



Detecting shadow credentials

A defenders perspective on msDS-KeyCredentialLink

TL;DR;

What's msDS-KeyCredentialLink and why should I care?

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Auditing msD	S-VouCro	dontiall ink	
Auditing msD	3-keyciet	aemilailiik	
5136: A directory se	ervice ohiect wa	s modified	
	. vice object wa	3 mouli icu	
		Subject	
Obje	ct		
A directory service	e object was mod	lified.	
Subject: Security ID Account Nam		RP\evil	
ACCOUNT Nam	evii		

Account Domain: NETCORP Logon ID: 0xBCDAC

Directory Service:

Name: netcorp.at

Type: Active Directory Domain Services

Object:

DN: CN=pc1,OU=Client,OU=Computer,OU=company,DC=net
GUID: CN=pc1,OU=Client,OU=Computer,OU=company,DC=net

Class: computer

Attribute:

LDAP Display Name: msDS-KeyCredentialLink

Syntax (OID): 2.5.5.7

Value: B:828:<Binary>:CN=adlab-01,OU=Client,OU=Comput

Operation:

Type: Value Added

Correlation ID: {5bff0e70-432c-4ae9-9081-06675db

Application Correlation ID: -

blackhat Key Credential Types

NGC	Next-Gen Credentials
FIDO	Fast IDentity Online Key
STK	Session Transport Key
FEK	File Encryption Key (Undocumented)
BitlockerRecovery	BitLocker Recovery Key (Undocumented)
AdminKey	PIN Reset Key (Undocumented)

Use-case 1 - WHfB Hybrid Azure AD Joined Key Trust

A directory service object was modified.

Subject:

Security ID: netcorp\MSOL_8bee7c7b05af

Account Name: MSOL 8bee7c7b05af

Account Domain: netcorp Logon ID: 0xAFEC9F

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https://cyberstoph.org/posts/2022/03/detecting-shadow-credentials/
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Directory Service:
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Name: netcorp.at

Type: Active Directory Domain Services

Object:

DN: CN=whfbuser,OU=WHFB,OU=DomainUser,OU=User,OU=c GUID: CN=whfbuser,OU=WHFB,OU=DomainUser,OU=User,OU=c

Class: user

Attribute:

LDAP Display Name: msDS-KeyCredentialLink

Syntax (OID): 2.5.5.7

Value: B:854:<Binary>:CN=whfbuser,OU=WHFB,OU=DomainUs

Operation:

Type: Value Added

Correlation ID: {10148d86-8374-4197-84d6-586a201

Application Correlation ID: -

user

An account was successfully logged on.

Subject:

Security ID: NULL SID

Account Name: -

Account Domain: -

Logon ID: 0x0

Logon Information:

Logon Type: 3

Restricted Admin Mode: -

Virtual Account: No Elevated Token: Yes

Impersonation Level: Impersonation

New Logon:

Security ID: netcorp\MSOL_8bee7c7b05af

Account Name: MSOL_8bee7c7b05af

Account Domain: NETCORP.AT

Logon ID: 0xAFEC9F

Linked Logon ID: 0x0

Network Account Domain: -

Logon GUID: {a095cd77-3ac7-c998-61d3-9995308}

Process Information:

Process ID: 0x0

Process Name: -

Network Information:

Workstation Name: -

Source Network Address: fe80::2d5f:1c5a:ede5:89c8

Source Port: 54856

Detailed Authentication Information:

Logon Process: Kerberos

Authentication Package: Kerberos

Transited Services: -

Package Name (NTLM only): -

Key Length: 0

```
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```


- •
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```
\label{lem:Get-ADUser-Identity} \textbf{Get-ADUser -Identity whfbuser -Properties} ~ + ~ | ~ \textbf{select -expand}
```

Get-AzureADDevice | ? {\$_.deviceid -eq "<device-id>"}

```
Administrator.Windows PowerShell

PS C:\Users\domadm>
PS C:\Users\
```



Use-case 2 - Credential Guard

Key generation

If the device is running Credential Guard, then a public/private key pair is created protected by Credential Guard.

If Credential Guard is not available and a TPM is, then a public/private key pair is created protected by the TPM.

