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Threat Intelligence

A LNK Between Browsers: Hunting Methodologies and Extension Abusing Actors

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Mandiant

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Two pillars in sleight of hand magic are *User Initiated Action*, where the target needs to believe their actions are their own, and *Hidden Action*, the trick needs to be concealed behind something ordinary and nonthreatening. Mandiant became aware of a chain of adversary methodologies that leverage these two pillars to achieve persistence.

1. The user executes an LNK shortcut file that, unbeknownst to them, has been tampered with.

2. The modified LNK shortcut file executes a legitimate browser, hiding the malicious extension.

If the technical sleight of hand is successful, the adversary will achieve persistence by means of malicious Chromium-based browser extensions.

While hunting this methodology Mandiant identified BRAINSTORM, a rust-based dropper, which ultimately led to RILIDE, a chromium-

ecosystem of RILIDE is larger than reported. This research will dissect the relevant adversary methodologies, discuss the identified malware families abusing this methodology, and include numerous detection opportunities to expand the defender's hunting and detection repertoire.

The Connection from LNK to Extension

The LNK File

Files with the extension .lnk are colloquially known as LNK files but are officially known as [Shell Link Binary Files](#) and follow a standardized format. LNK files contain information that points a user's interaction to another data object on the system. In many instances this is transparent to an end user. A Windows user may click on the Google Chrome icon in the Start Menu and Chrome opens. What is not shown to the user is that they are executing an LNK file with properties that point to the actual Chrome executable.

Mandiant has reported on many adversaries and malware families abusing LNK files including: [FIN7](#), [UNC1151](#), [KEGTAP](#), [FIN13](#), and [APT29](#) ([twice](#)).

The CRX File

A CRX file is a collection of files archived together into a single package that can be used as an *extension* in Chromium-based browsers. Extensions enhance the browsing experience by adding features and functionality to the browser. Many browsers have an

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a safer practice because the company owning the browser software performs analysis on the extensions themselves attempting to identify malicious extensions.

However, depending on the implemented security settings, browsers will allow for manual loading of CRX files or unpacked extensions. Packed extensions (CRX files) are a single file with a .crx extension, conversely an unpacked extension is a directory containing the extension files.

Throughout 2022 Mandiant has observed multiple financially motivated threat actors distributing and/or expressing interest in leveraging malicious browser extensions in their operations.

Abusing Both LNK and CRX

While Mandiant has previously reported on the abuse of LNK and CRX files separately, this recently observed adversary methodology has been using both filetypes within a chain of events and the bridging data-point is the `--load-extension` switch in Chromium-based browsers.

The `--load-extension` switch allows the source to specify a target directory to load as an extension. This gives malware the opportunity to start a new browser window with their malicious extension loaded.

This functionality is present on Chromium-based browsers and multiple example commands can be found in Figure 1.

```
chrome.exe  --load-extension="C:\Users\user\AppData\Loca
brave.exe  --load-extension="C:\Users\user\AppData\Local
msedge.exe  --load-extension="C:\Users\user\AppData\Loca
```

Figure 1: Example Commands to Load an Extension on Multiple Chromium-based Browsers

Mandiant Identification of Methodology Abuse

Mandiant investigated several compromises involving LNK and extension abuse methodology in 2023. The impacted organizations extended across a broad scope of sectors, including the semiconductor, business marketing, financial investment, and telecom industries.

The following three sections dive deep into separate investigations performed on malware families utilizing both LNK abuse and extension installing to achieve persistence with RILIDE.

Investigation 1

TradingView Desktop is a charting platform and a social network for traders and investors. This software allows users to track and view cryptocurrency market changes. As a software that is used in the finance industry with the capability of a cryptocurrency focus, it is a reasonable target to masquerade as for actors with goals of stealing cryptocurrency. Users willing to track cryptocurrency may be more likely to trade, allowing RILIDE a potential vector for cryptocurrency theft.

The file TradeVlewDesktop_v4-94406.zip is a TradingView Desktop masquerading set of files. The sample is a compressed directory that contains 457 different files. The file of interest in the zipped file is TradeVlewDesktop_x64.exe, a NodeJS-based downloader. After

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hxxp://telegromch[.]org/soft/analytics/extension[.]exe
to download dropper extension.exe, which Mandiant tracks as
BRAINFOG.

