Conflict and Female Leadership: Evidence from Colombia

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NBER SI
Gender in the Economy

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Can female leadership reduce conflict violence?

- ► Gender gap in behaviors and decisions across different contexts:
  - ► Competition and risk taking (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Exley et al., 2020; Castillo et al., 2013)
  - ► Policy making (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Brollo & Troiano, 2016)

- ► Existing work from different disciplines point towards a gender gap in conflict resolution (Ruddick, 1982; Goldstein, 2003)

- ► Not much causal empirical evidence when it comes to conflict (Dube & Harish, 2020)
  - ► Male dominance in conflict-related matters (Pinker, 2012)
  - ► Despite a rising trend in the number of active armed conflicts (Rohner, 2017)

This paper

- ▶ Use close elections for municipal mayor decided between a female and a male in Colombia between 1997 and 2015.

    - ▶ Election of a woman results in a 60% reduction in conflict violence during the following electoral cycle.

- ▶ Use novel data on the guerrilla internal structure and gender of command line.

    - ▶ Female leadership in the guerrilla correlated with lower levels of violence.
    - ▶ Larger effects when there is a woman on both sides of the conflict (Smith & Price, 1973; Tannen, 1994).

- ▶ Use government manifestos and text analysis to document a gender gap in the use of "belligerent" vocabulary.

Gloria Cuartas - an illustrative case study

"I always come as a mediator in conflicts and a creator of projects (1997)".

- ► Local housing councilor for conflict victims in the 1980's → Mayor in 1994 → Senator in 1998.
- ► They helped their communities by mediating between them and the government or international organizations.

Conflict in Colombia since 1990

- ▶ Partisan violence → political exclusion → communist guerrillas. (Bushnell, 1993).

- ▶ Drug violence → private armies → Right-wing paramilitaries (Fergusson et al., 2019).

- ▶ Government-paramilitary collusion to fight guerrillas (Acemoglu et al., 2013).

Female political participation - evolution

Roadmap

Data - violence and elections

- ► Daily count of violent actions coded from local news sources (updated version of Restrepo et al. (2003)). ●

    - ► Actor (Guerrilla, Paramilitaries, government forces).
    - ► Type (e.g., attack, clash).
    - ► Motive (e.g., attack on the mayors life).

- ► 6 rounds of local election results between 1997 and 2015 from national electoral authority.

- ► Municipality balance sheets and measures of provision of public goods from (Acevedo & Bornacelly, 2014).

Descriptive statistics   Violence distribution

Empirical specification

▶ I use a RDD with the following specification:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Female_{i,t} + \beta_2 f(X_{i,t}) + \beta_3 Female_{i,t} \times f(X_{i,t}) + \mathbf{Z}_{i,t}\gamma + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

▶ $Female_{i,t}$: indicator $= 1$ when a female is elected in municipality i and electoral cycle t.

▶ $X_{i,t}$: vote share for for the female candidate. $|X_{i,t}| < h$, where bandwidth h chosen following (Calonico et al., 2019).
  ▶ $f(.)$ is a flexible polynomial of the vote share.

▶ $y_{i,t}$: per-capita conflict outcome (attacks or clashes).

▶ $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t}$: electoral cycle FE's and municipal characteristics

Roadmap

Female leadership and violence

Dep. var: yearly average # of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Guerrilla Violence		*Paramilitary Violence*	
Female mayor	-1.200**	-1.306**	-0.267	-0.105
	(0.571)	(0.602)	(0.705)	(0.687)
Observations	1045	1045	1045	1045
Mean of dep. var	1.979		1.069	
Controls:	X	✓	X	✓
Electoral cycle FE's	X	✓	X	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observation is the municipality per electoral period. Optimal (Calonico et al., 2019) robust bandwidth and bias-corrected estimators used in all regressions. Running variable is the share of votes out of the two highest votings for female candidate.

Extensive margin   Spatial spillovers

Identification, robustness and measurement

- ▶ Identification:
    - ▶ Balance on observable characteristics ●
    - ▶ McCrary ●
    - ▶ Violence in the previous year ●

- ▶ Robustness:
    - ▶ Bandwidths ●
    - ▶ Alternative cutoffs ●
    - ▶ Higher order polynomials ●
    - ▶ Geographical fixed effects ●

- ▶ Measurement:
    - ▶ Alternative normalizations & samples ●
    - ▶ Anti-personnel mines ●

Assessing the effects

- ▶ 1.3 fewer attacks per year and 100,000 inhabitants → 60% decline in violence.

