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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication dated 6 October 1994, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 6 October 1994 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Paragraph 8 of resolution 715 (1991), adopted by the Security Council on 11 October 1991, requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). These reports are to be submitted when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, every six months after the adoption of resolution 715.

Accordingly, I am requesting you kindly to transmit to the President of the Security Council the enclosed sixth biannual report on the implementation of the Plan. I remain available for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Sixth report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the implementation of the IAEA's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 11 October 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 715 (1991) which, inter alia, approved the plan submitted in document S/22872/Rev.1/Corr.1 by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and with the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 707 (1991). In paragraph 8 of resolution 715, the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit to it reports on the implementation of the plan when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715. The Director General has submitted thus far five reports, circulated on 15 April 1992, as S/23813; 28 October 1992, as S/24722; 19 April 1993, as S/25621; on 3 November 1993, as S/26685; and on 22 April 1994, as S/1994/490.

2. The Director General submits herewith the sixth six-month report on implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification related to Iraq's nuclear capabilities (hereinafter referred to as the Plan).

3. In addition to providing a semi-annual report on the implementation of the Plan, this document also summarizes the past three years of the IAEA activities in phasing in its Plan, activities which coincided with the continuing implementation by the IAEA of its mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions to identify Iraq's nuclear capabilities and to dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

II. HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL TALKS

4. Since the last report by the IAEA on the implementation of its Plan, two more rounds of high-level technical talks have been held between the IAEA and the United Nations Special Commission, on the one hand, and Iraq, on the other hand. These discussions were continuations of the talks initiated by a visit of Chairman Ekéus to Baghdad in July 1993 and focused on the implementation of the IAEA and the Special Commission plans for ongoing monitoring and verification and on the resolution of outstanding issues between Iraq and the two organizations. The ensuing series of high-level technical talks marked a turning point in the level of cooperation and support extended by the Iraqi authorities to IAEA and the Special Commission. This change in the Iraqi attitude has enabled inspectors' work to be conducted effectively and has contributed significantly to expediting the process of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification, as called for in the Security Council resolutions. The substantive results of the last two rounds of high-level technical talks are summarized below. Reports on the high-level technical talks have been circulated as Security Council documents, as identified in Appendix A of this report.

5. From 24 to 26 April 1994, the two sides - the IAEA and the United Nation Special Commission, on the one hand, and Iraq, on the other hand - met in Baghdad to discuss issues relating to the implementation of resolutions 687 and 715 (1991). The two sides reviewed the considerable progress made in this regard since the last round of high-level talks, held in New York from 14 to 19 March 1994. It was noted that many actions had been undertaken during that period, including inspections to establish the baseline for implementing ongoing monitoring and verification. Iraq assured the Special Commission and the IAEA that it would respect their rights and privileges established under the Plans. For their part, the Special Commission and the IAEA reiterated their commitment to exercise these rights and privileges in a manner that

respected Iraq's legitimate concerns relating to sovereignty, independence, security and dignity in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and to conduct their activities in the least intrusive manner consistent with effective monitoring and verification.

6. A further round of high-level technical talks took place in Baghdad on 4 and 5 July 1994. Discussions focused upon the parties' respective assessments of the stages which had been reached in connection with the two principal responsibilities of the Special Commission and the IAEA: the identification and destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's capabilities for weapons of mass destruction; and the putting in place and operation of an effective system of monitoring and verification as approved by the Security Council resolution 715 (1991). The Special Commission and the IAEA agreed that the first of these tasks was almost complete, with the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of declared and otherwise identified prohibited weapons and capabilities. As regards the second of these tasks, the Special Commission, the IAEA, and Iraq noted that substantial progress had been made in all the areas covered by the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

7. In the nuclear area, the IAEA indicated that the system for environmental monitoring was now well established and anticipated its ongoing development. Having received from Iraq the supplementary information required under the IAEA Plan, the IAEA was in possession of adequate information to support its monitoring activities. The Special Commission and the IAEA indicated that the plans for the installation of sensors were well advanced, and that it was the objective of the Special Commission and the IAEA to have the monitoring system operational in September 1994.