If neither is available, then a key pair is not generated and the device can only authenticate using password.

Provisioning computer account public key

When Windows starts up, it checks if a public key is provisioned for its computer account. If not, then it generates a bound public key and configures it for its account in AD using a Windows Server 2016 or higher DC. If all the DCs are down-level, then no key is provisioned.

```
A directory service object was modified.
```

Subject:

Security ID: NETCORP\PC1\$

Account Name: PC1\$

Account Domain: NETCORP

Logon ID: 0xA170D

Directory Service:

Name: netcorp.at

Type: Active Directory Domain Services

Object:

DN: CN=pc1,OU=Client,OU=Computer,OU=company,DC=net
GUID: CN=pc1,OU=Client,OU=Computer,OU=company,DC=net

Class: computer

Attribute:

LDAP Display Name: msDS-KeyCredentialLink

Syntax (OID): 2.5.5.7

Value: B:754: <Binary>: CN=pc1, OU=Client, OU=Computer, OU

Operation:

Type: Value Added

Correlation ID: {cb1839a0-32c4-4843-bf57-a5b5308

Application Correlation ID: -

A directory service object was modified.

Subject:

Security ID: netcorp\PC1\$

Account Name: PC1\$

Account Domain: netcorp

Logon ID: 0x125BAF

Directory Service:

Name: netcorp.at

Type: Active Directory Domain Services

Object:

DN: CN=pc1,OU=Client,OU=Computer,OU=company,DC=net GUID: CN=pc1,OU=Client,OU=Computer,OU=company,DC=net

Class: computer

Attribute:

LDAP Display Name: msDS-KeyCredentialLink

Syntax (OID): 2.5.5.7

Value: B:828:<Binary>:CN=pc1,OU=Client,OU=Computer,OU


Operation:

