Deobfuscating O
JavaScript Dow

by Alex Holland on Septemb



Introduction

For a malicious actor to compro
entry into the target's network.
(T1193) serve as the initial acces

Adversaries also need a way to
tools and the monitoring efforts
techniques is to use interpreted scripting languages (T1064) that can run on an operating system without additional dependencies.[2] On Windows, popular interpreted languages that are abused by attackers include PowerShell, VBScript, JScript, VBA (Visual Basic for Applications), and commands interpreted by Command shell (cmd.exe).

Network attackers and defenders are in a constant state of competition to out-do the other to gain an advantage that could determine the outcome of an intrusion attempt. Against this background, we regularly see malicious actors change their tooling to increase the chances of a successful intrusion, particularly the downloaders used to initially compromise systems.

In early August 2019, we noticed that high-volume malicious spam campaigns delivering TrickBot started using Ostap, a commodity JavaScript (or more specifically, JScript) downloader. Previously, TrickBot campaigns relied on downloaders that used obfuscated Command shell and later PowerShell commands that were triggered by VBA AutoOpen macros to download their payloads.

In this post, I explain how to deobfuscate Ostap and describe a Python script I wrote (deobfuscate_ostap.py) that au
available to download on GitHu

TrickBot, also known as The Tri
operated by at least three threa
Spider and Wizard Spider.[4][5]
TrickBot's latest downloader is
measures. For example, the Ost
two different public sandboxes
[9] Moreover, a sample that was
when it was first uploaded, sug





Figure 1 – VirusTotal detection summary for one of the Ostap samples.

Ostap, TrickBot's JScript Downloader

Downloaders are a type of malware designed to retrieve and run secondary payloads from one or more remote servers. Their simple function means that downloaders are rarely more than several hundred lines of code, even when obfuscated. Ostap counters this trend in that it is very large, containing nearly 35,000 lines of obfuscated code once beautified. Historical TrickBot

campaigns suggest that their operators prefer code obfuscation that is lengthier than most other e-crime actors to bypass detection, as seen, for example in campaigns in August 2018.[10]

```
mallory@mallory-pc:~$ wc ~/Samples/2angola.Jse.beautified
  34757  166487 1760029 /home/mallory/Samples/2angola.Jse.beautified
```

Figure 2 – Line, word and byte count of a sample of Ostap used to deliver TrickBot after being beautified. The downloader is 34,757 lines long.

Macro Analysis

The downloader is delivered as a Microsoft Word 2007 macro-enabled document (.DOCM) that contains the two components of the downloader: a VBA macro and the JScript (figure 3). The emails and samples analysed were themed as purchase orders, suggesting that the campaigns were likely intended to target businesses rather than individuals.



Figure

The JScript component of the downloader is stored in the body of the document as white text, resulting in a high word and page count.

st Read on the Boulevard

ok 'Infinite Money Glitch' — Idiots sed by JPMorgan

oky Spam, Scary Scams: Halloween Threats Rise

NTT Data Taps Palo Alto Networks for MXDR Service

Proofpoint Boosting Data Security with Normalyze Acquisition

UnitedHealth Hires Longtime Cybersecurity Executive as CISO

More Than Just a Corporate Wiki? How Threat Actors are Exploiting Confluence

Industry Spotlight »

Ô! China Hacks Canada too, Says CCCS



F

The VBA macro is saved in a pro
the JScript to files named 2ang
directory (%AppData%\Microso
event.[11]

Figure 5 – Annotate

The rest of the macro only runs if the document is closed, which is achieved by monitoring for a Document.Close event (figure 6).[12] This is an anti-sandbox measure used to defeat behavioural analysis by sandboxes that don't imitate user activity such as closing documents.

Figure 6 – Annotated VBA code that runs when the document is closed.

