

```
25
         mitre_attack:
26
           execution:
             - T1204.002 - User Execution - Malicious File
27
28
             - T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
29
           defense evasion:
             - T1218.010 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Regsvr32
30
           detection:
31
32
             ideas: >
33
               - monitor Office applications spawning WMI command-line (WMIC.exe) utility.
                 Note: add more office applications to the rules logic of your choice.
34
35
             telemetry:
36
               process_create:
                 - Windows EID 4688
37
38
                 - Sysmon EID 1
39

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

             rules: >
40
41
               - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR Proce
                 AND CreatorProcessName:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
42
               - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:"\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR CommandLine:"*wmic *" OR Or
43
                 AND ParentImage:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
44
             ideas: >
45
               - monitor WMI "Win32_Process::Create" command execution by Office applications processes.
46
                 Note: add more office applications to the rule logic of your choice.
47
             telemetry:
48
49
               wmi execution:
                 - EDR (Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity ETW)
50
51
             rules: >
52
               - Channel:EDR AND EventType:WMIExecution AND Image:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\
             ideas: >
53
               - Excel called wmic to finally proxy execute regsvr32 with the payload. An attacker wanted
54
                 But we have command-line in the event which allow us to "restore" this suspicous parent-c
55
                 Monitor process creation with "wmic process call create" and LOLBins in command-line with
56
57
                 Note: add more LOLBins to the rules logic of your choice.
58
             telemetry:
59
               process_create:
                 - Windows EID 4688
60
                 - Sysmon EID 1
61

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

62
63
             rules: >
               - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR Proce
64
                 AND ProcessCommandLine:(*regsvr32* OR *rundl132* OR *msiexec* OR *mshta* OR *verclsid*) A
65
               - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:"\\wbem\\WMIC.exe" OR CommandLine:"*wmic *" OR Or
66
                 AND CommandLine:*process* AND CommandLine:*call* AND CommandLine:*create* AND CommandLine
67
                 AND ParentImage:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
68
             ideas: >
69
               - monitor LOLBins process creations by Office applications.
70
```

```
Note: add more LOLBins and Office applications to the rules logic of your choice.
 71
 72
              telemetry:
 73
                process_create:
 74
                  - Windows EID 4688
 75
                  - Sysmon EID 1
 76

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

 77
              rules: >
 78
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND NewProcessName:("\\regsvr32.exe" OR "\\rund
 79
                  AND CreatorProcessName:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND Image:("\\regsvr32.exe" OR "\\rundl132.exe" OR "\\msiexe
 80
 81
                  AND ParentImage:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.exe")
 82
                - monitor LOLBins process creations with Wmiprvse parent process.
 83
 84
                  Note: add more LOLBins to the rules logic of your choice. FPs are possible here, but some
 85
              telemetry:
                process create:
 86
 87
                  - Windows EID 4688
 88
                  - Sysmon EID 1
 89
                  EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)
 90
              rules: >
 91
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND NewProcessName:("\\regsvr32.exe" OR "\\rund
 92
                  AND CreatorProcessName:("\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe")
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND Image:("\regsvr32.exe" OR "\rundl132.exe" OR "\msiexe
 93
 94
                  AND ParentImage:("\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe")
 95
              ideas: >
96
                - monitor executable and script files creation by Office applications, use files extensions
 97
                  Note: add more files extensions/magic bytes to the rules logic of your choice.
98
              telemetry:
99
                file_create:
100
                  - Sysmon EID 11
101
                  - EDR (minifilter)
                file_rename:
102
103
                  - EDR (minifilter)
              rules: >
104
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:11 AND Image:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\excel.exe" OR "\\powerpnt.
105
106
                  AND TargetFilename:(*.exe OR *.dll OR *.ocx OR *.com OR *.ps1 OR *.vbs OR *.sys OR *.bat
107
                - Channel:EDR AND EventType:(FileCreate OR FileRename) AND Image:("\\winword.exe" OR "\\exe
                  AND (Filename:(*.exe OR *.dll OR *.ocx OR *.com OR *.ps1 OR *.vbs OR *.sys OR *.bat OR *.
108
109
          quote: >
110
            - "This (MS Excel) then made a network request to download a file from this URL"
111
          mitre_attack:
            defense_evasion:
112
113
              - T1218.010 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Regsvr32
114
            detection:
              ideas: >
115
116
                - MS Excel process initiated an external network connection of we try to monitor such acti
```

