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#### Security operations for Infrastructure

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# Security operations for infrastructure

Article • 10/23/2023 • 5 contributors

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Infrastructure has many components where vulnerabilities can occur if not properly configured. As part of your monitoring and alerting strategy for infrastructure, monitor and alert events in the following areas:

- Authentication and Authorization
- Hybrid Authentication components incl. Federation Servers
- Policies
- Subscriptions

Monitoring and alerting the components of your authentication infrastructure is critical. Any compromise can lead to a full compromise of the whole environment. Many enterprises that use Microsoft Entra ID operate in a hybrid authentication environment. Cloud and on-premises components should be included in your monitoring and alerting strategy. Having a hybrid authentication environment also introduces another attack vector to your environment.

We recommend all the components be considered Control Plane / Tier 0 assets, and the accounts used to manage them. Refer to Securing privileged assets (SPA) for guidance on designing and implementing your environment. This guidance includes recommendations for each of the hybrid authentication components that could potentially be used for a Microsoft Entra tenant.

A first step in being able to detect unexpected events and potential attacks is to establish a baseline. For all on-premises components listed in this article, see Privileged access deployment, which is part of the Securing privileged assets (SPA) guide.

## Where to look

The log files you use for investigation and monitoring are:

- Microsoft Entra audit logs
- Sign-in logs
- Microsoft 365 Audit logs
- Azure Key Vault logs

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From the Azure portal, you can view the Microsoft Entra audit logs and download as comma separated value (CSV) or JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) files. The Azure portal has several ways to integrate Microsoft Entra logs with other tools that allow for greater automation of monitoring and alerting:

- Microsoft Sentinel Enables intelligent security analytics at the enterprise level by providing security information and event management (SIEM) capabilities.
- Sigma rules 2 Sigma is an evolving open standard for writing rules and templates that automated management tools can use to parse log files. Where Sigma templates exist for our recommended search criteria, we've added a link to the Sigma repo. The Sigma templates aren't written, tested, and managed by Microsoft. Rather, the repo and templates are created and collected by the worldwide IT security community.
- Azure Monitor Enables automated monitoring and alerting of various conditions. Can create or
  use workbooks to combine data from different sources.
- Azure Event Hubs integrated with a SIEM Microsoft Entra logs can be integrated to other SIEMs such as Splunk, ArcSight, QRadar and Sumo Logic via the Azure Event Hubs integration.
- Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps Enables you to discover and manage apps, govern across
  apps and resources, and check your cloud apps' compliance.
- Securing workload identities with Microsoft Entra ID Protection Used to detect risk on workload
  identities across sign-in behavior and offline indicators of compromise.

The remainder of this article describes what to monitor and alert on. It is organized by the type of threat. Where there are pre-built solutions, you'll find links to them, after the table. Otherwise, you can build alerts using the preceding tools.

#### **Authentication infrastructure**

In hybrid environments that contain both on-premises and cloud-based resources and accounts, the Active Directory infrastructure is a key part of the authentication stack. The stack is also a target for attacks so must be configured to maintain a secure environment and must be monitored properly. Examples of current types of attacks used against your authentication infrastructure use Password Spray and Solorigate techniques. The following are links to articles we recommend:

- Securing privileged access overview This article provides an overview of current techniques using Zero Trust techniques to create and maintain secure privileged access.
- Microsoft Defender for Identity monitored domain activities This article provides a comprehensive list of activities to monitor and set alerts for.
- Microsoft Defender for Identity security alert tutorial This article provides guidance on creating and implementing a security alert strategy.

The following are links to specific articles that focus on monitoring and alerting your authentication infrastructure:

- Understand and use Lateral Movement Paths with Microsoft Defender for Identity Detection techniques to help identify when non-sensitive accounts are used to gain access to sensitive network accounts
- Working with security alerts in Microsoft Defender for Identity This article describes how to review and manage alerts after they're logged.

The following are specific things to look for:

Expand table

| What to monitor         | Risk<br>level | Where                             | Notes   |
|-------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Extranet lockout trends | High          | Microsoft Entra<br>Connect Health | See, Monitor AD FS using Microsoft Entra Connect<br>Health for tools and techniques to help detect<br>extranet lock-out trends. |
| Failed sign-ins         | High          | Connect Health<br>Portal          | Export or download the Risky IP report and follow the guidance at Risky IP report (public preview) for next steps.              |

| In privacy compliant   | Low    | Microsoft Entra<br>Connect Health     | Configure Microsoft Entra Connect Health to disable data collections and monitoring using the User privacy and Microsoft Entra Connect Health article. |
|--|--------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Potential brute force attack on LDAP                                 | Medium | Microsoft<br>Defender for<br>Identity | Use sensor to help detect potential brute force attacks against LDAP.  |
| Account enumeration reconnaissance                                   | Medium | Microsoft<br>Defender for<br>Identity | Use sensor to help perform account enumeration reconnaissance.   |
| General correlation between<br>Microsoft Entra ID and Azure<br>AD FS | Medium | Microsoft<br>Defender for<br>Identity | Use capabilities to correlate activities between your Microsoft Entra ID and Azure AD FS environments.   |

# Pass-through authentication monitoring

Microsoft Entra pass-through authentication signs users in by validating their passwords directly against on-premises Active Directory.

