



## Security Council

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### **Letter dated 23 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

Further to the address made by Ambassador Paul Heinbecker to the Security Council on 16 January 2001, I am pleased to provide herewith Canada's proposal for improving cooperation between the Council and troop-contributing countries (see annex). I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Council.

*(Signed)* Michel **Duval**  
Ambassador  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

## **Annex to the letter dated 23 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

### **A mission-specific cooperative mechanism for Security Council-mandated operations**

#### **Problematic**

1. The issue is not communications and consultations, however imperfect they have been in practice, but cooperation and participation. Missions have become progressively more complex and dangerous. Politically responsible Governments cannot provide troops to such contemporary missions unless they are confident that these missions are sound and that their soldiers are secure, at least within the parameters of what are inherently risky enterprises. Confidence comes from participation in the decision-making process, from inception through deployment to termination. Responsible and effective decisions require that risk be integrated with authority. It is not beyond the ingenuity of members of the United Nations to reconcile the Security Council's "constitutionally mandated" primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security with the troop-contributing countries' political necessity of participating in decisions to that end. We have not yet found a way for troop contributors to participate in the decision-making process. This non-paper suggests how it might be done.

#### **Proposal**

2. For each mission, an **operation-specific cooperative committee** would be established by the Security Council with troop-contributing countries. This committee would involve a partnership of trust and collaboration between the Council and the troop contributors, supported by the Secretariat. Participation of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in the Committee would involve those countries contributing formed military units and/or senior command personnel, when they are not the same.

#### **Military advice**

3. In every phase, it will be important that the committee (and the Security Council) receive sound military advice from the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General and the Force Commander. They

should be able to answer the key questions whether the plan is militarily sound and if the forces proposed for the operation are sufficient. Conceivably, the military staff committee should be revived and bolstered by the participation of troop-contributing countries.

#### **Decision-making**

4. The new mechanism would recognize the Security Council's primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The new mechanism would not supplant this responsibility but rather would complement it. The **operation-specific cooperative committee**, nonetheless, would be a decision-making committee and would entail troop contributors participating in the pre-decision-making of the Council. The Council would retain its ultimate decision-making authority, but, as a practical matter, would not make decisions that did not carry the formal consensus of the troop contributors. Troop contributors that could not rally to an emerging consensus would withdraw.

5. This approach is, to a significant degree, an extension of the concept of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) advocated in the Brahimi report (A/55/305-S/2000/809). It is also consistent with the Brahimi recommendation to establish ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Security Council (paras. 61 and 64 (d)).

6. The modalities for such an **operation-specific cooperative committee** would be very simple. It would be presided over by a Security Council member with a natural lead interest in the situation. All other Council members and those TCCs meeting participation criteria would be full members. Decisions would normally be made by consensus. The Secretariat would actively support the committee; participation by the relevant United Nations agencies would be essential. The parties to the conflict would be excluded. Modalities for consultations with the parties to the conflict would be developed on a case-by-case basis.

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