8. The Iraqi delegation stressed the view that it had completed all actions contemplated in the relevant provisions of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and that, consequently, the Security Council should immediately apply paragraph 22 of

the said resolution without any restrictions or further conditions.

9. The Special Commission, the IAEA, and Iraq agreed to continue the dialogue to further the execution of the relevant provisions of the Security Council's resolutions.

10. In addition to the two rounds of high-level technical talks, a meeting was held on 9 May 1994 at IAEA headquarters in Vienna between an Iraqi delegation headed by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, and an IAEA team headed by the Director General of the IAEA. The actions taken thus far in implementing many elements of the IAEA's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification were reviewed. Confidence was expressed that continued cooperation would contribute to the implementation of the remaining elements in accordance with the tentative schedule envisaged during the March 1994 round of high-level technical talks.

11. In the course of the May meeting, the importance of the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, as referred to in paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), was also stressed by both sides. The Director General stated that the IAEA was doing its best to inform States which may negotiate such an agreement, of the Agency's expertise in the field of verification and of the modes of verification which might be employed.

12. During this meeting, the Iraqi delegation raised the issue of provision by the IAEA of technical assistance in the areas of medical and agricultural applications of radioisotopes and radiation. The IAEA agreed to examine the extent to which technical cooperation might be accomodated within the constraints of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

III. INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

13. Since the last report of 22 April 1994 to the Security Council on the implementation of the Plan, the IAEA has conducted two additional inspection missions in Iraq, bringing the total to twenty-six. The report on the results of IAEA-25 has been brought to the attention of the Security Council in document S/1994/1001; the IAEA-26 report is in preparation. The results of these two inspections are summarized below.

14. The twenty-fifth IAEA inspection mission in Iraq took place from 21 June to 1 July 1994. This inspection was principally directed towards ongoing monitoring and verification activities. Sites covered during this inspection included a number of sites with no known connection to the past nuclear program, but which were judged to have capabilities useful to a reconstituted nuclear program. No activity relevant to those proscribed under resolution 687 (1991) was identified. A video surveillance system was installed and commissioned in the flow-forming machine workshop at Nassr (Taji), and a third video unit was added to the two units already installed in the milling and boring machine workshop at Um Al Ma'arik.

15. During the course of IAEA-25, several meetings were held with the Iraqi counterpart with a view to securing missing information and remedying inadequacies in the Iraqi declarations. In addition, the current activities at a number of sites were reviewed and the non-proscribed use of equipment declared in accordance with Annex 3 of the Plan was confirmed. Follow-up activities from the previous inspections were also completed, including the transfer of irradiated beryllium components from the IRT reactor storage to Location C and the characterization of the different batches of uranium.

16. The twenty-sixth IAEA inspection mission in Iraq took place from 22 August to 7 September 1994. One of the main

objectives of this inspection was to investigate Iraq's former activities in laser isotope separation (LIS) as a follow-up of information received in May 1994 from Member States indicating that Iraq had invested significant resources in this area. The subject of LIS-relevant activities had been addressed first during the seventh IAEA inspection mission, carried out in October 1991. At that time, the IAEA received two written statements from a senior Iraqi official denying the existence in Iraq of any LIS activities and, as a consequence, of any scientist or engineer who had been involved in such activities.

17. The investigation carried out by the IAEA-26 inspection team, which included five experts in LIS technology, resulted in a statement by the Iraqi side that the Laser Division of the Department of Physics of Tuwaitha *"had received, in 1981, an objective from the Atomic Energy Commission to work in Laser Isotope Separation...we started in two lines; one which is looking after the molecular and the other, the atomic direction."* Inspectors were informed that when the achievements of the Laser Division were assessed in 1987, it was decided to downgrade the project to a "watching brief" and to transfer a number of key personnel to other activities.

18. Thus, as finally acknowledged by Iraq, a specific task to explore the feasibility of LIS as a means of producing enriched uranium had, indeed, existed in Iraq. The task appears to have been poorly focused; its declared limited achievements are consistent with the equipment, personnel resources and expertise available, and with the analysis of confiscated Iraqi documents. The team of LIS experts unanimously agreed that the information which had been gathered was consistent with a loosely coordinated and largely empirical approach, but not consistent with achievement of substantial progress in what is a highly complex technology. In the opinion of these experts, nothing was found to contradict the statement by the Iraqi side that they never achieved isotopic separation of uranium either in the metallic or the molecular form. A parallel investigation by the IAEA of

suppliers of laser equipment supports, thus far, the conclusion that Iraq was unable to procure critical pieces of equipment, most notably copper vapor laser systems, from these suppliers.