The following are specific things to look for:

|   |               |  | C Expand table   |   |  |
|---|---------------|--|--|---|--|
| What to monitor   | Risk<br>level | Where  | Filter/sub-<br>filter  | Notes   |  |
| Microsoft Entra pass- through authentication errors             | Medium        | Application and Service  Logs\Microsoft\AzureAdConnect\AuthenticationAgent\Admin | AADSTS80001  – Unable to connect to Active Directory   | Ensure t<br>agent se<br>member<br>same AI<br>as the u<br>whose p<br>need to<br>validated<br>they car<br>to Active<br>Director |  |
| Microsoft<br>Entra pass-<br>through<br>authentication<br>errors | Medium        | Application and Service Logs\Microsoft\AzureAdConnect\AuthenticationAgent\Admin  | AADSTS8002 -<br>A timeout<br>occurred<br>connecting to<br>Active<br>Directory                | Check to<br>that Act<br>Director<br>available<br>respond<br>requests<br>the ager  |  |
| Microsoft<br>Entra pass-<br>through<br>authentication<br>errors | Medium        | Application and Service Logs\Microsoft\AzureAdConnect\AuthenticationAgent\Admin  | AADSTS80004 - The username passed to the agent was not valid                                 | Ensure t<br>is attem<br>sign in v<br>right use  |  |
| Microsoft<br>Entra pass-<br>through<br>authentication<br>errors | Medium        | Application and Service Logs\Microsoft\AzureAdConnect\AuthenticationAgent\Admin  | AADSTS80005 - Validation encountered unpredictable WebException                              | A transic<br>Retry th<br>request.<br>continue<br>contact<br>support   |  |
| Microsoft<br>Entra pass-<br>through<br>authentication<br>errors | Medium        | Application and Service Logs\Microsoft\AzureAdConnect\AuthenticationAgent\Admin  | AADSTS80007 - An error occurred communicating with Active Directory                          | Check the logs for informative rify the Director operatine expected   |  |
| Microsoft<br>Entra pass-<br>through<br>authentication<br>errors | High          | Win32 LogonUserA function API  | Log on events<br>4624(s): An<br>account was<br>successfully<br>logged on<br>- correlate with | Use with<br>suspecte<br>usernam<br>the dom<br>controlle<br>authent<br>requests  |  |

|   |        |  | 4625(F): An<br>account failed<br>to log on | Guidanc<br>LogonU<br>function<br>(winbase                           |
|---|--------|--|--|---|
| Microsoft Entra pass- through authentication errors | Medium | PowerShell script of domain controller | See the query<br>after the table.          | Use the informal Microso Connect Troubles Pass-thr Authent guidance |

```
Kusto

QueryList>

<Query Id="0" Path="Security">

<Select Path="Security">*[EventData[Data[@Name='ProcessName'] and (Data='C:\Program Files

</Query>

</QueryList>
```

# Monitoring for creation of new Microsoft Entra tenants

Organizations might need to monitor for and alert on the creation of new Microsoft Entra tenants when the action is initiated by identities from their organizational tenant. Monitoring for this scenario provides visibility on how many tenants are being created and could be accessed by end users.

#### **Expand table**

| What to monitor   | Risk<br>level | Where                         | Filter/sub-filter                 | Notes                                |
|---|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Creation of a new Microsoft Entra tenant, using an identity from your tenant. | Medium        | Microsoft Entra<br>audit logs | Category: Directory<br>Management | Target(s) shows the created TenantID |
|   |               |                               | Activity: Create                  |                                      |
|   |               |                               | Company                           |                                      |

#### Private network connector

Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Entra application proxy give remote users a single sign-on (SSO) experience. Users securely connect to on-premises apps without a virtual private network (VPN) or dual-homed servers and firewall rules. If your Microsoft Entra private network connector server is compromised, attackers could alter the SSO experience or change access to published applications.

