

Detecting Tor use with LogPoint

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On July 1, 2020, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), along with contributions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), released an [advisory](#) highlighting risks associated with Tor, including technical details and mitigation recommendations. CISA and the FBI recommend that organizations assess their risk of compromise via Tor and take appropriate mitigations to block or closely monitor network traffic to and from Tor exit nodes.

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Tor uses the Onion Routing Protocol to obfuscate the user's identity from anyone seeking to monitor online activity. Tor uses a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers known as Tor relays, which obfuscates the source and destination of a network connection. Anyone conducting monitoring or analysis will only see the traffic coming from the Tor exit node and will not be able to determine the original IP address of the request. Tor also has a browser-based on Firefox ESR that aims to make all users look the same, making it difficult for anyone to be fingerprinted based on their browser and device information.

Although Tor's primary purpose is to protect its users' privacy, it is increasingly used by threat actors to hide their malware's network traffic. In 2013, Trend Micro blogged about the [Mevede](#) malware using Tor to hide their C&C servers. Kaspersky also noted that a few banking malware families, such as 64-bit [Zeus](#) Trojans, use Tor connections. There are also some ransomware variants like [Onion](#) that use Tor to hide their C&C servers. To make matters simple for malware to access a website hosted in the Tor, free services like [Tor2web](#) enable anyone to connect to an onion site with any regular browser. Just by appending the .to extension to almost any onion link makes it accessible from the clearnet. This way, the malware doesn't require the bells and whistles of a full-blown Tor client.

[FireEye](#) has observed that threat actors have used Tor to communicate with their command and control (C&C) servers. In 2015, FireEye reported that the APT side. The incident involved a sophisticated group of threat actors using Tor to communicate with their C&C servers in their enterprise.

Malicious Tor use

Adversaries use Tor to hide their network traffic and to communicate with their C&C servers. Some of the techniques used by adversaries include:

- Initial Access
 - Exploitation of Remote Services
- Command and Control
 - Custom Command and Control Protocol [T1094]
 - Custom Cryptographic Protocol [T1024]
 - Multi-hop Proxy [T1188]
 - Multilayer Encryption [T1079]
 - Standard Application Layer Protocol [T1071]
- Exfiltration [TA0010]
- Impact [TA0040]
 - Data Encryption for Impact [T1486]
 - Endpoint Denial of Service [T1499]
 - Network Denial of Service [T1498]

LogPoint supports a wide range of [MITRE ATT&CK analytics](#). We recommend businesses keep up-to-date with our alert rules to increase incident detection capabilities.

LogPoint detection to Tor use

On the detection side, enterprises can detect Tor use by leveraging the various network, endpoint and security appliance logs. According to CISA, using an indicator-based approach, network defenders can leverage SIEMs and other log analysis platforms to flag suspicious activities involving known Tor exit nodes' IP addresses. With a behavior-based approach, blue teams can uncover suspicious Tor activity by searching for Tor client software and protocols' operational patterns and protocols, for example, port use commonly affiliated with Tor.

Tor use, both malicious or legitimate, is easy to detect using LogPoint. Firewalls, proxy servers and endpoint logs can pinpoint the endpoint from where the Tor connection originates.



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Detection from firewalls and proxy servers

At the very least, it is required to maintain a list named TOR_ENTRY_IPS, which contains up-to-date IP addresses of known Tor entry (also called guard) nodes. Such a list can be periodically fetched from many [sites](#) with additional filtering to select only the guard nodes. An alternative is to create a list named TOR_IPS that contains all the Tor node's IP addresses.

Egress Filtering for Tor Connections

```
source_address IN HOMENET destination_address IN TOR_IPS
```

Egress Filtering for Tor Ports

```
source_address IN HOMENET destination_address IN TOR_IPS
```

Tor2web detection

The following query can detect any use of the Tor2web service for connecting to onion sites.

```
(resource="*.onion.*" OR url="*.onion.*")
```

At the Windows endpoint, DNS queries can be monitored for detecting any Tor2web use.

```
norm_id=WindowsSysmon label=DNS label=Query query="*.onion.*"
```

Detection from IDS/IPS

IDS/IPS, such as Snort or Suricata, are also capable of detecting Tor use if the required [rules](#) are activated.

```
(norm_id=Snort rule_id=2000000000)
```

Detection

Tor client execut

```
norm_id=WindowsSysmon label=Process label=Create image="*.tor.exe" command IN ["*-HiddenServiceDir*", "*-HiddenServicePort*"]
```

Use of the Tor br

```
norm_id=WindowsSysmon label=Process label=Create image="*.tor.exe" command IN ["*-HiddenServiceDir*", "*-HiddenServicePort*"]
```

Installation of th

```
norm_id=WindowsSysmon label=Process label=Create image="*.tor.exe" command IN ["*-HiddenServiceDir*", "*-HiddenServicePort*"]
```

Network connection logs from Sysmon can detect Tor use from the endpoint.

```
norm_id=WindowsSysmon label=Network label=Connect destination_port IN [443, 8443] source_address IN HOMENET destination_address IN TOR_IPS
```

Windows Filtering Platform logs also help detect HTTP proxy listening for Tor connections.

```
norm_id=WinServer event_id=5154 source_port=9050
```

Windows's native AppLocker can be used to block the execution of Tor. This query will detect any instance of Tor execution blocked by AppLocker.

```
norm_id=WinServer event_id=8004 event_source=Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker rule="*.tor.exe"
```

A variant of ZeuS maintained a torexe utility inside its body, which it later injects into svchost.exe. In the ZueS variant, it is the svchost.exe that is running torexe. Similar behaviors can be detected by looking at the execution of Windows's native processes having command lines options of torexe.

```
norm_id=WindowsSysmon label="Process" label=Create image="*.svchost.exe" command IN ["*-HiddenServiceDir*", "*-HiddenServicePort*"]
```

Sometimes, malware like ChewBacca drops torexe in the user's temp directory and runs it with a default listing on localhost:9050.

```
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=11 path="*\\Temp\\" file="tor.exe"
```

In conclusion

In the end, we strongly advise that administrators use Tor detection capabilities within their deployed WAFs, firewalls, IPS/IDS, etc. Sinkholing of DNS queries can be done to prevent the use of services like Tor2web. However, sophisticated threat actors may leverage additional anonymization technologies—such as VPNs and Tor bridges to circumvent detection and blocking. Ultimately, each entity must consider its risk tolerance level when determining which risk mitigation approach to use for Tor.


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
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