19. In the course of IAEA-26, the IAEA team also conducted inspections of Iraq's current activities and of the utilization of machine-tools, non-nuclear materials and other equipment, at 15 facilities, installations, and sites.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS ACHIEVED IN 26 INSPECTION MISSIONS

20. At the completion of IAEA-26 a total of over 2,500 inspector days had been spent in Iraq since the beginning of inspection activities in May 1991. This involved the deployment of several hundred inspectors and support staff, comprising 35 nationalities. This inspection included 634 visits to 151 different sites, installations, and facilities. Reports of the inspection missions circulated so far as Security Council documents are identified in Appendix B.

A. Identification of the secret Iraqi nuclear program

21. The first task assigned to the IAEA under resolution 687 (1991), namely the identification of the various elements of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear program, was largely completed by the end of September 1991, i.e., six months after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 687. Charting the map of this program has entailed a number of difficulties, including sometimes dramatic confrontations between Iraqi authorities and the IAEA inspection teams. During this phase of the inspection process, the Iraqi Government employed a strategy of obstruction and delay in its efforts to conceal the real nature of its nuclear projects, while, on the other hand, demonstrating a level of cooperation in some less sensitive areas.

22. The secret Iraqi nuclear program appears to have commenced in 1981, under the code name of `Petrochemical Project 3' or `PC3'[1/]. PC3 consisted of a diversified and well financed approach to developing multiple techniques for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU). At a later stage, a program to investigate all the practical elements of designing and building a nuclear weapon was added to PC3. In the course of PC3, several techniques for producing HEU were explored, including gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation (EMIS), and separation by centrifuge. Preliminary experiments were also conducted in the area of laser isotope separation (LIS) and, later on, around the end of 1987, laboratory-scale research was started on a fifth uranium enrichment method, based on chemical enrichment through ion-exchange and liquid-liquid extraction.

23. In May 1987, as revealed in documents seized by IAEA inspectors, Iraqi activities concentrated on two methods, EMIS and centrifuge, which, in the assessment of the Iraqi scientists and engineers, were the most promising for industrial scale operation in Iraq.

24. A large construction program of industrial scale facilities for EMIS was launched in 1987, followed in 1989 by the construction of a large plant for the mass production of centrifuges. The establishment of an organized structure to carry out weapon-design-related research and development activities dates from April 1988.

25. The Iraqi secret nuclear program was carried out at nine dedicated sites. Fifteen other sites in Iraq (mainly industrial State establishments) supported the PC3 project by providing services of various kinds and manufacturing components to be used in HEU production. The Gulf War stopped this HEU production effort well before any significant amount

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[1/] In the course of IAEA-6, IAEA inspectors confiscated in Iraq 2348 documents totaling 54,922 pages. The dates of these documents range from 1979 to 1991. All of the PC3 documents seized were stamped "Top Secret", the earliest of which bears the date 23 December 1981.

of such material was produced. At the time of the Gulf War, a significant amount of HEU in the form of fresh (i.e., unirradiated) reactor fuel was in Iraq under IAEA safeguards. Additionally other HEU, in the form of irradiated fuel, was present, also under IAEA safeguards. All safeguarded HEU has been accounted for by post-war IAEA inspections and has been removed from Iraq.

26. The rapid identification of the secret Iraqi nuclear program is due, in no small measure, to the continuous support of the UN Security Council and to the assistance extended to the IAEA by its Member States through the provision of intelligence information and of experts who expanded the competence of the IAEA teams in particular areas.

27. The identification of the main components of the secret Iraqi nuclear program was followed by a lengthy process of verification aimed at consolidating the inspection findings. Important details had to be clarified in areas such as the procurement of sensitive materials and equipment and the sources of foreign advice in sensitive technologies, with the objective of arriving at a consistent and reasonably complete picture of PC3. It is the considered opinion of the IAEA, based on the results of the twenty-six inspection missions, the analyses of thousands of samples, the analysis of documents confiscated in Iraq, the assessment of procurement and other information obtained from Member States of the IAEA, that the essential components of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear program have been identified and that the scope of the program is well understood. Although still lacking in some detail, the picture appears complete and consistent.