To configure monitoring for Application Proxy, see Troubleshoot Application Proxy problems and error messages. The data file that logs information can be found in Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Microsoft Entra private network\Connector\Admin. For a complete reference guide to audit activity, see Microsoft Entra audit activity reference. Specific things to monitor:

#### **Expand table**

| What to monitor    | Risk<br>level | Where                     | Filter/sub-filter   | Notes   |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------------------|---|---|
| Kerberos<br>errors | Medium        | Various<br>tools          | Medium  | Kerberos authentication error guidance under<br>Kerberos errors on Troubleshoot Application<br>Proxy problems and error messages. |
| DC security issues | High          | DC Security<br>Audit logs | Event ID 4742(S): A<br>computer account was<br>changed<br>-and-<br>Flag – Trusted for<br>Delegation | Investigate any flag change.  |

|             |      | -or-<br>Flag – Trusted to<br>Authenticate for<br>Delegation |   |
|-------------|------|---|---|
| Pass-the-   | High |   | Follow guidance in:                       |
| ticket like |      |   | Security principal reconnaissance (LDAP)  |
| attacks     |      |   | (external ID 2038)                        |
|             |      |   | Tutorial: Compromised credential alerts   |
|             |      |   | Understand and use Lateral Movement Paths |
|             |      |   | with Microsoft Defender for Identity      |
|             |      |   | Understanding entity profiles             |

### Legacy authentication settings

For multifactor authentication (MFA) to be effective, you also need to block legacy authentication. You then need to monitor your environment and alert on any use of legacy authentication. Legacy authentication protocols like POP, SMTP, IMAP, and MAPI can't enforce MFA. This makes these protocols the preferred entry points for attackers. For more information on tools that you can use to block legacy authentication, see New tools to block legacy authentication in your organization.

Legacy authentication is captured in the Microsoft Entra sign-in log as part of the detail of the event. You can use the Azure Monitor workbook to help with identifying legacy authentication usage. For more information, see Sign-ins using legacy authentication, which is part of How to use Azure Monitor Workbooks for Microsoft Entra reports. You can also use the Insecure protocols workbook for Microsoft Sentinel. For more information, see Microsoft Sentinel Insecure Protocols Workbook Implementation Guide 2. Specific activities to monitor include:

**Expand table** 

| What to monitor           | Risk<br>level | Where                          | Filter/sub-filter   | Notes   |
|---------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Legacy<br>authentications | High          | Microsoft Entra<br>sign-in log | ClientApp: POP ClientApp: IMAP ClientApp: MAPI ClientApp: SMTP ClientApp: ActiveSync go to EXO Other Clients = SharePoint and EWS | In federated domain environments, failed authentications aren't recorded and don't appear in the log. |

## Microsoft Entra Connect

Microsoft Entra Connect provides a centralized location that enables account and attribute synchronization between your on-premises and cloud-based Microsoft Entra environment. Microsoft Entra Connect is the Microsoft tool designed to meet and accomplish your hybrid identity goals. It provides the following features:

- Password hash synchronization A sign-in method that synchronizes a hash of a user's on-premises AD password with Microsoft Entra ID.
- Synchronization Responsible for creating users, groups, and other objects. And, making sure identity information for your on-premises users and groups matches the cloud. This synchronization also includes password hashes.
- Health Monitoring Microsoft Entra Connect Health can provide robust monitoring and provide a central location in the Azure portal to view this activity.

Synchronizing identity between your on-premises environment and your cloud environment introduces a new attack surface for your on-premises and cloud-based environment. We recommend:

- You treat your Microsoft Entra Connect primary and staging servers as Tier 0 Systems in your control plane.
- You follow a standard set of policies that govern each type of account and its usage in your environment.

• You install Microsoft Entra Connect and Connect Health. These primarily provide operational data for the environment.

Logging of Microsoft Entra Connect operations occurs in different ways:

- The Microsoft Entra Connect wizard logs data to \ProgramData\AADConnect. Each time the wizard is invoked, a timestamped trace log file is created. The trace log can be imported into Sentinel or other 3<sup>rd</sup> party security information and event management (SIEM) tools for analysis.
- Some operations initiate a PowerShell script to capture logging information. To collect this data, you
  must make sure script block logging in enabled.

### Monitoring configuration changes

Microsoft Entra ID uses Microsoft SQL Server Data Engine or SQL to store Microsoft Entra Connect configuration information. Therefore, monitoring and auditing of the log files associated with configuration should be included in your monitoring and auditing strategy. Specifically, include the following tables in your monitoring and alerting strategy.

