Francis Guiton

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Citizenship: Canadian

Research Interests: Industrial Organization, Business Economics, Applied Econometrics

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Toronto 2024 (Expected)

Committee: Victor Aguirregabiria (supervisor), Heski Bar-Isaac,

Avi Goldfarb

M.A in Economics, McGill University 2018

B.Com. in Economics, McGill University 2016

Research

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} \bf Misaligned\ Objectives\ and\ Within-Firm\ Competition\ in\ Retail\ Chains\ ({\bf Job\ Market\ Paper}) \end{tabular}$

Decentralized Decision-Making in Retail Chains: Evidence from Inventory Management with Victor Aguirregabiria [Under Journal Review]

AWARDS AND GRANTS

University of Toronto Doctoral Fellowship 2018 - 2024

Professional Experience

Teaching Assistant 2018 - present

- ECO 310, ECO 380: Industrial Organization
- ECO 404: Managerial Economics
- ECO 460: Financial Risk Management
- ECO 374: Forecasting and Time Series
- ECO 220: Applied Econometrics
- ECO 105, ECO 200, ECO 202, ECO 313: Microeconomics and Macroeconomics

Research Assistant 2017 - 2021

- Victor Aguirregabiria (University of Toronto): Advanced programming and numerical analysis
- Jim Goldman (University of Toronto): Data collection and cleaning
- Francesca Carrieri (McGill University): Financial data analysis

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS (* ATTENDED BY COAUTHOR)

Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial	2023
Economics (Rome)	
Annual Conference of the International Association for Applied Economet-	2023
rics (Oslo)	
Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association (Winnipeg)	2023
Access to Cash and Financial Services Workshop (Ottawa)	2023
Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association (Ottawa)	2022
International Industrial Organization Conference (Boston)*	2022
Conference to Honor John Rust (Washington)*	2022
Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial	2021
Economics (Bergen)	

ACADEMIC SERVICE

Training Coordinator for Teaching Assistants, Department of Economics	2021
Co-President, Graduate Economics Union	2019 - 2020

LANGUAGES

French (native language), English (bilingual) *Programming:* MATLAB, Stata, R

REFERENCES

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Abstracts

Misaligned Objectives and Within-Firm Competition in Retail Chains

(Job Market Paper)

In large retail organizations, the objectives of the firm can be misaligned with the objectives of managers. In particular, competitive interactions between store managers driven by performance-based incentives can lead to sub-optimal outcomes from the point of view of the firm. This paper examines this misalignment in the context of a large Canadian retail chain, in which store managers oversee the inventory management of their store. Leveraging a unique and highly-detailed dataset describing the inventories, sales, and prices of products carried by each store in the retail chain, the structural estimation of a game of product assortment decisions shows that store managers do not fully internalize the firm's outcomes, leading to within-firm competition. Particularly, results indicate that a store's location, size, and proximity to rivals are determinants of the weight placed by the store manager on the outcomes of the firm. Counterfactual experiments reveal that this misalignment of objectives implies a substantial loss in profit for the organization, but an ambiguous effect on consumer welfare. Aligning the firm with its store managers is found to mitigate these cannibalization effects and provide consumers with greater product variety.

Decentralized Decision-Making in Retail Chains: Evidence from Inventory Management

with Victor Aguirregabiria [Under Journal Review]

This paper investigates the impact of decentralizing inventory decision-making in multi-establishment firms using data from a large retail chain. Analyzing two years of daily data, we find significant heterogeneity among the inventory decisions made by 634 store managers. By estimating a dynamic structural model, we reveal substantial heterogeneity in managers' perceived costs. Moreover, we observe a correlation between the variance of these perceptions and managers' education and experience. Counterfactual experiments show that centralized inventory management reduces costs by eliminating the impact of managers' skill heterogeneity. However, these benefits are offset by the negative impact of delayed demand information.