BRAINFOG is a Node.JS packaged binary dropper which drops
RILIDE along with Visual Basic scripts to delete all Chrome LNKs and
replace them with LNK files to force the execution of RILIDE. RILIDE
is a Chromium-based extension that monitors the URLs visited by
victims, screenshots their browser tab views, and injects remote
JavaScript into select websites. RILIDE targets the theft of email
and cryptocurrency details, falling inline with the targeted audience,
the finance sector.

BRAINFOG drops extension.zip (RILIDE), wtf.vbs, chrome.vbs, and a
Google Chrome.lnk file. Upon execution BRAINFOG uses...

- `taskkill.exe` to close all instances of Chrome
- `chrome.vbs` to delete all LNK files with "*Chrome*" in it
- `wtf.vbs` to create a new LNK using the --load-extension
  switch to force the loading of RILIDE browser extension at
  execution.

After the user loads Chrome via the replaced LNK shortcut file,
RILIDE runs in the background as the infected browser loads and
manipulates web pages. During initial execution, it fetches a
machine identifier and a list of targeted domains from the
command and control's (C2) API endpoint `/api/machine/init`;
this list is re-fetched every five minutes.

```
{"machineId":2984,"urls":
["coinbase.com","binance.com","blockchain.com","mail.goc
```

*Figure 2: The domains this variant of RILIDE is monitoring for from
/api/machine/init*

loadScript. The loadScript function will download a list of key-values pairs which include a name and a path. The name is the domain related to the traffic of interest. If the browsing domain matches one of the monitored domains, the JavaScript in the path value will be accessed and the resulting file injected into the website for execution.

```
[
{"name":"coinbase.com","path":"scripts\/coinbase.js?v=3'
{"name":"binance.com","path":"scripts\/binance.js"},
{"name":"blockchain.com","path":"scripts\/blockchain.js'
{"name":"mail.google","path":"scripts\/gmail.js"},
{"name":"outlook.live","path":"scripts\/hotmail.js"},
{"name":"mail.yahoo","path":"scripts\/yahoo.js"},
{"name":"bybit.com","path":"scripts\/bybit.js"},
{"name":"okx.com","path":"scripts\/okx.js"}
]
```

Figure 3: Domains and URIs listed at the /api/machine/get-urls endpoint of the Adversary C2

This enables the adversary to invoke actions on behalf of the victim or steal data from their web sessions.

While hunting the RILIDE malware family Mandiant identified numerous interesting API endpoints on their C2.

```
Figure 4: RILIDE C2 API Endpoints
hxxp://extenision-app[.]com/api/settings
hxxp://extenision-app[.]com/api/machine/
hxxp://extenision-app[.]com/api/machine/init
hxxp://extension-app[.]com/api/machine/get-urls
```

Figure 4: RILIDE C2 API Endpoints

Endpoint	Function
/api/settings	- Datetimes for when it was created and updated - Multiple currency amounts defining the minimum amount (80 EUR, 80 USD, etc) - Telegram Chat ID and Token
/api/machine	Returns a list of details about victims. This includes... - Victim IP address - Victim country - Variant reference (Google, TradingView, etc) - When it was added - When it was last observed communicating to the C2
/api/machine/init	Returns a machine ID and the list of domains it monitors for
/api/machine/get-urls	Returns the URI path to the JS script to inject

Figure 4: RILIDE C2 API Endpoint Descriptions

Investigation 2

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storing RILIDE samples. Furthermore, Mandiant suspects this may
have been a method for delivery.

A file named Blanks, tracked by Mandiant as BRAINLINK, was
downloaded from the raw.githubusercontent.com URL on the
gulantin github

```
(hxxp://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/gulantin/blanks/main/blanks_online.exe)
```

BRAINLINK is an Advanced Installer compiled dropper which drops
a CAB file that contains the RILIDE extension files along with
PowerShell scripts to create new shortcuts forcing the execution of
RILIDE.

Mandiant's research of RILIDE identified that the background
JavaScript file includes a domain variable set to the C2 domain for
each malware version. In this investigation the RILIDE sample used
the domain `ashgrrwt[.]click`.

```
const domain = "https://ashgrrwt.click"
```

Figure 5: RILIDE C2 domain variable defanged

RILIDE C2 Infrastructure Hunt

This C2 infrastructure provided interesting overlaps between
numerous other domains. While the Admin, Billing, and Technical
WHOIS details for the `ashgrrwt[.]click` domain were redacted
for privacy, the registrant organization was not. The registrant
organization, Kruglova LTD, was associated with 11 other websites.

