Local PowerShell Execution



Threat Hunter Playbook

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
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Technical Context

Hypothesis

Offensive Tradecraft

Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Therefore, it is important to understand the basic artifacts left when PowerShell is used in your environment.

Adversaries might be leveraging PowerShell to execute code within my environment

Pre-Recorded Security Datasets

Metadata	Value
docs	https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/execution/SDWIN-190518182022.html
link	https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OTRF/Security- Datasets/master/datasets/atomic/windows/execution/host/empire_launcher_vbs.zip

Download Dataset

```
import requests
from zipfile import ZipFile
from io import BytesIO

url = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OTRF/Security-Datasets/master/dataser
zipFileRequest = requests.get(url)
zipFile = ZipFile(BytesIO(zipFileRequest.content))
datasetJSONPath = zipFile.extract(zipFile.namelist()[0])
```

Read Dataset

```
import pandas as pd
from pandas.io import json

df = json.read_json(path_or_buf=datasetJSONPath, lines=True)
```

Analytics

A few initial ideas to explore your data and validate your detection logic:

Analytic I

Within the classic PowerShell log, event ID 400 indicates when a new PowerShell host process has started. You can filter on powershell.exe as a host application if you want to or leave it without a filter to capture every single PowerShell host.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Powershell	Windows PowerShell	Application host started	400
Powershell	Microsoft-Windows- PowerShell/Operational	User started Application host	4103

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`, Hostname
FROM dataTable
WHERE (Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" OR Channel = "Windows AND (EventID = 400 OR EventID = 4103)
```

Pandas Query

Analytic II

Look for non-interactive powershell session might be a sign of PowerShell being executed by another application in the background.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Process	Microsoft-Windows-Security-	Process created Process	4688

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`, Hostname, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName
FROM dataTable
WHERE LOWER(Channel) = "security"

AND EventID = 4688

AND NewProcessName LIKE "%powershell.exe"

AND NOT ParentProcessName LIKE "%explorer.exe"
```

Pandas Query

```
(
df[['@timestamp','Hostname','NewProcessName','ParentProcessName']]

[(df['Channel'].str.lower() == 'security')
    & (df['EventID'] == 4688)
    & (df['NewProcessName'].str.lower().str.endswith('powershell.exe', na=Fal:
    & (~df['ParentProcessName'].str.lower().str.endswith('explorer.exe', na=Fil)
    .head()
)
```

Analytic III

Look for non-interactive powershell session might be a sign of PowerShell being executed by another application in the background.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Process	Microsoft-Windows-	Process created	1
	Sysmon/Operational	Process	

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`, Hostname, Image, ParentImage
FROM dataTable
WHERE Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
AND EventID = 1
AND Image LIKE "%powershell.exe"
AND NOT ParentImage LIKE "%explorer.exe"
```

Pandas Query

```
(
df[['@timestamp','Hostname','Image','ParentImage']]

[(df['Channel'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational')
    & (df['EventID'] == 1)
    & (df['Image'].str.lower().str.endswith('powershell.exe', na=False))
    & (~df['ParentImage'].str.lower().str.endswith('explorer.exe', na=False))
]
.head()
)
```

Analytic IV

Monitor for processes loading PowerShell DLL *system.management.automation*.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Module	Microsoft-Windows- Sysmon/Operational	Process loaded DII	7

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`, Hostname, Image, ImageLoaded
FROM dataTable
WHERE Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
AND EventID = 7
AND (lower(Description) = "system.management.automation" OR lower(ImageLoaded)
```

Pandas Query

```
(
df[['@timestamp','Hostname','Image','ImageLoaded']]

[(df['Channel'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational')
    & (df['EventID'] == 7)
    & (
        (df['Description'].str.lower() == 'system.management.automation')
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.lower().str.contains('.*system.management.automation')
        | head()
)
```

Analytic V

Monitoring for PSHost* pipes is another interesting way to find PowerShell execution.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Named Pipe	Microsoft-Windows- Sysmon/Operational	Process created Pipe	17

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`, Hostname, Image, PipeName
FROM dataTable
WHERE Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    AND EventID = 17
    AND lower(PipeName) LIKE "\\\pshost%"
```

Pandas Query

```
(
  df[['@timestamp','Hostname','Image','PipeName']]

[(df['Channel'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational')
    & (df['EventID'] == 17)
    & (df['PipeName'].str.lower().str.startswith('\pshost', na=False))
]
.head()
)
```

Analytic VI

The PowerShell Named Pipe IPC event will indicate the name of the PowerShell AppDomain that started. Sign of PowerShell execution.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Powershell	Microsoft-Windows- PowerShell/Operational	Application domain	53504

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`, Hostname, Message
FROM dataTable
WHERE Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
AND EventID = 53504
```

Pandas Query

```
(
df[['@timestamp','Hostname','Message']]

[(df['Channel'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational')
     & (df['EventID'] == 53504)
]
.head()
)
```

Known Bypasses

False Positives

Hunter Notes

- Explore the data produced in your environment with the analytics above and document what normal looks like from a PowerShell perspective.
- If execution of PowerShell happens all the time in your environment, I suggest to
 categorize the data you collect by business unit to build profiles and be able to filter
 out potential noise.
- You can also stack the values of the command line arguments being used. You can hash the command line arguments too and stack the values.

Hunt Output

Туре	Link
Sigma Rule	https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/sysmon_powershell_execution_pipe.yml
Sigma Rule	https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_non_interactive_powershell.yml

References

- https://github.com/darkoperator/Presentations/blob/master/PSConfEU 2019
 Tracking PowerShell Usage.pdf
- https://posts.specterops.io/abusing-powershell-desired-state-configuration-for-lateral-movement-ca42ddbe6f06

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