**Expand table** 

| What to monitor          | Where                     | Notes                        |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| mms_management_agent     | SQL service audit records | See SQL Server Audit Records |
| mms_partition            | SQL service audit records | See SQL Server Audit Records |
| mms_run_profile          | SQL service audit records | See SQL Server Audit Records |
| mms_server_configuration | SQL service audit records | See SQL Server Audit Records |
| mms_synchronization_rule | SQL service audit records | See SQL Server Audit Records |

For information on what and how to monitor configuration information refer to:

- For SQL server, see SQL Server Audit Records.
- For Microsoft Sentinel, see Connect to Windows servers to collect security events.
- For information on configuring and using Microsoft Entra Connect, see What is Microsoft Entra Connect?

### Monitoring and troubleshooting synchronization

One function of Microsoft Entra Connect is to synchronize hash synchronization between a user's onpremises password and Microsoft Entra ID. If passwords aren't synchronizing as expected, the synchronization might affect a subset of users or all users. Use the following to help verify proper operation or troubleshoot issues:

- Information for checking and troubleshooting hash synchronization, see Troubleshoot password hash synchronization with Microsoft Entra Connect Sync.
- Modifications to the connector spaces, see Troubleshoot Microsoft Entra Connect objects and attributes.

Important resources on monitoring

**Expand table** 

| What to monitor                       | Resources   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Hash synchronization validation       | See Troubleshoot password hash synchronization with Microsoft Entra<br>Connect Sync |
| Modifications to the connector spaces | see Troubleshoot Microsoft Entra Connect objects and attributes                     |
| Modifications to rules you configured | Monitor changes to: filtering, domain and OU, attribute, and group-based changes    |
| SQL and MSDE changes                  | Changes to logging parameters and addition of custom functions                      |

Monitor the following:

Expand table

| What to monitor            | Risk<br>level | Where                         | Filter/sub-filter   | Notes                              |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| Scheduler changes          | High          | PowerShell                    | Set-ADSyncScheduler   | Look for modifications to schedule |
| Changes to scheduled tasks | High          | Microsoft Entra<br>audit logs | Activity = 4699(S): A scheduled task was deleted -or- Activity = 4701(s): A scheduled task was disabled -or- Activity = 4702(s): A scheduled task was updated | Monitor all                        |

- For more information on logging PowerShell script operations, see Enabling Script Block Logging, which is part of the PowerShell reference documentation.
- For more information on configuring PowerShell logging for analysis by Splunk, refer to Get Data into Splunk User Behavior Analytics 2.

## Monitoring seamless single sign-on

Microsoft Entra seamless single sign-on (Seamless SSO) automatically signs in users when they are on their corporate desktops that are connected to your corporate network. Seamless SSO provides your users with easy access to your cloud-based applications without other on-premises components. SSO uses the pass-through authentication and password hash synchronization capabilities provided by Microsoft Entra Connect.

Monitoring single sign-on and Kerberos activity can help you detect general credential theft attack patterns. Monitor using the following information:

**Expand table** 

| What to monitor   | Risk<br>level | Where                                      | Filter/sub-filter  | Notes   |
|---|---------------|--|--|---|
| Errors associated with<br>SSO and Kerberos<br>validation failures | Medium        | Microsoft Entra<br>sign-in log             |  | Single sign-on list of error codes at Single sign-on.   |
| Query for<br>troubleshooting errors                               | Medium        | PowerShell                                 | See query following<br>table. check in each<br>forest with SSO<br>enabled. | Check in each forest with SSO enabled.  |
| Kerberos-related events   | High          | Microsoft Defender for Identity monitoring |  | Review guidance available at<br>Microsoft Defender for<br>Identity Lateral Movement<br>Paths (LMPs) |

```
Kusto

QueryList>

<Query Id="0" Path="Security">

<Select Path="Security">*[EventData[Data[@Name='ServiceName'] and (Data='AZUREADSSOACC$')

</Query>

</QueryList>
```

# Password protection policies

If you deploy Microsoft Entra Password Protection, monitoring and reporting are essential tasks. The following links provide details to help you understand various monitoring techniques, including where each service logs information and how to report on the use of Microsoft Entra Password Protection.

The domain controller (DC) agent and proxy services both log event log messages. All PowerShell cmdlets described below are only available on the proxy server (see the AzureADPasswordProtection PowerShell

module). The DC agent software doesn't install a PowerShell module.