Figure 6: RILIDE C2 domain infrastructure graph

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(FinAndy/Tradingview) and Finance/Banking.

Investigation 3

Researching the RILIDE ecosystem led to the identification of an open directory at `146.70.79[.]75` which included two BRAINSTORM samples ([0a4f321c903a7fbc59566918c12aca09](#) and [34eea751fcbf4ee8d44977adb4742d93](#)) and numerous other malicious samples. BRAINSTORM is a Rust-based dropper which drops RILIDE and updates Google Chrome, Brave, and Microsoft Edge LNK files to force the execution of RILIDE. Mandiant is tracking the activity related to this open directory as UNC4553.

Figure 7: UNC4553 Open Directory

```
// M_Hunting_FileWrite_ManifestandChromeLNK_1
tag:peexe and ((behaviour_files:"C:\\Users\\Public\\Desk
behaviour_files:"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\St
Chrome.lnk") or (behaviour_files:"C:\\Users\\Public\\Des
and behaviour_files:"C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Roaming\\
```

The open directory IP shown in Figure 7 (146.70.79[.]75) has previously resolved to `nch-software[.]info` and `panger-top[.]click` . Further solidifying the connection from the IP to the domains, there is evidence connecting the URI patterns in the open directory to the URI patterns for these domains.

```
hxxps://nch-software[.]info/1/2.exe
hxxps://nch-software[.]info/1/install-win64-11.5.8_en-US
hxxps://panger-top[.]click/1/2.exe
hxxps://panger-top[.]click/1/install-win64-11.5.8_en-US.
```

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The open directory contained the two BRAINSTORM samples, two
PUFFPASTRY samples, a suspected incomplete PUFFPASTRY
sample, and two XLL samples.

PUFFPASTRY is a backdoor written in Visual-basic. PUFFPASTRY can
download, upload, delete, and execute files. Additionally,
PUFFPASTRY can self-terminate and enumerate system information
including Anti-virus details. C2 communications occur over
standard HTTP/HTTPS.

An XLL add-in is an Excel add-in file with the file extension .xll. An
XLL file is a type of dynamic link library (DLL) file that can only be
opened by Excel. It is not exactly clear what the intention of some
of these files are given they appear to be in staging or templates.

URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/2.exe
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/1/2.exe
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/1/install-win64-11.5.8_en-US.ex
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/light.dotm
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/light.pub
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/light.xlsm
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/x64.xll

Figure 9: UNC4553 Open Directory Contents

System Hardening

Preventing the malicious extensions (RILIDE and others) to be loaded by the browser is the linchpin to stopping the actor's methodology. With the inability to install the extension, further damage or exfiltration of sensitive data is prevented.

Chrome Enterprise provides numerous extension blocking options within the security settings. The following highlights a list of the settings relevant to this methodology.

- BlockExternalExtensions – Controls external extensions installation.
- DeviceLoginScreenExtensionManifestV2Availability – Remove the ability to use version 2 manifests.
- ExtensionInstallAllowlist and ExtensionInstallBlocklist – Implement block and allow lists to vastly restrict the extensions available.
- ExtensionInstallSources – Use strings with wildcards to identify where extensions can be installed from.

If there is a concern that Chrome LNKs have been manipulated or as a reoccurring security measure, users can run a user-level Chrome Settings Reset. When executed, numerous Chrome profile settings will change to the default on all devices where you're signed in. This will reset all of the default Windows-provided Chrome LNKs (i.e. Quick Launch LNKs) removing the `--load-extension` parameter that the actor is using to force the loading of the malicious extension.

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any prevention gaps.

Detection Opportunities

The Detection Opportunities section will be broken into two detection directions and will encompass a list of rules that will be expanded on in Appendix A.

1. Detecting Methodologies – Larger chance of detecting legitimate files or tactics that overlap with the methodology.
2. Detecting Malware Families – More targeted approach to detect the specific families themselves.

