
$\label{lem:complex} \textbf{detection-rules/rules/integrations/aws/initial\_access\_via\_system\_manager.toml at main \cdot elastic/detection-rules \cdot \textbf{GitHub} - 31/10/2024 \ 09:13 \ \text{https://github.com/elastic/detection-}$ 

rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/initial\_access\_via\_system\_manager.toml



 $\label{lem:complex} \textbf{detection-rules/rules/integrations/aws/initial\_access\_via\_system\_manager.toml at main \cdot elastic/detection-rules \cdot \textbf{GitHub} - 31/10/2024 \ 09:13 \ \text{https://github.com/elastic/detection-}$ 

rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/initial access via system manager.toml

```
27
       note = """## Triage and analysis
28
       ### Investigating AWS Execution via System Manager
29
30
       Amazon EC2 Systems Manager is a management service designed to help users automatically collect sof
31
32
       This rule looks for the execution of commands and scripts using System Manager. Note that the actual
33
34
       #### Possible investigation steps
35
36
       - Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of ac
37
       - Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
38
39
       - Validate that the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator acti
       - Investigate the commands or scripts using host-level visibility.
40
       - Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
41
           - Do they look normal for the calling user?
42
           - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your acco
43
           - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the
44
       - Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences i
45
       - Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
46
       - Check if this operation was approved and performed according to the organization's change managem
47
       - If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking
48
49
       ### False positive analysis
50
51
       - If this rule is noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding exceptions -
52
53
54
       ### Response and remediation
55
       - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
56
       - Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
57
       - Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions ca
58
           - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
59
           - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
60
           - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
61
           - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or ser
62
           - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
63
       - Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all comp
64
       - Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request passw
65
       - Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
       - Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege princip
67
       - Implement security best practices [outlined](https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-cent
68
       - Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational
69
70
       - Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the
       - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to d
71
```

72

detection-rules/rules/integrations/aws/initial\_access\_via\_system\_manager.toml at main · elastic/detection-rules · GitHub - 31/10/2024 09:13 https://github.com/elastic/detection-

rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/initial access via system manager.toml

```
73
        ## Setup
 74
 75
        The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible
 76
        references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/ssm-plugins.html"]
 77
        risk score = 21
 78
        rule_id = "37b211e8-4e2f-440f-86d8-06cc8f158cfa"
        severity = "low"
 79
 80
        tags = [
 81
            "Domain: Cloud",
 82
            "Data Source: AWS",
 83
            "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
            "Data Source: AWS SSM",
 85
            "Use Case: Log Auditing",
 86
            "Tactic: Initial Access",
            "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 88
 89
        timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 90
        type = "query"
 91
 92
        query = '''
 93
        event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ssm.amazonaws.com and event.action:SendCommand and
94
 95
 96
 97
        [[rule.threat]]
98
        framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
99
        [[rule.threat.technique]]
        id = "T1566"
100
101
        name = "Phishing"
102
        reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
103
        [[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
        id = "T1566.002"
104
105
        name = "Spearphishing Link"
        reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/"
106
107
108
109
        [rule.threat.tactic]
110
        id = "TA0001"
111
112
        name = "Initial Access"
113
        reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
```