

T1207 - Rogue Domain Controller

Indicator of Activity (IOA):

- Network:
 - Methods:
 - DCSync:
 - IDL_DRSCrackNames
 - IDL_DRSGetNCChanges
 - DCShadow:
 - IDL_DRSAddEntry
 - IDL_DRSUpdateRefs
 - IDL_DRSReplicaAdd
- Host:
 - Inbound network connection to LSASS on domain controllers over TCP_IP Port.
 - Access to the Domain-DNS Class object {19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9} with extended rights:
 - {1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} -DS-Replication-Get-Change
 - {1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
 - Window Security Event 4662
 - DCShadow specific:
 - Seeing hosts be promoted to a global category server (GC)

Prevention Opportunities:

- Remove the replication based extended rights from DA's.
- For force replication create a new group and apply extended rights. Only use this group on a case by case basis.

Remove traffic ability between workstation <-> domain controllers (DC <-> DC is normal traffic)
(firewall or rpc filter)

RPC Filter Example:

```
rpc
filter
add rule layer=um actiontype=permit
add condition field=if_uuid matchtype=equal data=e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2ddadd condition field=remote_user_token matchtype=equal data=D:(A;;CC;;;DD)
add filter
add rule layer=um actiontype=block
add condition field=if_uuid matchtype=equal data=e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2ddadd filter
quit
```

• Filter forces the interface e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2 to only accept calls coming from other DCs (the DD in the SDDL string).

Notes:

- RPC filter hasn't been tested in production. Things to keep in mind if pushed out:
 - o gpupdate.exe will fail on workstations. Use Invoke-GPUpdate on DC's.
 - Functionality issues may arise as a good amount of services/actions leverage replication within their process. Name conversions allow clients to map the different names used to identify directory service objects through DsCrackNames under the hood which is apart of this RPC interface.
 - Example Splunk Universal Forwarder can use DsCrackNames to help with name resolution.
 - Force replication by a user on a domain controller will fail.
 - Normal replication will occur as needed by the DC.
 - Andrew Robbins suggests restricting domain admins interactive logons on DCs. Aka don't allow DA's to login to hosts within the organization, but create groups for specific use cases.

MSRPC-to-ATTACK/documents/MS-DRSR.md at ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3 · jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK · GitHub - 31/10/2024 09:05 https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-DRSR.md

Useful Resources:

- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/
- https://medium.com/@jsecurity101/syncing-into-the-shadows-bbd656dd14c8