- ▶ Why is there a difference between armed groups?
  - ▶ Different gender dynamics and composition between groups (Cruz & Olarte, 2021; Wirtz et al., 2014; Salazar, 2019; Vega, 2019).

- ▶ These differences have been cited as a reason for the peace negotiations (Barrios Sabogal & Richter, 2019).

- ▶ In the next section, I use data on the guerrilla commanders and location to document this female influence in the guerrillas.

Roadmap

# Exploiting the FARC's administrative division and the gender its commanders

▶ Compare municipalities where the guerrilla unit in the region (r) had a female commander, with those where the unit was led by men.

  ▶ Guerrilla warfare was harder for women $\rightarrow$ few female leaders (Lobo, 2021).

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Female guerrilla})_{i,t} + Z_i\gamma + \alpha_t + \alpha_r + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

▶ Combine the close races with guerrilla data to test the reciprocity idea of (Smith & Price, 1973; Tannen, 1994).

  ▶ RD with split sample according to the gender of guerrilla commander.

Geographic division of FARC's units - data

Figure: FARC's blocks & fronts

▶ Geocode FARC units from military intelligence reports.

▶ Combine field and qualitative work to identify most salient female guerrilla members.

　　▶ Determine the gender composition of each unit's line of command.

Measures of guerrilla presence and female leadership

- ▶ I study 2 types of guerrilla units separately (blocks and fronts):
  - ▶ Blocks are more stable, fronts have finer variation.
- ▶ I define female leadership in the FARC in 2 different ways, each relying on different assumptions.

Assumptions:

a. *Stability:* units command and presence doesn't change without being observed.
   - ▶ Relies on variation across space, most demanding on guerrilla activity.
b. *Visibility:* commanders (and units) are only active when observed.
   - ▶ Allows me to compare the same municipality in time, smallest sample.

Female leadership in the guerrilla and violence

Dep. var: yearly avg. # of guerrilla attacks (per 100,000 inhabitants)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Type of FARC structure with female leadership			
	Block		Front	
Female FARC commander	-1.683**	-1.195*	-1.683**	-1.432**
	(0.777)	(0.613)	(0.777)	(0.593)
Observations	2,175	6,013	2,175	1,023
Type of variation in FARC presence:	Stability	Visibility	Stability	Visibility
Fixed Effects:				
Year	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Standard errors clustered by state-year in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS estimations using municipalities × year as observation in all columns. All regressions include year and region fixed effects.

Heterogeneous effects by female leadership in guerrillas

Dep. var: avg. # of guerrilla attacks per 100,000 inhabitants during electoral cycle

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Close races in places where FARC structure had female commanders				
	Block		Front	
Female mayor	-8.216**	-1.493	-5.935**	-5.967*
	(3.884)	(0.965)	(2.402)	(3.056)
Observations	115	245	184	67
Mean of dep. var	3.819	2.367	2.813	2.562
Panel B: Close races in places where FARC structure didn't have female commanders				
	Block		Front	
Female mayor	1.571	-1.200	-1.540	-0.652
	(3.763)	(1.134)	(1.793)	(6.356)
Observations	123	344	175	80
Mean of dep. var	4.048	1.819	3.408	4.526
FARC variation:	Stability	Visibility	Stability	Visibility

Roadmap

What is the underlying cause for the drop in violence?

1. Female mayors have more ideological affinity with guerrilla groups (Edlund & Pande, 2002).
   - ► Estimate the heterogeneous effect by partisan affiliation.
   - ► $\rightarrow$ effect holds even holding partisan affiliation constant.

2. Third-group interference driving guerrillas out of a region.
   - ► No evidence of armed of financial interference.

3. Gender differences in preferences towards public goods provision and public policy (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004).
   - ► Approximate ex-ante preferences for peace using campaign manifestos $\rightarrow$ gender gap in the belligerency of language.
   - ► No ex-post differences in other dimensions of public policy.

