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Red Team Tactics: Hiding Windows Services

A little known feature of Windows allows attackers to hide persistent services from view, creating an opportunity to evade threat hunting detection.

October 13, 2020

A little known feature of Windows allows the red team or an attacker to hide services from view, creating an opportunity to evade detection from common host-based threat hunting techniques.

In a recent red team engagement, my team was up against some well-trained, sophisticated defenders. We built custom malware to evade the anticipated EDR platforms, but we knew host analysis would eventually get us caught and quickly pulled from the target organization.

PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-Service -Name SWCUEngine

Status Name DisplayName Running SWCUEngine SWCUEngine

Taking notes from several advanced threat groups, we will use common service names that could be overlooked to try and blend into a system while maintaining persistence on the host. Here, SWCUEngine is our malware, shallowly pretending to be the AVAST software cleanup engine. While this might escape casual inspection, in an exercise where the defenders are actively hunting for the presence of the red team, this is probably going to get us caught.

So, we decided to tie on a bit of extra difficulty.

PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> & \$env:SystemRoot\System32\sc.exe sdset SWCUEngine "D:(D;;DCLCWPDTSD; SetServiceObjectSecurity SUCCESS PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-Service -Name SWCUEngine Get-Service : Cannot find any service with service name 'SWCUEngine'. At line:1 char:1 + Get-Service -Name SWCUEngine : ObjectNotFound: (SWCUEngine:String) [Get-Service], ServiceComma + CategoryInfo + FullyQualifiedErrorId : NoServiceFoundForGivenName,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetSer

Windows services sunnort the ability to control service nermissions using the Service Descriptor

Definition

service pe



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```
D: - Set the Discretionary ACL (DACL) permissions on the service

(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU) - Deny Interactive Users the following permissions:

DC - Delete Child

LC - List Children

WP - Write Property

DT - Delete Tree

SD - Service Delete
```

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This SDDL block is repeated for services (SU) and administrators (BA) as well. A (allow) permissions follow, inheriting the default permissions for services. Special thanks to Wayne Martin \mathscr{O} and Harry Johnston \mathscr{O} for their articles on decoding SDDL permissions.

By making this change to the service, the persistence mechanism is hidden from the defenders. Neither services.exe, Get-Service, sc query nor any other service control tool I'm aware of will enumerate the hidden service.

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-Service | Select-Object Name | Select-String -Pattern 'SWCUEngine PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | Select-String -Pattern 'SWCUEngine' PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> & $env:SystemRoot\System32\sc.exe query | Select-String -Pattern 'SWC PS C:\WINDOWS\system32
```

If the defender knows the name of the service in advance, they can identify the service presence by attempting to stop it. In this example, the service JoshNoSuchService does not exist, while SWCUEngine exists and is hidden:

If you know the name of the service that is hidden, then you can *unhide* it again:

On the red team, this can be a useful technique to preserve persistence on a compromised host. The hidden service will autostart after a reboot as well.

In the next article, my colleague and trusted defense analyst Jon Gorenflo \mathscr{O} will present defense options for detection and enumeration. Stay tuned!


```
Tags: P
```


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