Detailed information for planning and implementing on-premises password protection is available at Plan and deploy on-premises Microsoft Entra Password Protection. For monitoring details, see Monitor on-premises Microsoft Entra Password Protection. On each domain controller, the DC agent service software writes the results of each individual password validation operation (and other status) to the following local event log:

- \Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\AzureADPasswordProtection\DCAgent\Admin
- \Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\AzureADPasswordProtection\DCAgent\Operational
- \Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\AzureADPasswordProtection\DCAgent\Trace

The DC agent Admin log is the primary source of information for how the software is behaving. By default, the Trace log is off and must be enabled before data is logged. To troubleshoot application proxy problems and error messages, detailed information is available at Troubleshoot Microsoft Entra application proxy. Information for these events is logged in:

- Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Microsoft Entra private network\Connector\Admin
- Microsoft Entra audit log, Category Application Proxy

Complete reference for Microsoft Entra audit activities is available at Microsoft Entra audit activity reference.

## **Conditional Access**

In Microsoft Entra ID, you can protect access to your resources by configuring Conditional Access policies. As an IT administrator, you want to ensure your Conditional Access policies work as expected to ensure that your resources are protected. Monitoring and alerting on changes to the Conditional Access service ensures policies defined by your organization for access to data are enforced. Microsoft Entra logs when changes are made to Conditional Access and also provides workbooks to ensure your policies are providing the expected coverage.

#### Workbook Links

- Conditional Access insights and reporting
- Conditional Access gap analysis workbook

Monitor changes to Conditional Access policies using the following information:

**Expand table** 

| What to monitor   | Risk<br>level | Where                            | Filter/sub-filter                                | Notes   |
|---|---------------|----------------------------------|--|---|
| New Conditional Access<br>Policy created by non-<br>approved actors | Medium        | Microsoft<br>Entra audit<br>logs | Activity: Add<br>Conditional Access<br>policy    | Monitor and alert on Conditional Access changes. Is Initiated by (actor): approved to make changes to Conditional Access? |
|   |               |                                  | Category: Policy                                 | Microsoft Sentinel template   ☑   |
|   |               |                                  | Initiated by (actor): User<br>Principal Name     | Sigma rules ௴   |
| Conditional Access Policy<br>removed by non-<br>approved actors     | Medium        | Microsoft<br>Entra audit<br>logs | Activity: Delete<br>Conditional Access<br>policy | Monitor and alert on Conditional Access changes. Is Initiated by (actor): approved to make changes to Conditional Access? |
|   |               |                                  | Category: Policy                                 | Microsoft Sentinel template   |
|   |               |                                  | Initiated by (actor): User<br>Principal Name     | Sigma rules ☑   |

| Conditional Access Policy<br>updated by non-<br>approved actors          | Medium | Microsoft<br>Entra audit<br>logs | Activity: Update<br>Conditional Access<br>policy | Monitor and alert on Conditional<br>Access changes. Is Initiated by<br>(actor): approved to make changes<br>to Conditional Access? |
|--|--------|----------------------------------|--|--|
|  |        |                                  | Category: Policy                                 |  |
|  |        |                                  |  | Review Modified Properties and   |
|  |        |                                  | Initiated by (actor): User                       | compare "old" vs "new" value   |
|  |        |                                  | Principal Name                                   | Microsoft Sentinel template  |
|  |        |                                  |  | Sigma rules ☑  |
| Removal of a user from a group used to scope critical Conditional Access | Medium | Microsoft<br>Entra audit<br>logs | Activity: Remove<br>member from group            | Montior and Alert for groups used to scope critical Conditional Access Policies.   |
| policies   |        |                                  | Category:  |  |
|  |        |                                  | GroupManagement                                  | "Target" is the user that has been removed.  |
|  |        |                                  | Target: User Principal                           |  |
|  |        |                                  | Name   | Sigma rules ♂  |
| Addition of a user to a group used to scope critical Conditional Access  | Low    | Microsoft<br>Entra audit<br>logs | Activity: Add member to group                    | Montior and Alert for groups used to scope critical Conditional Access Policies.   |
| policies   |        | 1093                             | Category:  | Tolicles.  |
| policies   |        |                                  | Group Management                                 | "Target" is the user that has been added.  |
|  |        |                                  |  |  |
|  |        |                                  | Target: User Principal                           |  |

## **Next steps**

Microsoft Entra security operations overview

Security operations for user accounts

Security operations for consumer accounts

Security operations for privileged accounts

Security operations for Privileged Identity Management

Security operations for applications

Security operations for devices

#### **Feedback**

Provide product feedback ☑

### **Additional resources**

#### **☎** Training

Module

Plan, implement, and administer Conditional Access - Training

Conditional Access gives a fine granularity of control over which users can do specific activities, access which resources, and how to ensure data and systems are safe.

Certification

Microsoft Certified: Identity and Access Administrator Associate - Certifications

Demonstrate the features of Microsoft Entra ID to modernize identity solutions, implement hybrid solutions, and implement identity governance.

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