

Threat Hunter Playbook

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Windows

PRE-HUNT ACTIVITIES

Data Management

GUIDED HUNTS

Windows

LSASS Memory Read Access

DLL Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread and LoadLibrary

Active Directory Object Access via Replication Services

Active Directory Root Domain Modification for Replication Services

Registry Modification to Enable Remote Desktop Conections

Local PowerShell Execution

WDigest Downgrade

PowerShell Remote Session

Alternate PowerShell Hosts

Domain DPAPI Backup Key Extraction

SysKey Registry Keys Access

SAM Registry Hive Handle Request

WMI Win32_Process Class and Create Method for Remote Execution

WMI Eventing

WMI Module Load

Local Service Installation

Remote Service creation

Remote Service Control Manager Handle

Remote Interactive Task Manager LSASS Dump

Registry Modification for Extended NetNTLM Downgrade

Access to Microphone Device

Remote WMI

Active Script Event Consumers

Remote DCOM IErtUtil DLL Hijack

Remote WMI Wbemcomn DLL Hijack

SMB Create Remote File

Wuauclt CreateRemoteThread Execution

TUTORIALS

Jupyter Notebooks









∷ Contents

Hypothesis

Technical Context

Offensive Tradecraft

Pre-Recorded Security Datasets

Analytics

Known Bypasses

False Positives

Hunter Notes

Hunt Output

References

LSASS Memory Read Access

Hypothesis

Adversaries might be accessing LSASS and extract credentials from memory.

Technical Context

After a user logs on, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process in memory. This is meant to facilitate single sign-on (SSO) ensuring a user is not prompted each time resource access is requested. The credential data may include Kerberos tickets, NTLM password hashes, LM password hashes (if the password is <15 characters, depending on Windows OS version and patch level), and even clear-text passwords (to support WDigest and SSP authentication among others.

Offensive Tradecraft

Adversaries look to get access to the credential data and do it so by finding a way to access the contents of memory of the LSASS process. For example, tools like Mimikatz get credential data by listing all available provider credentials with its SEKURLSA::LogonPasswords module. The module uses a Kernel32 function called OpenProcess to get a handle to Isass to then access LSASS and dump password data for currently logged on (or recently logged on) accounts as well as services running under the context of user credentials.

Pre-Recorded Security Datasets

Metadata	Value
docs	https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/credential_access/SDWIN-190518202151.html
link	https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OTRF/Security- Datasets/master/datasets/atomic/windows/credential access/host/empire mimikatz logonpasswords.zip

Download Dataset

```
import requests
from zipfile import ZipFile
from io import BytesIO

url = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OTRF/Security-Datasets/master/datasets/szipFileRequest = requests.get(url)
zipFile = ZipFile(BytesIO(zipFileRequest.content))
datasetJSONPath = zipFile.extract(zipFile.namelist()[0])
```

Read Dataset

```
import pandas as pd
from pandas.io import json

df = json.read_json(path_or_buf=datasetJSONPath, lines=True)
```

Analytics

A few initial ideas to explore your data and validate your detection logic:

Analytic I

Look for non-system accounts getting a handle to and accessing Isass. Even though most adversaries might inject into a System process to blend in with most applications accessing LSASS, there are ocassions where adversaries do not elevate to System and use the available administrator rights from the user since that is the minimum requirement to access LSASS.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Process	Microsoft-Windows-Security- Auditing	Process accessed Process	4663
Process	Microsoft-Windows-Security- Auditing	Process requested_access Process	4656

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`, Hostname, SubjectUserName, ProcessName, ObjectName, AccessMa
FROM dataTable
WHERE LOWER(Channel) = "security"

AND (EventID = 4663 OR EventID = 4656)

AND ObjectName LIKE "%lsass.exe"

AND NOT SubjectUserName LIKE "%$"
```

Pandas Query

```
(
df[['@timestamp','Hostname','SubjectUserName','ProcessName','ObjectName','AccessI
[(df['Channel'].str.lower() == 'security')
    & ((df['EventID'] == 4663) | (df['EventID'] == 4656))
    & (df['ObjectName'].str.contains('.*lsass.exe', regex=True))
    & (~df['SubjectUserName'].str.endswith('.*$', na=False))
]
.head()
)
```

Analytic II

Look for processes opening handles and accessing Lsass with potential dlls in memory (i.e UNKNOWN in CallTrace).

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Process	Microsoft-Windows- Sysmon/Operational	Process accessed Process	10

Logic

```
SELECT `@timestamp`,Hostname,SourceImage,TargetImage,GrantedAccess,SourceProcess(
FROM dataTable
WHERE Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
   AND EventID = 10
   AND TargetImage LIKE "%lsass.exe"
   AND CallTrace LIKE "%UNKNOWN%"
```

Pandas Query

```
(
df[['@timestamp','Hostname','SourceImage','TargetImage','GrantedAccess','SourcePi

[(df['Channel'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational')
    & (df['EventID'] == 10)
    & (df['TargetImage'].str.contains('.*lsass.exe', regex=True))
    & (df['CallTrace'].str.contains('.*UNKNOWN*', regex=True))
]
.head()
)
```

Analytic III

Look for processes loading a few known DLLs loaded by tools like Mimikatz to interact with credentials.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Module	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational	Process loaded DII	7

Logic

```
SELECT ProcessGuid, Image, COUNT(DISTINCT ImageLoaded) AS hits FROM dataTable
```

```
WHERE Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"

