Symmetric Encryption - Technical Study Guide

1. Encryption Fundamentals

1.1 Key Definitions

- Encryption: Process of converting plaintext ('P') into ciphertext ('C') using a key ('K').
 - Encryption: C = E(K, P)
 - Decryption: P = D(K, C)
- Symmetric Encryption:
 - Same key used for both encryption and decryption.
 - Requires secure key exchange between parties.
- Asymmetric Encryption:
 - Uses different keys for encryption and decryption (not covered in detail here).

1.2 Why Encryption?

- Ensures confidentiality of data.
- Real-world systems require additional properties like:
 - Authenticity
 - Integrity
 - Non-repudiation

2. Security Principles

2.1 Kerckhoffs's Principle

- The security of a cryptographic system should rely only on the secrecy of the key, not the algorithm.
- Open designs promote scrutiny and reliability
- All modern cryptographic standards (e.g., AES) adhere to this principle.

2.2 Avoid DIY Cryptography

- Designing cryptographic systems is complex and error-prone.
- · Common pitfalls:
 - Poor design: E.g., A5/2 encryption in 2G networks was broken after 10 years.
 - $\bullet \quad \text{Weak implementations: Timing attacks or padding oracle attacks can break systems. } \\$
 - o Implementation bugs: E.g., Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL.

3. Classical Ciphers

3.1 Caesar Cipher

- Algorithm:
 - Shift each letter of plaintext by a fixed number.
 - \circ Example: banana with a shift of 3 \rightarrow edqdqd
- Weaknesses
 - Small key space (only 26 possible shifts for English).
 - Easily broken via brute force.

3.2 Substitution Cipher

- Algorithm:
 - Replaces each letter with another based on a permutation.
 - Example: a -> f, b -> x, c -> z.
- Key Space: 26! permutations (~88 bits of entropy).
- Weakness:
 - o Patterns in the plaintext (e.g., letter frequencies) remain visible in the ciphertext.

3.3 Frequency Analysis

- Exploits the statistical properties of languages.
 - E.g., 'e' is the most common letter in English.
 - Matching ciphertext letter frequencies with expected plaintext frequencies can reveal the key.

3.4 Rotor Machines

- Hebern Machine:
 - o A single rotating disk performs substitution.
- Enigma Machine:
 - Uses multiple rotors with different rotation speeds.
 - Significantly increased encryption complexity but was broken during WWII due to predictable key patterns.

4. One-Time Pad

4.1 Algorithm

- XOR the plaintext with a truly random key of the same length.
 - o Encryption: C = P ⊕ K
 - o Decryption: P = C ⊕ K

4.2 Properties

- Perfect Security:
 - o Guaranteed if the key is:
 - 1. Truly random.
 - 2. Used only once.
- Limitations:
 - Key size must equal the message size.
 - Impractical for general use due to key distribution challenges.

5. Modern Encryption: Block Ciphers

5.1 Fundamentals

- Operates on fixed-size data blocks (e.g., 128 bits).
- Deterministic: For the same key and plaintext, output is identical.
- Invertible: Key defines a permutation over all possible block values.

5.2 AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- Key Features:
 - o Block size: 128 bits.
 - o Key sizes: 128, 192, or 256 bits.
 - Efficient hardware implementations (e.g., AES-NI in CPUs).
- Internal Structure:
 - 1. SubBytes: Non-linear substitution.
 - 2. ShiftRows: Row-wise permutation.
 - 3. MixColumns: Matrix-based diffusion.
 - 4. AddRoundKey: XOR with a subkey.
- Selected via public competition (1997-2000 by NIST).

6. Modes of Operation

6.1 ECB (Electronic Codebook Mode)

- Encrypts each block independently.
- Weakness:
 - Identical plaintext blocks produce identical ciphertext blocks.
 - Example: Patterns in ECB-encrypted images reveal structure.

6.2 CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)

- Each ciphertext block depends on the previous block and an Initialization Vector (IV).
 - Formula: C_i = E(K, P_i ⊕ C_{i-1})
- Advantages:
 - Hides plaintext patterns.
- Weakness:
 - Requires careful IV management.

6.3 CTR (Counter Mode)

- Converts block cipher into a stream cipher.
 - Encrypts a counter concatenated with a nonce.
 - o Formula: C_i = P_i ⊕ E(K, Nonce || Counter_i)
- Advantages:
 - o Parallelizable and efficient.
 - Random access to encrypted data.

7. Key Management

7.1 Key Generation

- · Symmetric Keys:
 - Randomly generated or derived using Key Derivation Functions (KDFs).
- Asymmetric Keys:
 - Larger key sizes ensure security (e.g., 256-bit elliptic curve keys).

