



linear memory




small bins:

{ }



small bins

{ b }



small bins


{ b }

→ nothing happens!
 → next malloc returns b!


empty bin:



first free:



second free:



next malloc:

- unlink b from free list
- return b

→ forever... every new malloc returns

'b again and again!

→ this also means that the FD and BK pointers are now "user data" (!!!) returned by malloc() → writable for us!

exploit:

- free(b), free(b), malloc()
- write FD and BK pointers to get a write what where condition
- example: $X = \text{malloc}(\dots)$

$X : \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline & \text{(FD)} & \text{(BK)} \\ \hline & \text{WHERE}^* & \text{WHAT} \\ \hline \end{array}$ ← sizes

→ overwrite FD and BK pointers with strcpy, read, gets, ..

WHERE: GOT, malloc hook, free hook, ...

* slightly different

WHAT: address of injected shell code, EIP chain, ...

* remember the unlink macro:

FD = p → fd
BK = p → bk
FD → bk = BK
BK → fd = FD

WHERE WHAT
→ FD → bk = BK
FD + [24] = BK

.. [FD | BK] ..

victim chunk

FD := xyz@GOT-24
BK := &shellcode

xyz can be any function that will

be called later..

full exploit sketch.


1) `void *p = malloc(SIZE);`



2) `free(p);`



3) `free(p);`



4) `void *q = malloc(SIZE);`



// set first 8 bytes of q
// set second 8 bytes of q
// e.g. overwrite puts @ GOT
// with address of shellcode



5) `void *t = malloc(SIZE)` // this triggers the unlink overwrite



6) `puts(...);` // executes the shellcode



`0101010101010101`