



**How could the vendor have prevented this vulnerability?**

Most DLL Hijacking vulnerabilities are introduced by the 'lazy' loading of DLL files, which relies on Windows' default `DLL search order`. Explicitly specifying where a required DLL is located is easy and often already helps a lot. This doesn't have to hurt portability if Windows API calls are used to obtain paths, e.g. `GetSystemDirectory` to get the path of the System32 folder. Even better is to check the signature of required DLLs prior to loading them; most platforms, frameworks and/or runtimes offer means to verify DLL signatures with minimal performance impact.

**This DLL Hijack doesn't seem to work (anymore), why is it still included?**

Luckily, vendors regularly patch vulnerable applications in order to prevent DLL Hijacking from taking place. Nevertheless, older versions will remain vulnerable; for that reason, the entry won't be deleted from this project. To help others, you may want to open a pull request updating the 'precondition' tag on this entry to make the community aware of the reduced scope.

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