

```
25
         mitre_attack:
26
           execution:
             - T1204.002 - User Execution - Malicious File
27
28
             - T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
29
           defense evasion:
             - T1218.010 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Regsvr32
30
           detection:
31
32
             ideas: >
33
               - monitor Office applications spawning WMI command-line (WMIC.exe) utility.
                 Note: add more office applications to the rules logic of your choice.
34
35
             telemetry:
36
               process_create:
                 - Windows EID 4688
37
38
                 - Sysmon EID 1
39

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

             rules: >
40
41
               - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR Proce
                 AND CreatorProcessName:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
42
               - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:"\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR CommandLine:"*wmic *" OR Or
43
                 AND ParentImage:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
44
             ideas: >
45
               - monitor WMI "Win32_Process::Create" command execution by Office applications processes.
46
                 Note: add more office applications to the rule logic of your choice.
47
             telemetry:
48
49
               wmi execution:
                 - EDR (Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity ETW)
50
51
             rules: >
52
               - Channel:EDR AND EventType:WMIExecution AND Image:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\
             ideas: >
53
               - Excel called wmic to finally proxy execute regsvr32 with the payload. An attacker wanted
54
                 But we have command-line in the event which allow us to "restore" this suspicous parent-c
55
                 Monitor process creation with "wmic process call create" and LOLBins in command-line with
56
57
                 Note: add more LOLBins to the rules logic of your choice.
58
             telemetry:
59
               process_create:
                 - Windows EID 4688
60
                 - Sysmon EID 1
61

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

62
63
             rules: >
               - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR Proce
64
                 AND ProcessCommandLine:(*regsvr32* OR *rundl132* OR *msiexec* OR *mshta* OR *verclsid*) A
65
               - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:"\\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR CommandLine:"*wmic *" OR Or
66
                 AND CommandLine:*process* AND CommandLine:*call* AND CommandLine:*create* AND CommandLine
67
                 AND ParentImage:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
68
             ideas: >
69
               - monitor LOLBins process creations by Office applications.
70
```

```
Note: add more LOLBins and Office applications to the rules logic of your choice.
 71
 72
              telemetry:
 73
                process_create:
 74
                  - Windows EID 4688
 75
                  - Sysmon EID 1
 76

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

 77
              rules: >
 78
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND NewProcessName:("\\regsvr32.exe" OR "\\rund
 79
                  AND CreatorProcessName:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND Image:("\\regsvr32.exe" OR "\\rundl132.exe" OR "\\msiexe
 80
 81
                  AND ParentImage:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
 82
                - monitor LOLBins process creations with Wmiprvse parent process.
 83
 84
                  Note: add more LOLBins to the rules logic of your choice. FPs are possible here, but some
 85
              telemetry:
                process create:
 86
 87
                  - Windows EID 4688
 88
                  - Sysmon EID 1
 89
                  EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)
 90
              rules: >
 91
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND NewProcessName:("\\regsvr32.exe" OR "\\rund
 92
                  AND CreatorProcessName:("\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe")
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND Image:("\regsvr32.exe" OR "\rundl132.exe" OR "\msiexe
 93
 94
                  AND ParentImage:("\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe")
 95
              ideas: >
96
                - monitor executable and script files creation by Office applications, use files extensions
 97
                  Note: add more files extensions/magic bytes to the rules logic of your choice.
98
              telemetry:
99
                file_create:
100
                  - Sysmon EID 11
101
                  - EDR (minifilter)
                file_rename:
102
103
                  - EDR (minifilter)
              rules: >
104
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:11 AND Image:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.
105
106
                  AND TargetFilename:(*.exe OR *.dll OR *.ocx OR *.com OR *.ps1 OR *.vbs OR *.sys OR *.bat
107
                - Channel:EDR AND EventType:(FileCreate OR FileRename) AND Image:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\exe
                  AND (Filename:(*.exe OR *.dll OR *.ocx OR *.com OR *.ps1 OR *.vbs OR *.sys OR *.bat OR *.
108
109
          quote: >
110
            - "This (MS Excel) then made a network request to download a file from this URL"
111
          mitre_attack:
            defense_evasion:
112
113
              - T1218.010 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Regsvr32
114
            detection:
              ideas: >
115
116
                - MS Excel process initiated an external network connection of we try to monitor such acti
```

Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329 Soding

TIS EXCEL PROCESS INTERFACES ON EXECUTION INCOMENCE CONTINUES FOR IN WE CITY OF MONTHER SACTIONS instead monitor outbound network connections initiated by Regsvr32.exe (not directly relative to the connection of the c 117

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7	les/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sc	odino

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```
579
                  - EDR (minifilter)
                file rename:
580
581
                  - EDR (minifilter)
582
                file_delete:
                  - EDR (minifilter)
583
584
              rules: >
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\rclone.exe" OR ProcessCo
585
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (OriginalFileName:"rclone.exe" OR Company:""*rclone\.org
586
                - Channel: EDR AND EventType: (FileCreate OR FileRename OR FileDelete) AND (OriginalFileName:
587
                  AND NOT FilePath:"\\rclone.exe"
588
589
              ideas: >
590
                - monitor Rclone tool execution with suspicious command-lines.
591
              telemetry:
592
                process_create:
593
                  - Windows EID 4688
                  - Sysmon EID 1
594
595

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

596
              rules: >
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\rclone.exe" OR ProcessCo
597
                  AND ProcessCommandLine.keyword:/.*\\\.*\\(ADMIN|IPC|C)\$.*/ AND ProcessCommandLine:(*htt
598
599
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:"\\rclone.exe" OR CommandLine:"*rclone *" OR Orig
600
                  AND CommandLine.keyword:/.*\\\.*\\(ADMIN|IPC|C)\\$.*/ AND CommandLine:(*http* OR *ftp*)
601
                - monitor system processes execution from untypical paths. Add more executables of your cho
602
603
              telemetry:
604
                process_create:
                  - Windows EID 4688
605
606
                  - Sysmon EID 1
607

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

608
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND NewProcessName:("\\svchost.exe" OR "\\gpupc
609
                  AND NOT NewProcessName:("C\:\\Windows\\System32\\" OR "C\:\\Windows\\Sys\WOW64\\")
610
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND Image:("\\svchost.exe" OR "\\gpupdate.exe" OR "\\taskhos
611
                  AND NOT Image:("C\:\\Windows\\System32\\" OR "C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\")
612
613
          auote: >
614
            - "For the final actions, the threat actors dropped a ransomware executable on the domain contr
615
616
            - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/main/TTPs/Defense%20Evasion/T1197%
          quote: >
617
618
            - "The -smode flag was used with the ransomware executable to set the system to reboot into Saf
619
            - "bootcfg /raw /a /safeboot:network /id 1 (pre-Vista)"
```

```
- "bcdedit /set {current} sateboot network" (vista+)"
620
621
            - "bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot"
            - "REG ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce /v "*UndoSB" /t REG SZ /d "bd
622
623
          mitre_attack:
624
            defense_evasion:
              - T1562.001 - Impair Defenses - Disable or Modify Tools
625
            detection:
626
              ideas: >
627
                - monitor bootcfg/bcdedit tools execution with "safeboot" option. Multiple alerts of this r
628

    monitor writing bootcfg/bcdedit executables to Windows registry run keys. Add more regist

629
630
            telemetry:
              process_create:
631
                - Windows EID 4688
632
                - Sysmon EID 1
633

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

634
              registry_value_set:
635
                - Windows EID 4657 (SACL)
636
                - Sysmon EID 13
637

    EDR (CmRegisterCallback/Ex, Registry API)

638
            rules: >
639
              - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:("\\bcdedit.exe" OR "\\bootcf
640
              - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:("\\bcdedit.exe" OR "\\bootcfg.exe") OR CommandLine
641
                OR Description: ("Boot Configuration Data Editor" OR "BootCfg*")) AND CommandLine: *safeboot*
642
643
              - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4657 AND ObjectName:"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*'
              - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:13 AND TargetObject:"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*" AND Detai
644
              - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:("\\powershell.exe" OR "\\pws
645
                AND ProcessCommandLine:("*Set-ItemProperty*" OR "* sp *" OR "*add*") AND ProcessCommandLine
646
              - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:("\\powershell.exe" OR "\\pwsh.exe" OR "\\reg.exe")
647
                OR Description:("Windows PowerShell" OR "Registry Console Tool")) AND CommandLine:("*Set-It
648
              - Channel:Windows-Powershell AND EventID:400 AND HostApplication:("*powershell *" OR "*pwsh *
649
                AND HostApplication: "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*" AND HostApplication: ("*bcdedit *" OF
650
651
652
```