7.2 Secure Storage

- Use Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) or smartcards.
- · Key wrapping:
 - Encrypt long-term keys with another key.
 - o Example: Wrap with a hardware-protected master key.

7.3 Randomness

- Cryptographic security depends on unpredictable random numbers.
- · Sources of randomness:
 - Hardware entropy (e.g., thermal noise, mouse movements).
 - Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) like /dev/urandom.

8. Security Metrics and Practical Guidelines

8.1 Security Levels

- n-bit security: Resists attacks requiring 2^n steps.
 - o Example: 128-bit keys are secure against all practical brute-force attacks.

8.2 Key Length Guidelines

- Short-term security: 80-bit keys may suffice for temporary protection.
- Long-term security: 256-bit keys recommended for enduring protection.

8.3 Practical Implications

- · Probability of breaking a 128-bit key:
 - Equivalent to winning the lottery (with millions of participants) multiple times in a row.

9. Key Takeaways

Encryption:

- Core mechanism for securing data.
- Relies on strong algorithms and proper implementation.

Classical Ciphers:

• Insecure due to small key spaces and predictable patterns.

Modern Ciphers:

• AES is the standard, but secure usage depends on correct modes of operation (e.g., avoid ECB).

Keys and Randomness:

- Proper key management and high-quality randomness are critical.
- Avoid predictable patterns and ensure secure storage.

Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and Authenticated Encryption - Technical Study Guide

1. Overview of Cryptographic Hash Functions

1.1 Definition and Applications

- Hash Function Basics:
 - Maps inputs of arbitrary length to fixed-length outputs (e.g., 256 or 512 bits).
 - o Properties: Deterministic, efficient, and collision-resistant.
- Applications:
 - Key derivation (e.g., PBKDF2, HKDF).
 - o Randomness extraction.
 - o Password storage (e.g., bcrypt, Argon2).
 - Integrity verification in file systems, cloud storage, and intrusion detection.
 - Proofs of work (e.g., blockchain mining).

1.2 Secure Hash Function Properties

- Pre-image Resistance: Hard to find any input (m) such that (H(m) = h).
- Second Pre-image Resistance: Hard to find (m' ≠ m) such that (H(m') = H(m)).
- Collision Resistance: Hard to find any pair ((m_1, m_2)) such that (H(m_1) = H(m_2)).

2. Hash Function Constructions

2.1 Merkle-Damgård Construction

- Used in MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-2.
- Workflow:
 - Message is divided into fixed-size blocks.
 - o Compression function iteratively processes blocks, combining them with a chaining variable.
 - Outputs the final hash.
- Padding: Ensures messages align with block size.

2.2 Sponge Construction

- Basis of SHA-3 and SHAKE functions.
- Workflow:
 - Absorb Phase: Input message blocks XORed with internal state.
 - o Squeeze Phase: Outputs derived iteratively, supporting flexible output lengths.
- Advantages: Enhanced resistance to length extension attacks and adaptable output sizes.

2.3 Collision Finding and the Birthday Paradox

- Collision Complexity: Approx. (2^{n/2}) for an (n)-bit hash function (e.g., 128 operations for a 256-bit hash).
- Birthday Attack Methodology:
 - Compute hash values for multiple inputs.
 - · Store values and search for matches using indexing.

3. Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

3.1 Purpose and Functionality

- Definition: A MAC ensures both data integrity and authenticity using a shared secret key.
 - o (t = MAC(k, m)): Produces a tag(t) for message(m) using key(k).
- Applications: Used in protocols like TLS, IPSec, and SSH for verifying message integrity.

3.2 Construction Methods

- Keyed Hashes:
 - Example: HMAC (Hash-based MAC).
 - Formula: $(HMAC(k, m) = H((k \oplus opad) || H((k \oplus ipad) || m)))$.
 - o Properties: Secure against length extension attacks when used with Merkle-Damgård hashes.
- Block Cipher-Based MACs:
 - Example: CMAC (Cipher-based MAC).
 - Uses AES in CBC mode, with the last ciphertext block as the MAC tag.

3.3 Limitations and Enhancements

- Prefix MACs: Insecure against length extension attacks.
 - Example: (MAC(k, m) = H(k || m)).
 - Vulnerable to manipulation of (m) by attackers.
- Wegman-Carter MACs: Combines universal hash functions with PRFs for secure message authentication.
 - Example: ($UH(k_1, m) \oplus PRF(k_2, nonce)$).

4. Authenticated Encryption (AE)

4.1 Overview and Motivation

- Purpose: Combines confidentiality and integrity guarantees for secure communication.
- Components:
 - Encryption for confidentiality.
 - MACs for integrity and authenticity.
- Variants: Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) supports additional authenticated plaintext (e.g., sequence numbers).

