Francisco Poggi

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Northwestern Economics

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Citizenship: Argentina and Italy

Fields

Research: Microeconomic Theory, Innovation, Law and Economics
Teaching: Microeconomics, Statistics.

Education

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University — (anticipated) 2021
 Dissertation: Essays on Learning and Markets.
 Committee: Jeffrey Ely (Chair), Bruno Strulovici, Wojciech Olszewski

M.A., Economics, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013

B.A., Economics, Universidad de San Andrés — 2012

Fellowships & Awards

Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University — 2020–2021

Young Researcher Award, Argentine Association of Economists — 2014

Merit Scolarship, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013

Mathematical Olympiad Scholarship, Universidad de San Andrés — 2009-2011

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University — 2016-2019
 Microeconomics (graduate)
 Behavioral Economics (undergraduate)
 Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate)

Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management — 2018-2020
 Decision Making and Modeling (MBA)
 Analytical Approach to Uncertainty (EMBA)
 Statistical Decision Analysis (EMBA)
 Biases, Forecast, and Deep Uncertainty (EMBA)

Teaching Assistant, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013-2015
 Advanced Microeconomics (Graduate)
 Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate)

Lecturer, Universidad de Buenos Aires — 2013-2015
 Economics and Public Finance (Graduate, Law School)

Research Experience

Research Assistant, Eddie Dekel, Northwestern University — 2020

Research Assistant, Jeffrey Ely, Northwestern University — 2019

Research Assistant, Bruno Strulovici, Northwestern University — 2019

Research Assistant, Federico Weinschelbaum, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013-2014

Refereeing

American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Job Market Paper

"The Timing of Complementary Innovations"

Abstract: This paper studies the development of socially-valuable technologies that require complementary innovations. At each point in time, resources are allocated across different innovation projects. Projects are completed stochastically in the form of breakthroughs and the social value of the technology depends on the set of projects that is completed by an endogenous stopping time. In some cases, it is optimal to develop the innovations in sequence. In others, it is optimal to develop multiple innovations simultaneously. I provide conditions that determine the efficient timing of development: sequential development is efficient when development costs are high and there is high uncertainty about the innovations' rate of success. I compare the efficient timing of development to the equilibrium outcome with a decentralized industry in which many firms race to innovate. The discrepancy between the decentralized outcome and the efficient allocation (the *race effect*) is null when the projects are symmetric or the stakes are sufficiently high.

Other papers

"Market-Based Mechanisms" with Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey

Brief abstract: Decision makers frequently condition their actions on economic outcomes that they believe convey information about an unknown state. However the decision maker's action, or expectations thereof, may also influence the outcome. We study the general problem of choosing decision rules mapping outcomes to actions in the presence of such feedback effects. We characterize the set of joint distributions of outcomes, actions, and states that can be implemented as the unique equilibrium by decision rules which satisfy a minimal notion of robustness to manipulation. Moreover, we show that all such equilibria are robust to model misspecification.

"A Taxation Principle with Non-Contractible Events" with Bruno Strulovici

Brief abstract: In some settings it is not possible to contract with an agent ex ante. We study a principal-agent model with private information and moral hazard in which the intervention of the principal is only triggered by certain outcomes. We introduce a property of social choice functions, *identifiability* and show that implementable social choice functions satisfying this property can be implemented by a *tariff*.

Work in Progress

"Liability Design with Information Acquisition" with Bruno Strulovici

"Delayed Disclosure" with Ludvig Sinander

"Optimal Publication Bias"

Languages

English (fluent), Spanish (native), Italian (basic)

References

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