B. Destruction, removal and rendering harmless operations

28. The second main task given to the IAEA by resolution 687 (1991) concerns the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the essential elements of the Iraqi nuclear weapons development program, including the nuclear-weapons-usable

material known to have been in Iraq in the form of safeguarded reactor fuel.

29. Extensive destruction of the Iraqi nuclear installations occurred during the Gulf War as a result of air raids by Coalition forces. Additional destruction of equipment and material was carried out by the Iraqi army at the end of the war and prior to the start of the IAEA inspections, in an attempt to remove evidence of its secret program.

30. Since September 1991, i.e., when the scope of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear program came into focus, the IAEA has supervised the systematic destruction of facilities, technical buildings, equipment and other items proscribed under Security Council resolution 687 which had escaped destruction during the war or which had been only slightly damaged. The IAEA teams ordered and supervised the destruction of over 1,900 individual items as well as 600 tons of specialty alloys useful in a nuclear weapons program or in uranium enrichment activities. At nuclear-dedicated sites, specialized process buildings covering a surface area of some 32,500 square meters were demolished with explosives, entailing as well the destruction of a large amount of high quality equipment which had been installed or stored at those sites.

31. With the completion of the destruction, removal and rendering harmless activities to date, the IAEA is satisfied that there remain no practical capabilities in Iraq for the production of nuclear weapons or of nuclear-weapons-usable material (i.e., HEU or plutonium). Should additional prohibited items be located, these items would also be subject to destruction, removal or rendering harmless.

32. As to the quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material (HEU in the form of reactor fuel elements) which were in Iraq under IAEA safeguards, these were found untouched and have been fully accounted for and removed, as referred to above. The operation for removing the special nuclear material,

including a few grams of separated plutonium, has entailed, inter alia, a complex technical effort to clear part of the enriched fuel elements from the rubble of a bombed research reactor.

33. Reports on the status of destruction, removal and rendering harmless activities have been circulated semi-annually as Security Council documents and are listed in Appendix C.

V. PROCUREMENT-RELATED INFORMATION

34. Under the IAEA plan, Iraq is required to declare to the IAEA all items listed in Annex 3 of the Plan. These items fall into two general categories:

- Items prohibited under resolution 687
  Any item falling in this list must be destroyed, removed from Iraq or otherwise rendered harmless.

- Items of relevance under resolution 687
  These are items which could be used to implement activities prohibited under resolution 687, but which may also serve other non-prohibited purposes. The utilization in Iraq of such dual-use items must be monitored.

35. In order to ensure the completeness of the Iraqi declarations, and to ensure the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of all items falling within the first category, verification of the information provided by Iraq on the procurement of key materials, equipment and instrumentation needed in their secret nuclear program is essential. Verification of this information is a prerequisite for establishing a meaningful Plan. This is a lengthy process, requiring identification of the manufacturers and suppliers which in turn calls for the cooperation of the concerned Member States. The inquiries conducted so far by the IAEA in

this delicate matter involve 172 companies and governmental institutions in 27 countries.

36. Since the last report on implementation of the Plan, two outstanding issues, related to procurement, have been resolved through independent verification. These issues concerned the quantities of natural uranium oxide which Iraq had procured from Brazil, and the amount and origin of the maraging steel which, according to Iraqi statements, had been procured through a UK-based intermediary. Both issues were important, since the first concerned the completeness of the inventory of nuclear material existing in Iraq, i.e., the nuclear material balance, and the second related to the amount of stock material that Iraq planned to use for the mass production of centrifuges.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION PLAN

37. With the approval of the Plan by the Security Council in November 1991 in resolution 715, the IAEA began phasing in activities relevant to ongoing monitoring and verification, such as material accountancy and containment measures. These measures have included the establishment of the inventories of nuclear material and other nuclear-related items, the application of seals and the tagging of equipment subject to the Plan.