4.2 AE Composition Methods

- Encrypt-and-MAC:
 - Separately encrypts and authenticates message (m).

- o Vulnerabilities: Potential for decrypting unauthenticated data.
- Example: SSH.

MAC-then-Encrypt:

- Appends MAC to (m) before encryption.
- o Vulnerabilities: Susceptible to padding oracle attacks.
- Example: TLS (pre-1.3).

· Encrypt-then-MAC:

- Authenticates ciphertext instead of plaintext.
- Preferred method due to robustness against DoS attacks and integrity failures.

4.3 Modern AE Schemes

• Galois/Counter Mode (GCM):

- o Combines AES-CTR mode for encryption and a GHASH-based MAC for authentication.
- Features: Parallelizable, efficient in hardware, uses 96-bit nonces.

• ChaCha20-Poly1305:

- o Combines ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC.
- Features: Resilient against side-channel attacks, efficient on platforms without AES hardware support.

5. Optimized AE Constructions

5.1 Performance Considerations

Parallelism:

- o Enables simultaneous encryption and authentication.
- · Example: AES-GCM processes ciphertext blocks independently.

Streamability:

- Allows processing of partial messages without storing entire ciphertexts or plaintexts.
- Example: Duplex-based constructions derived from Sponge.

5.2 Common Schemes

- · Offset Codebook (OCB):
 - · XORs offsets with input blocks for enhanced security.
 - Features: Efficient, patented design.
- Synthetic IV Mode (SIV):
 - Strengthens AE against nonce reuse by combining PRFs with encryption.
 - Features: Non-streamable but robust against nonce-related vulnerabilities.

5.3 Security Implications

- Nonce Reuse:
 - Critical for AEAD schemes; reuse can lead to plaintext compromise (e.g., AES-GCM).
 - Example: Synthetic IV Mode mitigates this by deriving unique nonces from PRF outputs.
- Key Management
 - Proper generation, storage, and rotation are essential for maintaining AE security.

6. Key Takeaways

- MACs: Provide integrity and authenticity but not confidentiality.
- Authenticated Encryption: Combines encryption and MACs to secure messages against tampering and unauthorized access.
- Modern Standards:
 - AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 dominate modern applications.
 - SHA-2 and SHA-3 underpin secure hash and MAC operations.
- Best Practices:
 - $\circ \;\;$ Use Encrypt-then-MAC for new systems.
 - $\bullet \quad \hbox{Ensure unique nonces and robust key management to prevent catastrophic failures}. \\$

Public Key Cryptography - Technical Study Guide

1. Revolution of Public Key Cryptography

1.1 Before Public Key Cryptography

- Relied solely on symmetric cryptography:
 - · Required pre-shared keys for communication.
 - Scaling issues: n(n-1)/2 keys needed for n participants.
 - Limited practicality for asynchronous, open systems.

1.2 Breakthrough (1975-1978)

- Introduction of Public Key Cryptography:
 - 1. Public Key Encryption (PKE): Secures communication without pre-shared keys.
 - 2. Digital Signatures: Provides authenticity and non-repudiation.

2. Key Management

2.1 Symmetric Cryptography Challenges

- Requires n(n-1)/2 unique keys for n participants.
- Key Distribution Centers (KDCs):
 - o Centralized solution where each participant shares a long-term key with the KDC.
 - o Issues:
 - Single point of failure.
 - Scalability limitations in large networks.

2.2 Modern Key Management

- Differentiates between:
 - Long-term keys:
 - Persistent and securely stored in devices like HSMs or smartcards.
 - Session keys:
 - Ephemeral; used for a single session to minimize compromise impact.
- Hybrid Key Management:
 - 1. Use public key cryptography to exchange a symmetric session key.
 - 2. Use the session key for efficient bulk encryption.
 - o Example: TLS handshake process.

2.3 Advantages of Public Key Systems

- 1. Scalability: Removes the need for shared secrets among all participants.
- 2. Non-repudiation: Ensures accountability via digital signatures.
- 3. Compatibility: Works seamlessly in both synchronous and asynchronous systems.

3. Public Key Encryption (PKE)

3.1 Core Concepts

- Public Key ('pk'): Used for encryption.
- Private Key ('sk'): Used for decryption.
- Workflow:
 - 1. Sender encrypts plaintext p using recipient's public key: c = E(pk, p).
 - 2. Recipient decrypts ciphertext c using their private key: p = D(sk, c).

3.2 Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs)

- Asymmetric encryption is computationally expensive for large data.
- Hybrid Approach:
 - 1. Generate a symmetric session key k.
 - 2. Encrypt k with the recipient's public key.
 - 3. Use k for encrypting the bulk data.

