

An Outlook parasite for stealth persistence

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TRADECRAFT

PERSISTENCE

In 2019 I was researching new “stealthy” persistence techniques that were not yet published or commonly known. I was triggered by the techniques that (mis)used plugins for programs on the target’s machine. Particularly interesting targets are browsers, e-mail clients and messaging apps, as they’re typically started after boot.

While reading other’s work, I stumbled upon a blog post from [@bohops](#) about [VSTOs: The Payload Installer That Probably Defeats Your Application Whitelisting Rules](#). He shows how to create an “evil VSTO” and install it into Office. His conclusion there however, is that an unprivileged account will get a (“ClickOnce”) pop-up from `vstoinstaller.exe` asking the user for permission:

Bypassing this “ClickOnce” pop-up would be very valuable from an attacker perspective and so I decided to dig a bit deeper into how exactly `vstoinstaller.exe` installs a VSTO add-in. I fired up Procmon and filtered on `vstoinstaller.exe` process while clicking through this pop-up. I started by looking at the registry keys in `HKCU`, since I assumed that would be a key part of the installation.

These registry keys were particularly interesting and seemed very much related to the installation of the VSTO. I uninstalled the plugin again using `vstoinstaller.exe /uninstall` which removed those particular registry keys.

Installing the VSTO again using the conventional method triggers the pop-up again, so I was assuming the uninstallation performed a complete roll-back of the VSTO install.

Next I wrote a PowerShell script that set the correct registry keys and values to test if my Outlook add-in would be loaded by Outlook, without any user consent pop-ups. I think the trick of bypassing the “ClickOnce” pop-up eventually boils down to adding the public key of the certificate used to sign the VSTO with, in `HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\Security\Inclusion\`.

```
function Install-OutlookAddin {
<#
    .SYNOPSIS

        Installs an Outlook add-in.
        Author: @_vivami

    .PARAMETER PayloadPath

        The path of the DLL and manifest files

    .EXAMPLE

        PS> Install-OutlookAddin -PayloadPath C:\Path\to\Addin.vsto
#>

[CmdletBinding()]
param(
    [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
    [string]
    $PayloadPath
)

$RegistryPaths =
    @( "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\OutlookExtension"),
    @( "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\SolutionMetadata"),
```


.EXAMPLE

```
PS> Remove-OutlookAddin

#>

$RegistryPaths =
    @( "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\OutlookExtension"),
    @( "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\SolutionMetadata"),
    #@( "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\SolutionMetadata\{FA2052FB-9E23-43C8-A0EF-43BBB710DC61}"),
    @( "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\Security\Inclusion\1e1f0cff-ff7a-406d-bd82-e53809a5e93a")

$RegistryPaths | foreach {
    Remove-Item -Path $_ -Force -Recurse
}
}
```

Sure enough, it worked! The add-in was installed and loaded by Outlook upon startup, without a pop-up.

Taking a look at Sysinternals' AutoRuns, we can see that this VSTO add-in is not detected.

MSRC

I've reached out to Microsoft Security Response Center, but since this is not a breach of a [security boundary](#), this bug does not meet the bar for servicing and will not be fixed.

Detection

To detect this persistence technique, monitor "RegistryEvent Value Set"-events (Sysmon Event ID 13) on the following paths:

```
HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\
HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\Word\Addins\
```

```
HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\Excel\Addins\  
HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\Powerpoint\Addins\  
HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\Security\Inclusion\
```

You can try all of this yourself with the PoC code on my [GitHub repo](#).

Related Posts

- [Persisting our implant like the CIA](#)
- [Reigning the Empire, evading detection](#)