Type: Value Added


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machineboundcertificate

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\domadm>
PS C:\Users\domadm> .\Verify-KeyLink.ps1 -Computername pc1
[+] Verifying msds-KeyCredentialLink for host pc1
[+] Found a key in Active Directory. Checking network connection with the host.
[+] Network connection OK. Trying to acquire MBC from registry.
[+] Found MBC, trying to match.
   Match found: msds-KeyCredentialLink -> MachineBoundCertificate
[+] Key extracted from AD is:
           Path:
           00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
                                                               00...0...åÄ£j3Ü|
{åé´û:DeÙDq.$DH
           30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 E5 C4 A3 6A 33 DC 7C
           7B E5 E9 C2 B4 FB 3A 8B 65 D9 9F 71 01 24 94 48
00000010
00000020
           89 88 64 AD 2B E1 DF B8 40 0F D0 3F CB 7F 38 5D
                                                               22d-+áß,@.Đ?Ë28]
00000030
           FD 53 B2 EB 1C AC 00 5C EF 47 3C FD 77 94 64 9C
                                                               ýS²ë.¬.\ïG<ýw⊡d⊡
                                                               ÕõH@Þ@D¹¹N_ZÒÂ1"
00000040
           D5 F5 48 9D DE A9 44 B9 B9 4E 5F 5A D2 C2 31 A8
00000050
           34 B3 75 64 ED 28 EF 64 35 19 C8 5D 54 17 6E A2
                                                               43udí(ïd5.È]T.n¢
           67 FB 5C 0D 4D 7A 2E 75 17 6C 90 14 DE 30 1C B9
                                                               gû\.Mz.u.l⊡.Þ0.¹
00000060
           F2 AC 69 B7 4E 07 6C 22 C4 B8 54 A2 FA BC 99 61
                                                               ò-i·N.1"Ä T¢ú%⊡a
00000070
           A7 76 20 90 EA 50 2F 92 6C 2C 74 A2 D8 01 13 98
                                                               §v @êP/@1,t¢Ø..@
00000080
                                                               ĒģÖ@ó; '@Z`Ï.,îz@
           C8 36 D6 89 F3 A1 B4 8A 5A 60 CF 0A 09 EE 7A 96
00000090
000000A0
           F2 CA 16 5A BC 0F 08 2A B5 49 8A BB CD 83 54 2B
                                                               òÊ.Z%..*μΙ@»Í@T+
000000В0
           ED F7 66 61 7B 4F 10 0C 69 F2 07 8A 70 79 66 88
                                                               í÷fa{0..iò.@pyf@
00000C0
           94 AC 1B 4B 1A 01 A7 58 DF 6E 53 ED 24 BE C7 8E
                                                               □¬.K..§XßnSí$¾Ç□
                                                              ¥.0K82D#Z.ý.e_@*
.Ã.@,éâ<ñ%ÉbÁïM.
0j0µ¹0<Ù¹=³.¬¢>ø
           A5 0D 89 4B 38 B2 44 23 5A 14 FD 1C 65 5F 40 2A
00000D0
00000E0
           17 C3 06 40 2C E9 E2 3C F1 BD C9 62 C1 EF 4D 1A
000000F0
           8B 6A 81 B5 B9 7F 3C D9 B9 3D B3 11 AC A2 3E F8
                                                               ä.³«¦Â-.A....
00000100
           E4 0D B3 AB A6 C2 AD FF 41 02 03 01 00 01
[+] Key extracted from host is:
00000000
           30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 E5 C4 A3 6A 33 DC 7C
                                                               00...0...åÄ£j3Ü|
00000010
           7B E5 E9 C2 B4 FB 3A 8B 65 D9 9F 71 01 24 94 48
                                                               {åé´û:⊡eÙ⊡q.$⊡H
00000020
           89 88 64 AD 2B E1 DF B8 40 0F D0 3F CB 7F 38 5D
                                                               22d-+áß,@.Đ?Ë28]
                                                               ýS²ë.¬.\ïG<ýw⊡d⊡
ÕõH⊡Þ©D¹¹N_ZÒÂ1¨
00000030
           FD 53 B2 EB 1C AC 00 5C EF 47 3C FD 77 94 64 9C
           D5 F5 48 9D DE A9 44 B9 B9 4E 5F 5A D2 C2 31 A8
00000040
           34 B3 75 64 ED 28 EF 64 35 19 C8 5D 54 17 6E A2
                                                               4³udí(ïd5.E)T.n¢
00000050
           67 FB 5C 0D 4D 7A 2E 75 17 6C 90 14 DE 30 1C B9
00000060
                                                               gû\.Mz.u.10.Þ0.1
                                                              ò¬i·N.1"Ä_T¢ú%@a
§v @êP/@1,t¢ø..@
È6Ö@ó; @Z`Ï..îz@
           F2 AC 69 B7 4E 07 6C 22 C4 B8 54 A2 FA BC 99 61
00000070
00000080
           A7 76 20 90 EA 50 2F 92 6C 2C
                                           74 A2 D8 01
                                                       13 98
00000090
           C8 36 D6 89 F3 A1 B4 8A 5A 60 CF 0A 09 EE 7A 96
                                                               òÊ.Z%..*µI@»Í@T+
000000A0
           F2 CA 16 5A BC 0F 08 2A B5 49 8A BB CD 83 54 2B
000000B0
           ED F7 66 61 7B 4F 10 0C 69 F2 07 8A 70 79 66 88
                                                               í÷fa{0..iò.@pyf@
                                                              ⊡¬.K..§XßnSí$¾Ç⊡
¥.⊡K8²D#Z.ý.e_@*
.Ã.@,éâ<ñ%ÉbÁïM.
000000C0
           94 AC 1B 4B 1A 01 A7 58 DF 6E 53 ED 24 BE C7 8E
           A5 0D 89 4B 38 B2 44 23 5A 14 FD 1C 65 5F 40 2A
аааааара
000000E0
           17 C3 06 40 2C E9 E2 3C F1 BD C9 62 C1 EF 4D 1A
           8B 6A 81 B5 B9 7F 3C D9 B9 3D B3 11 AC A2 3E F8 @j@μ¹@<Ù¹=³.¬¢>ø
000000F0
                                                               ä.³«¦Â-.A....
00000100
           E4 0D B3 AB A6 C2 AD FF 41 02 03 01 00 01
PS C:\Users\domadm> _
```



Conclusion



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