3.3 RSA Encryption

- Key Generation:
 - 1. Select two large primes p and q.
 - 2. Compute modulus n = p * q and totient $\phi = (p-1)(q-1)$.
 - 3. Choose a public exponent e, typically 65537.
 - 4. Compute private exponent d such that d * e mod ϕ = 1.
- Encryption: c = m^e mod n.
- **Decryption**: m = c^d mod n.

3.4 Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)

- Enhances RSA security by:
 - o Preventing deterministic outputs.
 - Adding randomness to resist chosen plaintext attacks.
 - Workflow:
 - 1. Input data is padded and split into blocks.
 - 2. Blocks undergo a masking process before encryption.

4. Digital Signatures

4.1 Definition and Properties

- Ensures:
 - 1. Authenticity: Confirms the sender's identity.
 - 2. **Integrity**: Detects message tampering.
 - 3. **Non-repudiation**: Prevents the sender from denying authorship.

4.2 Example: RSA Digital Signatures

- 1. Compute hash h = H(m).
- 2. Compute signature $\sigma = h^d \mod n$.
- 3. Verification:
 - Recipient computes h' = H(m).
 - Valid if h' = (σ ^e mod n).

4.3 Comparison: MACs vs. Digital Signatures

- MACs:
 - o Require shared secret keys.
 - o Provide authenticity and integrity but not non-repudiation.
- · Signatures:
 - Use private-public key pairs.
 - Provide authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation.

5. Key Agreement Protocols

5.1 Diffie-Hellman (DH)

- Goal: Establish a shared symmetric key over an insecure channel.
- Workflow:
 - 1. Public parameters: Group G, generator g.
 - 2. Alice computes A = g^a mod p; Bob computes B = g^b mod p.
 - 3. Shared key: K = A^b mod p = B^a mod p.
- Limitations:
 - Vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks if public keys are not authenticated.

5.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman

• Combines DH with digital signatures to verify authenticity of key exchanges.

6. Cryptography in the Quantum Era

6.1 Quantum Threats

- · Grover's Algorithm:
 - Reduces symmetric key security by half.
 - Mitigation: Increase AES key sizes (e.g., 256 to 512 bits).
- . Shor's Algorithm:
 - Efficiently factors large integers and computes discrete logarithms.
 - Breaks RSA and ECC.

6.2 Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

- NIST's PQC Standards:
 - 1. Lattice-based Cryptography:
 - Examples: CRYSTALS-Kyber (KEMs), CRYSTALS-Dilithium (signatures).
 - 2. Hash-based Cryptography:
 - Resilient against quantum attacks.
 - 3. Code-based Cryptography.

6.3 Transition Strategies

- Hybrid Models:
 - Combine classical and PQC algorithms during the migration period.
- Store-Now, Decrypt-Later (SNDL):
 - o Protect against future decryption by using PQC early.

7. Applications and Secure Protocols

7.1 Secure Email

- Workflow:
 - 1. Sender signs the message: σ = Sign(sk_sender, m).
 - 2. Encrypts: $c = E(pk_recipient, (m, \sigma))$.

- 3. Recipient decrypts and verifies
- Challenges
 - Ensure metadata (e.g., recipient) is signed to prevent tampering.

7.2 TLS 1.3

- Combines:
 - 1. Authenticated Key Exchange: Using Diffie-Hellman.
 - 2. Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305.
- Advantages:
 - Forward secrecy.
 - o Simplified handshake process.

8. Key Takeaways

8.1 Advantages of Public Key Cryptography

- Resolves scalability issues of symmetric cryptography.
- Enables secure, asynchronous communication.
- Provides mechanisms for digital signatures and key agreements.

8.2 Current Challenges

- · Transitioning to post-quantum secure algorithms.
- · Strengthening PKI infrastructure to handle emerging threats.

8.3 Recommendations

- Use well-tested algorithms (e.g., RSA-OAEP, AES-GCM).
- Begin transitioning to PQC standards to future-proof systems.

Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) and Authentication - Technical Study Guide

1. Introduction to Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)

1.1 Need for PKI

- Problem: Public key cryptography assumes authentic public keys.
 - $\circ \;\;$ Example: Alice must trust that Bob's public key (pkB) is truly his.
 - $\verb| o Without authentication, attacks like {\it Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)} are possible. \\$
- Solutions:
 - o Ad-hoc methods (e.g., secure key exchange in person).
 - Systems like PGP/GPG for decentralized trust.
 - o Comprehensive Public Key Infrastructures (PKI).

1.2 Context for PKI

- PKI provides a structured approach with:
 - Legal guarantees: Standardizes algorithms and responsibilities.
 - Technical norms: Ensures interoperability and compliance.
- Key Idea: Establish trust through trusted third parties (Certification Authorities CAs).

