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#### **ESET RESEARCH**

# **OSX/Proton spreading again** through supply-chain attack

Our researchers noticed that the makers of the Elmedia Player software have been distributing a version of their app trojanized with the OSX/Proton malware.



**ESET Research** 

20 Oct 2017 • 5 min. read

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On 19 October 2017, ESET researchers noticed that Eltima, the makers of the Elmedia Player software, were distributing a version of their application trojanized with the OSX/Proton malware on their official website. ESET contacted Eltima as soon as the situation was confirmed. Eltima was very responsive and maintained an excellent communication with us throughout the incident.

#### Timeline

- 2017-10-19 : Trojanized package confirmed
- 2017-10-19 10:35am EDT: Eltima informed via email
- 2017-10-19 2:25pm EDT: Eltima acknowledged the issue and initiated remediation efforts
- 2017-10-19 3:10pm EDT: Eltima confirms their infrastructure is cleaned up and serving the legitimate applications again
- 2017-10-19 10:12am EDT: Eltima publishes an announcement about the event
- 2017-10-20 12:15pm EDT: Added references to Folx that was also distributed with the Proton malware

Note: This blog was initially posted despite our research being incomplete. Hence, this information is preliminary and the blogpost will be updated as new facts emerge.

# Am I compromised?

ESET advises anyone who downloaded Elmedia Player or Folx software recently to verify if their system is compromised by testing the presence of any of the following files or directories:

- /tmp/Updater.app/
- /Library/LaunchAgents/com.Eltima.UpdaterAgent.plist
- O /Library/.rand/
- O /Library/.rand/updateragent.app/

If any of them exists, it means the traignized Elmodia Player or Folx application

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abilities. It gains

- Operating system details: hardware serial number (IOPlatformSerialNumber), full name of the current user, hostname, System Integrity Protection status (csrutil status), gateway information (route -n get default | awk '/gateway/ { print \$2 } '), current time & timezone
- Browser information from Chrome, Safari, Opera and Firefox: history, cookies, bookmarks, login data, etc.
- Cryptocurrency wallets:
  - Electrum: ~/.electrum/wallets
  - Bitcoin Core: ~/Library/Application Support/Bitcoin/wallet.dat
  - Armory: ~/Library/Application Support/Armory
- SSH private data (entire .ssh content)
- macOS keychain data using a modified version of chainbreaker
- Tunnelblick VPN configuration (~/Library/Application Support/Tunnelblick/Configurations)
- GnuPG data (~/.gnupg)
- 1Password data (~/Library/Application Support/1Password 4 and ~/Library/Application Support/1Password 3.9)
- List of all installed applications.

# How do I clean my system?

As with any compromise of an administrator account, a full OS reinstall is the only sure way to get rid of the malware. Victims should also assume at least all the secrets outlined in the previous section are compromised and take appropriate measures to invalidate them.

# Supply-chain attack revisited on the Mac

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# **Technical analysis**

OSX/Proton is a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) sold as a kit on underground forums. It was very briefly documented by Sixgill earlier this year and then further analyzed by Thomas Reed at MalwareBytes, Amit Serper at CyberReason and Patrick Wardle at Objective-See.

In the current case of Eltima trojanized software, the attacker built a signed wrapper around the legitimate Elmedia Player and Proton. In fact, we observed what seems to be real-time repackaging and signing of the wrappers, all with the same valid Apple Developer ID. See the history of currently known samples below. Eltima and ESET confirmed they are working with Apple to invalidate the Developer ID used to sign the malicious application. (Apple revoked the certificate.)

(timestamps are all in EDT timezone)

Clean application:

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
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
Timestamp=Oct Authoritv=Developer

	I L -	
19, 2017, 8:00:05	ID Application: Clifton	e9dcdae1406ab1132dc9d507fd63503e5c4d41d9
AM	Grimm (9H35WM5TA5)	
Timestamp=Oct	Authority=Developer	
19, 2017, 12:22:24	ID Application: Clifton	8cfa551d15320f0157ece3bdf30b1c62765a93a5
PM	Grimm (9H35WM5TA5)	
Timestamp=Oct	Authority=Developer	
Timestamp=Oct 19, 2017, 2:00:38	Authority=Developer  ID Application: Clifton	0400b35d703d872adc64aa7ef914a260903998ca
•	, .	0400b35d703d872adc64aa7ef914a260903998ca

First, the wrapper launches the real Elmedia Player application stored in the Resources folder of the application:



#### And finally extracts & launches OSX/Proton:




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#### Persistance


OSX/Proton ensures persistence by adding a LaunchAgent for all users when the administrator types their password. It creates the following files on the system:

- O /Library/LaunchAgents/com.Eltima.UpdaterAgent.plist
- O /Library/.rand/updateragent.app

```
$ plutil -p /Library/LaunchAgents/com.Eltima.UpdaterAgent.plist
{
   "ProgramArguments" => [
     0 => "/Library/.rand/updateragent.app/Contents/MacOS/updateragent"
]
   "KeepAlive" => 1
   "RunAtLoad" => 1
   "Label" => "com.Eltima.UpdaterAgent"
}
```

# **Backdoor commands**

As mentioned at the beginning of the post, OSX/Proton is a backdoor with extensive information stealing capabilities. The backdoor component we observed supports the following commands:



remote_execute	Execute the binary file inside a .zip file or a given shell command	
tunnel	Create SSH tunnel using port 22 or 5900	
upload	Upload file to C&C server	

# **C&C** server

Proton uses a C&C domain that mimics the legitimate Eltima domain, which is consistent with the Handbrake case:

	Legitimate domain	Proton C2 domain
Eltima	eltima.com	eltima[.]in
Handbrake	handbrake.fr	handbrakestore[.]com
		handbrake[.]cc

#### **IOCs**

URL distributing the trojanized application at the time of discovery:

- hxxps://mac[.]eltima[.]com/download/elmediaplayer.dmg
- hxxp://www.elmedia-video-player.[.]com/download/elmediaplayer.dmg
- hxxps://mac.eltima[.]com/download/downloader\_mac.dmg

#### **C&C** servers

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Elmedia Player.app/Contents/MacOS/Elmedia Player	C9472D791C076A10DCE5FF0D3AB6E7706524B741	OS>
	30D77908AC9D37C4C14D32EA3E0B8DF4C7E75464	OS>
Updater.app/Contents/MacOS/Updater	3EF34E2581937BABD2B7CE63AB1D92CD9440181A	OS)
	EF5A11A1BB5B2423554309688AA7947F4AFA5388	OS>

Hat tip to Michal Malik, Anton Cherepanov, Marc-Étienne M. Léveillé, Thomas Dupuy & Alexis Dorais-Joncas for their work on this investigation.

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