[CB19] Recent APT attack on crypto exchange employees by Heungsoo Kang

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In this talk, I plan to present overview of the recent APT attacks against employees of cryptocurrency exchanges. Attackers took extra care on its social engineering skills wl

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

- Background
  - Coinbase announced it's been attacked by a very sophisticated, highly targeted attack
  - Coinbase blog / Philip Martin (@SecurityGuyPhil)
  - Decent analysis by objective-see.com
- Undisclosed, but LINE was also targeted

About this talk

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













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