2. PKI Architecture

2.1 Trust Model

- Certificate Authority (CA): A trusted entity that certifies public keys.
- Hierarchical Structure:
 - Root CA: Top-level authority, self-signed certificates.
 - Intermediate CAs: Delegated by Root CA, sign end-user certificates.
 - End-Users: Certificates for individuals, devices, or organizations.
- Trust Relationships:
 - If Alice trusts a Root CA, she implicitly trusts all certificates issued by its chain.

2.2 Certificates

- Definition: Digital documents binding a public key to an identity.
- Components:
 - Subject's public key and identity.
 - o Issuer's identity (e.g., CA).
 - Validity period (start and expiration dates).
 - Metadata (e.g., usage constraints).
 - CA's digital signature.

2.3 Certificate Standards

. X.509 Certificates:

- Widely adopted standard for public key certificates.
- Includes:
 - Subject: Identity of the certificate owner.
 - Issuer: CA that signed the certificate.
 - Public Key Info: Associated key and usage constraints.
 - Serial Number: Unique identifier.
 - Extensions: Optional metadata, like key usage.

· Extensions:

- o Subject/Authority Key Identifier: Hash of the public key.
- o Basic Constraints: Indicates whether the certificate belongs to a CA.
- Key Usage: Defines permitted cryptographic operations.

3. Certificate Verification and Management

3.1 Certificate Verification

- Steps for verifying Bob's certificate (presented to Alice):
 - 1. Validate the certificate's signature using the CA's public key.
 - 2. Confirm the certificate's validity period.
 - 3. Check metadata compliance with application needs.
 - 4. Ensure the issuing CA is trusted.
 - 5. Trace the certificate chain to a trusted Root CA.

3.2 Certificate Revocation

- · Need for Revocation:
 - o Private keys are compromised.
 - · CA's integrity is questioned.
 - o Certificates expire or become invalid due to metadata changes.
- Mechanisms:
 - o Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs):
 - CA publishes a blacklist of revoked certificates.
 - Applications periodically fetch CRLs for updates.
 - o Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP):
 - Real-time certificate status verification.
 - Common in eGovernment and enterprise applications.
 - o Certificate Pinning:
 - Pre-approved certificates for specific applications.

4. PKI Challenges and Alternatives

4.1 Initialization of Trust

- Root Certificate Trust:
 - o Root CAs are implicitly trusted (e.g., pre-installed in browsers).
 - Certificates are self-signed and require manual verification.
- Alternative Approaches:
 - Decentralized systems like Pretty Good Privacy (PGP):
 - Web of trust model.
 - Relies on direct and indirect trust relationships.

4.2 Multi-Level Certificate Chains

- Hierarchical Trust:
 - Root CAs issue certificates to intermediate CAs.
 - Intermediate CAs validate certificates for end-users.
- Real-World Complexities:
 - Verification involves tracing back through multiple CAs.
 - Each CA in the chain must be trusted.

5. Authentication Mechanisms

5.1 Fundamentals of Authentication

- Goal: Verify the identity of a user or device.
- · Key Methods:
 - o Something you know: Passwords, PINs, security questions.
 - Something you have: Smart cards, crypto tokens.
 - Something you are: Biometrics (fingerprints, facial recognition).

Workflow:

- 1. Bob sends a challenge to Alice.
- 2. Alice responds by signing or encrypting the challenge.
- Bob verifies Alice's response.

• Example:

- Use of nonces (numbers used once) to prevent replay attacks.
- · Hash functions combine passwords and nonces for secure responses.

5.3 Authentication Protocols

- Kerberos:
 - Centralized authentication using tickets issued by a trusted server.
- TLS:
 - o Combines PKI with authenticated encryption for secure sessions.
- SSH:
 - Enables secure command-line access using public key authentication.

6. Security Considerations

6.1 Password Security

- Threats:
 - o Dictionary attacks: Precomputed hash databases.
 - Keyloggers: Hardware or software capturing keystrokes.
 - Phishing: Adversary tricks user into revealing credentials.

· Mitigations:

- Use salted hashes to resist precomputation attacks.
- o Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA).
- · Educate users on identifying phishing attempts.

6.2 Trusted Computing Base (TCB)

- Definition: Components that must function correctly to ensure overall system security.
- Examples:
 - o Cryptographic coprocessors.
 - Secure APIs.
 - o Tamper-resistant hardware.

7. Key Takeaways

7.1 Role of PKI

- Ensures authentic public keys via certificates.
- Provides a scalable and legally backed framework for trust.

7.2 Challenges

- Establishing trust in Root CAs.
- Managing certificate revocation efficiently.
- · Mitigating human errors in authentication protocols.

