also be attached to UNOB in order to continue contingency planning for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Any change on the ground, such as the signing of an inclusive ceasefire agreement, will, of course, necessitate a review of the tasks of UNOB and the resources needed to accomplish them.

51. The United Nations has borne the cost of convening the meetings of the Implementation Monitoring Committee at the rate of about US\$ 150,000 per session. In addition, the cost related to the ceasefire negotiations has been supported so far by a grant from the Government of the United States through the United Nations

Trust Fund. The international judicial commission of inquiry that has to be established and the other commissions that will be set up following a ceasefire agreement will also need the financial support of the United Nations to function properly and effectively.

VIII. Observations

52. Full implementation of the Arusha Agreement will only be possible if a ceasefire agreement is reached. The efforts to this end of Deputy President Zuma of South Africa, with the active support of the Governments of Gabon and the United Republic of Tanzania, are of vital importance. I commend Deputy President Zuma and Presidents Benjamin Mkapa and Omar Bongo for the important contribution that they have made, and reiterate my appreciation to the Regional Peace Initiative for its untiring efforts to bring peace to Burundi and assure it of the continued support of the United Nations.

53. The armed groups that have so far stood aloof should negotiate and conclude speedily a ceasefire agreement and join the peace process. In this respect, the ceasefire agreement that was signed between the Government of Burundi and CNDD-FDD (Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye) and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Alain Mugabarabona) was an important development. I have asked my Special Representative to continue to support fully the efforts of the Facilitator and of the Regional Initiative in helping the Government of Burundi and all armed groups to reach a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. The United Nations will do all that it can to contribute to efforts to implement such an agreement in Burundi.

54. A ceasefire that did not include all armed parties and political movements would be dangerous and must be avoided. Moreover, the issue of reform of the security sector must be addressed by the parties in the context of the ceasefire negotiations. Without reaching a common understanding on the broad parameters of such reform, serious obstacles would be encountered in the implementation of the peace agreement. I encourage the parties to continue to negotiate in good faith towards a full, comprehensive and all-inclusive ceasefire agreement. Once such an agreement is reached, I intend to provide to the Security Council my analysis of the situation and recommendations on the future course of action, including planning for a possible expanded involvement of the United Nations in Burundi.

55. The Arusha Agreement calls upon the international community to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Burundi by assisting the country in its humanitarian, development and reconstruction efforts. This would require the United Nations system in the country to cooperate closely and coordinate their activities with the Chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee.

56. The donor community should exert more effort to provide assistance to Burundi, pursuant to pledges made at the donor conferences held in Paris and Geneva. With regard to funding for humanitarian and development activities, I continue to attach particular importance to the consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2003 and I urge the donor community to contribute generously to the success of the consolidated appeal process. At the same time, the parties to the conflict should facilitate safe and unhindered passage to humanitarian workers.

57. The Government of South Africa has contributed substantively to the installation of the Transitional Government by sending troops to Burundi for the protection of exiled leaders who are returning to participate in the transitional institutions. The role of the South African Government in the efforts to bring peace and stability to Burundi remains of vital importance.

58. The Security Council has reiterated its strong support of the Burundi peace process. A delegation of the Council has visited the country more than once and has gained deeper insight into the complexity of the problems and their regional ramifications. It is important that the Security Council continue to follow closely the situation in and relating to Burundi and to give critical support and guidance to the search for durable peace in the country.

59. I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Berhanu Dinka, and to all staff members of UNOB for their commendable efforts under the very trying circumstances prevailing in Burundi.