Detecting Methodologies

Detection Engine	Detection Title
YARA	M_Hunting_Embedded_Chromium_CRX_1
YARA	M_Hunting_Embedded_Chromium_CRXandLNK_1

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YARA	M_Hunting_AdvancedInstaller_LNK_1
YARA	M_Hunting_LNKEngine_LoadExtension_1
YARA	M_Hunting_LNKEngine_LoadExtension_Temp_1
YARA	M_Hunting_ArchiveEngine_CAB_Extension_1
YARA-L	M_Hunting_FileWrite_Manifest_Temp_1

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YARA-L	M_Hunting_Process_Chromium_LoadExtension_1
YARA-L	M_Hunting_FileWrite_Chrome_LNK_1

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YARA-L	M_Hunting_FileWrite_CRXandLNK_1
YARA-L	M_Hunting_FileWrite_ManifestandLNK_1
VT Grep	M_Hunting_FileWrite_ManifestandChromeLNK_1

Detecting Malware Families

Detection Engine	Detection Title	Detection Description

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YARA	M_Hunting_RILIDE_InjectJS_1	files that RILIDE in
YARA	M_Hunting_RILIDE_InjectJS_2	Detects JavaScr files that RILIDE in
YARA	M_Hunting_RILIDE_InjectJS_3	Detects JavaScr files that RILIDE in
YARA	M_Win_BRAINLINK_AdvancedInstaller_1	Detects BRAINLI
YARA	M_Utility_RILIDE_Manifest_1	Detects RILIDE Manifest
YARA	M_Utility_RILIDE_JS_1	Detects RILIDE JavaScr files
YARA	M_Utility_RILIDE_Background_1	Detects RILIDE backgro JavaScr files
YARA	M_Hunting_RILIDE_CRX_1	Detects RILIDE C

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YARA	M_Win_BRAINSTORM_1	Detects BRAINST
YARA	M_Win_BRAINFOG_1	Detects BRAINFC
YARA	M_Hunting_BRAINFOG_1	Detects suspecte BRAINFC samples

Conclusion

While hunting for this chain of adversary methodologies, Mandiant uncovered numerous new malware families and investigations. The adversary's effort to remain undetected by chaining methodologies has come with mixed results, as many of the samples discussed in this post have very low detection ratings. However, with this new research, detecting these methodologies should be more accessible and further expand the defender's hunting and detection repertoire.

Acknowledgments

This content would not have been possible without the assistance of Connor McLaughlin, Pepe Torrijos, Matthew Dunwoody, Anders Vejlby, and Nick Simonian.

Appendix A: Detections

```
    meta:
            author = "Mandiant"
            md5 = "f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1"
            description = "Hunting for non-CRX files with e

    strings:
            $a1 = "_metadata" ascii
            $a2 = "manifest.json" ascii
            $a3 = "verified_contents.json" ascii
            $s1 = "_locales" ascii
            $s2 = "messages.json" ascii
            $f = /[a-z0-9A-Z_-]+\.(html|htm|css|js)/ ascii
            $pk = {50 4B 03 04}

    condition:
            (((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)
            (((2 of ($a*)) and $f) or ((1 of ($a*)) and ($f
            $pk and
            (#pk >1) and
            (for any i in (1..#pk) : ($a2 at @pk[i]+30)) an
            (for any j in (1..#pk) : ($f at @pk[j]+30))
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_Embedded_Chromium_CRXandLNK_1
{
    meta:
            author = "jared.wilson"
            md5 = "f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1"
            description = "Hunting for non-CRX files with e

    strings:
            $a1 = "_metadata" ascii
            $a2 = "manifest.json" ascii
            $a3 = "verified_contents.json" ascii
            $s1 = "_locales" ascii
```

```
$pk = {50 4B 03 04}
$load = "--load-extension" ascii wide
$lnk1 = "Google Chrome.lnk" ascii wide


condition:
    (((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)
    (((2 of ($a*)) and $f) or ((1 of ($a*)) and ($f
    $pk and
    (#pk >1) and
    (for any i in (1..#pk) : ($a2 at @pk[i]+30)) an
    (for any j in (1..#pk) : ($f at @pk[j]+30)) and
    ($load or $lnk1)
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_AdvancedInstaller_LNK_1
{
    meta:
        author = "Mandiant"
        md5 = "2782af385665c765807ed887d4bacf36"
        description = "Hunting for Advanced Installer

    strings:
        $a1 = "Advanced Installer" wide
        $a2 = "Advanced Installer" ascii
        $a3 = "https://www.advancedinstaller.com" ascii
        $l1 = "Google Chrome.lnk"
        $l2 = "Brave.lnk"
        $p1 = "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Progra
        $p2 = "\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Quick La
        $p3 = "\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Quick La
        $p4 = "\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Quick La
        $p5 = "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Progra
        $p6 = "\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Quick La
        $r = /\$[^\.]+\.CreateShortcut\([^\)]+\)/
```