7.3 Recommendations

- Use strong, standardized protocols like TLS and Kerberos.
- Transition to post-quantum cryptography to future-proof PKI systems.
- Regularly audit and update trust relationships in certificate chains.

Network Security Protocols - Technical Study Guide

1. Overview of Network Security Protocols

1.1 Web Security Considerations

- The World Wide Web operates on the client/server model over TCP/IP.
- Security Challenges:
 - Web servers can act as entry points into sensitive systems by exploiting software vulnerabilities.
 - o Complexity of web server software and underlying operating systems introduces hidden vulnerabilities.
- Critical Needs:
 - Tailored security tools for ease of configuration and management.
 - Robust mechanisms to mitigate vulnerabilities in web content development and delivery.
 - Effective intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to identify and mitigate web-based attacks.

1.2 OSI Layers and Security Mechanisms

- Application Layer: Implements protocols such as HTTPS, S/MIME, and Kerberos to secure application-level data exchanges.
- Transport Layer: TLS/SSL ensures encryption, authentication, and integrity for data in transit.
- Network Layer: IPSec secures all IP traffic independently of the applications, ensuring a uniform approach to security.
- Other Layers: Focus on securing specific aspects such as physical transmission (Layer 1) and MAC-level protections (Layer 2).

2. Transport Layer Security (TLS)

2.1 Introduction

- TLS, the successor to SSL, is a cryptographic protocol designed to secure communications over a computer network.
- Provides three primary security services:
 - 1. Encryption: Ensures confidentiality of transmitted data using symmetric cryptography.
 - 2. Message Integrity: Prevents data tampering via Message Authentication Codes (MACs).
 - 3. Authentication: Verifies the identities of communicating parties, often using X.509 certificates.

2.2 TLS Protocol Stack

- Record Protocol: Handles fragmentation, compression, encryption, and appending MACs to application data.
- Handshake Protocol:
 - Negotiates cipher suites, protocols, and cryptographic keys between the client and server.
 - o Conducts mutual authentication (if required) and establishes session keys.
- Change Cipher Spec Protocol: Updates the session's cryptographic parameters to finalize key agreements.
- Alert Protocol: Sends alerts in case of errors, such as certificate validation failures or handshake mismatches.
- Heartbeat Protocol: Prevents connection timeout by exchanging periodic heartbeat messages, enhancing session persistence.

2.3 TLS Architecture

- · Connections:
 - Peer-to-peer communication channels that are transient and tied to a specific session.
- Sessions:
 - · Associations between a client and server, defined by cryptographic parameters (e.g., master secret, cipher suite).
 - o Sessions are reusable across multiple connections, reducing handshake overhead.

2.4 Record Protocol Workflow

- 1. Application data is fragmented into manageable blocks.
- 2. Optional compression is applied to reduce data size.
- 3. A MAC is appended to ensure data integrity.
- 4. Encrypted data is encapsulated with a TLS record header.
- 5. Transmitted over TCP; on the receiving end, the process is reversed (decryption, verification, decompression, reassembly).

2.5 Handshake Protocol Stages

- 1. ClientHello:
 - o Client initiates the handshake by sending supported TLS versions, cipher suites, session IDs, and random data.
- 2. ServerHello:
 - o Server responds with chosen TLS version, cipher suite, and session ID. Includes a random value for key generation.
- 3. Server Certificate:
 - Server provides its X.509 certificate to authenticate its identity.
- 4. Key Exchange:
 - o Server and client exchange cryptographic keys using RSA, Diffie-Hellman, or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
- 5. Finished Message:
 - Both parties confirm key agreements and start secure communication.

2.6 HTTPS (HTTP over TLS)

- HTTPS encrypts sensitive elements of HTTP, including:
 - URLs, form data, cookies, and headers.
 - Browser-to-server communications, ensuring secure web transactions.
- Protects against man-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping, and tampering.

3. Secure Shell (SSH)

3.1 Overview

- SSH establishes a secure, encrypted channel over an insecure network.
- · Provides mechanisms to authenticate the remote machine and the user.
- Replaces plaintext protocols like Telnet and rlogin, which are vulnerable to sniffing and spoofing.

3.2 SSH Protocol Architecture

- 1. Transport Layer Protocol:
 - Ensures confidentiality and integrity of the session using encryption (e.g., AES) and MAC algorithms.
 - Provides server authentication using public key infrastructure (PKI).
- 2. User Authentication Protocol:

o Supports multiple methods, such as password-based authentication, public key authentication, and host-based authentication.

3. Connection Protocol:

• Multiplexes the encrypted session into multiple logical channels for different operations.