Mechanisms

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Heterogeneous effects by ideology

Heterogeneity dimension :	Victory of right-wing candidate	Candidate from a traditional party:	
		Lost	Incumbent
	(1)	(2)	(3)

Dep. var. is yearly average # of guerrilla attacks per 100,000 inhabitants.

Panel A: Municipalities where dimension = 1.

Female mayor	-1.112	-3.189***	-1.665**
	(0.730)	(1.117)	(0.779)
Observations	143	446	546
Mean of dep. var	0.203	2.787	2.609

Panel B: Municipalities where dimension = 0.

Female mayor	-1.102*	0.335	-0.382
	(0.632)	(0.578)	(0.802)
Observations	902	599	499
Mean of dep. var	2.260	1.377	1.289

Traditional parties RD

Mechanisms

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Financial and military influence of other conflict actors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Violent intrusion		*Financial intrusion*	
Dependent variable is:	# of actions per 100,000 inhabitants by:			*log of*	*% of income*
	Army	Police	Paramilitary	Gov't transfers	*are transfers*
Female mayor	0.907	-0.271	-0.273	0.213	-0.269
	(1.023)	(0.214)	(0.728)	(0.201)	(0.323)
Observations	1045	1045	1045	959	738
Mean of dep. var	1.635	0.555	1.167	8.360	8.842

What is the underlying cause for the drop in violence?

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   - ▶ No ex-post differences in other dimensions of public policy.

Campaign manifestos as proxy for preferences

▶ Documents produced by candidates to transmit information to voters during the campaign.

▶ Not compulsory before 2015; no standardized format
  ▶ Non-random subsample $\rightarrow$ no causality
  ▶ Not suited for text-mining algorithms.

▶ Measure tone differences by counting "peaceful" words.
  a) Supervised classification: categorize the universe of words in the documents.
  b) Keyword approach: search for key terms from an AI-generated list.

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Female_{i,t} + \alpha_t + \alpha_r + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

▶ OLS regression. $y_{i,t} =$ relative use of peace/conflict terms.

Word cloud   Examples

Gender gap in the type of language used

Dependent variable is the # of words that relate to:	Words classification		AI keywords		
	Peace	Conflict	Peace		Conflict
			Unconditional	Conditional	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female mayor	2.641**	1.114	2.792**	2.887**	-0.213
	(1.200)	(1.119)	(1.182)	(1.205)	(0.268)
Observations	1,114	1,114	1,114	1,093	1,114
Mean of dep. var	20.540	14.565	21.588	22.004	1.942

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observation unit is the elected mayor. All regressions control for the total number of words used in the program, and include year and state fixed effects.

Placebo exercises   Keywords examples   Ex-post preferences

Summing-up

▶ In municipalities where a woman was elected as a mayor *conflict violence* declined.
   ▶ Driven by guerrilla attacks, no change on paramilitary violence.

▶ Female leadership in the guerrilla also correlated with lower violence.

▶ Differences in campaign manifestos suggest different preferences towards peace and conflict.

▶ Corollary:
   ▶ Institutional differences can account for the difference with the results in (Dube & Harish, 2020).

Appendix

Female participation in politics - Evolution
Slow increase, stable success rate

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Noche y Niebla

PANORAMA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS

NOCHE y NIEBLA 45

Y VIOLENCIA POLÍTICA EN COLOMBIA

Enero - Junio 2012

BANCO DE DATOS
DE VIOLENCIA POLÍTICA

ISSN 0123-3637

Julio 29/2012

DEPARTAMENTO: **ANTIOQUIA**
MUNICIPIO: **ANORÍ**

Dos campesinos murieron luego que pisaran en horas de la tarde, en la vereda Montebello un campo minado. Según la fuente el hecho fue atribuido "al Frente 36 de las Farc, que advirtió que había minado los caminos".

