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Nationalité: Canadienne

Recherche: Organisation Industrielle, Économie des Affaires,

Économétrie Appliquée

FORMATION

Doctorat en Économie, Université de Toronto 2024 (Prévu)

Comité: Victor Aguirregabiria (superviseur), Heski Bar-Isaac,

Avi Goldfarb

Maîtrise en Économie, Université McGill 2018

Comité: Laura Lasio (superviseure)

Baccalauréat en Affaires et en Économie, Université McGill 2016

RECHERCHE

Managerial Incentives, Common Ownership, and Within-Firm Competition in Retail Chains (Job Market Paper)

Decentralized Decision-Making in Retail Chains: Evidence from Inventory Management avec Victor Aguirregabiria [En cours de révision]

Bourses et Subventions

Bourse Doctorale de l'Université de Toronto 2018 - 2024

Expérience Professionnelle

Aide-Enseignant 2018 - aujourd'hui

- ECO 310, ECO 380: Organisation Industrielle
- ECO 404: Économie Managériale
- ECO 460: Gestion des Risques Financiers
- ECO 374: Séries Temporelles et Prévisions
- ECO 220: Économétrie Appliquée
- ECO 105, ECO 200, ECO 202, ECO 313: Microéconomie et Macroéconomie

- Victor Aguirregabiria (Université de Toronto): Programmation avancée et analyse numérique
- Jim Goldman (University of Toronto): Récolte et analyse de données
- Francesca Carrieri (McGill University): Analyse de données

Présentations aux Conférences (* assisté par coauteur)

Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial	2023
Economics (Rome)	
Annual Conference of the International Association for Applied Economet-	2023
rics (Oslo)	
Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association (Winnipeg)	2023
Access to Cash and Financial Services Workshop (Ottawa)	2023
Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association (Ottawa)	2022
International Industrial Organization Conference (Boston)*	2022
Conference to Honor John Rust (Washington)*	2022
Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial	2021
Economics (Bergen)	

SERVICE ACADÉMIQUE

Chargé de Formation pour Aide-Enseignants, Département d'Économie	2021
Coprésident, Association des Étudiants en Économie aux Cycles Supérieurs	2019 - 2020

LANGUES

Français (maternelle), Anglais (maternelle) Programmation: MATLAB, Stata, R

Références

REFERENCES	
Victor Aguirregabira	Heski Bar-Isaac
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Résumés

Managerial Incentives, Common Ownership, and Within-Firm Competition in Retail Chains

(Job Market Paper)

Managerial incentives designed to reward individual performance can decrease the degree of common ownership, leading to a misalignment of objectives between the organization and its managers. This paper examines this trade-off in the context of a large Canadian retail chain, in which store managers receive performance-based incentives for overseeing the inventory management of their store. Using a revealed preference approach, the estimation of a game of product assortment decisions shows that the degree of common ownership varies significantly across store managers in the retail chain. Particularly, results indicate that a larger store size and a closer proximity to rivals are associated with lower degrees of common ownership, creating an avenue for within-firm competition. Counterfactual experiments reveal that competitive interactions imply a substantial profit loss for the organization, particularly within denser clusters of stores, but that the impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous. Incentives that align the degree of common ownership across managers – for instance, by enhancing the role of district managers – are explored, and are found to mitigate these cannibalization effects.

Decentralized Decision-Making in Retail Chains: Evidence from Inventory Management

avec Victor Aguirregabiria [En cours de révision]

This paper investigates the impact of decentralizing inventory decision-making in multi-establishment firms using data from a large retail chain. Analyzing two years of daily data, we find significant heterogeneity among the inventory decisions made by 634 store managers. By estimating a dynamic structural model, we reveal substantial heterogeneity in managers' perceived costs. Moreover, we observe a correlation between the variance of these perceptions and managers' education and experience. Counterfactual experiments show that centralized inventory management reduces costs by eliminating the impact of managers' skill heterogeneity. However, these benefits are offset by the negative impact of delayed demand information.