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```
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_LNKEngine_LoadExtension_1
{
    meta:
            author = "Mandiant"
            description = "Hunting rule that looks for file
            md5 = "30abf9ca1bb792eb5edd8b033c010979"

    strings:
            $r1 = /(chrome|msedge|opera|brave)[^\r\n]+--loa
            $s1 = "chrome" ascii wide
            $s2 = "--load-extension=" ascii wide

    condition:
            (uint32(0) == 0x0000004c) and filesize < 50KB a
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_LNKEngine_LoadExtension_Temp_1
{
     meta:
            author = "Mandiant"
            description = "Hunting rule that looks for files
            md5 = "30abf9ca1bb792eb5edd8b033c010979"

    strings:
            $r1 = /(chrome|msedge|opera|brave)[^\r\n]+--load
            $s2 = "--load-extension=" ascii wide

    condition:
            (uint32(0) == 0x0000004c) and filesize < 50KB an
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_ArchiveEngine_CAB_Extension_1
{
```

```
        description = "Looking for CAB containing what
        md5 = "de283dfb9c88dbb6d455ca4b31c57240"


    strings:
        $f1 = "manifest.json" nocase
        $f2 = ".js" nocase
        $f3 = ".htm" nocase
        $f4 = ".png" nocase


    condition:
        filesize < 1MB and uint32be(0) == 0x4D534346 an
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_FileWrite_Manifest_Temp_1
{
    meta:
        author = "Mandiant"
        md5 = "f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1"
        description = "Hunting for cases where a proces
        severity = "Medium"

  events:
        $e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
        ($e.target.file.names = "manifest.json" OR $e.t
$e.target.file.full_path = /[a-zA-Z]{1}:\\Users\\[^\\]+\

    condition:
        $e
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_Process_Chromium_LoadExtension_1
{
    meta:
        author = "Mandiant"
        md5 = "f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1"
```

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```
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_OPEN"
$e.target.process.command_line = /(chrome|brave|msedge|
$e.target.process.file.full_path = /(chrome|brave|msedge
    condition:
$e
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_FileWrite_Chrome_LNK_1
{
   meta:
        author = "Mandiant"
        md5 = "f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1"
        description = "Hunting for cases where the LNK
        severity = "Medium"
   events:
        $e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
        $e.target.file.full_path = /Google Chrome\.lnk$
        ($e.target.file.full_path = `C:\ProgramData\Mic
        ($e.principal.process.file.full_path = /[a-zA-Z
   condition:
        $e
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_FileWrite_CRXandLNK_1
{
   meta:
        author = "Mandiant"
        md5 = "f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1"
        description = "Hunting for cases where a proces
        severity = "Medium"
   events:
        $e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
        $e2.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
        $md5 = $e1.principal.process.file.md5
```

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```
        $e1.principal.hostname = $e2.principal.hostname
        $e1.principal.hostname != ""
        $e1.principal.process.pid = $e2.principal.proce
        $e1.principal.process.pid != ""
        (((($e1.principal.file.file_type = "FILE_TYPE_(
    match:
        $md5 over 1m
    condition:
        $e1 and $e2
}
```