If the document is closed, the macro renames 2angola.dot to 2angola.Jse and then runs it:

1. The macro calls the Create method from the Win32_Process WMI class to run a new Explorer.exe process with 2angola.Jse as its command line argument (figure 7).[13]
2. When a new Explorer.exe process is created where one is already running, the new process is created with the */factory,{75DFF2B7-6936-4C06-A8BB-676A7B00B24B} -Embedding* command-line arguments (figure 8). The CLSID corresponds to the ProgID called "CLSID_SeparateMultipleProcessExplorerHost".[14]
3. Explorer runs 2angola.Jse using Windows Script Host (WScript.exe), the default file handler for JScript Encoded Files (.JSE), as shown in figure 9. The file extension of 2angola.dot is renamed to *.Jse* ensure that the JScript is opened using WScript.exe. Relying on default file associations means that the macro can evade detection by indirectly referencing WScript, a program commonly used for malicious purposes in the context of macros.

Figure 7 – Sysmon event show
launche

Figure 8 – Sysmon event s
arguments */factory,CLSI*

Figure 9 – Sysmon event showing WScript.exe running the JScript file.

Anti-Analysis Measures

Interestingly, the Ostap includes a fake Windows Script Host runtime error that occurs shortly after the script is run. It's likely that the fake error was included to discourage manual examination of the downloader.

Figure 10 – Fake error message displayed early during the runtime of the downloader.

Figure 11 – Variable storing the fake error message in TrickBot's downloader.

Some samples of the download
This is another anti-analysis me
which may interpret the rest of
executable code.

Once deobfuscated, several oth
queries WMI to check if it is run
processes:

- AgentSimulator.exe
- anti-virus.EXE
- BehaviorDumper
- BennyDB.exe
- ctfmon.exe
- fakepos_bin
- FrzState2k
- gemu-ga.exe (Possible missp
- ImmunityDebugger.exe
- KMS Server Service.exe
- ProcessHacker
- procexp
- Proxifier.exe
- python
- tcpdump
- VBoxService
- VBoxTray.exe
- VmRemoteGuest
- vmtoolsd
- VMware2B.exe
- VzService.exe
- winace
- Wireshark

Many sandboxes run these processes in their guest images, such as Cuckoo Sandbox and its derivatives which use a Python agent. The script also checks for a blacklist of host and user names.

- Emily
- HANSPETER-PC
- HAPUBWS
- Hong Lee
- IT-ADMIN
- JOHN-PC
- Johnson
- Miller
- MUELLER-PC
- Peter Wilson
- SystemIT | admin
- Timmy

- WIN7-TRAPS

Beautifying the JScript

The JScript that is written to disk is one line, making it difficult to analyse manually. To make it more readable, you can reformat and add indentations to the code using Einar Lielmanis's JS Beautifier tool, which also works for JScript because they share a similar syntax.[15]

js-beautify 2angola.Jse > 2angola.Jse.beautified

Identifying Code Structure, Key Variables and Functions

Now that the code is readable, we can begin analysing the script's structure, variables and functions. Our aim here is to identify the functions responsible for deobfuscating the downloader.

The script includes many junk variables that aren't used anywhere else in the script. We can simply remove these variables. It is often possible to distinguish the variables that have been automatically generated by an obfuscator from meaningful ones because their naming convention will differ.

For example, in figure 12 you ca
are junk code, except the variab
the string "from". It's also refere

Figure

In figure 13, you can see at line
interesting, *gunsder*, is concate
the returned string is a referenc
character code into a character
calling fromCharCode, the function checks that the second parameter, *vqjpvi*, is the character *h*. This function is also referenced 7,540 times, so it's likely that this function is used in the deobfuscation of the script.

Now that we understand what the function does, we can give it, its variables and parameters meaningful names (figure 14).

Figure 13 – Function *xxqneol* before deobfuscation.

Figure 14 – Renamed *xxqneol* function.

Analysis of Character Code Calculation Functions

Next, we can look at the functions where fromCharCode is referenced to understand how it is used. After cleaning up the code in figure 15, you can see that the function uses arithmetic operators to calculate a Unicode character code from the values stored in an array called *pkkwrit4*. The Unicode character code and the character *h* are then supplied to the fromCharCode function, which returns a Unicode character. In this case, the character returned is *f*. Each character in the downloader has its own function to calculate its character code. This particular sample has 7,540 functions that are used to calculate all the characters codes.