Presunto Responsable: FARC-EP

INFRACCIONES AL DIH
Muerto Por Métodos y Medios Ilícitos

LUIS ARTURO HERRERA MARÍN - CAMPESINO
NOEL RENDON HERNÁNDEZ - CAMPESINO

INFRACCIONES AL DIH
Mina Ilícita / Arma Trampa

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Geographical distribution of violence

Armed actions carried out by guerrillas per 100,000 inhabitants

- Municipalities where women won

# of attacks per 100,000
- 0
- 0 - 4
- 4 - 13
- 13 - 31
- >31

0   200   400 km

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Geographical distribution of paramilitary violence
Armed actions carried out by other groups per 100,000 inhabitants

# of attacks per 100,000
- 0
- 0 - 5.3
- 5.3 - 13.4
- 13.4 - 28.4
- 28.4 <

250 500 km

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Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev	Median	Min	Max
Panel A: Violence outcomes					
Average yearly # of ... per 100,000 inhabitants during government period					
Attacks					
Guerrilla	2.0	6.1	0	0	71
Paramilitary	1.1	4.1	0	0	65
Casualties					
Guerrilla	5.7	29.8	0	0	423
Paramilitary	2.9	17.0	0	0	407
Panel B: Electoral variables					
Vote share	0.481	0.120	0.487	0.0	1.0
% of victories	0.443				
Panel C: Female candidates characteristics					
% of female candidates that represent:					
Traditional parties	0.440				
Right-wing parties	0.128				
Left-wing parties	0.022				

Notes: 1,045 observations in all panels. Vote share in panel B is percentage of votes for female candidate out of the total votes received by top 2 candidates. Traditional parties in panel C are Liberal and Conservative parties. Ideology in panel C drawn from 132019Fergusson et al.Fergusson, Querubin, Ruiz-Guarin, & Vargas (). In panel D, rurality index is the ratio of rural to total population; Distance to capital is linear distance to State's capital city; Transfers corresponds to non-automatic transfers by central government; Functionaries investigated stands for # of civil servants prosecuted by the General Attorney's office for corruption related charges; Indigenous settlement is an indicator of whether municipality was a pre-colonial settlement. Smuggling routes are indicators of whether a municipality is crossed by each type of route. * only 786 observations available.

Spatial spillover analysis

Once again, the effects are relevant when considering guerrilla violence

Dep. var.: # of attacks by...		
Spatial weighting matrix:	Distance	Neighbor
	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Guerrilla violence		
Effect:		
Direct	-0.365**	-0.323**
	(0.142)	(0.141)
Indirect	-1.469***	-2.701***
	(0.336)	(0.318)
Mean of dep. var	0.928	
Panel B: Paramilitary violence		
Effect:		
Direct	-0.133	-0.118
	(0.142)	(0.141)
Indirect	-0.559	-0.997**
	(0.441)	(0.420)
Mean of dep. var	0.928	

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Balance on observables

	Mean	Point estimate	Std. Error
Panel A: Time varying characteristics:			
Total income	21411	11173	9929
Total expenditure	24910	16745	14813
Payroll expenses	1636	1104	958
Per capita turnout	.446	-.0142	.0233
Council HHi - votes	.281	.0123	.0231
Panel B: Time invariant characteristics:			
Area (km²)	749	-473	398
Altitude (masl)	1074	76.4	168
Soil suitability index	2.81	.337	.388
Flatness index	7.65	-.802	1.12
Distance to state capital (km)	74.3	-4.23	10
Distance to Bogotá (km)	315	4.54	41.2
Historical land conflict	.0565	-.0463	.0533
(log) Cadastral value (1960)	9.55	-.276	.25
(log) Latifundia (1960)	.543	.134	.244
Panel C: Baseline:			
Population	32773	14450	18539
Rurality index	.598	.0348	.0494
GINI	.456	.00342	.00791
Total income	5170	5065	5213
Government Credit	271	-56.9	135

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Female leadership and the extensive margin of violence

Dep. var: indicator of ... in municipality during electoral cycle				
	Attack	Civilian casualty	Attack	Civilian casualty
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Guerrilla Violence		*Paramilitary Violence*	
Female mayor	-0.149*	-0.141*	0.129	0.059
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.161)	(0.162)
Observations	1045	1045	1045	1045
Mean of dep. var	0.243	0.224	0.200	0.185
Controls:	X	✓	X	✓
Electoral cycle FE's	X	✓	X	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Observation is the municipality per electoral period. Optimal (Calonico et al., 2019) robust bandwidth and bias-corrected estimators used in all regressions. Running variable is the share of votes out of the two highest votings for female candidate.