```
rule M_Hunting_FileWrite_ManifestandLNK_1 {
    meta:
        author = "Mandiant"
        md5 = "f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1"
        description = "Hunting for cases where a proces
        severity = "Medium"
    events:
        $e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
        $e2.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
        $md5 = $e1.principal.process.file.md5
        $e1.principal.process.file.md5 = $e2.principal.
        $e1.principal.process.file.md5 != ""
        $e1.principal.hostname = $e2.principal.hostname
        $e1.principal.hostname != ""
        $e1.principal.process.pid = $e2.principal.proce
        $e1.principal.process.pid != ""
        ((($e1.target.file.full_path = /\\manifest\.jsc
    match:
        $md5 over 1m
    condition:
        $e1 and $e2
}
```

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```
rule M_Hunting_RILIDE_InjectJS_1
{
    meta:
            author = "Mandiant"
            md5 = "9fe5b99b20bc91995b81eddd917bff50"
            description = "Hunting for the code that RILIDE

    strings:
            $banner = "https://public.bnbstatic.com/image/
            $s1 = "[Bybit]Withdrawal Request" ascii
            $s2 = "[Bybit] Authorize New Device" ascii
            $a1 = "created a withdrawal request"
            $a2 = "Authorize New Device You recently attemp
            $a3 = "Please check your withdrawal address car
            $a4 = "Verification Code Of Withdrawal"
            $a6 = "Withdrawal Verification Code"
            $a7 = "Verification Code Of Authorization"
            $a8 = "initiate this withdrawal or the address
            $a9 = "Authorize New Device You recently attemp
            $a10 = "Confirm your new withdrawal address"
            $a11 = "A new withdrawal address was just added
            $f1 = "div:contains(\"Binance\"), div:contains(
            $f2 = "binance()" fullword
            $f3 = "div:contains(\"Bybit\"), div:contains(\"
            $f4 = "bybit()" fullword
            $f5 = "div:contains(\"Huobi\"), div:contains(\"
            $f6 = "huobi()" fullword
            $f7 = "div:contains(\"Okx\"), div:contains(\"ok
            $f8 = "okx()" fullword
            $f9 = "div:contains(\"Kraken\"), div:contains(\
            $f10 = "kraken()" fullword

    condition:
```

```
rule M_Hunting_RILIDE_InjectJS_2
{
    meta:
            author = "Mandiant"
            md5 = "6e426758f184b5a942428731b749b000"
            description = "Hunting for the code that RILIDE

    strings:
            $anchor = "const DOMAIN = 'https://extenision-a
            $v1 = "exchangeRates" ascii fullword
            $v2 = "supportedAssets" ascii fullword
            $v3 = "supportedAccounts" ascii fullword
            $v4 = "currencySymbol" ascii fullword
            $v5 = "userId" ascii fullword
            $v6 = "settings" ascii fullword
            $v7 = "extensions" ascii fullword
            $s1 = "Confirm settings change"
            $s2 = "2-step verification"
            $s3 = "This extra step is to make sure it's rea
            $s4 = "Enter the 2-step verification code we te
            $s5 = "Enter the 2-step verification code from
            $s6 = "Didn't receive the SMS?"
            $s7 = "Re-send SMS"
            $u1 = "${DOMAIN}/settings"
            $u2 = "${DOMAIN}/exchange/get-address?type=${ty
            $u3 = "${DOMAIN}/exchange/create-account"
            $u4 = "${DOMAIN}/exchange/set-balance"
            $u5 = "${DOMAIN}/exchange/set-all-balances"
            $u6 = "${DOMAIN}/exchange/set-withdraw"
            $p1 = "password = localStorage.getItem('coinbas
            $p2 = "email = localStorage.getItem('coinbase_u
            $f1 = "getExchangeRates" fullword
            $f2 = "getSupportedAssets" fullword
            $f3 = "getAccounts" fullword
```

```
       filesize < 1MB and (($anchor and (8 of them))
}
```

Appendix B: Indicators

Indicator	Refere
9984af7a440c39b7ac11a68f2da48137	BRAIN
1af84663df057aee4934abe717938b33	BRAIN WScrip
f2f85d38b91f582a83388690fdc45284	BRAIN WScrip
2782af385665c765807ed887d4bacf36	BRAIN
de283dfb9c88dbb6d455ca4b31c57240	BRAIN CAB
6b2e6d6650116d372ca8c47af08ca8fa	BRAIN PowerS Script
0a4f321c903a7fbc59566918c12aca09	BRAIN
34eea751fcbf4ee8d44977adb4742d93	BRAIN
69a1c37a796dd3ed81785c1995f0973f	BRAIN

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ea7496d6fb96e3c1e00a1d5f501f6724	BRAIN
f1c21a69ed9f85e12d58ef0f5ac5c9b1	BRAIN
3e181d794e62af5c54d4df5517766af8	PUFFP
70700ae977a0f3ca6a331842d8c103c9	PUFFP
770dd49f7340003d9c66b58cd793dada	PUFFP
f483821b0650653e4da643b212025709	PUFFP
0fc2bd7320c2edfd7985b87fc8cb1f96	RILID
223e499f6ba6ebdacf1dcff96008635b	RILID
395bef4512a3743299a45d4f9b74a2ee	RILID
4f506058ab8bfc5746308a95e34dce85	RILID
5133177ac4950cf772d2f729bb0622ec	RILID
b7ad9777e3166628abe11dd043ddfb7e	RILID
bb8323247baad2d592e7ad1896935dd1	RILID
d56d195ebfaea6d97cccddcf3823be24	RILID
4724261ef04e2301ecc9ac994b4b346e	RILID HTML

