

HDS Serenity Ledger

Delivery 1

Highly Dependable Systems

Group number: 08

95579: Francisco Sousa

95641: Miguel Porfírio

95674: Sara Aguincha

Computer Science and Engineering
MEIC-A

2023/2024

Contents

1	Design Analysis	1
1.1	Communication	1
1.2	Round Changes	1
1.3	Future Implementations	2
2	Dependability Guarantees	3
3	Tests	4
	Bibliography	5

Chapter 1

Design Analysis

HDS Ledger is a simplified blockchain system with high dependability guarantees. The system consists fundamentally of Clients and Nodes. The client application makes calls to a Library, which translates them into requests to the service, to trigger instances of the consensus protocol.

1.1 Communication

The base code came with a Link class implemented for handling the communication. After reviewing the code, we concluded that on top of the **Fair Loss Link**, the **Stubborn Link** and **Perfect Link** layers were already present as well. From there, we implemented authentication by the use of signatures, thus making it an **Authenticated Perfect Link**. Every message is hashed and asymmetrically signed by its author. This way, all messages are authentic and preserve integrity. The hash algorithm used for signing is SHA-512 and the asymmetric encryption is ensured by RSA. Hence, all communications in the system offer non-repudiation.

1.2 Round Changes

The base code already provided an implementation of the IBFT consensus algorithm [1], though incomplete, as there were no round changes implemented. This generates a liveness problem whenever the leader becomes faulty/byzantine. To implement the round changes, we've created a new type of message (*ROUND-CHANGE*) and

implemented a *timer*, that when expired, triggers a round-change request from that node, followed by an increment to the current local round and a broadcast to all other nodes, requesting a round-change for the new round value. Once a quorum of round-change messages has been achieved, the round-change is triggered and a new leader is implemented by all correct nodes. The leader is chosen by being the next one in the sequence of node IDs. The new leader then starts a new round of consensus by broadcasting a *PRE-PREPARE* message with either the highest prepared value of the quorum, if it exists, or the input value of that instance, thus assuring protection against byzantine nodes/leaders. This implementation follows the IBFT algorithm closely and the justification of messages is ensured by what was previously written, with all messages offering signatures and the authenticity of any quorum being easily verifiable.

The base code also included mechanisms to prevent a byzantine node from trying to prepare/commit a different value than the one pre-prepared by the leader. This is done in the form of Quorums, which are used to check if a majority of nodes ($2f + 1$) are trying to perform the same *correct* action. This means that *correct* nodes will only accept prepare/commit values that were initially pre-prepared by the leader.

1.3 Future Implementations

In terms of the communication, we have yet to implement the signature in all relevant parameters of the message. This means the value is not signed, allowing a byzantine leader to change the value requested by a client.

Chapter 2

Dependability Guarantees

The system protects against integrity violations during the execution of the consensus protocol (after the pre-prepare begins) through the usage of quorums each time a new message with a value is received, only advancing when a consenting quorum is reached.

The addition of round changes ensures liveness in the system, as it is guaranteed that a faulty/byzantine leader will eventually be changed to a correct one and the system will maintain its availability.

Adding authenticity and integrity to all messages is essential to prevent any impersonation attacks and byzantine processes trying to alter values throughout the execution of the protocol.

Chapter 3

Tests

Our system has proven to withstand the following byzantine behaviours:

- Node **impersonating** a leader
- Leader **crashing** or **not participating**
- Node sending *PREPARE* or/and *COMMIT* with a **different value**

However, the system does not protect against a test where a byzantine leader prepares with a **different value** than the one requested by the **client**.

Bibliography

- [1] H. Moniz, “The istanbul bft consensus algorithm,” *arXiv:2002.03613v2 [cs.DC]* 19 May 2020, 2020.