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	no exect process interaced an executar necmork connecessor, in we cry to monitor such aces
117	instead monitor outbound network connections initiated by Regsvr32.exe (not directly rela
118	Note: you may also check hypothesis for local-to-local connections and add other LOLBins

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```
579
                  - EDR (minifilter)
                file rename:
580
581
                  - EDR (minifilter)
582
                file_delete:
                  - EDR (minifilter)
583
584
              rules: >
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\rclone.exe" OR ProcessCo
585
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (OriginalFileName:"rclone.exe" OR Company:""*rclone\.org
586
                - Channel: EDR AND EventType: (FileCreate OR FileRename OR FileDelete) AND (OriginalFileName:
587
                  AND NOT FilePath:"\\rclone.exe"
588
589
              ideas: >
590
                - monitor Rclone tool execution with suspicious command-lines.
591
              telemetry:
592
                process_create:
593
                  - Windows EID 4688
                  - Sysmon EID 1
594
595

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

596
              rules: >
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:"\\rclone.exe" OR ProcessCo
597
                  AND ProcessCommandLine.keyword:/.*\\\.*\\(ADMIN|IPC|C)\$.*/ AND ProcessCommandLine:(*htt
598
599
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:"\\rclone.exe" OR CommandLine:"*rclone *" OR Orig
600
                  AND CommandLine.keyword:/.*\\\.*\\(ADMIN|IPC|C)\\$.*/ AND CommandLine:(*http* OR *ftp*)
601
                - monitor system processes execution from untypical paths. Add more executables of your cho
602
603
              telemetry:
604
                process_create:
                  - Windows EID 4688
605
606
                  - Sysmon EID 1
607

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

608
                - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND NewProcessName:("\\svchost.exe" OR "\\gpupc
609
                  AND NOT NewProcessName:("C\:\\Windows\\System32\\" OR "C\:\\Windows\\Sys\WOW64\\")
610
                - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND Image:("\\svchost.exe" OR "\\gpupdate.exe" OR "\\taskhos
611
                  AND NOT Image:("C\:\\Windows\\System32\\" OR "C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\")
612
613
          auote: >
614
            - "For the final actions, the threat actors dropped a ransomware executable on the domain contr
615
616
            - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/main/TTPs/Defense%20Evasion/T1197%
          quote: >
617
618
            - "The -smode flag was used with the ransomware executable to set the system to reboot into Saf
619
            - "bootcfg /raw /a /safeboot:network /id 1 (pre-Vista)"
```

```
- "bcdedit /set {current} sateboot network" (vista+)"
620
621
            - "bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot"
            - "REG ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce /v "*UndoSB" /t REG SZ /d "bd
622
623
          mitre_attack:
624
            defense_evasion:
              - T1562.001 - Impair Defenses - Disable or Modify Tools
625
            detection:
626
              ideas: >
627
                - monitor bootcfg/bcdedit tools execution with "safeboot" option. Multiple alerts of this r
628

    monitor writing bootcfg/bcdedit executables to Windows registry run keys. Add more regist

629
630
            telemetry:
              process_create:
631
                - Windows EID 4688
632
                - Sysmon EID 1
633

    EDR (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine/Ex)

634
              registry_value_set:
635
                - Windows EID 4657 (SACL)
636
                - Sysmon EID 13
637

    EDR (CmRegisterCallback/Ex, Registry API)

638
            rules: >
639
              - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:("\\bcdedit.exe" OR "\\bootcf
640
              - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:("\\bcdedit.exe" OR "\\bootcfg.exe") OR CommandLine
641
                OR Description: ("Boot Configuration Data Editor" OR "BootCfg*")) AND CommandLine: *safeboot*
642
643
              - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4657 AND ObjectName:"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*'
              - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:13 AND TargetObject:"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*" AND Detai
644
              - Channel:Windows-Security AND EventID:4688 AND (NewProcessName:("\\powershell.exe" OR "\\pws
645
                AND ProcessCommandLine:("*Set-ItemProperty*" OR "* sp *" OR "*add*") AND ProcessCommandLine
646
              - Channel:Sysmon AND EventID:1 AND (Image:("\\powershell.exe" OR "\\pwsh.exe" OR "\\reg.exe")
647
                OR Description:("Windows PowerShell" OR "Registry Console Tool")) AND CommandLine:("*Set-It
648
              - Channel:Windows-Powershell AND EventID:400 AND HostApplication:("*powershell *" OR "*pwsh *
649
                AND HostApplication: "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*" AND HostApplication: ("*bcdedit *" OF
650
651
652
```