38. In 1992, a periodic radiometric survey of the main surface water bodies of Iraq (rivers, lakes, and canals) was instituted. The radiometric survey of Iraqi water bodies is now routinely conducted, twice a year. Samples of water, sediment, and biota are collected at 45 pre-established sampling points and shipped out of Iraq for analysis. This technique is sensitive enough to detect radioactive and other chemical signatures which would reveal the existence of undeclared nuclear activities, for example, the operation of a nuclear reactor or a reprocessing plant.

39. The provision by Iraq of detailed information concerning sites, facilities, and installations subject to the Plan, using reporting forms developed by the IAEA has been completed recently. These forms, which cover all the reporting requirements under the Plan, were developed in such a way as to facilitate the electronic processing and updating of the information.

40. On-site inspections are the backbone of IAEA monitoring and verification activities. The value of visual observations and information gathering by experienced inspectors and experts cannot be overemphasized in terms of ensuring the IAEA's ability to respond immediately to developing situations. The procedures for conducting routine and no-notice inspections at sites, facilities or installations subject to the Plan have been thoroughly tested and have proved to be operational. The continuous presence in Iraq of nuclear inspectors, as of the end of August 1994, will facilitate the conduct of no-notice inspections at all sites.

41. The deployment of video surveillance systems to monitor the usage of dual-use equipment, such as high precision computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine-tools, was also begun in mid-1993. The installations are now complete and all of the equipment is operational.

42. Practical arrangements have been made with the Special Commission to coordinate the IAEA's activities in areas of overlapping responsibility, such as video surveillance and no-notice inspection of certain dual-use equipment.

43. Arrangements with the Special Commission have also been made to secure office space in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC), which is now nearing completion, and to share the support services that BMVC will provide, such as aerial photography, high altitude imagery, transportation, communications, interpretation and medical services.

44. On 26 November 1993, Iraq formally accepted Security Council resolution 715 (1991). As underlined in the course of the high-level technical talks, this acceptance by Iraq of the resolution represented a major step towards Iraq's fulfillment of its obligations under the Security Council resolutions.

45. As required in paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991), the IAEA, the Special Commission and the Sanctions Committee have developed a mechanism for monitoring future sales and supplies by other countries to Iraq. It is expected that the Security Council will, in the near future, approve this jointly-developed mechanism, which will form an integral part of the IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification activities in Iraq.

46. At the beginning of 1994, the Iraqi authorities established the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD), which will be responsible for implementing all actions required of Iraq under the provisions of resolution 715 (1991) and the Plans of the IAEA and the Special Commission. An Iraqi document outlining the NMD functions and responsibilities is contained in Appendix D. Iraq is also developing comprehensive procedures to assist its personnel in the implementation of these functions and responsibilities.

47. The Iraqi authorities have also provided to the IAEA and the Special Commission a draft decision, to be promulgated by the Revolutionary Command Council, intended to address paragraphs 34 and 35 of the IAEA's Plan, as well as paragraph 20 of the Special Commission's Plan, which require Iraq to adopt legal measures necessary to implement its obligations under the terms of the relevant resolutions.

48. To implement the Plan effectively, the IAEA requires on continuing basis updated information on sites, facilities, or installations which might harbor activities or utilize items prohibited under resolution 687. In this context, the IAEA has gathered and continues to gather much information of its own from its verification activities. It also acquires information through in-depth analyses of media reports and other open

literature. In the future, it will secure information from detailed reports by States on exports to Iraq of nuclear-related material and equipment. Finally, the IAEA also receives information from its Member States collected through national intelligence means. No information, whatever its provenance, may be ignored, but all information must be critically analyzed to determine its credibility.

VII. CONCLUSION

49. It can be concluded that, with the establishment at the end of August of the IAEA continuous presence in Iraq, all elements of the IAEA's Plan are now in place. Monitoring and verification measures will evolve as technical needs arise and as advanced technologies become available. The implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan does not foreclose the exercise by the IAEA of its right to investigate any aspect of Iraq's former nuclear weapons program, in particular, through the follow-up of any new information developed by the IAEA or provided by Member States, and assessed as warranting further investigation.