AND EventID = 7

AND (
    ImageLoaded LIKE "%samlib.dll"
    OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%vaultcli.dll"
    OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%hid.dll"
    OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%winscard.dll"
    OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%cryptdll.dll"
    OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%cryptdll.dll"
)

AND '@timestamp' BETWEEN "2019-03-00 00:00:00.000" AND "2019-06-20 00:00:00.00 GROUP BY ProcessGuid,Image ORDER BY hits DESC LIMIT 10
```

Pandas Query

```
(
df[['@timestamp','ProcessGuid','Image','ImageLoaded']]

[(df['Channel'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational')
    & (df['EventID'] == 7)
    & (
        (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*samlib.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*vaultcli.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*hid.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*winscard.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*cryptdll.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['@timestamp'].between('2020-06-00 00:00:00.000','2020-08-20 00:00:00.00]]
        .groupby(['ProcessGuid','Image'])['ImageLoaded'].count().sort_values(ascending=Fa).to_frame()
```

Analytic IV

Join processes opening a handle and accessing LSASS with potential DLLs loaded in memory and processes loading a few known DLLs loaded by tools like Mimikatz to interact with credentials.

Data source	Event Provider	Relationship	Event
Module	Microsoft-Windows- Sysmon/Operational	Process loaded DII	7
Process	Microsoft-Windows- Sysmon/Operational	Process accessed Process	10

Logic

```
SELECT a.'@timestamp', a.Hostname, m.Image, a.SourceProcessGUID
FROM dataTable a
INNER JOIN (
    SELECT ProcessGuid, Image, COUNT(DISTINCT ImageLoaded) AS hits
    FROM dataTable
    WHERE Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
        AND EventID = 7
        AND (
            ImageLoaded LIKE "%samlib.dll"
            OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%vaultcli.dll"
            OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%hid.dll"
            OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%winscard.dll"
            OR ImageLoaded LIKE "%cryptdll.dll"
        AND '@timestamp' BETWEEN "2020-06 00:00:00.000" AND "2020-10-20 00:00:00
        GROUP BY ProcessGuid, Image ORDER BY hits DESC LIMIT 10
ON a.SourceProcessGUID = m.ProcessGuid
WHERE a.Channel = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    AND a.EventID = 10
    AND a.TargetImage LIKE "%Lsass.exe"
    AND a.CallTrace LIKE "%UNKNOWN%"
    AND m.hits >= 3
```

Pandas Query

```
imageLoadDf = (
df[['@timestamp','ProcessGuid','Image','ImageLoaded']]

[(df['Channel'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational')
    & (df['EventID'] == 7)
    & (
        (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*samlib.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*vaultcli.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*hid.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*winscard.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['ImageLoaded'].str.contains('.*cryptdll.dll', regex=True))
        | (df['@timestamp'].between('2020-06-00 00:00:00.000','2020-08-20 00:00:00.00]
]
.groupby(['ProcessGuid','Image'])['ImageLoaded'].count().sort_values(ascending=Factorial)
```

```
).to_frame()

processAccessDf = (
df[['@timestamp', 'Hostname', 'SourceImage', 'TargetImage', 'GrantedAccess', 'SourceImage', 'GrantedAccess', 'SourceImage'] == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational')
    & (df['EventID'] == 10)
    & (df['TargetImage'].str.contains('.*lsass.exe', regex=True))
    & (df['CallTrace'].str.contains('.*UNKNOWN*', regex=True))
]
)

(
pd.merge(imageLoadDf, processAccessDf,
    left_on = 'ProcessGuid', right_on = 'SourceProcessGUID', how = 'inner')
)
```

Known Bypasses

Idea Playbook

Inject into known processes accessing LSASS on a regular basis such as pmfexe.exe and as System

False Positives

The Microsoft Monitoring Agent binary pmfexe.exe is one of the most common ones that
accesses Lsass.exe with at least 0x10 permissions as System. That could be useful to
blend in through the noise.

Hunter Notes

- Looking for processes accessing LSASS with the 0x10(VmRead) rights from a nonsystem account is very suspicious and not as common as you might think.
- GrantedAccess code 0x1010 is the new permission Mimikatz v.20170327 uses for command "sekurlsa::logonpasswords". You can specifically look for that from processes like PowerShell to create a basic signature.
 - 0x00000010 = VMRead
 - o 0x00001000 = QueryLimitedInfo
- GrantedAccess code 0x1010 is less common than 0x1410 in large environment.
- Out of all the Modules that Mimikatz needs to function, there are 5 modules that when loaded all together by the same process is very suspicious.
 - $\circ \ \ \mathsf{samlib.dll}, \mathsf{vaultcli.dll}, \mathsf{hid.dll}, \mathsf{winscard.dll}, \mathsf{cryptdll.dll}$
- For signatures purposes, look for processes accessing Lsass.exe with a potential CallTrace Pattern> /C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+[a-zA-Z0-9] {1,}|C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll+[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,}|UNKNOWN.*/
- You could use a stack counting technique to stack all the values of the permissions invoked by processes accessing Lsass.exe. You will have to do some filtering to reduce the number of false positives. You could then group the results with other events such as modules being loaded (EID 7). A time window of 1-2 seconds could help to get to a reasonable number of events for analysis.

Hunt Output

Type Link

Sigma https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_lsass_access_non_system_account.yml

References

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- https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821#SEKURLSALogonPasswords
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/dev
- http://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/04/09/modifying-mimikatz-to-be-loaded-using-invoke-reflectivedllinjection-ps1/

Previous Next

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< Windows

DLL Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread and LoadLibrary

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