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Violence in the year preceding the elections

Dep. Var:	Attacks	Indicator	Casualties
	(1)	(6)	(2)

Panel A: Guerrilla Violence

Female mayor	-0.122	-0.021	-0.031
	(0.223)	(0.059)	(0.053)
Observations	946	1,045	1,045

Panel B: Paramilitary Violence

Female mayor	-0.189	-0.017	-0.023
	(0.185)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Observations	946	1,045	1,045

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observation is the municipality per electoral period. Optimal (Calonico et al., 2019) robust bandwidth and bias-corrected estimators used in all regressions. Running variable is the share of votes out of the two highest votings for female candidate. Dependent variables in columns 2 and 3 are indicators of whether municipality experienced any attack or conflict related civilian casualty respectively.

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No sorting around the threshold

McCrary test

Each point represents a bin. Bin size is .007
Discontinuity estimate (standard error): .009 (.122)

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Robustness to bandwidth selection

Linear polynomials

Robustness to alternative cutoff points

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Robustness: normalization and sampling

Dependent variable is the # of guerrilla attacks transformed or adjusted by:						
	IHS	Count	Per 100,000	Until 2018	Until 2014	Outliers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female mayor	-0.340**	-0.728*	-3.032*	-0.706*	-0.680*	-0.817*
	(0.148)	(0.393)	(1.688)	(0.416)	(0.395)	(0.452)
Observations	1045	1045	1045	1045	1045	993
Mean of dep. var	0.424	1.108	6.251	1.157	1.073	0.794

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Observation is the municipality per electoral period. Optimal (Calonico et al., 2019) robust bandwidth and bias-corrected estimators used in all regressions. Each coefficient reports a different regression. Running variable is the share of votes out of the two highest votings for female candidate. Panel A only includes conflict attacks carried out by the guerrillas. Panel B only includes conflict attacks committed by paramilitary groups. Column 1 uses the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the dependent variable. Column 2 uses the raw count of attacks as dependent variable. Column 3 uses the # of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants (not normalized by # of years). Column 4 extends the sample period up to 2018. Column 5 reduces the sample size up to 2014. Column 6 drops the top 5% most violent municipalities in the sample.

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Robustness: higher order polynomials

Dep. var: yearly avg. # of guerrilla attacks per 100,000 inhabitants				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female mayor	-1.200**	-1.636**	-1.947**	-1.860*
	(0.571)	(0.738)	(0.871)	(0.952)
Polynomial degree:	1	2	3	4

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Observation is the municipality per electoral period. 1,045 observations in all regressions. Mean of dependent variable is 1.979. Optimal 62019Calonico et al.Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik () robust bandwidth and bias-corrected estimators used in all regressions. Each coefficient reports a different regression. Running variable is the share of votes out of the two highest votings for female candidate.

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Robustness: anti-personnel mines

Dep. var: # of anti-personnel mines:	During the electoral cycle		Normalized	
	Events (1)	Casualties (2)	Events (3)	Casualties (4)
Female mayor	1.099 (5.070)	-0.042 (0.138)	-4.590 (35.251)	-0.139 (0.210)
Observations	1045	1045	1045	1045
Mean of dep. var	8.657	0.333	45.328	1.568

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Robustness: Geographical fixed effects

Dependent variable is the yearly average # of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants by...

	Guerrillas			Paramilitaries		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female mayor	-2.289***	-2.845***	-1.113**	-0.172	-0.716	-0.157
	(0.653)	(0.626)	(0.565)	(0.686)	(0.681)	(0.667)
Controls:						
Baseline controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region Fixed Effects	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
State Fixed Effects	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Block Fixed Effects	X	X	✓	X	X	✓

Most frequently used terms by gender

(a) Women top terms

participacion
calidad construccion
servicios gestion
apoyo gobierno
social programa
salud desarrollo
rural municipio sector
nacional municipal educacion
programas recursos
poblacion proyectos comunidad
atencion plan mas

(b) Men top terms

servicios
poblacion
apoyo programas gobierno
atencion programa calidad
gestion desarrollo
plan municipio construccion
municipal educacion
nacional social mas
recursos sector
proyectos salud rural
comunidad
participacion

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Examples of campaign manifestos

PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO DEL DOCTOR GABRIEL ANTONIO RIVERA CUETO, CANDIDATO A LA ALCALDIA MUNICIPAL DE SUAN ATLÁNTICO; PERIODO 2.004 – 2.007

PERFIL DEL CANDIDATO
Medico Doctor Gabriel Antonio Rivera Cueto, nació el 24 de febrero de 1.973, en el Municipio de Suan de la trinidad.

