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Citizenship: Argentina and Italy

**Fields**

Research: Microeconomic Theory, Innovation, Law and Economics  
Teaching: Microeconomics, Statistics.

**Education**

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University (anticipated) 2021  
Dissertation: Essays on Learning and Markets.  
Committee: Jeffrey Ely (Chair), Bruno Strulovici, Wojciech Olszewski  
M.A., Economics, Universidad de San Andrés 2013  
B.A., Economics, Universidad de San Andrés 2012

**Fellowships & Awards**

Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University 2020–2021  
Young Researcher Award, Argentine Association of Economists 2014  
Merit Scholarship, Universidad de San Andrés 2013  
Mathematical Olympiad Scholarship, Universidad de San Andrés 2009–2011

**Teaching Experience**

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University 2016–2019  
Microeconomics (graduate)  
Behavioral Economics (undergraduate)  
Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate)  
Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management 2018–2020  
Decision Making and Modeling (MBA)  
Analytical Approach to Uncertainty (EMBA)  
Statistical Decision Analysis (EMBA)  
Biases, Forecast, and Deep Uncertainty (EMBA)  
Teaching Assistant, Universidad de San Andrés 2013–2015  
Advanced Microeconomics (Graduate)  
Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate)  
Lecturer, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2013–2015  
Economics and Public Finance (Graduate, Law School)

**Research Experience**

Research Assistant, Eddie Dekel, Northwestern University 2020  
Research Assistant, Jeffrey Ely, Northwestern University 2019  
Research Assistant, Bruno Strulovici, Northwestern University 2019  
Research Assistant, Federico Weinschelbaum, Universidad de San Andrés 2013–2014

**Refereeing**

American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

**Job Market Paper**

**“The timing of complementary innovations”**

*Abstract:* Resources are not always oriented towards the most socially valuable R&D projects. In the context of complementary innovations, I provide conditions that determine the nature of the efficient dynamic allocation: When there is relatively high uncertainty

about the projects' difficulty and high developing costs, it is efficient to concentrate the resources and, thus, work on the projects in sequence. Otherwise, it is efficient to work on the projects in parallel. I compare the efficient allocation to a greedy allocation that is the equilibrium outcome with a decentralized, atomistic industry. The decentralized industry achieves efficiency in production when it is efficient to work on the projects in parallel or the projects are symmetric. The decentralized industry might fall in a myopic trap when it is efficient to work on the projects in sequence and the projects are asymmetric.

## Other papers

### "Market-based mechanisms" with Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey

*Brief abstract:* Decision makers frequently condition their actions on economic outcomes, e.g. asset prices, that they believe convey information about an unknown state. However the decision maker's action, or expectations thereof, may also influence the outcome. In this paper we study the general problem of choosing decision rules mapping outcomes to actions in the presence of such feedback effects. We characterize the set of joint distributions of outcomes, actions, and states that can be implemented as the unique equilibrium by decision rules which satisfy a minimal notion of robustness to manipulation. Moreover, we show that all such equilibria are robust to model misspecification. This characterization of the feasible set greatly simplifies the problem of choosing decision rules. A simple graphical technique allows us to identify qualitative features of optimal policies. We illustrate the power of this approach with an application to corporate bailouts. The results are also useful for characterizing optimal decision rules when the requirement of unique implementation is relaxed.

## Languages

English (fluent), Spanish (native), Italian (basic)

## References

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