

# **Analysis of Destructive Malware (WhisperGate) targeting Ukraine**





BLKSMTH | S2W TALON



Photo by Kristina Flour on Unsplash

## **Medium**





The flow consisting of a total of three stages revealed so far is as follows.


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**Stage1:** Overwrites the MBR and destroy all partitions


Stage2: Downloads Stage3 through the discord link

Stage3: Executes file wiper & AdvancedRun.exe after decoding

resources



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File Type: Win22 FYF


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
Stage1 directly accesses the MBK(Master Boot Record) and overwrites with the 0x200 size data that is hard-coded inside. After that, when the PC is rebooted, the overwritten code is executed, and the code traverses all drives on the disk and overwrites it with specific data at intervals of 199 LBAs.

The overwritten code reads the ransom note string inside the MBR and sets it to appear on the display.

Overwrites MBR

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



Drives wiper code

Disk Address Packet(DAP) structure initialized when malicious code writes to disk

- (0x7C72) (offset 0 size 1) : size of packet (16 bytes)
- (0x7C73) (offset 1 size 1): Reserved (always 0)
- (0x7C74) (offset 2 size 2) : number of sectors to transfer
- (0x7C76) (offset 4 size 4) : transfer buffer (segment:offset)
- (0x7C7A) (offset 8 size 4): lower 32-bits of 48-bit starting LBA
- (0x7C7E) (offset 12 size 4): upper 16-bits of 48-bit starting LBA

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Overwritten drives

#### Stage2

• SHA256: dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b7


• Creation Time: 2022-01-10 14:39:54


• First Submission: 2022–01–16 20:31:26

• File Type: Win32 EXE

Stage2 does not perform malicious actions for 20 seconds to bypass the AV (Anti Virus). To do this, run the following command twice.

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#### Stage3 (Tbopbh.jpg)

• SHA256:

923eb77b3c9e11d6c56052318c119c1a22d11ab71675e6b95d05eeb73d1accd

#### Thopbh.jpg (Reversed)

• SHA256:

9ef7dbd3da51332a78eff19146d21c82957821e464e8133e9594a07d716d892d


• Creation Time: 2022-01-10 14:39:31


• First Submission: 2022-01-16 21:29:58

• File Type: Win32 DLL

The downloaded Stage3 is written in C# as in Stage2, and an obfuscation tool called **Eazfuscator** is detected by exeinfoPE.

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





3 resources inside Stage3

Stage3 loads "78c855a088924e92a7f60d661c3d1845" resource inside and performs decoding by XOR operation.

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2 resources in the decoded resource

- 1. AdvancedRun: Stop Windows Defender service
- Execute "%Temp%Nmddfrqqrbyjeygggda.vbs" to specify "C:\" as the exception folder

 $Command: C: \Windows \System 32 \Windows Power Shell \v1.0 \power shell. exe" Set-MpP reference - Exclusion Path 'C: \'$ 

• Stop Windows Defender service through AdvancedRun.exe and delete "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender" directory


Command: "C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\AdvancedRun.exe" /EXEFilename "C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe"/WindowState 0/CommandLine "stop WinDefend"/StartDirectory ""/RunAs 8/Run


Command: "C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\AdvancedRun.exe"

/EXEFilename "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"

/WindowState 0 /CommandLine "rmdir 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows

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arget file extensions (106)

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• Executes ping command and delete itself

 $cmd.exe/min/C \ ping \ 111.111.111.111 - n \ 5 - w \ 10 > Nul \ \& \ Del/f/q \ ``[Filepath]''$ 

#### **Appendix**

#### **Ransom Note**


```
Your hard drive has been corrupted.
In case you want to recover all hard drives of your organization,
You should pay us $10k via bitcoin wallet

1AVNM68gj6PGPFcJuftKATa4WLnzg8fpfv and send message via tox ID

8BEDC411012A33BA34F49130D0F186993C6A32DAD8976F6A5D82C1ED23054C057E
CED5496F65
with your organization name.
We will contact you to give further instructions.
```

#### **Related IoCs**

#### **Medium**




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- URL:
  https[:]//cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/928503440139771947/9301086
  37681184768/Tbopbh.jpg

#### Reference


• <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/">https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/</a>




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- Facebook: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/S2WLAB/">https://www.facebook.com/S2WLAB/</a>
- Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/S2W\_Official">https://twitter.com/S2W\_Official</a>



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
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
S2W in S2W BLOG S2W in S2W BLOG **Unmasking CVE-2024-38178: The** Ransomware Landscape in H1 **Silent Threat of Windows Scriptin...** 2024: Statistics and Key Issues Author: HuiSeong Yang, HyeongJun Kim, Author: Hosu Choi, Minyeop Choi | S2W Talon SeungHo Lee  $\Box$  
 Image: Continuous c Oct 16 👋 30 Oct 14 S2W in S2W BLOG S2W in S2W BLOG Threat Tracking: Analysis of puNK-[Part1] Getting to know DarkBERT: 003's Lilith RAT ported to Autolt... A Language Model for the Dark... Author: Eugene Jang | S2W Al Team Author: Jiho Kim | S2W TALON  $\Box$  
 Image: Control of the May 18, 2023 🔌 35 🗨 2 Aug 22

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
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
See all from S2W





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