

FRANCESCO FABBRI

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OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION

Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544

GRADUATE STUDIES

Princeton University	<i>2019 - present</i>
PhD Candidate in Economics	
Dissertation: <i>“Essays on Attention in Economics”</i>	
Expected Completion Date: June 2025	

References

Professor Pietro Ortoleva	Professor Faruk Gul	Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics
Princeton University	Princeton University	Princeton University
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PRIOR EDUCATION

Bocconi University	<i>2013 - 19</i>
MSc in Economic and Social Sciences	
BSc in Economic and Social Sciences	

FIELDS

Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics

PUBLISHED PAPERS

“Competing to Commit: Markets with Rational Inattention,” with Carlo Cusumano and Ferdinand Picroth. *American Economic Review*, 114, no.1, (2024):285-306.

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Attention Holdup.”

A producer invests in the quality of its product before offering it for a fixed price to a rational inattentive consumer who learns about the product’s quality. Flexible information acquisition enables positive quality provision, mitigating the holdup problem caused by costly, non-contractible information investments. A new refinement, preventing information from being acquired for free, uniquely selects a binary-quality equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the producer randomizes between zero and a higher-than-price quality. A trade-off emerges: as the consumer becomes more attentive, the high quality rises, but trade frequency falls since high quality is produced less often. When attention costs vanish, the holdup becomes inevitable: only zero quality is provided, causing the market to fail. Following this trade-off, the producer profits increase when prices lower or production costs rise, as both imply lower high quality and more efficient trade.

WORKING PAPERS

“Rational Inattention with Ambiguity Aversion.”

“Dynamic Games with Noisy Informational Asymmetries,” with Sofia Moroni.

“Absolute and Relative Ambiguity Attitudes,” with Giulio Principi and Lorenzo Stanca.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Games with Nature,” with Massimo Marinacci and Giulio Principi.

“Updating Against Nature,” with Pietro Ortoleva.

“Costly Endogenous Updating,” with João Thereze.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Presentations at Conferences and Seminars

2024 D-Tea Workshop (HEC), University of Naples Federico II

2023 Canadian Economic Theory Conference (Simon Fraser), Bounded Rationality in Choice Conference (Northwestern), North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (UCLA), Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, University of Naples Federico II

2022 D-Tea Workshop (PSE)

2017 Lake Como School of Advanced Studies, ETDM

Refereeing

American Economic Review, Econometrica, The Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Decisions in Economics and Finance

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

<i>Princeton</i>	ECO 501: Graduate Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant (Fall 2022, 2023)	
	ECO 100: Undergraduate Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant (Fall 2022, 2023, 2024)	
<i>Bocconi</i>	Introductory Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant (Fall 2018)	

SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dietrich Economic Theory Center Summer Grant, Princeton University	<i>2021 - 2024</i>
Goldfeld Summer Fellowship, Princeton University	<i>2023</i>
Graduate Economics Fellowship, Princeton University	<i>2022 - 2025</i>
Graduate Honorific Fellowship, Princeton University	<i>2020 - 2022</i>
Bonaldo Stringher Scholarship, Bank of Italy	<i>2020 - 2022</i>
Harold Willis Dodds Merit Fellowship in Economics, Princeton University	<i>2019</i>

LANGUAGES

Italian (native), English

Last updated: November 2024