Figure 15 – One of the m

Writing a Python Script (deobfu

Since we don't want to have to r
let's write a Python script to do

By looking for code similarities
the functions that calculate the
calculated using the elements a
these elements before they are
addition and subtraction used in Ostap samples in the wild.

We can use Python's re module to write regular expressions that match the elements in each array at index 0 and 1 and store them in lists.[17] Next, we'll clean up the matches using the re.sub() function and then convert them into integers. We can then use Python's zip() function to perform the arithmetic on the values in the index 0 and 1 lists.[18] The script tries subtraction and addition operations to deobfuscate the downloader. Finally, the script converts the character codes into Unicode characters, removes line breaks and prints the result.

The script is available on GitHub to download and can be modified to support automated analysis pipelines.[3] To test the script, a YARA rule was written to detect Ostap and then run against 100 samples from August 2019. The extracted and deduplicated URLs are at the end of the report.

Analysis of the Deobfuscated Downloader

After running the script, we can examine the deobfuscated strings from the downloader, including the URL where the TrickBot payload is hosted:

- hxxps://185.180.199[.]102/angola/mabutu.php?min=14b

Figure 17 – Deobfuscat

The strings are very similar to o
high confidence assessment tha
belong to this family of malware
campaigns unrelated to TrickBo
[20] The variety of malware deli
popular among different threat

Ostap's aggressive anti-analysis
use other interpreted scripting
seeking a downloader.

YARA Rule

```
rule win_ostap_jse {
      meta:
            author = "Al
            date = "2019
            sample_1 =
"F3E03E40F00EA10592F20D8
            sample_2 =
"38E2B6F06C2375A955BEA03

      strings:
            $comment = { 2A 2A 2F 3B } // Matches on **/;
            $array_0 = /\w{5,9}\[0\]=\d{1,3};/
            $array_1 = /\w{5,9}\[1\]=\d{1,3};/

      condition:
            (filesize > 1100KB and filesize < 400KB) and ($comment at 0)
and (#array_0 > 100) and (#array_1 > 100)) or ((#array_0 > 100) and
(#array_1 > 100))
}
```

Hashes (SHA-256)

- F3E03E40F00EA10592F20D83E3C5E922A1CE6EA36FC326511C38F45B9C9B6586 – Last_order_specification_1217492.docm
- 38E2B6F06C2375A955BEA0337F087625B4E6E49F6E4246B50ECB567158B3717B – Heiress_Documents_id18598.docm

Extracted URLs

- hxxps://185.130.104[.]149/odr/updateme.php?oxx=p
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]149/odr/updateme.php?oxx=up
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]149/odr/updateme.php?oxx=z
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]236/deerhunter/inputok.php?min=29h
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]236/deerhunter/inputok.php?min=up3
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]236/deerhunter2/inputok.php?min=6h
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]236/deerhunter2/inputok.php?min=8h
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]236/deerhunter2/inputok.php?min=9a
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]236/deerhunter2/inputok.php?min=9h
- hxxps://185.130.104[.]236/targ/inputok.php?min=13s
- hxxps://185.130.107[.]236/deerhunter3/inputok.php?min=12a
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=up
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=17ha
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=18h
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=19a
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=19h
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=a
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=m
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=m2
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=t2
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=tu
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole/c644.php?min=w
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole2/c644.php?min=19h
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]15/hollyhole2/c644.php?min=7
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]20/t-30/
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]20/t-34/
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]20/t-34/
- hxxps://185.159.82[.]20/t-34/
- hxxps://185.180.199[.]102/an
- hxxps://189.130.104[.]236/de

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https://www.thaicert.or.th/dow

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[8] https://app.any.run/tasks/dc86fb23-b8ac-49db-8c22-a53b88236676/

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The post Deobfuscating Ostap: TrickBot's 34,000 Line JavaScript Downloader appeared first on Bromium.