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The Tale of SettingContent-ms Files



Matt Nelson · Follow

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
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
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
being embedded via OLE by default. This reduces the effectiveness of one of the most relied upon payload delivery methods. When trying to activate a blocked file extension, Office will throw an error and prevent execution:



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




Attack Surface Reduction Rules blocking Office child processes


When you combine OLE blocking and ASR together, the options to execute code on an endpoint from the internet become a little more limited. Most

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


```
ControlPanel - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<PCSettings>
 <SearchableContent xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/Search/2013/SettingContent">
   <ApplicationInformation>
     <AppID>windows.immersivecontrolpanel_cw5n1h2txyewy!microsoft.windows.immersivecontrolpanel</appID>
     <DeepLink>%windir%\system32\control.exek/DeepLink>
     <Icon>%windir%\system32\control.exe</Icon>
   </ApplicationInformation>
   <SettingIdentity>
     <PageID></PageID>
     <hostID>{12B1697E-D3A0-4DBC-B568-CCF64A3F934D}</hostID>
   </SettingIdentity>
   <SettingInformation>
     <Description>@shell32.dll,-4161</Description>
     <Keywords>@shell32.dll,-4161</Keywords>
   </SettingInformation>
 </SearchableContent>
</PCSettings>
```








Then if we double-click the file:



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
When looking up the <u>ZoneIds online</u>, "3" equals "URLZONE_INTERNET". For one reason or another, the file still executes without any notification or warning to the user.

So, we now have a file type that allows arbitrary shell command execution and displays zero warnings or dialogues to the user. When trying to get initial access, going across a target's perimeter with an unusual file type can be risky. Ideally, this file would be placed in a container of a more common file type, such as an Office document.

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




The <rule ID> parameter is the GUID of the rule you want to enabled. You can find the GUID for each ASR rule documented <u>here</u>. For this test, I want to enable the Child Process Creation rule, which is GUID D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A.

After enabling the rule, the attack no longer works:

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
while clicking around in Word, I noticed that there were still child processes being spawned by Word.


Valid child process creation of Word

This makes sense, as Office needs to use features that rely on other

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
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




The next step is to embed this new file into a Word document and see if ASR blocks "Excel.exe" from being spawned.


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





Execution of commands via ASR whitelisted "AppVLP.exe"

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file type appears to give execution (even from the internet) immediately after it's opened, despite having the MOTW applied.

Defenses:

Great, so what can you do about it? Ultimately, a .SettingContent-ms file should not be executing anywhere outside of the "C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel" path. Additionally, since the file format only allows for executing shell commands, anything being run

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




As committed as SpecterOps is to transparency (https://posts.specterops.io/a-push-toward-transparency-c385a0dd1e34), we acknowledge the rate at which attackers adopt new offensive techniques once they are made public. This is why prior to publicization of a new offensive technique, we regularly inform the respective vendor of the issue, supply ample time to mitigate the issue, and notify select, trusted vendors in order to ensure detections can be delivered to their customers as quickly as possible.

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[UPDATE] 8/14/2018: MSRC fixed the issue CVE-2018–8414 (https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8414)

Cheers,

Matt N.

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