APPENDIX A

HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL TALKS AND RELATED REPORTS

DATE		LOCATION	REPORT IN DOCUMENT	DATED	
31 August-9 September	1993	New York	S/26451	6 September	1993
2-8 October	1993	Baghdad	S/26571	12 October	1993
15-30 November	1993	New York	S/26825	1 December	1993
2-5 February	1994	Baghdad	S/1994/151	29 April	1994
14-19 March	1994	New York	S/1994/341	24 March	1994
24-26 April	1994	Baghdad	S/1994/520	29 April	1994
4-5 July	1994	Baghdad	S/1994/860	20 July	1994

APPENDIX B

IAEA'S INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ AND RELATED REPORTS

INSPECTION	DATES OF INSPECTION		REPORT	DATED	
1	15-19 May	1991	S/22788	12 July	1991
2	22 June- 3 July	1991	S/22788	12 July	1991
3	7-18 July	1991	S/22837	25 July	1991
4	27 July-10 August	1991	S/22986 and Corr. 1	28 August	1991
5	14-20 September	1991	S/23112	4 October	1991
6	22-30 September	1991	S/23122	8 October	1991
7	11-22 October	1991	S/23215	14 November	1991
8	11-18 November	1991	S/23283	12 December	1991
9	11-14 January	1992	S/23505	30 January	1992
10	5-13 February	1992	S/23644	26 February	1992
11	7-15 April	1992	S/23947	22 May	1992
12	26 May-4 June	1992	S/24223	2 July	1992
13	13-21 July	1992	S/24450	16 August	1992
14	31 August -7 September	1992	S/24593	28 September	1992
15	8-18 November	1992	S/24981	17 December	1992
16	5-8 December	1992	S/25013	24 December	1992
17	25-31 January	1993	S/25411	13 March	1993
18	3-11 March	1993	S/25666	26 April	1993
19	30 April-7 May	1993	S/25982	21 June	1993
20	25-30 June	1993	S/26333	20 August	1993
21	24-27 July	1993	S/26333	20 August	1993
22	1-15 November	1993	S/1994/31	14 January	1994
23	4-11 February	1994	S/1994/355	25 March	1994
24	11-21 April	1994	S/1994/650	1 June	1994
25	21 June-1 July	1994	S/1994/1001	26 August	1994
26	22 August-7 September	1994	in preparation		1994

APPENDIX C

IAEA SEMI-ANNUAL REPORTS ON DESTRUCTION, REMOVAL AND RENDERING HARMLESS, PURSUANT TO UNITED NATION SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 699 (1991)

DOCUMENT	DATED	
S/23295	17 December	1991
S/24110	17 June	1992
S/24988	17 December	1992
S/25983	21 June	1993
S/26897	20 December	1993
S/1994/793	5 July	1994

APPENDIX D

ESTABLISHMENT OF A
NATIONAL MONITORING DIRECTORATE IN IRAQ
(IRAQI DOCUMENT HANDED OVER TO THE IAEA ON 4 JULY 1994)

THE TASKS OF NATIONAL IRAQI MONITORING DIRECTORATE

1. Implementation of SCR 715 (1991) and its provision regarding prohibited activities.

2. The coordination and following-up with different Iraqi Sectors and role liaison officers in the different sectors and facilities (F/I/S).

3. The coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other concerned Ministries in implementing SCR 715 (1991).

4. The coordination and support for the different UNSCOM and IAEA teams in carrying out their tasks in the OMV process.

5. The coordination and support for the different UNSCOM teams in carrying out their task in the aerial survey.

6. Following-up of the operation of different sensors installed in different (F/I/S) and give whatever logistical support needed by UNSCOM and the IAEA teams to ensure the normal operation of these sensors.

7. The monitoring of import and export of machines, equipment and material in accordance with agreed upon import export mechanism.

8. The implementation of the roles and provision of different Annexes of the OMV plan (UNSCOM and IAEA).

9. The coordination of different activities with Baghdad Monitoring Center (UNSCOM and IAEA).

10. The assurance in the proper implementation of Iraqi legislative provisions regarding prohibited activities in accordance with pertinent Security Council Resolutions.

11. Monitoring and Control of movement of equipment and materials covered by the different annexes to resolution 715.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NMD AND THE DIFFERENT FACILITIES INSTALLATION AND SITES



NATIONAL MONITORING DIRECTORATE