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Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script



Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. This rule detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

- winlogbeat-*
- · logs-windows.powershell*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002/
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/master/data/module_source/credel Mimikatz_ps1
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access

Tags:

- · Domain: Endpoint
- · OS: Windows
- · Use Case: Threat Detection
- · Tactic: Credential Access
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: PowerShell Logs

Version: 210

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Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide



Triage and analysis

Investigating Mimikatz PowerShell Activity

Mimikatz is an open-source tool used to collect, decrypt, and/or use cached credentials. This tool is commonly abused by adversaries during the post-compromise stage where adversaries have gained an initial foothold on an endpoint and are looking to elevate privileges and seek out additional authentication objects such as tokens/hashes/credentials that can then be used to move laterally and pivot across a network.

This rule looks for PowerShell scripts that load mimikatz in memory, like Invoke-Mimikataz, which are used to dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Any activity triggered from this rule should be treated with high priority as it typically represents an active adversary.

More information about Mimikatz components and how to detect/prevent them can be found on ADSecurity.

Possible investigation steps

- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes.
 Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Invoke-Mimitakz and alike scripts heavily use other capabilities covered by other detections described in the "Related Rules" section.
- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host.
- Examine network and security events in the environment to identify potential lateral movement using compromised credentials.

False positive analysis

• This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.

Related rules

https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.html#potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script

- PowerShell PSReflect Script 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192a2d8-eed98afc766a
- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4de6183431d0d
- Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected ebb200e8-adf0-43f8-a0bb-4ee5b5d852c6
- Modification of WDigest Security Provider d703a5af-d5b0-43bd-8ddb-7a5d500b7da5

Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to
 ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts
 and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and
 web services.
- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
- Validate that cleartext passwords are disabled in memory for use with WDigest.
- Look into preventing access to LSASS using capabilities such as LSA protection or antivirus/EDR tools that provide this capability.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).

Setup



Setup

The PowerShell Script Block Logging logging policy must be configured (Enable).

Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:

```
Computer Configuration >
Administrative Templates >
Windows PowerShell >
Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
```

Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:

reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogg:

Rule query

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```
event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
powershell.file.script_block_text:(
   (DumpCreds and
   DumpCerts) or
   "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" or
   ("crypto::certificates" and
   "CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE")
)
```

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM


- · Tactic:
 - · Name: Credential Access
 - ID: TA0006
 - Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
- · Technique:
 - Name: OS Credential Dumping
 - ID: T1003
 - Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
- Sub-technique:
 - Name: LSASS Memory
 - ID: T1003.001
 - Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/

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Potential JAVA/JNDI Exploitation Attempt »

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