ESTUDIOS:
- Bachiller académico del colegio Bachillerato Mixto de Suan
- Medico Cirujano Universidad Metropolitana de Barranquilla.

EXPERIENCIA
- Medico Cirujano Hospital Metropolitano de Barranquilla.
- Medico Cirujano Escuela Naval Barranquilla.
- Medico Cirujano Hospital Niño Jesús
- Medico Cirujano Batallón Vergara y Velazco
- Medico Cirujano Unidad Administrativa Centro de Salud de Santa Lucia.
- Concejal del Municipio de Suan y presidente de esa honorable corporación.

CARACTERÍSTICAS:

Su formación científica y social le permite analizar con claridad los problemas del ser humano y de su entorno y decidir con acierto sus soluciones.
Esta características, sumada a su profundo sentimiento por todas las cosas de la vida, junto con la capacidad de tolerancia y servicio a la comunidad, constituyen su principal fortaleza, lo que lo diferencia de los políticos tradicionales.

PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO:

La postulación de mi nombre a la Alcaldía del Municipio de Suan, surge como respuesta a la necesidad expresada por la ciudadanía de continuar con el desarrollo social y económico emprendida en las administraciones de Voluntad Popular y de construir juntos en Municipio que queremos.

El Municipio que queremos es un Municipio real, autentico, en plena concordancia con sus necesidades, desde sus presupuestos de ingreso, gastos e inversión. Un Municipio que inevitablemente debe combinar los esfuerzos administrativos y comunidad para alcanzar el desarrollo deseado.

Sin dejar de atender los sectores básicos definidos por la ley, el programa de Gobierno contempla la ejecución de tres ejes estratégicos dirigidos a garantizar el desarrollo económico y social del Municipio de Suan.

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"Peace" keywords

(Spanish:) amnistias, civiles, convivencia, defender, defensa, desarme, desplazada, desplazamiento, desprotegidos, humanitario, indefension, liberacion, marginales, marginalidad, miedo, necesitada, pacifista, pacto, paz, protegiendo, protectora, proteger, reconciliacion, restitucion, salvar, salvo, solidarias, solidaridad, temor, tolerante, victima, vida, vulnerables, vulnerabilidad, vulneracion.

(Translated:) amnesty, civilians, coexistence, to defend, defense, disarmament, displaced, displacement, unprotected, humanitarian, undefended, liberation, marginalized, marginality, fear, in need, peaceful, pacifist, pact, peace, protecting, protector, to protect, reconciliation, restitution, to save, safe, solidarity, fear, tolerant, tolerance, victims, life, vulnerable, vulnerability, violation.

Placebo: differences on other topics

Dependent variable is the # of words that relate to:	Words classification		AI keywords	
	Infrastructure	Sports	Infrastructure	Sports
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female mayor	-0.749	-0.128	-3.446	-0.074
	(1.130)	(0.859)	(2.615)	(0.745)
Observations	1,114	1,114	1,114	1,114
Mean of dep. var	19.828	14.889	60.986	15.631

Voters' perceptions and public goods provision

Dependent variable is:	(1) Trust in mayor	(2) Perceived transparency	(3) Investment expenses	(4) School enrolment	(5) Child mortality	(6) Land distribution
Female mayor	0.137	0.050	4.384	-10.136	-9.973	0.037
	(0.088)	(0.078)	(3.448)	(17.124)	(9.623)	(0.093)
Observations	3320	1432	918	810	810	1045
Mean of dep. var	0.604	0.367	82.866	213.589	57.076	0.526

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RD on the victory of a traditional party

Dependent variable is the average yearly # of guerrilla attacks per 100,000 inhabitants.

	"Traditional" close victory	2 "traditional" candidates	Political Violence	Previous female mayor
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Traditional mayor	-0.086 (0.553)			
Female mayor		-3.365* (1.890)	-0.454** (0.177)	-1.188** (0.570)
Observations	3196	166	1045	1045
Mean of dep. var	2.000	4.572	0.406	1.979

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