





Hypervisor Jackpotting, Part 2: eCrime Actors Increase Targeting of ESXi Servers with Ransomware

August 30, 2021 | Michael Dawson | From The Front I



This is Part 2 of a three-part blog series. Read Part 1 and Part 3.

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and SPRITE SPIDER, were observed utilizing this technique with their respective ransomware variants, *Darkside* and *Defray777*. Since then, CrowdStrike has observed a significant uptrend in hypervisor jackpotting by other adversaries, including PINCHY SPIDER and VIKING SPIDER. In this blog, we overview each new campaign CrowdStrike has observed targeting ESXi systems and detail defensive controls that can be implemented to protect these critical assets.

Babuk Locker

In March 2021, operators of *Babuk Locker* ransomware offered access to an ESXi variant as part of a sought-out partnership opportunity. In May 2021, CrowdStrike Services observed a victim targeted with this ESXi variant. The ransomware appends the file extension .babyk_esxi to files it encrypts, and creates a ransom note named How To Restore Your Files.txt. The ransom note contains two URLs: a victim-specific .onion URL for communications, and one for the *Babuk Locker* dedicated leak site (DLS).

FERAL SPIDER and DeathKitty

Since March 2021, FERAL SPIDER, the developers and operators of *DeathKitty* (aka

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account, where they enable SSH for a remote shell. The operators then use PuTTY and WinSCP to copy the ransomware to the /tmp directory and execute the commands shown in Table 1.

Command	Description
pythonversion	Check version of Python installed
cd /tmp/	Change to /tmp/ directory
chmod +x <filename></filename>	Add execute permission to Pysa script
./ <filename> /vmfs/volumes 4096</filename>	Execute Pysa against the VM datastore path

Table 1. Pysa commands

CrowdStrike observed multiple cases in which the *Pysa* ransomware script was tailored for the version of Python installed on the ESXi, with *Pysa* filenames 27 and 3 noted as highly likely to correspond with Python v2.7 or v3.x. The ransomware also appends the file extension .pysa to files it encrypts, and creates a ransom note named RECOVER_YOUR_DATA.txt at the root (/) of the volume. The ransom note provides two email addresses, hosted on OnionMail and ProtonMail, for communications and includes *Pysa's* DLS .onion domain.

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


Table 2. REvix commands

In July 2021, PINCHY SPIDER began distributing *REvix v1.2a*, which added execution of VM termination functionality within a separate thread, and support for additional encryption types. In mid-July 2021, PINCHY SPIDER's DLS infrastructure went offline, leaving in question the future of these operations.

VIKING SPIDER and Ragnar Locker

Since June 2021, VIKING SPIDER has deployed *Ragnar Locker's* ELF binary to ESXi systems via SSH using the native root account. VIKING SPIDER copies the binary to the /tmp directory and issues the commands shown in Table 3.

Command Description

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	esxcliformatter=csv vm process list	List the running VMs on this sys
	<pre>find /vmfs/volumes/ -type f -name "*.vmdk"</pre>	Search for all virtual disk files w
	chmod a+x /tmp/ <filename></filename>	Add execute permission to Rac
	<pre>/tmp/<filename> /vmfs/volumes/<uuid>/</uuid></filename></pre>	Execute Ragnar Locker against
	ps grep <filename></filename>	Ensure Ragnar Locker process

Table 3. Ragnar Locker commands

The ransomware appends the file extension .crypted to files it encrypts, and creates a ransom note per encrypted file using the original filename appended with the extension .crypted.README_TO_RESTORE. The ransom note includes a unique victim URL for live chat communications via Tor, as well as VIKING SPIDER's dedicated leak site (DLS) .onion domain.

How to Protect Your Cluster

Listed below are CrowdStrike's top five recommendations that organizations should implement to mitigate the success or impact of hypervisor jackpotting.

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- Ensure ESXi datastore volumes are regularly backed up. Specifically, virtual
 machine disk images and snapshots should be backed up daily (more frequently if
 possible) to an offsite storage provider.
- If encryption activity is observed, do not shut down the ESXi hosts. If encryption activity is observed, system administrators may be tempted to reboot or shutdown VMs. Be aware that ransomware is not able to modify locked files, and if a VM is still powered on, it will be considered locked. As a result, shutting down or rebooting VMs will actually release the lock and allow the ransomware to encrypt the virtual disk files.

Additional ESXi security recommendations are available from VMware at https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/7.0/com.vmware.vsphere.security.doc/GUID-B39474AF-6778-499A-B8AB-E973BE6D4899.html.

Conclusion

CrowdStrike has observed a significant uptrend in eCrime campaigns targeting VMware ESXi hypervisors with ransomware to maximize encryption impact across a victim

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


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
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


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
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
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