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	RILID Inject Script
219070a2502a47a50dd3df5c804074b4	RILID Inject Script
3235e27576dd4e81f1c5986212ec2b78	RILID Inject Script
41a5f1c5d032bcac16c903681674872c	RILID Inject Script
6e426758f184b5a942428731b749b000	RILID Inject Script
94c16b8f9236ab88bb0bca60c4399665	RILID Inject Script
9e5f43b2dc1606e27fa0cfdfb4e363d2	RILID Inject Script
9fe5b99b20bc91995b81eddd917bff50	RILID Inject Script
d41b7138ad25d0401acf3298d0110342	RILID Inject Script

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d54fa225b07298ec34be872cd4ebf4ae	RILID JavaSc
19c859513f67400f3563e656f27df1c0	RILID
30abf9ca1bb792eb5edd8b033c010979	RILID
baee9ba0b94ea1e2b2e566fc8a615554	RILID Manife
f31e9238593b34b390ab8faf755e6ede	RILID Manife
3bf971fcaa2a3bd321f4e0b6864cb86a	Templ XLL
ac00b947ca51d0e71b4c792f1646e4e0	Templ XLL
028b2f15560b0f80514cf0a23ae77a43	VB Ma
0a4834d3da05a1d0b2f3a0c13f352a0a	VB Ma
89c34309aca3214c3ce7c72b407570e8	VB Ma
172.67.192[.]61	C2 A Record
89.185.85[.]144	C2 A Record

146.70.79[.]75	Open Direct
104.168.167[.]25	Open Direct
telegromcn[.]org	BRAIN In The Wild D
nch-software[.]info	Open Direct Domair
vceilinichego[.]ru	Open Direct Domair C2
2022-blanks[.]site	Regis Org Pi Domair
finandy[.]info	Regis Org Pi Domair
finandy[.]online	Regis Org Pi Domair

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	Domain
kz-smartbank[.]com	Regis Org Pi Domain
mareux[.]online	Regis Org Pi Domain
mmarx[.]quest	Regis Org Pi Domain
okxsat[.]xyz	Regis Org Pi Domain
pr-tracker[.]online	Regis Org Pi Domain
qivvi-3[.]click	Regis Org Pi Domain
serienjunkies[.]us	Regis Org Pi Domain
vse-blanki[.]online	Regis Org Pi Domain

extenision-app[.]com	RILID
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/1/2.exe	Open Direct BRAINS Downlo
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/1/install-win64-11.5.8_en-US.exe	Open Direct BRAINS Downlo
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/2.exe	Open Direct BRAINS Downlo
hxxps://nch-software[.]info/1/2.exe	Open Direct BRAINS Downlo
hxxps://nch-software[.]info/1/install-win64-11.5.8_en-US.exe	Open Direct BRAINS Downlo
hxxps://panger-top[.]click/1/2.exe	Open Direct BRAINS Downlo

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11.5.8_en-US.exe	BRAINS Downlo
hxxp://nch-software[.]info/1/2.exe	Open Direct URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/	Open Direct URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/admin_cp/	Open Direct URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/	Open Direct URL
hxxp://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/	RILID URL
hxxp://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/get-urls	RILID URL
hxxp://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/init	RILID URL
hxxp://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/set-urls	RILID URL

| URL	Type
hxxps://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine	RILID URL
hxxps://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/	RILID URL
hxxps://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/check-tasks	RILID URL
hxxps://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/get-urls	RILID URL
hxxps://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/init	RILID URL
hxxps://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/set-tasks	RILID URL
hxxps://vceilinichego[.]ru/api/machine/set-urls	RILID URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/light.dotm	Templ Open Direct URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/light.pub	Templ Open Direct URL

hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/light.xlsm	Direct URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/x64.xll	Templ Open Direct URL
hxxps://146.70.79[.]75/templates/x86.xll	Templ Open Direct URL

Posted in [Threat Intelligence](#)—[Security & Identity](#)

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
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