3.3 SSH Authentication Methods

· Public Key Authentication:

- Relies on asymmetric cryptography, where the client proves its identity by signing data with a private key.
- Password Authentication:
 - Client encrypts a plaintext password before transmission to the server.

• Host-based Authentication:

• The client's host authenticates itself using its private key, enabling trusted access across multiple devices.

3.4 SSH Connection Protocol

- Logical channels enable diverse tasks within a single session:
 - o Session Channel: Executes remote commands or provides terminal access.
 - o X11 Channel: Enables GUI forwarding over SSH.
 - o Port Forwarding: Secures arbitrary TCP connections (local or remote).

4. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)

4.1 Overview

- IPSec operates at the IP layer, ensuring end-to-end security for all IP-based communications.
- Provides mechanisms for encryption, authentication, and replay protection.

4.2 IPSec Components

1. Authentication Header (AH):

- Protects packet integrity and authenticates the source.
- o Does not encrypt the payload, leaving data readable but verified.

2. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP):

- · Encrypts the payload for confidentiality.
- o Includes integrity checks for data and optional header fields.

4.3 IPSec Modes

Transport Mode:

- o Adds AH/ESP headers directly after the original IP header.
- o Preserves original packet headers, enabling host-to-host communication.

Tunnel Mode

- Encapsulates the entire original packet within a new IP header and AH/ESP header.
- Ideal for gateway-to-gateway VPNs, masking internal network structure.

4.4 Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

- Phase 1:
 - o Establishes a secure channel using algorithms like Diffie-Hellman.
 - Negotiates cryptographic parameters and verifies identities.
- Phase 2:
 - Establishes IPSec SAs, defining session keys for encryption and MAC operations.

4.5 IPSec Security Architecture

- Security Associations (SA):
 - Unidirectional relationships that define encryption, authentication, and key parameters.
- Security Policy Database (SPD):
 - Matches incoming and outgoing traffic to specific SAs based on defined policies.

4.6 Advanced IPSec Features

- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS):
 - Ensures session keys cannot be derived from compromised long-term keys.
- Replay Protection:
 - Prevents attackers from reusing captured packets by employing sequence numbers.
- Dynamic Re-keying:
 - Periodically updates session keys to minimize risks

5. SSL/TLS vs IPSec

5.1 Differences in Operation

SSL/TLS:

- o Application-layer security, specific to individual sessions.
- Requires client and server to be aware of the security protocol.
- Designed for securing application-level protocols (e.g., HTTP, SMTP).

IPSec:

- Network-layer security, transparent to applications.
- o Suitable for securing entire networks or VPNs without application modifications.

5.2 Technical Comparison

· SSL/TLS Strengths:

- o Flexible and lightweight for application-specific needs.
- Limited scope makes it easier to implement and debug.

IPSec Strengths:

- Comprehensive protection for all network traffic.
- Robust against IP-layer attacks (e.g., spoofing, fragmentation).

6. Key Takeaways

6.1 TLS Summary

- · Employs layered protocols to ensure encryption, integrity, and authentication.
- Frequently used in HTTPS to secure web applications.
- Session reuse optimizes performance without compromising security.

6.2 SSH Summary

- · Provides secure remote access and flexible authentication options.
- Supports advanced features like X11 forwarding and port tunneling.

6.3 IPSec Summary

- Delivers transparent, end-to-end security for all IP traffic.
- Excels in VPN use cases, offering robust protection for both IPv4 and IPv6 environments.

Network Security Threats and Countermeasures - Technical Study Guide

1. Intruders: Classification and Skills

1.1 Types of Intruders

· Cybercriminals:

- o Goal: Financial gain.
- Activities: Identity theft, credential theft, corporate espionage, data theft/ransoming.
- Use underground forums and anonymous networks (e.g., Tor) for coordination.

• State-Sponsored Organizations:

- Known as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs).
- Focus: Espionage and sabotage.
- o Operate covertly over extended periods; backed by governmental resources.

Activists (Hacktivists):

- Driven by political or social motives.
- $\bullet \quad \text{Techniques: Website defacement, DDoS attacks, the ft/distribution of sensitive data}. \\$

• Others (Classic Hackers):

- Motivated by technical challenge and peer recognition.
- · Responsible for discovering new vulnerabilities.

1.2 Intruder Skill Levels

Apprentice:

- Limited technical skills; rely on existing tools ("script-kiddies")
- Represent the majority of attackers; easiest to defend against.

• Journeyman:

- Moderate skills; can modify tools and identify new vulnerabilities.
- Found across all intruder classes.

Master:

- Advanced skills capable of discovering novel attack vectors and creating tools.
- Often employed by state-sponsored organizations.

1.3 Examples of Intrusions

- · Remote root compromise.
- Password cracking/guessing.
- · Packet sniffing.
- Impersonation (e.g., phishing).
- · Using unsecured access points to infiltrate networks.

2. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks

2.1 Overview

- Goal: Disrupt availability of services.
- · Can target:
 - Network bandwidth: Saturates the victim's network connections.
 - o System resources: Overloads processing capacity or memory buffers.
 - o Application resources: Exploits specific server operations to exhaust resources.

2.2 Common DoS Techniques

· Flooding Attacks:

- Example: ICMP echo request floods (Ping floods).
- Traffic overwhelms network links, causing packet drops.

UDP Flooding:

• Sends UDP packets to random ports; server wastes resources responding or discarding packets.

SYN Spoofing:

- Exploits TCP handshake by sending SYN packets with spoofed IPs.
- Server reserves resources for incomplete connections, causing exhaustion.

Reflection Attacks:

• Spoofs victim's IP in requests to third parties, causing them to flood the victim with responses.

· Amplification Attacks:

• Exploits services (e.g., DNS) to amplify traffic from small requests into large responses.

2.3 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

- Uses botnets (networks of infected devices) to launch large-scale attacks.
- Command and Control (C&C) Servers: Coordinate bot activities.
- Attack-as-a-Service: Rentable botnets for executing attacks.

2.4 Countermeasures

1. Prevention and Preemption:

- Enforce resource allocation policies.
- Maintain backup resources.

2. Detection and Filtering:

- Identify suspicious traffic patterns during attacks.
- Employ filters to block attack packets.

3. Traceback and Identification:

Track attack origins; prepare blacklists or whitelists.

4. Reaction and Recovery:

o Mitigate attack effects; clean up compromised systems.

3. Firewalls

3.1 Functionality

- Acts as a "choke point" to monitor and control incoming/outgoing traffic.
- Filters traffic based on defined policies, including:
 - Address ranges, protocols, and content types.

3.2 Types of Firewalls

• Packet Filtering Firewalls:

- o Operates at the network layer.
- o Allows or blocks packets based on headers (e.g., source/destination IP, port).
- Advantages: Fast, simple, and transparent.
- o Disadvantages: Stateless, lacks context of application data.

· Stateful Packet Filters:

- o Tracks connection states (e.g., TCP handshake status).
- o Advantages: More accurate detection of malicious traffic.
- o Disadvantages: Higher processing overhead.

Application Proxies:

- Inspects application data for policy violations or malicious content.
- o Advantages: Deep inspection and application-specific controls.
- · Disadvantages: High resource consumption.

3.3 Firewall Policies

- Permissive Policies: Allow by default; block selectively.
 - · Easier to implement but less secure.
- Restrictive Policies: Block by default; allow selectively.
 - o More secure but risks availability issues if misconfigured.

3.4 Example Ruleset

- Allow internal traffic to the internet (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS, DNS).
- Allow reply packets.
- · Block all other traffic.

4. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

4.1 Overview

- Monitors network or host activity for malicious behavior.
- · Complements firewalls by detecting complex attacks.

4.2 IDS Types

- . Host-Based IDS (HIDS):
 - o Monitors activities on a specific host (e.g., logins, privilege escalations).
 - Advantages: Detailed view of host activities.
 - o Disadvantages: Limited visibility into network traffic.
- Network-Based IDS (NIDS):
 - Analyzes network traffic for suspicious patterns.
 - Advantages: Detects network-level attacks (e.g., DoS, malformed packets).
 - Disadvantages: Limited view of host-specific behavior.

4.3 Detection Methods

- Signature-Based Detection:
 - o Matches traffic against known attack patterns.
 - Advantages: High accuracy for known attacks.
 - ${\color{gray} \bullet} \ \ \, \textbf{Disadvantages:} \ \, \textbf{Ineffective for unknown threats;} \ \, \textbf{requires frequent updates.} \\$
- Anomaly-Based Detection:
 - Learns normal system behavior and flags deviations.
 - · Advantages: Can detect novel attacks.
 - Disadvantages: Prone to false positives and negatives.

4.4 Base-Rate Fallacy in IDS

- Even highly accurate IDS systems may generate numerous false positives due to the rarity of actual attacks.
- Example:
 - o 99% accurate IDS; 1 million benign events; 100 malicious events.
 - o 10,000 false positives compared to 99 true positives.

4.5 Key IDS Requirements

- Availability: Operate continuously with minimal disruption.
- Adaptability: Adjust to evolving threats and policy changes.
- Performance: Minimize system overhead while scaling effectively.

5. Key Takeaways

5.1 Threat Landscape

• Diverse intruders range from amateurs to state-sponsored actors.

• Common threats include DoS/DDoS attacks, unauthorized access, and malware.

5.2 Defensive Strategies